FRIAS V. ALCAYDE, G.R. NO.

194262, 28 FEBRUARY 2018

FACTS

Petitioner Frias as a lessor and respondent Alcayde as a lessee, entered into a Contract of Lease
involving a residential house and lot starting on December 5, 2003 up until December 4, 2004, with a
monthly rental of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000).

However, respondent refused to perform his obligations which prompted petitioner to file a Complaint
for Unlawful Detainer with the MeTC. The process server tried to personally serve the summons to
respondent on January 14 and 22, 2006, but to no avail. Through substituted service, summons was
served upon respondent's caretaker, May Ann Fortiles.

The MTC rendered a decisions in favor of the petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate the subject
premises and to pay the petitioner of the accrued rentals.

Respondent filed a petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for Issuance of TRO and/or
Injunction,12 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), claiming that MeTC does not bind him since the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over his person. Respondent likewise averred that the MeTC lacked
jurisdiction over the case for two reasons: (1) petitioners' complaint has no cause of action for failure
to make a prior demand to pay and to vacate; and (2) petitioner's non-referral of the case before
the barangay.

A copy of the petition for annulment of judgment was allegedly served to the petitioner. Based on the
Officer's Return, Sheriff IV Jocelyn S. Tolentino (Sheriff Tolentino) caused the "service of a Notice of
Raffle and Summons together with a copy of the complaints and its annexes" to the petitioner,
through Sally Gonzales (Ms. Gonzales), the secretary of petitioner's counsel, Atty. Daniel S. Frias (Atty.
Frias)

Petitioner filed a Special Appearance/Submission (Jurisdictional Infirmity Raised), 18 alleging among

others, that respondent's Motion to Revive Relief re: Issuance of a TRO merits neither judicial
cognizance nor consideration.

Sheriff III Armando S. Camacho, sent a Notice to Pay and to Vacate21 to respondent. Petitioner, through
her representative, Marie Regine F. Fujita (Ms. Fujita), filed a Preliminary Submission to Dismiss
Petition - Special Appearance Raising Jurisdictional Issues (Preliminary. Submission), on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over her person.
Petitioner pointed out that the defect in the service of summons is immediately apparent on the
Officer's Return, since it did not indicate the impossibility of a personal service within a reasonable
time; it did not specify the efforts exerted by Sheriff Tolentino to locate the petitioner; and it did not
certify that the person in the office who received the summons in petitioner's behalf was one with
whom the petitioner had a relation of confidence ensuring that the latter would receive or would be
notified of the summons issued in her name

The RTC issued an Order,26 granting respondent's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, to enjoin the MeTC's Decision. The RTC ruled that although Atty. Frias maintained his.
special appearance, he actively participated in the proceedings by attending the summary hearing in
the prayer for the issuance of the TRO

Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Petition for Annulment of Judgment
and to Set Aside and/or Reconsider the RTC's Order. Alleging among others, that the RTC's Order
violated the well-settled rule that a writ of injunction is not proper where its purpose is to take
property out of the possession or control of one person and place the same in the hands of another
where title has not been clearly established by law.

The RTC issued an Order,31 granting petitioner's Preliminary Submission. It ruled that the summons
and copies of the petition and its attachments were not duly served upon petitioner, either personally
or through substituted service of summons strictly in accordance with the Rules.

The Motion for Reconsideration,51 having been denied by the CA in its Resolution. Petitioner filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari

ISSUE

Whether or not the RTC acquires jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner

RULING

No. It is elementary that courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner once the complaint
or petition is filed. On the other hand, there are two ways through which jurisdiction over the
defendant or respondent is acquired through coercive process - either through the service of summons
upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court.
An action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the
person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person. Actions in rem are actions against the thing
itself. They are binding upon the whole world.

In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property.

In actions in personam, the judgment is for or against a person directly. Jurisdiction over the parties is
required in actions in personam because they seek to impose personal responsibility or liability upon a
person.

In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.

Here, respondent filed a petition to annul the MeTC's July 26, 2006 Decision, which ordered him to
vacate the premises of the subject property and to pay the petitioner the accrued rentals thereon, in
violation of the parties' lease contract

Annulment of judgment, as provided for in Rule 47, is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence, however, recognizes lack of due process as an additional ground to
annul a judgment. It is unlike a motion for reconsideration, appeal or even a petition for relief from
judgment, because annulment is not a continuation or progression of the same case, as in fact the
case it seeks to annul is already final and executory. Rather, it is an extraordinary remedy that is
equitable in character and is permitted only in exceptional cases.

For purposes of summons, this Court holds that the nature of a petition for annulment of judgment is
in personam, on the basis of the following reasons:

First, a petition for annulment of judgment is an original action, which is separate, distinct and
independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. Thus, regardless of
the nature of the original action in the decision sought to be annulled, be it in personam, in rem or
quasi in rein, the respondent should be duly notified of the petition seeking to annul the court's
decision over which the respondent has a direct or indirect interest.
Second, a petition for annulment of judgment and the court's subsequent decision thereon will affect
the parties alone. Any judgment therein will eventually bind only the parties properly impleaded. In
this case, had the RTC granted the respondent's petition, the MeTC's July 26 2006 judgment would
have been declared a nullity. This would have resulted to the following consequences: as to the
respondent, he would no longer be required to pay the rentals and vacate the subject property; and,
as to the petitioner, she would be deprived of her right to demand the rentals and to legally eject the
respondent. Clearly, only the parties' interests would have been affected.

Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, as in this case, the service of
summons may be done by personal or substituted service as laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14.
Indeed, the preferred mode of service of summons is personal service. Accordingly, this Court
explained the nature and enumerated the requisites of substituted service in Manotoc v. Court of
Appeals, et al.,which

We summarize and paraphrase below:

For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to
personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one (1) month which eventually resulted
in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two (2) different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were
unsuccessful. If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or residence, it should be
left with a person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. The sheriff must therefore
determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what
the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the
significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or
at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons.

If the substituted service will be done at defendant's office or regular place of business, then it should
be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted
service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the
president or manager. Such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of
the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the
summons.

A perusal, however, of Sheriff Tolentino's Return discloses that the following circumstances, as
required in Manotoc, were not clearly-established: (a) personal service of summons within a
reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was
served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party's residence or upon a
competent person in charge of the party's office or place of business.
Thus, Sheriff Tolentino fell short of the required standards. For her failure to faithfully, strictly, and
fully comply with the requirements of substituted service, the same is rendered ineffective. As such,
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, which is generally accorded to a
sheriff’s return,does not obtain in this case

As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. In this case, it is readily apparent that the petitioner did not acquiesce to the
jurisdiction of the trial court.

The records show that the petitioner never received any copy of the respondent's petition to annul the
final and executory judgment of the MeTC in the unlawful detainer case. As explained earlier, the copy
of the said petition which was served to Ms. Gonzales was defective under the Rules of Court.
Consequently, in order to question the trial court's jurisdiction, the petitioner filed several pleadings
and motions. However, in all these pleadings and motions, the petitioner never faltered in declaring
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person, due to invalid and improper service of
summons

To recapitulate, the jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner was never vested with the RTC
despite the mere filing of the petition for annulment of judgment. The manner of substituted service
by the process server was apparently invalid and ineffective. As such, there was a violation of due
process. Thus, as the essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of her defense, the petitioner must be
properly served the summons of the court. Regrettably, as had been discussed, the Constitutional right
of the petitioner to be properly served the summons and be notified has been utterly overlooked by
the officers of the trial court