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    Ipsec

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    babulgsm
    IPSec provides general IP security mechanisms including authentication, confidentiality, and key management. It can be used over LANs, WANs, and the Internet. IPSec uses security associations and security policies to determine how to process packets. It supports both transport and tunnel modes to secure host-to-host or gateway-to-gateway traffic. While IPSec aims to be transparent, network address translation can interfere with its operation in some cases.

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    Ipsec

    Uploaded by

    babulgsm
    124 views43 pages
    IPSec provides general IP security mechanisms including authentication, confidentiality, and key management. It can be used over LANs, WANs, and the Internet. IPSec uses security associations and security policies to determine how to process packets. It supports both transport and tunnel modes to secure host-to-host or gateway-to-gateway traffic. While IPSec aims to be transparent, network address translation can interfere with its operation in some cases.

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    IPSec provides general IP security mechanisms including authentication, confidentiality, and key management. It can be used over LANs, WANs, and the Internet. IPSec uses security associations and security policies to determine how to process packets. It supports both transport and tunnel modes to secure host-to-host or gateway-to-gateway traffic. While IPSec aims to be transparent, network address translation can interfere with its operation in some cases.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PPT, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as ppt, pdf, or txt
    124 views43 pages

    Ipsec

    Uploaded by

    babulgsm
    IPSec provides general IP security mechanisms including authentication, confidentiality, and key management. It can be used over LANs, WANs, and the Internet. IPSec uses security associations and security policies to determine how to process packets. It supports both transport and tunnel modes to secure host-to-host or gateway-to-gateway traffic. While IPSec aims to be transparent, network address translation can interfere with its operation in some cases.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    Download as ppt, pdf, or txt
    of 43

    IP Security

    IP Security

    Have a range of application specific


    security mechanisms
    eg. S/MIME, PGP, Kerberos, SSL/HTTPS

    However there are security concerns that


    cut across protocol layers
    Would like security implemented by the
    network for all applications

    IPSec
    General IP Security mechanisms
    Provides

    authentication
    confidentiality
    key management

    Applicable to use over LANs, across public


    & private WANs, & for the Internet

    IPSec Uses

    Transparency

    Benefits of IPSec
    In a firewall/router provides strong security to
    all traffic crossing the perimeter
    In a firewall/router is resistant to bypass
    Is below transport layer, hence transparent to
    applications
    Can be transparent to end users
    Can provide security for individual users
    Secures routing architecture

    IP Security Architecture
    Specification is quite complex
    Defined in numerous RFCs

    incl. RFC 2401/2402/2406/2408


    many others, grouped by category

    Mandatory in IPv6, optional in IPv4


    Have two security header extensions:

    Authentication

    Header (AH)
    Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

    Architecture & Concepts


    Tunnel vs. Transport mode
    Security association (SA)

    Security parameter index (SPI)


    Security policy database (SPD)
    SA database (SAD)

    Authentication header (AH)


    Encapsulating security payload (ESP)
    Practical Issues w/ NAT

    Transport Mode vs. Tunnel Mode


    Transport mode: host -> host
    Tunnel mode: host->gateway or gateway->gateway

    Encrypted Tunnel
    Gateway 1

    pted
    y
    r
    c
    n
    Une

    New IP
    Header

    Gateway 2
    Encrypted

    AH or ESP
    Header

    Orig IP
    Header

    Unen
    crypt
    ed

    TCP Data

    Transport Mode
    IP
    IP
    IPSec
    header options header
    Real IP
    destination

    Higher
    layer protocol

    ESP
    AH

    ESP protects higher layer payload only


    AH can protect IP headers as well as higher
    layer payload

    Tunnel Mode
    Outer IP IPSec Inner IP
    Higher
    header header header layer protocol
    Destination
    IPSec
    entity

    ESP

    Real IP destination

    AH

    ESP applies only to the tunneled packet


    AH can be applied to portions of the outer
    header

    Security Association - SA

    Defined by 3 parameters:
    Security Parameters Index (SPI)
    IP Destination Address
    Security Protocol Identifier

    Have a database of Security Associations


    Determine IPSec processing for senders
    Determine IPSec decoding for destination
    SAs are not fixed! Generated and customized per
    traffic flows

    Security Parameters Index - SPI


    Can be up to 32 bits large
    The SPI allows the destination to select the
    correct SA under which the received packet
    will be processed

    According to the agreement with the sender


    The SPI is sent with the packet by the sender

    SPI + Dest IP address + IPSec Protocol (AH or


    ESP) uniquely identifies a SA

    SA Database - SAD

    Holds parameters for each SA


    Lifetime of this SA
    AH and ESP information
    Tunnel or transport mode

    Every host or gateway participating in


    IPSec has their own SA database

    Security Policy Database - SPD


    What traffic to protect?
    Policy entries define which SA or SA
    bundles to use on IP traffic
    Each host or gateway has their own SPD
    Index into SPD by Selector fields

    Dest IP, Source IP, Transport Protocol, IPSec

    Protocol, Source & Dest Ports,

    SPD Entry Actions

    Discard
    Do not let in or out

    Bypass
    Outbound: do not apply IPSec
    Inbound: do not expect IPSec

    Protect will point to an SA or SA bundle


    Outbound: apply security
    Inbound: check that security must have been

    applied

    SPD Protect Action

    If the SA does not exist


    Outbound processing: use IKE to generate SA

    dynamically
    Inbound processing: drop packet

    Outbound Processing
    Outbound packet (on A)

    A
    IP Packet
    Is it for IPSec?
    If so, which policy
    entry to select?

    SPD
    (Policy)

    SA
    Database

    IPSec processing

    Determine the SA
    and its SPI

    SPI & IPSec


    Packet

    Send to B

    Inbound Processing
    Inbound packet (on B)

    From A
    SPI & Packet

    SA Database

    SPD
    (Policy)

    Use SPI to
    index the SAD

    Was packet properly


    secured?

    Original IP Packet

    un-process

    Architecture & Concepts


    Tunnel vs. Transport mode
    Security association (SA)

    Security parameter index (SPI)


    Security policy database (SPD)
    SA database (SAD)

    Authentication header (AH)


    Encapsulating security payload (ESP)
    Practical Issues w/ NAT

    Authenticated Header

    Data integrity
    Entire packet has not been tampered with

    Authentication
    Can trust IP address source
    Use MAC to authenticate

    Symmetric encryption, e.g, DES


    One-way hash functions, e.g, HMAC-MD5-96 or HMACSHA-1-96

    Anti-replay feature
    Integrity check value

    IPSec Authenticated Header


    SAD

    Length of the authentication header

    Next Header Payload Length


    (TCP/UDP)

    Reserved

    SPI
    Sequence Number

    ICV

    Integrity Check Value - ICV

    Keyed Message authentication code (MAC)


    calculated over
    IP header field that do not change or are predictable

    Source IP address, destination IP, header length, etc.


    Prevent spoofing
    Mutable fields excluded: e.g., time-to-live (TTL), IP
    header checksum, etc.

    IPSec protocol

    header except the ICV value field


    Upper-level data

    Code may be truncated to first 96 bits

    AH: Tunnel and Transport Mode


    Original
    Transport Mode

    Cover most of the

    original packet

    Tunnel Mode
    Cover entire

    original packet

    Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)


    Provide message content confidentiality
    Provide limited traffic flow confidentiality
    Can optionally provide the same authentication
    services as AH
    Supports range of ciphers, modes, padding

    Incl. DES, Triple-DES, RC5, IDEA, CAST etc


    A variant of DES most common
    Pad to meet blocksize, for traffic flow

    ESP: Tunnel and Transport Mode

    Original

    Transport Mode
    Good for host to

    host traffic

    Tunnel Mode
    Good for VPNs,

    gateway to gateway
    security

    Outbound Packet Processing

    Form ESP header


    Security parameter index (SPI)
    Sequence number

    Pad as necessary
    Encrypt result [payload, padding, pad length,
    next header]
    Apply authentication (optional)

    Allow rapid detection of replayed/bogus packets


    Integrity Check Value (ICV) includes whole ESP

    packet minus authentication data field

    SPI
    Sequence Number
    Encrypted

    Authentication coverage

    ESP Transport Example

    Original IP Header

    Payload (TCP Header and Data)


    Variable Length
    Padding (0-255 bytes)
    Pad
    Length

    Next
    Header

    Integrity Check Value

    Inbound Packet Processing...

    Sequence number checking


    Duplicates are rejected!

    Packet decryption
    Decrypt quantity [ESP payload,padding,pad

    length,next header] per SA specification


    Processing (stripping) padding per encryption
    algorithm
    Reconstruct the original IP datagram

    Authentication verification (optional)


    Allow potential parallel processing - decryption

    & verifying authentication code

    Architecture & Concepts


    Tunnel vs. Transport mode
    Security association (SA)

    Security parameter index (SPI)


    Security policy database (SPD)
    SA database (SAD)

    Authentication header (AH)


    Encapsulating security payload (ESP)
    Practical Issues w/ NAT

    NATs

    Network address translation = local, LAN-specific


    address space translated to small number of globally
    routable IP addresses
    Motivation:

    Scarce address space


    Security: prevent unsolicited inbound requests

    Prevalence of NATs

    Claim: 50% of broadband users are behind NATs


    All Linksys/D-Link/Netgear home routers are NATs

    NAT types
    All use net-10/8 (10.*.*.*) or 192.168/16
    Address translation
    Address-and-port translation (NAPT)

    most common form today, still called NAT


    one external (global) IP address

    Change IP header and TCP/UDP headers

    NAT Example
    IAPs Point of Presence

    Messages sent between host B


    to another host on the Internet
    Host B original source socket:
    192.168.0.101 port 1341
    Host B translated socket:
    68.40.162.3 port 5280
    A

    Router with NAT


    External IP: 68.40.162.3
    Internal IP: 192.168.0.0

    Router assigns internal


    IPs to hosts on LAN :
    A: 192.168.0.100
    B: 192.168.0.101
    C: 192.168.0.102

    Will IPSec Work with NAT ?

    Consider both AH and ESP protocols.


    Consider both transport and tunnel modes. For
    tunnel mode, consider the following two cases

    Sender NAT IPSec Gateway 1 IPSec Gateway 2


    Receiver
    Sender IPSec Gateway 1 NAT IPSec Gateway 2
    Receiver

    What about w/o port # translation?

    Backup Slides

    Combining Security Associations


    SAs can implement either AH or ESP
    to implement both need to combine SAs

    form a security association

    bundle
    may terminate at different or same
    endpoints
    combined by
    transport adjacency
    iterated tunneling

    issue of authentication & encryption order

    Combining Security Associations

    SA Bundle
    More than 1 SA can apply to a packet
    Example: ESP does not authenticate new IP
    header. How to authenticate?

    Use SA to apply ESP w/o authentication to

    original packet
    Use 2nd SA to apply AH

    Outbound Packet Processing...

    Integrity Check Value (ICV) calculation


    ICV includes whole ESP packet minus

    authentication data field


    Implicit padding of 0s between next header and
    authentication data is used to satisfy block size
    requirement for ICV algorithm

    Inbound Packet Processing

    Sequence number checking


    Anti-replay is used only if authentication is

    selected
    Sequence number should be the first ESP check
    on a packet upon looking up an SA
    Duplicates are rejected!
    reject
    0

    Check bitmap, verify if new


    Sliding Window
    size >= 32

    verify

    Anti-replay Feature
    Optional
    Information to enforce held in SA entry
    Sequence number counter - 32 bit for
    outgoing IPSec packets
    Anti-replay window

    32-bit
    Bit-map for detecting replayed packets

    Anti-replay Sliding Window


    Window should not be advanced until the
    packet has been authenticated
    Without authentication, malicious packets
    with large sequence numbers can advance
    window unnecessarily

    Valid packets would be dropped!

    IPv4

    ESP Processing - Header


    Location...

    New
    IP hdr

    ESP
    hdr

    Orig
    IP hdr

    ESP ESP
    TCP Data
    trailer Auth

    IPv6
    New New ESP Orig Orig
    ESP ESP
    TCP Data
    IP hdr ext hdr hdr IP hdr ext hdr
    trailer Auth

    Tunnel mode IPv4 and IPv6

    Key Management
    Handles key generation & distribution
    Typically need 2 pairs of keys

    2 per direction for AH & ESP

    Manual key management


    Sysadmin manually configures every system

    Automated key management


    Automated system for on demand creation of keys

    for SAs in large systems

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