Paraguay's Archive of Terror: International Cooperation and Operation Condor Author(s): Katie Zoglin Reviewed work(s): Source: The

University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter - Spring, 2001), pp. 57-82 Published by: University of Miami Inter-American Law Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40176523 . Accessed: 22/12/2012 13:36
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PARAGUAY'SARCHIVE OF TERROR: INTERNATIONALCOOPERATIONAND OPERATION CONDOR*

I. Introduction II. Political Context III. Overview Of Paraguay's Archive Of Terror A. Discovery Of TheArchive Of Terror B. OverviewOf TheArchive's Contents IV. Evidence Of Operation Condor In The Archive Of Terror A. InternationalIntelligence ConferencesAnd Meetings 1. MultilateralMeetings 2. BilateralConferences 3. AdvancedIntelligence Courses B. OperationCondor's Extra-LegalExchange Of Political Prisoners

58 59 61 61 63 64 65 65 68 70 71

Presented at the XII International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Miami, Florida March 16 - 18, 2000. Not for citation without the permission of the author. This research was sponsored by a Fulbright grant providedby the Council of International Exchange of Scholars. The author would like to thank the Comite de Iglesias para Ayudas de Emergencia and the International Human Rights Law Group, and Reed Brody for supporting the grant. Affiliations stated for identification purposes only. The ideas contained in this paper represent the views of the author only. 1. Katie Zoglin (J.D., Harvard Law School) spent over four months reviewing documents in Paraguay's Archive of Terror through a Fulbright grant provided by the Councilof International Exchange of Scholars.

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71 73 75 77 81

1. The Detention,Transfer,And DisappearanceOf Nell, Insaurralde, Santana,Logoluso, And Landi 2. DetentionAnd ClandestineTransferOf Three Paraguayans C. Potential InvolvementOflNTERPOLIn OperationCondor D. SharingInformation RegardingInternational SubversiveActivities V. Concluding Remarks

I. INTRODUCTION Paraguay's Archive of Terror not only records General Alfredo Stroessner's fear of political opponents, but it also confirms accounts that Southern Cone countries such as Argentina,Chile, Brazil, Uruguay,and Paraguayengagedin the clandestineexchangeof intelligenceand prisonersfromthe mid1970s throughthe early 1980s. This secret scheme was known as "Operation Condor."Certainly,the exchangeof intelligenceis not per se inappropriate illegal. However,OperationCondor or must be viewed in the larger context in which these military governmentsignored the due process rights of individuals and to targetedthose who voicedopposition them. Evidence of OperationCondorhas gradually come to light. In 1999, Operation Condor received attention in the United States when the ClintonAdministration's Chile Declassification Projectreleased documentsrevealing that as early as 1976 the United States governmentwas aware of and expressedconcerns regardingat least one aspect of OperationCondor.2The work of Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzon in the cases against Chile's GeneralAugusto Pinochethas also increased knowledgeof this scheme. Whilepreviousaccountsof evidencecontainedin the Archive of TerrorregardingOperationCondorhave not always portrayed documents accurately, cited specific records, or relied on a
2. September 1976 telex on file with the National Security Archive at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch23-01.htm.

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systematic review of the Archive, this article provides a comprehensivereview of the records in Paraguay'sArchive of Terrorthat demonstratethe secret exchange of intelligence and prisoners. In doing so, this article providesadditionalevidence to the developing pictureof OperationCondor. II. POLITICALCONTEXT From 1954 through 1989, General Alfredo Stroessner ruled Paraguay with an iron fist.3 Cold War ("Stroessner") regime. politicsplayeda significantrole duringhis authoritarian In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States gave considerable financial aid to Paraguay. Paraguay was seen as a U.S. ally, particularlyin its oppositionto communism.4 Stroessner used as and the nationalsecuritydoctrine5 the threat of communism a unifyingtheme.6 He freely labeledunsanctionedpoliticalactivity as communist.7 Stroessner relied upon the alleged communist menace as a pretext for imposing many of his government's repressivemeasures.8 Throughouthis tenure, Stroessnerimposed a state of siege without legal justification.9Hundredsof soalmost continuously were arrestedpursuant to laws entitled "In called "subversives" and "In Defense of Public Peace and Defense of Democracy" of Persons."10 Liberty
3. See Virginia M. Bouvier, Decline of the Dictator: Paraguay at a Crossroads 4 (1988); Int'l Hum. Rts. L. Group & Comity de Iglesias para Ayudas de Emergencia, Paraguay: Human Rights and the Transition Towards the Rule of HUMAN 1 RIGHTS]. LAW (1996) [hereinafterPARAGUAY:
SCOTTSACKS, KOETT& KICHARD 4. See BOUVIER,supra note 3, at 7-9; KIORDAN 147-148 (1991); Andrew Nickson, The Overthrow of LEGACY THE PERSONALIST PARAGUAY: the Stroessner Regime, 8 (no. 2) BULL. LATINAM. RES.185, 195 (1989).

5. See Paul C. Sondrol, The Emerging New Politics of Liberalizing Paraguay: STUD.& WORLD Sustained Civil-Military Control without Democracy,J. INTERAM. AFF., 127, 131 (1992). 6. See Marcial Antonio Riquelme, Desde el stronismo hacia la transicidn a la
EN democracia: el papel del actor militar, in PARAGUAY TRANSICI6N193-95 (Diego Abente Y ORIGENES CONSOLIDACI6N STRONISTA: Brun ed., 1993); FATIMA YORE, La DOMINACltiN 174-78, 188-90 (1992).

7. See Carlos R. Miranda, The stroessner Paraguay 70 (1990). 8. See id.

era: authoritarian

kule in

See OAS REPORT, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PARAGUAY,

OEA/ser. L/V/II.71, Doc. 19 rev. 1, at 21-22, 111 (Sept. 28, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 OAS Report]. 10. See generally MIRANDA, supra note 7, at 7-9.

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Real and perceivedopponentsof the Stroessnergovernment were detained without warrant, imprisoned without formal chargeslodgedagainst them, never broughtbeforea magistrate, held without trial, tortured, "disappeared," and killed extraof those tortured were forced to sign judicially.11 Many statements about their purported involvement in subversive activities. Still others were compelledto leave the country or placedin internalexile.12Manyopposition partieswere banned.13 The judiciary lacked independence; judges were appointedand could be dismissed by the executive branch.14 Political, student, union, and religious groups were closely monitored and The repressed.16 governmentshut downa newspaperand a radio was station.16 Electionswere held but in name only.17 Corruption widespread.18 Paraguay was not the only Latin American country that justified the suppression of political opponents based on the or threat. During the 1970s, purported"Marxist" "communist" militaryregimesin many Latin Americancountries,includingin Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, responded to the perceived communist menace by detaining, torturing, and "disappearing" political opponents.19 These countries created Condor combatwhat they viewed as a pervasiveand to Operation imminentthreat to their nationalinterests.
11. See OAS REPORT,REPORT THE SITUATION HUMANRIGHTSIN PARAGUAY, ON OF OEA/ser.L/V/IL43, Doc. 13 corr. 1, 86-87 (Jan. 31, 1978) [hereinafter 1978 OAS REPORT]. 12. See BOUVIER, supra note 3, at 23.

13. See Jos Luis Sim6n G., La Dictadura de Stroessner y Los Derechos HUMANOS 240 (2d ed. 1992). 222, 14. See Dr. David M. Helfeld & Dr. William L. Wipfler, MbaratS: The Higher Law of Paraguay 86, 208, 211 (1980).
15. See BOUVIER, supra note 3, at 23; 1978 OAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 87. 16. See 1987 OAS REPORT, supra note 9, at 113. 17. See BOUVIER, supra note 3, at 15-16.

18. See Dionisio Borda, Empresariadoy transition a la democracia en Paraguay, in

Carlos Martini, Historia de la Transici6n: Pasado y futuro de la democracia en el Paraguay 27 (1994).

National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Phillip E. Berryman trans., 1993); Servicio Paz y Justicia Uruguay, Uruguay Nunca MAs (1989); Torture in Brazil: A Report by the Archdiocese of Sao Paulo (Jaime Wright trans., Joan Dassin ed., 1986).

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III. OVERVIEWOF PARAGUAY'SARCHIVE OF TERROR A. Discovery Of The Archive Of Terror In 1989, Stroessner was overthrown in a military coup engineered by his brother-in-law,General Andres Rodriguez.20 While this change in government and the introduction of democratic rule representsignificantdevelopmentsin Paraguay, Stroessner'sColoradoParty continues to retain power. Indeed, Paraguay's transition toward democratic rule has been an unsteadyone. Chile or Argentina,Paraguayhas not set Unlike neighboring task forceto examine up a truth commissionor other fact-finding the human rights abuses committed during the decades of dictatorship. It has not prosecutedhuman rights abuses;rather, that role has been left to human rights groups and individual victims or their families. The government has made little attempt to redress the human rights abuses perpetratedunder Stroessner.21Nor was it the governmentthat released records fromthe Stroessnerregimeto the public. Instead, it was the efforts of some courageousindividuals that brought Paraguay'sArchive of Terror to light. In 1992, Paraguayan attorney and educator Martin Almada filed a pursuant to Article 135 of the 1992 petition for habeas data,22 information regarding his detention Constitution, requesting during Stroessner'srule.23On December22, 1992, Almada and to Judge Jose Agustin Fernandezproceeded the police station in Lambare(locatedjust outside of Paraguay'scapital in Asuncion) to request the habeas data.24 Initially, the police denied the existence of such information.25 Ultimately, however,"thepolice
HUMANRIGHTS, 20. See PARAGUAY: supra note 3, at 3. 21. See id. at 23-24, 52. 22. See R. Andrew Nickson, Paraguay's Archivo del Terror, LATINAM. RES. REV. 125, 125-27. 23. "Everyone may have access to information and data available on himself or his assets in official or private registries of a public nature. ... He may request a competent judge to order the updating, rectification, or destruction of these entries if they are wrong

or if they are illegitimately affecting his rights." Para. Const, art. 135 (1992). 24. See Rosa Palau, De "Archivo del Horror" a Centro de Documentacion para Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, at 5-6 (Dec. 1993), (unpublished article, on file with author);See Nickson, supra note 22, at 125-27.
HUMANRIGHTS,supra note 3, at 10; Palau, supra note 24, at 6. 25. See PARAGUAY:

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allowed Almada and Judge Fernandez to enter the station where thousands of documents were stored."26Some of the records were actually being buried.27 Most of these documents were from the political branch of the police department in the capital, known as the Investigations Department.28 Judge Fernandez and his colleague Judge Luis Maria Benitez Riera understood the significance of this discovery, as well as the potential danger posed to the records.29 They ordered the documents to be transferred to the courthouse in Asuncion.30 These two judges, reporters, and human rights activists formed a human chain to move the documents from the police station to the courthouse.31 Additional confidential police records existed. Again, the government did not voluntarily release them. On December 24, 1992, Judge Benitez learned of documents from the Direction Nacional de Asuntos Tecnicos of the Ministry of the Interior ("La La Tecnica").32 Tecnica was established during the second half of the 1950s to combat communism, and was responsible for political intelligence.33 The majority of the items recovered from La Tecnica were so-called "subversive"books (approximately 700 volumes) confiscated from individuals, including Bibles and writings of Lenin and Marx.34 Documents from the police department's legal division, known as the Judicial Department, were also recovered on January 21, 1993.35 All of these documents were removed from police custody and are stored in the courthouse in Asuncion. They are collectively known as the Archive of Terror or the Archive of Horror ("theArchive").36

26. PARAGUAY: HUMANRIGHTS, supra note 3, at 10. 27. See Palau, supra note 24, at 6. 28. See PARAGUAY: HUMANRIGHTS, supra note 3, at 10.

29. See id. 30. See id. 31. See id. 32. See Palau, supra note 24, at 6. 33. See id. at 6-7. 34. See id. at 7. 35. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 11. 36. In 1993, additional police documents were identified in the town of Coronel Oviedo, located in central Paraguay, as the result of a habeas data request. Approximately ten to twelve files regarding the Agrarian League (a "campesino" group which was subject to severe repression during the 1970s) consequently were released. However, thousands of additional documents were reportedlybeing held by local Colorado Party authorities.

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B. Overview Of The Archive's Contents The Archive is comprised of more than half a million documents created, collected, and maintained by various divisions of the police and armedforces in Paraguay. The large number of records and their detail demonstratethe degree of controland oversightmaintainedby the Stroessnerregime. The Archive provides a unique opportunityto help understandthe methods of operation and mindset of the Stroessner regime. Because police and military files from other Southern Cone countries remain largely unavailable to the public, Paraguay's Archiveof Terrorhas becomeincreasinglyimportant. For example, the Archive contains over 9,000 "fichas,"or cards, on which police recorded basic information about suspected governmentopponents,such as a photograph,name, address,date of birth, fingerprints,profession,supposedpolitical affiliation, and dates of detention. The fichas are the general equivalent of police bookingcards in the United States, but the fichas also include informationconcerningthe detainee'salleged politicalactivities. The Archive has provideddocumentationof "disappeared" individuals about whom the Stroessner government originally denied having detained, including Rodolfo and Benjamin Ramirez Villalba. These brothers were accused of having They were held in the participatedin a plot to kill Stroessner.37 Departmentof the police.38After Stroessnerleft Investigations power, Julio Ramirez Villalba filed a criminal complaint on behalf of his brothers.39Officialsinitially denied knowledgeof the detention, torture, and murder of the Ramirez brothers.40 However,documentsin the Archive and testimony from fellow Other prisonerstestified prisonersunderminedtheir positions.41 brotherswere repeatedlytorturedduringa sixthat the Ramirez Luis AlbertoWagner,a formerpoliticalprisoner monthperiod.42
HUMANRIGHTS, 37. See PARAGUAY: supra note 3, at 30. DE PARA AYUDAS 38. See id. See also INT'LHUM. RTS. L. GROUP& COMITti IGLESIAS Y at PASADO PRESENTE 81(1993) [hereinafter EN TORTURA EL PARAGUAY: DE EMERGENCIA, TORTURA]. HUMANRIGHTS,supra note 3, at 31; See TORTURA, 39. See PARAGUAY: supra note 38. HUMANRIGHTS,supra note 3, at 31; See TORTURA, 40. See PARAGUAY: supra note 38,

at 20.
HUMANRIGHTS, 41. See PARAGUAY: supra note 3, at 31.

42. See id. at 30.

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who served as a National Deputy after Stroessner left power, testified that Stroessnerhimself told the Ramirezbrothersthat they would be killed if they refused to admit that they were plotting to assassinate Stroessner.43 Wagneralso witnessed the brothersbeing removedfrom their cells at about midnight and never saw them again.44 The Archive also includes approximately 500 bound notebooks compiled by the police. These volumes contain thousandsof pages of surveillancereportson knownor suspected communists and political opponents, reports from named and unnamed civilian spies, signed and unsigned declarationsfrom detainees (many of which were reportedly obtained under torture), and lists of political detainees. Surveillance reports record the activities and whereabouts of suspected political opponents who lived in Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil. the ANTELCO, state run telephonecompany,providedthe police with time, duration,and recipientof telephonecalls. The police saved communist and "subversive" literature, books, political and newsletters confiscated from Paraguayan pamphlets, citizens. The Archivealso containslists of politicalparty leaders and their addresses. IV. EVIDENCE OF OPERATIONCONDOR IN THE ARCHIVE OF TERROR Documents in the Archive demonstrate that by approximately1974, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay had agreed to coordinate their efforts to exchange informationwith one another in response to the communist menace that they perceivedhad reached an internationalscale. "OperationCondor"was the code name for this clandestine schemein which SouthernConemilitarygovernmentsexchanged intelligence and prisoners during the mid-1970s through the early 1980s. Archive documents establish that in Paraguay, Operation Condor was coordinatedthrough the Second Division of the Armed Forces ("ESMAGENFA"), which was headed by Benito Guanes Serrano("Guanes").Guanes exchangedthe intelligence
43. See id. at 30-31. 44. See id. at 31.

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the he receivedwith Pastor M. Coronel("Coronel"), Chief of the Investigations Department, as well as with Francisco Britez the Police. AfterStroessner Borges("Britez"), Chiefof Asuncion's left power,Guanes,Coronel,and Britez were convictedof having committed a range of human rights violations during this In period.45 addition,many intelligencereportswere signed by or addressed to Alejandro Fretes Davalos, who commanded ArmedForces. Paraguay's The followingdiscussionis based on recordscontainedin the Archive. This information comes from police and military intelligence sources. Thus, the Archivepresents an interesting, albeit one-sided,view of the politicalclimate. A. International Intelligence ConferencesAnd Meetings It is clear fromthe Archivethat the militarygovernmentsin their efforts in the so-calledwar the SouthernCone coordinated subversionand communism. Discussionof international against coordinationappears to have begun as early as 1973 or 1974 during intelligence conferencesheld among police and military were directedat fighting officials. These intelligenceconferences subversion and reflect a pervasive fear of the perceived communist threat. The intelligence services concluded that because the communist threat had reached an international scale, the governments had to coordinatetheir activities and responses on a national, as well as an internationallevel. The bulk of the Archive's documents involving international intelligencemeetings span a ten-yearperiodfromapproximately 1973 through1982. 1. Multilateral Meetings One of the earliest records in the Archive relating to international cooperation is a report authored by Antonio Campos Alum, the Director of Paraguay's La Tecnica, and appears to summarize what occurred at an international to conferencein approximately1973.46According this reportby
45. See id. at 24-40. 46. Direction Nacional de Asuntos TScnicos, Carpeta 73 (undated)[hereinafter DNAT]. The first page of the three-page document was missing. It referred to an

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Campos, Paraguay accepted Brazil's offer to exchange information through bilateral meetings and other methods with members of the Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation ("CAL").47 Paraguay and Brazil agreed to coordinate methods of and protection.48 The Brazilian delegation privately security offered to provide Paraguay with comprehensive collaboration, information, materials,*and technical support.49According to the document, Campos discussed the political situation in each country and methods to combat subversion.50 At the close of this conference, all the delegates affirmed that the time had come to take offensive action against communism.51 Campos reported that he had established valuable contacts for the direct exchange of information and methods with the other delegations.52 In 1974, a number of international anti-communist conferences were convened, including the Congress of CAL in Rio de Janeiro and the Seventh Congress of the World Antiin Communist League ("WACL") Washington, DC.53 The most significant of the conferences held that year was a meeting of the Coordinating Council of the Anti-Communist Confederation.54 The purpose of the meeting was to receive information and to exchange experiences concerning Communists and proCommunists in order to adopt methods that could be applied throughout the continent.55 It was important because one of its main resolutions sought to establish a system to exchange confidential information among member nations.56 Thus, this meeting marked a more widespread exchange of information
upcoming World Anti-Communist League conference scheduled to begin at the end of August 1973. 47. See id at 2. 48. See id. 49. See id. at 3. 50. See id. 51. See id. 52. See id. 53. See Memorandumfrom la Policia Federal de Argentina, DPA 8 1973-77 W, No. 00013F 0298-99 (July 22, 1977)[hereinafter DPA 8]; Memorandum, Bibliorata 221 (1976)[hereinafterBib. 221]. 54. Many of the documents in the Archive were found in bound, labeled volumes. After they were "discovered," many of the recordswere bates stamped. Here, the citations to records from the Archive include both cites, if they exist. In these notes, the first reference is to the volume and the second is to the bate stamp number. See DPA 8, supra note 53. 55. See id.; Bib. 221, supra note 53. 56. See id.

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than had previouslytaken place. The Coordinating Councilwas comprised of representatives from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay,and Cubanexiles.57 In 1975, the number of high-level meetings among the intelligenceservicesappearsto have increased. One of the initial planning meetings of what apparentlywas to becomeOperation Condorwas held from May 30 throughJune 4, 1975.58Guanes traveled to Chile to help with the meeting of the chiefs of the in national intelligenceservices and the chiefs of communication the nationalintelligenceservicesfromArgentina,Bolivia,Brazil, Chile,Paraguay,and Uruguay.59 From November 25 through December 1, 1975, a key Duringthis meeting, meetingwas convenedin Santiago,Chile.60 of the mechanismsthroughwhich OperationCondormight many operate were discussed.61A planning document for this First Working Meeting of National Intelligence explained that . "subversion . . recognizes no Borders or Countries, and the infiltrationpenetrates all levels of National life."62It discussed how subversion had developed in the continent during the precedingyears and how subversionwas contraryto the history, It and philosophy, religionof the continent.63 continuedthat: War we have It is to confrontthis Psycho-political determined that we must count on the International realm not with a Command centralizedin its internal action,but with efficient that permits an opportuneexchange Coordination and experiencesas well as a certain of information level of personal knowledge between the Chiefs responsiblefor Security.64 As a result of this meeting, a proposal was made to
57. See id. 58. See Informe No. 65 from El Comando en Jefe de la Nacion de Paraguay, Bibliorata 245, No. 00021F 1558-59 (Oct. 22, 1975)[hereinafterBib. 245]; GS CV. 59. See id. In October 1975, the Eighth Intelligence Conference ot the American Armies was held in Montevideo.See id. 60. See Primera Reunion de Trabajo de Inteligencia Nacwnal, Bibliorata 47, No. 00022F 0155-65 (Oct. 29, 1975)[hereinafterBib. 47]. 61. See id. 62. Id. at 00022F 0157. 63. See id. 64. Id.

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coordinate the exchange of informationthrough an Office of Coordination and Security. Further, a data bank, a centralized archivewith the backgrounds individuals,organizations,and of activities "connecteddirectly or indirectly with subversion," would be located in one country.65It would generally be like INTERPOL,but instead it would be dedicated to combating A subversion.66 moderninformation center would allow access to the data bank.67 Workinggroups would evaluate and address specific problems.68 Under this proposal, all non-Marxist countrieswouldbe allowedto join.69Chile'sNationalIntelligence Directorate("DINA") offeredto house the data bank.70 The Archivecontainsformalinvitationsto this meeting sent by Colonel Manuel Contreras,the Directorof DINA. Officials from Paraguay'spolice departmentand armed forces, including Coronel,Britez,and Guanes,were invitedto attend.71 2. Bilateral Conferences The Archivereveals that SouthernConecountriesfrequently held bilateral conferencesbetween military intelligence services in the 1970s throughthe early 1980s. Participantsdiscussedthe status and activities of "subversive as groups" well as methodsto coordinate effortsagainst them. For example, from 1974 through 1977, Paraguay and Argentina held annual bilateral conferences.72 At the 1975 Bilateral Intelligence Conference between Paraguay and Argentina, the Paraguayan Army presented its views of

65. 66. 67. 68.

Id. at 00022F0158. See id. See id. See id.

69. See id. at 00022F 0159. 70. See id. The telephone and telex numbers of "Luis Gutierrez"were provided as contact numbers. See id. at 00022F 0162. Accordingto a conversation the author had with Manuel Garret6nin Asunci6n in 1995, "LuisGutierrez"was not a person but rather was the code name for the Directorof the Department of the Exterior of DINA. 71. See id. at 00022F 0152-53. 72. See generally Conferencia Bilateral de Inteligencia: Paraguay-Argentina , Bibliorata 1008, No. 00046F 1344-1377 (1975)[hereinafter Bib. 1008]; Letter from Guillermo Clebsch, Sub-jefe del Estado Mayor General (Asunci6n),to Francisco A. Britez Borges, Jefe de la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n),Bibliorata 246, No. 00021F 1692 (Sept. 5, 1997)[hereinafterBib. 246].

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subversion in South America.73The Army concludedthat for many years subversionin Paraguay and other Latin American countries had been consideredmerely an internal problembut that was no longerthe case.74Paraguaythereforerecommended the direct exchange of information;the exchange of doctrine, organization,and instruction;and the possibility of broadening the bilateral nature of the Intelligence Conferenceto include of other countries.75It explainedthat the efficient coordination activities among the Paraguayan and Argentine intelligence armed forces and national police was needed to deal with subversives.76 Paraguay noted that there were connections among subversive groups in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and other countries.77 The Army was Revolucionaria interestedin the Junta Coordinadora particularly which was comprised of members of the National ("JCR"), Liberation Movement ("MLN,"Tupamaros from Uruguay), from Chile), and the RevolutionaryLeft Movement ("MIR," from Argentina).78 It People's RevolutionaryArmy ("ERP," understood that the purpose of the JCR was to make the Americancontinentsocialist.79 Beginning in the early 1970s through at least 1982, Paraguay and Brazil convened annual bilateral conferences.80 For the 1976 conference,Paraguay'spolice intelligence division was asked to develop a presentation on internal subversive activities and their connectionwith the exteriorfor the previous year or so. In addition,the Paraguayanand Chileanarmiesheld 81 bilateral conferences beginning in approximately 1975. for to topicsincluded According the program the 1982 conference,
73. See Bib. 1008, supra note 72, at 00046F 1376-77. 74. See id. at 00046F 1376. 75. See id. at 00046F 1377. At the September 197YArgentine-** araguayan Bilateral Intelligence Conference held in Paraguay, Coronel was asked to discuss subversive activities in Paraguay. See Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 0002 IF 1692. In 1980, Guanes participated in working meeting with the Argentine Army. 76. See Bib. 1008, supra note 72, at 00046F 1347. 77. See id. 78. See id. at 0004b* 1347-55. 79. See id. at 00046F 1348. 80. See Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1650; Bib. 245, supra note 35, at 00021F 1553; Document from el Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n),Bibliorata 147, 1-13 (1975)[hereinafterBib. 147]. 81. See generally Program from the Conferencia Bilateral de Inteligencia entre los Ejercitos de Paraguay y Chile a Desarrollarse, DPA 6 D, No. 00019F 0855-0857 (July 2531, 1982)[hereinafterDPA 6 D].

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the evolutionof the subversivesituationin LatinAmericaoverall as well as in Paraguayand Chile.82 3. Advanced Intelligence Courses From at least 1979 through 1982, Argentina's State held annual advancedintelligence IntelligenceAgency ("SIDE") courses for high-level officials from "friendly countries."83 were Althoughthe names of these so-called"friendlycountries" not identified, Paraguay was certainly one of them given the numerousletters of invitationand coursedescriptionsexisting in the Archive.84These training courses were designed to address issues of intelligence and counter-intelligence, subversion and terrorism,and methodsof socialcommunication.86 These courses also discussed the underlying ideologies of subversivesand sought to providea comprehensiveoverviewof the situation.86 They emphasized the importanceof national intelligencegiven the currentclimateof internationalterrorism.87 They cited the extent of the insidious ideologicalpenetration.88 Argentine authoritiesbelieved that it was indispensablefor the security of the nations to developthis intelligence.89 They noted
82. See id. 83. See DPA 10 1979-80 E, 00010F 0535. 84. See e.g. Series of letters from FranciscoAlcibiades Britez B., Jefe de la Policfa de la Capital (Ascunci6n), to Pastor Milciades Coronel, Jefe del Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policia (Asunci6n), Bibliorata 81 No. 706, 963, 1771 (May-Dec. 1979)[hereinafter Bib. 81]; DPA 10 1979-80 E, No. 00010F 0533; Letter from the Secretaria de Inteligencia de Argentina to D. Benito Guanes Serrano, Jefe del II Departamento del Estado Mayoral General de Paraguay, Bibliorata 173 (Sept. 18, 1979)[hereinafterBib. 173]; Letter from el Ministro del Interior (Asunci6n)to FranciscoA. Britez, Jefe de la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n), PQ 53 (Oct. 10, 1981)[hereinafter PQ 53]; Letter from Carlos Martinez to Guenes, Bibliorata 595, No. 00053F 0617 (May 19, 1981) [hereinafter Bib. 595]; Letter from AlejandroFretes Davalos to Pastor M. Coronel, Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1658; Letter from Pastor M. Coronel, Jefe del Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n), to Francisco A. Britez Borges, Jefe de la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n) (Dec. 15, 1981), Informes from Pastor M. Coronel to Fransisco A. Britez Borges, 1981 1984 F (Oct. 3, 1980)[hereinafter Informes]; DPA 10 1979-80 E, 00010F 0532. See also J. Patrice McSherry, Analyzing Operation Condor:A Covert Interamerican Structure, (March 16-19, 2000)(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). McSherrycontends that high-ranking Spanish officials also attending these intelligence courses sponsoredby the Argentines. 85. See Bib. 595, supra note 84, at 00053F 0617; Bib. 173, supra note 84. 86. See generally DPA 10 1979-80 E, supra note 84, at 00010F 0535. 87. See id . at 00010F 0533. 88. See id.

89. See id. at 00010F0533,0535;Bib.173,supranote84.

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that it would be beneficialto exchange intelligence and to have some personnelwith knowledgeof the regional,continental,and worldwide situation.90 Paraguay's representatives to the advancedcourses were orderedto reportto the SecondDivision of the Armed Forces to receive instructions before attending.91 were made availableto some attendees.92 Scholarships B. Operation Condor'sExtra-Legal Exchange Of Political Prisoners The Archive reveals several examples of suspected subversiveswho were detained in one countryand then secretly transferredto the custody of another government'smilitary or police authority. These individuals were detained without warrant,based on their politicalaffiliationsand activities. They without being broughtbeforea were transferredextra-judicially: courtof law, without legal representation,and without attention to extraditiontreaties. 1. The Detention, Transfer, And Disappearance Of Nell, Insaurralde, Santana, Logoluso, And Landi The Archive'smost clearlydocumented exampleof Operation Condor's extra-judicial exchange of political prisoners is illustrated by the fate of five individuals from Argentina and Jose AntonioLogoluso("Loguloso"), Uruguay:Jose Nell ("Nell"), Nelson RodolfoSantana Scotto Dora Marta Landi Gil ("Landi"), and Gustavo Edison Insaurralde (or Inzauralde) ("Santana"), Meliar ("Insaurralde"). These individuals were detained by Paraguayan officials without warrant; interrogated by Paraguayan, Argentine, and Uruguayan military authorities; never presented with formal charges; and then disappearedby Argentineauthorities. Nell was a 69-year-old Argentine affiliated with the Both Insaurraldeand Santana were Uruguayans Montoneros.93
90. See Bib. 595, supra note 84, at 00053F 0617. 91. See DPA 10 1979-80 E, supra note 84, at 00010F 0532, 0534; Informes, supra note 58; PQ 53, supra note 84. 92. See Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1658; Bib. 81, supra note 84. 93. Booking record No. 3845 from la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n), No. 00017F 1308-11 (Mar. 29, 1977) [hereinafter00017F].

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who belonged to the Student Workers Resistance ("ROE").94 Insaurralde purportedly was involved in other "subversive and organizations" presumablyserved as a leader for the Party for the Victoryof the People ("PVP").95 Logoluso,an Argentine, was described as an active member of the Peronist Youth ("Juventud Peronista").96 Landi, also from Argentina, was affiliatedwith the PeronistYouth.97 five arrivedin Paraguay All in early 1977 on variousdates.98 Recordsin the Archiveindicatethat Paraguayanauthorities believed that Nell, Insaurralde, Santana, and Logoluso were involved in a plan to arrange for political dissidents from Argentina to obtain Paraguayandocumentsso that they could leave the country and seek political asylum in the United Nations' office in Brazil.99 The political dissidents would then travel on to Europe.100 March 29, 1977, Nell, Insaurralde, On and Landi were detained by Paraguayan Santana, Logoluso, authorities.101 were held pursuantto what the documentsin All the Archiverefer to as a "superior In order."102 a rare document addresseddirectlyto PresidentStroessner,Coronelreportedthat these five individuals had been detained and described their "scheme."103 The followingweek, from April 5-7, 1977, a working team comprised of military intelligence officers from Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentinamet in the Politica and Afines division

94. See Document from el Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n), DPA 63 MOPOCO P, No. 00008F 1371-74, at 1374 (undated)[hereinafterDPA 63]. 95. Letter from Alberto B. Cantero, Director de Policia y Afines, to Pastor M. Coronel, Sr. Jefe del III Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n),DPA 2 ENE MAY 1977 A (Apr. 9, 1977)[hereinafterDPA 21. 96. See Booking record No. 3851 from la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n), 00017F, supra note 93, at 1320-22. 97. See Booking record No. 8850 from la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n), 00017F, supra note 93, at 1317-19. 98. See id. at 1309-10, 1317-18, 1320; Documents from el Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n),DPA 48 W, No. 00008F 1742-80, at 1744, 1746 (Mar. 29, 1977)[hereinafterDPA 48 W]. 99. See DPA 48 W, supra note 98, at 00008F 1743-44; 00017F, supra note 93, at 1311. 100. See DPA 48 W, supra note 98, at 00008F 1743. 101. See 00017F, supra note 93, at 1309, 1318, 1321. 102. See id. 103. DPA 48 W, supra note 98, at 00008F 1742-45.

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of This ("DPA") the Investigations Departmentin Asuncion.104 division was responsible for overseeing internal security and investigating subversion within Paraguay. Alberto Cantero served as the director of the DPA. This working group was comprisedof high ranking military officials, including Guanes and Galo Escobar, both of the Second Division of Paraguay's and Stada fromSIDE; ArmedForces;Jose Montenegro Alejandro Carlos Calcagno of Uruguay's Army Intelligence Service; and others.105 Each of the five detainees was meticulously to but, according Cantero,none providedany major interrogated, new revelations.106 On May 16, 1977, Nell, Insaurralde,Santana, Logoluso,and Landi were transferredto the custody of Argentine authorities, again pursuant to what the recordsidentify only as a "superior Guanes and Captain Lazaro Sosa of Paraguay was order."107 when these five individualswere deliveredto the custody present of two members of SIDE: Jose Montenegroand Juan Manuel At Berret.108 4:34 in the afternoon,an ArgentineNaval airplane Abdala piloted by CaptainJose Abdala left for Buenos Aires.109 an was an official from the Naval MechanicsSchool ("ESMA"), near Buenos Aires.110 infamousclandestinetorture center Nell, Insaurralde,Santana, Logoluso,and Landi have not been heard of since, and are presumed"disappeared."111 2. Detention And Clandestine Transfer Of Three Paraguayans The case of three Paraguayans- Nercio Anastacio Stumps and Sotelo Franco Benegas ("Franco"), Lidia Ester ("Stumps"), Cabrera("Cabrera") illustrates the clandestine detention and transfer of political prisoners from Argentina to Paraguay. the Accordingto a report by Francisco Ortiz Tellez ("Ortiz"),
104. See DPA 2, supra note 95. 105. See id. 106. See id. See also DPA 63, supra note 94, at 00008F 1371-73. 107. Informe from Alberto Cantero to Pastor M. Coronel, DPA 1 1976-77 A (May 16, 1977)[hereinafterDPA 1]; 00017F, supra note 69, at 1311, 1318-19. 108. See DPA 1. 109. See id. 110. See NUNCA MAS, supra note 19, at 130-31.
111. See generally, GLADYS MEILINGER DE SANNEMANN, PARAGUAY EN EL OPERATIVO

Condor, at 22.

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ParaguayanConsul stationed in Posadas, Argentina,to Sabino Montanaro(Paraguay'sMinister of the Interior), Stumps was detained in Iguazii, Argentina, by Argentine authorities.112 During the night of January 18, 1977, Stumps, Franco, and Cabrera were detained in a joint operation by the Argentine At National Gendarmerieand Argentine police in Misiones.113 the same time, the Argentine officials confiscatedParaguayan Communist Party ("PCP")propaganda from the detainees' homes.114 Ortiz reportedthat he spoke with the Assistant Chief of Policeof the Province,who indicatedthat the Headquarters of the Military Area in Posadas (Argentina) would presumably to arrangefor the "subversives" be held pursuantto Argentina's ExecutivePower.115 The next day, Ortiz again reported to Montanaro. He confirmedthat Stumps, Franco,and Cabrerahad been detained in Iguazii.116 They were held in the Military Unit in Posadas, Ortiz asked the Chief of the Military Intelligence Argentina.117 Service if an official from the Paraguayan Armed or Security Forces could participate in the interrogations of these detainees.118 On May 5, 1978, Alberto Cantero wrote that Stumps, Franco, and Cabrerawere in custody and were sent from the Political Division of Paraguay'sPolice to Emboscada.119 Emboscada was a detentioncenter for politicalprisonerslocated outside of Asuncion. These individuals were never brought beforea judge and chargeswere never filed against them.

112. See Three letters from Francisco Ortiz Teller, Consul del Paraguay en Posadas, Argentina, to el Ministro del Consulado del Paraguay en Posadas, Argentina, Bibliorata 600, No. 00053F 1527-29 (Jan. 20-21, 1977)[hereinafterBib. 600]. 113. See id. 114. See id. 115. Id. The Organization of American States (and others) concluded that Argentina violated the rights of many by indiscriminately detaining individuals pursuant to the National Executive Power. See INTER-AM. PROHIBIDO: INFORME C.H.R., El INFORME Sobre La Situ[a]ci6n de los Derechos Humanos en Argentina (1984) at 289-90. 116. See Bib. 600, supra note 112, at 0053F 1528. 117. See id. 118. See id. 119. See Letter from Alberto Cantero to Jose Felix Grau, DPA 15 1978-80 W, 00013F 0380 (May 5, 1978).

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C. Potential Involvement Of INTERPOL In Operation Condor Records in the Archive further indicate that Operation Condormay have subverted the purpose of the International Criminal Police Commission, more commonly known as INTERPOL.120 Notwithstandingthe prohibitionin INTERPOL's Constitutionagainst involvementin politicalcrimes,INTERPOL seems to have participated in the trading of intelligence regardingpoliticalopponentsof some governmentson at least a few occasions. A handful of INTERPOLdocuments in the Archiveseek and respondto requests for informationregarding the backgroundof various individuals perceivedto be political opponents. This exchange of information regarding the political affiliation and backgrounds of certain individuals through Constitution. INTERPOL appearsto have violated INTERPOL's to Constitution,its purposeis "(a)To According the INTERPOL ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between the criminal police authoritieswithin the limits of the laws existing in different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declarationof Human Rights; [and] (b) To establish and developall institutions likely to contributeeffectivelyto the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes."121 In Constitutionspecifies:"Itis addition,Article3 of the INTERPOL strictly forbidden for the organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racialcharacter."122 Moreover,the exchange of informationregarding political opponentsof military regimes certainlywas not "in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Freedom of expression and association are clearly protected under the Universal Declaration.123More specifically, Article 19 of the
120. INTERPOLis an international police force created in 1923 by police chiefs from twenty different countries. 121. INTERPOLConstitution,Article 2. 122. In 1984, INTERPOL adopted a resolution allowing it to address issues of terrorism. However, all incidents discussed in this article took place when INTERPOL's Constitution prohibitedinvolvement in politically motivated crimes, before that resolution was adopted. 123. See G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).

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Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold these opinions without interference and to impart information without regard to frontiers.124 Under Article 2, individuals are entitled to rights without regard to political opinion.125 Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that freedom of association shall be respected.126 Nevertheless, a few INTERPOLradiograms in the Archive relate not to "ordinary law crimes" committed by individuals, as was the proper domain of INTERPOL, but rather to the political activities, views, and affiliations of certain individuals. For example, in February 1979, Asuncion's police chief indicated in a confidential report that INTERPOL Buenos Aires had been asked to provide background information regarding Jose Tomas Salinas Pintos ("Salinas"), who had returned to Paraguay to complete his military service.127Salinas purportedly wanted to join the Cavalry's Presidential Escort Regiment for better access to national dignitaries.128 Paraguayan authorities expressed concern that Salinas may belong to unidentified "subversive" Argentine groups.129 There is no indication that Salinas was suspected of being involved in any "commoncrime." Two radiograms to INTERPOL Asuncion responded to its prior requests for information.130In the first, dated March 10, 1980, INTERPOL Buenos Aires replied to a communication from INTERPOL Asuncion.131 INTERPOL Asuncion had forwarded fingerprints and identification cards of several individuals to INTERPOL Buenos Aires.132In its response, INTERPOL Buenos Aires provided INTERPOLAsuncion with the political affiliation

124. See id. 125. See id. 126. See id. 127. See Letter from el Jefe de Policia de la Capital (Asuncibn),DPA 47 W, No. 248 (Feb. 19, 1979)[hereinafterDPA 47 W]. 128. See id. 129. See id. 130. See Radiogram from Domingo Galeano, Inspector General, Jefe del Departamento INTERPOL, DPA 14 1977-82 W, No. 00048F 0683 (Oct. 3, 1980)[hereinafterDPA 14]; Radiogramfrom Ysax Ruiz Diaz, Sub-ComisionarioOP., SubJefe, Departamento INTERPOL, DPA 14 1977-82 W, No. 00048F 0669 (Jul. 13, 1981)[hereinafterDPA 14 0069]. 131. See id. 132. See id.

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It of two individuals.133 explained that accordingto the police, Jorge OmarLewingerwas a memberof the subversiveBolivian National LiberationArmy (ELN) and presumablyhad received INTERPOL Buenos Aires also reportedthat training in Cuba.134 ERP.135 AlbertoRuizwas a memberof the "subversive" Jorge Next, in a radiogram dated July 13, 1981, INTERPOL Montevideo responded to another inquiry from INTERPOL Asuncion.136INTERPOLMontevideostated that Julio Cesar Suarez Formolliwas identified as a member of the MLN (an Uruguayan guerilla group) and had been detained by the activities."137 MilitaryJustice on July 22, 1972 for his "subversive D. Sharing Information Regarding International Subversive Activities The exchange of information among the Southern Cone countriesregardingalleged subversivesis further substantiated by numerousreportsto and from Paraguay'sSecondDivision of the ArmedForces,particularly duringthe periodof 1974 through 1980. In many of the reports, instead of naming a particular country,the distributionlists or sourcesof intelligenceoften refer only to a "friendlycountry,""intelligenceservice of a friendly or agencyof a friendlycountry."138 country," "security The Archivealso containsa confidentialdistributionlist that identified some of the codes used in these confidential intelligence reports, although this key does not directly clarify That these codes which states were the "friendlycountries."139 and veiled referenceswere used rather than the actual names of the countriesinvolvedinvites speculation. Perhaps these codes were used becausethe authoritiessought to avoidpublicscrutiny for or accountability their activities.
133. See id. 134. See id. 135. See id. 136. See DPA 14, supra note 130. 137. Id. 138. See DPA 7 1973-83 W; DPA 8 1973-77 W, 00013F 0340; DPA 5 Personal de ABC, Hoy, Ultima Hora y de Radio Emisoras 1980-3 Q; Informe No. 025/78 from Alejandro Fretes Davalos, DPA 6 D, supra note 55, at 00019F 1061 (May 23, 1978); DPA 47 W, supra note 127; Archivador109, 00040F 1245 (Feb. 10, 1978). 139. For example, this "key"shows that a "G"on a distribution list refers to specific foreign military, aeronautic, and naval attaches. Bib. 595, supra note 84, at 00053F 0719.

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Paraguayanauthorities requested and receivedinformation from Argentine, Bolivian, Brazilian, Chilean, and Uruguayan authorities regarding suspected subversives groups and individuals who had been detained; they also sought to verify Officialsofferedto support intelligencethey alreadypossessed.140 and cooperate with other countries. They also exchanged documentsthey seized.141Military attaches of these countries, especially Argentina, are frequently identified (by their designated codes) as sources of information and on the distributionlists for these confidentialreports. As an example,on November22, 1974, Guanes circulateda reportto the junta of other governmentsdiscussingtwo guerilla training camps located in Argentina and requested additional In intelligenceregardingthem.142 a reportdated March14, 1975, distributedto the military attaches of Argentina,Bolivia, Chile, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela,Guanes noted that "extremist" He Latin Americanswere meeting in Argentina.143 Later that month, sought further details about the meeting.144 Guanes circulated a confidential report to Argentine military authorities explaining that Paraguayan authorities had been unable to verify whether Paraguayan dissidents, including Epifanio Mendez Fleitas and Waldino Lovera, had met in Clorinda, Argentina.145
140. See Letter from Guanes to Coronel,DPA 12 1976-83 WP, 00050F 1855 (Mar. 26, 1976);Letter from Alberto Cantero, DPA 29 ENE FEB 1981 A (Jan. 12, 1981). 141. In January 1977, the Argentine intelligence service intercepted a card from Dr. Telmo Carrilloand turned it over to Paraguay's EMAGENFA. Letter from the Ministerio de Interior to Fransisco Britez, DPA 1 DE (Oct. 21, 1976). In July 1978, ESMAGENFA received information from Argentina's Armed Forces regarding the plans of various Argentine subversive organizations based on documents confiscated from the Ejercito Revolucionariodel Pueblo (ERP), Partido Revolucionariode Trabajo(PRT), and Banda de Delinquent Terrorists (BDT). See Letter from el Jefe de la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n), to Pastor M. Coronel, Jefe del Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policia de la Capital (Asuncidn),Archivador207, No. 00040F 1353-54 (July 15, 1978). In July 1979, Fretes reported on intelligence received from Uruguay's Defense Intelligence Service (SID) regarding two individuals who had held a clandestine meeting of Paraguayan Confederationof Workers (CPT) in Buenos Aires. Accordingto SID, these individuals were in touch with leftists in Uruguay and were going to participate in international campaigns against "our countries." Uruguayan authorities wanted them located. SID providedParaguayan authorities with materials seized in Buenos Aires. See Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1675. 142. See Bib. 595, supra note 56, at 00053F 0707. 143. Bib. 245, supra note 58, at 00021F 1435. 144. See id. 145. See id. InformeNo. 16 at 00021F 1644 (Mar. 24, 1975).

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The Archivecontains a series of reportswritten in October one 1975, approximately month beforethe meeting of the First Meetingof NationalIntelligenceheld in Santiagothat is Working describedabove. A secret reportdated October20, 1975, based on informationfrom Brazilian and Argentine military sources discussed the operations, organization,and plans of dissident Guanes concludedthat these organizations political groups.146 a threat.147 He emphasized the importance of represented coordinating all the national intelligence resources through meetings and the exchange of intelligence.148 Guanes recommendedthat a commission evaluate intelligence for the Commander-in-Chief.149He advocated devoting economic resources for trips abroad to verify the intelligence held by In agencies of other countries.150 another memo, sources from Bolivia and the United States informed Paraguayan officials centerin Santa Cruz,Bolivia.151 coordination abouta "subversive" This information was analyzed with Colonel Padilla of the Bolivian Army during the 1975 Bilateral Intelligence meeting held in Asuncion.152 A report dated July 6, 1976, from Guanes is significant in that its distributionlist cites "Condor the apparentcodename 1," for Chile.153 Paraguayanauthorities,Argentine authorities,and are Argentina'sArmy IntelligenceService ("SIE") also identified that a on the circulationlist.154Guanes asked for confirmation was searchingfor a guerrillacampand patrol militarymotorized indicatedthat he wanted to coordinateefforts with the chief of the military unit responsible for investigating the guerrilla camp.155 Moreover, the Archive establishes that military officials visited one another. On February26, 1979, two officialsfromthe ArgentineIntelligenceService,who oversawthe investigationof
146. See id. InformeNo. 64 at 00021F 1578-81 (Oct. 20, 1975). 147. See id. 00021F 1580-81 148. See id. at 00021F 1581. 149. See id. 150. See id. 151. See id. InformeNo. 65 at 00021F 1558-59 (Oct. 22, 1975). 152. See id. at 00021F 1558. 153. Id. Pedidio de Busqueda No. 23/76 at 00021F 1522. (Jul. 6, 1976). See Peter 21, Kornbluh,Chile Declassified, THENATION 23 (August 9/16, 1999). 154. See Bib. 245, supra note 58, at 00021F 1522. 155. See id.

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Montonero activities, visited the Political Division of Paraguay's Police Department.156 On July 10, 1980, Fretes and Guanes reported on intelligence obtained during a visit from several Argentine officials, including Orlando Ruiz of the Intelligence Unit of the Naval Mechanics School, and two other intelligence officers from Argentina's Chaco and Formosa provinces.157 Fretes indicated that he had previously exchanged information with the Argentine Intelligence Unit.158Fretes requested authorization to coordinate efforts with Argentina to identify and to follow two Montoneros detained by Argentine officials.159 On November 6, 1978, Camilo Almada Sapriza and Lucilo Benitez, from Paraguay's Investigations Department, reported on their mission to Buenos Aires.160They stated that they were well received by Argentine authorities, especially the commanders of the military attachment division and members of SIDE.161 Almada and Benitez were allowed to interrogate members of the Political Military Organization (OPM, a Paraguayan political opposition group) who had been detained in Buenos Aires.162 It should be noted that after Stroessner was deposed, Almada and Benitez were convicted of having committed a range of human rights abuses.163 Brazil and Uruguay participated in the exchange of information with Paraguay as well. The Archive contains a 1977 164 report discussing the background of certain Brazilian citizens. The information contained in this report originated from Brazil's National Information Service, ("SNI").165 confidential map with A the stamp from the military attache of the Brazilian Embassy in Paraguay shows the locations of various Brazilian, Paraguayan,
156. See Letter from Alberto Cantero to Pastor Milciades Coronel, DPA 12 Feb. Abr 1979 A. (Feb. 27, 1979). 157. See DPA 6 D, supra note 81, at 00019F 0876. 158. See id. 159. See id. 160. See Letter from Almada and Benitez to Coronel,DPA 5 1978-81 B (Nov. 6, 1978). 161. See id. 162. See id. 163. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 24-40. In 1992, these two individuals were sentenced to 25 years in prison for the murder of Mario Schaerer Prono. See id. at 25. In 1994, Benitez was sentenced for his involvement in the detention and torture of Amilcar Maria Oviedo. See id. at 35. In 1995, Lucilo Benitez was convicted of having tortured AlbertoAlegre Portillo. See id. at 26. 164. See InformeNo. 004/77, DPA 12 1976-83 WP, No. 00050F 1839 (Jan. 5, 1977). 165. See id.

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and Argentine dissidents living in Paraguay.166As demonstrated by several reports from 1981, Uruguay's intelligence service provided Paraguayan authorities information regarding the political affiliations of Uruguayans detained in Paraguay.167 A lengthy report from Uruguay's National Army (Dept. II) discusses the history and operations of political opposition groups in Uruguay.168 The Archive contains numerous lists of "subversives" from Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, including organizational charts of these groups. Some of these lists are extensive. For example, the Archive holds lists of: Brazilian subversives living in Argentine terrorists, including one with more than Argentina;169 one thousand names;170 Chileans, Brazilians, and Bolivians exiled in missions;171 the Peronist Montonero Movement from Paraguayans detained and disappeared in Argentina's SIDE;172 Argentina (including Augustin Goiburii and Federico Tatter, who terrorist are believed to be victims of Operation Condor);173 criminals;174 and Uruguayan "subversives" and Argentine political opponents of the Uruguayan government, including more than six hundred alleged Tupamaros wanted by the Montevideo police.175

V. CONCLUDINGREMARKS
More research is required to completely understand the true extent and nature of Operation Condor in the Southern Cone
166. See Map of Paraguay, 1051 Caso Goiburu,No. 00050F 2474. 167. See DPA 10 1974-83 WV, 00048F 1706 (Jan. 2, 1981); InformeNo. 004/85, DPA 6 D, supra note 81, at 0019F 0994 (Jan. 9, 1981); Bib. 595, supra note 84; Letter from Cantero and Coronel, DPA 29 (Jan. 12, 1981); Informe (E.M.G.),DPA 11 1981-3 E (Aug. 10, 1981);Nota No. B/247, Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1672. 168. See DPA 48 W, supra note 98, at 00008F 1761. These groups included the Anarchist Federation of Uruguay (FAU), the Student Worker Resistance (ROE), and Popular Revolutionary Organization 33 (OPR 33, which allegedly had connections with the Montoneros). See id. 169. See Nota No. B/650, Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 0002 IF 1653 (Aug. 6, 1976). 170. See Nomina de Terroristas Argentinos, DPA 1 1962-83 EW, No. 00051F 0382-83 (undated)[hereinafterDPA 1 1962-83 EW];DPA 36. 171. See Documents from la Embajada del Uruguay en Paraguay- Agregatura Militar, Bibliorata 7 INTERPOL,No. 00046F 0341-49 [hereinafterBib. 7 INTERPOL]. 172. See DPA 6 D, supra note 81, at 00019F 1015. 173. See DNAT, supra note 46, at Carpeta 30. 174. See id. at Carpeta 3. 175. See Bib. 7 INTERPOL,supra note 171, at 00046F 0341.

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countries,as well as the level of awareness and involvementof the United States. Additionalinvestigationof INTERPOL's role in Operation Condormay also provide insight as to whether INTERPOL routinely exceeded its mandate by exchanging information regardingpoliticalcrimes. In any case, it is evident from Paraguay's Archive of Terror that the Southern Cone military governments coordinated their efforts against the perceived communist threat. The Archive provides concrete evidenceof the clandestineexchangeof intelligenceand prisoners among the Southern Cone countries. Unfortunately, documentswere likely removedfrom the Archive compromising of Terrorbefore they were "discovered." The Archive of Terror adds to the small but growing number of publicly available recordsconfirming existenceof Operation the Condor.

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