People Power Re WPS Office
People Power Re WPS Office
People Power Re WPS Office
Power Revolti on
Title
a. Ver at first denied any " monitoring " of Aquino's activities in the U.S.A. It was only
after intensive questioning that he finally admitted to " following up " Aquino's
movements in America . He had to admit he was being regularly informed of the
messages from the Philippine Consul General in New York , and , later , from the
Philippine Ambassador at Singapore . Those messages leave no doubt about the
close monitoring or surveillance of Senator Aquino's activities .
b. Still he gave the impression that he was a mere passive receiver
of news and was not soliciting the same .
c. He denied asking the Singapore authorities to make inquiries .
The Singapore messages show
otherwise.
d. Ver also denied making inquiries about Aquino in Taipeh . This ,
despite the fact that the Singapore messages had narrowed down the
probable " jumping - off points of Aquino to either Hongkong or
Taipeh ; and in Taipeh the Government had ASECTAI .
2. The evidence shows the military authorities knew that Aquino was
coming via CAL CI-811. Yet Ver
denied awareness of this fact.
2. The evidence shows the military authorities knew that Aquino was
coming via CAL CI-811. Yet Ver
denied awareness of this fact.
3. Ver's alternatives in his directive to Gen, Custodio dated August 21,
1983 made no sense. The
directive spoke of Aquino's coming without travel papers, Via JAL or
other carrier, a manifest
impossibility, or with travel papers.
4.Ver tried to amend ris directive of August 19 by eliminating the
inoperative alternatives, but he gave evidently implausible reasons for
the amendment: the reaffirmation of Aquino's death sentence and the
issuance of a new warrant of arrest for him on the other charges, events
which had taken place more than a year earlier and which were already
known to him before he issued his August 19 directive.
5. We can assume Ver read OPLAN BALIKBAYAN. He must nave noted
the assumption that Aquino might come via JAL. This was clearly
erroneous since he knew Aquino was coming via CAL and
Could not possibly come via JAL since the latter had given assurances it
would not board Aquino
6. Ver said it is usual to give an INSUM to the commander of a mission,
and INSUM being a summary of intelligence information already
gathered, relevant to a mission.
7. Ver also said he did not give Gen. Custodio the intelligence
information obtained from the Singapore authorities ; this , despite the
fact that the information narrowed down the probable " jumping - off '
points of Senator Aquino to only Hongkong and Taipeh
8. At another point Gen. Ver said his directive to Gen. Custodio contained
intelligence information . This was not true , as he had to admit when
shown the directive .
9. Gen. Custodio , Col. Ontog , Col. Ochoco , and Capt . Valerio testified
that there were only four ( 4 ) IMPLANS to carry out OPLAN BALIKBAYAN
, and there was no medical IMPLAN simply being no need for it , since the
matter was sufficiently covered by the bare clause , " EVACUATION as
directed , " a clearly nonsensical claim .
10. There were seven ( 7 ) lawyers who were at the session hall when
General Ver testified before us on whom he could call for legal
representation . Yet before the hearing he sounded out Public Coordinator
Bien Tan , Jr. about the possibility of the latter's representing him , and at
the start of the hearing declared he had no lawyer and actually asked
Atty . Tan to so represent him .
11. Ver said that it was usual procedure for a commander , after a
mission , to submit a command ( post - incident ) report ; but in Custodio's
case this was dispensed with because an investigating committee had
been formed .
12. Ver said the function of military attaches ( AFAs ) is to relay "
essential elements of information " to the home country ; but that they
would do so only if so directed by the head of mission .
13. Ver tried to qualify his answer further by declaring that what should
be relayed to the home Government were only matters " of military
interest . " This contrary to his prior statement that embassies and
consulates should relay matters of general interest , such as changes in
government , financial affairs , bank runs , etc. , aside from the fact that
the Aquino affair was clearly a matter of military interest . "
14. Ver had publicly asserted the reality of the threats against Aquino
emanating from NPA elements . Yet , he failed to give specific orders to
assure that , in the event that should such a threatened assault actually
occur , the assassin or assassins should be captured alive and made to
reveal vital information .
" In the light of all the foregoing considerations , we find the following to
be indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino ,
Jr. , and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21 , 1983 : 1. General
Fabian C. Ver , 2. Maj . Gen. Prospero A. Olivas , 3. Brig . Gen. Luther
Custodio , 4 . Col. Arturo Custodio , 5. Col. Vicente Tigas , 6. Capt .
Felipe Valerio , 7. Capt . Llewelyn Kavinta , 8 . Capt . Romeo Bautista ,
9. 2Lt . Jesus Castro , 10. Sgt . Pablo Martinez , 11. Sgt . Tomas
Fernandez , 12 . Sgt . Arnulfo de Mesa , 13. Sgt . Claro Lat , 14. Sgt .
Filomeno Miranda , 15. Sgt . Rolando de Guzman , 6. Sgt . Ernesto
Mateo , 17. Sgt . Rodolfo Desolong , 18. Sgt . Leonardo Mojica , 19.
Sgt . Pepito Torio , 20. Sgt . Armando de la Cruz , 21. Sgt . Prospero
Bona , 22. CIC Rogelio Moreno , 23. CIC Mario Lazaga , 24. AIC
Cordova Estelo , 25. AIC Aniceto Acupido , 26. Hermilo Gosuico.
EXCERPT FROM GALMA, et al. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et. al. ( G.R
No. 72660 September 12, 1986 )
December 2, 1986 - Two years after the assassination of Senator
Aquino,
the said court acquitted all of the 26 accused individuals and
effectively confirmed the culpability of Galman.
September 12, 1986 - the mother and the son of the late Rolando
Galman, and 29 other petitioners including former justices of the court,
university presidents, members of the Philippine Bar, and concerned
citizens questioning the validity of the Sandiganbayan's acquittal of the
26 military men accused of Ninoy Aquino's assassination.
Primary Source
"The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board
to investigate " the treacherous and vicious assassination of former
Senator Benigno S. Aquino , Jr. on August 21 , 1983 [ which ] has to
all Filipinos become a national tragedy and national shame specially
because of the early distortions and exaggerations in both foreign
and local media so that all right thinking and honest men desire to
ventilate the truth through fair , independent and dispassionate
investigation by prestigious and free investigators . After two false
starts , he finally constituted the Board on October 22 , 1983 which
held 125 hearing days commencing November 3 , 1983 ( including 3
hearings in Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los Angeles , California ) and
heard the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in 20,377 pages of
transcripts , until the submission of their minority and majority
reports to the President on October 23 and 24 , 1984 .
" The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the
military version as propounded by the chief investigator , respondent Gen.
Olivas , that Rolando Galman was the NPA - hired assassin , stating that " the
evidence shows [ to the contrary ] that Rolando Galman had no subversive
affiliations . " They were in agreement that " only the soldiers in the staircase
with Sen. Aquino could have shot him ; " that Galman , the military's " fall
guy " was " not the assassin of Sen. Aquino " and that " the SWAT troopers
who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted Sen." The fact is
that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military
version as propounded by the chief investigator , respondent Gen. Olivas ,
that Rolando Galman was the NPA - hired assassin , stating that " the
evidence shows [ to the contrary ] that Rolando Galman had no subversive
affiliations . " They were in agreement that " only the soldiers in the staircase
with Sen. Aquino could have shot him ; " that Galman , the military's " fall
guy " was " not the assassin of Sen. Aquino " and that " the SWAT troopers
who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted Sen.
" Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro ( the
Coordinator ) and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos , who left earlier , came back and
left again . The former President had a copy of the panel's signed resolution
( charging all accused as principals ) , evidently furnished him in advance ,
and with prepared notes on the contents thereof .
"The former President started by vehemently maintaining that Galman
shot Aquino at the tarmac . Albeit initially the undersigned argued against
the theory , to remain silent was the more discreet posture when the former
President became emotional ( he was quite sick then ).
1. The Office of the Tanodbayan , particularly Justice Fernandez and the
Special Investigating Panel composed of Justice Herrera , Fiscal Bernabe
and Special Prosecutor Tamayo , was originally of the view that all of the
twenty - six ( 26 ) respondents named in the Agrava Board majority report
should all be charged as principals of the crime of double murder for the
death of Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman .
2. When Malacanang learned of the impending filing of the said charge
before the Sandiganbayan , the Special Investigating Panel having already
prepared a draft Resolution recommending such course of action ,
President Marcos summoned Justice Fernandez , the three members of
the Special Investigating Panel , and justice Pamaran to a conference in
Malacanang in the early evening of January 10 , 1985 .
3. In said conference , President Marcos initially expressed his
disagreement with the recommendation of the Special Investigating Panel
and disputed the findings of the Agrava Board that it was not Gaiman who
shot Benigno Aquino .
4. Later in the conference , however , President Marcos was convinced of
the advisability of filing the murder charge in court so that , after being
acquitted as planned , the accused may no longer be prosecuted in view of
the doctrine of double jeopardy .
5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the accused would be denied bail
during the trial considering that they would be charged with capital offenses ,
President Marcos directed that the several accused be " categorized " so that some
of them would merely be charged as accomplices and accessories .
6. In addition to said directive , President Marcos ordered that the case be handled
personally by Justice Pamaran who should dispose of it in the earlies possible time .
7. The instructions given in the Malacanang conference were followed to the letter ;
and compliance therewith manifested itself in several specific instances in the course
of the proceedings , such as , the changing of the resolution of the special
investigating panel , the filing of the case with the Sandiganbayan and its assignment
to Justice Pamaran , suppression of some vital evidence , harassment of witnesses ,
recantation of witnesses who gave adverse testimony before the Agrava Board ,
coaching of defense counsels , the hasty tnal , monitoring of proceedings , and even
in the very decision rendered in the case .
8. That that expression of President Marcos ' desire as to how he
wanted the Aquino - Galman case to be handled and disposed of
constituted sufficient pressure on those involved in said task to
comply with the same in the subsequent course of the
proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez manifested
no revulsion against complying with the Malacañang directive ,
Justice Herrera played his role with manifestly ambivalent feelings
10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino -
Galman murder case , as stage - managed from Malacañang and
performed by willing dramatis personae as well as by recalcitrant
ones whipped into line by the omnipresent influence of an
authoritarian ruler .
The desire of President Marcos to have the Aquino - Galman case disposed of in a
manner suitable to his purposes was quite understandable and was but to be
expected . The case had stirred unprecedented public outcry and wide international
attention . Not invariably , the finger of suspicion pointed to those then in power who
supposedly had the means and the most compelling motive to eliminate Senator
Aquino .
" The facts set forth above are all supported by the evidence on record . In the
mind of the Commission , the only conclusion that may be drawn therefrom is that
pressure from Malacanang had indeed been made to bear on both the court and the
prosecution in the handling and disposition of the Aquino - Galman case .
" President Marcos undoubtedly realized the importance of the matter he
wanted to take up with the officials he asked to be summoned . He had to do it
personally , and not merely through trusted assistants . The lack of will or
determination on the part of Justice Fernandez and Justice Pamaran to resist the
presidential summons despite their realization of its unwholesome implications on
their handling of the celebrated murder case may be easily inferred from their
unquestioned obedience thereto .
•Excerpt from " A Path to Democratic Renewal: A Report
on the February 7, 1986 Presidential Election in the
Philippines by the International Observes Delegation
- It is important to note that Senator Aquino's
assassination in 1983 forced the public to
overtly display its dissent against the Marcos
administration.
Stephen Bosworth - Ambassador of the Philippines.
- In his first major speech since his appointment in mid-
1984, stressed the importance of reliable democratic and
free-market systems in the country. In other words, this
meant that the government had to observe clean elections
and abolish crony capitalism.
- President call for a snap election - President to call for a snap election -A move
which was aimed to disprove public perceptions that he had lost the Filipino people's
mandate. The announcement happened during his interview for the American
Broadcasting Company's This Week with David Brinkey in November 1985.
- On election day February 7, 1986 - incumbent President Ferdinand Marcos of
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) faced Corazon C. Aquino of Partido Demokratiko
Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban). After several days of tabulating votes, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the National Citizen's Movement for Free
Elections (NAMFREL) presented different results. The former proclaimed Marcos as
the victor while the latter declared Aquino the winner. In the end, Marcos had the
upper
hand because the COMELEC results were affhrmed by the KBL-dominated
Batasang
Pambansa.
1986 - Elections proved to be one of the most controversial in Philippine history
primarily because it had widespread incidents of vote buying and electoral fraud.
Primary Source
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
" The International Delegation which observed the February 7
presidential election in the Philippines was sponsored by the National
Democratic and Republican Institutes for International Affairs and
included forty - four individuals from nineteen countries . The co -
leaders of the delegation were the former President of Colombia , the
Honorable Misael Pastrana , and the Honorable John Hume , a member
of the British and European Parliaments from Northern Ireland .
1. The delegation concludes that the election of February 7 was not
conducted in a free and fair manner . It is our belief that the Government
of Ferdinand Marcos and the Commission on Elections ( COMELEC )
bear the responsibility for this failure .
2. The delegation finds that the National Assembly , the Batasang
Pambansa , ignored explicit provisions of the Philippine Electoral Code
requiring that tampered or altered Election Returns be.
3. At the same time , we observed millions of Filipinos who were committed to
making the electoral process work . Principally because of their commitment , the
election succeeded in providing a vehicle through which the national will of the
Philippines was ultimately expressed .
4. There is no single piece of " smoking - gun ' evidence which leads to our
determination that the election failed to meet a " free - and - fair standard ; there are
instead many " smoking - guns . " They include the following :
The campaign period was marked by numerous violations of the provisions
designed to curb improper campaign practices and to limit the Government's use of
its power to influence the election.
The Commission on Elections ( COMELEC ) did not carry out its responsibility
under the election code to provide equal access to the television media during the
campaign period . As a result , Marcos benefitted greatly from the partisan - owed
and influenced television and radio media , though the opposition had reasonable
access to alternative ( radio and print ) media . COMELEC officials were unable or
unwilling to deal with the problem of fraudulent registration ...
An estimated 3.5 million voters were disenfranchised on election day ,
when they could not find their names on the voting register . This resulted
in a voter turnout of only 76 % in this important presidential election , as
compared to 89 % in the 1984 Batasang election ... Disenfranchisement
appears to have occurred in opposition - oriented provinces or cities ...
Virtually all members of the delegation observed or were told by
credible sources that voters were being paid on election day to vote for the
Marcos - Tolentino ticket . In many areas , carbonized sample ballots were
used as proof of an individual's vote and as a receipt for payments ranging
between 25 to 500 pesos .
• Problems relating to the counting of votes occurred during all phases of
the process . Major discrepancies between the count kept by NAMFREL -
based on hard copies of precinct tally forms signed by all members of the
Board of Election inspectors - and COMELEC recurred throughout the
week following the election , evidencing attempts to manipulate the vote
• Delegation members reported numerous instances wherein precincts
recorded zero votes for Aquino despite the claim of the UNIDO
pollwatchers present at the precinct that they voted for Aquino .
• Hard evidence was uncovered of " ghost " precincts , or fictional
polling places , wherein the vote was completely fabricated . In one
municipality of Southern Leyte , three such precincts were discovered
over and above the 55 authorized . In the 55 legitimate precincts , the
vote was 6,371 for Marcos and 5,876 for Aquino . In the three ghost
precincts , the vote was 900 for Marcos and 9 for Aquino .
• While we have no direct evidence , we believe that the interference
with the counting process which occurred after election day was not
simply a dispute between COMELEC and NAMFREL over their " quick
count agreement ; rather we believe this was part of an effort by the
Government and its supporters to buy time so that the above
mentioned fraud could be undertaken .
5. The above listed violations were perpetrated by
national and local officials who supported the
Marcos - Tolentino ticket . While we cannot exclude
the possibility , our delegation did not observe a
single election code violation by supporters of the
opposition party despite efforts undertaken to
monitor their activities . "
Photograph was taken
during the foneral of
Jenator Benigno Aquino Jr.
on August 31, 1986.
Started at sto.Domingo
Church in Quezon City,
took about 11-12 hours to
reach the Manila Memorial
Park in Paranaque City.one
to two million Flipinos
turned out to join and
Witness the funeral
procession
Excerpt from "report to the president of the united states of
america on the february 7,1986 philippine presidential elections"
by the US observer delegation and center for Democracy
POST-ELECTION STATEMENT
"Introduction. The people have spoken. Or have tried to. Despite the obstacles thrown in the way of
their speaking freely, we, the bishops, believe that on the basis of our assessment as pastors of the
recently concluded polls, what they attempted to say is clear enough
"The Conduct of the Polls. In our considered judgment, the polls were unparalleled in the fraudulence
of their conduct. And we condemn especially the following modes of fraudulence and irregularities. 1
The systematic disenfranchisement of voters. The sheer scrambling of the voters lists made impossible
for vast number of our people to express their proper preference of candidates.
2. The widespread and massive vote-buying The vote-buyers in their cynical exploiting of the people's
poverty and deep. If misguided, sense of utang na loob deprived a great many of any real freedom of
choice.
3. The deliberate tampering with the election retums.
The votes of the people, even when already duly
expressed and courted, wors altered to register
choices other than their own.
Radio Veritas
"My dear people, this is a very critical time for our country (Defense) Minister (Juan Ponce) Enrile and
General Ramos have expressed their position with respect to the legitimacy of the [Marcos]
government
"We appeal to the people to pray for a just and peaceful resolution of this crisis
"You spoke as a people in the last election, expressing your preference for peaceful change. I ask you
now to be calm and to be prepared to express again your power as a people
"Minister Enrile and those with him have appealed for food and expressions of support "Those of you
who wish to help should do so, in the meantime, continue to listen to Radio Veritas and I shall speak to
you again. Let us pray together. Let us not allow a drop of blood to be shed. If we can solve this
problem peacefully, that would be the best."
Selected Photographs of the EDSA People Power
Revolution, February 22-25, 1986
The following sources are photographs taken
during the peaceful revolution at EDSA staged
by Filipinos from different walks of life. As
mentioned earlier, people began to assemble on
the night of February 22, 1986 in response to
Cardinal Sin's plea on Radio
Veritas. The following days would witness the
swelling of demonstrators at EDSA. various
prayer vigils conducted before Marine tanks,
and further defections by military men (e.g., Col.
Antonio Sotelo and the 15th Strike Wing of the
Philippine Air Force).
The events of the peaceful revolution culminated in Corazon
Aquino's installation as the 11th President of the Philippines on
February 25, 1987 at the Club Filipino in San Juan City. At around
10:00 in the morning, she and Salvador H. Laurel (as vice
president) took their oaths before Senior Supreme Court Justice
Claudio Techankee and Justice Vicente Abad Santos,
respectively. An hour later, President Marcos had his own
inauguration ceremony at Malacañan in Manila. He was sworn
into office by Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino. By the evening of
the same day, news spread that the Marcoses had fled the
country after taking advice from Washington DC People
immediately rushed to Mendiola to take part on the historic
dismantling of the Marcos regime.
Popular Songs of the EDSA People Power Revolution
The 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution was a peaceful demonstration of the
people's strength in solidarity against an authoritarian government. This revolution,
composed of Filipinos from various sectors of the society, was a political movement
sustained not only by the unwavering patriotism of its participants but also by the
songs that serenaded the protesters on the streets. Today, some of these songs
remain in the people's consciousness primarily because they function as a
reminder of the victories that the 1986 revolution achieved.
The selected piece below is one of the songs that were popularized at the time of
the EDSA People Power Revolution. The song titled "Bayan Ko" was actually a
kundiman written by Jose Corazon de Jesus (popularly known as Huseng Batute).
Constancio de Guzman provided the music to de Jesus' lyrics in the 1920s. Years
later, the definitive rendition of the song was popularized by Freddie Aguilar in
1979.
Primary Source
Bayan Ko
"SECTION 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and
shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected
"SECTION 5.
1. The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker
by a majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary.
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting
of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators
and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
and parties of organizations registered under the party list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote,
except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members 11
SECTION 23
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to
the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it
and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall
enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. It, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the
bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that
House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against
shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill
to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof,
otherwise
it shall become a law as if he had signed
2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular tem or items in an
appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does
not object
"SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and conference
"SECTION 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted
"SECTION 32
The Congress shall, as early as possibile, provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed
by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters thereof
ARTICLE VII: Executive Department
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three five, of seven Members.
Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof
"SECTION 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term
of seven years without reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run
for any office in the election immediately succeeding
their cessation from office.