Future Scenarios, by David Holmgren (Book Preview)

FUTURE
Chelsea Green E-Galley. Not for copying or distribution. Quotation with permission only. UNCORRECTED PROOF.
SCENARIOS

How Communities
Can Adapt to Peak Oil
and Climate Change
D A V I D H O L M G R E N
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FUTURE SCENARIOS H
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point for imagining how
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strategies and structures might thriv
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dimensional nightmarish scenarios designed to scare people into env
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energy, politics, agriculture, social, and even spiritual trends. What th
are the best strategies for preparing for and adapting to these possible
MAUREEN CORBETT
$12.00 US, $14.95 CAN • PB
compassionate, and cautious
9781603580892
look at four possible
Future Scenarios provides brilliant and balanced consideration of the
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prove to prepare
be one of the most for them.
important books of the year.
Color illustrations & graphs
Environment/Future
In Future Scenarios, Studies
permaculture co-originator and leading sustainability innovator David
Holmgren outlines four scenarios that bring to life the likely cultural, political, agricultural,
• National Media
and economic implications of peak oil and climate change, and the generations-long era of
• U.S. Radio Tour David Holmgren is best known as the co-orig
“energy descent” that faces us.
with Bill Mollison, of the permaculture conce
“Scenario planning,” Holmgren explains, “allows us to use stories about the future as a reference
following the 1978 publication of their book
point for imagining how particular strategies and structures might thrive, fail, or be transformed.”
Permaculture One. Since then he has written
Future Scenarios depicts four very different futures. Each is a permutation of mild or destructive
Permaculture: Principles and Pathways Beyo
climate change, combined with either slow or severe energy declines. Probable futures, explains
Holmgren, range from the relatively benign Green TechSustainability, developed
catastrophicthree properties us
MAUREEN CORBETT
scenario to the near

Lifeboats scenario. permaculture principles, and conducted wor
As Adam Grubb, founder of the influential Energy Bulletin and courses
Web site, throughout the two-
says, “These aren’t world. He shows
dimensional nightmarish scenarios designed to scare people sustainable lifestyle isaction.
into environmental a realistic,
They attractive, a
David Holmgren isfleshed-out
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as the of quite plausiblepowerful
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following thestrategies
1978 publication of their
Holmgren lives with his partner, Su Dennett,
are the best for preparing forbook
and adapting to these possible futures.”
Permaculture One. Since then he has written their son, Oliver, at Melliodora, a one-hectar
Future Scenarios provides brilliant andBeyond
balanced consideration of the world’s options and will
Permaculture: Principles and Pathways permaculture demonstration
•••Other books site of
at Hepburn
interest•
prove to be one
Sustainability, of the most
developed threeimportant
propertiesbooks
using of the year.
permaculture principles, and conducted workshops
Springs, Central Victoria, Australia.
s and courses throughout the world. He shows that a
sustainable lifestyle is a realistic, attractive, and
Media Inquires contact: Taylor Haynes at:
powerful alternative to dependent consumerism.
[email protected]
Holmgren lives with his partner, Su Dennett, and
their son, Oliver, at Melliodora, a one-hectare 9780646269900
For more information go to:
permaculture demonstration site at Hepburn
Springs, Central Victoria, Australia.
9780646418445 $39.00 • PB 978190032218
$24.95 • PB
$30.00 • PB
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ChelseaG
CORBETT
EEN
FUTURE
SCENARIOS
How Communities
Can Adapt to Peak Oil
and Climate Change
D A V I D H O L M G R E N
C H E L S E A G R E E N P U B L I S H I N G
W H I T E R I V E R J U N C T I O N , V E R M O N T
FS First Pages.indd 1 1/12/09 12:05:48 PM

Copyright © 2009 by David Holmgren. All rights reserved.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Holmgren, David.
Future scenarios : how communities can adapt to peak oil and climate
change / David Holmgren.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-60358-089-2
1. Energy policy. 2. Renewable natural resources. 3. Climate change.
4. Permaculture. I. Title.
HD9502.A2H635 2009
333.8’232--dc22
2008053177
Chelsea Green Publishing Company

Post Office Box 428
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Contents
Acknowledgments • 00
1. Introduction: Energy and History • 00
Energetic Foundations of Human History • 00
The Next Energy Transition • 00
2. Energy Futures • 00
Four Energy Futures • 00
Views of the Future • 00
3. Climate Change and Peak Oil • 00
Climate Change • 00
Energy Reserves and Production Peaks • 00
Collapsing Oil Exports • 00
Net Energy Return • 00
Associated Issues • 00
4. Descent Scenarios • 00
Scenario Planning • 00
Interaction of Peak Oil and Climate Change • 00
The Four Energy-Descent and Climate-Change Scenarios • 00
Scenarios Summary • 00
5. Interpreting the Scenarios • 00
Global and Local Perspectives • 00
Cuba: Brown Tech, Green Tech or Earth Steward? • 00
Depressing and Positive Scenarios • 00
Different Scenarios in Different Places • 00
Stepped Energy-Descent Pathways Linking the Scenarios
Nested Scenarios • 00
Relevance of Mainstream Ideas of Sustainability to Energy
Descent • 00
Relevance of Environmental Principles • 00
Meta-Scenarios of Permaculture • 00
6. Conclusion • 00
Endnotes • 00
Index • 00

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ACknowledgments
This book has its origins, and continuing life, as a Web site
(futurescenarios.org) that is my contribution to stimulat-
ing awareness and positive responses to peak oil and climate
change by community and environmental activists. My intro-
duction to scenario planning dates from my frequent, long,
and varied discussions with friend and change-management
consultant Steve Bright during the late 1990s. My first use of
scenario planning to integrate peak oil and climate change was
in a presentation to government officials and environmental
activists in Adelaide focused on updating the South Australian
government’s State Strategy Plan. That presentation was part
of my Peak Oil and Permaculture tour of Australian capi-
tal cities with Richard Heinberg in 2006. Close contact and
discussions with Heinberg, along with his books, most nota-
bly Powerdown, influenced my thinking about the scenarios.
Web sites and discussion forums on the Internet related to
peak oil, energy, climate change, and permaculture have also
been a major source of information and ideas, in particu-
lar Energy Bulletin (energybulletin.net) and The Oil Drum
(theoildrum.com). Adam Grubb, founding editor of Energy
Bulletin, has had a unique role in this project. In 2004 he
interviewed me about peak oil, permaculture, and the future
of the suburbs. The following year he attended a two-week
permaculture design course that I co-taught in Bendigo, central
Victoria. Since then Adam has played a pivotal role in the
spread of awareness, through peak-oil networks, of permacul-
ture as a grassroots response to energy descent. In 2006 he
published a brief article I wrote about the scenarios on Energy

vI ACkNOw lEd gmE NTS
Bulletin and encouraged me to write a more in-depth essay.

After further development and workshopping of the scenarios
in advanced permaculture courses in New Zealand and Latin
America in 2007, Adam suggested and collaborated in publish-
ing a Web-site version of this essay. He used his considerable
Web skills and connections to cocreate and publish the Web
site in May 2008. In publishing on the Web we were aiming to
get the ideas out as quickly as possibly.
The proposal for this book came from Margo Baldwin
at Chelsea Green. Margo recognized the potential for its
publication as a traditional book to complement other books
published and distributed by Chelsea Green about permacul-
ture and related approaches for responding to the energy/
climate crisis. One such book is The Transition Handbook
by British permaculture activist Rob Hopkins, who has
spread awareness of the energy-descent concept and proac-
tive responses that households and communities can make
to adapt creatively to energy descent in the face of denial
and obfuscation by governments. As a result, the viral spread
of transition activism has provided a strong affirmation that
permaculture thinking can be a powerful catalyst for creative
community-based responses to energy descent. Beyond
the great achievers of permaculture activism such as Rob
Hopkins, I am incredibly indebted, as one of the co-origi-
nators of the permaculture concept, to the countless others
who have used permaculture to help change their own lives
and in the process have helped to increase the credibility of
permaculture as a force for positive change. This book is an
attempt to help those already along the path pioneered by
permaculture and related movements to recognize the storms
and the opportunities of the peak-oil and climate-change
era. If it manages to contribute to slightly less dysfunctional

ACkNOw lEd gmE NTS vII
public-policy decisions as we move deeper into the global
crisis, then that will be a bonus.
Finally I would like to acknowledge my parents for rais-
ing me to struggle to understand the big picture, question
authority, and work for a more equitable world.
Hepburn,Victoria, Australia
August 2008

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—1—
IntroduCtIon: energy And HIstory
T h E S I m U lTA N E O U S O N S E T of climate change and
the peaking of global oil supply represent unprecedented

challenges for human civilization.
Global oil peak has the potential to shake or even destroy
the foundations of global industrial economy and culture.
Climate change has the potential to rearrange the biosphere
more radically than the last ice age. Each limits the effective
options for responses to the other.
The strategies for mitigating the adverse effects and/or
adapting to the consequences of climate change have mostly
been considered and discussed in isolation from those relevant
to peak oil. While awareness of peak oil, or at least energy
crisis, is increasing, understanding of how the two problems of
climate change and peak oil might interact to generate quite
different futures is still at an early stage.
Over the last thirty-five years the climate-damaging
impacts of fossil-fuel burning and other sources of “green-
house gases” has shifted from being a worrying hypothesis
of some climate scientists to one of the primary drivers of
environmental awareness from the schoolroom to the board-
room. Rapid economic growth in developing economies,
especially China and India, addictive consumer economies
in the long-affluent West, and ongoing population growth
are driving emissions ever higher. Meanwhile the evidence
of actual climate change is accelerating, with the alarming
rates of Arctic sea-ice melting being the most dramatic. This
is belatedly creating an urgency in the halls of government

2 E NERgy ANd hI STORy
and international legal conventions. Economic policy in the

affluent countries is gradually shifting under the weight of
evidence that economies must be decarbonized whether or
not that reduces economic growth.
During the twentieth century, most thinking about the
future was based on the assumption that technological and
organizational complexity will continually expand in lock-
step with economic growth. The most substantial challenge
to those assumptions about the future was the modeling work
of Jay Forrester and colleagues in the Limits to Growth Report
(1972) commissioned by the Club of Rome, a prestigious
international public policy “think tank.”
While the energy crises of the 1970s illustrated the vulner-
ability of industrial society to oil shortage, the oil glut and low
prices of the 1980s, combined with a barrage of misinforma-
tion, saw these ideas lose favor. A whole generation of econo-
mists, politicians, business people, and even environmentalists
learned that, for better or worse, the limits of resources were
not going to threaten “business as usual.”
It is only the recent escalation of energy and commod-
ity prices that has seen energy, resources, and the limits of
nature again being widely recognized as the key drivers in
human economic systems. This return to notions of limits so
clearly outlined 36 years ago has also raised the specter of the
more fundamental scarcity of food, identified more than 150
years earlier by Thomas Malthus. Rising food prices are now
widely recognized as being driven directly and indirectly by
the cost of energy.The demand for biofuel, the cost of energy-
dense fertilizers, climate-change-related droughts, water scar-
city, and the impact of rising affluence driving increases in
meat consumption from agribusiness-production systems are
all contributing to this global crisis. Those who suggest the
likely return of the four horsemen of the apocalypse (famine,

E NERgy ANd hI STORy 3
Figure 1. A Cuban sunset silhouetting powerlines and an oil-fired power-station
smokestack. Cuba is still recovering from the fuel and electricity shortages that crip-
pled the economy and food supply in the 1990s. The Cuban experience is emblematic
of the current global energy crisis. (Photo by Oliver Holmgren.)
pestilence, war, and death) are more vocal than ever before
despite being labeled Malthusian or just “doomer.”
The evidence that global industrial civilization is in the early
stage of an energy transition as fundamental as the one from
renewable resources to fossil fuels is overwhelming. Using
the ecological history of past civilizations as a base, I review
the evidence about the future in terms of four possible long-
term scenarios: techno-explosion, techno-stability, energy descent,
and collapse. While faith in techno-explosion as the default
scenario is now waning, the hope of more environmentally
aware citizens and organizations depends on techno-stability,
characterized by novel renewable energy sources, while the
fears of total collapse of human civilization are continually
fed by evidence about climate change and resource depletion,
among a range of related emerging crises. Energy descent,
where available energy and resulting organizational complex-
ity progressively decline over many generations, is the most
ignored of the four possible long-term futures, but I think the

evidence is strong and increasing that it is the most likely in

some form or other.
Rather than gathering together all of the evidence to support
the claim for the energy-descent future, I build on thirty years
of permaculture thinking and activism to further develop the
thinking tools that can help us all adapt to energy descent as it
unfolds, irrespective of whether we believe it to be humanity’s
fate. Energy descent is likely to give birth to a new culture,
one more different from our current globalized culture than
post-Enlightenment capitalism and industrial culture was
from its precursors in Europe. The energetic contraction will
force a relocalization of economies, simplified technology, a
ruralization of populations away from very large cities, and
a reduction in total population. Over time there will be a
redevelopment of localized cultures and even new languages,
although these developments may be outside the time frame
of the peak-oil and climate-change scenarios described here.
I focus on four plausible scenarios by which peak oil and
climate change could generate the early stages, over the next
ten to thirty years, of the energy-descent future.
Permaculture is a design system for sustainable land use
and living that was proposed by Bill Mollison and me during
the 1970s when the evidence for the energy-descent future
was growing strongly. Exploitation of new oil and natural gas
resources in the 1980s and 1990s allowed resurgent economic
growth In the process our hopes for a graceful energy descent
supported by ecological design, appropriate technology and
relocalised economies were dashed. Nevertheless permacul-
ture has spread around the world. This spread has reflected
both mounting disaffection with consumer culture in afflu-
ent countries and the increasingly desperate needs of those
left behind by development in poor countries. As energy
and food costs now rise around the world and disaffection

mounts with the inability of governments to deal with the
emerging energy and environmental crisis, permaculture is
attracting increased attention from those acting to secure
their families’ future and contribute to a better world. As a
conceptual framework, a collection of practical strategies, and
a self-help and grassroots movement, permaculture provides
the hope and the tools to allow humanity to weather the
storms and even thrive in a world of progressively less and less
available energy. The energy-descent concept was an explicit
foundation for my articulation and explanation of permacul-
ture concepts in Permaculture: Principles and Pathways Beyond
Sustainability published in 2002, just before the current rapid
rise in oil and commodity prices began to stimulate wider
interest in energy descent. This new book uses permaculture
thinking to tell stories about the energy-descent future that
can empower us to take adaptive and positive action.
energetIC & eCologICAl

FoundAtIons oF HumAn HIstory
The broad processes of human history can be understood

using an ecological framework that recognizes primary energy
sources as the strongest factors determining the general struc-
ture of human economy, politics, and culture. The transition
from a hunter-gatherer way of life to that of settled agriculture
made possible the expansion of human numbers, denser settle-
ment patterns, and surplus resources. Those surplus resources
were the foundations for what we call civilization, includ-
ing the development of more advanced technologies, cities,
social class structures, standing armies, and written language.
Archaeology records a series of civilizations that rose and fell
as they depleted their bioregional resource base.

Archaeology records a series of civiliza-

tions that rose and fell as they depleted their
bioregional resource base.
Lower-density simple agrarian and hunter-gatherer cultures

took over the territory of collapsed civilizations and allowed the
resources of forests, soils, and water to regenerate.That, in turn,
gave rise to new cycles of growth in cultural complexity.
In the European Renaissance, the medieval systems that
evolved from the remnants of the Roman Empire were
reinfused with knowledge and culture from the Islamic and
Asian civilizations and grew into competing nation-states. A
combination of the demands of internal growth and warfare
between nations almost exhausted the carrying capacity of
Europe. As this ecological crisis deepened in the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries, European exploration in search of
new resources carried the “diseases of crowding” around the
world. In the Americas, up to 90 percent of many populations
died, leaving vast resources to plunder. Starting with the plun-
dering of precious metals and seeds of valuable crop plants
such as corn and potatoes, European nations soon moved on
to building empires powered by slavery that allowed them to
exploit and colonize the new lands well stocked with timber,
animals, and fertile soils, all rejuvenating in the wake of the
collapse of indigenous populations.
European population, culture (especially capitalism), and
technology then grew strong enough to tap vast stocks of
novel energy that were useless to previous simpler societies.
As industrialization spread, oil quickly

surpassed coal as the most valuable energy
source, and accelerated the jump in human
population.

European coal fueled the Industrial Revolution while food
and other basic commodities from colonies helped solve the
limits to food production in Europe.As industrialization spread
in North America and later in Russia, oil quickly surpassed
coal as the most valuable energy source, and accelerated the
jump in human population from one billion in 1800 to two
billion in 1930 to now over six billion in one lifetime. This
massive growth in human carrying capacity has been made
possible by the consumption of vast stocks of nonrenewable
resources (in addition to expanding demand on the renewable
biological resources of the planet). Rapid rates of urbanization
and migration, technology change, increasing affluence, and
disparity of wealth as well as unprecedented conflicts between
The history of the twentieth century makes

more sense when interpreted primarily as
the struggle for control of oil rather than the
clash of ideologies.
global and regional powers have accompanied this transition.

The history of the twentieth century makes more sense
when interpreted primarily as the struggle for control of
oil rather than the clash of ideologies.1 In emphasizing the
primacy of energy resources I am not saying that the great
struggles between ideologies have not been important in
shaping history, especially capitalism and socialism, but most
teaching and understanding of history underestimates the
importance of energetic, ecological, and economic factors.
The fact that conflict has increased as available resources
have expanded is hard to explain using conventional think-
ing. One way to understand this is using older moral concepts

about more power leading to greater moral degradation.

Another equally useful way to understand this is using ecolog-
ical thinking. When resources are minimal and diffuse, energy
spent by one human group, tribe, or nation to capture those
resources can be greater than what is gained. As resources
become more concentrated (by grain agriculture, for exam-
ple, and even more dramatically by tapping fossil fuels), the
resources captured through diplomacy, trade, and even war are
often much greater than the effort expended.
The final phase in the fossil-fuel saga is playing out now
as the transition from oil to natural gas and lower-quality oil
resources accelerates, with massive new infrastructure devel-
opments around the world as well as increasing tension and
The final phase in the fossil-fuel saga is

playing out now as the transition from oil to
natural gas and lower-quality oil resources
accelerates.
active conflicts over resources. We can only hope that nations

and humanity as a whole learn quickly that using resources
to capture resources will yield less return and incur escalating
costs and risks in a world of depleting and diffuse energy.
tHe next energy trAnsItIon
Quite early in the exploitation of fossil resources the debate

began about what happens after their exhaustion, but it has
remained mostly academic. The post–World War II period of
sustained growth, affluence, and freedom from the adverse
effects of war had the effect of entrenching the faith in human

power and the inexorable arrow of progress that would lead
to more of whatever we desired.2 Consideration of exter-
nal limits or cultural constraints on affluence remained at the
fringe. Throughout most of the twentieth century, a range of
energy sources (from nuclear to solar) have been proposed
as providing the next “free” energy source that will replace
fossil fuels.3
In so-called developing countries, the power of the domi-
nant globalist culture, both as a model to emulate and a mode
of exploitation to resist, preoccupied most thinkers, leaders,
and activists. The key issue was how to get a share of the pie,
not the limits to the size of the pie.
But the super-accelerated growth in energy per person of
the post–World War II era came to an end with the energy
crisis of 1973, when OPEC countries moved to exert their
power through oil supply and price. The publication of the
seminal Limits to Growth report in 1972 had defined the prob-
lem and the consequences by modeling how a range of limits
would constrain industrial society in the early twenty-first
century. After the second oil shock in 1979 the debate about
the next energy transition intensified, but by 1983 a series
of factors pushed energy supply off the agenda. Economic
contraction, not seen since the Depression of the 1930s, had
reduced demand and consequently prices for energy and natu-
ral resources. In affluent countries, the conversion from oil to
gas and nuclear for electricity generation reduced demand for
oil. Energy-efficiency gains in vehicles and industry further
reduced demand. Most importantly, the new supergiant oil
fields in the North Sea and Alaska reduced Western depen-
dence on OPEC and depressed the price even further. All
other primary commodity prices followed the downward
trend set by oil because cheap energy could be used to substi-
tute for other needed commodities.4

The economies of the affluent countries were further

boosted by two important changes. The shift from Keynesian
to Friedmanite free-market economic policies reduced regu-
latory impediments to business and enlisted public wealth for
new private profits. At the same time, the debt crisis in devel-
oping countries triggered by collapsing commodity prices
didn’t slow the flow of interest repayments into the coffers
of Western banks. In line with the new free-market ideol-
ogy, structural adjustment packages from the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank provided more loans (and
debt) on the condition that developing countries slash educa-
tion, health, and other public services to conserve funds for
repayments.
The scientific consensus about global warming in the
late 1980s and early 1990s renewed the focus on reducing
fossil fuel use, not to conserve resources, which were widely
thought to be abundant, but to reduce carbon dioxide addi-
tions to the atmosphere. But with energy prices low owing to
a glut of oil, the main action was an acceleration in the shift
to gas as a cheap and relatively “clean” fuel.
Half a century earlier, in 1956, the startling predictions
by eminent petroleum geologist M. King Hubbert that oil
production in the United States, the world’s largest producer,
would peak in 1970, had almost destroyed Hubbert’s career
and reputation. Ironically, the controversy within the oil
industry over Hubbert’s methodology and predictions was
not known by the authors of the Limits to Growth report
and was not part of the 1970s public debate over limits of
resources. It was nearly a decade later, at the depth of the
greatest economic recession since the 1930s, that the industry
acknowledged that oil production in the lower forty-eight
states had in fact peaked and declined despite the greatest
drilling program in history. Hubbert also estimated a global

Figure 2. Freeway in Raleigh, North Carolina, at rush hour, 2005: the classic symbol of
automobile dependence in the United States, where private cars and light trucks used
mostly for personal mobility consumes about 43 percent of total oil consumption ( ref
to PEAKING OF WORLD OIL PRODUCTION: IMPACTS, MITIGATION, & RISK MANAGEMENT Robert L. Hirsch, SAIC, Project
Leader Roger Bezdek, MISI Robert Wendling, MISI February 2005)
oil peak early in the twenty-first century.

In the mid 1990s the work of independent and retired
petroleum geologists who were colleagues of Hubbert
reviewed his original predictions using new information and
evidence, triggering the debate about peak oil that grew and
spread along with the Internet in the last years of the millen-
nium. But with the cost of oil as low as ten dollars a barrel, the
gurus of economics and oil supply quoted in the mainstream
media thought that oil was on the way to becoming worthless
and redundant through glut and technological advances. The
delusions of cheap energy were widespread. Ironically, many
environmentalists concerned about the mounting evidence
of, and inaction of governments about, climate change, put
their faith in the “hydrogen economy” powered by clean
renewable technologies to save us from polluting the planet
to death.

While energy and consequently food costs in affluent coun-

tries remained the lowest in human history, the evidence for
energy descent rather than ascent made little impact outside
the counterculture. Since 2004 the rising cost of energy, and
now food, is focusing the attention of leaders and the masses
on questions of sustainability not seen since the energy crises
of the 1970s.
The research, activism, and awareness of energy and climate
issues provide a context for the growing debate about the
ecological, economic, and social sustainability of everything
from agriculture to human-settlement patterns and even
fundamental human values and beliefs. There is a huge body
of evidence that the next energy transition will not follow the
pattern of recent centuries to more concentrated and power-
ful sources.
The likelihood that this transition will be to one of less
energy is anathema to the psychosocial foundations and power
elites of modern societies that it is constantly misinterpreted,
ignored, covered up, or derided. Instead we see geopolitical
maneuvering around energy resources, including proxy and
real wars to control dwindling reserves and policy gymnastics
to somehow make reducing carbon emissions the new engine
of economic growth.

—2—
energy Futures
T h E R E I S S T I l l much debate about the basic nature of
the current energy transition, driven most notably by climate

change and peak oil.1 Most of that debate focuses on the
immediate future of the next few decades, though I think it
is essential to see these changes first on a larger temporal scale
of centuries if not millennia. I have set the scene by charac-
terizing the debate about the future as primarily one about
whether energy available to human systems will rise or fall.
Four energy Futures
Four broad energy scenarios provide a framework for consid-

ering the wide spectrum of culturally imagined, and ecologi-
cally likely, futures over the next century or more. I’ve labeled
these:
• Techno-explosion,
• Techno-stability,
• Energy descent, and
• Collapse.
Techno-explosion depends on new, large, and concentrated

energy sources that will allow the continual growth in mate-
rial wealth and human power over environmental constraints
as well as population growth.This scenario is generally associ-
ated with space travel to colonize other planets.

14 E NE Rgy FUTURES
Climax Techno-Explosion
(post-modern
cultural chaos)
Techno-Stability
Energy & Resource Use
Cr
Population ea
(Pe tive
ism t
ern scen
Pollution rm Re
)
ac sp
A
ult on
(M trial
ur se
e)
od
us
Ind
Energy
Descent
Pre-industrial
sustainable culture Collapse
Historical Time Future Time
Agriculture Industrial Baby Great Grand Old Growth

10,000yrs BP Revolution Boom Children Forest
Figure 3. Four energy futures.
Techno-stability depends on a seamless conversion from

material growth based on depleting energy to a steady state
in consumption of resources and population (if not economic
activity), all based on novel use of renewable energies and
technologies that can maintain if not improve the quality
of services available from current systems. While this clearly
involves massive change in almost all aspects of society, the
implication is that once sustainable systems are set in place,
a steady-state sustainable society with much less change will
prevail. Photovoltaic technology directly capturing solar
energy is a suitable icon or symbol of this scenario.
Energy descent involves a reduction of economic activity,
complexity, and population in some way as fossil fuels are
depleted. The increasing reliance on renewable resources of
lower energy density will, over time, change the structure of
society to reflect many of the basic design rules, if not details,
of preindustrial societies. This suggests a ruralization of settle-

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FUTURE

scenario to the near

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Copyright © 2009 by David Holmgren. All rights reserved.

Project Manager: Emily Foote

Our Commitment to Green Publishing

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Chelsea Green Publishing Company

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Bulletin and encouraged me to write a more in-depth essay.

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IntroduCtIon: energy And HIstory

T h E S I m U lTA N E O U S O N S E T of climate change and

the peaking of global oil supply represent unprecedented

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and international legal conventions. Economic policy in the

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evidence is strong and increasing that it is the most likely in

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energetIC & eCologICAl

The broad processes of human history can be understood

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Archaeology records a series of civiliza-

Lower-density simple agrarian and hunter-gatherer cultures

As industrialization spread, oil quickly

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The history of the twentieth century makes

global and regional powers have accompanied this transition.

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about more power leading to greater moral degradation.

The final phase in the fossil-fuel saga is

active conflicts over resources. We can only hope that nations

tHe next energy trAnsItIon

Quite early in the exploitation of fossil resources the debate

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The economies of the affluent countries were further

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Leader Roger Bezdek, MISI Robert Wendling, MISI February 2005)

oil peak early in the twenty-first century.

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While energy and consequently food costs in affluent coun-

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T h E R E I S S T I l l much debate about the basic nature of

the current energy transition, driven most notably by climate

Four energy Futures

Four broad energy scenarios provide a framework for consid-

Techno-explosion depends on new, large, and concentrated

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Historical Time Future Time

Agriculture Industrial Baby Great Grand Old Growth

Figure 3. Four energy futures.

Techno-stability depends on a seamless conversion from

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