Democracy and Development in Africa

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Foreword .................................. i

Introduction ............................. iii


Le coût de la résolution des conflits
éloigne l’Afrique des OMD/
The Cost of Resolving Conflicts
takes Africa away from the MDGs

Presentation:

Western Democracy: Is it Applicable


in Africa?
Daniel Tetteh Osabu-Kle............... 2

Contributions:

Democracy and Its Practice: A


General Theory of Democratic
Relativity
Daniel Tetteh Osabu-Kle............... 16

Africa’s missing billions


International arms flows and the
cost of conflict
OXFAM ....................................... 26

Upholding Human Rights as the Most


Cost Effective Option in Averting
Violent Conflicts in Africa
Patrice E. Vahard ........................ 52

Democracy and Development in Africa


Démocratie et Développement en Afrique
A grant from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to support the
project is gratefully acknowledged.

Nous remercions le Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement (PNUD) de


son soutien financier pour la réalisation de ce projet.

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Foreword
The quest for development in Africa has preoccupied
politicians and economists alike. Africa is one of the richest
continents in terms of natural resources, yet its citizens remain
the poorest on earth. There are many potential explanations
to this irony, and one of these is the poor governance
environment in many parts of the continent.
As Africa struggles to alleviate poverty, bring about rapid
socio-economic development and integrate into the global
economy, the debate over good governance has become topical, thanks to the proven
impact of the latter on the attainment of the aforementioned objectives. Within this
context, the issue of democracy has taken centre stage.
Democracy derives from the Greek words demos and kratos meaning rule of the people. As
a form of government, it is generally defined as power of the people, by the people and
for the people. By implication, the government must belong to the people and not
imposed from outside; the citizens, not outsiders, must set the rules; and it should be a
means of helping the people achieve their aspirations. Based on the foregoing, therefore,
the cultural aspect is extremely important in any democracy. People must be free to
devise their own styles of government as a means to achieving their set objectives. These
will undoubtedly vary significantly from one place to the other, in view of difference is
culture. Hence, the failure of Western-style liberal democracy in some parts of the world
can be blamed largely on the failure on the part of the West to adequately gauge the
impact of cultural differences.
In Africa, much progress has been made in the democratization process. This is
evidenced by the growing number of multi-party elections, greater influence of civil
society in government policy, and the adoption of the African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance in January 2007.
Good governance, guided by strong democratic institutions, has a direct link to peace and
stability. In Africa, many conflict situations are direct consequences of poor governance
environments. In addition to this, the entrenchment of corruption in some quarters has
had significant effects on the cost of doing business which consequently impacts on
competitiveness and level of investment inflows. Addressing this problem is therefore
likely to improve the business environment, attract investments and impact positively on
economies.
In recognition of the aforementioned, concerted effort is being made at continental level
to improve the democratic space and governance climate. Great importance is attached to
NEPAD‘s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). To date, 29 AU Member States
have acceded to the APRM, 7 have completed their reviews and several are at various
stages of undertaking their assessments. On the issue of addressing the problem of
corruption, more than 15 countries have ratified the AU Convention against Corruption
whereas more than 40 have ratified the UN Convention on Anti-Corruption. Other legal
instruments such as the Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, and the
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance will go a long way in further
entrenching the principles of democracy and good governance in Africa.

i
Africa must do more to embrace the principles of democracy. This will mean not only
ratifying conventions, but also ensuring that they are applied to the letter and strong
institutions developed to uphold the principles of democracy. Failure to do the latter
could result in a reversal of significant gains made in democratic processes.
The continent must also do more to ensure that the masses have a say in the way in
which their resources are managed. Hence, prudent economic governance and the
equitable distribution of resources are vital to guarantee balanced development and
stability.
By upholding the principles of democracy and good governance, Africa would be laying
the foundation for peace, progress and prosperity. This way, the abundant resources we
have can benefit the masses who deserve much better.

Dr. Maxwell M. Mkwezalamba


Commissioner for Economic Affairs

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Introduction
Introduction
Le coût de la The Cost of Resolving
résolution des Conflicts takes Africa
conflits éloigne away from the MDGs
l‟Afrique des OMD
Depuis le début des Since the beginning of the 90s, the world
années 90, le monde has been marked by the domination of the
est caractérisé par la market economy, symbolised by the
domination de phenomenon of globalisation. At the
l‘économie de political level, this change manifested itself,
marché, symbolisée par le phénomène de among others, by the collapse of the
la mondialisation. Au plan politique, cette Eastern block, the fall of the Berlin Wall,
mutation s‘est manifestée, entre autres, par the speech of F. Mitterand at La Baule,
l‘effondrement du block de l‘Est, la chute calling upon the whole of Africa to adopt
du mur de Berlin, le discours de la Baule de the virtues of the Greek democracy. In its
F. Mitterrand invitant l‘Afrique, tout attempt at democratisation, Africa has
entière, à adopter les vertus de la witnessed several concrete cases. If some
démocratie grecque. Dans sa tentative de African countries adapted themselves to
démocratisation, l‘Afrique connaît this new international factor, others, on the
plusieurs cas de figure. Si certain pays other hand, got engulfed in different
africains s‘accommodent de cette nouvelle problems: serious political crises, painful
donne internationale, d‘autres, par contre, democratic alternation, armed rebellions,
se sont englués dans divers maux : crises intra and inter- State conflicts, resurgence
politiques graves, alternances of xenophobia, ethnocentrism, religious
démocratiques douloureuses, rebellions fundamentalism and so on.
armées, conflits intra et inter Etats,
résurgence de la xénophobie,
ethnocentrisme, fondamentalisme
religieux, etc..
Depuis un temps, l‘Afrique vit au rythme For some time now Africa has lived at the
d‘interminables conflits dont les tentatives pace of unending conflicts, whose
de résolution sont extrêmement onéreuses. attempted resolution, is very expensive.
Des sommes colossales sont consacrées au Huge amounts are devoted to conflict
règlement des conflits et aux opérations de resolution and Peacekeeping operations.
maintien de la paix. Ces coûts These extremely high costs lead one to ask
extrêmement élevés conduisent, entre the following fundamental question: And
autres, à poser la question fondamentale if, all being equal elsewhere, these
suivante : et si ces ressources colossales, phenomenal amounts were devoted to the
toutes choses étant égales par ailleurs, financing of development projects? In
étaient consacrées plutôt au financement other words, if Africa did not face conflicts
de projets de développement ? En d‘autres and if the funds allotted to conflict
termes, si l‘Afrique ne connaissait pas de resolution were earmarked for the
conflits et si les fonds alloués à la productive sectors of African countries
résolution des conflits étaient affectés aux what would be the situation of Africa
secteurs productifs des pays africains,
quelle serait la situation de l‘Afrique

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aujourd‘hui ? Le continent serait-il une des today? Would the Continent have been
économies émergentes? Serait-il en bonne one of the emerging economies? Would it
voie pour atteindre les OMD ? Autant have been on track to attain the MDGs?
d‘interrogations qui s‘offrent à l‘esprit So many questions come to mind when we
lorsque l‘on tente de s‘appesantir sur les try to dwell on all types of cost incurred by
nombreux coûts, de tous genres, que conflicts in Africa. These very high costs
gênèrent les conflits en Afrique. call for a careful consideration, without any
L‘énormité de ces coûts invite à un examen complacency, of the problem of the
minutieux et sans complaisance de la application of the Western democracy in
problématique de l‘applicabilité de la Africa and consequently a better analysis of
démocratie occidentale en Afrique et, the impact of conflicts on the development
partant, à une meilleure appréciation des of African countries. The costs of conflicts
effets des conflits sur le développement can be summed up in the following
des pays africains. Les coûts des conflits manner:
peuvent être récapitulés de la façon
suivante :
i) The direct costs (resulting directly
i) Les coûts directs (résultant from violence and involving direct
directement de la violence et expenses) :
impliquant des dépenses directes) :
 Medical expenses;
 Les frais médicaux ;
 Military expenses;
 Les dépenses militaires ;
 Destruction of infrastructures;
 La destruction des infrastructures ;
 Costs related to the attention to
 Les coûts liés à l‘attention portée be paid to refugees and
aux réfugiés et aux personnes
displaced persons.
déplacées.
ii) The indirect costs: they are generally linked
ii) Les coûts indirects : ils sont to lost opportunities. In that case the
généralement liés aux opportunités countries face:
perdues. Dans ce cas, les pays
connaissent :  High inflation rate;
 Un taux élevé d‘inflation ;  Increasing indebtedness;
 Un endettement croissant ;  Decrease in Foreign Direct Investments
(FDI) and local investments;
 Un recul net des investissements
directs étrangers (IDE) et des  Structural and chronic under-
investissements locaux ; employment;
 Un sous-emploi structurel et  Marked deterioration of public services.
chronique ;
 Une détérioration marquée des
services publics.
iii) The invisible costs (costs that are difficult to
iii) Les coûts intangibles (coûts
quantify but affect the life of the peoples and
difficiles à quantifier, mais affectant
their development capacity)

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la vie des populations et leur capacité de  Psychological costs such as trauma;


développement)
 Spread of a culture of violence
 Les coûts psychologiques tels que particularly among the youths;
le traumatisme ;
 Break in family and inter-
 La propagation d‘une culture de Community links, etc..
violence surtout chez les jeunes;
 La rupture des liens familiaux et
inter-communautaires, etc..
Les conflits qui sévissent sur le continent The conflicts persisting on the Continent
constituent un handicap majeur pour sa constitute a major handicap for its growth
croissance et son développement. Selon and development. According to a study
une étude réalisée en 2007 par l‘International carried out in 2007 by the ‘International
Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA),
OXFAM et SaferWorld, et intitulée OXFAM and SaferWorld, and entitled
«Africa‘s Missing Billions – International Arms "Africa‘s Missing Billions – International Arms
Flows and the Cost of Conflict», environ 300 Flows and the Cost of Conflict‖, about 300
milliards USD ont été perdus par les pays billion US Dollars have been lost by
africains depuis 1990, du fait des conflits African countries since 1990 due to armed
armés. Cette somme, selon cette même conflicts. That amount, according to the
étude, est l‘équivalent de l‘aide same study, is the equivalent of
internationale fournie par les principaux international aid given by the main donors
donateurs au cours de la même période. Si during the same period. If the 300 billion
ces 300 milliards USD n‘avaient pas été US Dollars had not been lost or wasted
perdus ou gaspillés en raison des conflits through armed conflicts, they could have
armés, ils auraient pu contribuer à remédier contributed to the solution of many
aux problèmes du continent et notamment problems of the Continent and particularly
à la promotion du développement durable, to the promotion of sustainable
à la réduction de la pauvreté et à la lutte development, poverty reduction and
contre la maladie. disease control.
L‘étude révèle également que l‘Afrique The study also reveals that Africa loses
perd environ 18 milliards USD par an, du about 18 billion US Dollars per year as a
fait des guerres et des rébellions armées. result of conflicts and armed rebellions.
Cette étude met en lumière quelques The study highlights some illustrative
indicateurs illustratifs des conflits et des indicators of conflicts and the costs related
coûts liés aux conflits en Afrique : to conflicts in Africa:
 95% des armes utilisées dans les  95% of arms used in conflicts
conflits viennent de l‘extérieur du come from outside the Continent
continent (IANSA, OXFAM, et (IANSA, OXFAM, and
SaferWorld (2007)) ; SaferWorld (2007)) ;
 38% des conflits dans le monde se  38% of conflicts in the world take
déroulent en Afrique (Muggah R. place in Africa (Muggah R.
(2007)) ; (2007)) ;

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La moitié des conflits les plus  Half of the most destructive
destructeurs ont lieu en Afrique conflicts have taken place in Africa (Hiik
(Hiik (2006)) ; (2006)) ;
Comparés aux pays en paix, les pays Compared to other countries at peace,
africains où sévissent des conflits ont en African countries, where conflicts are
moyenne : taking place, have, on an average:
 50% de plus de mortalité infantile ;  50% more of infant mortality;
 15% de plus de personnes mal  15% more malnourished people;
nourries ;
 Life expectancy reduced by 5
 une espérance de vie réduite de 5 years;
ans ;
 20% of more adult illiterates;
 20% de plus d‘adultes
analphabètes ;  2.5 times less of doctors per
patient,
 2,5 fois moins de médecins par
patient,  12.4% less food per inhabitant
(World Bank (2007)) ; and
 12,4% moins de vivres par habitant
(World Bank (2007)) ; et  63% less per capita GDP (IMF
(2007)).
 63% moins de PIB par habitant
(IMF (2007)).
Comme on le voit, les indicateurs ci-dessus As can be seen, the above indicators
confortent manifestement l‘idée que les obviously beef up the idea that conflicts
conflits sont extrêmement onéreux pour are extremely costly for our countries and
nos pays et notre continent. Ces données our Continent. These data add fuel to the
ajoutent au pessimisme des afro- pessimism of the Afro-pessimists as to
pessimistes quant à la probabilité de voir Africa witnessing a better future one day
un jour l‘Afrique connaître des lendemains because of the persistence of conflicts on
meilleurs, du fait de la persistance des the Continent. Hardly a hotbed of conflict
conflits sur le continent. À peine un foyer is resolved than another one breaks out, as
de guerre est-il éteint qu‘un autre se if all the conflict generating factors are
rallume, comme si tous les facteurs ever-present in Africa. Is there an effective
générateurs de conflits se donnaient and lasting therapy for this deplorable
rendez-vous en Afrique. Existe-t-il une situation?
thérapie efficace et durable à cette
déplorable situation ?
En réalité, les solutions proposées sont In truth, the solutions proposed are many.
nombreuses. Mais la solution qui à nos But the solution, which according to us,
yeux semble la plus crédible et la plus facile seems the most credible and easiest to
à mettre en œuvre tient à la création de implement is the creation of wealth and its
richesses et à leur répartition équitable. equitable distribution. The equation that is
L‘équation qui est mise en exergue ici est highlighted here is the very strong positive
celle de la très forte corrélation positive et and significant correlation between poverty
significative qui existe entre pauvreté et and conflicts. The equation that is

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highlighted here is the very strong positive


conflits. En d‘autres termes, et les faits de
and significant correlation between poverty
tous les jours nous le prouvent, là où sévit
and conflicts. In other words and the facts
la pauvreté ou la misère, la probabilité
of everyday bear evidence, that, where
d‘éclatement de conflits de tous genres
there is poverty and misery, the probability
constitue une quasi-certitude. La pauvreté
of an outbreak of all types of conflict is
et la misère dressent quotidiennement le lit
almost certain. Poverty and misery prepare
de la guerre. La pauvreté et la misère
daily the ground for war. Poverty and
appellent la guerre, et la guerre entretient la
misery invite war and war perpetuates
pauvreté et la misère. Pour rompre cette
poverty and misery. To break this
dynamique appauvrissante, voire
impoverishing, indeed pauperising, circle,
paupérisante, l‘Afrique doit s‘entourer de
Africa should use all the possible assets to
tous les atouts possibles pour créer des
create wealth and develop its economic
richesses et valoriser le potentiel
potential, while offering decent jobs to
économique, tout en offrant des emplois
Africans and particularly to youths and
décents aux Africains, et notamment aux
women. The establishment of a strong
jeunes et aux femmes. La création d‘une
growth for a sustainable development and
croissance forte pour un développement
the guarantee of an equitable distribution
durable et la garantie d‘une répartition
of the fruits of this growth represent surely
équitable des fruits de cette croissance
the best response to the vicious circle of
représentent assurément la meilleure
conflicts in which Africa seems to be
réponse au cercle vicieux des conflits dans
structurally engulfed. Not to understand
lequel l‘Afrique semble s‘être enlisée
this almost universal truth tantamounts to
structurellement. Ne pas comprendre cette
practising the policy of burying one‘s head
vérité quasi universelle revient à pratiquer
in the sand, whose consequences are huge
la politique de l‘autruche dont les
for the present and future generations of
conséquences sont énormes pour les
our Continent.
générations présentes et futures de notre
continent.
Oui, les conflits handicapent Yes, conflicts impede Africa daily in its
quotidiennement l‘Afrique dans sa marche march towards progress, economic and
vers le progrès, l‘intégration économique et political integration. The causes of these
politique. Les causes de ces conflits sont de conflicts are many and varied. Resolution
nature diverse et variée. La résolution de of these conflicts is very costly. And if
ces conflits est extrêmement onéreuse. Et these phenomenal amounts were devoted
si ces montants faramineux étaient to development projects in a peaceful
consacrés aux projets de développement Africa? And if it is a dream, we have, for
dans une Afrique apaisée ? Si c‘est un rêve, once, the right and even the duty to dream!
nous avons pour une fois le droit et même
le devoir de rêver !

Dr René N‟Guettia Kouassi


Directeur des Affaires économiques
Director of Economic Affairs

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“Democracy and Development in Africa”

« Démocratie et Développement en Afrique »

1
This paper which draws from both
Western Democracy: Is it Applicable
recent and historical experience seeks to
in Africa?
question the compatibility and
Daniel Tetteh Osabu- appropriateness of liberal democracy in
Kle1 the African cultural environment.
1.0 Introduction Specifically, it attempts to answer the
following pertinent questions. Do we
Liberal democracy need a strong State without democracy
or Western or a democracy without a strong
democracy has State? Is there an African voice of
become a religion democracy? It also seeks to address the
which the West, relationship between tribalism/ethnicity
with the Breton and democracy in Africa. It begins by
Woods organizations as their principal explaining the etymology of democracy,
agents, is preaching to the rest of the its meaning, and its various forms. After
world and Africa, in particular, as the explaining that pure democracy does not
vehicle to good governance. Like exist anywhere and that, in reality, it is a
development, it is a religion in the sense culturally compatible articulation of
that though it has consistently failed to democracy and dictatorship that exists in
work in Africa, unflinching faith in it all societies arguments and evidence are
continues to discourage questions about advanced in support of the view that
its cultural compatibility, appropriateness liberal democracy is inappropriate to the
and affordability. For the West, there is African cultural environment and that an
no reason why whatever is good for ―us‖ African voice of culturally compatible
should not be good for ―them‖. This democracy exists that can be modified to
Western mentality is what Basil suit the requirements of modern
Davidson calls ―The Church of Fifth government and establish the
Stage Adventism‖i. For Africa governance conditions necessary for
impoverished through four centuries of successful development. It is argued
captive slavery followed by a century of further that the nation and state building
colonial enslavement within the shackles blocks of this African or Jaku democracy
and tutelage of imperialism and decades can be used to establish the United
of neocolonialism, the resulting subtle States of Africa and make Africa great as
mental slavery encourages dancing it was in ancient times.
faithfully to whatever economic or
political music is beamed from the West. 2.0 What is democracy?
This acquiescence is dangerous to Africa Etymologically, the word democracy
and should be analyzed within the comes from two Greek words: demos
context of power relations emanating meaning the people and kratos meaning
from the larger religion of globalization rule. Hence, democracy is essentially the
with liberal democracy as its political rule of the people as a whole. While
subset. there is no problem with the
etymological, pure or essential meaning
of democracy, problems arise with
operationalization of the rule of the
1
Professor in the Department of Political people. In very small communities, the
Science, Carleton University, Canada. Author people as a whole can meet and take
of the book “Comparative Cultural
Democracy: the key to development in Africa” decisions that affect them. This is direct
(2000). democracy. As societies become more
2
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complex, it becomes difficult for the Making decisions which are binding on
people to assemble and take decisions the people presupposes the willingness
together concerning their common of the people to accept those binding
good. The process of decision making decisions. It is this acceptance of the
itself becomes so protracted that binding decisions which make the
democracy becomes like a jelly with people governable. Hence, democracy
infinite degrees of freedom (Hobbesian assumes the prior existence of
state of nature). It becomes both governable people. In a situation of
convenient and necessary for some few chaos such as occurred in Iraq after the
selected, appointed, or elected removal of Saddam where people are
representatives to assume not governable, democracy is
the role of making binding of no use.
decisions on behalf of the Binding decisions mean that
people. This is the representatives have
representative authority to tell or dictate to
democracy. There is no the people what to do and
one best way for selecting, what not to do. Thus, the
appointing, or electing representatives become
these representatives. It necessarily authoritarian.
depends entirely upon the Hence, representative
worldview of the people determined by democracy has a necessarily
their values, beliefs, orientations, authoritarian or dictatorial component
attitudes, knowledge base, history, without which it cannot function.
traditions and customs which define However, there is some trade off. The
them and explain how they think and greater this dictatorial component, the
act. This world view of the people is
less the democratic component.
their culture. Mathematically, there exists an inverse
It is within this representative context relationship between the democracy
that democracy is perceived as a component and the dictatorship
government of the people, by the people component. Pure dictatorship does not
and for the people which according to exist either, for every dictator has some
Abraham Lincoln shall never perish council where free or democratic
from the earth. However, the people discussions take place. Who a democrat
does not mean the absence of exclusion is and who a dictator is entirely in the
for, in both direct and representative eyes of the beholder. For example, to
democracy, there is some measure of the followers of George Bush, Saddam
exclusion by age or by registration. Hussein was a dictator while to the
Babies and children are excluded and so followers of Saddam Hussein, Saddam
are foreigners or non-citizens. Given the was a democrat and George Bush is the
premise that the common people are in worst dictator ever who dictates to the
majority, the representative process is entire world.
expected to reflect the rule of the Moreover, modern democracies and
common people. In practice, dictatorships have something in
representative democracy does not common. They both operate through
necessarily reflect the rule of the bureaucracies which are authoritarian.
common people. This is precisely what Max Weber advances liberal democracy
the elite theorists emphasize, oligarchy - as an appropriate means for controlling
the rule of the organized few. the powerful bureaucracy, but
3
dictatorships also exercise control over ingredients of both dictatorship and
the same bureaucracy. What then is the democracy. In my article Democracy and
difference? It is much more a matter of its Practice: A General Theory of Democratic
style and perceived degree of control. In Relativity (www.panafricanwisdo.com), I
analyzing the relationship between explained the mathematically inverse
liberal democracy and bureaucracy in the relationship between these two
exercise of this articulated
control function, …Modern democracies components of
David Beetham real (practical)
and Eva Etzioni- and dictatorships have democracies. I
Halevyii explain something in common attach it as an
in detail how annexure to this
bureaucracy is a liberal democratic paper. I proceed to explain further why
dilemma because they consider the two democracy should be a government of
to be separate. They are not! What they the people, by the people and for the
overlook is that authoritarianism or people.
bureaucracy is an integral part of real 3.0 A government of the People, by
(practical) democracy for, lo and behold, the People and for the People
even the political parties of liberal
democracy are bureaucracies. The Democracy as a government of the
private corporations are also people implies that it must be owned by
bureaucracies. Do they have their own the people themselves and not imposed
liberal democracies to control them? by outsiders. It must be a product of
Certainly, no. They are controlled by their ideas which reflect their culture -
boards of governors, a government of values, beliefs, orientations, attitudes,
the selected few who dictate to the rest. knowledge base, history, traditions and
customs so that it authoritatively
Elite theorists including, the classical allocates their own values to them. For
elite theorists, Mosca, Pareto, Michel example, African democracy must
and modern elite theorists such as Mills, allocate African values to Africans and
Porter, Field and Higley have drawn not European or American values to
attention to the fact that, despite the Africans. When the people own their
expensive partisan political competition own democracy, they are more apt to
and claims of existence of democracy, it respect it and abide by its rules. If they
is the organized few that rule the do not own it, they are more apt to rebel
majority comprising the unorganized against it or reject it. The attempts by
masses. This dictatorship of the western governments to impose liberal
organized few is in effect a reference to democracy as a precondition for the
the dictatorship component of grant of independence or by the Breton
democratic practice. The Marxist notion Woods organizations acting at the
of a dominant class of capitalists and the behest of the same Western
notion of the executive of the modern governments to impose liberal
State being ―a committee for managing democracy through structural
the affairs of the whole bourgeoisie‖ adjustment conditionalities are therefore
also substantiate the fact that democratic a contravention of this principle of
practice has a dictatorship component. democracy. Such imposition is not
Thus, I advance the thesis that democracy, the rule of the people, but
democratic practice is invariably a democrazy, demonstration of craziness.
convenient product comprising some The character of such imposition is not
4
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democratic but democrazic. It is no dreams contravenes this fundamental


wonder that such imposition has not led principle of democracy. The persistence
to democracies in Africa, but democrazies of racial discrimination (detrimental to
as exemplified by the historical equal opportunity, equity and justice)
experience of Nigeria‘s Biafran war, and inequalities - coexistence of abject
Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and poverty with billionaires - in the so
recently, the lamentable experience of called western democracies is proof that
Kenya. liberal democracy has failed miserably as
democracy for the people. Go to the United
Democracy by the people means the
States, Britain, France and you will find
people and only the people must
abject poverty in the midst of plenty
participate in it in accordance with the
despite centuries of liberal democracy,
rules they have set and not according to
decades of space age pomposity, and
rules set for them by outsiders. It
inordinate pride boasting of arsenals of
implies that it is the citizens, and only
weapons of mass destruction. I
the citizens, who should participate in it.
therefore advance the thesis that
Strangers and outsiders are excluded and
should not interfere. The interference of western liberal democracy is
the West in the in the democratic hypocritical, inadequate and
processes of African countries such as inappropriate for mobilizing the
election monitors from outside is a very people for the realization of the
serious violation of this fundamental common good, their dreams and
principle of democracy. aspirations.
Organizing democratic practice to fulfill
Democracy for the people means
the objectives of being of the people, by
democracy is purposeful. It must be a
the people
means by
which the …Western liberal democracy and for the
people is
people can
realize their is hypocritical, inadequate culturally
specific.
aspirations. It and inappropriate for Since
implies
democracy
mobilizing the people for the cultural
should realization of the common values
differ it
facilitate the good, their dreams and cannot be
attainment of
the aspirations aspirations expected
that
of the people
African democracy should be the same
including reducing transaction costs. It
as Chinese democracy, Western
must help the people solve their
democracy, or Russian democracy or any
problems. Genuine democracy must be
other foreign democracy. What matters
capable of mobilizing the people and
is cultural compatibility that recognizes
directing their talents and energies
and adapts to slow but sure cultural
towards the realization their needs and
dynamics to ensure political stability.
aspirations. A predatory government
Cultural incompatibility can lead to
that always takes from the people to
provide fat salaries to politicians and political chaos. It is not therefore
surprising that the sudden and holus
officials while providing negligible
bolus transplantation of liberal
services to the people or fails to mobilize
democracy in Africa has led to much
the people to meet their needs and
5
political chaos in the continent and has gets what and when and economics is
undermined the achievement of the concerned with the production of the
necessary preconditions for successful what. Before liberal demand for goods
development. Culture, though dynamic, and services, there must be capacity and
changes slowly and is linked to the level capability for liberal production of those
of development of the productive forces goods and services. That is precisely why
or the mode of production. Thus, pre- industrialization wisely preceded the
capitalist culture and a capitalist culture bourgeois revolution that led to the
should not be expected to be the same. development of liberal democracy in the
It follows that a pre-capitalist political West. The demands and requirements of
culture cannot be expected to be the the capitalist political kingdom and the
same as the political culture of a precapitalist political kingdoms are just
capitalist society. not the same. To expect the pre-
capitalist culture of Africa to swallow
4.0 The Inappropriateness of
liberal democracy without pain and at a
Western Democracy in Africa
time when industries are not even on the
Western democracy, also called liberal drawing boards is unfair, a reflection of
democracy is appropriate for the double historical standards, and raises
capitalist mode of production and questions about the sincerity of those
culture of Western society which who advocate so, including their
emphasizes competition. It should not possible hidden agendas.
be forgotten, however, that liberal
Some characteristics and practices of
democracy did not surface in Western
liberal democracy further confirm its
society until that society had become
inappropriateness in Africa. These derive
industrialized and capitalist. When
from its partisan and competitive nature.
western society was pre-capitalist, its
Its partisan nature divides society along
culture was not capitalist and, for this
partisan lines. When this partisan nature
reason, liberal democracy did not exist
is superimposed upon the multiethnic or
there. The pre-capitalist culture of
multi-clan societies of Africa, the
Western society passed through several
invocation of ethnic and clan symbols
stages in response to changes in the
during the competitive campaigns to win
dominant mode of production. I
votes sets centrifugal political forces into
therefore advance the thesis that
motion which tend to tear the very
liberal democracy is only appropriate
fabric of society apart rather unite it.
for the capitalist mode of production.
Loyalty and commitment to the nation
Liberal democracy emphasizes individual
are sacrificed for
choice leading
liberal …Liberal democracy loyalty to the party
to
demands. Until is only appropriate for while the sovereignty
of the people becomes
industrialization
has taken roots the capitalist mode of the sovereignty of the
party. I therefore
with capacity production advance the thesis
and capability
to meet these liberal demands liberal that one of the
democracy is inappropriate. To principal hidden agendas of those
introduce liberal democracy prematurely who advocate liberal democracy for
is to commit an economic suicide as Africa from the West might be to
liberal demands stretch the economy keep African countries divided and
beyond its limits. Politics is about who weak enough to be dominated
6
:

politically – the same divide and rule


borrow from outside. Such borrowing
logic of imperialism. Imperialism is cannot be expected to be without strings
like Johnny Walker, born 1820, still attached. When this happens, liberal
going strong! democracy becomes a sell out for the
resulting party government is not owned
Moreover, the formation of political
by the people, but by outsiders and a
parties and the subsequent political
violation of
campaigns are
not only very …the formation of political a
fundamental
expensive, but parties and the subsequent
principle of
also divert
scarce political campaigns ….divert democracy
itself. I
resources scarce resources from therefore
from
development development… advance the
thesis that
and
encourages straddling and corruption to one of the principal hidden agendas
raise funds for political competition. The of those who advocate liberal
expensiveness of the political campaigns democracy for Africa might be to
of liberal democracy is substantiated by enable them advantageously own and
the tens of millions of dollars being control African governments from
spent on the processes of just selecting outside. This is buttressed by the fact
that it is the same people who enslaved,
the nominees of Democratic and
colonized and continue to neo-colonize
Republican parties of the United States
Africa and their agents who advocate
before the November presidential
liberal democracy for Africa. They
elections. Is that what Africa really
advocated it for the Palestinians, but
needs? The expensiveness of liberal
when Hamas won the elections, they
democracy raises many questions about
refused to recognize it. Are they really
why it is recommended for
serious about the liberal democracy they
impoverished Africa. The
preach?
economies of African countries
are known to be very weak. Is it …cultural problems Surely,
liberal
fair to expect the weak are associated with
economies of Africa to afford liberal democracy…
the expensiveness of liberal
democracy? Analogously, does it
democracy is like its own mother,
make sense to expect a poor fellow to
imperialism. They both have a forked
purchase an expensive Mercedes Benz
tongue for they do not practice what
car? This is my call to Africa, my native
they preach. Should Africa not be
land, the land of my birth. Listen, O
suspicious at least?
Africa! Liberal democracy is a luxurious
and expensive political Mercedes Benz. There are also cultural problems
Moreover, it is neither the only political associated with liberal democracy in
car available nor the only real democratic Africa. African culture emphasizes
car. Why buy it? If political parties in cooperation rather than competition for
African countries find themselves not competition is regarded as an easy
capable of raising adequate funds to invitation for the devil to enter. For this
finance their parties and the political reason, a competitive spirit is frowned
campaigns, there is a great temptation to upon right from childhood while
7
cooperation and compromise are therefore competition between enemies
emphasized. On the contrary, Western and election time is a time of war
culture emphasizes competition which it between uncompromising enemies. As
embraces as a means to efficiency. It African culture predicts and expects of
explains why liberal democracy involves competition, the devil of competition
competition among political parties. enters with its sharp claws turning real
Unfortunately, the expensive political (practical) democracy into real (practical)
campaigns are not conducive to democrazy. It explains why elections in
efficiency. Africa are characterized by much
violence resulting in much loss of life.
According to African culture, people
should not praise themselves, for it is The ballot box technology of liberal
more honourable for others to praise democracy complicates the problem. In
them. Contrary to this fundamental such an electoral war, it is not so much
cultural value, the political campaign of who actually votes, but who controls the
liberal democracy both requires and ballot box, stuffs it with ballot papers
encourages individuals to mount political and announces the results. It is also not
platforms praising themselves as good so much who is convinced about some
people to be trusted and who deserve political principles or values, but who
votes. Various scandals including the can buy much electoral votes. All sides
recent scandal of Governor Eliot Spitzer in the competition know the possibility
of New York State, confirm that the of such political games. Under such
candidates are not as good as they claim conditions, it is difficult to trust the
and may even be hypocrites and crooks. ruling government who appoints the
Also, in African culture, it is a disgrace electoral commission and is perceived as
and a taboo to fail to honour your having some power over it. It is
promise. In liberal democracy, more therefore not surprising that much vote
often than not promises made at the rigging and vote buying characterize
campaigns soon turn into dupes. elections in Africa. It is also not
Indeed, the successful politician of surprising that post election accusations
liberal democracy is the one who is able of vote rigging and unfairness are so
to manipulate the people with vain common. Even if no vote rigging
promises to win the most votes. Because occurs, the suspicion persists for it is not
African culture abhors vain promises, easy and honorable to accept defeat at
when hopes are suddenly dashed the hands of the enemy. Examples of
through broken promises, the resulting this include the recent elections in
mistrust of politicians leads to social Nigeria and Kenya. Certainly, this is not
unrest and political turmoil. Another democracy but democrazy.
cultural problem is linguistic. In the The time-mandate in liberal democracy
indigenous political culture there were where those elected cannot be replaced
no political parties and the concept of until the end of their mandate
political opposition did not exist. The encourages the phenomenon of
only force of opposition came from the dictatorship of the elected few in which
enemy from outside. There is therefore a Prime Ministers and Presidents are
tendency in Africa to linguistically virtually mandated dictators. Once the
consider the member of an opposing elections are over, they dictate to the
party as an enemy rather than a fellow people rather than listen to them as
citizen who happens only to have election promises are soon thrown into
different political views. Election is the garbage can. Thus, despite much
8
:

opposition from the American and of the United States are identified and
British people and rest of the world, defined, its state apparatuses respond to
acting on a casus belli of weapons of achieve the level of strong sate required
mass destruction which both Britain and to meet the challenges and marshals the
America have amassed in abundance, support of its allies when necessary. In
George W. Bush and Tony Blair the same manner, Africa must aim at
declared war on Iraq with impunity. having no friends and no masters or
Ironically, George Bush and Tony Blair lords, but interests which it must identify
later justified their invasion of Iraq in the and define. Additionally, African
name of establishing democracy there. countries must be able to identify who
But a dictator is one who is able to carry their real allies are. Are their true allies
out his intentions despite much those who give them aid with strings
resistance to the contrary. Thus, by such attached or those who give them aid
analytical criterion, George Bush and without strings? Are their allies those
Tony Blair qualify as dictators. Some who deny them reparations as
may even argue that they dictated to the atonement for centuries of slavery, a
entire world while Saddam Hussein only century of colonialism and decades of
dictated to Iraqis. Despite this, both neocolonialism or are they those who
Tony Blair and George Bush claim to be are supportive of reparations which have
champions of democracy. This confirms been paid to all human societies except
my thesis that liberal democracy, like Africans?
beauty, is in the eyes of the beholder. Its An obstacle standing in the way of
dictatorship component is always Africa identifying its interests is the
present and can be increased to or legacy of the scramble for Africa which
invoked to achieve the status of a strong resulted in Africa being divided into little
state at any time. This leads to the
and weak bits. Under such conditions, it
question of whether Africa needs a is difficult for an individual African to
strong State without democracy or a define its interests effectively. A city
democracy without a strong State. divided against itself cannot stand. It is
5.0 Does Africa need a strong State up to the political leaders of Africa today
without democracy or a to decide whether to continue with this
democracy without a strong particular legacy of colonialism or not. I
State? call to Africa, my native land again!
Listen, O Africa, there is wisdom in the
The rectangular hyperbolic relationship
maxim of Osagyefo Dr. Kwame
between democracy and dictatorship
Nkrumah ―Seek ye first the political
confirms that both pure democracy and
kingdom and all other things shall be
pure dictatorships are impossible for the
added unto it.‖ Imported liberal
graphs do not cross the axes though
democracy, imported socialism, and
asymptotic to them. Strong state is
imported military rule have all failed and
obtained by increasing the dictatorship
proved incapable of providing Africa
component as desired. Desire is a
with this political kingdom – the United
product of interest. Once interest is
States of Africa. It is only a continental
identified and defined, the state
government of Africa that can
apparatuses can be rearranged to raise or
lower the dictatorship content to obtain effectively identify and define the
interests of Africa effectively and
the level of strong state required.
mobilize the human and material
According to the United States it has no
resources of continent to achieve the
friends, but interests. Once the interests
9
level of strong state required to meet not take place. It is to emphasize that
Africa‘s needs. Africa in bits can achieve after conquest, the processes of
very little. Divided African states absorbing the conquered to expand the
emerging in less than a century from empire followed the consensual
colonialism with weak and vulnerable democratic process. It should not be
economies competing with one another forgotten that most of the ancient Greek
and weakened deeper and deeper by philosophers revered today including
premature imposition of liberal Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras, Socrates,
democracy can only hope to be beggars Euclid, Diodorus, Solon, Thales,
with caps in hand lining up for their turn Hypocrates, Archimedes, and Euripides
of the crumbs that fall from the masters‘ received their schooling in Egypt where
tables. This is the scenario at the present. they learnt at the feet of the Egyptian
Can Africa rise above this? Yes, we can masters.iii These masters were Africans.
provided we unite to constitute the It is difficult to deny that these
United States of Africa. The rudiments philosophers carried rudiments of
for constituting this United States of democracy in Africa to Greece. The
Africa are present in Africa‘s own origin of democracy might therefore not
indigenous democracy and so are the be in Greece, but in Africa.
solutions to Africa‘s problems. Thus, to the ancient Greeks, Egypt of
6.0 Is there an African voice of the pharaohs was both the origin and
democracy? fountain of wisdom amazing in
mathematics and
Liberal democracy is not the
only type of democracy Democracy is not philosophy and
flocked there to
available to humanity. alien to Africa…
acquire both
Democracy is not alien to
wisdom and
Africa for it is an integral
knowledge that were not available in
part of its pervasive consensual culture
Europe. In his histories written around
and reflected very much in its mode of
450 B.C, Herodotus reminded his
organization of labour, cooperative
readers that the names of the gods of
labour. Under trees, in compounds, in
ancient Greece came to Greece from
farms and in rooms, Africans or their
Egypt. Homer before him asked
selected representatives gathered to
emphatically, was it not to the lands in
make consensually democratic decisions
Africa south of Egypt that that the gods
about their common good in both the
of Greece flew once a year to feast with
economic and political spheres. Through
the older gods of inland Africa?iv If the
this consensual decision making process,
ancient Greeks could borrow or copy
clans united to constitute villages and
the gods of Africa, what prevented them
villages merged to form towns and cities.
from borrowing or copying the
The same building blocks were used to
democracy of Africa?
constitute nations. We hear of the
ancient Egyptian empire, the Ghana, In my book, Compatible Cultural
Mali, and Songhay empires of the Democracy: The Key to Development in Africa,
Western Sudan, the Monomapata I explained how this consensual
kingdom of Zimbabwe, the Zulu empire democracy which I called Jaku
of South Africa to mention a few. These democracy worked and how the
were all products of the same consensual institution of Ajina (an odd number of
processes. This should not be people selected at random at any
interpreted to mean that conquests did council) helped to break any consensual
10
:

deadlockv. There are no parties in social welfare function under liberal


consensual democracy and democratic conditions. However, it can
representatives are selected according to be optimized under consensual or Jaku
their known qualities right from democratic conditions.vi The superiority
childhood and not by political of Jaku democracy over liberal
competition. Thus, in Jaku democracy democracy in the African cultural
the people know those they select very environment is therefore very difficult to
well and no chance is given to hypocrites deny, for while liberal democracy tends
or crooks. There is no time mandate and to divide Africans, Jaku democracy tends
they can be removed at any time if they to bring them together and unite them
do not perform. Such removal is by facilitating the transfer of the
considered a disgrace. For this reason, ideological symbols of unity from the
the representatives are kept on their toes ethnic level to the national level through
to deliver their best. It is characterized its consensual process which gives all
by a balance between centralization and ethnic groups equal voice.
decentralization to prevent the abuse of Jaku democracy means an end to
power and to ensure the effective concentration of power in the hands of
participation of citizens at all levels of one person and the complete eradication
the political system. Preliminary of all forms of dictatorship and tyranny
decisions taken at the top are fed down for the people decide by consensus.
to the lower levels for their Consensual decision making encourages
consideration and feedback before final and empowers the free exchange of
and binding decisions are taken. ideas leading to
Some argue forward ever and
that …Consensual democracy backward never
consensual – „Jaku Democracy‟ – is dynamics. Its mode
democracy is
possible only
the best compatible of organization of
labour means an
in small democracy for Africa… end to the
phenomena of
communities. That view is far from the unemployment and poverty so prevalent
truth. The empires of Ghana, Mali, and in western democracies. Because of its
Songhay were no small communities and rejection of cultural stasis or
the kingdoms of the Ashanti, Ga, conservatism and its strong recognition
Ovimbuda and Zulu to mention only a of cultural dynamics, it means
few were not small either. Moreover, the continuous improvement in the
United Nations, a very huge and organization of the consensual political
complex organization in modern times system to conform to the requirements
operates mainly by consensus despite the of modern government. For this reason,
possibility of veto at its Security Council. when Africa becomes industrialized and
In Compatible Cultural Democracy: The Key capitalist, a type of democracy shall
to Development in Africa, Chapter 5, I emerge which may be similar, but not
explained in detail how this Jaku the same as the inadequate liberal
democracy can be modified to satisfy the democracy of the West, for it shall
requirements of modern government. I allocate African values to the Africans of
argued that the Nobel prize laureate those days. Jaku democracy does not
Kenneth Arrow proved mathematically mean delinking from the rest of the
that it is impossible to optimize the world. Rather, it seeks to integrate and
11
reorganize African political systems and principally rooted in the legacy of
unite Africans in such a manner that slavery and colonialism and are
Africa, as a whole, can participate more invoked and animated by the
effectively in the political economy of partisan politics of liberal democracy.
the world. It means an end to As explained above, the partisan and
destructive competition among African competitive nature of liberal democracy
states through judicious distribution of exacerbates these ethnic tensions and
industries and productive activities to divides the people as politicians invoke
promote a strong internal trade so ethnic symbols to win votes. The winner
conducive to autocentric development. take all stance of liberal democracy has
7.0 Tribalism or Ethnicity and the tendency to alienate ethnic
Democracy in Africa minorities. On the contrary, Jaku
democracy overcomes ethnic tensions
The word tribe is not an African word,
through its consensus building process
but a European word that was used to
which emphasizes cooperation rather
describe the structure of past European
than competition and gives all ethnic
society especially the Goths of Germany
groups including minorities equal voice.
who were also called the barbarians.
While ethnicity is a problem in liberal
Hence, there is an inextricable
democracies, it is not a problem at all in
association between the word tribe and
Jaku democracy. Historical evidence
the word barbarian. Unfortunately, the
supports this view. When liberal
word barbarian is used to describe
democracy failed to work in Somalia and
savages. It was in this negative sense
the modern state of Somalia collapsed, it
that imperialism described African social
was the consensual democracy of the
formations as tribes. For this reason, and
clan system which rescued the various
because Africans are not Gothic
clan communities from disaster and
Europeans, I do not like to use the word
fostered inter-clan cooperation and
tribe to describe any social formation in
communication. Recently, the former
Africa. In Africa, there were nations and
United Nations Secretary General, Kofi
sub-nations which continue to exist
Annan, has been engaged in bringing the
despite the European legacy of division
warring ethnic factions in Kenya
of the continent into bits under
together using the principles of
colonialism. These nations and sub-
consensual democracy. Again, when
nations may be referred to appropriately
liberal democracy failed and incited
as ethnic groups. Ethnic tensions
violent ethnic conflict in Kenya, it was
accompanied the processes of the
consensual democracy that came to the
European and Arab slave trade in
rescue. Unfortunately, after the rescue,
Africans which set one African nation
the leaders of Kenya are expected to
against another African nation for the
operate within the same political religion
purposes of obtaining captives. It should
– liberal democracy. Why? Because
not be forgotten that the Atlantic slave
Kenyans still have faith in that religion
trade in Africans was between
which the West beams vehemently to
Europeans in Africa and Europeans in
the whole world. By returning to and
Europe and the Americas.vii The
embracing its own democracy, Africa
processes of the colonial conquest and
colonial logic of divide and rule had the can achieve a lot and even lead the world
again.
effect of worsening these ethnic
tensions. I therefore advance the thesis
that ethnic tensions in Africa are
12
:

8.0 Conclusion: What can Africa large and strong federal army that can
Achieve Under its Own Voice of easily and swiftly crush any rebellion
Democracy? anywhere without assistance from
outside shall dissuade such attempts.
Africa can practice its own Jaku
Industrialization shall open the way for
democracy more effectively to solve its
value added exports that create more
problems because it owns it and knows
jobs and make unemployment a thing of
how to apply it being its own political
the past. Unemployment is impossible
culture. The nation-building and state-
in African cooperative labour. Land is
building blocks of Jaku democracy can
available in abundance, why should
be applied to establish the United States
Africans be unemployed?
of Africa and to create a strong and
Unemployment was a deliberate creation
encompassing political coalition capable
of colonialism through the imposition of
of identifying, defining and realizing the
the hut tax and poll tax to obtain a
interests and aspirations of the people of
reserve army of labour for the mines, the
Africa. Africa, the slumbering giant shall
colonial administrative system, and the
awake and proudly project the African
colonial military. Jaku democracy means
identity, respect and dignity within the
genuine decolonization and an end to
world community. Africa shall become
nominal independence in the shackles
the pride of the descendants of its
and tutelage of neocolonialism. Africa
children who were stolen to Europe and
shall no longer be the exporter of
America and shall welcome them back
primary products, but of finished
with open arms. The brain drain from
products. Africa shall once again assume
Africa to the rest of the world shall not
its role as the fountain and origin of
only come to an end, but be reversed.
wisdom amazing in mathematics,
In this United States of Africa, there
science, technology by establishing and
shall be no longer be citizens of Nigeria,
expanding learning and research
Ghana, Somalia, Kenya, Algeria, Tunisia,
institutions second to none in the world.
Egypt, Tanzania etc., but citizens of the
United States of Africa with one destiny. Some may ask curiously, can the United
States of Africa ever catch up in great
Africans shall no longer communicate
scientific and technological feats such as
with Africans via Europe and neither
putting a satellite into orbit, sending
shall banks in Africa be the virtual
astronauts to walk on the moon and
extensions of banks in America and
participate effectively in the international
Europe for Africa shall have its own
space station where astronauts float like
bank and is own independent common
kites in weightless space? Of course we
currency. The great East-West and
can, but we are wiser and can do better
North-South trade routes which the
than that so long as famine, disease and
forces of colonialism closed shall be
poverty abound on earth. Can Africa
opened again and the internal trade of
produce nuclear weapons and ballistic
the over 800 million Africans shall be
missiles to serve as deterrence to others?
greater than those of Europe and
Of course we can and we can use such
America put together. Africa shall no
deterrence to press for the reparations
longer have multiple and uncoordinated
long overdue to Africa from Europe,
foreign policies each vetted and
approved from Europe and America, America and the Arab world, but we are
wiser than that. Instead, we shall apply
but one foreign policy that speaks one
our superior wisdom and knowledge of
potent voice. Political stability shall be
the technology of desalination of
ensured and coups shall cease for the
13
seawater to create artificial rivers and once again the brightest continent and
lakes from the Atlantic and Indian the hope of the entire world. The souls
Oceans and the Mediterranean Sea to of the ancestors of Africa including the
irrigate and transform the Sahara and great Pharaohs, Emperors, Kings and
Kalahari deserts into bread baskets for Queens shall rise and join us in singing
Africa in particular, and the world as a ―Great Africa leads the world again. O
whole. Poverty and famine shall vanish Africa, how great you are!‖ Certainly,
away and hope for the future shall liberal democracy cannot achieve this.
become as the bright as the sun. Africa, Surely, the Jaku democracy of the United
the dark continent of today shall become States of Africa can.

14
Contributions
The following section
presents opinions
and articles obtained
from interested
individuals or
institutions.

15
democracy may be said to be in the eye
Democracy and Its Practice: A
of the beholder.
General Theory of Democratic
Relativity The essential or real meaning of
democracy derives from two Greek
Daniel Tetteh Osabu-Kle1
words demos and kratos. Demos means the
1.0 Introduction: Defining common people (not the aristocracy) and
Democracy kratos means rule. Thus, democracy
Democracy has been defined in various essentially means the rule of the common
ways by different people including people (citizens). As explained above, any
government of the people, by the people attempt to define it otherwise is a matter
and for the people, government with the of convenience and may have its roots in
consent of the governed, and a form of the difference between what democracy
regime that derives from popular essentially is and how it is practiced.
sovereignty in which ordinary citizens Defining what constitutes the common
are endowed with the right and ability to people and what constitutes rule have both
govern themselves. It is my contention been the subject of much debate. Calling
that concepts may have real (essential), the common people simply, the people,
nominal and operational definitions and Robert Dahl questioned how the people
democracy is no exception. The real are designated (Dahl, 1989, p.3). For
definition is concerned with the true, Rustow democracy has to be preceded
essential or philosophical nature of the by national feeling or a feeling of
concept. The nominal definition is national unity for ―The people cannot
concerned with what has been agreed decide until somebody decides who are
upon by society, a particular community the people.‖(Rustow, 1970, pp.337-367).
or by a researcher that helps to imagine At the time of the ancient Greeks, the
and describe what the concept is. common people who could take part in
Although the nominal definition can political decision making was defined to
lead to the description of the concept, it comprise only a subset of the people as a
may not necessarily lead to its whole, for children, prisoners, women
measurement. The operational definition and slaves were excluded. For the
specifies the indicators of the concept to Greeks, the exclusion of certain sections
enable its measurement directly or of society from the definition of the
indirectly. Democracy has only one real common people was reasonable and did not
or essential definition. Other definitions render democratic practice null and void.
of it arise precisely because there is a In modern democratic practice,
difference between the real or essential exclusion of certain sections of society
meaning of democracy and the actual including foreigners and children still
practice of democracy that leads to exists and considered reasonable. The
nominal and operational definitions. problem in democratic practice is,
While the real, philosophical, ideal or therefore, what constitutes a reasonable
essential meaning of democracy remains exclusion. No matter how reasonable it
the same, the actual practice of is, however, exclusion undeniably
enables one section of society (who may
1
or may not be the majority) to dictate to
Professor in the Department of Political those that are excluded. Democratic
Science, Carleton University, Canada. Author
practice may therefore be conceived of
of the book “Comparative Cultural
Democracy: the key to development in Africa” as a mixture of some essence of
(2000). democracy and some measure of
16
:

dictatorship. democracy content or level of


democracy depends
Exclusion may also be subtle and there
upon the amount of the dictatorship
is no place on this planet where the
content or level of dictatorship.
common people (interpreted as the masses)
Denoting the level of
rule. Elite theorists including, the
democracy by Y and the level of
classical elite theorists Mosca, Pareto,
dictatorship by X, the relationship
Michel and modern elite theorists such
between the two may
as Mills, Porter, Field and Higley have
be expressed mathematically as:
drawn attention to the fact that, despite
partisan political competition and claims Y = K/X.
of existence of democracy, it is the Thus,
organized few that rule the majority YX = K. .................................................. (1)
comprising the unorganized masses. Where K is a constant.
This dictatorship of the organized few is This is the equation of a rectangular
in effect a reference to the dictatorship hyperbola with the level of democracy as the
component of democratic practice. The dependent variable and the level of
Marxist notion of a dominant class of dictatorship as the independent variable.
capitalists and the notion of the For every political system, the value of
executive of the modern State being ―a the constant K is different giving rise to
committee for managing the affairs of a family of rectangular hyperbolas. We
the whole bourgeoisie‖ also substantiate may call K, the democratic product
the fact that democratic practice has a constant. A sketch of the family of
dictatorship component. Thus, rectangular hyperbolas is given in figure
democratic practice is invariably a 1 below. The rectangular hyperbolas
convenient product comprising some represent paths of democratic practice
ingredients of both dictatorship and demanded by society. Once the value of
the essence of democracy. K is calculated for any society, the path
2.0 The Democratic Practice of democratic practice can be drawn. As
Model explained below, the family of
rectangular hyperbolas can help predict
Democratic practice involves a constant
the impact on democratic practice both
struggle between society and State in
under challenging and harmonious
which society demands some
level of the essence of
democracy mixed with some Y
Fig. 1
level of dictatorship and the
State provides what it Increasing K
considers a balanced mixture.
Some level of
dictatorship is always required
as a control function to avoid
anarchy. The relationship
between the dictatorship
component and the democracy
component of democratic
practice demanded by society X
is such that when one increases
the other decreases - an inverse
relationship. The amount of
17
conditions. As Aristotle has warned, time and again
throughout history these pure democracies
The components of democratic practice
had been captured by demagogues and
within societies may be operationalized
had degenerated into dictatorial tyrannies.
to enable the level of democratic
John Adams wrote in an 1814 letter:
practice to be measured and compared.
―Remember, democracy never lasts long. It
At the level of internal or local politics,
soon wastes, exhaust, and murders itself.
the constituents of the level of dictatorship,
There is never a democracy that did not
X, include, the degree of regulation, the
commit suicide.‖ This well justified fear of
degree of centralization of political
―the mob‖ led the founders to create a
power, degree of political repression, the
ability of the republic, a form of government one step
political executive Any form of democratic removed from
democracy that
to act without
consultation, level practice is a combined
presumably
protects the
of police brutality, product of democracy people from
degree of racial
ethnic and dictatorship their own
and
passions. The
discrimination,
frustrations of coming to grips with the
degree of inequality, and level of political
concept and reality of democracy is
violence. The constituents of the level of
illustrated by Wiston Churchill‘s 1947
democracy, Y, include the level of cultural
remark in the House of Commons: ―No
compatibility, freedom of speech, degree
one pretends that democracy is perfect or all
of availability of opportunity for
wise. Indeed, it has been said that
individual participation, degree of
democracy is the worst form of government
multicultural harmony, level of tolerance
except all those forms that have been tried
of political opinion, level of respect for
from time to time.‖ (p.45)
individual rights, degree of consensual
decision making, ability to mobilize the Despite much rhetoric to the contrary,
people to realize their dreams, level of any form of democratic practice is a
equal opportunity, level of equity, combined product of democracy and
equality of justice, and degree of dictatorship. Stability of democratic
decentralization of political power. Both practice therefore depends upon a
the level of dictatorship and the level of balanced combination of the democracy
democracy may be obtained indirectly and dictatorship components.
through attitudinal research on their It is quite possible for a political regime
constituents. Techniques used in to have a high democracy component
assessing these components may include internally, but in its relations with the
Thurstone , Likert, and Semantic outside world to have a very high
Differential Scaling available in standard
dictatorship content. For example, the
textbooks on research methods. It is political regimes of the West may be said
emphasized that without the dictatorship to have high democracy components
component, democratic practice might internally, but in their relations with
degenerate into mobocracy (the developing countries, they tend to
Hobbesian state of nature) and without dictate. This is because the constituents
the democracy component, democratic of the level of democracy and the level of
practice might degenerate into tyranny. dictatorship are not the same at the local
Pure democracy invites demagogues and and international arenas. At the
tyrants. Thus, Jay M Shafritz and E.W international arena, the constituents that
Russell write as follows.
18
:

influence the level of dictatorship include, of democracy axes and sends the
the degree of international regulation, message that those same societies that
the level of economic power, the level of may be quick to demand ideal
military power, effectiveness of democracy may be the same societies
intelligence, degree of dependence on that may be quick to degenerate into
external resources, degree of focus on chaos and requiring dictatorial control
national interest, ability to exercise veto when faced with a crisis because their
power, degree of national pride, and democratic product constant is lower. It
degree of involvement in military explains the prevalence of coups in
alliances. The constituents that influence weaker economies as the economic crisis
the level of democracy include the degree of deepens. Also for any given value of K,
reliance on diplomacy, degree of belief the higher the level of dictatorship, the
in the equality of nations, degree of lower the level of democracy and vice
sensitivity to international opinion, level versa. When K remains the same, but
of tolerance of the laws of individual the dictatorship and democracy contents
nations, level of tolerance of the actions of its democratic practice change, a
of individual nations, respect for the society may move along a particular
rights of individual nations, degree of rectangular hyperbola. Thus, a society‘s
respect for international conventions, movement along a rectangular hyperbola
and degree of respect of the United with K fixed implies changes in its
Nations. For this reason, the value of dictatorship and democratic
democratic product constant, K, is not the constituents. It is to be noted that once
same at the local and international levels. K is obtained from attitudinal research
Democratic practice demanded by a for any country, that country‘s
particular society at the international and rectangular hyperbola can be drawn. K
local levels may, therefore, be quite enables the democratic maturity of
different. countries to be compared and their
likely stable democratic trajectory to
3.0 Explanatory Power of the
be predicted.
Model
Under conditions of, prosperity, peace
The curves are asymptotic to the axes
and harmony, a country may choose to
and convey the message that there is no
increase its democracy content and
perfect democracy and there is no
reduce its dictatorship content. It
perfect dictatorship. A study of the
explains why the prosperity of the West
values of K and its influence on the
has encouraged an increase in
sketch of the family of rectangular
democracy content, but it is emphasized
hyperbolas shows that the higher its
that peace and harmony are equally
value, the further away a curve is from
important. In an emergency situation
the axes. For any given value of the
such as war, more power may be
dictatorship content of democratic
concentrated in the hands of the political
practice, the higher the value of K, the
executive to enable quick decisions to be
higher the level of democracy. K is
made without appreciable change in the
therefore a measure of how
nature of the political regime. This
democratic practice has matured. The
concentration of power leads to an
lower the value of K the closer the
increase in the dictatorship component
curves of the rectangular hyperbolas are
and a decrease in the democracy
to the axes. It implies that the same
component while K remains the same.
curves that are closer to the level of
When the challenges are overwhelming
dictatorship axes are also closer the level
and last long enough, the dictatorship
19
component may so increase and the faced with a crisis. The situation in
democracy component so decrease that Chechnya, if allowed to stretch the
democratic practice jumps from one political fabric of Russia too far, can
value of K to another. If the value of K result in a transition back to the
so changes in response to changes in the communist dictatorship of the past.
dictatorship and democracy contents, Military coups are examples of negative
then a country‘s democratic path may transitions. After a military coup,
change from one rectangular hyperbola dramatic changes occur in both the
to the other. This change may be democracy component and the
smooth over time or sudden. We may dictatorship component. The
call this change a regime transition and dictatorship component increases
when this regime transition changes the sharply, the democracy component
democracy component dramatically, a decreases sharply and the resulting
democratic transition may be said to have transition is negative. However, a nasty
taken place. A democratic transition experience with military rule may
may therefore be negative or positive. actually stimulate society to demand a
The following examples illustrate these democratic practice in which sharp
points. changes on the democracy and
dictatorship components may lead to a
After the terrorist attack on the Word
positive transition to a higher level K
Trade Center and the Pentagon,
than before the military rule. A case in
Congress placed more power in the
point is Ghana where experience with
hands of the President of the United
the military rule of Jerry John Rawlings
States to enable him deal with the
led to Ghanaian society demanding a
emergency situation and security was
more reliable form of democratic
tightened. These measures increased the
constitution that both increased the
dictatorship component and reduced the
democracy component and decreased
democracy component, but the political
the dictatorship component sharply to
regime did not change. Hence, K
achieve a balance at a higher level of
remained the same and democratic
democratic maturity.
practice in the United States only moved
downward along the same rectangular In developing countries with acute
hyperbola. The experience of Russia technological scarcity and overwhelming
after the collapse of the Soviet Union economic challenges, it may be expected
provides an illustration of a positive that the political systems may tend to
transition. The resulting regime in Russia have a high dictatorship component and
made a positive transition by both a low democracy component. This
dramatically increasing the democracy tendency has been referred to variously
component and decreasing the as one party rule, personal rule, and
dictatorship component. The value of K neopatrimonial rule. While one party
changed in such a manner that Russia is regimes have existed, personal rule and
now on an entirely different rectangular neopartrimonial rule may be only in the
hyperbola of democratic practice. eyes of the beholder. Since the
However, Russia has to be carefully hyperbolas are asymptotic to the level of
watched for as explained earlier, nation- dictatorship axis, there can be no perfect
states with lower levels of democratic dictatorship and personal rule is just
maturity (low values of K) that are quick impossible. Given that every dictator
to raise their levels of democracy needs the cooperation of others and
content are also likely to increase their discussions take place between the
dictatorship content rather sharply when dictator and his political colleagues, the
20
:

democracy content can never be zero. 2000).


Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Despite the role of culture, there is a
Walle explain neopratimonial rule as tendency to conceive of democracy as
―those hybrid political systems in which simply a political regime in which
the customs and patterns of political representatives are freely and
patrimonialism coexist with, and suffuse, fairly chosen through competitive
rational legal institutions.‖( Bratton and elections. This fallacy of electoralism
Walle, 1997, p.62) These neopatrimonial leaves much to be desired. First, a
systems are supposed characterize the political regime comprises rules that
political regimes of Africa. They explain prescribe, among other things, the
patrimonial political systems as those in qualifications for engaging in politics and
which ―an individual rules by dint of how politics is to be conducted. Because
personal prestige and power; ordinary the rules exclude sections of the
folks are treated as extensions of the
population from competing in the
―big mans‖ household with no rights or political arena, in practice, the
privileges other than those bestowed by representatives are not freely chosen.
the ruler. Authority is entirely Indeed, more often than not, voter
personalized, shaped by the ruler‘s registration tends to exclude. Secondly,
preferences rather than codified systems the political arena cannot be said to be
of laws.‖ (Bratton and Walle, 1997, fair so long as the competitors are not
p.61). They seem to forget that endowed with equal resources. Thirdly,
neopatrimonial tendencies also exist in competitive elections are not a sufficient
the developed countries of the West and condition for democracy. Apart from
there is no country in the world where the possibility of rigging, elections might
the political system is not a hybrid and actually lead to the dictatorship of the
political outcomes are not shaped by the elected few or to the dictatorship of the
preferences of the political executive. majority of the population over visible
Party loyalty and the powers of minorities.
Presidents and Prime Ministers are all
reflections of neopatrimonialism. Hence, 4.0 Comparison With Dahl‟s
neopatrimonialsm is a universal Model
phenomenon which exists in varying In Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition,
degrees. It is the democracy and Robert Dahl distinguished political
dictatorship contents that make the regimes by two axes - the degree of
difference. political competition and the degree of
Moreover, it is not economics and political participation (Dahl, 1971). The axis
technology alone that influence or shape of political competition was graduated
the democracy and dictatorship contents from monopolistic regimes in which
of democratic practice. For example, the power is concentrated in the hands of a
indigenous political systems of Africa, by narrow elite to pluralist regimes in which
their consensual nature, have a very high power is dispersed among groups and
democracy content and low dictatorship institutions. The axis of political
content. It suggests that, with peace and participation was graduated by the
harmony acting as catalysts, culture plays proportion of the population that is
a significant role in determining the entitled to participate in a more or less
value of the democracy component. This equal plane. The higher the proportion
role played by culture is explained in of the population that plays a part in
detail in Compatible Cultural Democracy: The decision making, the more inclusionary
Key to Development in Africa (Osabu-Kle, the regime type and the lower that
21
proportion, the more exclusionary the system that, in the final analysis, permits
regime type. There is some similarity the particular mix of democracy and
between Dahl‘s axes and mine. His axis dictatorship. In completely stateless
of degree of political competition may societies, the dictatorship component
correspond to my axis of level of does not exist for there is no rule, and
dictatorship denoted by X and his axis of where there is no rule, there is no
political participation may correspond to democracy either for each one is for
my axis of level of democracy denoted by Y. himself or herself. In such a state of
anarchy or Hobbesian state of nature,
However, in Dahl‘s model, there is no
both the democracy and dictatorship
notion of the democratic product constant, K,
components are zero. In general, the
or possible paths along which
democratic mix permitted by the state
democratic practice may follow. His
may be represented by
descriptive model does not explain why
and how under emergency situations, Y = aX n.................................................. (2)
political decision making power tends to where n is an index representing the
be concentrated in the hands of the willingness of the state system to
political executive while the political respond to the democratic demands of
regime remains the same and change society. We may call n the state sensitivity
only when the challenges are index. Since the willingness of the state
overwhelming. My model explains that, may vary from one period to another
for a given value of K, democratic and under various circumstances, the
practice demanded by society is free to value of n may change from one period
move along a rectangular hyperbola so to another and under differing
that in emergency situations a State may circumstances. When n is zero, Y equals
choose to alter its position on its path of a . Hence, a represents a particular
democratic practice by increasing its threshold of the level of democracy
dictatorship content and decreasing its permitted by the State. We may call a the
democracy content. Dahl‘s model does democratic threshold constant of the State. The
not explain why some States that have value of a may vary from one State to
high democracy content at the local level the other. For the particular case where n
tend to exhibit the characteristics of = 1, Y = aX which is a straight line. The
dictatorship in their dealings at the
values of Y and X for the State
international arena to the extent that subsystem may be obtained through an
they even buttress regimes with high attitudinal research on the elites of the
levels of dictatorship content. My model State system comprising the bureaucratic
explains that the value of K is not the elite, the political representatives, and
same at the international level for its the leaders of political parties where
constituents at the local and such parties exist.
international levels are just not the same.
From equation (2), the gradient or slope
5.0 Determining the Point of of the curve, dY/dX ( aXn) is naXn-1.
Democratic Equilibrium Hence, the larger the value of n, the
The political system of a society may steeper the gradient of the curve. It
move along its path of democratic implies that the larger the value of n, the
practice, but at any particular period it more sensitive a state is to democratic
occupies a particular point on that path. demands, for it permits more democracy
The political system as a whole may content per unit increase in dictatorship
require a type of democratic practice content. The equilibrium point at any
profile specified by K, but it is the State time period is determined by the
22
:

intersection of equations (1) and (2) as revolution and coups occur. It is to be


shown in figure 2 below. noted that the democracy content is not
zero, but of a fixed and conservative
At any particular time period, it is at this
value of a. The constant a cannot be
equilibrium point that any stable political
zero since, as explained above, pure
dictatorship cannot exist.
Y
Fig. 2a
6.0 Logarithmic
Y=aXn Transformation of the
Model
YX=K
Equation (1) is
XY = K where K is a constant, X is
the dictatorship content and Y the
democracy content.
Taking logarithms of both sides of
the equation yields,
Point of intersection
LogY = -LogX + LogK
A plot of LogY against LogX is a
X family of straight lines with gradient
-1 and equal intercepts of LogK on
system operates. The equilibrium point both the LogX and LogY axes. Hence,
for external democracy may be when the value of K is known, LogK can
determined in a similar fashion. be calculated and the corresponding
Figure 2b below is the situation when straight line drawn through two points,
(0, LogK) and (LogK, 0). A sketch
Y of these family of straight lines is
Fig. 2b shown below in figure 3.
The logarithmic transformation
helps to explain democratic
development which occurs when K
decreases or increases. Positive
a
democratic development occurs
n=0
when K increases resulting in an
upward shift and negative
democratic development occurs
X
when K decreases resulting in a
Y
downward shift. These shifts are very
the state sensitivity index n equal zero. similar to the shift of the demand curve
Under such a situation, the state in economics.
provides a constant level of democracy
content a no matter the demand society Equation (2) is
places on it. The state can be made Y = aXn
sensitive again
a only through an
overthrow of the regime and its Taking logs,
replacement by one more responsive o n = 0 LogY = Loga + nLogX
the people. This is how justifiable
X

23
A graph of LogY against LogX is a countries are determined through
straight line of gradient n and intercept attitudinal research of their societies and
Log a. A sketch of the resulting family of their associated State systems. Thus,
straight lines is shown in figure 4 below. apart from K, n, and a enabling countries
Log Y
to be compared on their democratic
Fig. 3
practice, they enable their relative
positions on a map of democracy
content versus dictatorship content
to be graphically determined.
Estimating a and n
By putting n = 1 and using the
estimated values of X and Y from
attitudinal research, a can be
LogX
determined. When n =1, Log Y =
Loga + LogX giving Loga = LogY
– LogX . Thus, a be obtained from the
At a particular political equilibrium, estimated values of X and Y used to
LogY = - Log X + LogK = Loga
+ n LogX (n+1)LogX = LogK – LogY

Loga Fig. 4
Political equilibrium is attained
when corresponding lines of
figure 3 and figure 4 intersect Increasing K

as shown below.
Hence, at the point of political
equilibrium,
Log X = (LogK - Loga)/(n+1) LogX

....... (3)
obtain K. To obtain the value of n for
Equation 3 enables LogX and, hence, any other equilibrium point on the same
rectangular hyperbola, the values of
Log Y
X and Y for that particular point
Fig. 5 must be used. Substituting the
Point of Intersection values of a, Y and X in equation (3)
then gives n for that equilibrium
point.
7.0 Conclusion
Essentially, democracy is the rule of
the common people. In practice pure
democracy does not exist and
democratic practice is a balanced
product of some level of
Log X
democracy and some level of
dictatorship. Society demands
LogY for the political equilibrium points democratic practice in which there is an
for various countries to be calculated if inverse relationship between the level of
the corresponding K, n, and a for those
24
:

democracy content and the level of While not denying class or group
dictatorship content. The dictatorship struggles within society itself, the model
component is an indispensable control conveys the idea of a constant struggle
function without which democratic between society and State which
practice may degenerate into mobocracy. sometimes results in crises leading to
To avoid chaos and anarchy, society democratic transitions from one value of
itself demands a reasonable mixture of K to another. However, a high level of K
some level of democracy and some level does not necessarily mean a high level of
of dictatorship. The State system democracy content. Depending upon
responds by permitting what it considers the nature of the State system, it is quite
a balanced mixture compatible with the possible for a political system with a
culture of society and situational high value of K
variables including the level of to have less democracy content than a
emergency. Because culture is dynamic
political system with a lower value of K.
and situations change, both the societal For this reason, democratic practice may
demand and the response of the State be said to be in the eye of the beholder.
are subject to change. The model
discussed shows that there is always a References
struggle between the democratic practice Bratton, Michael and Walle, Nicholas
demanded by society as a whole and van de, (1997), Democratic Experiments in
what the State system is willing to allow. Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University
A point of political equilibrium is Press.
reached where democratic practice is in
stable equilibrium. However, depending Dahl, Robert (1989), Democracy and its
upon circumstances, the State may make Critics, New Haven: Yale University
some adjustments by varying the Press.
democracy and dictatorship contents Dahl, Robert (1971), Polyarchy:
along the path of a rectangular Participation and Opposition, New Haven:
hyperbola determined by the democratic Yale University Press.
product constant K. The State does that by
varying a, the democratic threshold of the Osabu-Kle, D.T. (2000), Compatible
State, and n, its sensitivity to democratic Cultural Democracy: The Key to Development
demands. When societal challenges are in Africa, Peterborough: Broadview
overwhelming, a positive or negative Press.
transition may occur in which K moves Rustow, Dankwart (1970), ―Transitions to
smoothly or jumps from one value to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model‖,
another while a and n remain constant or Comparative Politics 2, pp. 337-367.
change to accommodate a new
equilibrium point. Thus, society
determines the value of K (societal
property) while a and n are determined
by the State system (State properties).
Societies may be compared on their K
values and State subsystems may
compared on their a and n values.

25
Briefing Paper probably a conservative estimate. The real
costs of armed violence to Africans could
Africa‟s missing billions
be much, much higher.
International arms flows and the cost
of conflict1 The costs are incurred in a huge variety of
ways. There are the obvious direct costs
Summary
of armed violence – medical costs, military
For the first time, IANSA, Oxfam, and expenditure, the destruction of
Safeworld have estimated the economic infrastructure, and the care for displaced
cost of armed conflict to Africa‘s people – which divert money from more
development. Around $300bn since 1990 productive uses. The indirect costs from
has been lost by Algeria, Angola, Burundi, lost
Central African
Republic, Chad, Around $300bn since areopportunities even higher.
Democratic Republic 1990 has been lost… Economic
of Congo (DRC),
Republic of Congo, Africa loses around activity falters
or grinds to a
Côte d‘Ivoire, $18bn per year due to halt. Income
Djibouti, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Ghana,
wars, civil wars, and from valuable
natural
Guinea, Guinea- insurgencies… resources ends
Bissau, Liberia, Niger, up lining
Nigeria, Rwanda, individual pockets rather than benefiting
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan the country. The country suffers from
and Uganda. inflation, debt, and reduced investment,
This sum is equivalent to international aid while people suffer from unemployment,
from major donors in the same period. If lack of public services, and trauma. More
this money was not lost due to armed people, especially women and children, die
conflict, it could solve the problems of from the fall-out of conflict than die in
HIV and AIDS in Africa, or it could conflict itself.
address Africa‘s needs in education, clean The research carried out for this report
water and sanitation, and prevent has estimated that the cost of armed
tuberculosis and malaria. conflict to Africa‘s development has been
Our research estimates that Africa loses a shocking $284bn since 1990. Although
around $18bn per year due to wars, civil high, this is almost certainly an under-
wars, and insurgencies. On average, armed estimate. For a start, this calculation only
conflict shrinks an African nation‘s covers the cost of armed conflict, not
economy by 15 per cent, and this is armed crime. Further, our calculation only
covers periods of actual combat but some
1 costs of war, such as increased military
This text is adapted by the publisher from
Africa’s Missing Billions by Debbie Hillier spending and a struggling economy,
Oxfam GB Publishing Oct 2007 with the continue long after the fighting has
permission of Oxfam GB, Oxfam House, John stopped. Neighbouring countries also
Smith Drive, Cowley, Oxford OX4 2JY UK suffer economically, due to reduced trade,
www.oxfam.org.uk Oxfam GB does not political insecurity, or an influx of
necessarily endorse any text or activities that
refugees.
accompany the materials, nor has it approved the
adapted text.

26
:

The evidence also suggests that at least 95  Commit serious violations of


per cent of Africa‘s most commonly used international humanitarian law;
conflict weapons come from outside the
 Commit serious violations of
continent. The most common weapon is
international human rights law;
the Kalashnikov assault rifle, the most
well-known type being the AK-47, almost  Undermine sustainable development.
none of which are Although the
made in Africa. …95 per cent of Africa‟s causes of
A steady supply of most commonly used armed
ammunition is required violence are
to keep arms deadly, conflict weapons come many and
but little military from outside the highly
ammunition is complex, and
manufactured in continent require a
Africa. Although it is variety of
impossible to demonstrate precisely, our actions to be taken, we believe that an
research suggests that the vast majority of ATT based on these principles would be
ammunition has to be imported from one important tool in reducing armed
outside Africa. violence in Africa.
If armed violence is this costly and most At the moment, there are international
of the weapons come from outside Africa, negotiations working towards such a
then Africa desperately needs to stop the treaty. So far, African support for an ATT
flow of arms to those who abuse human has been crucial to its success.
rights and ignore the rules of war. As well Negotiations in the United Nations are
as looking at the demand for weapons, reaching a critical stage. It is vital for
strong initiatives must be taken to restrict governments, in Africa and around the
supply. Many African nations, recognising world, to support these negotiations and
the threat to their development from demand a strong result.
irresponsible arms transfers, have already There is an urgent need to reduce the
made significant efforts towards arms international supply of arms and
control. ammunition to Africa. Otherwise the cost
However, many African governments feel to African development – measured not
let down by the international community. just in dollars wasted but in lives shattered
They know that the arms trade is and opportunities squandered – will
globalised, and that national or regional remain immense.
regulations, although absolutely vital, are 1.0 Introduction
not enough.
This report moves beyond what is already
Africa, as elsewhere, needs new clear: that armed violence is one of the
international standards on arms transfers greatest threats to development in Africa.
– a strong and effective Arms Trade It investigates the high costs of armed
Treaty (ATT). Such a treaty would not violence to Africa, looks at where the
prevent the responsible transfer of weapons come from which feed this
weapons for defence, policing, violence, and then highlights one
peacekeeping, and other legitimate important area where progress is urgently
purposes, but it must prohibit arms required at both African and international
transfers if they are likely to be used to:

27
levels. This report will not attempt to Somalia), as well as a considerable number
address the complex causes of armed of protracted and lingering conflicts (e.g.
violence, but instead will focus on the Algeria, Democratic Republic of Congo
arms that fuel, prolong and intensify this (DRC)), and the tendency for conflicts to
violence. become regionalised or internationalised,
involving other countries (for example,
This report will focus primarily on
the conflict in Darfur has drawn in
Africa‘s armed conflicts – partly for
neighbouring Chad and the Central
methodological
African
reasons, and Thirty-eight per cent of Republic).
partly because
their impact on the world‟s armed These conflicts
people and conflicts are being fought prevent
economies is development.
most severe. But in Africa, and in 2006, Paul Collier,
this should not almost half of all high- Professor of
imply that armed intensity conflicts were in Economics at
violence is Oxford
caused only by Africa. University,
armed conflicts. defines conflict
Africa's experience of armed violence as one of four ‗traps‘ that keep the world‘s
comes from both armed conflict and poorest countries poor and confine the
armed crime (with increasingly blurred world‘s ‗bottom billion‘ people to a life of
distinctions between the two), sustained poverty in stagnant or shrinking
and made more lethal by the supply of economies.6 Africa is further from
arms and ammunition. attaining the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) than any other region7 and
Globally, an estimated 1,000 people die
armed conflict is one important factor in
every day due directly to the use of small
this.8 Compared to peaceful countries,
arms.1 But this figure captures only a
African countries in conflict have, on
fraction of the human impact. For
average:
conflicts, the greater part of the human
cost results not from deaths and injuries  50 per cent more infant deaths9;
due to combat but indirectly from the loss
 15 per cent more undernourished
of health and livelihoods caused by the
people;10
disruption of economy and society.
Across nine African conflicts, indirect  Life expectancy reduced by five
deaths were 14 times greater than deaths years;11
occurring in combat.2
 20 per cent more adult illiteracy;12
Even though the number of armed
 2.5 times fewer doctors per patient;13
conflicts is falling,3 there is no room for
and
complacency. Thirty-eight per cent of the
world‘s armed conflicts are being fought  12.4 per cent less food per person.14
in Africa,4 and in 2006, almost half of all The value of the Human Development
high-intensity conflicts were in Africa.5 Index (HDI) drops, pushing the average
There are still conflicts where the human conflict country from medium to low
toll is enormous and currently with little development,15 and GDP per capita is
hope for a swift settlement (e.g. Darfur, reduced by $1120 (63 per cent).16 Of

28
:

course, costs are not borne equally across survey of over 200 people, the infiltration
the population, and inequalities often rise of arms was given as a major cause of
as many conflicts are fought along armed insecurity in northern Kenya24. In a
regional, social, religious, or ethnic lines. well-armed community, fist-fights become
fire-fights, leading to an ‗arms race‘ in
In non-conflict situations, Africa is also
which young men feel the need to be
disproportionately affected by violence
armed.25
from firearms. It has
14 per cent of the As the Kenyan
world‘s population Africa has 14 per cent Foreign Minister
but 20 per cent of the of the world‟s said, ‗Conflict is
world‘s firearm part of the
homicides, second
population but 20 per history of
only to Latin cent of the world‟s mankind. My
America.17 This is firearm homicides… part of the
perhaps not region is no
surprising, as the guns made available exception to this historical fact. There are
through armed conflict are one factor enough reasons to cause conflict like
dictating levels of armed crime.18 religious, ethnic and clan difference. Poor
people tend to have even more causes for
Data on armed crime in Africa are in
conflict. But when guns get into the
short supply, but anecdotal evidence
calculus then it becomes a recipe for
suggests that it is rising in a number of
disaster.‘26
countries. According to law enforcement
officials, armed robbery increased sharply Reducing levels of armed violence
in Ghana from 1999 to 2001 (latest requires many actions to be taken by
figures);19 in Kaduna, northern Nigeria, African governments and by the
firearms homicide increased by over 130 international community, in diverse areas
per cent in 1999–200020 and there has such as conflict prevention, governance,
been a rise in gangster violence, including and disarmament. Oxfam, Saferworld, and
a proliferation of armed ‗cults‘ in IANSA members are working in many of
institutions of higher learning.21 In these areas. We acknowledge and
northern Kenya, livestock rustling, recognise the multi-faceted nature of the
banditry, and insecurity involving issue and that the root causes of armed
pastoralists have become widespread and conflict in Africa – such as poverty, poor
increasingly severe, with women and governance, and inequality – must be
children constituting around a quarter addressed. Indeed, these factors can lead
each of all deaths.22 to a high demand for arms and there is a
need for more work to address this.
What is crucial here is that this is armed
violence. Just as the continuing supply of However, this particular report does not
arms and ammunition sustains and aim to be comprehensive in its search for
increases the lethality of conflicts, so arms solutions. It has been written to support
increase the deadliness and widen the discussions on the Arms Trade Treaty
impact of societal violence, domestic (ATT) currently under consideration in
violence, and crime. For example, in the United Nations. The research for this
Nigeria, researchers have linked the paper confirms what we intuitively know,
increase of crime in Lagos, with the that the vast majority of weapons used in
increase in availability of firearms23. In a Africa are not made in Africa. So as one

29
key part of the solution, we must look at GDP. Figure 1 demonstrates the result for
arms flows into Africa. Burundi.
2.0 Counting the cost of armed conflict Figure 1: Cumulative GDP loss for
Burundi
In new research for this report, we have
estimated the economic cost of armed
conflicts to Africa‘s development. Because
of methodological challenges and
weaknesses in the data, the results are
approximate but they will, for the first
time, provide a figure to help show the
scale of the threat facing development in
Africa.
Our estimation
There is no standardised methodology to This method will underestimate the true
calculate the cost of conflict. We have figure because it does not include:
used a method similar to that used by
• International costs: humanitarian
Stewart and Fitzgerald, in their influential
aid, peacekeeping etc;
War and Underdevelopment,27 where they
used the fall in gross domestic product • The economic impact on
(GDP) as a measure of costs in 14 neighbouring peaceful countries;
conflicts. GDP shows the combined value • The lingering economic impact
of all goods and services produced in one once the conflict has been officially
year, and will be seriously affected by resolved – our estimation only covers the
armed conflict in a variety of ways; war years.
Section 3 explains how this happens. This
method (see below and further in the Further information on neighbouring
Appendix) is robust enough to provide an countries and long-term impacts are
order of magnitude result. included in Section 3. Just to reiterate, we
have only estimated the costs of armed
Using the definitions from the Heidelberg conflict, not economic losses due to crime
Institute for International Conflict or societal violence.
Research, Conflict Barometer ,28 we
looked at 23 African countries that We have deliberately taken this
experienced armed conflict or severe conservative approach to ensure that the
violent crisis, between 1990 and 2005. 29 calculation does not exaggerate the cost of
This included all African conflicts in this armed conflict to Africa‘s development. It
period, apart from Somalia for which is therefore particularly shocking that the
there are no data. We calculated what the cost estimated for those 23 countries is
GDP of each of these countries would $284bn (in constant year 2000 $) from
have been had there been no conflict, by 1990 to 2005, representing an average
applying the average economic growth annual loss of 15 per cent of GDP. This
rate of countries at a similar economic amounts to an average of $18bn per year
level to that of the country in conflict. lost by Africa due to armed conflict.
The growth foregone is revealed by These figures are of course approximate.
finding the difference between each What is most telling, is that they are likely
country‘s actual GDP and this projected to underestimate the true cost.

30
:

Table 1: Selected country results for the although the dollar loss in Eritrea, for
cost of conflict example, seems tiny in comparison with
DRC, the loss is still
Country Conflict Number Projected Actual Loss GDP 11 per cent of GDP,
years of years growth* growth* as % loss
of ($bn)
representing an
GDP** enormous economic
burden. Again, it
Burundi 1993– 13 5.5% -1.1% 37% 5.7
2005
must be underlined
that GDP data from
Rwanda 1990– 12 4.5% 2.8% 32% 8.4 conflict countries are
2001 not always reliable.
DRC 1996– 10 5.4% 0.10% 29% 18 The figures below
2005 should be regarded
Eritrea 1998- 3 4.8% -3.8% 11% 0.28 as estimates rather
2000 than precise
calculations.
Republic 1997– 3 3.3% 0.03% 7.1% 0.70
of 99 Other calculations
Congo of the cost of
South 1990-96 7 1.2% 1.2% 2.7% 22 Africa‟s conflicts
Africa
There are very few
* Average of annual growth during war data with which to compare these figures.
years.
** Average of annual loss as percentage of • A review of 14 studies using different
predicted GDP.
methodologies found widely differing
This is a massive waste of resources – estimates, with an average cost of 17.6 per
roughly equivalent to total international cent of GDP per annum.33
aid to Africa from major donors during • Paul Collier and others used regression
the same period.30 It is also roughly analysis to estimate that the average civil
equivalent to the additional funds war reduces GDP by around 2.2 per cent
estimated to be necessary to address the per annum.34
problems of HIV and AIDS in Africa, or
to address Africa‘s needs in education, • Stewart and Fitzgerald studied nine
clean water and sanitation, and help African conflicts from 1970 to 1995; the
prevent the spread of TB and malaria.31 average loss was 10.5 per cent per
annum.35 This was expected to be an
The average annual loss of 15 per cent of under-estimate due to lack of data for four
GDP represents an enormous economic countries.
burden – this is one and a half times
average African spending on health and For the damage caused by Uganda‘s
education combined.32 activities in the north eastern part of the
DRC, the International Court of Justice
The table below gives some of the results (ICJ) ruled that Uganda should pay
per country as an illustration. reparations.36 The ICJ agreed that the
Unsurprisingly, we find that in general, DRC‘s estimate of the bill – $6bn–$10bn
countries with bigger economies produce – was appropriate; $6bn represents an
the biggest dollar losses, and long-lasting annual loss of 21 per cent of GDP. Our
and widespread conflicts produce the calculations are similar: around $18bn
biggest loss as a percentage of GDP. So reduction in GDP, representing 29 per

31
cent of GDP. Our higher values are due could have been invested in projects that
to the longer time frame (11 rather than benefit the economy and population.
five years) and the fact that our calculation
 Direct costs: arise directly from
would also capture the broader impact of
violence and involve actual
the war beyond that associated with the
expenditure;
Ugandan presence.
 Indirect costs: represent lost resources
More than $20bn per year?
and opportunities;
Our estimate of the cost of armed conflict
 Intangible costs: do not have a price
to Africa is around $18bn per year. We
tag but fundamentally affect people‘s
have not attempted to calculate the cost of
lives and their capacity for
armed crime and other violence, despite
development.
its importance. To date, no studies have
quantified the cost of societal violence and The table below presents the broad
crime in Africa. categories of costs.
Further data on armed crime and the Table 2: Key costs to the national
effects of armed violence in Africa will be economy in the context of armed
published in 2007 and 2008.37 In crime/societal violence and conflict40
particular, the World Health Organization These are all real costs to each country
and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention have developed
guidelines for estimating the
economic costs of injuries due
to interpersonal and self-
directed violence,38 and studies
are currently ongoing in
Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya.
In Brazil and Colombia, similar
studies estimated the total costs
of gun violence at 0.5 per cent
and one per cent of GDP
respectively.39
When the African reports are
available, it may be possible to
calculate the cost to Africa‘s
development of armed violence
outside of conflict. It may be
possible to answer the question: does involved but not all will be noted as a
armed violence cost Africa more than drop in GDP, because GDP captures the
$20bn per year in lost development? market value of all goods and services
produced, whether these increase
3.0 Breaking down the costs of armed
wellbeing in the country or not. 41 GDP
violence
will be reduced by most of the indirect
To the national economy costs; but most of the direct costs
The economic costs of armed violence represent ‗unproductive expenditure‘ i.e.
represent resources lost to society that extra expenditure due to the insecurity.

32
:

Diversion of resources from productive indirect cost of productivity losses, and


expenditure finally by direct medical costs.46 If indirect
costs are higher for societal violence, then
There are two factors at play which reduce
this trend will be even more pronounced
productive expenditure:
for conflict situations.
1. Total income to governments and the
There are too few data to say how the
vast majority of households falls in times
GDP loss during armed conflict is
of armed conflict. At state level, the
apportioned. There is only one example in
collection of domestic and border taxes
Africa where there has been an attempt to
dwindles catastrophically due to losses in
quantify the costs of conflict by counting
taxable production, tax evasion, and low
individual costs (rather than modelling).
administrative capacity.42 This is
This study of the cost of conflict in
exacerbated by decreasing external
northern Uganda found that the key costs
balance, soaring foreign debt, accelerating
were: 47
inflation, and budget deficit.
2. The proportion of state expenditure  Military costs (relating only to the war
diverted into conflict-related activities – in the north of the country): 28 per
both military spending and combat-related cent of total costs;
health care – will probably rise at the  Losses to agriculture and livestock, the
expense of investment in essential mainstays of the region: over 20 per
services. At household level, families may cent;
have to spend money on healthcare for
 Lost income from tourism: almost 14
injuries, which will prevent them, for
per cent;
example, from sending their children to
school.  War-related medical costs: over 10 per
Government social expenditure per head cent.
fell dramatically during the wars in It is expected that different costs will be
Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia, and more prominent in different contexts. For
Uganda.43 According to the World Health example, the cost of the material damage
Organisation, treating large numbers of during the Rwandan genocide was around
patients with gunshot wounds in Africa $1bn, whereas reconstruction for the
‗has a draining effect on basic health care DRC is estimated at $20bn.48
and diverts much-needed resources from
As an illustration, each category of cost is
other health and social services‘.44 The
briefly explored below.
same is true at household level; in South
Africa, a significant proportion of non- Direct costs, with a focus on medical
fatally injured patients are forced into debt expenditure
to pay medical expenses resulting from Direct costs arise directly from violence
firearm injuries.45 and necessitate real payments. Direct costs
Proportions of direct, indirect, and include the cost of maintaining security –
intangible costs such as increased military expenditure and
costs for policing and justice – as well as
Although no studies have been
the cost of dealing with refugees and IDPs
undertaken in Africa, studies from
and the loss/depreciation in assets (both
elsewhere clearly show that for societal
in terms of major infrastructure and also
violence and crime, intangible quality of
life costs are the greatest, followed by the

33
household assets such as animals and injury in the USA costs 50 times more
farmland). than the average cut/stab wound.55.
Medical costs are one of the most obvious
direct costs caused by armed violence. It is Snapshot 1: The cost of a bullet56
important to note that often these costs Dr. Walter Odhiambo, a surgeon from Kenya,
are not actually met; one study in Ghana tells the story of a 17-year-old Congolese boy
found that in rural regions only 51 per whose jaw was shattered by a bullet. The son
cent of persons with gunshot injuries of a diamond prospector, he was shot by rebel
receive care at a hospital or clinic,49 and soldiers who thought he had diamonds. It took
elsewhere the chronic shortage of hospital him one year to raise the money from friends
facilities and the limited access of poor and family to have it treated. During this time,
people to these facilities results in wounds he kept his disfigured mouth covered. He
becoming infected and in the death or traveled 3,000km to Nairobi for the operation
disability of victims.50 to insert a steel plate into his jaw, which took
Costs cannot be generalised and, nine hours and cost $6,000.
obviously, are specific to different The cost of the operation is equivalent to a
situations and injuries. Box 1 below gives year of primary education for 100 children, or
one example. In Uganda, the direct costs full immunizations for 250 children, or 1.5
of treating firearm injuries are around years of education for a medical student.
$0.5m per year, around 80 per cent of
which is paid for by the government. The
In armed conflict, the medical impact of
out-of-pocket costs average $58 per
combat injuries is dwarfed by the other
victim, more than several months‘ salary
medical impacts of the conflict. These
for most victims, a significant burden.51 In
include higher rates of disease and
Kenya, a spinal injury caused by firearms
infection (from population movements,
costs around $23,815 per year; this
concentrations of people, and lower levels
includes the cost of a wheelchair,
of resistance due to poor nutrition), water-
treatment, food, drugs, etc.52
and sanitation-related issues, malnutrition,
Gun violence especially impacts young higher rates of sexually-transmitted
men, who may have long productive diseases, etc.
futures ahead of them. Men aged 15–29
Studies show that although women are
account for half of all non-conflict firearm
often not targeted in combat as directly as
homicide victims globally. Anecdotal
men, women experience as much57 or
evidence from Africa suggests that men
more58 mortality in the long run. Women
are the major victims of gunshot injuries.
suffer seriously and exclusively from lack
In four studies from Kenya, Nigeria, and
of maternal health services, as well as
Uganda, the male:female ratio for such
facing extremely high levels of rape and
injuries ranged from 6:1 to 12:1.53 In
HIV infection. During the conflict in
South Africa, homicide primarily
Sierra Leone, more than half of women
involving firearms was the leading cause
experienced some type of sexual
of death among men aged 15–21.54
violence.59
It is worth noting that violence committed
Indirect costs, with a focus on lost
with firearms generates higher costs than
production
violence committed with other weapons,
due to the serious nature of the injuries Indirect costs result from opportunities
caused. For example, the average gunshot lost. Much of this involves the diversion

34
:

of resources – development projects


that are suspended due to insecurity, Snapshot 2: Tourism in Africa: running
income from natural resources from the gun
siphoned away from the formal
economy (thus lining individual Tourism is important to Africa. In 2004, the
pockets rather than benefiting the continent‘s share of global tourism revenues
country) - and the impact of severe was twice its share of global GDP.62 It is an
economic decline (rising inflation, essential source of foreign exchange to many
increased debt, reduced exports, etc.). countries, and for Kenya the largest source.63
One key cost is reduced economic However, armed violence deters millions of
activity, which can be an enormous potential visitors. The chief director at South
loss in armed conflicts. In agriculture, African Tourism admitted that the reality and
this goes beyond the personal reputation of South Africa as a country beset by
tragedies of families and communities gun crime had lost it 22 million visitors in five
64
who have their livestock or crops years.
destroyed, are too afraid to work Oxfam‘s 2007 research of international opinion
their land, or are forced off it. The showed that more than half of people from the
cash crop sector suffers significantly world‘s top tourism spenders (France,
from the destruction of crops and Germany, Japan, the UK, and the USA) said
irrigation networks, the killing of they would be less likely to go on holiday to a
livestock, interruption of credit, the country with a reputation for armed violence or
unavailability of inputs, gun crime than to a country without such a
transportation bottlenecks, and reputation.65
marketing problems. Net losses to
agricultural production from armed Intangible costs, with a focus on social
violence in Africa are estimated at $25bn capital
between 1970 and 1997, equivalent to
three-quarters of all aid in the same Although intangible costs are
period. 60 extraordinarily difficult to quantify, they
have a clear impact in reducing
Although a limited number of people development. The exposure to brutality
benefit from armed conflicts – through and subsequent displacement and civil
the exploitation of resources and, of disorder leave individuals psychologically
course, by selling arms – most do not. scarred and less able to function. In some
Manufacturing and construction cases, this amounts to ‗collective
companies, for example, tend to be major trauma‘.66
losers in violent conflict, suffering
severely from the disruption of supply and Serious armed violence, and particularly
marketing channels as well as from looting civil war, also erode institutions of civil
and destruction. 61 society. Family, community, and inter-
community links are severed, and a culture
Services such as tourism and transport are of violence spreads. The destruction of
also hit – and this applies significantly to trust leads to more opportunistic
situations of armed crime, as well as behaviour that is not likely to disappear
conflict. rapidly after war. Ethnically-accentuated
conflict is particularly detrimental, since
hatred and mistrust deepen divides.67

35
The impacts on children can be severe. In translates into lost business potential and
a survey of more than 300 child soldiers in lower GDP. A civil war in one country
Uganda, over 90 per cent had post- reduces the growth rate of neighbouring
traumatic stress of clinical importance.68 countries by around 0.9 per cent; thus the
In IDP camps in northern Uganda, boys combined growth loss to neighbours can
and girls play games ‗only about violence, exceed the loss to the country itself.72
about the war, abduction, and death. Not Effects become more marked as the
about family life – cooking, hunting, and conflict intensity increases.73
digging – like it used to be.‘69
Conflict leads to lost educational Snapshot 3: Trade and finance for Côte
opportunities for children, as it destroys d‟Ivoire‟s neighbours
education infrastructure, reduces ‗Without peace in Côte d'Ivoire, practically our entire
spending on schools and teachers and economy will need to be reoriented.‘ — Malian
prevents children from attending classes. Finance Minister Bassari Touré, 200274
While one in 11 primary-school age
children in low-income countries are out- In 2002, when fighting in Côte d‘Ivoire made
of- school, this figure rises to one in access to the key Ivorian seaport of Abidjan
three in conflict-affected fragile states, virtually impossible, foreign trade was
according to a recent Save the Children disrupted in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.75
report.70  Mali's cattle exports halted almost
In situations of armed conflict, societal completely and Burkina Faso's total
violence, and armed crime, young men exports of cattle and animal products fell
use small arms to bypass traditional by 65 per cent.76
power structures, which are often  Transporting a container by train from
weighted towards elders, and seize power Burkina Faso to Abidjan cost
by force. Young men perceive small arms CFA290,000, whereas transporting the
violence as a means to reach positions of same goods by road to Lomé in Togo
social or economic status that they feel cost CFA700,000.77
entitled to, becoming what are often
known in Africa as ‗big men‘.71 The economic disturbances caused by the
Ivorian conflict have weakened the financial
Other key costs position of the affected countries. Burkina
The above costs are incorporated, Faso and Mali each lost nearly $30m in
sometimes in complex ways, in our government revenues in the first three
estimation of the cost of armed conflict. months of the war in taxes, customs duties,
There are two other highly significant and other sources of revenue.78
costs for Africa that are not reflected in
our calculation, as the methodology for The spillover effects of armed conflict,
doing so could not be robust. and the perceived or real fear of violence
Nevertheless, a brief examination is spreading, also translate into increased
needed. military spending by neighbours. After
Economic impacts on neighbouring tensions increased in Côte d‘Ivoire in
countries 1999, Mali purchased military equipment
worth CFA8bn ($13m) while Burkina
Severe economic costs to a whole region Faso increased military investments by
can be caused by the disruption of trade 52.6 per cent in 1999 and continued
and loss of investor confidence, which spending in 2000.79

36
:

An inflow of refugees can be costly and responsible for the collapse of formal
the return of migrant workers can lead to rural market networks and have been an
a major decrease in remittances. This was obstacle to post-conflict reconstruction.87
particularly significant for Burkina Faso, 4.0 Where do Africa‟s weapons of war
where several hundred thousand come from?
Burkinabé from Côte d‘Ivoire stopped
sending home remittances – where What weapons are used in Africa‘s
previously such remittances made up 70 conflicts?
per cent of financial private net transfers.80 This section focuses on the most
„War overhang‟: long-term costs numerous weapons used in Africa‘s
conflicts: small arms and light weapons.
Our calculation has only looked at the However, it is worth underlining that
period of armed conflict. However, heavy weapons have played a major role
economists find that economies often
in some of Africa‘s conflicts with a very
remain essentially at conflict levels for heavy humanitarian and economic toll.
many years; this ‗war overhang‘ is more
common than the expected ‗peace To identify which small arms are used in
dividend‘.81 Africa‘s conflicts, we investigated arms
collection programmes and government
If, during peacetime, the average military stockpiles.
spending of a developing country
amounts to 2.8 per cent of its GDP, this Arms collection programmes: We
increases to around five per cent during collected quantified information from
civil war,82 and remains elevated to 4.5 per seven arms collections in Africa, mostly as
cent during the first post-conflict decade.83 part of Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Mortality rates also remain high: Reintegration (DDR) programmes (in
approximately half of lost years of life South Sudan, Nigeria, Mozambique,
expectancy arise after the violence is over, Uganda, Central African Republic, the
mainly due to degraded health and Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone),
sanitation conditions.84 and received anecdotal/non-quantified
evidence from seven other sources.88 A
Economies also change. Economic wide variety of weapons was reported, but
behaviour shifts towards activities which the Kalashnikov assault rifle and its
bring short-term returns. In Angola, derivatives (the most well-known being
landmines have created an extra burden, the AK-47), were ranked as the first or
as land remains inaccessible and second most numerous weapon in every
unproductive. The movement of people case.
from rural to urban areas during armed
conflicts is not reversed; Freetown in Government stockpiles: An examination
Sierra Leone and Monrovia, Liberia have of government inventories revealed that
seen their populations triple.85 As well as the most popular assault rifles are from
rapid urbanisation increasing the the Kalashnikov family: 27 countries hold
86
likelihood of armed violence, it can lead the AK-47 and 28 countries hold the
to labour shortages in rural areas, slowing AKM.89
down reconstruction, and can boost the Government forces are not the only users
informal economy in urban areas. In of weapons from state stockpiles. Rebel
Somaliland and Mozambique, informal army groups and bandits typically obtain
economies that provided a basic means of their arms and ammunition by seizing
survival in wartime have been partly

37
them from police and army stockpiles. Where are these weapons
This was illustrated during the 1990s in manufactured?
conflicts in the Republic of Congo, Weapons made in Africa are rarely used in
Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra African conflicts. A respondent to our
Leone, and Somalia.90 And while the survey of disarmament programmes, from
Lord‘s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda UNDP in Sudan, said ‗I have not seen any
has stockpiles of weapons obtained many African-manufactured weapons‘95 – and
years ago, it continually acquires weapons this response is typical of African arms
by capturing them from Ugandan defence specialists and field workers.
forces. The primary weapons used by the
LRA are Kalashnikov derivatives – most While small arms and their components
commonly Chinese Type 56.91 are produced in a number of African
countries, the scale of this production is
This problem is compounded by the fact small, both in comparison with the
that many African governments distribute number of weapons produced in the rest
arms to non-state forces. Recipients might of the world and with the number of small
be militias in-country, militias in other arms used in Africa. Small arms and their
countries, or ‗local defence forces‘. The components are produced by 22
governments generally do not have companies in South Africa, seven in
adequate ‗command and control‘ over the Egypt, and one in Nigeria, while Uganda
groups using these weapons and there is has one facility for reconditioning arms.96
an increased risk of diversion of these It is worth noting, however, that even this
weapons to the illicit trade. African production depends mostly on
Thus the most commonly used weapon in technology and licences from outside the
Africa‘s conflict zones is the Kalashnikov continent. There is also skilled craft
and its derivatives. production in some countries (for
example, Ghana and Nigeria) of weapons
The rest of this section looks exclusively
that appear to be used primarily in armed
at weapons used in Africa‘s conflicts
crime, rather than armed conflict.
rather than in crime, due to length
constraints. However, it is worth noting To get a picture of the scale of African
that whilst criminals in other countries purchases of small arms, we looked at the
might typically use handguns, military UN COMTRADE database.97 This
assault rifles are often found in the hands revealed that, of $59.2m-worth of small
of African criminals, particularly where arms imports to African countries in 2005,
DDR programmes have been inadequate. $58.5m, or 99 per cent, came from outside
For example, in Cameroon‘s Northern Africa and only one per cent from African
Region, more than half the highway countries.98 This is only an estimate of
bandits are former combatants and have state-sanctioned trade, but it shows that
brought their weapons primarily from the the vast majority of African weapons are
Central African Republic, Chad, and imported from outside the continent.
Nigeria.92 In Nigeria, armed criminals and Looking more specifically at
secret cultists in Lagos,93 and armed gangs Kalashnikovs, most producers are located
in the Delta,94 have stocks of sophisticated outside Africa, in at least 13 countries.99
small arms, including Kalashnikovs. Currently Egypt and South Africa are the
only African countries that produce
Kalashnikov derivatives (respectively, the
Misr,100 a high-quality copy, and the

38
:

Vektor R4 and R5, more distant relatives), government forces used this respite to
although Nigeria announced plans in 2006 resupply, and the fighting resumed with
to produce and export its own version, even greater intensity.105 A shortage of
the OBJ006.101 We believe that Misr ammunition in Mali during the 1990–96
weapons are in service in Central Africa northern insurgency was the principle
and that the R4 is in service in Zimbabwe, reason why armed groups imposed strict
although it does not appear that Egypt or rules governing when and where guns
South Africa are exporting significant could be fired.106
numbers of these weapons in Africa or In general, ascertaining the origins of
elsewhere. 102 ammunition used in Africa is not easy.
Of the two arms collection programmes Spain is the biggest supplier of
we surveyed which have some data on ammunition to sub-Saharan Africa.107 The
manufacture, these reveal a low level of UN COMTRADE database showed that,
African-manufactured Kalashnikovs: of imports of ammunition to African
countries worth $109.2m, 98 per cent
 Of 891 assault rifles found in the
came from outside Africa.108 Very little, if
2002–03 DDR programme of the
any, military ammunition is produced in
Central African Republic, 660 were
West Africa.109 In East Africa, however,
Kalashnikov derivatives and 23 (3.5
researchers report finding Kenyan-,
per cent) were South African Vector
Ugandan-, and Sudanese-manufactured
R5s.103
ammunition in the hands of non-state
 Of 1,100 weapons collected by armed groups in several countries.110
international peace-keepers in Ituri,
Where does the ammunition come from
eastern DRC, 605 were Kalashnikov
to feed the most prevalent weapons in
derivatives and one was Egyptian-
Africa‘s conflicts? Most Kalashnikovs use
manufactured, i.e. less than one per
7.62 x 39mm ammunition111, and
cent were African-made.104
ammunition of this calibre is produced in
Thus the best evidence available suggests 19 countries outside Africa,112 as well as in
that the vast majority – more than 95 per Egypt, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.113
cent – of Africa‘s most commonly used
Exactly quantifying African production
conflict weapons (Kalashnikov
and export of ammunition of this calibre
derivatives) come from outside the
is not possible, as most production figures
continent. This is borne out by the
are not public. We know that the
experience of experts in the field and by
Tanzanian factory now only produces one
other supporting data on arms
million rounds per year;114 however, the Al
manufacture.
Shajara/Yarmuk complex in Khartoum
What about ammunition? was upgraded in around 1996,115 so will
Ammunition is spent quickly during probably have an output in the tens of
conflict and needs to be resupplied millions.116
constantly. There are cases where the lack There is only one report of African-
of ammunition has helped to prevent manufactured ammunition of this calibre
armed violence – albeit sometimes only being found in African conflicts:
temporarily. For example, in Liberia, the ammunition manufactured in North
rebel LURD group ran out of ammunition Sudan, found in South Sudan.117
in late June 2003 and had to retreat.
However, both LURD and the opposing

39
Although we cannot quantify precisely the and 2005, at least ten African countries
amount of ammunition manufactured in revised their laws and procedures on
Africa that contributes to Africa‘s export controls, nine did so in relation to
conflicts, we do know that the quantities import controls and five on transit
are extremely small and that the vast controls.118
majority of ammunition comes from There have also been national initiatives
outside Africa. to try and reduce losses from stockpiles; at
5.0 Arms control in Africa – and least six African countries reviewed their
beyond standards and procedures for the
management and security of stockpiles
The problem of armed violence in Africa
between 2001 and 2005.119 The Nairobi
is a complex one, requiring solutions at
Protocol has led to the development of
local, national, regional, and global levels,
best practice guidelines on stockpile
from conflict prevention to enforcement
management.
of national gun laws, to DDR, to effective
peacebuilding strategies. This report does These are extremely welcome
not attempt to list all the positive efforts developments but it is too early to report
that African governments have made, nor definitively on their implementation and
provide a comprehensive range of impact. In any case, the arms trade is
solutions. However, African control highly globalised; the changing pattern of
efforts can be undermined if the supply of ownership and production since the early
weapons is poorly regulated, so this report 1990s means that national or even
will highlight the importance of regional regulations are insufficient to
preventing irresponsible arms transfers. prevent arms from reaching the hands of
abusers;120 they need to be complemented
Some African initiatives on arms
by international controls. It is not
transfers
surprising that many African governments
Some countries in Africa have already feel let down by the failure of the
made significant efforts to prevent international community to commit
irresponsible transfers of weapons. In serious resources to implementing the UN
particular, two instruments have created Programme of Action on Small Arms and
new regional standards for arms control in Light Weapons or to act to control arms
a whole range of areas, including robust transfers. Effective control of a globalised
controls on international arms transfers: arms trade requires new international
 The 2004 Nairobi Protocol for the standards and regulations based on
Prevention, Control and Reduction of international law.
Small Arms and Light Weapons, Africa and the Arms Trade Treaty
which applies to countries in the
The vast majority of arms used in Africa –
Great Lakes region and the Horn of
both in conflict and non-conflict zones –
Africa.
are imported. Tough international
 The 2006 ECOWAS Convention on controls on arms transfers are one
Small Arms and Light Weapons, their important tool in the effort to prevent
Ammunition, and other Related armed violence in Africa and worldwide.
Materials.
In December 2006, 153 countries agreed
African governments are also seeking to start developing an ATT. A UN Group
changes at national level. Between 2001 of Governmental Experts (GCE) will

40
:

begin their work in January 2008 and will Guidelines for the implementation of the
present their recommendations to the Nairobi Protocol.122
General Assembly in October 2008. However, we have seen that the vast
African support for the ATT has been key majority of arms used in Africa‘s conflicts
in its success to date: Africa has hosted originate from outside the continent, so
key international meetings in Tanzania African states and arms producing states
(February 2005) and Kenya (April 2006), share responsibility for the irresponsible
as well as many regional meetings. Forty- arms trade. Arms producers must take
two African countries (91 per cent of responsibility for ensuring their weapons
those present) voted to start the process are not diverted to misuse, and African
of negotiating an ATT in the UN General states have a responsibility to prevent
Assembly in December 2006, and 21 have internal diversion of these weapons. This
made submissions in 2007 to the UN is why a global ATT is so necessary and,
Secretary-General‘s consultation process, to be effective, it is important that it
the vast majority of which were positive. comes with a mechanism to enhance
transparency in arms transfer and also
The view of IANSA, Oxfam, Saferworld,
significant and long-term capacity-building
and many other non-government
support, to enable compliance and
organisations is that the ATT should
implementation.
crystallise and reinforce, in the context of
international arms transfers, commitments Preventing irresponsible arms
already assumed by states under the UN transfers
Charter, the Geneva Conventions, the two The ATT will not prevent the responsible
international covenants on human rights, transfer of weapons for defence, policing,
other widely supported international peacekeeping, or other legitimate
conventions, and established principles of purposes. It will not prevent a transfer if it
customary international law. We have
is legal under the national laws of all
brought together these obligations – the countries concerned, legal under
minimum necessary for an ATT which international laws, and upholds current
will reduce the human cost of armed best practice, particularly in ensuring that
violence – in a set of Global Principles for the arms are not likely to be diverted to
Arms Transfers.121 They can be another user.
summarised in the ‗golden rule‘: the ATT
must prohibit arms transfers if they are Thus many arms transfers would not be
likely to be used to: affected. But the ATT would impact on
the following transfers:
 Commit serious violations of
international humanitarian law (the Irresponsible transfer to a state: Such a
‗rules of war‘); transfer may be irresponsible if it was not
authorised by all of the states concerned
 Commit serious violations of (through import, export, brokering,
international human rights law; or transit, or transhipment), or if the transfer
 Undermine sustainable development. was in violation of international law. For
example, the transfer would be prohibited
Provisions that are broadly consistent with
if it breached an arms embargo, or if the
the Global Principles have been
arms were likely to be used for serious
incorporated into the ECOWAS
violations of international humanitarian or
Convention and the Best Practice
human rights law.

41
Amnesty International‘s report ‗DRC: implementation of UN arms embargoes,
Arming the East‘ provides an extensive in particular by requiring them to be
list of questionable arms transfers to incorporated into national legislation.
countries involved in the DRC war.123 Recirculation of weapons: Weapons
Rwanda imported millions of rounds of cross borders in Africa relatively easily, in
small arms ammunition, grenades, and what is often called the ‗ant trade‘. But the
rocket launchers from surplus stocks in quantities are not always small. In the first
Albania and there have been large flows six months of 2002, the Nigerian Customs
of arms from Eastern Europe to the DRC Service reported that it had intercepted
transitional government and to Uganda. small arms and ammunition worth more
Until April 2005, only rebel groups within than $34m on their way into the country.
the DRC were under UN arms embargo, Much of this had come through the
so it appears that these transfers did not border with Benin, and was being brought
breach any embargo. However, there is a
into Nigeria either overland or by sea.125
strong possibility that at least some of
these arms did ultimately reach rebel The crossing of national borders is an
groups in the DRC. The ATT would put a international transfer of weapons and the
legal obligation on exporters to seriously ATT would require such transfers to be
investigate and consider the possibility of brought under control by the countries
diversion. It is not sufficient simply to involved. This obviously requires
accept an end-user certificate at face value. investment to control weapons flows,
Under the ‗Golden Rule‘, an exporter such as building customs, border control,
would be in breach of the ATT if that and law enforcement capabilities. Efforts
exporter should have known of a risk of to this end are already underway, and an
diversion or misuse. ATT would complement this and provide
a legal framework for increased donor
Transfer to an illegal armed group – funding.
Without authorisation by all states with
jurisdiction over the transfers, transfers to Diversion from stockpiles: As stated in
armed groups would be illegal under the Section 4, leakage from state stockpiles are
ATT. a key source of weapons for armed
groups, and also a key contributor to
The UN Panel of Experts on the arms armed crime.
embargo on Somalia provides details of
several countries alleged to have supplied According to Gun Free South Africa, an
arms to actors in Somalia, in breach of the estimated 16,893 weapons were stolen or
arms embargo. For example, one report lost from the South African Police Force
refers to at least three separate between 1990 and 2002, and 1,759 from
consignments containing arms and the South African National Defence
ammunition from Iran, including machine Force, the majority of which were assault
guns and MANPADs.124 rifles, between 1994 and 2003.126
While the findings of the report have been The ATT would put a legal obligation on
contested by a number of the arms exporters to consider the possibility
governments named, such shipments of diversion from stockpiles before
would be in violation of an existing arms agreeing to transfer arms. Again, increased
embargo, and therefore are already illegal. funding for improvements to stockpile
The ATT would help prevent such security may be required and, in some
transfers by strengthening the cases, exports should be preceded by a

42
:

programme to improve stockpile Such an ATT would need to come with


management. support and capacity-building to ensure
effective implementation.
6.0 Conclusions
Economic growth and the lives and
Every effort must be made to limit the
livelihoods of people in Africa are being
enormous social and economic cost of
held back by armed violence. In failing to
armed violence. Our rough estimate is
control the arms trade, the international
that armed conflict alone has cost Africa
community has let Africa down. The
around $300bn (constant year 2000 $)
disarmament community must play its
since 1990, or around $18bn per year –
part to help Africa achieve the MDGs and
costing each conflict country, on average,
lift people out of poverty.
15 per cent of its GDP.
We are now at a crucial stage. As well as
Many things need to be done to reduce
sustaining dynamic arms control efforts at
armed violence, and of course the poverty
national and regional levels, African
that lies behind much of it. Preventing
governments, arms-producing countries,
arms proliferation is a multi-faceted issue
and the rest of the international
and one that requires a plethora of
community, must vigorously and
measures, which address both supply and
proactively support international
demand. In terms of supply, we estimate
discussions to achieve a robust ATT, to
that 95 per cent of Africa‘s most
protect Africans from the daily effects of
commonly used conflict weapons
armed violence.
(Kalashnikov derivatives) and the vast
majority of other arms and ammunition After 153 votes for ATT discussions to
are not made in Africa. It is true that begin and 97 submissions to the
many weapons used in Africa are Secretary-General‘s consultation, there is a
recirculated, but there are still continuous strong expectation that the GGE meeting
new supplies of weapons and ammunition in 2008 will recommend that negotiations
to state and non-state actors. should start on a tough ATT.
Indeed, preventing the supply of All governments have a role to play in
ammunition into zones of armed violence ensuring its success, so that women, men,
is an often overlooked strategy in limiting girls, and boys across Africa are spared the
armed violence. According to the UN human and economic impact of armed
Panel of Experts on Somalia, ‗When a violence.
serious confrontation is anticipated, larger
quantities of arms and, more importantly,
ammunition enter the Mogadishu Appendix: Methodology for cost to
market.‘127 At a minimum, a shortage of Africa calculation
ammunition is likely to impose a ‗shooting The methodology used is very similar to
discipline‘ that could prevent some that used by Stewart and Fitzgerald of the
violations of human rights.128 University of Oxford in War and
Thus there is an urgent need to address Underdevelopment (2001).129 We have
the international supply of arms and also taken advice from academics and
ammunition. An effective ATT, based on experts, including Anke Hoeffler of the
the ‗golden rule‘, is vital to reduce the Centre for the Study of African
human and economic costs of armed Economies at Oxford University and
violence in Africa and across the world. Graham Harrison of the University of
Sheffield.

43
The calculation was done as follows: particular countries. As a form of
comparison and verification, we have used
1. Determining where and when
other counterfactuals (for example,
conflicts happened in Africa from 1990.
predicting a country‘s GDP according to
The basic source of data used was the
its previous non-conflict growth), and
Heidelberg Institute for International
these suggest that our estimate is
Conflict Research (HIIK)‘s register of
satisfactory. The comparison with growth
conflicts (new methodology, not yet
projected from past performance was not
published) which does not rely on a
used to generate the total cost figure
narrow definition of combat deaths.130 Of
because it was impossible to generate a
HIIK‘s five levels of violence, we used a
non-conflict growth rate for some
‗severe crisis‘ (level 4) or a ‗war‘ (level 5).
countries, due to the length of the conflict
These results were cross-checked against
or its cyclic nature.
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program131 and
other sources such as the BBC, The For most of the conflicts considered,
Economist, and the UN‘s IRIN. conflict had an overwhelming effect on
the economy and therefore the fall in
2. Predicting what GDP should have
GDP can be used as a reasonable proxy
been (the counterfactual). Each conflict
for the cost of the conflict. However, if
country was assigned to a broad economic
the conflict is geographically limited and
grouping using World Bank categories:
situated away from main economic zones,
low income, low-middle income or upper-
the impact on the national economy may
middle income.132 The GDPs of all
not be so marked. For example, the
countries (constant year 2000 $) were
conflict in South Africa in the 1990s was
taken from the World Development
geographically confined and so only had a
Indicators.133 It should be noted that data
small impact on the economy. In a few
may not be totally reliable and in some
situations, other factors also have an
cases is dependent on estimates. For each
impact on GDP: e.g. major changes in
grouping, the annual growth rate was
world commodity prices or drought in an
calculated for each year, 1990–2005.
agricultural economy (the impact of which
3. Calculating a measure of the cost of would obviously be made much worse by
conflict = the cumulative loss in GDP. conflict).
Starting with the GDP at the beginning of
Our figure is likely to be an under-
the conflict, the growth rate of the
estimate because it does not include the
economic grouping was applied for every
effects on neighbouring countries (of
year that the country was in conflict. The
reduced trade and remittances, refugee
difference between the predicted GDP
movements, etc.) or the social costs of
and the actual GDP was calculated for
conflict (propensity to increase crime, loss
each conflict year and summed.
of social capital), and it only looks at the
Limitations to this methodology period of conflict, not the war overhang.
There is no perfectly accurate way of All countries showed a loss due to
developing the counterfactual; however, conflict, apart from Uganda. The major
our method is reasonable and reflects the reason for this peculiar and unconvincing
typical performance of a country of that result is the booming Ugandan
economic level. The large number of economy.134 Our methodology compares
countries in each economic group (around actual growth with predicted growth, but
45) smoothes peculiarities due to

44
:

the Ugandan economy has grown much 6 Collier, P. (2007) The Bottom Billion: Why the
faster than average. poorest countries are failing and what can be done
about it, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
In addition, the conflict is confined to the
north of the country and although this has 7 UN Millennium Project (2005) ‗Investing in
had some economic impacts at national Development: A practical plan to achieve the
MDGs: Overview‘, New York.
level (cotton production has suffered),
other economic drivers (including coffee, 8 See, for example, Batchelor P. and S.
the country‘s main export) have not been Demetriou (2005) ‗Securing Development:
affected. UNDP‘s support for addressing small arms
issues‘, UNDP. Also, according to the 2005
A 2002 study, updated in 2006, used an Human Development Report: ‗Insecurity
accounting methodology (i.e. counting linked to armed conflict remains one of the
individual costs, rather than modelling) to greatest obstacles to human development. It is
estimate the economic cost of the war in both a cause and consequence of mass
the north of Uganda as $1.7bn over 20 poverty.‘
years, or $85m per year.135 This is clearly 9 Average of IMR as infant deaths per 1,000
significant and has major opportunity live births: 105.5 for conflict countries, 68 for
costs, particularly in the north. $85m non-conflict countries. Source: World Bank
represents 1.1 per cent of GDP in 2005. (2007) ‗World Development Indicators 2007‘,
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
For more details on the methodology, DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:212981
please email: 38~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSi
[email protected] tePK:239419,00.html (last checked by the
author in May 2007)

Notes 10 Average of undernourishment as a


percentage of population: 35.5 per cent for
1 International Action Network on Small conflict countries, 21.8 per cent for non-
Arms (IANSA) (2006) ‗Bringing the global conflict countries. Source: World Bank
gun crisis under control‘, (2007b) ‗Health, Nutrition and Population
http://www.iansa.org/members/IANSA- Data‘, http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats
media-briefing-low-res.pdf (last checked by (last checked by the author May 2007).
the author August 2007).
11 Average life expectancy: 48.31 for conflict
2 Using data from Annex 2 of Muggah R. countries, 53.19 for non-conflict countries.
(2007: forthcoming) ‗A hard pill to swallow: Source: World Bank (2007) World Development
risk factors and impacts of collective violence Indicators 2007, op. cit.
on population health in Africa‘, WHO/AFRO
chapter on collective armed violence. 12 Average adult literacy: 48 per cent for
conflict countries, 68 per cent for non-conflict
3 See SIPRI 2007 Yearbook, chapter 2 and countries. Source: World Bank (2007) World
the work of the Human Security Centre: Development Indicators 2007, op. cit.
www.humansecuritycentre.org
13 Average of physicians per 1,000 people:
4 From 1990 to 2003. UNDP (2005) Human 0.14 for conflict countries, 0.37 for non-
Development Report, p.154. conflict countries. Source: World Bank (2007)
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pd World Development Indicators 2007, op. cit.
f/HDR05_chapter_5.pdf
14 This data was not calculated by Oxfam. It
5 HIIK (2006) ‗Conflict Barometer 2006‘, p.3. applies to sub-Saharan Africa during 1970–93.
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Source: Messer, E., M. J. Cohen, and J.
Research at the Department of Political D‘Costa (1998) ‗Food from peace: Breaking
Science, University of Heidelberg. the links between conflict and hunger‘

45
http://www.ifpri.org/2020/briefs/number50. 26 Statement By The Minister of Foreign
htm (last checked by the author August 2007) Affairs, Hon. Raphael Tuju, while addressing
Ministerial Summit On Armed Violence And
15 Average of HDI value: 0.408 for conflict
Development In Geneva, Switzerland, 7 June,
countries, 0.540 for non-conflict countries.
2006
Source: UNDP (2006).
http://www.mfa.go.ke/statement%20by%20t
16 Average GDP per capita: $1839 for he%20Minister.htm
conflict countries, $2997 for non-conflict
27 Stewart, F. and FitzGerald V. (2001) War
countries. Data is PPP, averaged from 1990-
and Underdevelopment, Volume 1, Oxford:
2006. Source: International Monetary Fund,
Oxford University Press, p.97.
World Economic Outlook Database, April
2007 28 Using the classification from the Conflict
Barometer. HIIK (2006) ‗Conflict Barometer
17 Small Arms Survey (2004) Small Arms
2006‘, op. cit.
Survey 2004: Rights at risk, p.192. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. 29 Algeria, Angola, Burundi, CAR, Chad,
DRC, Republic of Congo, Côte d‘Ivoire,
18 Small Arms Survey (2004) op. cit., p.194
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea,
and Collier, The Bottom Billion, op. cit.
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria,
19 UNDP and Government of Ghana (2006) Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
‗Illicit small arms in Ghana: A baseline Sudan, Uganda. Somalia had to be omitted
assessment‘, p.24. due to lack of data.
20 Small Arms Survey (2003) Small Arms 30 OECD data, from DAC2a dataset. DAC
Survey 2003: Development denied, p.139. Oxford: donors to all Africa at constant 2005 $ =
Oxford University Press. $279,303
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm
21 Ebo A. (2003) in: ‗Armed violence and
(last checked by the author 20 August 2007).
poverty in Nigeria, March 2005. Mini case
study for the Armed Violence and Poverty 31 HIV and AIDs: $16.3bn/year, from
Initiative‘, p.9, Jeremy Ginifer and Olawale Oxfam International (2007) ‗The World is Still
Ismail Centre for International Cooperation Waiting‘, Oxfam Briefing Paper 103.
and Security Department of Peace Studies.
TB: $2.2bn/year and malaria: $3.1bn/year,
22 Pkalya R., Adan M. and Masinde I. (2003) from DATA (2007) ‗The Data Report 2007‘,
‗Conflict in Northern Kenya: A focus on the Health, p.6.
internally-displaced conflict victims in
Education in Africa: $5bn/year, from
Northern Kenya‘, ITDG. Of 251 people
DATA(2007) ‗The Data Report 2007‘,
killed, 54 were children, 64 were women, and
Education p.5.
133 were men.
Provision of clean water and sanitation in
23 Ebo, A., (2003), p. 9. as found in: Armed
Africa: $1.8bn/year, from DATA (2007) ‗The
violence and poverty in Nigeria, March 2005
Data Report 2007‘, Water, p.3.
Mini case study for the Armed Violence and
Poverty Initiative Jeremy Ginifer and Olawale http://www.thedatareport.org/issues.html
Ismail Centre for International Cooperation (last checked by the author July 2007).
and Security Department of Peace Studies
32 Using World Development Indicators
24 Pkalya, R., Adan M.and Masinde I. (2003). 2007 from The World Bank
‗Conflict in Northern Kenya: A focus on the
Public expenditure on education – per cent of
internally-displaced conflict victims in
2005 GDP – Average for Africa = 4.76 per
Northern Kenya‘. ITDG
cent
25 Dowdney L. (2005) op. cit., p.307.
Total health expenditure: percentage of 2004
GDP – Average for Africa = 5.2 per cent

46
:

33 Lindgren G. (2004) ‗Measuring the 46 Small Arms Survey (2006), op. cit., p.197
Economic Costs of Internal Armed Conflict – and Waters H. R., Hyder A. A., Rajkotia Y.,
A Review of Empirical Estimates‘, Uppsala Basu S., and A. Butchart (2005) ‗The costs of
University, Sweden. Paper for the conference interpersonal violence – an international
Making Peace Work in Helsinki 4–5 June review‘, Health Policy 73 (2005), 303-315,
2004. Note that Lindgren gives an average of p.312.
11.3 per cent, but made an error in calculation
47 Dorsey J. and S. Opeitum (2002) ‗The net
for results from Stewart, Huang, and Wang
economic cost of the conflict in the
(2000).
Acholiland sub-region of Uganda‘, Civil
34 Collier P. (1999) ‗On the economic Society Organisations for Peace in Northern
consequences of civil war‘, Oxford Economic Uganda (CSOPNU) and Care USA.
Papers, Vol. 51, No.1, pp.168-183.
48 Commission for Africa (2005). ‗Our
35 Stewart and Fitzgerald (2001) op. cit., p.97. Common Interest: Report of the Commission
for Africa‘, p.38.
36 The Guardian (2005) ‗Court orders Uganda
to pay Congo damages‘, 20 December 2005. 49 As referenced in Pinto A. D., Olupot-
Olupot P., and V. Neufeld (2007) ‗Health
37 This includes the work of UNODC
implications of small arms and light weapons
(Information in Africa initiative) and the
in eastern Uganda‘, Medicine, Conflict and
forthcoming AFRO/WHO African Report
Survival, 22:3, 207-219.
on Violence and Health.
50 Small Arms Survey (2003) Small Arms
38 WHO, CDC (2007) ‗Guidelines for
Survey 2003: Development denied, p.132. Oxford:
estimating the economic costs of injuries due
Oxford University Press.
to interpersonal and self-directed violence‘,
draft, 15 January 2007. 51 Pinto A. D., Olupot-Olupot P., and V.
Neufeld (2007) op. cit.
39 Small Arms Survey (2006) Small Arms
Survey 2006: Unfinished business, p.206. Oxford: 52 Tuttle D., Lamb G., and N. Stott (2006)
Oxford University Press. Driving Change: Developing Firearms Policy
for Safer Societies Conference, International
40 Adapted from Small Arms Survey (2006)
Convention Centre, Durban, South Africa, 31
op. cit., p.191 and Lindgren (2004) op. cit.
March–1 April 2006. Institute of Security
41 GDP can be calculated using the Studies. Conference report available at:
expenditure method: www.smallarmsnet.org/events/DrivingChang
eMarch06.pdf
GDP = private consumption + investment in
goods and services + government spending + 53 Ratios were:
(exports minus imports)
• 6:1 in two rural and two urban hospitals in
42 Luckham R., Ahmed I., Muggah R., and S. northern Nigeria (from Muggah, 2007:
White (2001) ‗Conflict and poverty in Sub- forthcoming, op.cit.);
Saharan Africa: an assessment of the issues
• 7.2:1 in eastern Uganda, most not from
and evidence‘, IDS working paper, No. 128,
conflict (from Pinto A. D., Olupot-Olupot P.,
Brighton, UK.
and V. Neufeld (2007) op. cit.);
43 Stewart and Fitzgerald (2001) op. cit.,
• 9.8:1 in two urban hospitals in Kenya
pp.83-89.
(from Muggah 2007: forthcoming, op. cit.);
44 Fleshman M. (2001) ‗Small arms in Africa:
• 12.4:1 amongst the civilian population in
Counting the cost of gun violence‘, Africa
central Nigeria (from Solagberu B. A. (2003)
Recovery, Vol. 15 No. 4, December 2001, p.1.
‗Epidemiology and outcome of gunshot
45 Small Arms Survey (2001) Small Arms injuries in a civilian population in West
Survey 2001: Profiling the problem, pp.217-18. Africa‘, European Journal of Trauma 2003,
Oxford: Oxford University Press. No 2).

47
54 Fleshman (2001) op. cit. the Costs of Conflict‘, unpublished working
paper.
55 Small Arms Survey (2006) op. cit., p.199.
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0144/hoereyque.p
56 Odhiambo W. (2003) One Bullet Story df (last accessed by the author August 2007).
Powerpoint – Kenya, IPPNW/Kenya. From
68 Muggah R. (2007: forthcoming) op. cit.
www.ippnw.org/Programs/AFP/Matl.html
(last checked by the author, August 2007). 69 IRIN (2007) ‗Uganda: Traditions eroded
by years of war‘, 21 May 2007.
57 Li Q. and M. Wen (2005) ‗The immediate
and lingering effects of armed conflict on 70 International Save the Children Alliance
adult mortality: a time-series cross-national (2007) ‗Last in Line, Last in School: How
analysis‘, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, No. donors are failing children in conflict-affected
4, 471-492 (2005). fragile states‘, p4
58 Stewart and Fitzgerald (2001), op. cit., 71 Lindsay L. and S. Miescher (eds) (2003)
p.94. ‗Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa‘, as
quoted in Small Arms Survey (2006) op. cit.,
59 UNDP (2005) Human Development Report,
p.305.
p.160.
72 Collier P. and A. Hoeffler (2004)
60 Ibid., p.159.
‗Conflicts‘, in Global Crises, Global Solutions,
61 Collier (1999) op. cit. ed. Lomborg B., Copenhagen Consensus,
University of Cambridge, p.133.
62 Africa‘s share of global tourism revenues is
3.6 per cent (according to the UN Economic 73 Murdoch, J. C. and T. Sandler (2001).
Commission for Africa 2007 Report ‗Economic growth, civil wars and spatial
www.uneca.org/era2007/, p.52). Africa‘s spillovers‘. World Bank, Washington.
share of global GDP is 1.8 per cent ($808bn http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict
of $44,688bn in 2005, according to the IMF /papers/murdochsandler.pdf
World Economic Outlook,
74 Harsch E. (2003) ‗Ivorian war sends
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/0
regional shockwaves‘, Africa Recovery, Vol.
1/data/index.aspx).
17 No. 2, July 2003, p.7.
63 Katumanga M. and L. Cliffe (2005) www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol17
‗Nairobi – a city besieged: the impact of no2/172ciwar.htm (last checked by the author
armed violence on poverty and development‘, 15 August 2007).
www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotli
75 Doré O., Anne B., and D. Engmann
ght/country/afr_pdf/africa-kenya-2005-b.pdf
(2003) ‗Regional impact of Côte d‘Ivoire‘s
(June 2007, p.21)
1999–2000 sociopolitical crisis: an
64 Daily News (South Africa) (2005) ‗Crime assessment‘, IMF Working Paper, WP/03/85,
costs tourism millions‘, 25 November 2005. p.12.
www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=
76 Harsch (2003), op. cit.
13&art_id=vn20051125091504631C726062
(last checked by the author 15 August 2007). 77 Kipping (2004), op. cit., p.12.
65. 78 Harsch (2003), op. cit.
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/applications/blogs
79 Doré et al. (2003), op. cit., p.14.
/pressoffice/2007/05/oxfam_major_develop
ing_countri.html 80 Kipping (2004), op. cit.
66 Muggah R. (2007: forthcoming) op. cit. 81 Collier et al. (2003) op. cit.
67 Kipping M. (2004) ‗The Economic 82 Ibid., p.2.
Consequences of Violent Conflict in West
83 Ibid., p.20.
Africa‘, Paris: SWAC/OECD; and Hoeffler
A. and M. Reynal-Querol (2003) ‗Measuring

48
:

84 Ghobarah, H., A. P. Huth and B. Russett Pdf&id=112, Basic, International Alert,


(2003) ‗Civil wars kill and maim people - long Saferworld (last checked by the author June
after the shooting stops‘. American Political 2007); Somalia: Small Arms Survey (2004)
Science Review, Issue 2, Vol 97: 189-202 p.54; Guinea-Bissau: Small Arms Survey
Cambridge University Press (2006) p.254.
85 Freetown: 550,000 inhabitants in 1995 to 91 Small Arms Survey (2006), op. cit. p.283.
more than 1.6 million in 2003; Monrovia:
92 Small Arms Survey (2004), op. cit., p.194.
400,000 to 1.3 million during the civil war. See
Kipping (2004) op. cit., p.16. 93 Ebo A., (2003), op. cit., p.9.
86 Researchers have shown that large-scale 94 Dowdney (2005) op. cit., p.259.
and rapid urbanisation may lead to armed
95 Lochhead D., correspondence with the
violence where availability of weapons is high
author June 2007.
and community and public security
institutions are weak – i.e. conditions 96 Omega Research Foundation databases
occurring during and after conflict. See Small (2007).
Arms Survey (2007) Small Arms Survey 2007: 97 UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database,
Guns and the city, p. 189. Cambridge: data for 2005, the most recent year for which
Cambridge University Press. reasonably comprehensive data are available.
87 Luckham et al (2001), op. cit., p.31. 98 Information from UN Comtrade
88 Collection programmes in South Sudan DESA/UNSD (download date 3 August
(Pibor County, May 2007), Nigeria (Delta, 2007). The appropriate customs codes were
2004), Mozambique (eight provinces, 2003), taken from the Small Arms Survey(2005)
Uganda (2005), Central African Republic Small Arms Survey 2005 - Weapons at War,
(2002–03), Congo Brazzaville (2005–06), Geneva, and are intended for classification HS
Sierra Leone (up to May 2000). 1996. Information for both reported imports
and reported exports was compiled, with a
Comments/non-quantified information from
careful attempt to avoid any double-counting.
Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light
Data available upon request.
Weapons (RECSA), covering Horn, East, and
Central Africa); UNMIS in Akobo, South 99 Albania, Bulgaria, China, Germany,
Sudan; UNDP DDR Programme; Small Arms Hungary, India, Iraq, North Korea, Poland,
Survey 2006 (p.283) concerning the weapons Romania, Russia, Serbia, and Venezuela.
most frequently used by the Lord‘s Resistance Amnesty International, IANSA, and Oxfam
Army in northern Uganda; Control Arms International (2006) ‗The AK-47: the world's
Campaign, from a survey in eastern DRC; favourite killing machine‘, Control Arms
‗Small Arms Survey Sudan Working Paper 4‘, Campaign.
Sudan/DRC border; Burundi, from Pézard S. 100 Gander T. (2006) Jane‘s Infantry Weapons
and N. Florquin (2007) ‗Small Arms in 2006-2007, Jane‘s Information Group, p.172.
Burundi: Disarming the Civilian Population in
Peacetime‘, Small Arms Survey Special 101 Its aim is to ‗produce the rifle in large
Report. quantities for both the nation's military needs
and those of neighbouring countries‘. People‘s
89 Collated by James Bevan of Small Arms Daily Online (October 2006) ‗Nigeria to
Survey, based on information from Jane‘s mass-produce Nigerian version of AK-47
Infantry Weapons 2004. rifles‘
90 Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Congo- http://english.people.com.cn/200610/02/en
Brazzaville: Greene O. (2001) ‗Stockpile g20061002_308128.html (last checked by the
Security and Reducing Surplus Weapons‘, author June 2007).
www.international- 102 Omega Research Foundation.
alert.org/publications/getdata.php?doctype=

49
103 Florquin N. (2006) ‗BCPR Strategic August 2007. It is possible that Kenya and
Review: Central African Republic‘. Geneva: Zimbabwe also produce this ammunition, but
Small Arms Survey. there is no information available to confirm
this.
104 Amnesty International, IANSA, and
Oxfam International (2006) ‗The call for 114 Anders H. and R. Weideacher (2006) ‗The
tough arms controls: Voices from the DRC‘s, production of ammunition for small arms and
Control Arms Campaign. light weapons‘, in Pézard S. and H. Anders
(eds.) Targeting Ammunition: A Primer. Geneva:
105 Human Rights Watch (2003) ‗Weapons
Small Arms Survey, p.56.
Sanctions, Military Supplies, and Human
Suffering: Illegal Arms Flows to Liberia and 115 Small Arms Survey (2007) Sudan Issue
the June–July 2003 Shelling of Monrovia‘, Brief, Number 6, April 2007.
Briefing Paper, 3 November 2003.
116 Anders and Weideacher (2006) op. cit.,
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/liberia/li
pp.48ff and p.56.
beria_arms.pdf
117 Small Arms Survey (2007) Sudan Issue
106 Florquin N. and S. Pézard (2005)
Brief, op. cit.
‗Insurgency, disarmament and insecurity in
Northern Mali, 1990–2004‘ in Florquin N. 118 Biting the Bullet and IANSA (2005)
and E. Berman (eds.) (2005) Armed and ‗Examining Implementation of the UN
Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns and Human Programme of Action, 2005‘, p. 44.
Security in the ECOWAS Region. Geneva:
119 Biting the Bullet and IANSA (2005), op.
Small Arms Survey, p.56. cit., p.201.
107 Oxfam (2006). Ammunition: the fuel of
120 See Control Arms (2006) ‗Arms without
conflict. Oxfam briefing note. 15 June 2006
Borders: why a globalised trade needs global
108 Information from UN Comtrade controls‘, Amnesty International, IANSA, and
DESA/UNSD: see note 97. Oxfam.
109 NISAT database. 121 See Control Arms website: Compilation
of Global Principles for Arms Transfers, 9
110 James Bevan, researcher, Small Arms
August 2006.
Survey, correspondence with the author July
www.controlarms.org/documents/060809Glo
2007.
balPrinciplesFINAL.pdf
111 The most frequently used Kalashnikov
122 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms
variants in Africa – AK-47, AKM, Chinese
and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and
Type 56 – use 7.62 x 39mm. Other variants
Other Related Materials, 2006; Best Practice
which use different calibres (see Small Arms
Guidelines for the Implementation of the
Survey 2007: Guns and the city, p. 260.
Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) are
Weapons, 2005.
not used so much precisely because the
ammunition is not so available. 123 Amnesty International (2005)
‗Democratic Republic of Congo: Arming the
112 Russia, Armenia, Brazil, Bosnia-
East,‘ AI Index AFR 62/006/2005.
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Czech
Republic, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, 124 UN (2006) Report of the Monitoring
Israel, South Korea, Poland, Portugal, Group on Somali pursuant to Security
Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Council Resolution 1676. S/2006/913, 22
USA. Ness L. and Williams A.G. (2006) Jane's Nov 2006
Ammunition Handbook 2005–2006, Jane‘s http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/mo
Information Group. ngroup.shtml
113 James Bevan, researcher, Small Arms 125 IRIN (2002) ‗Focus on the dangers of
Survey, correspondence with the author cross-border crime,‘ Lagos, 20 October 2002.

50
:

126 ‗Hide and Seek: Taking Account of Small 132


Arms in Southern Africa‘, Gun Free South http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTE
Africa, Centre for Conflict Resolution, RNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK
Institute for Security Studies, pp.152-157. :20421402~pagePK:64133150~piPK:6413317
5~theSitePK:239419,00.html
127 UNSC (2003) ‗Report of the Panel of
Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security 133 DATA (2006) World Development Indicators,
Council Resolution 1474‘ (2003), CD-Rom, 2006 edition
S/2003/1035 of 4 November, p.17, para 71.
134 Economist Information Unit (2006),
128 Pézard S (2006) ‗Sustaining the Conflict: Uganda Country Profile 2006, EIU
Ammunition for Attack‘ in Pézard S. and H.
135 CSOPNU (2006) ‗Counting the Cost:
Anders (eds.) Targeting Ammunition: A Primer,
Twenty years of war in northern Uganda. Civil
op. cit., p.2.
Society Organisations for Peace in Northern
129 Stewart and Fitzgerald (2001), op. cit., Uganda‘.
p.94.
135 CSOPNU (2006) ‗Counting the Cost:
130 For a discussion of data sets, see SIPRI Twenty years of war in northern Uganda. Civil
yearbook 2007, Appendix 2C Society Organisations for Peace in Northern
Uganda‘.
131 www.pcr.uu.se/database/

51
participation and religion, cost far less to
Upholding Human Africa than their denial. According to him,
Rights as the Most human rights, as a system of knowledge
Cost Effective Option embedded with standards and principles
in Averting Violent believed to be culturally blind and of
Conflicts in Africa universal applicability, is relevant to
Patrice E. Vahard1 conflict resolution in Africa. The often-
neglected African indigenous systems are
Conscious of the fact that also vital in addressing some of the root
the scourge of conflicts in causes of conflicts in Africa in a
Africa constitutes a major impediment to the sustainable manner. The challenge that
socio-economic development of the continent however remains is, among others, the
and of the need to promote peace, security and knowledge gap that blinds the globalising
stability as a prerequisite for the world from realising the potentials of the
implementation of our development and African indigenous knowledge system.
integration agenda2
1.0 Historical Centrality of Human
Constitutive Act of the African Union, Rights in the Resolution of Armed
preamble. Lomé July 2000.
Conflicts
Approaching conflict as a manifestation
In 1945, when the Charter of the United
of differences in perspectives, views, inter
Nations (UN) was adopted in San
alia is part of life and often a sign of
Francisco, it seemed clear that both then
change. The merit of going through
victors and the defeated had measured the
conflict therefore lies not in perpetuating
cost of armed conflicts and opted for
it, but in transforming it into an
peace, security, development and human
opportunity for positive change. The
rights as the legacy they wanted to leave
paradigm for anticipating and the methods
for future generations. The commitment
for dealing with conflict matter more as
at that time was so eloquently put thus:
they determine the outcome of the
conflict resolution mechanism. For the We the peoples of the United Nations
sake of focus, this paper is particularly determined to save succeeding generation from
limited to internal armed conflicts in the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime
Africa. has brought untold sorrows to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
The author argues that conflict prevention
rights, in the dignity and worth of human
interventions such as development related
person, in the equal rights of men and women
investments, the realization of basic rights
and of nations large and small, and to
such as decent work, food, health,
establish conditions under which justice and
education and the freedoms of expression,
respect for the obligations arising from treaties
and other sources of international law can be
1
The author is Regional Advisor with the Office maintained, and to promote social progress
of the United Nations High Commissioner for and better standards of life in larger
Human Rights. The views expressed herein are freedom…3..
those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the United Nations. The author is The United Nations tasked its
grateful to Amadu Shour, David Omozuafoh, commission on human rights with the
Eke Ubiji, Emile Yanaki, and Pamela Ashanut
for their inputs. E-mail: [email protected]
2 3
Preamble to the Constitutive Act of African UN Charter, preamble. San Francisco, 26 June
Union, Lomé Togo, July 2008. 1945

52
:

responsibility of drafting an instrument sixtieth anniversary of the UDHR, much


that would provide guidance on how this has certainly been done to save succeeding
purpose of the United Nations could be generation from the scourge of war, which… has
met. On 10 December 1948, the UN brought untold sorrows to mankind. The UN,
adopted the Universal Declaration of the AU and their partners continue to
Human Rights (UDHR) .It was meant to mobilise enormous resources for peace
expand the global faith in the dignity and and security. African-led initiatives under
worth of the human person, and in justice the auspices of the AU or regional bodies
among individuals, groups and nations. such as ECOWAS have borne positive
The UDHR set the premises for fruits in many parts of the Continent for
deepening the understanding of the root example in Côte d‘Ivoire and the
causes of and solutions to human Comoros. It only takes a simplistic
suffering as it laid the foundation for the observation of the immediate impact of
development of hundreds of instruments, armed conflicts and wars on countries in
treaties and resolutions. Human rights or emerging from conflict on the African
represent not only legal obligations on continent to appreciate the importance of
States and fewer duty bearers; they also peacekeeping.
constitute moral expectations that rights 2.0 The immediate and medieum to
holders (individuals and groups) long-term costs of conflicts in
legitimately have on their leaders and on Africa
whoever is in position of authority, and
has the capacity to change the course of The reality of the figures provided by a
their suffering. recent joint study by IANSA, Oxfam and
Safeworld on international
In 1963, at the
creation of the “Conflicts
arm flow and the cost of
conflict reveals that Africa
Organisation of undermine national loses around $18bn per year
African Unity, its
founders were
program on access due to wars, civil wars, and
insurgencies. On average,
conscious of the fact to clean water and armed conflict shrinks an
that freedom, health-care” African nation‘s economy by
equality, justice and 15 per cent, and this is
dignity were essential objectives for the achievement
probably a conservative estimate.2 The
of the legitimate aspirations of the African real costs of armed violence to Africans
peoples1. Thirty seven years later, in 2000, could be much, much higher. This study
the twenty-first century new generation of points to the fact that conflict prevention
African leaders, premised the foundation interventions such as development related
of the African Union on their individual investments, the realization of basic rights
and collective determination to promote such as decent work, food, health,
and protect human and peoples' rights,
education and the freedoms` of
consolidate democratic institutions and expression, participation and religion, cost
culture, and to ensure good governance
and the rule of law. 2
IANSA, Oxfam, and Saferworld. “Africa’s
Today, sixty-three years after the adoption missing billions: International arms flows and
of the UN Charter and as we observe the the cost of conflict.” Oxfam international. 2007.
<
http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/briefingpapers/b
1
Preamble to the Charter of the Organisation of p107_africas_missing_billions > Accessed :12
African Unity, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1963. Jun. 2008

53
far less to Africa than their denial. reconciliation and reintegration to
African leaders recognize that at the dawn mention but a few. The longer the
of the 21st Century, Africa portrays the conflict persists, the longer it takes to
image of a Continent that has taken very recover from it.
little advantage of the economic A few examples would suffice to
globalization, which has been gathering demonstrate the impact of armed conflicts
momentum since the on
80s and is evidenced “Generations of Africans
by tremendous
wealth creation. miss the opportunity of
Whereas Asia and quality and uninterrupted
Latin America have
succeeded in education”
ameliorating their
economic situation and integrating development in Africa as follows:
themselves into the global economy to
their own advantage, Africa seems to be 2.1 Conflicts undermine national
experiencing much difficulty doing the program on access to clean
same. Counting 832 million inhabitants, water and health-care
who represent 13% of the world Debt has a direct bearing on some rights
population, Africa accounts for only 1% such as access to clean water and
direct foreign investment, 1% global gross affordable health-care. The example of
domestic product (GDP) and around 2% Rwanda is illustrative of the global trend.
of world trade, figures which represent a
net regression in relation to the 60s1. Rwanda case study2
However, the fundamental, yet obvious In the late seventies and early eighties,
question and perhaps also an issue of Rwanda borrowed and invested prudently
morality remains: Why spend so much in in physical infrastructure and clean water
armed conflicts and so less on systems. But the total stock of external
development, human rights and conflict debt rose rapidly after 1985, as regional
prevention? What is the rationale? Is the recession and a collapse in world coffee
adage ‗prevention is better than cure‘ irrelevant prices hit the Government‘s earnings.
to armed conflicts? These questions are Between 1990 and 1995, Government
subject to theoretical speculations. revenue as a percentage of GDP fell from
10% to 7%, one of the lowest ratios in
Beyond the immediate, direct and sub-Saharan Africa.3 At the same time,
quantifiable financial losses caused by
conflicts, their mediums to long-term
costs are more worrisome. For instance, 2
conflicts aggravate the debt situation of Oxfam International. “Debt relief for Rwanda:
an opportunity for peace-building and
countries in or emerging from conflict, as reconstruction” Oxfam international .1999
they invest huge amount of their capital <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/debt
budget and foreign aid in reconstruction, _aid/downloads/debt_rwanda.rtf. > Accessed :
17 Jun. 2008
3
David Woodward, “the World Bank and
1
Office of the Chairperson of the African Union Economic Policy in Rwanda: Economic, Social
Commission. “Vision of the African Union.” AU and Political Implications” .The IMF. 1996.
publication .2004.pg 9 <www.africa-union.org> Cited in
Accessed : 12 Jun. 2008 <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/debt

54
:

indicators were
Rwanda‟s deteriorating human development - 1992 and 1996 extremely poor, and
had deteriorated
significantly since
Indicator 1992 1996
1992. The genocide in
1994 and its
GNP per capita (US$) 250 209 devastating
Infant mortality rate* 85 125 aftermath eroded the
Government's
Child mortality rate* 141 185
revenue base and its
Illiteracy - aged 10+ (%) 56 60 capacity to deliver
Severe wasting - under-fives (%) 0.7 5.3 basic services. In
1998, the UNDP
* (per 10,000 live births) ranked Rwanda 174th
Source: UNICEF 1998, UNDP 1995 out of 175 countries,
society became increasingly militarized as using a composite of
communal tensions and violence welfare indicators in its human-
increased. Public spending on arms rose development index. Prior to the
sharply, crowding out social sector
budgets. Poverty levels rose, while genocide, Rwanda's human-development
investment fell. Against this backdrop, the indicators were better than the regional
Government soon found it was unable to average.
meet the demands of creditors. Arrears
rapidly accumulated, and the debt stock
became increasingly unsustainable. In effect, external debt problems were
Between 1985 and 1997, the stock of eroding the Rwandan government's
external debt more than doubled, from capacity to direct domestic resources to
US$400m to over US$1bn.1 Rwanda also where they are most needed. In 1998,
built up a large public domestic debt, servicing the external debt absorbed one
reaching the equivalent of US$220m in quarter of the entire budget. This is
mid-1997. In common with other African equivalent to more than the health-care
HIPCs, the share of the multilateral and education operational budgets
creditors in Rwanda‘s external debt had combined.
steadily risen, as the debt crisis had
progressed. At the end of 1997, Rwanda‘s 2.2 Generations of Africans miss the
external debt stood at US$1164m opportunity of quality and
including arrears. This debt was large even uninterrupted education
by the standards of other HIPCs, and Several African conflicts have left
equivalent to 65% of Rwandan generations of African youth with
GDP.Debt-servicing after the war carried interrupted education or no education at
high social costs in Rwanda. Child all. People perish from lack of knowledge,
mortality, literacy, and nutritional goes the saying. One of the unseen and
yet far reaching effects of conflict is its
potential to undermine social ethics and
_aid/downloads/debt_rwanda.rtf. > Accessed :
17 Jun. 2008
education in its fullest meaning, long after
1
Rwanda's Donor's Meeting, June 2-3 1998 . “ the conflict has ended. The situation of
World Bank Rwanda: Debt Sustainability in the higher education in Liberia is not peculiar.
Transition to Growth with Equity”

55
The impact of the armed conflict on a combined enrolment of approximately
the Liberian higher education system 1 6,000 students, with the University of
Liberia constituting two thirds, (4,000) of
In Liberia, education at all levels faced
this figure. Except for the two Teacher
serious crisis. The crisis ranges from the
Training institutions which granted
near total absence of institutional and
certificates, the others were non
human resource capacities as a result of
specialized
war damages, the lack of basic
facilities and infrastructure for “The cost of degree-
granting
meaningful learning, and to the reconstruction is far
presence of obsolete and
irrelevant curricula, too excessive”
compounded by the lack of
institutions, the only exception being the
funds to tackle the crisis and to redress
William V. S. Tubman College of
the painful situation. Before the war,
Technology which specialized exclusively
which began in 1989, the education
in Engineering (i. e. Agricultural, Civil,
system of the Republic of Liberia was
Electrical, Electronics and Mechanical
beyond the rudimentary stage it currently
Engineering). All institutions, however,
is. The higher education in Liberia was
catered to the production of middle and
assumed to have met international
high-level labour force. Liberia did not
standards comparable to any such
operate a unified "system" of higher
programmes in the Western world. There
education and there was no functional
were two major state-owned institutions
national body coordinating all tertiary
of higher education: the University of
institutions. They were autonomous and
Liberia, which was funded in 1862 as
operated under the control of Boards of
Liberia College and chartered as the
Trustee in which the Ministry of
University of Liberia (U.L.) in 1951, and
Education (MOE) served as member. The
the William V.S. Tubman College of
Commission on Higher Education, which
Technology. There were also four
was established in 1989 to evaluate,
private/church operated tertiary
accredit and monitor quality performance
institutions, prominent among which is
of tertiary institutions, could not take off
Cuttington University College (CUC)
before the civil war.
which, though operated by the Episcopal
Church, received a subsidy from the The civil war dealt a devastating blow to
Liberian Government. Also, there were all the achievements, not only in universal
two higher education institutions mainly basic and secondary education, but equally
for the training of primary school teachers to the higher education sub-sector.
and directly managed by the Ministry of Almost all public and private educational
Education (MOE). These institutions had structures, materials and supplies, libraries,
research centres, and laboratories were
1
Thomas B. Collins. “State of Higher Education looted or destroyed. University/college
in Liberia before the Civil War and the Impact of campuses, which were not destroyed, were
the War on Higher Education Institutaions.” either occupied by internally displaced
UNESCO . 1998 <
.http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001173/ people or used as military bases for
117375e.pdf > combatants. Several lecturers, staff and
Accessed : 18 Jun. 2008 students were killed, internally displaced
or fled into exile. Moreover, the requisite

56
:

database for appropriate planning in the Communities that used to coexist


education sector was destroyed. peacefully will, as a consequence of
conflict, take decades to overcome the
2.3 The challenge of ownership of
trauma of distrust and hatred in order to
reconstruction
live together again. Forced displacements
The cost of reconstruction is far too with their related natural and supernatural
excessive for the country to bear alone. de-linking leave many totally disoriented,
This often necessitates the intervention of with no sense of belonging and only
third countries or memories of
development partners “Women, children, peace followed
in providing the elderly and persons by nightmares of
needed intervention –
reconstruction, with disability pay the sudden brutal uprooting
and

reconciliation and greatest price” in the name of


reintegration. The survival. For
resources to be channelled to many children, youth and in some cases
reconstruction, would definitely have adults, violence would become the only
pushed the country to attain a higher level means for resolving any conflict. The
of development if the violent conflict had large-scale displacement of people has
not occurred. Internal conflict in become a defining characteristic of sub-
particular compromises domestic Saharan Africa. During the past four
ownership of the destiny and management decades, millions of people throughout
of the country when eventually the the continent have been obliged to
conflict would have ended. Most war- abandon their homes and to seek safety
affected countries rely on foreign elsewhere, often losing the few assets they
expertise while nationals offer themselves possessed and suffering great hardship in
to cheap and casual labor for a relatively the process. Even in places where they
long period. The return of the expertise in have taken refuge, the continent‘s
exile or the Diaspora at large is often too displaced people have often been
minimal to match the immediate demand; confronted with serious threats to their
and commensurate to the degree of good welfare and restrictions on their rights.
governance displayed by the leaders. In For many, moreover, displacement has
this context, the efforts of the African proven to be a protracted experience,
Union through its NEPAD project to lasting for years and even decades on end.
reverse the brain drain are most relevant.
2.4 Women, children, elderly and
NEPAD is an African home grown
persons with disability pay the
continental initiative to help address the
greatest price1
numerous challenges that create or
instigate conflicts. If we can critically look Because of their limited mobility and
at the NEPAD initiative, it will help us reduced physical strength, older persons
address the challenges of conflict are less able to have access to assistance.
prevention, resolution and management; They may be left behind to guard
and thereby create a conducive
environment for the African expertise to 1
UN Security Council. “Report of the Secretary-
participate in post-conflict reconstruction. General on the protection of civilians in armed
conflict.” Ochaonline .2007.<
Social defragmentation and the challenges http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=s
of learning to live together again in /2007/643> Accessed : 26 Jun. 2008

57
property, or abandoned in the chaos as under reported. These Congolese
other family members flee. Similarly, organisations drew the attention of the
persons with disabilities are at heightened international community on the effects of
risk of injury or death if they are not extermination of their society due to acts
assisted in seeking safety. They may have of sexual violence, which, once committed
lost mobility devices such as wheelchairs, against one woman, has consequences for
and the physical environment is often her children and the entire community. All
transformed by destruction. Support the armed groups and even the Congolese
networks are often disrupted, leading to army brought sexual violence to the DRC,
increased isolation and neglect. and now, after several years of
destruction, this threat has unfortunately
It used to be a taboo in most African
become a part of Congolese culture. In
societies and families to abandon the
the province of North Kivu, just in the
elderly. Those who fail to take care of
month of April 2008, over 880 cases of
their older relatives (no matter how well-
rape were documented by NGOs and
off they may be) are considered worthless.
United Nations agencies2.
However, older persons tend to lose such
respectability in times of conflicts. Even 2.5 The dimensions of conflict-lead
when persons with disabilities reach displacement in Africa 3
settlements for the displaced, mobility While Africans constituted only 12 per
remains problematic, limiting their access cent of the global population, at the
to services. For example in January 1999, beginning of 2005, more than a third (i.e.
when RUF rebels besieged Freetown, the 2.7 million) of the world‘s 9.5 million
Sierra Leone capital and its surroundings a refugees and around half of the world‘s 25
seventy-two year old parish priest who got million internally displaced persons are to
trapped for days in his church at be found in Africa. The total number of
Waterloo, eventually died from hunger. displaced people in Africa thus stands in
Everyone including his parishioners had the region of 15 million. Of the 10 top
fled the village1. ‗refugee-producing‘ countries around the
In an open letter to the UN Security world, five - Sudan, Burundi, Democratic
Council, 71 Congolese organizations Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and
representing the women of DRC, Liberia - are to be found in Africa. Africa
expressed their grave concerns about the also has three of the world‘s top-ten
tragedy sexual violence inflicted on refugee-hosting states (Tanzania, Chad
women and young girls in the DRC, and Uganda). 17 African states have
particularly in the east. It is common
knowledge that women suffered greatly 2
A Coalition of 71 Congolese NGOs,
during the years of war. Due to a representing the women of DRC .
combination of factors including “Congolese Women Appeal to the UN Security
widespread fear, shame, stigmatization, Council to Help End Sexual violence.” 2008.
<http://www.cmc.nu/files/2008_06_16%20Secur
isolation and impunity; war related ity%20Council%20Letter%20Women%20DRC-
violence against women and girls are often %20English.pdf > Accessed: 25 Jun.2008
3
Jeff ,Crisp. “Forced displacement in Africa:
1
R. Deen, Aroun. “Aged in Africa.”Global dimensions, difficulties and policy directions.”
Action on Aging. 2004. UNHCR Research Paper No. 126. 2006 <.
<http://www.globalaging.org/armedconflict/cou http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
ntryreports/africa/aroun.htm > Accessed : 26 bin/texis/vtx/research/opendoc.pdf?tbl=RESEAR
Jun. 2008 CH&id=44b7b758f > Accessed : 26 Jun. 2008

58
:

refugee populations in excess of 50,000. refugees were allowed to settle


According to the US Committee for permanently and to become naturalized
Refugees, eight of the 20 countries with citizens. While the deportation and
the highest ratio of refugees to local expulsion of refugees was not unknown,
people are member states of the African the principle of voluntary repatriation was
Union (AU). With respect to IDPs, the broadly respected across Africa.
figures are equally striking: Africa provides Pressures on asylum
9 of the 24 countries with the largest IDP
populations. Today, there is a broad consensus
amongst refugee agencies and analysts
The principle and practice of asylum that these conditions no longer prevail.
From the 1960s to the 1980s, Africa Indeed, refugee protection principles are
established a largely well-deserved now being challenged and undermined in
reputation as many parts of Africa. Boanventure
Rutinwa, a Tanzanian scholar, captures
a continent which treated refugees in a
the current trend as follows:
relatively generous manner. The newly
independent states of Africa readily African states have become less committed to
acceded to the main international refugee asylum. Instead of opening their doors to
instruments, and in 1969 established a persons fearing harm in their own states,
regional refugee convention which African countries now prefer refugees to receive
introduced protection in ―safe zones‖ or similar areas
within their countries of origin. African states
a more inclusive definition of the refugee
now routinely reject refugees at the frontier or
concept than that which applied in other
return them to their countries of origin even if
parts of the world. At the same time, the
the conditions from which they have fled still
OAU Refugee Convention of 1969 –
persist. Refugees who manage to enter and
unlike the 1951 UN Refugee Convention -
remain in host countries receive ―pseudo-
unambiguously stated that the repatriation
asylum‖. Their physical security, dignity and
of refugees to their country of origin
material safety are not guaranteed. As for
should take place on a voluntary basis. In
solutions, African states are less inclined to
these respects, Africa established new and
grant local settlement or resettlement
improved legal standards for the
opportunities to refugees. What they seem to
treatment of exiled populations. While
prefer is repatriation at the earliest
there were certainly occasions on which
opportunity, regardless of the situation in the
states failed to act in accordance with
countries of origin.1
these laws and standards, the period from
the 1960s to the 1980s has with some 2.6. Accelerated degradation of the
justification (if a little exaggeration) been environment
labelled the ―golden age‖ of asylum in When fear and want become a constant
Africa. In general, governments allowed concern, the enjoyment of human rights
large numbers of refugees to enter and and the preservation of the environment
remain on their territory. Many refugees become very distant aspirations for
enjoyed reasonably secure living populations in desperation. Armed
conditions and were able to benefit from a
range of legal, social and economic rights. 1
Considerable numbers of refugees were Boanventure ,Rutinwa. “The end of asylum?
The Changing nature of refugee policies in
provided with land and encouraged to Africa.” New Issues in Refugee Research. 1999.
become self-sufficient. In some states,

59
conflicts have severely affected the collection services all but ceased, leaving
relationship between ordinary African and raw sewage to pollute surface and
his/her environment. The absence of groundwater. In addition, gold, iron, and
alternative coping mechanisms have diamond mines, the majority of which are
forced many to aggressively exploit forests unlicensed, discharge toxic metals and
and rivers to the extent of compromising cyanide into rivers. Finally, leaking oil
the ecosystem and threatening the storage facilities are known to
biodiversity. contaminate coastal waters. Water
pollution is a threat to Liberia‘s fisheries,
Liberia1 is thought to be the only country
which provide over half of the
in West Africa that was once entirely
population‘s protein intake and ten per
covered by tropical rain forest. Due to
cent of its gross domestic product.
uncontrolled deforestation, forests now
account for only one-third of land cover In Mozambique2, the civil war during the
and continue to disappear at a rate of 1970s and 1980s disrupted conservation
roughly two per cent efforts
per year (UN 2007). The absence of alternative taking a
Farmers cope with coping mechanisms heavy
Liberia‘s generally toll on
poor soils by compromises the ecosystem the
practicing shifting and threatens the nation‘s
cultivation, which is wildlife.
the major driver of biodiversity
forest loss. Logging,
dependence on fuel wood, and rubber Although still among the poorest
production are also factors. Liberia‘s countries in the world, Mozambique is
forests are biologically rich, but species are now expanding its protected areas. It
threatened by habitat fragmentation and shares a section of the Great Limpopo
poaching. Wild animals are a major source Tranfrontier Park—Africa‘s largest
of protein for most people since livestock wildlife refuge that spans 35 000 km2—
production has been set back by with South Africa and Zimbabwe.
prolonged civil war. Uncontrolled cutting Wildfires remain a significant threat to
of logging roads through virgin forests Mozambique‘s forests and wildlife. Every
facilitates the bush meat trade. The Mount year, approximately 40 per cent of the
Nimba Nature Reserve, a UNESCO country is burned by fire, of which 80 per
World Heritage Site, has exceptional cent is forest. Human activities and
species diversity due to the variety of particularly slash-and-burn agriculture are
habitats created by unique high altitude suspected to be responsible for 90 per
grasslands laced with montane forests. cent of all fires.
The area is still recovering from iron-ore
Sierra Leone3‘s forests are rich in
mining activities in the 1990s, which left biodiversity, including over 2 000 plant
over 300 million metric tonnes of mine species, 74 of which are found nowhere
wastes (UNEP 2004). Nearly 14 per cent
of Liberia‘s surface is covered with water. 2
UNEP. “Republic of Mozambique: Protecting
After 14 years of civil war, waste Wildlife and Forests.” Africa Atlas .2007. pg.
251
1 3
UNEP. “Republic of Liberia: Deforestation and UNEP. “Republic of Sierra Leone:
Rubber Plantations.” Africa Atlas.2007. pg. 209 Deforestation.” Africa Atlas. 2007. pg. 291

60
:

else in the world (CBD)1. It is estimated World to complement their efforts. There
that dense tropical forests once covered are already signs of progress and hope.
65 per cent of the country; these have Democratic regimes that are committed to
been reduced to only five per cent today the protection of human rights, people-
(UNCCD 2004)2. There are many human centred development and market-oriented
pressures on the forest, including logging economies are on the increase. African
(both legal and illegal), slash-and-burn peoples have begun to demonstrate their
agriculture, mining, and dependence on refusal to accept poor economic and
fuel wood by 85 per cent of the political leadership. These developments
population (CBD). The country‘s marine are however, uneven and inadequate and
and inland fisheries are biologically rich. need to be further expedited.
Although production significantly 3.1 The human rights based approach
declined during the decade-long civil war to development
that ended in 2002, the sector is again on
the rise. Widespread illegal fishing is Governments across the continent would
increasing concerns about ensure that the common understanding in
overexploitation. Although not yet applying the human rights- based
believed to be overexploited, several fish approached to development are adhered
stocks may be in decline. to as follows:
In Sudan3, human activities have greatly 1. All programmes of development
altered the natural open-savannah co-operation, policies and technical
woodlands. Population growth, especially assistance should further the realisation of
in the latter half of the 20th century, human rights as laid down in the
coupled with an influx of refugees from Universal Declaration of Human Rights
drought and conflict in Northern Darfur and other international human rights
have put increasing pressure on this fragile instruments,
ecosystem. Tree loss in the foothills of 2. Human rights standards contained
Jebel Marra region of Sudan occur at an in, and principles derived from, the
alarming pace. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
3.0 Is there any way out? and other international human rights
instruments guide all development
Like the moult determines the shape of cooperation and programming in all
the clay pot, so does the paradigm sectors and in all phases of the
influence the final outcome of conflict programming process,
prevention, management and resolution.
Across the African Continent, Africans 3. Development cooperation
declare that they will no longer allow contributes to the development of the
themselves to be conditioned by capacities of ‗duty-bearers‘ to meet their
circumstance. They will determine their obligations and/or of ‗rights-holders‘ to
own destiny and call on the rest of the claim their rights
3.2. The human rights based
1
Convention on Biological Diversity approach to conflict prevention,
2
UN Convention to Combat Desertification management and resolution
3
UNEP. “Republic of the Sudan: Tree Loss in
the Foothills: Jebel Marra, Sudan.”. Africa Atlas
If a choice has to be made between
.2007. spending huge sums of money in armed
pg. 308 conflicts and investing in the fulfilment of

61
human rights expectations, I will argue discrimination, injustice and from
that upholding human rights is not only oppression, chances are that they
preferable in the quest for peace, security constructively and creatively participate in
and sustainable development; it is also the consolidating and preserving the system
cost effective option. The human rights that promote their dignity and welfare; as
based approach implies the inclusion of well as in the creation and preservation of
the following three points in conflict wealth. The opposite is also verified.
prevention, management and resolution: 3.3. Validity and use of African
1. To further the realisation of human indigenous knowledge
rights as laid down in the Universal We have to understand our culture and know
Declaration of Human Rights and other what kind of people we are. Are we the kind that
international human rights instruments. are willing to accept other people's mistakes
The pursuit of human rights appears without pointing fingers? Are we the kind of
today as generic objective of all AU people who can confess truthfully and forgive
organs and institutions as well as regional wholeheartedly?1
economic
communities. Human rights based There are
numerous
2. To be guided by paaroach is the most studies that
human rights standards
contained in, the cost effective option in point to the
value of
principles derived averting violent exploring
from, the Universal
Declaration of Human
conflicts in Africa indigenous
conflict
Rights and other prevention, management and resolution
international human rights instruments. mechanisms. Often they appear cheaper
The principles of universality,
without necessarily being of temporary
inalienability, interdependence as inherent effect. Sometimes they fall short of so-
features of human rights; and equality, called international standards of justice
non-discrimination, accountability and and fair trial. While the court-based
adherence to the rule as element of the approach to conflict may not be the only
process of addressing conflicts. available solution, it is up to us,
3. To develop the capacities of ‘duty- contemporary Africans and citizens of this
world at large to think creatively about
bearers’ to meet their obligations to how to blend approaches that may prima
respect, protect and fulfill human rights facie appear to be at symmetry.
and international humanitarian law and/or
‘rights-holders’ to claim their rights before
and after the armed conflict. In the final
analysis, many of the conflicts that divert 1
Paramount Chief, David Onen Acana, cited in
Africa‘s resources (both owned and Liu Institute for Global Issues and Gulu District
borrowed) could be significantly reduced NGO Forum, "Roco Wati Acoli: Restoring
in terms of human and finances if duty Relations in Acholi-land Traditional Approaches
bearers do not ignore but have the to Reintegration and Justice," September 2005,
available
capacity to attend to the legitimate claims <http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/admin/Information/543/
of the rights holders. When individuals Roco%20Wat%20I%20Acoli-20051.pdf>
and groups are free from poverty,

62
:

The Acholi Traditional Approach to cardinal principle in international


Forgiveness and Reconciliation humanitarian law
(Northern Uganda )1 Most of the principles emphasize the need
to live in harmony with others and
Forgiveness and reconciliation are said to
restoring social relations. This shows that
be at the center of the traditional Acholi
traditionally, the Acholi are a peace-loving
culture. The traditional Acholi culture
people. The Acholi traditional culture
views justice as means of restoring social
encourages individuals to accept their
relations. In other words, justice in the
mistakes and take responsibility for their
traditional Acholi culture should be
actions. It is important to note that an
considered as restorative.
individual does this voluntarily.
Paramount Chief Rwot David Onen Acana Individuals are encouraged to forgive and
II pointed out that, "The wounds of war not to seek revenge. One of the
will be healed if the Acholi practice their mechanisms for forgiveness and
traditional guiding principles.". He reconciliation among the Acholi is the
pointed out the following as the guiding Mato Oput (drinking the bitter herb).
principles:
Mato Oput is both a process and ritual
 Do not be a troublemaker, ceremony that aims at restoring
relationships between clans that would
 Respect, one of the core content-pillars have been affected by either an intentional
of human rights obligations2 murder or accidental killing. It helps to
 Sincerity, a moral value constitutive of bring together the two conflicting parties
human dignity with the aim of promoting forgiveness
and restoration, rather than revenge. The
 Do not steal, an imperative of life in Acholi conduct the Mato Oput ceremony
society prohibited by criminal law because they believe that after the
 Reconciliation and harmony, as ceremony the "hearts of the offender and
constitutive of peoples‘ right to peace the offended will be free from holding any
grudge between them."
 Forgiveness, core in indigenous conflict
resolution The Liu Institute for Global Issues and
the Gulu District NGO Forum points out
 Problem solving through that, the Mato Oput ceremony itself has
discussion, the principle of peaceful 'various forms across different clans.'
resolution of conflict, and "The drinking of the bitter herb means
that the two conflicting parties accept "the
 Children, women, and the disabled bitterness of the past and promise never
are not to be harmed in war, a to taste such bitterness again." The
payment of compensation follows the
1
Patrick, Tom.“The Acholi Traditional ceremony. The victim or his/her family is
Approach to Justice and the War in Northern compensated for the harm done, for
Uganda.” Beyondintractability. 2006. example, in the form of cows or cash. Is
<http://crinfo.beyondintractability.org/case_studi
such kind of compensation is enough to
es/acholi_traditional_approach.jsp?nid=6792>
Accessed:18 jun.2008 satisfy people? It is believed by many
Acholi that Mato Oput "can bring true
healing in a way that formal justice system
2
The two others are the obligation to protect and cannot." It doesn't aim at establishing
fulfil.

63
whether an individual is guilty or not, pertinent policy decisions, which are
rather it seeks to restore marred social generic to African or international
harmony in the affected community. conferences on conflicts in Africa, include
the followings:
The Acholi elders consider the formerly
abducted persons (FAPs) as their sons 1. Institutionalization of democracy
and daughters, hence the need for them to and good governance
undergo the forgiving and reconciliation 2. A strict adherence to the
process after returning from the bush. If it principles of rule of law
is the case that the FAPs are forgiven and
reconciled to the community without 3. Prevention /reduction of intra-
compensation, then we have a model of and inter-state conflicts.
reconciliation without justice in Northern 4. Promotion of the right to
Uganda. development, as well as economic,
social / cultural right, and civil and
political rights.
4.0 As a way of conclusion
5. Upholding the principle of the
In my opinion, the new Africa is the one separation of powers including the
that does not have to choose between a protection / promotion of the
romantic and distance cultural heritage of independence of the Judiciary.
its post-colonial era and an exogenous
paradigm in which she is condemned to 6. Promotion of the principles of
occupy a marginal seat. Reconciling the Transparency and Accountability
past and the present only takes in governance, and the eradication
commitment to change. This is doable! of corruption.
Africa has long mobilised the rest of 7. Promotion and protection of the
world around its conflicts. It is time to rights of women, children
draw from Africa the recipe for minorities and other vulnerable
transforming conflicts into opportunities groups
for sustainable development, mutual
acceptance respect and support. Under 8. Africa-wide adherence to and
the auspices of the African Union, several institutionalization of the
mechanisms have the potential to achieve NEPAD/APRM process
cost-effective conflict prevention, These recommendations are still valid and
resolution and management. The Peace relevant to the prevention, management
and Security Council and its the Panel of and resolution of armed conflicts in
the Wise, the NEPAD/APRM, the Africa. The process of turning them into
Panafrican Parliament, the African reality should include the use of the
Commission on Human and Peoples‘ human rights based approach and
Rights, the African Committee of Experts indigenous methods of conflict
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child- all prevention and management.
have a role to play. At regional level,
almost all regional economic communities The failure to live up to the pledges of
have in place institutional and normative halting armed conflicts that have the
frameworks to address armed conflicts. potential to adversely affect present and
What has been worryingly lacking is the future generations as well as the overall
translation of wishful decisions into development of the continent, will hunt
concrete interventions. Some of the Africans in any position of leadership or

64
:

authority. On the contrary respecting IANSA, Oxfam, and Saferworld (2007),


pledges will no doubt contribute to the ―Africa‘s missing billions: International arms
creation of peaceful and stable flows and the cost of conflict‖, Oxfam
environment that is a pre-requisite for the international. <
accelerated development and integration http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/briefin
agenda of Africa. gpapers/bp107_africas_missing_billions
> Accessed :12 June 2008.
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66
:
Executive and Managing Editor
Dr Maxwell Mkwezalamba Commissioner for Economic Affairs, AUC
Editor in Chief
Dr René N‟Guettia Kouassi Director of Economic Affairs, AUC
Editorial Board
Dr Maxwell Mkwezalamba Commissioner for Economic Affairs, AUC
Dr René N‟Guettia Kouassi Director of Economic Affairs, AUC
Mme Habiba Mejri-Cheikh Head of Communication and Information
Division, AUC
Mr. Yeo Dossina Statiscian, Department of Economic Affairs,
AUC
Mr Baboucarr Koma Policy Officer, Private Sector Development,
Department of Economic Affairs, AUC
Ms Hiwot Tifsihit Editorial Assistant, Department of Economic
Affairs, AUC

Web site: Mrs Christiane Yanrou, Senior Website Administrator,


Communication and Information Division AUC
Mr Asmerom Girma, Web Administrator, Communication and
Information Division AUC
Photographer: Mr Engida Wassie, AUC
:
i
Basil Davidson. The Search for Africa. New York: Random House, 1994, p8.
“Fridays ofii David
the Commission” are trimestrial
Beetham. Bureaucracy, conferences/debates
Minneapolis: University of Minnesotaon current
Press, 1987; socio-economic,
Eva Etzioni- and political
issues of Africa.
Halevy. Bureaucracy and Democracy, Apolitical Dilemma. London: Routeledge & Kegan Paul, 1985.
iii
Kwame Nantambu. Afrocentric Geopolitics, Kent, Ohio: Imhotep Publishing, 1996.
Organized iv by:Davidson,
Basil the op.cit.
Department
p20. of Economic Affairs in collaboration with Communication and
Informationv Division. If you have any questions or suggestions, please contact:
Daniel Osabu-Kle. Compatible Cultural Democracy: The Key to Development in Africa,
Peterborough: Mr Yeo Dossina, Email: [email protected]
Ms Hiwot
Broadview Press, 2000. Tifsihit, E-mail: [email protected]
vi
ibid Tel.: (251 11) 5 51 92 87
Fax: (251Africa,
11) 5Washington,
51 02 49D.C: Howard University Press,
vii
Walter Rodney. How Europe Underdeveloped
1982.
« Les Vendredis de la Commission » sont des conférences/débats trimestriels sur des problématiques
sociales, politiques et économiques africains.

Organisé par : le Département des Affaires économiques en collaboration avec la Division de


Communication et Information. Pour vos questions ou suggestions, veuillez contacter :
Mr Yeo Dossina, Email: [email protected]
Mlle Hiwot Tifsihit, E-mail: [email protected]
Tel.: (251 11) 5 51 92 87
Fax: (251 11) 5 51 02 49

www.africa-union.org

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