CHAPTER FOUR: The Impact of the Somalia Situation on the Fight against Piracy in the East Coast of Africa

Introduction

Chapter four discusses the case study; which is the impact of the Somalia situation on the fight against Piracy in the East Coast of Africa. Somalia is at the heart of the East African coast piracy. Issues of failed state, anarchy, conflicts and terrorism will emerge in this chapter. This chapter forms the basis of the arguments the study wishes to advance; that is, it explores the problems experienced by Somalia as a failed state, and the impact of piracy on international maritime security.

Piracy is defined by the IMO via the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as ...any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft... To be considered as piracy, the convention holds that such acts must be committed on the high seas outside the jurisdiction of any state. 1 By definition, this removes attempted acts or those actions occurring within the recognized territorial waters of a nation-state. Therefore by definition, piracy involves acts occurring beyond the territorial waters of a state. At work is a Westphalia state logic that holds criminal activity within the territory of a state to be the jurisdiction and responsibility of said countrys government. Piracy is a problem that exists in international space and can be linked to a condition arising from the lack of political authority. In governed spaces, piracy is controllable by denying pirates land upon which to operate. However in Somalia, this presents a problem as there is no political authority to
1

Article 101, UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982).

exercise jurisdiction and responsibility in controlling criminal activities of pirates. Unlike in other parts of the world, Somalia case is unique since pirates have a sanctuary on land and territorial waters from which they can launch attacks and negotiate ransoms. This has presented maritime security forces with challenges to traditional strategies and tactics.2 Somalia Piracy Proliferation: environment and motivational factors The proliferation of piracy in the Horn of Africa can be attributed to various motivating factors. Historically, after the ouster of President Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991 by clan war lords, the Somali state essentially declined in existence, lacking any coordinated governmental authority. Hence, no meaningful security body has been able to replace the Somali regime following its collapse in 1991. The absence of designated policing authorities has created an ongoing security vacuum that has encouraged the clan violence and anarchy that make Somalia a failed state politically, economically, and socially.3 This observation led the UN Secretary-General Ban Kimoon; in 2008 to state that piracy is a symptom of the state of anarchy which has persisted in Somalia for over 17 years.4

Piracy off the coast of the failed state of Somalia has been growing at an alarming rate. In 2008, over 120 attacks have been reported; resulting in the seizure of more than 40 ships and the kidnapping of more than 600 crew members, and about $30 million (USD) in ransom has been paid.5 In May 2009, IMB reported pirate activity off the coast of Somalia to have jumped from a
2

Lauren Ploch et al., Piracy Horn of Africa, Congressional Research Report for Congress, Washington DC April 24,2009.
3

Jason McLure, The Troubled Horn of Africa: Can the War-torn Region Be Stabilised?, 3 Cq Global Researcher 149, 16364 (2009). P. 151.
4

Piracy Problem Inseparable from Overall Somali Crisis, Ban Warns, UN News Service, Dec. 16, 2008, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29334. 5 See Maliti, Tom. World struggles to take on plague of Somali piracy Washington Post, November 20. 2008.

total of 111 incidents involving 42 hijackings during the twelve months of 2008, to 114 incidents with 29 hijackings during the first four months of 2009.6 Somalia is therefore the epicenter of piracy activities in the East Coast of Africa and it is thus justified for the study to focus on the impact of the Somalia situation on the fight against Piracy in the East Coast of Africa.

For twenty years, the international community has largely ignored Somalias internal problems. With the emergence of international piracy along Somalias coastline, however, these problems threaten to spread throughout the broader region. The civil war destroyed Somalia, deprived its people of their homes and livelihoods, and created a parallel economy driven by piracy.7 Within the Somalia environment, the pirates operate in groups, predominately organized along clan lines, with the two primary groups operating in the Puntland region district of Eyl and the Muddug region district of Haradheere as the major bases. Therefore, most of piracy incidents occurred in the North Eastern part of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Piracy grew strong in these regions due to corruption by successive regimes that abetted the crime provided they received financial backing. The international community, especially the US, seems to have noted this and decided to engage the regional administrations in Puntland, thus discouraging government-pirates cooperation. Recently Puntland administration jailed and continues to prosecute Somali pirates.

Pirate attacks off Somalia already surpass 2008 figures. International Chamber of Commerce - Commercial Crime Services (2009). http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=352:pirateattacks-off-somalia-already-surpass-2008-figures&catid=60:news&Itemid=51
7

Workshop Commissioned by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN to Somalia Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Nairobi, Kenya, Nov. 1021, 2008, Piracy Off the Somali Coast, Final Report, pp, 3334 (Nov. 21, 2008), http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/somalia_piracy_intl_experts_report_consolidated.pdf [hereinafter UN Workshop].

The rise in the number of pirate attacks in Somalia is attributed to many factors, political crisis being the major one. Somali still suffers from lack of order and security. Twenty years of violence and anarchy have in turn left the Somali people in despair, with over 1.5 million Somalis dependent on food aid. This factor, coupled with the rather high rate of unemployment has pushed many Somalis to be involved in the rather lucrative craft of piracy.8

Economically, Somalia is one of the poorest states; hence piracy has become the most lucrative economy for Somalia, given its enormous payouts.9 Somali pirates have made millions of dollars in recent years by capturing cargo vessels in the shipping lanes around the Horn of Africa and holding the ships and crew for ransom. The value of loot taken in a piracy attack will vary from what can be stolen from the crew to the entire cargo of a large vessel. A common method of obtaining monies from piracy is to hijack the vessel and crew and then hold them for ransom to be paid by either the insurance companies or the home state of the vessel or crew. The money paid recently for ransom of ships hijacked off Somalia coast has been significant. For instance the Saudi flagged oil tanker MV Sirius Star and the Ukrainian flagged MV Faina were reportedly ransomed for $3.0 and $3.2 million respectfully in January and February 2009.10

Besides, the very existence of opportunity is also a critical factor for the rise in incidents of piracy. Somalia has 1,880 mile of unruly coastline along the Indian Ocean which enhances the number of

Potgiete, Thean, The Maritime Security Quandary in the Horn of Africa Region: Causes, Consequences, and Responses. East Africa Human Security Forum Discussion Paper, Hanns Seidel Foundation; Guerilla News Network, 2008. The Piracy Deflection. http://szamko.gnn.tv/blogs/29590/thepiracy-deflection 3 Oct, 2008.
9

Ryu, Alisha, 2008. Report Urges Global (http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008. 2 October).

Action

to

Curb

Piracy

in

Somalia.

Lauren Ploch et al., Piracy Horn of Africa, Congressional Research Report for Congress, Washington DC April 24,2009.p.9

target ships for the pirates, as they could access more ships within reach, and more safe places from which to launch attacks.11 Somalia also commands access to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and it is one of the busiest routes in the world; around 20, 000 vessels carrying oil and goods, destined to Europe and North America pass through this narrow gulf. This, in turn, has provided sufficient targets for the pirates, especially when the ships are forced to reduce their speed to pass through the narrow and busy sea lane.12

The decline of the fishing industry in Somalia after the collapse of a central government has also offered a conducive environment for piracy. The ungoverned coastal waters of Somalia have been heavily exploited by foreign fishing companies. In fact, during the decade that followed Barres ousting, some European and Asian countries took advantage of the chaos in Somalia by illegally sending their commercial fleets to fish in Somali waters without providing any compensation for such use.13 Somalia pirates interviewed by international media sources frequently link their piracy activities to trends such as illegal fishing and dumping in Somalia waters that have emerged following the country losing its ability to patrol its waters over time.14 As a result, foreigners were able to fish off the Somalia waters without restrictions. In January, 2009, CNN interviewed a local pirate leader, by the name Boyah: Boyah said that the piracy began because traditional
11

Nincic, Donna, State Failure and the Reemergence of maritime Piracy, California Maritime Academy, California State University Presented at the 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association March 26-29, 2008, San Francisco.
12

Kennedy, E., Somali Pirates Stare down Global Superpowers, The Associated Press. 2008. (http://www.chron.com/disp/story). Accessed 14 February 2011.

13

Alisha Ryu, Somali Piracy Exposes Weakness in UN Law of the Sea (Voice of America radio broadcast Apr. 8, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-04-08-voa67-68785907.html). Accessed 15 February 2011.
14

Lauren Ploch et a.l, Piracy Horn of Africa, Congressional Research Report for Congress, Washington DC April 24,2009.p.6.

coastal fishing became difficult after foreign fishing trawlers depleted local fish stocks. Traditional fishermen started attacking trawlers until the trawler crews fought back with heavy weapons. The fishermen then turned to softer targets. We went into deep Ocean and hijacked the unarmed cargo ships, Boyah said. For the past three years, we have not operated near the Somalia coast. We have operated at least 80 miles out, in international waters. 15 Similarly, Somalias Prime Minister stated in a speech in October, 2009 that many pirates are fishermen responding to the loss and disappearance of their livelihoods16 Therefore there is a general acceptance of the pirate groups as they are seen, by local Somalis, to be filling the void left by the absence of an organized government. The pirates do not see themselves as criminals; instead they claim that the real sea bandits are those who illegally fish in their seas and dump waste. To Somali pirates they are simply patrolling their seas.17 Roger Middleton, a Horn of Africa analyst, argues that what began as a legitimate fight by Somali fishermen against foreign exploitation has morphed into a criminal enterprise following the discovery of piracys lucrative potential.18 Not only do non-fishermen, who are motivated entirely by money, capitalize on the illegal fishing to supposedly legitimize and expand their pirate activities,19 but local fishermen also may resort to piracy.

15

Sterling, Joe. Navy Creates Force Devoted to Fighting Piracy. 2009. CNN.com. http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/01/08/piracy.task.force (accessed 15 November 2009).

16

Associated Press, Somali Pirates: Western Boats Loot our Fish Kidnappers Seeking $7 m for British Couple Try to Justify Actions. MSNBC.com, 31 October, 2009. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33566280/ns/world_newsafrica/ (accessed 1 November 2009).
17

Ross S., and Joshua Ben-David, Somalia Piracy: An Escalating Security Dilemma. Harvard Africa Policy Journal 5 (2008-2009): 55-70.
18

Alisha R., Somali Piracy Exposes Weakness in UN Law of the Sea (Voice of America radio broadcast Apr. 8, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-04-08-voa67-68785907.html). Accessed on 14 February 2011.
19

Ibid.,

Inadequate naval power and insufficient patrolling in the Horn of Africa and in Somalia in particular, have also provided a tremendous opportunity for the pirates. In the absence of a functioning central government, the coastal waters of Somalia remain unguarded. On one hand, the current Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia lacks ability to internally consolidate power, let alone effectively secure territorial waters; giving the pirates a room to maneuver freely. Further, the maritime security interest of the United States, that has a military base in the Horn of Africa, is heavily concerned with terrorism, piracy being very low in their list of priorities. Also, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), that was deployed to ensure peace there, is heavily embroiled in the local counter-insurgency, let alone providing security for the long coastline. Hence, the pirates armed with advanced technology and plenty of weapons find the opportunity to constantly launch attacks.20 In general, the ongoing political crisis in Somalia, combined with Somalia's strategic location, deteriorating humanitarian condition and wreaked economy that has rendered many unemployed and poor; have encourage the upsurge of Somalia piracy.

20

Kidist M. and Berouk M., Piracy off the Somali Coast Briefing On Human Security Issues in the Horn of Africa, Center for Dialogue on Humanitarian, Peace and Development Issues in the Horn of Africa April 2009. P.4

Proliferation of Somalia Piracy as an International Security Threat As piracy attacks and hijacking decrease in other once pirates infested areas of South Asia, Malacca Straits, the Caribbean and Nigeria among others; the Somalia case remains different as piracy attacks continue to escalate. Hence Somali piracy has become a sore national, regional and international security threat.

Piracy as a security threat in Somalia can be seen from various different angles. Nationally, piracy is believed to be fuelling the conflict by funding the insurgents who are fighting to remove the internationally recognized Transition federal government of Somalia. It is feeding the internal conflict, disrupting aid and incapacitating Somalias economy. It has also been argued that piracy is sponsoring terrorism; there being allegations that the pirates provide financial assistance to alShabab; an Islamist insurgency listed as terrorist group by the US.21 In his speech during the Greater Horn Horizon Forum (GHHF), the Executive Secretary of IGAD, Mr Mahboub M. Maalim, identified three constraints to conflict resolution in Somalia; the fragility and volatility of the security situation in Somalia, the problem of displaced persons and maritime piracy. 22

Piracy is also critically hampering aid delivery to Somalia, an issue raised by the World Food Programme (WFP). Food insecurity in the region, caused by drought and instability, has been heightened by high food and fuel prices in the local scene. Officials from the World Food Program (WFP), which ships tens of thousands of metric tons of food monthly to the Horn of Africa region, reports that it has become more expensive to ship assistance to Mogadishu, and that their ability to
21

Kidist M. and Berouk M., Op Cit.

22

Somalia: Perspectives for Getting Out of the Crisis and Building the State: The Roles of the Regional and International Organizations, Greater Horn Horizon Forum (GHHF), Report of the High-Level Round Table, 8 November 2009, Djibouti, Republic of Djibouti.

deliver relief is significantly hampered.23 The hijacking of vessels carrying aid usually results in the suspension of food deliveries, which in turn jeopardizes the lives of the Somali people.24 Economically, piracy makes Somalia a very dangerous destination thus discouraging potential overseas business partnership and investment. It is also reducing port revenues and funds available for Somalias struggling economy. The Marine sovereignty of Somalia is also violated as a result of piracy. Now different states are allowed to enter into the Somali territorial waters freely in the name of combating piracy.25

Regionally and internationally, piracy in Somalia continues to be a threat; as its economic implication on shipping companies, insurance companies and states is excessively high. It disrupts international trade, funds the vicious war in Somalia, provides breeding ground for terrorists, a convenient route for illicit economies, and can lead to serious environmental damage. 26 The 2011 report by former French minister Jack Lang, presented to the UN Security Council, said pirate raids are now costing at least $7 billion a year, a sum that includes the military force, lost merchandise, ransom fees and higher insurance.27

The level of human security threats and cost of piracy is also alarming. Initially, unlike in other parts of the world, Somalia pirates were less violent and mostly interested in the ransom sums.
23

Lauren Ploch et al, Piracy Horn of Africa, Congressional Research Report for Congress, Washington DC September 28,2009.p.14
24

Guyo M., Piracy in Somalia: Indications of a Breakdown of Global, Regional and National Security Systems. ISS, 2008.
25

Kidist M. and Berouk M., Piracy off the Somali Coast Op cit p.6

26

Middleton, Roger. Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars, Chatham House Africa Programme Briefing Paper No. 2. 2008.p.3
27

AFP UN Study Proposes Somalia Pirate Court, Tuesday 25 January 2011.

Their operations involved capturing of vessels and hostages with which ransom could be claimed. But of late, Somalia pirates have become violent with the number of deaths increasing for both pirates and vessel crew. For instance in February 2011, the South Korean navy commandos stormed a cargo ship, Samho Jewelry, which had been seized by pirates in the Arabian Sea and killed eight Somali pirates. According to Col Lee Bung-woo, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who led the rescue, three of Korean soldiers suffered light scratches on their bodies as they were fired upon by pirates while the captain of the ship suffered a gunshot wound to the stomach.28 This is because modern time pirates mainly in the East African coast have improved their style of operation by being equipped with high-tech weapons like explosives, launchers and speed boats equipped with radars. Modern day pirates are also well-trained. Modern maritime piracy attacks range from petty looting to hijacking for ransom and theft of the entire ships and cargos. Choke points and congested shipping lanes areas are mostly vulnerable to such pirate attacks. In general, the possession of technologically advanced weapons, coupled with the alleged information they receive from Somalis in the Diaspora about potential targets and the mother ship they own have increased pirates potential to launch successful attacks.29

The situation in Somalia, which until recently was considered a local conflict, represents a challenge to all regional and international players and requires a concerted response that factors in the strategic errors of the past and complex socio-political dynamics. The perception of a combination of increasingly al-Shabaab-backed pirates cooperating with Yemen pirates linked to

28

Alshahid News and Analysis, South Korea Rescues Samho Jewelry Crew from Piratesalshahid.net,21st February 2011.
29

Middleton, Roger., Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars, Chatham House Africa Programme Briefing Paper No. 2. 2008.

10

al-Qaeda operatives could pave way to the final securitization of the piracy problem and lead to a call for a comprehensive intervention.30

Efforts to Combat Somali Piracy

The current efforts, mainly international, to suppress piracy in the region have generally been in the form of supplying naval forces to detect and interdict pirate attacks. Dozens of warships from the European Union, the United States, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea and other countries patrol the Indian Ocean shipping lanes off Somalia. At the start, Operation ALLIED PROVIDER was launched in October 2008 to provide security for World Food Program deliveries of food aid to Mogadishu.31 This operation was terminated in December 2008 after the European Union established Operation ATALANTA to fulfill the same role. In March 2009, NATO initiated Operation ALLIED PROTECTOR, tasked generally with disrupting pirate attacks against vessels traversing the region.32

There are also significant legal concerns inherent in the suppression of piracy in East Africa by foreign states. It is also crucial that local governments take a leading role in the prosecution of pirates captured either by regional security forces or international fleets. To that end, Kenya has signed agreements with both the European Union and United States in early 2009 to receive pirates captured in East African waters. Furthermore, the Djibouti Code of Conduct calls on signatories to

30

Allesandra S., Piracy-threat or Nuisance?, Research Paper, Research Division- NATO Defense College, RomeNo. 56- February 2010, p.11
31

Lauren P. et al., Piracy off the Horn of Africa Congressional, Research Service, R40528, 19 (2009). Ibid.

32

11

ensure that local law provides an avenue for prosecuting suspected pirates.33 The UN Security Council Resolution 1816 (June 2008) authorized states acting in cooperation and with prior notification of the TFG to enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. The resolution affirmed that the authorization for action applies only with respect to the Somali exceptional situation and should not be considered as establishing customary international law.34

There was a reduction in pirate activity in Southeast Asia following the conclusion of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (ReCAAP); and therefore governments in the region have begun to implement a similar system for coordinating anti-piracy efforts. However, the East African and Middle Eastern states that would be parties to such an agreement do not have resources, financial or legal, commensurate with the scope of the Somali pirate threat. In his speech during the Greater Horn Horizon Forum (GHHF) the Executive Secretary of IGAD, Mr Mahboub M. Maalim, identified three constraints to conflict resolution in Somalia; the fragility and volatility of the security situation in Somalia, the problem of displaced persons and maritime piracy. Faced with these challenges, he recommended strengthening the capacities of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in order to reinstate the rule of law and regulate current malfunctions.35 The view has been that the solution to piracy lies both on land and at sea. Somalias lack of central governance limits the countrys capacity to tackle
33

See Jacquelyn S. Porth, Legal Experts Take Action to Prosecute Pirates, AMERICA.GOV, Feb. 27, 2009. (http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2009/February/20090227144346sjhtrop0. 3818781.html.) accessed on 10 February 2011.
34

S/Res/1816 (2008) available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions08.htm. Accessed on 12 February 2011. 35 Somalia: Perspectives for Getting Out of the Crisis and Building the State; The Roles of the Regional and International Organizations, Greater Horn Horizon Forum (GHHF), Report of the High-Level Round Table, 8 November 2009, Djibouti, Republic of Djibouti.

12

onshore piracy. Furthermore, the active offshore piracy that is taking place in the Gulf of Aden provides a clear indication of the state of anarchy within Somalia. 36 It is not possible to confront piracy without addressing the collapse of the Somali state and the inherent poverty, governance issues, and absence of the rule of law in the region. Professor Isami Takeda of Dokkyo University in Japan also pointed to three core components of the Somali conflict that fuelled anarchy and the political economy of war; piracy, arms trafficking and the lack of infrastructures and industries. He therefore stressed that industrial development, in particular of the fisheries sector, would foster economic growth and offer an alternative to the recruitment of young people into piracy.37 In addition, the ongoing civil war in Somalia has led to the internal displacement of millions of people, making the country a refuge for suspected terrorist organizations.38 The international community must play a role in peace-building and state reconstruction to enable Somalia to deal with piracy in a meaningful and effective way.

The Obama Administration has endorsed the Bush Administrations overarching strategic approach with regard to the piracy threat, so that in addition to providing expanded material assistance to the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), U.S. officials and military personnel engage with leaders and officials from of Puntland to encourage them to act against piracy and to improve coordination with international efforts.39 So as to tackle piracy from inland, one possibility is holding out the prospect of recognition for Puntland in return for suppression of
36

Alemayehu F., Anarchy, Terrorism, and Piracy in Somalia: New Rules of Engagement for the International Community, AM. CHRON., May 27, 2009, http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/103942. Accessed on 14 February 2011.
37

Ibid.,

38 39

Ibid., Lauren P., et al, Piracy Horn of Africa, Congressional Research Report for Congress, Washington DC September 28,2009.p.17

13

piracy and its attendant bases by the local authorities. Unless the anarchy that has been allowed to engulf Somalia since 1991 is dealt with, deployments to the region will become long term.40

Suggested Ways of Tackling Piracy in the East African Coast

In December 2009, the Cambridge Coalition to Combat Piracy proposed that if the United Nations (UN), concerned world powers and African nations combined with maritime industry stakeholders to mount a combined approach Somali piracy could be curbed.41 This approach would have to include measures to deter pirates on land as well as at sea, and would necessarily need to employ carrots as well as sticks. Since piracy is but an income-generating industry rather than a way of life, suitable incentives could wean pirates away from their dangerous pursuits. Those incentives would need to be complemented with both stepped-up patrols and ship-borne measures that make successful hijackings less likely and more costly.

Piracy can be deterred at sea, but reducing individual and group incentives to turn to piracy for income, adventure, livelihoods and self-respect, will only prove successful when more rewarding alternatives exist on land and/or a sufficiently strong local governing force shuts pirate bases and subsidiary support operations.42 The main pirate cartels that operate out of Puntland and northern Somalia cannot function exclusively at sea as they need to bring their captured ships back to home bases and for logistical services in support of their hostages. They also require home bases from
40

Liam B., What Can Be Done To Counter Somali Piracy? Research Institute for European and American Studies (Rieas) Research Paper, No. 129, March 2009 (http://www.rieas.gr). Accessed on 14 February 2011.
41

Robert I. Rotberg, Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with Recommendations for Action, Policy Brief No. 11 World Peace Foundation Cambridge, January 26, 2010, pp.3-4 42 Robert I. Rotberg, Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with Recommendations for Action, Policy Brief No. 11 World Peace Foundation Cambridge, January 26, 2010, pp.3-4.

14

which to conduct the internationally extensive ransom negotiations that are at the very heart of the piratical enterprise. Either directly or indirectly, each act of piracy from the Somali region is carried out with the implicit cooperation of local power-brokers on land. Those power-brokers may be clan-based warlords or even leaders of the semi-autonomous Puntland region. The Somali regime has also for some time justified piracy, and rationalized support for piratical activities on the premise of illegal foreign fishing and alleged toxic dumping. Irrespective of whether or not those claims are correct, they are believed locally and widely accepted.

The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, recognized by the UN and the African Union (AU), and supported by the United States, nominally controls all of Somalia. However, its domain of power is concentrated in a small section of Mogadishu and a few other western and central Somali villages and towns. Further North, along the Somali coast are localities and areas controlled by clan-based warlords where some of the pirate operations are based. Within the semiautonomous Puntland region is a major base of pirate operations in Harardhere.43 None of these governmental entities has thus far managed to exert an influential control over the pirates. Indeed, it appears as if the pirates dominate most of the potential sources of governance in their areas, and either bankroll or control alternative sources of political power. Therefore much effort should be geared towards strengthening the government and also initiating a peace process between the warring factions. Good governance is therefore absolutely fundamental to achieving sustainable security and development, not only in Somalia but the entire African continent. Hence concerted efforts must be made to address failure of governance and internal contradictions that serve to undermine human development. These factors are numerous but corruption, marginalization,

43

Ibid.,

15

poverty and injustice feature as the most prominent causes of insecurity onshore, which subsequently extends offshore in the form of piracy.44

Another option is to follow the piracy money and know where it goes and how it is used so as to discourage or stop investment of the same. The extent to which Somali piracy is a purely local response to opportunity and perceived grievance is exaggerated. Some of the proceeds that flow from successful ransom actions stays at home in Somalia and Puntland, but a large proportion of the take-off flows out of Somalia to Kenya, the United Arab Emirates, and other distant points managed by members of the Somali Diaspora and entrepreneurs from Europe and Arabia.45 The young pirates grow wealthy compared to other young Somali by going out to sea to capture innocent merchant vessels. The battle against piracy will be assisted when we know precisely where the money goes, who controls the sources of financing, and who receives the profits. Links, direct or indirect, to terror might be uncovered. With international support and legislation, piracyfueled assets and bank accounts can be seized, or at least the movement of such funds be impeded. States in the Horn of Africa should be encouraged to pass tough money-laundering laws. So that if profits from piracy reduce, and if ransoms become harder to acquire, the pirates would turn elsewhere for gainful employment. There have been other suggestions like making ships harder to capture through modifications such as electric fencing, improving speed, using blinding light beams, arming crew etc. Similarly, strengthening the legal response like creating and extraterritorial Courts will enhance the fight against piracy in the East African region. The international community should continue its training and assistance to build Kenyas court capacity, both to
44

Onuoha F, Sea Piracy and Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa: The Somali Coast and Gulf of Aden in Perspective, in Dean-Peter Baker, African Security Review, African Maritime Security, ISS, Vol 18 No 3 September 2009.
45

Robert I. Rotberg, Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with Recommendations for Action, Policy Brief No. 11 World Peace Foundation Cambridge, January 26, 2010, p. 7

16

address the piracy problem and for Kenyas long-term benefit. Tanzania, the Seychelles, Mauritius, and other countries should be encouraged to volunteer to receive pirates to be tried in their own court systems.

Conclusion In conclusion, the proliferation of piracy in Somalia continues to pose a serious threat to international security. The U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration (MARAD) issued a September 2009 advisory warning U.S. vessels to anticipate an increase in piracy attacks. The advisory further states that: Despite the increase in presence and effectiveness of naval forces in the region, as well as the effectiveness of defensive and protective measures, pirate activity has continued unabated.46 There are indications that pirates in the area continue to adapt their techniques and procedures in order to achieve success in capturing vessels, both in the Gulf of Aden as well as in the open sea off the east coast of Africa, particularly in the increased distances that they are able to operate effectively off the east coast of Somalia potentially utilizing mother ships.

Until 2008, the international community did not respond to the threat of piracy in the waters of Somalia in a coordinated and concerted manner, but of late there are significant efforts being implemented towards combating piracy off East African coast by way of the naval operations. Although naval vessels patrolling the Maritime Security Patrol Area provide a measure of deterrence through their presence, this is limited due to the vastness of the affected area. This

46

U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration Advisory No.: 2009-07, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Indian Ocean Transit, September 9, 2009.

17

aspect, coupled with the high volume of shipping in the region, makes it impossible to guarantee the safety of all ships.47

The development of a cooperative regional response in East Africa in 2009 has mirrored regional reactions to the threat of piracy in the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia; which are credited with having drastically reduced the instance of piracy in Southeast Asia since 2005. Eradicating piracy in the Horn of Africa region will also require collaboration of littoral states though it may prove to be a more daunting task. Piracy off the East African coast is exacerbated because vast areas of the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden where the pirates operate are remote, Somalia remains largely ungoverned, and regional states have relatively weak naval capabilities.48 Moreover, most of todays pirates are unemployed young men; many of them are ex-militia from the internal wars of the South attracted to piracy by the opportunities for gain that piracy has revealed.49

The Secretary General has also warned that some of the pirate groups now rival established Somali authorities in terms of their military capabilities and resource bases. There may now be three distinct pirate groups, the northern gang, based in Eyl; the central gang, based in Hobyo; and the southern gang, based in Harardera.50 Pirate groups have operated from these remote communities, since the early 1990s. The northern semi-autonomous region of Puntland appears to
47

U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration Advisory No.: 2009-07, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Indian Ocean Transit, September 9, 2009.
48 49

Lauren Ploch et al, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, Congressional Research Service, September 28, 2009, pp.4-5 Robert I. Rotberg, Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with Recommendations for Action, Policy Brief No. 11 World Peace Foundation Cambridge, January 26, 2010, p.3
50

International Crisis Group, Somalia: The Problem with Puntland, Africa Briefing No. 64, August 12, 2009.

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be home to the most active and capable pirate networks, and some regional and local government officials there are alleged to have facilitated and profited from piracy prior to recent efforts by regional leaders to crack down on piracy-related corruption. However, in April 2009, Puntland security forces began to launch raids on pirate bases, and the regions courts have tried and convicted suspected pirates.51 Local authorities also initiated wayigelin, a sensitization campaign and have offered general amnesty to those that renounce piracy. Puntlands regional authorities have developed a basic coast guard, but accounts suggest that the equipment and capabilities of this small force remain very limited. Some of the pirates may have previously received training by Somalias former navy and by foreign security firms and been given semiofficial status to intercept foreign fishing vessels and extract fines. Today, the pirates are collectively referred to by Somalis as burcad badeed (sea bandits).52 Nevertheless, piracy appears to have become an attractive pursuit for young men, creating potential legal complexities for regional and international governments seeking to try young pirate suspects for alleged crimes.

The following is a map showing the key piracy locations and the waters surrounding the Horn of Africa where pirates have concentrated their illegal activities.

51

AllAfrica, Anti-Piracy Campaign Begins Today in Puntland, April 24, 2009; and, AllAfrica, Puntland Nabs 15 Pirate Suspects, Seizes 5 Boats, May 18, 2009. 52 Ibid.,

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