Jyri Raitasalo

The nature and character of war has attracted lot of scholarly attention within the disciplines of International Relations, Strategic Studies and Security Studies, to name but a few. A majority of scholars agree that, while the nature of war changes slowly, if at all, the character of war – the detailed
manifestation of war at any particular era – is more subject to change.

Rupert Smith’s The Utility of Force – The Art of War in The Modern World is one of many recent attempts to come… Näytä lisää

The nature and character of war has attracted lot of scholarly attention within the disciplines of International Relations, Strategic Studies and Security Studies, to name but a few. A majority of scholars agree that, while the nature of war changes slowly, if at all, the character of war – the detailed
manifestation of war at any particular era – is more subject to change.

Rupert Smith’s The Utility of Force – The Art of War in The Modern World is one of many recent attempts to come to terms with the problem that Western states in general and the US in particular have faced during the last 25 years. This problem is related to the many military operations that the West has executed since the Cold War’s demise and the perception that most Western military operations have not produced positive results. On the contrary, on several occasions these operations have made the situation worse, with the examples of Iraq (2003–) and Libya (2011) troubling cases
in point. Näytä vähemmän

In a recent Foreign Policy article, former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili argued that “Russia’s most likely target in the near future is either Finland or Sweden.” As Saakashvili explains, “by attacking a non-NATO country, [Russian President Vladimir] Putin does not risk a proportional response in accordance with Article 5. But by targeting a European country, he can expect to reap the rewards of public approval at home from voters who are desperate for a victory.”

Fortunately… Näytä lisää

In a recent Foreign Policy article, former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili argued that “Russia’s most likely target in the near future is either Finland or Sweden.” As Saakashvili explains, “by attacking a non-NATO country, [Russian President Vladimir] Putin does not risk a proportional response in accordance with Article 5. But by targeting a European country, he can expect to reap the rewards of public approval at home from voters who are desperate for a victory.”

Fortunately for Finland and Sweden, Saakashvili’s argument is based more on threat inflation, Russia hype, and bad analysis than it is on a realistic understanding of interstate relations in Northern Europe today. Näytä vähemmän

Make no mistake, the aggressive and offensive actions of Russia—and China—need to be countered with vigilance. Espionage, bribery, extortion or spreading false information are all malign techniques of statecraft that require responses—365 days a year, 24 hours a day, and seven days a week. But putting thing into perspective, these above-mentioned methods—and a whole variety of associated tools of the Dark Arts—are traditional means that states have used to compete with each other. We in the… Näytä lisää

Make no mistake, the aggressive and offensive actions of Russia—and China—need to be countered with vigilance. Espionage, bribery, extortion or spreading false information are all malign techniques of statecraft that require responses—365 days a year, 24 hours a day, and seven days a week. But putting thing into perspective, these above-mentioned methods—and a whole variety of associated tools of the Dark Arts—are traditional means that states have used to compete with each other. We in the West may have forgotten this during the twenty-five years of the post–Cold War triumphalism and temporary amnesia about the very essence of international politics. But today—five years after the surprise that Russia caused in the Crimean peninsula and its subsequent malign deeds—it is time to move beyond the everlasting hybrid warfare perspective that securitizes all facets of our society and corrodes our domestic politics by accentuating the perpetual character of the external threat—and also the potential threat within our societies. By arguing that normal great-power competition is warfare, we are in fact making all spheres of our societies part of the battlefield and every citizen a combatant. By so doing, we are sowing the seeds for a future where everything and everyone can be(come) a national-security threat. And adjudication between “friends” and “foes” will be arbitrary—if not impossible. It is time to get rid of the hybrid warfare perspective. Traditional notions of great-power politics, rivalry and statecraft are a better framework for countering Russia and China. Näytä vähemmän

Analyzing Russia’s VOSTOK 2018 strategic level field-exercise (or “strategic manoeuvers”) in the West from a Western perspective is hard. A key reason for this is that Western and Russian perspectives on war and the use of military force have grown apart. By this, Russia is still focused on traditional notions of mass, i.e. massed troops and firepower brought to bear on the enemy to achieve tactical/operational victory. Conversely, most Western states have turned their thinking to effect… Näytä lisää

Analyzing Russia’s VOSTOK 2018 strategic level field-exercise (or “strategic manoeuvers”) in the West from a Western perspective is hard. A key reason for this is that Western and Russian perspectives on war and the use of military force have grown apart. By this, Russia is still focused on traditional notions of mass, i.e. massed troops and firepower brought to bear on the enemy to achieve tactical/operational victory. Conversely, most Western states have turned their thinking to effect precision engagement,
using high-tech situational awareness and C4 capabilities with small(er), professional and highly lethal forces. For the last 25 years, much of the Western focus on warfare has highlighted force-protection and the avoidance of collateral damage in expeditionary operations that have little to do with vital national security interests. This deviates completely from the Russian perspective: causing maximal casualties and destruction in order to prevail in the battlefield (to wit: observe Eastern Ukraine). In short, today the
very expensive Western precision warfare meets attrition warfare and decisive battles would enjoin to produce the ultimate use of violence. Näytä vähemmän

Hypersonic weapon systems are coming. That is a fact. But these new weapons will not change the fundamentals of strategy, the long-term logic of defense planning or military capability development.

The military defence of Europe is in trouble today. There are three main causes for this European military malaise. First, ever since the end of the Cold War, most European states have spent too little resources to maintain even a modest defence capability. Second, most European states have transformed their armed forces into all-volunteer forces, which are way too small for credible deterrence and defence of territory tasks. Instead these small forces have focused for the last 25 years
on… Näytä lisää

The military defence of Europe is in trouble today. There are three main causes for this European military malaise. First, ever since the end of the Cold War, most European states have spent too little resources to maintain even a modest defence capability. Second, most European states have transformed their armed forces into all-volunteer forces, which are way too small for credible deterrence and defence of territory tasks. Instead these small forces have focused for the last 25 years
on sending small contingents to multinational expeditionary operations out-of-area. Third, the United States - which has been the ultimate guarantor of European military security for decades - has under the Trump administration threatened to go it alone if European states fail to meet their defence spending targets. And many European states – Germany included – will certainly miss this target. In sum, Europe as a whole lacks credible defence capability in a situation where relations between Russia and the West have become confrontational. Näytä vähemmän

For cyber deterrence to make any sense for state actors, they need some concrete indicators of others’ offensive cyber capabilities. Thus, in order to develop even a rudimentary cyber deterrence framework, states need some lessons learned from the effects of “cyber weapons” and cyber war. The cases of nuclear war (1945) or the firebombing of cities (during World War II) are examples of the effects of concrete cases that influenced the way that states conceptualize the utility of certain weapons… Näytä lisää

For cyber deterrence to make any sense for state actors, they need some concrete indicators of others’ offensive cyber capabilities. Thus, in order to develop even a rudimentary cyber deterrence framework, states need some lessons learned from the effects of “cyber weapons” and cyber war. The cases of nuclear war (1945) or the firebombing of cities (during World War II) are examples of the effects of concrete cases that influenced the way that states conceptualize the utility of certain weapons of war. Today we have no concrete cases of cyber warfare to draw lessons from. And it is possible that this lack of empirical material related to cyber warfare continues for years to come. While this is good news, it will also prevent the development and maturation of any meaningful cyber deterrence framework. States will not reveal their cyber weapon arsenal for deterrence purposes. They will reserve it for the possibility of waging cyber war. Näytä vähemmän

The real problem is lack of collective military purpose within an Alliance that has become transactional during the post–Cold War era.

The Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War came to an abrupt end almost thirty years ago. This watershed event started a process, during which international security and war have been redefined—in many cases on Western terms. In addition, some ten years has passed since the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008. Today, many conceptualize it as a Russian starting shot for an aggressive policy of primacy in the post–Soviet space. Looking back some thirty years, it is reasonable to presume that there is… Näytä lisää

The Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War came to an abrupt end almost thirty years ago. This watershed event started a process, during which international security and war have been redefined—in many cases on Western terms. In addition, some ten years has passed since the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008. Today, many conceptualize it as a Russian starting shot for an aggressive policy of primacy in the post–Soviet space. Looking back some thirty years, it is reasonable to presume that there is enough—or at least some—empirical historical material for analyzing the way that Western states have redefined their take on international security and war during the post–Cold War era. This timeframe—thirty years—seems appropriate as strategy formulation, defense planning and military capability development are long-term endeavors—measured in decades, not years. Näytä vähemmän

Lately, many Western states have noted that today’s military capabilities are not in line with the existing and emerging military threats. Nor have the plans for future procurement, operational concepts under development (or the lack thereof) or requirements for future military training and exercises supported Western statesmen and the armed forces that are at their disposal to deal with the existing and future security challenges. The actions of China in the East and South China Seas as well… Näytä lisää

Lately, many Western states have noted that today’s military capabilities are not in line with the existing and emerging military threats. Nor have the plans for future procurement, operational concepts under development (or the lack thereof) or requirements for future military training and exercises supported Western statesmen and the armed forces that are at their disposal to deal with the existing and future security challenges. The actions of China in the East and South China Seas as well as Russia in Europe, Northern Africa and the Middle East have exposed gaps and shortages in the military capabilities of many Western states. Even in the best of circumstances, it is going to take years, most probably more than a decade, to address these shortfalls of military capability.

It is argued that the problems faced by the West today, concerning the challenge posed by Russia and increasingly by China, have developed as a result of two defense planning fallacies during the past 25 years: the lack of rigorous long-term defense policy guidance and the over-emphasis on future change at the expense of the long-term logic of maintaining and developing military capability. Näytä vähemmän

Today we in the West face new and traditional threats around the world. Russia has annexed the Crimean peninsula and started a military crisis in Eastern Ukraine. China is expanding its territory and sphere of influence in the East and South China Seas by building artificial islands. North Korea is quickly becoming a nuclear threat, and it has been on a politico-military rampage making threats to South Korea, Japan and even the United States. The Taliban is marching forward in Afghanistan… Näytä lisää

Today we in the West face new and traditional threats around the world. Russia has annexed the Crimean peninsula and started a military crisis in Eastern Ukraine. China is expanding its territory and sphere of influence in the East and South China Seas by building artificial islands. North Korea is quickly becoming a nuclear threat, and it has been on a politico-military rampage making threats to South Korea, Japan and even the United States. The Taliban is marching forward in Afghanistan, Syria and Libya are in shambles, NATO is trying to make a U-turn and refocus on “real defense,” and the European Union is infested with a new “East-West” divide in addition to the pre-existing “North-South” split. There are good reasons to ask, what has gone wrong after the Cold War ended and we were supposed to have overcome divisions and adversarial relations as the fuel of international politics. Näytä vähemmän

Terrorism should be returned to a law-enforcement perspective, and the use of military force against terrorists should be an exception rather than the rule.

Ever since Russia invaded the Crimean peninsula and started a military crisis in Eastern Ukraine in early 2014, many Western statesmen and analysts of strategy have framed Russia’s actions as hybrid warfare against the West. Hybrid threats posed by Russia have filled much of the Western media space ever since. “Green men”, “information warfare” and “cyber warfare” have been part of the Western strategic narrative on Russian hybrid warfare. This article analyses this Western narrative on hybrid… Näytä lisää

Ever since Russia invaded the Crimean peninsula and started a military crisis in Eastern Ukraine in early 2014, many Western statesmen and analysts of strategy have framed Russia’s actions as hybrid warfare against the West. Hybrid threats posed by Russia have filled much of the Western media space ever since. “Green men”, “information warfare” and “cyber warfare” have been part of the Western strategic narrative on Russian hybrid warfare. This article analyses this Western narrative on hybrid warfare and hybrid threats from the viewpoint of the post- Cold War era Western perspective on international security. It is argued that the emergence and maturation of the Western hybrid warfare narrative since 2014 is based on the need to formulate an analytical explanation for the surprise that the very traditional great-power behavior of Russia has caused within the West. After all, the post-Cold War era Western perspective on international security had prior to 2014 deliberately moved away from great-power rivalries, spheres of influence thinking and zero-sum notions of international politics. Thus, it is argued that hybrid warfare and hybrid threats are Western concepts – not Russian ones. Näytä vähemmän

Getting the diagnosis right on the root causes of today’s Russia-West problematique is a prerequisite for any chance of successfully solving it. According to some, today we face Cold War 2.0 or the “new normal”, which is characterized by predatory policies of Russia vis-à-vis the United States, Canada and European states. However, focusing on the superstructure of the confrontation - the level of actions and reactions - will not get us very far in understanding and… Näytä lisää

Getting the diagnosis right on the root causes of today’s Russia-West problematique is a prerequisite for any chance of successfully solving it. According to some, today we face Cold War 2.0 or the “new normal”, which is characterized by predatory policies of Russia vis-à-vis the United States, Canada and European states. However, focusing on the superstructure of the confrontation - the level of actions and reactions - will not get us very far in understanding and solving the ongoing crisis. Näytä vähemmän

Now that military tensions between Russia and the West have gone through the roof, most European states find themselves lacking credible warfighting capabilities.

I argue that what we are witnessing today is not Russia excelling in the dark arts of information warfare or “hybrid warfare,” but rather that we in the West have a depressingly low understanding of the workings of great-power politics and adversarial great-power behavior. Zapad-17 is a case in point. The exercise has not even started and our societies have been fretting about it for at least six months. All possible and many impossible Zapad-17-related scenarios have been played out through a… Näytä lisää

I argue that what we are witnessing today is not Russia excelling in the dark arts of information warfare or “hybrid warfare,” but rather that we in the West have a depressingly low understanding of the workings of great-power politics and adversarial great-power behavior. Zapad-17 is a case in point. The exercise has not even started and our societies have been fretting about it for at least six months. All possible and many impossible Zapad-17-related scenarios have been played out through a media frenzy that is still picking up speed as the main event approaches. Zapad-17 has been labelled “a Trojan horse,” “the World War 3 threat,” and “demonstrative preparation for war on the West,” to give just some examples. Meanwhile, Russia itself has largely kept quiet as multitudes of experts and news outlets filled Western airwaves with Zapad “news” and analysis. Näytä vähemmän

During the last 20 years, western militaries have followed a transformational agenda. Ever since the early 1990s, military “overweight” has been shed as direct military threats to western security and strategic interests evaporated. During the post-Cold War era, and relying on the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA), military transformation became a tool to redefine war and the guidelines for developing national armed forces in the West. Trashing Army Corps, Divisions and Brigades,… Näytä lisää

During the last 20 years, western militaries have followed a transformational agenda. Ever since the early 1990s, military “overweight” has been shed as direct military threats to western security and strategic interests evaporated. During the post-Cold War era, and relying on the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA), military transformation became a tool to redefine war and the guidelines for developing national armed forces in the West. Trashing Army Corps, Divisions and Brigades, slashing fighter jets and Navy vessels and reducing military manpower by the millions, western militaries, particularly in Europe, have become more usable, but less resilient and capable to operate according to the demands of large-scale high-intensity warfighting. This is particularly true if one takes the rising military capabilities of China and Russia as a yardstick. Näytä vähemmän

Small professional forces are not well equipped to deal with the rising tide of large-scale military risks and threats that are not only on the horizon but are already here.

According to the mainstream western strategic narrative, Russia has since 2014 erected multiple Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) exclusion zones or “bubbles” around Europe and the Middle-East. These bubbles supposedly hinder or even prevent western military action and troop deployments during a potential military crisis between the West (read: NATO) and Russia. Symbols of this new Russian A2AD policy can be found in modern long-range weapon-systems like the S-400 Triumf long-range surface to air… Näytä lisää

According to the mainstream western strategic narrative, Russia has since 2014 erected multiple Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) exclusion zones or “bubbles” around Europe and the Middle-East. These bubbles supposedly hinder or even prevent western military action and troop deployments during a potential military crisis between the West (read: NATO) and Russia. Symbols of this new Russian A2AD policy can be found in modern long-range weapon-systems like the S-400 Triumf long-range surface to air missile system, SS-26 Stone (aka Iskander) short range ballistic missile system or the K-300P (aka Bastion-P) mobile coastal missile system.

It is true that Russia has been developing and fielding new long-range weapon systems lately. In addition it is true that these would pose a challenge to NATO forces in the case of a military conflict between Russia and the West. However, I argue that the recent western A2AD discourse is as much a reflection of two decades of outright neglect concerning the development of real high-end military capability in Europe and within NATO against advanced state-based adversaries than it is about Russia’s new capabilities. Näytä vähemmän

Editor’s Note: In this two-part article, Dr Jyri Raitasalo considers what he argues are the two fundamental fallacies concerning the application of strategic air power by Western states in the modern era. In the first part, he examined the challenge of the use of military forces as a tool for solving political problems. In this second part, he examines the issue of ‘no casualty warfare.’

Editor’s Note: In this two-part article, Dr Jyri Raitasalo considers what he argues are the two fundamental fallacies concerning the application of strategic air power by Western states in the modern era. In this first part, he considers the challenge of the use of military forces as a tool for solving political problems.

I argue that the West is much more resilient to Russia’s “narrative manipulation” and its attempts to create havoc within the domestic politics of Western states than the proponents of Russia’s narrative power posit. Most of the weaponization of information discourse within the West is analytically limited—and maybe even politically motivated. This discourse is also facilitating Russia with new ‘tools’ as Western states—together with Western media outlets—have created an overall media hysteria,… Näytä lisää

I argue that the West is much more resilient to Russia’s “narrative manipulation” and its attempts to create havoc within the domestic politics of Western states than the proponents of Russia’s narrative power posit. Most of the weaponization of information discourse within the West is analytically limited—and maybe even politically motivated. This discourse is also facilitating Russia with new ‘tools’ as Western states—together with Western media outlets—have created an overall media hysteria, which is based on buzzwords and slogans instead of prudent judgement and rational analysis. European states should be much more concerned with the low level of military capability at their disposal rather than the inflated threat of false narratives. Näytä vähemmän

Finland’s defence policy guidelines and defence planning principles have been subject to change in the post-Cold War era, most notably due to the changing nature of the international security environment. However, it is noteworthy that in the European context, whereas most Western states have made fundamental changes to the way in which they conceptualize international security, defence planning and the use of military force over the past 25… Näytä lisää

Finland’s defence policy guidelines and defence planning principles have been subject to change in the post-Cold War era, most notably due to the changing nature of the international security environment. However, it is noteworthy that in the European context, whereas most Western states have made fundamental changes to the way in which they conceptualize international security, defence planning and the use of military force over the past 25 years, Finnish defence planning has been characterized more by continuity than change. Understanding this continuity is important when analysing recent defence policy decisions by the Finnish Government. The most recent of these is formulated in the Government Defence Report to parliament in February 2017. Näytä vähemmän

... during the last 25 years, most Western states have focused on committing military troops to multinational ex-peditionary operations with scant direct connections to Western states’ survival or national security interests. After Crimea, advocating hybrid warfare has been a way to (re)securitize the traditional great-power perspective on international se-curity—an approach that Western states had desecuritized since the end of the Cold War as the West was redefining international… Näytä lisää

... during the last 25 years, most Western states have focused on committing military troops to multinational ex-peditionary operations with scant direct connections to Western states’ survival or national security interests. After Crimea, advocating hybrid warfare has been a way to (re)securitize the traditional great-power perspective on international se-curity—an approach that Western states had desecuritized since the end of the Cold War as the West was redefining international security on its own terms. The hybrid warfare thesis is represented by the idea that Russia has invented a new approach to statecraft and military affairs after the war in Georgia. It re-flects more than anything the collective Western surprise that the very traditional actions of Russia have caused. This article argues that the hybrid warfare thesis has catered to the Western need to explain and understand Russia’s actions in Ukraine as the post-Cold War-era Western conceptualisations of international security have proved to be laid on shaky foundations. Great-power rivalries, spheres-of-influence thinking, propaganda, coercion, the use of proxies, spying, and the use of military force by great powers did not become extinct with the demise of the Cold War even though many Western analysts and statesmen thought they had. Recent actions of Russia have revealed this flaw in the Western approach to post-Cold War-era international security. Näytä vähemmän

Ever since the unexpected Russian land grab of Crimea in early 2014, western strategic analysts and policy-makers have been vowing in the name of Russia’s “hybrid warfare” and “hybrid threats”. I argue that most of the supposedly new elements of the so-called “hybrid warfare” and the myriad of associated and supposedly new forms of warfare are in fact normal practices of statecraft rather that novel expressions of war.

It is argued here that in order to understand the exponential… Näytä lisää

Ever since the unexpected Russian land grab of Crimea in early 2014, western strategic analysts and policy-makers have been vowing in the name of Russia’s “hybrid warfare” and “hybrid threats”. I argue that most of the supposedly new elements of the so-called “hybrid warfare” and the myriad of associated and supposedly new forms of warfare are in fact normal practices of statecraft rather that novel expressions of war.

It is argued here that in order to understand the exponential strengthening of the western strategic discourse on hybrid warfare during the past two years, one needs to come to terms with the post-Cold War era process of redefining the western perspective on securi-ty. After all, western states – and particularly European states – have during the last 25 years formulated a new perspective on security that has bypassed – or even neglected – traditional state-based military threats and great power rivalries. Now that Russia has used very traditional great power tools in Ukraine (and also in Syria), many western states have found themselves in need a “new” framework – any framework – to be able to cope with this “return of the past” in contemporary international politics.
Näytä vähemmän

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine ever since late 2013 has been a surprise to many analysts of security and defence policy as well as to statesmen in Europe and elsewhere. This article will probe what could be called the "root causes" concerning this strategic surprise that particularly Russian actions have caused within the West. As a backdrop – or a place to begin – this article looks at the clear conceptual watershed related to the end of the Cold War. It was this abrupt change of the… Näytä lisää

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine ever since late 2013 has been a surprise to many analysts of security and defence policy as well as to statesmen in Europe and elsewhere. This article will probe what could be called the "root causes" concerning this strategic surprise that particularly Russian actions have caused within the West. As a backdrop – or a place to begin – this article looks at the clear conceptual watershed related to the end of the Cold War. It was this abrupt change of the international security system some 25 years ago, which ushered Western states and others into the still ongoing and evolving process of redefining security, security and defence policy and the very principles according to which the West uses military force within the international system. Näytä vähemmän

Without the United States, NATO is hollow — capability-wise and in strategic purpose.

For two decades a wide variety of plans, guidelines and roadmaps have been published and issued on European defense matters. The adoption of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the creation of the European Union Military Committee and European Union Military Staff, the development of the European Defence Agency, the inception of the European Union Battlegroups, and the implementation of several military crisis management operations from Kosovo to Somalia and Iraq to Guinea-Bissau… Näytä lisää

For two decades a wide variety of plans, guidelines and roadmaps have been published and issued on European defense matters. The adoption of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the creation of the European Union Military Committee and European Union Military Staff, the development of the European Defence Agency, the inception of the European Union Battlegroups, and the implementation of several military crisis management operations from Kosovo to Somalia and Iraq to Guinea-Bissau, are all examples of the process by which European states are trying to facilitate the creation of a new post-Cold War era military dimension to European politics. In other words, these above-mentioned projects have been attempts to form a European-wide approach to security and defense policy.

It has been argued that Europe needs to beef up its military capability and establish an army in order to be “taken entirely seriously” or to “stay relevant” in contemporary international politics. The logic behind this is related to the recent history of European integration and the many successes that European states have accomplished in the political and economic domains. Free movement of ideas, people, and capital have benefitted hundreds of millions of Europeans — as have the increased levels of interactions between Europe and the rest of the world. Applying this positive-sum integration-based perspective to security matters and ultimately to military affairs is not as easy as many have thought it to be since the late 1990s.

There are four issues that explain why this is the case. Näytä vähemmän

Lately, a lot has been said and written down on hybrid war and hybrid warfare. The hybrid war thesis has been advocated to depict the new reality of contemporary warfare. Although the concept is not a new one, it has been proposed that today we are witnessing some new features in warfare. Russia’s capture of the Crimean peninsula and its support to the separatists in Eastern Ukraine have been presented as the contemporary pinnacle of hybrid warfare. For many analysts of contemporary security… Näytä lisää

Lately, a lot has been said and written down on hybrid war and hybrid warfare. The hybrid war thesis has been advocated to depict the new reality of contemporary warfare. Although the concept is not a new one, it has been proposed that today we are witnessing some new features in warfare. Russia’s capture of the Crimean peninsula and its support to the separatists in Eastern Ukraine have been presented as the contemporary pinnacle of hybrid warfare. For many analysts of contemporary security and defense issues, the hubris around this buzzword seems to neglect the very basic principles of war that have been discussed and theorized for centuries. Namely, war is not — and has actually never been — a “pure” military matter that is executed only by military forces. When looking closely at the various attributes of Russian and separatist warfare in Ukraine that together are said to constitute hybrid warfare, it becomes clear that none of this is new or unique to a special kind of warfare known as hybrid. Näytä vähemmän

Western states—the U.S. and many European states—have since the early 1990s conducted military operations at a pace that overshadows the number of military operations during the threat-penetrated Cold War era. During the last twenty years, Western states have switched their military outlook from containment and deterrence toward active engagement and expeditionary warfare. It is argued that even though in many cases the objectives of military activism are good and noble, the unintended—and in… Näytä lisää

Western states—the U.S. and many European states—have since the early 1990s conducted military operations at a pace that overshadows the number of military operations during the threat-penetrated Cold War era. During the last twenty years, Western states have switched their military outlook from containment and deterrence toward active engagement and expeditionary warfare. It is argued that even though in many cases the objectives of military activism are good and noble, the unintended—and in many cases the unrecognized—consequences of such action will in the long run be negative at best—and potentially even dangerous. Näytä vähemmän

Kullakin aikakaudella on omat uhkakuvansa ja tehokkaina pidetyt menetelmät näiden uhkien torjuntaan. 2000-luvulla terrorismi on noussut maailmanlaajuisesti yhdeksi keskeisimmistä kan-
sainvälisen turvallisuuden uhkakuvista. Perustellusti voi sanoa, että terrorismi nostettiin Yhdysvaltojen johdolla länsimaita kohtaavista uhista vaarallisimmaksi vuoden 2001 syyskuun
terrori-iskujen jälkeen. Tämän jälkeen terrorismin muodostamaa uhkaa on pyritty hallitsemaan monin keinoin, myös sotilaallista… Näytä lisää

Kullakin aikakaudella on omat uhkakuvansa ja tehokkaina pidetyt menetelmät näiden uhkien torjuntaan. 2000-luvulla terrorismi on noussut maailmanlaajuisesti yhdeksi keskeisimmistä kan-
sainvälisen turvallisuuden uhkakuvista. Perustellusti voi sanoa, että terrorismi nostettiin Yhdysvaltojen johdolla länsimaita kohtaavista uhista vaarallisimmaksi vuoden 2001 syyskuun
terrori-iskujen jälkeen. Tämän jälkeen terrorismin muodostamaa uhkaa on pyritty hallitsemaan monin keinoin, myös sotilaallista voimaa käyttämällä.

Kuten tämän teoksen eri kirjoituksista käy hyvin ilmi, terrorismi-käsitteen laaja-alaisuus ja epämääräisyys vaikeuttaa ilmiöstä muodostettavan kokonaiskuvan hahmottamista.
Toisaalta tämä käsitteellinen epäselvyys edesauttaa terrorismi-käsitteen poliittista käyttöä. Terrorismista onkin tullut yksi käytetyimmistä negatiiviseen leimaamiseen ja mustamaalaamiseen liittyvistä käsitteistä monien maiden sisäpolitiikassa ja myös kansainvälisissä suhteissa. Toimijan leimaaminen terroristiksi mahdollistaa kaikkien käytössä olevien vastakeinojen käyttämisen.
Kokemukset 2000-luvulta osoittavat, että jopa jotkut vakaat, demokraattiset ja ihmisoikeuksia
kunnioittavat valtiot ovat turvautuneet kyseenalaisiin ja myös laittomiin menetelmiin terrorismin muodostaman uhan torjunnassa. Näytä vähemmän

As Western states have been engaged in military crisis management, humanitarian interventions, development crises, counter-terrorist operations and other expressions of expeditionary military opeations and warfare since the end of the Cold War, there is a need to examine whether the Western definitions of international security have been productive and how they have served the security and national interests of Western states.

Just as the end of the Cold War was a clear manifestation of… Näytä lisää

As Western states have been engaged in military crisis management, humanitarian interventions, development crises, counter-terrorist operations and other expressions of expeditionary military opeations and warfare since the end of the Cold War, there is a need to examine whether the Western definitions of international security have been productive and how they have served the security and national interests of Western states.

Just as the end of the Cold War was a clear manifestation of the end of the old security system – a conceptual watershed – I presume in this paper that the end of ISAF-operation – a decade long Western military operation – could provide a strategic rethink of the foundations of our Western security perspective and the principles according to which Western states use military force in the world. After all, Western states have been engaged in state building, stabilisation operations and crisis management for 2 decades. And for the last 10 years, ISAF has been the main effort of NATO. Now this operation is coming to a close.

The idea of the paper was formed in the autumn of 2013 – without the clear manifestations of the crisis in Ukraine in sight. The other question thatthe paper tries to address, is why have Western states become suprised over hat happens in Ukraine? After all, in addition to what is happening in the streets of Ukraine, there seems to be a traditional great-power political conflict over Ukraine. I will thus also try to answer the question, how have the Western statesmen and the general public forgotten the centuries old logic of international politics in only 20 years? Näytä vähemmän

The purpose of this research is to examine the challenges involved in the post-Cold War development of the Finnish defence system within the framework of the Western military viewpoint, given the changes that have taken place in the international security environment. These changes have been of such a magnitude that they have inevitably altered the concepts harboured by the principal actors engaged in generating military power (still predominantly states) regarding the nature of a potential… Näytä lisää

The purpose of this research is to examine the challenges involved in the post-Cold War development of the Finnish defence system within the framework of the Western military viewpoint, given the changes that have taken place in the international security environment. These changes have been of such a magnitude that they have inevitably altered the concepts harboured by the principal actors engaged in generating military power (still predominantly states) regarding the nature of a potential future war. As these concepts alter, pressures will build up for changes in the principles governing the use of armed forces, the nature of their missions and the equipment and forms of organization required. As the “reality” of war changes, armed forces will be required to be prepared to cope with new modes of warfare. The aim here is therefore to examine the effects of the altered international security environment of the post-Cold War era on the principles governing the development of the Finnish defence system. Näytä vähemmän

This article probes from a critical perspective the emerging trend of small states actively using their militaries in expeditionary operations within the globalising international system. The aim of this article is not to prove that this emerging military activism and the use of armed force within a widening geographical area is somehow wrong or unjustified. Rather, this article raises some questions that are related to the increasingly active military doctrines and policies of small… Näytä lisää

This article probes from a critical perspective the emerging trend of small states actively using their militaries in expeditionary operations within the globalising international system. The aim of this article is not to prove that this emerging military activism and the use of armed force within a widening geographical area is somehow wrong or unjustified. Rather, this article raises some questions that are related to the increasingly active military doctrines and policies of small Wester
n states in the beginning of the 21st century. It is suggested that these questions should be analysed in a more profound and public manner than is currently the case. A changing military
agenda among small Western states should not only be analysed from a traditional strategic perspective – i.e. from a great-power perspective that conceptualises the use of armed force as one normal instrument of statecraft. I propose that in addition to this great-power perspective, one should also see the emerging globalising international system from the perspective of small states with more circumscribed strategic interests and limited resources. Näytä vähemmän

Naton nopean toiminnan joukkojen (Nato Response Force, NRF) kokoa ja valmiusvelvoitteita on jouduttu alentamaan. Euroopan unionin operaation aloittaminen Tšadissa ja Keski-Afrikan Tasavallassa viivästyi kuukausilla tarjottujen joukkojen puutteista johtuen. Naton ISAF-operaatio (International Security Assistance Force) Afganistanissa kärsii jatkuvasta – jopa kroonisesta – joukkopulasta. Lisäksi ISAF-operaation ongelmana on joukkoja lähettävien maiden haluttomuus
toteuttaa korkean… Näytä lisää

Naton nopean toiminnan joukkojen (Nato Response Force, NRF) kokoa ja valmiusvelvoitteita on jouduttu alentamaan. Euroopan unionin operaation aloittaminen Tšadissa ja Keski-Afrikan Tasavallassa viivästyi kuukausilla tarjottujen joukkojen puutteista johtuen. Naton ISAF-operaatio (International Security Assistance Force) Afganistanissa kärsii jatkuvasta – jopa kroonisesta – joukkopulasta. Lisäksi ISAF-operaation ongelmana on joukkoja lähettävien maiden haluttomuus
toteuttaa korkean vaatimustason ’kovia’ operaatioita, jotka ovat edellytys kasvavan sotilaallisen vastarinnan kukistamiseksi. Pintaraapaisulla näyttäisi siltä, että kylmän sodan jälkeisellä ajalla kehittynyt länsimainen sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan traditio olisi ajautumassa kriisiin.

Tässä kirjoituksessa arvioidaan niitä tekijöitä, jotka tämän päivän globalisoituvassa maailmassa ”pakottavat” länsimaat käyttämään entistä aktiivisemmin ja laajemmin sotilaallista voimaa
yhä kauempana omalta alueelta. Kirjoituksessa sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan kehkeytymistä länsimaisen asevoiman käytön päämuodoksi kylmän sodan jälkeisellä ajalla tarkastellaan kriittisestä näkökulmasta. Tavoitteena ei kuitenkaan ole osoittaa sotilaalliseen kriisinhallintaan osallistumista hyödyttömäksi tai turhaksi. Pyrkimyksenä on pikemminkin arvioida keskeisiä sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan kehittymistä ohjaavia tekijöitä pienen valtion näkökulmasta. Valittu näkökulma ei kuitenkaan tarkastele Suomen osallistumista sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan operaatioihin. Kirjoituksessa arvioidaan kehittyneiden länsimaiden piiristä kumpuavia sotilaalli-
sen kriisinhallintatoiminnan kehittymistrendejä. Näillä länsimaisten asevoimien käyttöön vaikutta
villa kehityslinjoilla on luonnollisesti tärkeä osansa myös suomalaisessa sotilaallista kriisinhallin-
taa koskevassa keskustelussa. Onhan pienen valtion syytä tarkasti pohtia asevoiman aktiivisen käytön välillisiä ja välittömiä seurausvaikutuksia – myös pidemmällä aikavälillä. Näytä vähemmän

With the demise of the Cold War and the winding down of superpower military rivalry, the concept of national security has become contested. Once the preserve of national defence establishments, national security has recently become attached to a widening set of problems and challenges facing states individually and collectively. Moreover, the referent object for security has been moving away from states. In this process individuals and even the global international society have become closer to… Näytä lisää

With the demise of the Cold War and the winding down of superpower military rivalry, the concept of national security has become contested. Once the preserve of national defence establishments, national security has recently become attached to a widening set of problems and challenges facing states individually and collectively. Moreover, the referent object for security has been moving away from states. In this process individuals and even the global international society have become closer to the core of security matters. As a result, states are now increasingly confronted with the problem of devising new national security doctrines in order to contain a multitude of threats facing individual human beings, states and eventually the entire global international society. Näytä vähemmän

Despite having played a crucial role in international relations for centuries, power remains a very elusive and contested concept. Questions related to different elements of power, the logic of power politics, balances of power, and the hegemonic aspirations of agents have animated scholars and policymakers for centuries. Similarly, questions concerning power have been at the core of the scientific discipline of international relations (IR), which has matured and developed into its current form… Näytä lisää

Despite having played a crucial role in international relations for centuries, power remains a very elusive and contested concept. Questions related to different elements of power, the logic of power politics, balances of power, and the hegemonic aspirations of agents have animated scholars and policymakers for centuries. Similarly, questions concerning power have been at the core of the scientific discipline of international relations (IR), which has matured and developed into its current form over the last century. The focus of this study is not, however, on power in general, but on military power in particular. These two have often been conceptualised as the same thing, although most scholars today would probably acknowledge the intellectual poverty of equating military power with power. The second qualifying remark on this study’s approach to power is that it deals with military power in the post-Cold War era.

The research problem that animates this study is how and through what mechanisms has the meaning of military power changed after the Cold War? In order to answer this question, this study relies on a morphogenetic methodology and on a qualitative process-tracing case study that concerns the most visible and fiercely debated western discourse of war and military power of the post-Cold War era – the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

The above-mentioned changing nature or definition of military power within the international system implies also changes in the shared conceptualisations of war. From the constructivist perspective,
war is not a permanently enduring static phenomena that occurs between states, but rather
an institution of the international system that is reproduced or transformed by the actions of states and other actors operating in that system. Shared conceptualisations of war among the leading actors within the international system define war at any point in history. Näytä vähemmän

War is a multi-faceted phenomenon. Against the trend of conceptualising war from a technological perspective, a historically sensitive strategic perspective on war is suggested, relying on Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm. The analytical utility of this framework on war is strengthened by investigating its historical relevance, as well as by applying it to the evaluation of the post-Cold War conceptualizations of war. In the latter context, the influence of six essential factors on… Näytä lisää

War is a multi-faceted phenomenon. Against the trend of conceptualising war from a technological perspective, a historically sensitive strategic perspective on war is suggested, relying on Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm. The analytical utility of this framework on war is strengthened by investigating its historical relevance, as well as by applying it to the evaluation of the post-Cold War conceptualizations of war. In the latter context, the influence of six essential factors on contemporary definitions of war is established. Accordingly, the “nature” of contemporary war is conceptualized via the process of reproducing and transforming the Cold War-era understandings of war. Näytä vähemmän