Oligopoly
Oligopoly
Oligopoly
• Monopolies are quiet rare, in part due to regulatory efforts to discourage them.
• However, there are many markets that are dominated by a relatively few firms, known
as oligopolies.
• The term oligopoly comes from two Greek words: oligoi meaning “few” and poleein
meaning “to sell”.
• Examples of oligopolies include:
• 1 Airliner Manufacturing: Boeing and Airbus
• 2 Food Processing: Kraft Food, PepsiCo and Nestle
• 3 US Beer Production: Anheuser-Busch and MillerCoors
• 4 US Film Industry: Disney, Paramount, Warners, Columbia, 20th Century Fox and
Universal
• 5 US Airline Industry: Delta/NWA, United, American Herriges (ISU)
The Problem With Oligopolies
• The problem with oligopolies is much that same as with monopolies–the firms realized
they have some market power because relatively few firms provide the good or
service.
• Oligopolies still compete– it’s just that the competition is not always as rigorous.
• The situation in which both competition occurs and firms exercise market power is
known as imperfect competition
• The market power of the oligopoly will typically result in higher prices and lower
production levels in the market than would be efficient
• However, the competition among firms, and particularly their incentives to cheat on
each other, will dampen this effect relative to a monopoly.
• Oligopolies are a very difficult type of market structure to study, relative to either
perfect competition or a monopoly.
Determining Whether an Oligopoly Exists
• An oligopoly is defined, not by the size of the firms, but by their relative market shares.
Essentially, if relatively few firms control most of the market sales, then an oligopoly
exists.
• One commonly used measure of market concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI)
• The HHI ranges from zero to 10000 (i.e., 1002 in the case of a monopoly)
• The US Department of Justice uses the following cutoffs:
• - HHI < 100 indicates a highly competitive market.
• - 100 < HHI < 1; 000 indicates an unconcentrated market.
• - 1; 000 < HHI < 1; 800 indicates a moderately concentrated market.
• - HHI > 1; 800 indicates a highly concentrated market.
Oligopolies by industry
Understanding Oligopolies
• The diculty in studying oligopolies in general is that there are so many possible ways in
which the rms might interact with each other.
• 1 They might collude; i.e., cooperate with each other so as to maximize their joint prots,
dividing up the profit among the firms.
• Such collusion might take the form of overt collusion (such as forming a cartel).
Alternatively it might be indirect, implicit collusion.
• 2 They might also act non-cooperatively, acting in their own self-interest, but taking into
account the actions of other rms.
• In many ways, the actions of the firms become similar to playing games, such as Monopoly
or Risk.
• Efforts to model such strategic interactions has led to a whole branch of economics and
math known as game theory
The Duopoly
• In order to understand some of the possible behaviors in the case of
oligopolies, consider the simplest case - the duopoly (i.e., two firms).
• Think, for example, of the airliner industry, which is dominated by two firms
(Boeing and Airbus).
• Suppose that the demand for airliners in any given month is given by the
following. If MC=1.75, how much would a monopoly produce?
The Collusion Outcome
• One alternative in the case of a duopoly would be for the two firms to form a cartel
• A cartel is an agreement among several producers to obey output restrictions in order
to increase their joint profit.
• Essentially, the cartel acts like a monopolist and simply divides the market among
members of the cartel.
• The most famous example of this is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). OPEC was formed in 1960's in response to quotas instituted by President
Eisenhower and enforced on Venezuela and Persian Gulf Countries.
• The success of OPEC has varied over time with conditions in the market and geo-
political relations among its members and customers.
• Cartels are typically illegal within countries, but in the case of OPEC, the cartel is
made up of countries.
The Airline Industry Example
• In our airline duopoly, the cartel outcome would be to produce Q=2 with P=3.00, dividing the
market between the two firms (i.e., Qi = 1 for each firm).
• Assume for simplicity that there are no fixed costs and that MC are constant (i.e., MC=ATC) at 1.75.
• The profit for each firm would be:
• Profit = TR - TC = (P - ATC) x Qi = (3 – 1.75) x 1 = $1.25 mill.
• The problem for our cartel is that each firm has an incentive to cheat.
• - Suppose Boeing stuck to the agreement, making only 1 airplane (QB = 1), but Airbus decided to
cheat, making 2 airplanes (QA = 2).
• - With total output at Q = QA + QB = 3, price drops to 2.50.
• - Airbus's profit rises to (P - ATC) QA = (2.50 – 1.75) 2 = $1.50 mill.
• - Boeing's profit, however, falls to (P - ATC) QB = (2.50 – 1.75) x 1 = $0.75 mill.
The Incentive to Cheat
• For each individual, their dominant strategy (i.e., their best action regardless
of what the other individual chooses to do) is to confess.
• Note that this is despite the fact that both individuals would be better off by
choosing not to confess.
• The result, is that both individual's confess.
• The result is what is known in game theory as a Nash Equilibrium; i.e., an
equilibrium in which each player takes the action that is best for him or her
given the actions taken by the other player.
• This is named after the famous mathematician and Nobel prize Laureate John
Nash.
• Because the individuals do not take into account the impact of their actions on
the other players, this is known as a noncooperative equilibrium.
Applying the Prisoner's Dilemma
• Tit for Tat games are an examples of tacit collusion; i.e., when the firms attempt to
control overall output (and hence price) indirectly without a formal agreement.
• Another form of tacit collusion is price leadership
• One firm [the price leader] sets its price and other sellers copy that price
• With price leadership, there is no formal agreement
• Rather the decisions come about because firms realize [without formal discussion]
that system benefits all of them
• Decisions include
• - Choice of leader
• - Criteria it uses to set its price
• - Willingness of other firms to follow
The Limits to Collusion