Chief China Correspondent at The Wall Street Journal, co-author of Superpower Showdown, author of WSJ China
In today’s WSJ China, I write about the parallels between Beijing’s recent economic policy U-turn and the U-turn on zero-Covid. Both point to how Xi’s centralization of power has delayed effective policy response. https://lnkd.in/etQ6w5pb Also we highlight the story by Liyan Qi on China’s most famous red guard. Hope you enjoy reading it! H/T Clarence Leong
Maximilian Butek
2mo
Thank you for sharing this, a very interesting perspective.
Jamie Gale
2mo
Great article and insights, as usual, Lingling! The centralization of power under Xi Jinping appears to have implications for policy responsiveness and effectiveness. This observation highlights important dynamics within China's internal governance and decision-making processes.
Randal Phillips
2mo
Great article! Think you meant 2022 rather than 2020 for end of zero Covid.
I was just talking about this very topic today at both our weekly tea conversation at the Fairbank Center, and subsequently with Jane Perlez former @nytimes Beijing Bureau Chief. My takeaway from two major policy reversals in less than 2 years isn’t just one of ‘delayed policy response’, Lingling. A more obvious one? We now have multiple data points to indicate that, when sufficient necessity emerges, the speed of reversal of policy can be startling. Whatever one feels about China’s govt, these cases show a sign of practical sensitivity. China under Xi seems to respond pragmatically, eventually, despite whatever ideological aversions exist.
Richard Ng
2mo
Put aside the politics for the moment. Would China really be better off if Beijing governs like Taipei? Can an elephant ever be as nimble as say, a deer? The history of China suggests a giant population of 1.4 billion cannot be governed like a population of 24 million. From a system management perspective, centralized policy making has been the only proven solution for China: Average GDP growth of 9 percent a year since the 80s. 800 million people lifted out of poverty. It has already outlived the USSR. In contrast, with a population of 333 million, the largest democratic republic in the world lurches between chronic threats of government shutdown. 50% of its population vote for a dictator from day one. My point is that whatever you may think of Xi, the delayed policy response, the policy course corrections that you characterize as U turns, and the tightly policed internal conformity may well be necessary system limitations for stability in China. It is a corollary of Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety. My prediction is that all eyes should be on India. If it can outpace China as a successful gaint parliamentary democracy, then that may serve as proof of a viable alternative for China.
Joseph Wang
2mo
The problem with this argument is that you could argue the opposite which is that delays in decision making may be due to the lack of centralized power. In both COVID and economic policy, I happen to think that Xi has less control than it seems. The other issue is 1) it doesn't seem to me that there *has* been a policy U-turn. If the policy is "hit 5 percent GDP" then there has been no U-turn at all 2) In the case of stimulus I would strong argue that the delay in stimulus was a good thing
David Alexander
2mo
China is superior when it comes to long range planning but short term, not so much.
Interesting to see parallels with zerocovid- again an overreaction?
Chief China Correspondent at The Wall Street Journal, co-author of Superpower Showdown, author of WSJ China
2moCorrection: China scrapped its zero-Covid policy in late 2022, not 2020. My apologies for the error.