Noetica

Noetica

Technology, Information and Internet

AI-powered knowledge extraction from complex financial documents

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Industry
Technology, Information and Internet
Company size
11-50 employees
Headquarters
New York
Type
Privately Held

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Employees at Noetica

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  • Noetica reposted this

    View profile for Daniel Wertman, graphic

    Co-Founder & CEO at Noetica

    “𝗣𝗿𝗶𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗱𝗲𝗯𝘁” is like a game of shuffleboard.  Let me explain. Player 1 goes first and lands on 10. Player 2 goes second and knocks Player 1’s disc from 10 to 7, with Player 2’s disc staying on 10. The strategy seems pretty obvious to anyone who’s played shuffleboard: place more discs closer to the top of the board to block the opposing player’s shot, thereby protecting your disc’s placement on 10. “Priming debt” effectively subordinates existing debt to new debt, giving borrowers more time to forestall a restructuring or bankruptcy while utilizing existing collateral. But priming debt isn’t always possible if deals include “sacred rights” blockers. With liability management transactions becoming more prevalent—and borrowers using loopholes to raise priming debt with the approval of a bare majority of lenders—you’d expect increasing prevalence of “sacred rights” blockers in new deals as a counterbalance. Interestingly, that hasn’t been the case. In Q3 ‘24, 74% of publicly filed credit agreements required all lenders to consent to amendments to pro rata sharing provisions, consistent with the same period in 2023. Similarly, in Q3 ‘24, 43% required all lenders to consent to subordination of liens, with 42% requiring the same in Q3 ‘23. Message me if you’d like access to the deal data on “sacred rights” provisions.

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  • View profile for Daniel Wertman, graphic

    Co-Founder & CEO at Noetica

    "𝙐𝙣𝙘𝙖𝙥𝙥𝙚𝙙" is the holy grail for borrowers—not so much for lenders. Manipulation of EBITDA through cost savings addbacks can increase a borrower’s ability to incur priming debt, move assets from the credit group via dividends or asset transfers, or even avoid an event of default under a financial covenant. While uncapped addbacks remain relatively rare, high caps and long look-forward periods still provide significant flexibility for borrowers. In the third quarter of 2024, 34% of publicly filed high yield credit agreements permitted cost savings-based addbacks to EBITDA, compared to only 20% of such deals in the same period in 2023. Of deals allowing such add-backs, none permitted uncapped addbacks in Q3 2024, compared to 3% in Q3 2023. However, in Q3 2024, 78% of deals permitting cost savings addbacks included caps equal to or greater than 20% of EBITDA, compared to 53% of such deals in Q3 2023. In addition, 17% of such deals in Q3 2024 included a look-forward period of 24 months or greater, compared to 47% of Q3 2023.   Message me if you’d like access to the deal data underlying the EBITDA addbacks.

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