Evaluating Forensic DNA Evidence

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Evaluating forensic DNA

evidence

Dan E. Krane, Wright State University, Dayton, OH

William C. Thompson, University of California, Irvine

Forensic Bioinformatics
(www.bioforensics.com)
The science of DNA profiling is
sound.

But, not all of DNA profiling is


science.
Three generations of DNA testing

RFLP DQ-alpha Automated STR


AUTORAD TEST STRIP ELECTROPHEROGRAM
Allele = BAND Allele = BLUE DOT Allele = PEAK
Two relatively new DNA tests

Mitochondrial DNA
mtDNA sequence Y-STRs
Sensitive but not Useful with mixtures
discriminating Paternally inherited
DNA content of biological samples:
Type of sample Amount of DNA
Blood 30,000 ng/mL
stain 1 cm2 in area 200 ng
stain 1 mm2 in area 2 ng
Semen 250,000 ng/mL
Postcoital vaginal swab 0 - 3,000 ng
Hair
plucked 1 - 750 ng/hair
shed 1 - 12 ng/hair
Saliva 5,000 ng/mL
Urine 1 - 20 ng/mL
Automated STR Test
Crime Scene Samples &
Reference Samples

• Extract and purify DNA

Differential extraction in sex


assault cases separates out
DNA from sperm cells
Extract and Purify DNA

• Reactions are performed in Eppendorf tubes. Typical volumes


are measured in microliters (one millionth of a liter).
PCR Amplification

• DNA regions flanked by


primers are amplified

Groups of amplified STR products are


labeled with different colored dyes
(blue, green, yellow)
The ABI 310 Genetic Analyzer:
SIZE, COLOR & AMOUNT
ABI 310 Genetic Analyzer:
Capillary Electrophoresis
•Amplified STR DNA
injected onto column
•Electric current
applied
•DNA pulled towards
the positive electrode
•DNA separated out by
size:
– Large STRs travel Detector
slower Window
– Small STRs travel
faster
•Color of STR detected
and recorded as it
passes the detector
Profiler Plus: Raw data
Statistical estimates: the product rule

0.222 x 0.222 x 2
= 0.1
Statistical estimates: the product rule

1 in 10 x 1 in 111 x 1 in 20
= 0.1

1 in 22,200

1 in 100 x 1 in 14 x 1 in 81

1 in 113,400

1 in 116 x 1 in 17 x 1 in 16

1 in 31,552

1 in 79,531,528,960,000,000
1 in 80 quadrillion
What more is there to say after you
have said: “The chance of a
coincidental match is one in 80
quadrillion?”
What more is there to say after you
have said: “The chance of a
coincidental match is one in 80
quadrillion?”

• Two samples really do have the


same source
• Samples match coincidentally
• An error has occurred
What might go wrong?

• Biased or mistaken interpretation of test


results
• Exaggerated or misleading statistics
• Errors in processing, handling or
labeling of samples
• Incorrect assumptions about a sample’s
source
• Inadvertant transfer
Fudge factors and net widening

• Test results can be ambiguous


• Standards for interpretation can be
vague and flexible
• Hence, multiple interpretations are
possible
• The range of possible matches is often
not reflected in match statistics
Opportunities for subjective
interpretation?

Can “Tom” be excluded?


Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25

No -- the additional alleles at D3 and FGA


are “technical artifacts.”
Opportunities for subjective
interpretation?

Can “Dick” be excluded?


Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Dick 12, 17 15, 17 20, 25

No -- stochastic effects explain peak height


disparity in D3; blob in FGA masks 20 allele.
Opportunities for subjective
interpretation?

Can “Harry” be excluded?


Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Dick 12, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Harry 14, 17 15, 17 20, 25

No -- the 14 allele at D3 may be missing due to


“allelic drop out”; FGA blob masks the 20 allele.
Opportunities for subjective
interpretation?

Can “Sally” be excluded?


Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Dick 12, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Harry 14, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Sally 12, 17 15, 15 20, 22
No -- there must be a second contributor;
degradation explains the “missing” FGA allele.
What might go wrong?

• Biased or mistaken interpretation of test


results
• Exaggerated or misleading statistics
• Errors in processing, handling or
labeling of samples
• Incorrect assumptions about a sample’s
source
• Inadvertant transfer
Documenting errors:
DNA Advisory Board Quality Assurance Standards
for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories, Standard
14

[Forensic DNA laboratories must] “follow


procedures for corrective action whenever
proficiency testing discrepancies and/or
casework errors are detected” [and] “shall
maintain documentation for the corrective
action.”
Documenting errors

Cross contamination:
Documenting errors

Positive result in negative control:


Documenting errors

Positive result in negative control, due to


tube swap:
Documenting errors

Analyst contamination:
Documenting errors
Separate samples combined in one tube . . . .
Documenting errors
Separate samples combined in one tube . . . .

. . . . leading to corrective action:


Documenting errors
Suspect doesn’t match himself . . . .

. . . . but then, staff is “‘always’ getting


people’s names wrong”:
Victorian Coroner’s inquest into the
death of Jaidyn Leskie

• Toddler disappears in bizarre


circumstances: found dead
six months later
• Mother’s boy friend is tried
and acquitted.
• Unknown female profile on
clothing.
• Cold hit to a rape victim.
• RMP: 1 in 227 million.
• Lab claims “adventitious
match.”
Victorian Coroner’s inquest into the
death of Jaidyn Leskie

• Condom with rape victim’s


DNA was processed in the
same lab 1 or 2 days prior to
Leskie samples.
• Additional tests find matches
at 5 to 7 more loci.
• Review of electronic data
reveals low level
contributions at even more
loci.
• Degradation study further
suggests contimation.
Degradation
The Leskie Inquest

• Undegraded samples can


have “ski-slopes” too.
• How negative does a slope
have to be to be an indication
of degradation?
• Experience, training and
expertise.
• Positive controls should not
be degraded.
Degradation
The Leskie Inquest

• DNA profiles in a rape and a


murder investigation match.
• Everyone agrees that the
murder samples are
degraded.
• If the rape sample is
degraded, it could have
contaminated the murder
samples.
• Is the rape sample
degraded?
Degradation
The Leskie Inquest
Sources of ambiguity in DNA testing
results
• Degradation, inhibition
• Mixtures: deconvolution and relatives
• Background noise
• Stutter (n+4)
• Pull-up
• Spikes and blobs
Mixed DNA samples
How many contributors to a mixture?
mixture if
analysts can discard a locus?
Maximum # of
alleles observed in a # of occurrences Percent of cases
3 person mixture
2 0 0.00

3 8,151
310 0.02
0.00

4 11,526,219
2,498,139 25.53
5.53

5 32,078,976
29,938,777 71.07
66.32

6 1,526,550
12,702,670 3.38
28.14

There are 45,139,896 possible different 3-way mixtures of the 648


individuals in the MN BCI database (accepted for publication in JFS).
Accounting for relatives
20%

18%

16%

14%

12%
Randomized Individuals

10% Simulated Cousins

Simulated Siblings
8%

Percent 6%
of total (%)

4%

2%

0%

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24

Number of pairwise shared alleles


Opportunities for subjective
interpretation?
Spikes and blobs

blob
Peak Area

Peak area

spike

Peak height
Peak Height

Blob:
Blob: Peak
Peak Area
Area // Peak
Peak Height
Height > 10
10 ++
Spike:
Spike: Peak
Peak Area
Area // Peak
Peak Height
Height << 4.5
4.5 --
The science of DNA profiling is
sound.

But, not all of DNA profiling is


science.

This is especially true in situations


involving: mixtures, relatives,
degradation, and small sample size.
Resources
• Internet
– Forensic Bioinformatics Website: http://www.bioforensics.com/
– Applied Biosystems Website: http://www.appliedbiosystems.com/
(see human identity and forensics)
– STR base: http://www.cstl.nist.gov/biotech/strbase/ (very useful)
• Books
– ‘Forensic DNA Typing’ by John M. Butler (Academic Press)
• Scientists
– Larry Mueller (UC Irvine)
– Simon Ford (Lexigen, Inc. San Francisco, CA)
– William Shields (SUNY, Syracuse, NY)
– Mike Raymer and Travis Doom (Wright State, Dayton, OH) Marc
Taylor (Technical Associates, Ventura, CA)
– Keith Inman (Forensic Analytical, Haywood, CA)
• Testing laboratories
– Technical Associates (Ventura, CA)
– Indiana State Police (Indianapolis, IN)
• Other resources
– Forensic Bioinformatics (Dayton, OH)

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