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    The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle
    The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle
    The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle
    Ebook319 pages5 hours

    The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle

    By Aristotle

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    Nicomachean Ethics focuses on the importance of habitually behaving virtuously and developing a virtuous character. Aristotle emphasized the importance of context to ethical behavior, and the ability of the virtuous person to recognize the best course of action. Aristotle argued that happiness and well being is the goal of life, and that a person's pursuit of such, rightly conceived, will result in virtuous conduct. "EVERY art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." -Aristotle
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherWilder Publications, Inc.
    Release dateJun 10, 2015
    ISBN9781633840171
    The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle
    Author

    Aristotle

    Aristotle was an ancient Greek philosopher and scientist whose works have profoundly influenced philosophical discourse and scientific investigation from the later Greek period through to modern times. A student of Plato, Aristotle’s writings cover such disparate topics as physics, zoology, logic, aesthetics, and politics, and as one of the earliest proponents of empiricism, Aristotle advanced the belief that people’s knowledge is based on their perceptions. In addition to his own research and writings, Aristotle served as tutor to Alexander the Great, and established a library at the Lyceum. Although it is believed that only a small fraction of his original writings have survived, works such as The Art of Rhetoric, Nicomachean Ethics, Poetics, and Metaphysics have preserved Aristotle’s legacy and influence through the ages.

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    Reviews for The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle

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    • 4/5
      A good translation. Aristotle is a surprisingly more brutal slog than I thought, given how those who pat down his depths into more accessible writing made it sound. Next up, I'll be reading the essay by this translator, reading a book by an Aristotle fan, then maybe another book about Aristotle, then diving into an older translation.
    • 4/5
      Comprehensive and well reasoned. Except in those few spots where it strains to use the "golden mean" approach to virtue ethics or suffers from outdated views, this important work has largely stood the test of time.
    • 2/5
      Eh, at least its not Plato. I read this as context/ground for Aristotle's more socially-oriented works.
    • 4/5
      So simple, so straightforward, so much sense. Quoting the translator's comments [unfortunately, name or edition unknown]: "Happiness for Aristotle is the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. Virtue is shown in the deliberate choice of actions as part of a worked-out plan of life, a plan which takes a middle course between excess and deficiency. This is the famous doctrine of the golden mean -- courage, for example, is a mean between cowardice and rashness, and justice between a man's getting more or less than his due. The supreme happiness, according to Aristotle, is to be found in a life of philosophical contemplation; but this is only possible for the few, and a secondary kind of happiness is available in a virtuous life of political activity." From introduction: "One is that it is the life of pleasure; but the life which aims at pleasure, regardless of the source from which it is derived, is worthy of beasts rather than of men. The political life aims at honour, but honour depends more on him who gives it than on him who gets it. The life of money-making cannot be regarded as an end in itself. There remains a fourth life, the contemplative life; and here he sounds the note which resounds in the final book." It really is in the last part of the last Book X that he brings this point out, but the rest of the work is a logical build-up toward that.
    • 4/5
      Shows almost all types of human character.
    • 3/5
      Aristotle vs. Plato

      Having just finished and enjoyed Plato's complete works, I find this book a bit annoying and uninspiring in comparison. Aristotle seems to take every opportunity to "correct" Plato, when in fact he is only attacking a strawman. His arguments, sometimes self-contradictory, often support and clarify Plato's ideas, albeit using his own terminology.

      Aristotle seems to have great difficulty appreciating or understanding Plato’s abstractions (from species to genus, from the individual instances to the common patterns, i.e. Idea or Form). This is the cause of the majority of his attacks against Plato, as “piety requires us to honour truth above our friends.” How very noble of him!

      I don't know whether the Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum charged their students fees. If not, there were no financial incentives in disparaging their rival. If it was purely intellectual rivalry, using straw man is often a sign of an inferior intellect or character. Since both Plato and Aristotle believed that the intellect was the best part of man or the true man, to attack and destroy another's ideas would be equivalent to murder (or Freudian parricide).

      However, it could also be true that Aristotle was formulating his own philosophy through engagement with Plato's ideas, and intellectual competitions and debates help facilitate the development of sound ideas. Since this is the first book by Aristotle that I've read, it's very likely that I'm not giving him his due here. It may take some time to switch from Plato to Aristotle's way of thinking.

      A Champion of Mediocrity

      Aristotle's definitions of good, virtue and happiness are unsatisfactory to me. Good is "that at which all things aim". All people aim at happiness (or pleasure), therefore happiness is the supreme good. But, what exactly is happiness or pleasure? How can one hit his aim if he can't discern what he is aiming at? If virtue is "the mean between deficiency and excess", what is the difference between virtue and mediocrity?

      "Pleasure perfects activity not as the formed state that issues in that activity perfects it, by being immanent in it, but as a sort of supervening [culminating] perfection, like the bloom that graces the flower of youth." How can a fleeting thing that lacks permanence be the object of a lifelong pursuit?

      In the end, Aristotle agrees with Plato, perhaps begrudgingly as it was dictated by reason, that happiness is contemplation of the divine, which is pleasant, self-sufficient and continuous. He insists on making a distinction between activity and state, but in this instance the distinction is unclear to me.

      An Acute Observer of Human Nature

      There are a few things I do appreciate in this book. Aristotle's joie de vivre (his delight in learning, being alive and active), his insights into human nature, his clear and penetrating psychological portrayal of various character traits and the dynamic relationships or transactions between human beings. He also introduced me to Pythagorean's fascinating mathematical representation of equality, A:B = B:C and A-M = M -C.
    • 3/5
      Bourgeois before the bourgeoisie.
    • 4/5
      The metaphors and language of this were difficult and if I hadn't been assigned this, I probably would not have slogged through it, but I'm glad I did. After parsing through and re-reading this, it's really quite brilliant, and simple. Of course I can't blame Aristotle too harshly, this is a transcription of student lecture notes, and then probably several translations later, it's what we read in English class, so the message does get through, it just takes a labyrinthine path to get there.
    • 4/5
      One of the most accessible works of Aristotle or ancient philosophy in general, but also one of the most practical, because its subject is ethics, or how to live one's life.
    • 4/5
      This is a hard slog but rewarding to the serious thinker.
    • 5/5
      This Is Very Good, Maybe This Can Help You
      Download Full Ebook Very Detail Here :
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    • 3/5
      I know I'm supposed to like this "foundational document of Western culture." I understand its importance, but I would feel perfectly fine if I never had to think about this book again. Give me poet-hating Plato over Aristotle; at least he is lively.
    • 5/5
      The vagueries of textual survival have left us with few specimens of Aristotle's prose at its finest. It's equally possible that Aristotle was not as exquisite a writer as his teacher Plato. In either case, this is one of the more cohesive of Aristotle's works, and even so it's somewhat repetitive and tedious. But Aristotle's ethical system is more humane: I'd rather live in his world than in Plato's Republic.

      In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes about friendship, happiness, and virtue in terms that have had a seminal influence on all subsequent ethical discourse in European philosophy. It creates a parallel system to Biblical ethics in shaping Western ideals of the good. So, a dull but vitally important work.

      This particular translation is readable and well-annotated.
    • 5/5
      This is Aristotle's classic guide to ethics including the golden mean, the nature of friendship and other topics. While it is more a set of lecture notes than a polished philosophical treatise it still demonstrates the power of the mind of the man behind it.

      In the first part he focuses on defining the nature of the highest good for human beings. That is the good at which all things aim (1094a3). This highest good is "happiness" by which is meaqnt both "living well" and "doing well" (1095a18); that, more specifically, happiness is "an activitiy of the soul [which] consists in action performed in conjunction with the rational element" (1098a13), "in conformity with excellence or virtue" (1098a15), "in a complete life" 91098a16).

      As he does for other subjects Aristotle approaches ethics in an organized and scientific manner with an initial emphasis on definitions such as: what is the good, virtue, justice and moral excellence? He does this with an expectation of only that level of precision that is appropriate for the subject at hand. Over the course of the middle section of the treatise the reader is introduced to the concept of the 'golden mean' by which virtues are discussed with regard to extremes (eg. courage vs. rashness) which allow for a middle ground or mean between the extremes. In book seven he discusses moral strength and weakness, and he follows this in book eight with an analysis of the nature and importance of friendship and the need for it. He makes the case that:
      "The perfect form of friendship is that between good men who are alike in excellence or virtue. For these friends wish alike for one an other's good because they are good men, and the are good per se, (that is, their goodness is something intrinsic, not incidental). Those who wish for their friends' good for their friends' sake are friends in the truest sense since their attitude is determined by what their friends are and not by incidental considerations."(1156b, 6-12)

      The ethics culminates in a argument for the supreme importance of contemplation. He says,
      "But a wise man is able to study even by himself, and the wiser he is the more is he able to do it. . . study (contemplation) seems to be the only activity which is loved for its own sake."(1177a, 33- 1177b, 1)
      The ethical principles, the method of demonstration and the sheer power of the ideas presented here make this a valuable guide even as we approach the twenty-first century.
    • 3/5
      Aristotle's Ethics by Penguin classics looks deceptively like a paperback novel. It is nothing of the kind, being a densely packed philosophical treatise on the nature of humankind and our relationships with others.

      The book, a translation of the Nichomachean Ethics and not Aristotle's earlier Eudemian Ethics, may seem slightly mistitled to a modern audience. It deals primarily with analysis of character and what good character is and is not. Discussion of ethical issues and moral judgments of right and wrong are largely missing. The reader is expected to develop their behaviour towards others by perfecting their own character. For example, courage in its various forms is discussed but the practical application of courage is not. Much of Aristotle's thesis appears obvious to our modern minds but it is important to remember that Aristotle was systematizing his description of human nature in an effort to understand it. Unfortunately this makes for a rather dry read.

      The book also contains a lengthy introduction by Jonathan Barnes. While it is accessible to the general audience, a background in philosophy would be useful to really understand the issues he addresses. There is also a preface by Hugh Tredennick who explains why this new translation is needed - primarily for readability. Between J.A.K. Thompson (the translator), Barnes and Treddennick we appear to have the crème de la crème of Cambridge and Oxford Aristotaleans involved in this little book. The introduction has a substantial bibliography in its own right and the book includes 10 brief appendices which provide background on the philosophical ideas in the text. These are critical to understanding the book if you aren't widely read in the early Greek philosophers. A glossary of Greek words and an index of names proceeds a general index. Footnotes are brief and unobtrusive but usually helpful.

      For couch philosophers and serious students looking for an inexpensive edition of the Nichomachean ethics, this is definitely the version for you. It has surprisingly good scholarly resources for such a slim volume. If, however, you had heard that Aristotle was Alexander the Great's tutor and are trying to conquer the business world this probably won't give you many pointers.
    • 5/5
      A true revelation for me. I've never read anything from Aristotle before, and I spent quite a lot of time reading papers and websites about the book to better understand it. I guess in a way I always thought about virtues as something boring conservatives talk about, so Aristotles perspective was really new and exciting for me.

      Also interesting to read in the context of gender (what Aristotle thinks a real man (tm) should be like).
    • 4/5
      I read the Nichomachean Ethics portion of the book
      I spent a long time with this book, and consulted the Masterpieces of World Philosophy, and another book by Johnathan Lear on the issue, to come to some understanding. The project of grounding ethics in a rational pursuit of the greatest happiness is much more attractive than obtaining moral authority from revelation. Aristotle advances the idea that the good is that at which all things aim, and for man the good is happiness. Happiness is defined as the realization of man's essential nature, that is, rational thought, since that is man's differentiating feature from animals. The good for man is the activity of the soul in accord with reason. To act in accord with reason is generally to choose the mean between extremes of conduct; to be courageous is neither to be rash or cowardly. Some acts, however, are absolutely bad, such as murder. The good life involves friendship, preferably of the kind that is the mutual association of free souls without regard to usefulness or pleasure. The highest good, however, because it needs the fewest external goods and most resembles the state of the gods, is contemplation

      Aristotle is difficult going in translation, and not all of the book, especially about continence and incontinence, made sense to me. I was pleased by the rational development of arguments, and the patient consideration of all alternatives.
    • 5/5
      Plato and Aristotle between them not only laid the foundations for Western philosophy, many would argue they divided it neatly between them: Plato the one who with his "Allegory of the Cave" gave birth to the idea of an existence beyond our senses, giving a rational gloss to mysticism. Aristotle, the father of logic and a scientist, with a this-world orientation. There's a famous fresco by Raphael, "The School of Athens," where that's illustrated, where the figure meant to be Plato points to the sky--the heavens--while Aristotle points to the ground--to this Earth. If you're going to ask me which school I belong to--at least as so categorized, Aristotle wins, hands down. Yet if you ask me which philosopher I found a joy to read, which a slog--well, Plato wins.

      Unfortunately, much of Aristotle's works were lost, and what remains I've seen described as not his polished material, but "lecture notes." Plato's dialogues are like little plays, and reading them often are, I daresay, fun. Yes, really. So it was disappointing not to find Aristotle as lively a read. This is dry stuff. But then there are the ideas, which fully earn the five stars. Back when I was introduced to ethics in school, about the only two choices we were given was Utilitarianism--the "greatest good for the greatest number" or Kant and his "categorical imperative" with examples contrasting them such as, under Utilitarianism, if torture leads to good for the greatest number, then by all means, let the water boarding begin! Under the categorical imperative, on the other hand, rules... well, rule. It doesn't matter if there's a ticking atomic bomb, you don't use torture. You're not supposed to care about practical consequences, to yourself or others. What's left out of both philosophies is the individual and his or her happiness. But that's not left out with Aristotle. For him ethics is practical and about the pursuit of happiness. It's for that and from that virtues flow. It's in our personal interest to be virtuous, to practice habits of character that lead to a good life for a human being. Those ethics that appeal and resonate to me come from this school of thought. It's philosophy for human beings, on a human level. So, Plato for style--Aristotle for substance. For me, anyway.

    Book preview

    The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle - Aristotle

    The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle

    by Aristotle

    Translated by William David Ross

    ©2007 Wilder Publications

    This book is a product of its time and does not reflect the same values as it would if it were written today. Parents might wish to discuss with their children how views on race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and interpersonal relations have changed since this book was written before allowing them to read this classic work.

    All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner without written permission except for brief quotations for review purposes only.

    A & D Publishing

    PO Box 3005

    Radford VA 24143-3005

    www.wilderpublications.com

    ISBN 13: 978-1-63384-017-1

    Table of Contents

    Book I: The Good for Man

    Chapter 1: All human activities aim at some good: some goods subordinate to others.

    Chapter 2: The science of the good for man is politics.

    Chapter 3: We must not expect more precision than the subject-matter admits. The student should have reached years of discretion.

    Chapter 4: It [the good] is generally agreed to be happiness, but there are various views as to what happiness is. What is required at the start is an unreasoned conviction about the facts, such as is produced by a good upbringing.

    Chapter 5: Discussion of the popular views that the good is pleasure, honour, wealth; a fourth kind of life, that of contemplation, deferred for future discussion.

    Chapter 6: Discussion of the philosophical view that there is an Idea of good.

    Chapter 7: The good must be something final and self-sufficient. Definition of happiness reached by considering the characteristic function of man.

    Chapter 8: This definition is confirmed by current beliefs about happiness.

    Chapter 9: Is happiness acquired by learning or habituation, or sent by God or by chance?

    Chapter 10: Should no man be called happy while he lives?

    Chapter 11: Do the fortunes of the living affect the dead?

    Chapter 12: Virtue is praiseworthy, but happiness is above praise.

    Chapter 13: Division of the faculties, and resultant division of virtue into intellectual and moral.

    Book II: Moral Virtue

    Chapter 1: It [moral virtue], like the arts, is acquired by repetition of the corresponding acts.

    Chapter 2: These acts cannot be prescribed exactly, but must avoid excess and defect.

    Chapter 3: Pleasure in doing virtuous acts is a sign that the virtuous disposition has been acquired: a variety of considerations show the essential connexion of moral virtue with pleasure and pain.

    Chapter 4: The actions that produce moral virtue are not good in the same sense as those that flow from it: the latter must fulfil certain conditions not necessary in the case of the arts.

    Chapter 5: Its [moral virtue’s] genus: it is a state of character, not a passion nor a faculty.

    Chapter 6: Its differentia: it is a disposition to choose the mean.

    Chapter 7: This proposition illustrated by reference to the particular virtues.

    Chapter 8: The extremes are opposed to each other and the mean.

    Chapter 9: The mean is hard to attain, and is grasped by perception, not by reasoning.

    Book III: Moral Virtue

    Chapter 1: Praise and blame attach to voluntary actions, i.e. actions done (1) not under compulsion, and (2) with knowledge of the circumstances.

    Chapter 2: Moral virtue implies that the action is done (3) by choice; the object of choice is the result of previous deliberation.

    Chapter 3: The nature of deliberation and its objects: choice is the deliberate desire of things in our own power.

    Chapter 4: The object of rational wish is the end, i.e. the good or the apparent good.

    Chapter 5: We are responsible for bad as well as for good actions.

    Chapter 6: Courage concerned with the feelings of fear and confidence—strictly speaking, with the fear of death in battle.

    Chapter 7: The motive of courage is the sense of honour: characteristics of the opposite vices, cowardice and rashness.

    Chapter 8: Five kinds of courage improperly so called.

    Chapter 9: Relation of courage to pain and pleasure.

    Chapter 10: Temperance is limited to certain pleasures of touch.

    Chapter 11: Characteristics of temperance and its opposites, self-indulgence and ‘insensibility’.

    Chapter 12: Self-indulgence more voluntary than cowardice: comparison of the self-indulgent man to the spoilt child.

    Book IV: Moral Virtue

    Chapter 1: Liberality, prodigality, meanness.

    Chapter 2: Magnificence, vulgarity, niggardliness.

    Chapter 3: Pride, vanity, humility.

    Chapter 4: Ambition, unambitiousness, and the mean between them.

    Chapter 5: Good temper, irascibility, inirascibility.

    Chapter 6: Friendliness, obsequiousness, churlishness.

    Chapter 7: Truthfulness, boastfulness, mock-modesty.

    Chapter 8: Ready wit, buffoonery, boorishness.

    Chapter 9: Shame, bashfulness, shamelessness.

    Book V: Moral Virtue

    Chapter 1: The just as the lawful (universal justice) and the just as the fair and equal (particular justice): the former considered.

    Chapter 2: The latter considered: divided into distributive and rectificatory justice.

    Chapter 3: Distributive justice, in accordance with geometrical proportion.

    Chapter 4: Rectificatory justice, in accordance with arithmetical progression.

    Chapter 5: Justice in exchange, reciprocity in accordance with proportion.

    Chapter 6: Political justice and analogous kinds of justice.

    Chapter 7: Natural and legal justice.

    Chapter 8: The scale of degrees of wrongdoing.

    Chapter 9: Can a man be voluntarily treated unjustly? Is it the distributor or the recipient that is guilty of injustice in distribution? Justice not so easy as it might seem, because it is not a way of acting but an inner disposition.

    Chapter 10: Equity, a corrective of legal justice.

    Chapter 11: Can a man treat himself unjustly?

    Book VI: Intellectual Virtue

    Chapter 1: Reasons for studying intellectual virtue: intellect divided into the contemplative and the calculative.

    Chapter 2: The object of the former is truth, that of the latter truth corresponding with right desire.

    Chapter 3: Science—demonstrative knowledge of the necessary and eternal.

    Chapter 4: Art—knowledge of how to make things.

    Chapter 5: Practical wisdom—knowledge of how to secure the ends of human life.

    Chapter 6: Intuitive reason—knowledge of the principles from which science proceeds.

    Chapter 7: Philosophic wisdom—the union of intuitive reason and science.

    Chapter 8: Relations between practical wisdom and political science.

    Chapter 9: Goodness in deliberation, how related to practical wisdom.

    Chapter 10: Understanding—the critical quality answering to the imperative quality practical wisdom.

    Chapter 11: Judgement—right discrimination of the equitable: the place of intuition in morals.

    Chapter 12: What is the use of philosophic and of practical wisdom? Philosophic wisdom is the formal cause of happiness; practical wisdom is what ensures the taking of proper means to the proper ends desired by moral virtue.

    Chapter 13: Relation of practical wisdom to natural virtue, moral virtue, and the right rule.

    Book VII: Continence and Incontinence

    Chapter 1: Six varieties of character: method of treatment: current opinions.

    Chapter 2: Contradictions involved in these opinions.

    Chapter 3: Solution of the problem, in what sense the incontinent man acts against knowledge.

    Chapter 4: Solution of the problem, what is the sphere of incontinence: its proper and its extended sense distinguished.

    Chapter 5: Incontinence in its extended sense includes a brutish and a morbid form.

    Chapter 6: Incontinence in respect of anger less disgraceful than incontinence proper.

    Chapter 7: Softness and endurance: two forms of incontinence—weakness and impetuosity.

    Chapter 8: Self-indulgence worse than incontinence.

    Chapter 9: Relation of continence to obstinancy, incontinence, ‘insensibility’, temperence.

    Chapter 10: Practical wisdom is not compatible with incontinence, but cleverness is.

    Chapter 11: Three views hostile to pleasure, and the arguments for them.

    Chapter 12: Discussion of the view that pleasure is not a good.

    Chapter 13: Discussion of the view that pleasure is not the chief good.

    Chapter 14: Discussion of the view that most pleasures are bad, and of the tendency to identify bodily pleasures with pleasure in general.

    Book VIII: Friendship

    Chapter 1: Friendship both necessary and noble: main questions about it.

    Chapter 2: Three objects of love: implications of friendship.

    Chapter 3: Three corresponding kinds of friendship: superiority of friendship whose motive is the good.

    Chapter 4: Contrast between the best and the inferior kinds.

    Chapter 5: The state of friendship distinguished from the activity of friendship and from the feeling of friendliness.

    Chapter 6: Various relations between the three kinds.

    Chapter 7: In unequal friendships a proportion must be maintained.

    Chapter 8: Loving is more of the essence of friendship than being loved.

    Chapter 9: Parallelism of friendship and justice: the state comprehends all lesser communities.

    Chapter 10: Classification of constitutions: analogies with family relations.

    Chapter 11: Corresponding forms of friendship, and of justice.

    Chapter 12: Various forms of friendship between relations.

    Chapter 13: Principles of interchange of services (a) in friendship between equals.

    Chapter 14: (b) In friendship between unequals.

    Book IX: Friendship

    Chapter 1: (c) In friendship in which the motives on the two sides are different.

    Chapter 2: Conflict of obligations.

    Chapter 3: Occasions of breaking off friendship.

    Chapter 4: Friendship is based on self-love.

    Chapter 5: Relation of friendship to goodwill.

    Chapter 6: Relation of friendship to unanimity.

    Chapter 7: The pleasure of beneficence.

    Chapter 8: The nature of true self-love.

    Chapter 9: Why does the happy man need friends?

    Chapter 10: The limit to the number of friends.

    Chapter 11: Are friends more needed in good or in bad fortune?

    Chapter 12: The essence of friendship is living together.

    Book I:

    The Good for Man

    Chapter 1:

    All human activities aim at some good: some goods subordinate to others.

    EVERY art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity—as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others—in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.

    Chapter 2:

    The science of the good for man is politics.

    If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that term.

    Chapter 3:

    We must not expect more precision than the subject-matter admits. The student should have reached years of discretion.

    Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, admit of much variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also give rise to a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.

    Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire and act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such matters will be of great benefit.

    These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be expected, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.

    Chapter 4:

    It [the good] is generally agreed to be happiness, but there are various views as to what happiness is. What is required at the start is an unreasoned conviction about the facts, such as is produced by a good upbringing.

    Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour; they differ, however, from one another—and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension. Now some thought that apart from these many goods there is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as well. To examine all the opinions that have been held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be arguable.

    Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between arguments from and those to the first principles. For Plato, too, was right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, ‘are we on the way from or to the first principles?’ There is a difference, as there is in a race-course between the course from the judges to the turning-point and the way back. For, while we must begin with what is known, things are objects of knowledge in two senses — some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, we must begin with things known to us. Hence any one who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just, and generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the fact is the starting-point, and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will not at the start need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get startingpoints. And as for him who neither has nor can get them, let him hear the words of Hesiod:

    Far best is he who knows all things himself;

    Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;

    But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart

    Another’s wisdom, is a useless wight.

    Chapter 5:

    Discussion of the popular views that the good is pleasure, honour, wealth; a fourth kind of life, that of contemplation, deferred for future discussion.

    Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which we digressed. To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominent types of life—that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative life. Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get some ground for their view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus. A consideration of the prominent types of life shows that people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness with honour; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since it is thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and not easily taken from him. Further, men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honoured, and among those who know them, and on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is better. And perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather than honour, the end of the political life. But even this appears somewhat incomplete; for possession of virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all costs. But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated even in the current discussions. Third comes the contemplative life, which we shall consider later.

    The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather take the aforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved for themselves. But it is evident that not even these are ends; yet many arguments have been thrown away in support of them. Let us leave this subject, then.

    Chapter 6:

    Discussion of the philosophical view that there is an Idea of good.

    We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss thoroughly what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an uphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by friends of our own. Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better, indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even to destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers or lovers of wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to honour truth above our friends.

    The men who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of classes within which they recognized priority and posteriority (which is the reason why they did not maintain the existence of an Idea embracing all numbers); but the term ‘good’ is used both in the category of substance and in that of quality and in that of relation, and that which is per se, i.e. substance, is prior in nature to the relative (for the latter is like an off shoot and accident of being); so that there could not be a common Idea set over all these goods. Further, since ‘good’ has as many senses as ‘being’ (for it is predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the like), clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases and single; for then it could not have been predicated in all the categories but in one only. Further, since of the things answering to one Idea there is one science, there would have been one science of all the goods; but as it is there are many sciences even of the things that fall under one category, e.g. of opportunity, for opportunity in war is studied by strategics and in disease by medicine, and the moderate in food is studied by medicine and in exercise by the science of gymnastics. And one might ask the question, what in the world they mean by ‘a thing itself’, is (as is the case) in ‘man himself’ and in a particular man the account of man is one and the same. For in so far as they are man, they will in no respect differ; and if this is so, neither will ‘good

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