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FILED a¢
Publlc Matter 7/24/2024
STATE BAR COURT OF CALIFORNIA STATE BAR COURT
HEARING DEPARTMENT - Los ANGELES CLERK'S OFFWCE
LOS ANGELES
In the Matter of ) Case No. SBC-22-O-30655-YDR
)
JOSEPH LAWRENCE DUNN, ) DECISION
)
State Bar No. 123063. )
)

Introduction

Joseph Lawrence Dunn (Respondent) was charged with three counts of moral turpitude in

Violation of Business and Professions Code] section 6106, stemming from actions he allegedly

committed While serving as Executive Director of the State Bar of California (Executive

Director) from 2010 to 2014.

Count One of the Notice of Disciplinary Charges (N DC) accuses Respondent of

misrepresentations to the State Bar Board of Trustees (Board) concerning California State

Assembly Bill AB 852 (AB 852). Count Two alleges that Respondent made misrepresentations

to the Board regarding the funding of a 2014 trip to Mongolia. Count Three charges him with

breaching his fiduciary duty to the Board in his capacity as Executive Director by making the

previously mentioned misrepresentations.

Count One and the related allegations in Count Three concerning AB 852 have been

dismissed with prejudice as untimely. Therefore, this decision addresses the remaining counts—

Count Two and the allegations in Count Three relating to Respondent’s misrepresentations to the

Board regarding funding of the 2014 trip to Mongolia.

1
All further statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code, unless
otherwise stated.
 After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented by both parties, the court finds by

clear and convincing evidence2 that Respondent is culpable of both remaining charges. Given

the nature and extent of the misconduct, along with the substantial mitigating factors and the

absence of aggravation, the court recommends that Respondent receive a one-year stayed

suspension and a one-year probation with standard conditions.

Significant Procedural History

Special Deputy Trial Counsel (SDTC) initiated this proceeding by filing the NDC on July

5, 2022. Respondent filed a response to the NDC on August 1, 2022.

On December 19, 2022, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the charges in the NDC,

arguing that the allegations were untimely under rule 5.21(A) of the Rules of Procedure of the

State Bar of California. This rule in part mandates that an initial pleading based solely on a

complainant’s allegations must be filed within five years of the date the violation occurred. This

motion was among several motions to dismiss that Respondent filed both before and after this

date.

On February 9, 2023, the court issued an order granting in part and denying in part

Respondent’s December 19 motion to dismiss. Specifically, the court dismissed with prejudice

Count One and the allegations in Count Three pertaining to AB 852, as the applicable rule of

limitations for those allegations had expired. The motion was denied as to Count Two and the

allegations in Count Three regarding the funding of the 2014 Mongolia trip. Thereafter, SDTC

sought interlocutory review of the partial dismissal.

2
Clear and convincing evidence leaves no substantial doubt and is sufficiently strong to
command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. (Conservatorship of Wendland
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 552.)

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 On May 26, 2023, the Review Department issued an order affirming this court’s

February 9 dismissal and ordered Count One and the allegations in Count Three concerning

Respondent’s misrepresentations to the Board regarding AB 852 dismissed with prejudice.

On November 13, 2023, the parties filed a Stipulation as to Facts and Admission of

Documents.

The trial date was postponed multiple times due to ongoing discovery issues,

interlocutory review of this court’s February 9 order and, additionally, at the request of the

parties due to personal conflicts. Ultimately, the trial was held on April 16, 17, and 18, 2024.3

The State Bar was represented by SDTC Charles Berwanger and Edward J. McIntyre.

Respondent was represented by Mark J. Geragos, Kimberly M. Casper and Ellen Pansky. SDTC

filed its closing argument brief on May 9, 2024, and Respondent filed his on May 10. The

matter was submitted for decision on May 10, 2024.

Jurisdiction

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in California on June 10, 1986, and has

been a licensed attorney of the State Bar of California at all times since his admission.

Findings of Fact

Respondent as Executive Director of the State Bar

On November 22, 2010, the Board hired Respondent as the Executive Director of the

State Bar of California under an employment agreement. Respondent acknowledges that in his

capacity as Executive Director, he owed the Board and the State Bar a fiduciary duty. He served

in this role until November 7, 2014, when the Board terminated his employment contract.

3
During trial, the court took under submission Respondent’s exhibit 1025 (April 1, 2024
Declaration of Daniel Eaton) and exhibit 1032 (Video deposition of Michael Colantuano on
December 7, 2016. Exhibits 1025 and 1032 are received into evidence.

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Respondent’s Representations at the November 2013 Board Meeting

On November 15, 2013, the Board held a meeting, during which Respondent, as

Executive Director, reported that the State Bar had been approached by officials from the

country of Mongolia. These officials were interested in forging a relationship with the State Bar

and were seeking support from the State Bar in developing a regime for regulating lawyers that

would support an independent judiciary. The minutes from this Board meeting reflect that

“Executive Director Dunn explained that the Mongolian officials were working to reform

Mongolia’s judicial system and as a result had established close cooperation with the Supreme

Courts of the United States and were seeking technical assistance to develop the regulatory

system from the State Bar of California.” (Exhibit [Exh.] 3, p. 2.) Multiple Board members

present at the meeting credibly testified that Respondent explicitly assured the Board that no

State Bar funds would be used to fund an upcoming trip to Mongolia. However, evidence

presented herein conclusively demonstrates that, contrary to these assurances, State Bar funds

were indeed utilized to cover various expenses associated with Respondent’s January 2014 trip

to Mongolia.

Michael Colantuono, a lawyer and Board member from 2012 to 2018, testified that at the

meeting in question, Respondent provided the Board with a brief report indicating that a request

had been made from Mongolia for support from the State Bar in developing a regime for

regulating lawyers. He specifically recalls that Respondent “indicated that no state funds, State

Bar funds would be used in that effort.” (Reporter’s Transcript [R.T.] Trial Day 1, p. 112.)4

Colantuono emphasized the importance of this assurance for two reasons: “One is the Bar always

4
The court references trial testimony from the non-official court reporter’s audio
transcriptions prepared under the direction of SDTC and filed on May 10, 2024. Although these
are not official State Bar Court transcripts as defined in rule 5.15 of the Rules of Procedure of the
State Bar, they are used to ensure accurate citations to the testimonial record, as both parties cite
to it in their closing argument brief.

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has an optics issue about how it spends the dollars that we get through the good graces of the

legislature on an annual basis. And secondly, as a public lawyer I’m aware that you cannot use

public resources for private purposes and you cannot use them for public purposes that are not

the purposes of your agenda.” (Id. at p. 113.) Colantuono further stressed: “And had I

understood that State Bar funds were to be used, I would have had a concern about whether

helping Mongolia develop an independent judiciary is part of the statutory mission of the State

Bar.” (Ibid.)

Colantuono highlighted the crucial nature of the relationship between the Board and its

Executive Director, emphasizing the need for trust and candor. He noted: “The use of the funds

is itself a concern because of the appearance issue and the public funds concern. But the non-

disclosure and the persistent non-disclosure after what might have been an innocent prediction

but later turned out to be a non-disclosed change of fact indicated a lack of candor with the

board. And the relationship between a board of directors of a government agency and their chief

executive is an important one and it has to be trusting and characterized by candor. That

becomes even more important when you're dealing with a judicial branch agency where we are

held to a higher standard of scrupulousness in our public behavior than other political figures

are.” (Id. at pp. 122-123.)5

Miriam Krinsky, a lawyer and Board member from 2013 to 2016, also attended the

November 2013 meeting. She recalls Respondent discussing forging a relationship and trying to

assist officials in Mongolia to improve their legal system and an upcoming trip to Mongolia to

5
The court rejects Respondent’s assertion that Colantuono’s testimony should be ignored
because he showed bias by declining informal cooperation with Respondent’s counsel during the
pendency of this proceeding. That he declined to speak informally with Respondent’s counsel
without a subpoena is entirely within standard legal practice and does not indicate any
impropriety. Nor does it diminish the significance of his testimony, which is substantially
corroborated by other highly credible witnesses.

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further that relationship. Regarding funding the trip to Mongolia, she testified: “I don’t recall the

exact words, but I do recall that in sum and substance he indicated that State Bar funds would not

be used to pay for the trip to Mongolia.” (R.T. Trial Day 2, p. 11.)

Like Colantuono, Krinsky emphasized the importance of Respondent’s assurance that no

State Bar funds would be used toward this endeavor. She explained: “So having spent time in

other organizations and on other boards as a fiduciary and taking seriously my responsibilities as

an appointee of the Supreme Court to the body, it would have been of concern to me if State Bar

funds that are supposed to be limited in the nature of what they subsidize were to be used for

something like this. And had that been the case, I would have felt that we had a responsibility

both to approve the expenditure of the funds on something like this, and I would not have

supported the use of State Bar funds for this kind of an expenditure.” (Id. at p. 12.) She

articulated two significant concerns regarding Respondent’s use of State Bar funds toward a trip

to Mongolia: “One, and most fundamentally, it was concerning to me that a representation made

to the board of trustees by our executive director was untrue and that he had not been forthright

with us about the issue. Secondly, I was concerned by the actual expenditure of Bar funds for

this kind of a trip. . . . The dishonest representation would have remained however much money

was used. And if this is an inappropriate use of Bar funds, which I believed it was, whether it

was $10 or $7,000 or $70,000, my concerns would have remained on both fronts.” (Id. at p. 15.)

Dennis Mangers, a Board member from 2010 to 2016, was also in attendance at the

November 15, 2013 Board meeting. He recalls Respondent informing the Board that the

Mongolian government reached out to the State Bar for advice and that he believed this initiative

would be a good thing for the State Bar to do. Mangers testified that Respondent “stipulate[d]

that there would be no use of State Bar funds for that purpose.” (R.T. Trial Day 1, p. 164.) In

cross-examination he reiterated that “[t]he only thing I remember hearing is Mr. Dunn indicating

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the whole Mongolia story as I’ve suggested and then indicating that no State Bar funds will be

used on the trip.” (Id. at p. 224.) He further stressed that “although the amounts were relatively

insignificant in terms of the Bar’s overall revenue expense, it was the fact that we were assured

that no Bar funds would be used and then to later learn that they were suggested that it was --

that what Mr. Dunn told the board was untrue. And that concerned me, of course, because I

considered him kind of the chief lawyer of the place, and his veracity was important.” (Id. at p.

168.)

James Fox attended the November 2013 Board meeting “as special assistant to the chief

trial counsel.” (R.T. Day 2, pp. 174-175.)6 Fox recalled Respondent “specifically saying that the

entire bill would be paid for by the Mongolia government, that no State Bar resources would be

used.” (Id. at p. 175.)7

Respondent’s Testimony Regarding the November 2013 Board Meeting Lacks Credibility

Respondent’s testimony regarding the November 2013 Board meeting and the funding of

the Mongolia trip was contradictory, severely undermining his credibility. At trial, Respondent

initially claimed he had no recollection of attending a Board meeting where the Mongolia trip

was discussed. (R.T. Trial Day 1, p. 39.) He denied making any presentation to the Board about

Mongolia trip expenses, and explicitly stated he did not inform the Board about using State Bar

funds for the Mongolia trip: “I don’t believe that I raised an issue with the Bar board that there

would be Bar funds used.” (Id. at pp. 98-99.) Respondent reiterated that testimony when his

6
Due to Fox’s passing, relevant portions of his 2017 arbitration testimony were read into
the record.
7
Respondent asserts that Fox’s testimony should be disregarded because the minutes of
the November 15, 2013 Board meeting do not reflect his attendance. While it is true that the
minutes do not indicate his presence, the court accepts Fox’s testimony that he did, in fact, attend
the meeting and heard Respondent’s representation regarding the non-use of State Bar funds.
There is no evidence before the court suggesting that his clear recollection of that meeting and
what Respondent said is unreliable.

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counsel asked: “Q. You didn’t make a presentation to the board about expenses. A. Regarding

Mongolia on the January trip, no.” (Id. at p. 96.) He also admitted that he did not inform the

Board after the Mongolia trip that State Bar funds had in fact been used for the trip because that

would have been an “unusual thing to do.” (Id. at p. 45.)

However, this account stands in stark contrast to his testimony during the 2017

arbitration, where Respondent asserted that he, in fact, had decided to use State Bar funds and

informed the Board that the State Bar would be charged for travel expenses:

“Q. Now, before you traveled to Mongolia in January 2014, you had already decided to
use State Bar funds to cover the cost of travel; right?

A. We had to, which is why I asked the office of general counsel to vet whether charging
those to the voluntary account, which was mandatory, was appropriate.

Q. And you presented to the board of trustees on or about November 13th regarding your
plans to travel to Mongolia, right?

A. I did indeed, yes.

Q. . . . Just so I’m clear, you didn’t inform the Board at that meeting that Bar funds
would be used; right?
....
A. I said that we would be charged the coach airfare. There’s only one way to pay for
those, counsel, and that’s by charging it to the State Bar, and I told them that in our
discussion about the general counsel’s opinion about it.”

(Exh. 17, pp. 46-47; see also p. 22 [“I brought that to the Board. I said, we have to pay for coach

airfare. . . .”].)

This dramatic shift in narrative is further complicated by his September 2016 deposition

testimony at the arbitration, where he denied discussing travel expenses with the Board, yet

claimed that he and former President of the Board Luis Rodriguez (Rodriguez) had decided

“from the outset” to use State Bar funds for some of the costs of the January trip to Mongolia: “Q

. . . Did you discuss at the meeting with the board how your travel expenses would be paid? . . .

THE WITNESS: No, sir.” (Exh. 10, p. 92). And Respondent further stated: “The answer is did I

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ever reference that State Bar funds would or wouldn’t be used? No, that would not have been

standard for me in describing a potential expenditure.” (Exh. 10, p. 91.)

Respondent’s assertion that he never discussed funding for the Mongolia trip with the

Board because it would have been “unusual” for him to discuss expenditure, and his directly

contradictory testimony that he told the Board that State Bar funds had to be used for airfare,

undermines his credibility.

Moreover, the testimony provided by Respondent’s two percipient witnesses fails to

corroborate his assertion that he did not make a misrepresentation to the Board at the November

2013 meeting. Former Board member Heather Rosing, who attended the subject meeting, stated

that she did not recall Respondent informing the Board that no State Bar funds would be used for

a trip to Mongolia. Rosing, however, testified that two Board members, Krinsky and Craig

Holden, told her Respondent had made a material misrepresentation. (R.T. Trial Day 1, p. 196.)

Rodriguez, who testified via a written declaration, was also present at the meeting. He declared;

“To the best of my recollection, I do not recall Mr. Dunn informing the board that no State Bar

funds would be used.” (Exh. 1016, p. 1.) He also declared that Respondent kept him regularly

updated on discussions with Mongolian representatives starting in late summer 2013, and he was

aware of the trip’s details, including that Mongolia would cover all in-country expenses while

the State Bar would cover the roundtrip airline tickets. Notably, however, neither witness

explicitly testified that Respondent did not make the statement in question; instead, they simply

do not remember him making it. This lack of corroboration from his own witnesses weakens

Respondent’s position and lends further credence to the contrary evidence presented by multiple

credible Board members.

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The 2014 Mongolia Trip and Respondent’s Use of State Bar Funds for Trip Expenses

Between January 24 and January 29, 2014, Respondent traveled to Mongolia. He

approved and was accompanied by State Bar employee Tom Layton (Layton). The evidence

shows that the State Bar was charged and paid for some of Respondent’s and Layton’s travel

expenses.

Justin Ewert, who at the time served as a budget analyst for the State Bar and currently

holds the position of Finance Director, provided testimony regarding the financial aspects of this

trip. Ewert identified charges totaling $6,041.72 that were billed to and paid for by the State Bar,

covering airfare and cell phone usage for Respondent’s and Layton’s January 2014 Mongolia

trip. (R.T. Day 2, pp. 138-140.) Respondent corroborated this information, acknowledging his

use of State Bar funds for airfare and telephone charges related to the Mongolia trip. (R.T. Day

1, pp. 46-47.) The airfare for Respondent and Layton was charged to the State Bar’s American

Express card through the organization’s travel arrangements. Then, on March 4, 2014,

Respondent submitted a reimbursement request for $1,114.37, categorized as “wireless services”

for the Mongolia trip. (Exh. 6, p. 15.) Peggy Van Horne, then Chief Financial Officer of the

State Bar, approved this reimbursement request. On March 11, 2014, the State Bar issued a

check to Respondent for the requested amount, which he subsequently negotiated on March 14.8

In early April 2014, the State Bar received a $5,000 check from the law firm of Girardi

and Keese dated March 20, 2014, made payable to the “State Bar Access & Education

Foundation” (foundation) (Exh. 6, p. 38). The foundation, a non-profit public benefit

corporation created in 2013 and dissolved in 2016, kept its funds separate from State Bar funds.

8
Layton undertook a second trip to Mongolia from April 4 to April 9, 2014. On this
occasion, he was accompanied by Howard Miller, an attorney from Girardi and Keese. For this
subsequent journey, Layton charged the State Bar and received reimbursement for travel
expenses amounting to $1,046.74.

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According to Respondent, the check was purportedly donated to cover the State Bar’s expenses

for the Mongolia trip. However, since the donation was specifically made to the non-profit

foundation and the foundation funds were segregated from the State Bar funds, the $5,000

donation was neither intended nor used to reimburse the State Bar for the expenses incurred for

Respondent’s and Layton’s Mongolia trip—which nevertheless exceeded the $5,000 check.

In total, the State Bar paid $6,041.72 for Respondent’s and Layton’s January 2014

Mongolia travel expenses; and additional funds for Layton’s April 2014 trip. Ewert confirmed

that the Girardi and Keese $5,000 check to the non-profit foundation was never used to

reimburse the State Bar for the Mongolia trip expenses. (R.T. Day 2, pp. 142, 149.) At no point

did Respondent notify the Board that State Bar funds had been used to fund the January 2014

Mongolia trip.

The Munger, Tolles & Olson Investigation and Report

On July 31, 2014, the then State Bar’s Chief Trial Counsel, Jayne Kim, submitted a

Report of Improper Activity (Kim report) to the State Bar Human Resources Department,

highlighting concerns regarding certain actions by Respondent in his role as Executive Director,

among others. The Kim report was forwarded to the State Bar Audit Committee.

In August 2014, the committee retained the law firm of Munger, Tolles & Olson (MTO)

to investigate these concerns. Among the many issues raised in the Kim report, MTO

investigated “[w]hether Joseph Dunn misled the board or allowed the public to be misled about

use of Bar funds in connection with travel to Mongolia.” (Exh. 7, p. 3.) Following their

investigation, in October 2014, MTO prepared an “Independent Investigation for the State Bar of

California: Summary of Findings and Recommendations” (MTO Report).

The MTO Report specifically concluded that Respondent had failed to satisfy his

contractual and fiduciary duties to the Board and had engaged in serious misconduct justifying

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termination of his employment. Among the many findings, the MTO Report concluded that

Respondent had falsely informed the Board that no State Bar funds would be used for the trip to

Mongolia: “Dunn’s representation that no Bar funds would be used proved to be untrue. In

connection with the January trip, the Bar paid $6041.72 in mandatory Bar dues for Dunn and

Layton’s airfare and cell phone roaming charges.” (Exh. 7, p. 5.) The MTO Report also found

that despite his representation to the Board, Respondent had intended to use State Bar funds from

the beginning: “Indeed, Dunn and Past President Luis Rodriguez acknowledged that they

decided from the outset to use Bar funds for at least some of the costs of the January trip to

Mongolia.” (Exh. 10, p. 5.) At trial, Respondent confirmed the accuracy of this finding in the

MTO Report. (R.T. Day 1, pp. 38-39.) This was consistent with his 2016 deposition and

subsequent testimony at the 2017 arbitration, where Respondent admitted that he had already

decided to use State Bar funds to cover the cost of travel before traveling to Mongolia in January

2014. (Exhs. 10, p. 90; 17, p. 46.)

Board members Colantuono, Krinsky, and Mangers first learned from the MTO Report

that, despite Respondent’s representations in November 2013, State Bar funds had been used to

pay for expenses related to the Mongolia trip.

On October 30, 2014, the Board accepted the findings in the MTO Report, but not its

recommendations at the time. Krinsky explained that the Board “had accepted all of the findings

in the report but that we weren’t accepting the recommendations in that we believed it was our

prerogative as a board to decide what the consequences should be of those findings and

determinations.” (R.T. Day 2, p. 16.)

Shortly thereafter, in November 2014, and based largely on the MTO Report, the Board

decided to terminate Respondent’s employment.

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The 2017 Arbitration and Judge Infante’s Findings

On November 18, 2014, Respondent filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of California,

Los Angeles County, case No. BC563715, against the State Bar and other named defendants,

arising from the termination of his employment with the State Bar.

On June 12, 2015, the Superior Court granted the State Bar’s motion to compel

arbitration and referred the matter to JAMS arbitrator, the Honorable Edward A. Infante (Ret.).

Judge Infante conducted hearings from February 1 through February 7, 2017.

Various Board members testified during the arbitration hearings. Consistent with their

testimony in this case, Colantuono, Mangers, and Krinsky testified that during the November 15,

2013 Board meeting, Respondent told the Board that no State Funds would be used to pay for the

Mongolia trip. As noted above, Respondent’s arbitration testimony on the key issue of the

Mongolia trip funding contradicts his testimony in this proceeding.

On March 20, 2017, Judge Infante issued his final arbitration award, ruling in favor of the

State Bar on all claims. Regarding the Mongolia trip expense allegations, Judge Infante

concluded that “Claimant [Respondent] breached his duty to keep the Board ‘fully informed’ and

to ‘safeguard and administer all [State Bar] funds’ when he informed the Board that State Bar

funds would not pay for the Mongolia trip and then charged some of the costs of his trip to the

State Bar.” (Exh. 12, p. 27.)

Conclusions of Law

Count One – Section 6106 (Moral Turpitude – Misrepresentation)

Pursuant to this court’s February 9, 2023 order, as affirmed by the Review Department on

May 26, 2023, Count One of the NDC is dismissed with prejudice.

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Count Two – Section 6106 (Moral Turpitude – Misrepresentation)

SDTC charges Respondent in Count Two with committing an act involving dishonesty

and moral turpitude in violation of section 6106, by stating to the Board that no State Bar funds

would be used to fund a trip to Mongolia in 2014, when he knew that statement was false and

misleading. Respondent is culpable of this charge.

Section 6106 provides that the commission of any act involving dishonesty, moral

turpitude, or corruption constitutes cause for suspension or disbarment. Broadly, any act

contrary to honesty and good morals involves moral turpitude. (Stanford v. State Bar (1940) 15

Cal.2d 721, 727.) Acts of moral turpitude include an attorney’s concealment as well as

affirmative misrepresentations. (Grove v. State Bar (1965) 63 Cal.2d 312, 315.) Indeed, “[n]o

distinction can . . . be drawn among concealment, half-truth, and false statement of fact.” (Ibid.)

While neither evil intent nor injury to a client is necessary for moral turpitude, some level of

guilty knowledge or at least gross negligence is required. (See Fitzsimmons v. State Bar (1983)

34 Cal.3d 327, 331; In the Matter of Respondent H (Review Dept. 1992) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct.

Rptr. 234, 241; see also In the Matter of Crane and DePew (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar

Ct. Rptr. 139, 154 fn. 17 [“[s]ection 6106 . . . expressly covers acts of moral turpitude whether

committed in one’s capacity as an attorney or not”].)

At the November 15, 2013 Board meeting, Respondent, then serving as Executive

Director of the State Bar, informed the Board that officials from Mongolia had sought the State

Bar’s assistance in developing a regulatory framework for lawyers. Three Board members and

one additional witness unequivocally testified that Respondent assured the Board that no State

Bar funds would be used to fund an upcoming trip to Mongolia. Colantuono recalls that

Respondent “indicated that no . . . State Bar funds would be used in that effort.” (R.T. Day 1, p.

112.) Mangers testified that Respondent “stipulate[d] that there would be no use of State Bar

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funds for that purpose.” (Id. at p. 164.) Krinsky stated that Respondent “indicated that State

Bar funds would not be used to pay for the trip to Mongolia.” (R.T. Day 2, p. 11.) Fox recalled

Respondent “specifically saying that the entire bill would be paid for by the Mongolian

government, that no State Bar resources would be used.” (Id. at p. 175.) This assurance was

unequivocal and left no room for misinterpretation.

The testimony of these witnesses is entirely consistent with their testimony at the 2017

arbitration. It also aligns with the MTO Report’s conclusion that Respondent’s “representation

that no bar funds will be used proved to be untrue.” (Exh. 7, p. 5.) Additionally, Judge

Infante’s 2017 arbitration award supports this conclusion, finding that Respondent “breached his

duty to keep the Board ‘fully informed’ and to ‘safeguard and administer all [State Bar] funds’

when he informed the Board that State Bar funds would not pay for the Mongolia trip and then

charged some of the costs of his trip to the State Bar.” (Exh. 12, p. 27.) While the arbitration

findings do not have collateral estoppel effect here, they are entitled to a strong presumption of

validity in this proceeding as they are supported by substantial evidence. (See Maltaman v. State

Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 924, 947) and In the Matter of Applicant A (Review Dept. 1995) 3 Cal.

State Bar Ct. Rptr. 318, 325) [civil court findings supported by substantial evidence should be

given a strong presumption of validity in disciplinary proceedings even where decided under a

preponderance of the evidence standard].)

The court finds Respondent’s testimony regarding the November 2013 Board meeting

and funding of the Mongolia particularly troubling given Respondent’s conflicting statements.

Respondent’s account of events has shifted dramatically over time, undermining his credibility.

At trial, he initially claimed no recollection of discussing the Mongolia trip at a Board meeting

and denied informing the Board about using State Bar funds. However, during the 2017

arbitration, Respondent contradicted this, asserting he had indeed informed the Board that the

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State Bar would be charged for airfare. His September 2016 deposition adds further

inconsistency, where he denied discussing travel expenses with the Board but claimed he and

Rodriguez had decided “from the outset” to use State Bar funds for some trip costs. The inability

of Rosing and Rodriguez to recall Respondent stating that no State Bar funds would be used does

not substantiate Respondent’s claims. Moreover, Rosing’s testimony that two other Board

members reported a material misrepresentation by Respondent further undermines his credibility.

Given these significant contradictions and lack of corroboration, the court finds Respondent’s

testimony on this matter to be unreliable.

Conversely, the credible and consistent testimony of several Board members, the MTO

Report’s findings, Judge Infante’s conclusions, and Respondent’s incredible testimony, all lead

to one single conclusion--- that Respondent represented to the Board at the November 2013

meeting that no State Bar funds would be used to fund the trip to Mongolia. This statement was

false and misleading, as State Bar funds were indeed used to cover some of the expenses for the

2014 Mongolia trip. As Ewert’s testimony and documentary evidence establishes, the State Bar

was charged and paid for Respondent’s and Layton’s Mongolia travel expenses in January 2014,

including airfare and cell phone charges, despite his guarantee that no State Bar funds would be

use for the Mongolia trip. At no point has Respondent sought to correct his earlier misstatement

to the Board.

Further, the evidence unequivocally demonstrates that Respondent’s false and misleading

statement to the Board was made knowingly. The MTO Report’s finding that Respondent and

Rodriguez had decided “from the outset” to use Bar funds for at least some of the January trip

costs to Mongolia (exh. 10, p. 5) was confirmed by Respondent himself at trial, consistent with

his prior deposition and arbitration testimony. In multiple instances, Respondent has admitted to

deciding to use State Bar funds for travel costs prior to the January 2014 Mongolia trip.

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Respondent’s testimony at the arbitration that he knew the State Bar would be charged for airfare

is further evidence he knew his representation to the Board was false and misleading. The

totality of this evidence establishes that Respondent was fully aware of the falsity of his

statement to the Board regarding the non-use of State Bar funds when he made it in November

2013. This knowledge of falsity presumes an intent to deceive. (See Pickering v. State Bar

(1944) 24 Cal.2d 141, 144; see also Davis v. State Bar (1983) 33 Cal.3d 231, 239-240.)

Moreover, the materiality of Respondent’s misrepresentation to the Board is significant.

Multiple Board members provided compelling testimony that Respondent’s assurance of no State

Bar funds being used for a trip unrelated to the organization’s core mission was crucial to their

decision-making process. Their concerns encompassed public perception of spending,

appropriate use of public resources, and adherence to the State Bar’s statutory mission of

regulating and disciplining California attorneys to protect the public. Board members

Colantuono, Mangers, and Krinsky all expressed that knowledge of State Bar funds being used

would have significantly altered their considerations and likely their support for the proposal.

Krinsky, in particular, emphasized that she would not have supported using State Bar funds for

this type of expenditure. The consistency and gravity of these concerns from Board members

strongly suggests that Respondent’s misrepresentation was driven by his personal interest in

undertaking the trip to Mongolia and a desire to avoid scrutiny from Board members rightfully

concerned about the appropriate use of State Bar funds. Given their reliance on Respondent’s

false assurance and its potential impact on their decision-making, the court finds Respondent’s

misrepresentation to be substantially material, warranting a finding of culpability.

The court finds Respondent’s numerous defenses unpersuasive and lacking merit. As

noted above, his inconsistent and contradictory testimony severely undermines his credibility,

making it impossible to discern a coherent or trustworthy narrative. His argument that the Board

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would have approved his travel expenses to Mongolia, as such charges are typically incurred by

Board members and executives during travel, misses the central issue. The relevant question is

not whether Respondent was entitled to seek reimbursement for his travel expenses to Mongolia

or whether a budget had been approved for this purpose. The sole issue here is whether

Respondent lied to the Board about using State Bar funds for the Mongolia trip. The absence of

any mention of Respondent’s misrepresentation in the November 2013 meeting minutes does not

disprove its occurrence, especially given the clear testimony of multiple Board members. As

Colantuono explained regarding the minutes, “you’ll note that most of these nine pages address

actions the Board took and not reports they received. So it doesn’t surprise me that an old report

from the chief executive would be covered more cursorily than other times.” (R.T. Day 1, p.

155.)

The court also finds unpersuasive Respondent’s argument that the lack of testimony from

other members of the Board—17 members at the time—serves as evidence that Respondent did

not make the misrepresentation. His speculation about other Board members’ potential

testimony is unsupported. Indeed, Respondent chose not to call other Board members to testify

except for Rosing and Rodriguez, neither of whom support his claims. (In the Matter of Oheb

(Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 920, 935, fn. 13 [unexplained failure to

corroborate testimony with evidence that could be produced is a strong indication that the

testimony is not credible].) Thus, the absence of testimony from other witnesses present at the

November 2013 meeting does not support Respondent’s unfounded conclusion that he did not

make the misrepresentation to the Board.

Respondent’s assertion that Krinsky’s reference to “in country costs” in her notes of the

October 17, 2014 Board meeting is proof that Respondent told the Board in November 2013 that

Mongolia would cover costs incurred in Mongolia is unpersuasive. Respondent denies making

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any presentation to the Board about the Mongolia trip expenses. Further, the notes are from a

meeting that took place nearly one year after his misrepresentation to the Board and Krinsky

explained that the reference could have been to something someone said or something

Respondent offered as an explanation in October 2014.

Respondent’s argument regarding the $5,000 contribution from Girardi and Keese,

allegedly made by Miller to cover expenses from the January 2014 Mongolia trip, is

fundamentally flawed and unpersuasive. This claim directly contradicts Respondent’s own

testimony during arbitration, where he explicitly acknowledged that the State Bar would be

responsible for airfare costs. Moreover, the timing of the check—received by the State Bar two

months after the January trip and long after travel costs had been incurred—strongly suggests

that the funds were never intended to reimburse past expenditures. Given that Miller did not

participate in the January 2014 trip, it is far more plausible that this contribution was intended, if

at all, for the subsequent April trip undertaken by Miller and Layton. But even if the funds were

meant for the January trip, the $5,000 contribution falls short of covering the full expenses

charged to the State Bar. Most crucially, Miller directed the funds to the non-profit foundation,

not to the State Bar itself, clearly demonstrating that the funds were neither intended nor used to

reimburse the State Bar for the expenses incurred for Respondent’s January trip to Mongolia.

Finally, the court rejects Respondent’s renewed and persistent attempts to relitigate the

timeliness of the charges. This matter has been thoroughly addressed and definitively resolved

in previous orders denying Respondent’s multiple motions to dismiss the charges relating to his

Mongolia trip misrepresentation. The court’s prior ruling on this issue stands and will not be

revisited.

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 In conclusion, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Respondent is

culpable of moral turpitude in violation of section 6106 for intentionally making a false and

misleading statement to the Board in November 2013, as charged in Count Two.9

Count Three – Section 6101 (Moral Turpitude – Breach of Fiduciary Duties as Executive
Director)

The remaining allegation in Count Three of the NDC charges Respondent with

committing an act of moral turpitude in violation of section 6106. Specifically, it is alleged that,

in his role as Executive Director, Respondent breached his fiduciary duties to the Board by

misrepresenting that no State Bar funds would be used in connection with the trip to Mongolia in

January 2014. This allegation is identical to that charged under Count Two.

“ ‘An attorney who accepts the responsibility of a fiduciary nature is held to the high

standards of the legal profession whether or not he acts in his capacity of an attorney.’ ” (In the

Matter of McCarthy (Review Dept. 2002) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 364, 373 (quoting Worth v.

State Bar (1976) 17 Cal.3d 337, 341).) Respondent acknowledges that, as Executive Director, he

had a fiduciary duty to the State Bar and its Board. Furthermore, for the reasons discussed in

Count Two, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent breached his

fiduciary duties to the Board through his intentional misrepresentation, thereby committing an

act of moral turpitude and dishonesty in violation of section 6106. (See In the Matter of Casey

(Review Dept. 2008) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 117, 124-125 [moral turpitude under section 6106

established by attorney’s failure to act as a fiduciary in fully communicating the terms of the sale

9
Even if the court were to accept the hypothetical scenario proposed in Respondent’s
closing argument brief that he made a non-intentional inaccurate prediction regarding the non-
use of State Bar funds at the November 2013 Board meeting, he would still be culpable of this
charge by gross negligence. (In the Matter of Maloney and Virsik (Review Dept. 2005) 4 Cal.
State Bar Ct. Rptr. 774, 786 [a finding of gross negligence in creating a false impression is
sufficient for a section 6106 violation].)

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or properly between clients, documenting the transaction, overreaching, and his conflicts of

interest].) Thus, Respondent is culpable as charged in Count Three.

However, no additional weight in discipline is assigned to this violation because the same

facts support culpability under Count Two. (In the Matter of Moriarty (Review Dept. 2017) 5

Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 511, 520 [no dismissal of charge where same misconduct proves

culpability for another charge, but no additional weight assigned for discipline purposes].)

Aggravation and Mitigation

Aggravating Circumstances

SDTC bears the burden of proving aggravating circumstances by clear and convincing

evidence. (Std. 1.5)10 The court finds no aggravation in this case.

Intentional Misconduct, Bad Faith or Dishonesty (Std. 1.5(d))—No Weight

Misrepresentation (Std. 1.5(e))—No Weight
Concealment (Std. 1.5(f))—No Weight

Standards 1.5(d), (e) and (f) provide that aggravating circumstances may include

intentional misconduct, misrepresentations or concealment, respectively. SDTC seeks

aggravation for Respondent’s intentional misconduct in his dishonest statements to the Board

and his concealment after the fact. However, SDTC has not presented additional facts, separate

and distinct from Respondent’s misconduct resulting in culpability, to support these aggravating

factors. Therefore, the court assigns no aggravation as Respondent’s alleged acts of intentional

misconduct were already considered in establishing culpability under section 6106. (In the

Matter of Guillory (Review Dept. 2015) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 402, 409, fn. 13 [improper to

consider in aggravation factual findings already used to determine culpability].)

10
All references to standards (Std.) are to the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, title
IV, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.

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 Significant Harm to the Client, the Public or the Administration of Justice (Std.
1.5(j))—Not Found

Standard 1.5(j) permits aggravation when an attorney’s actions result in “significant harm

to the client, the public, or the administration of justice.” SDTC contends that Respondent’s

misconduct caused harm to the Board by subjecting it to public humiliation due to its former

Executive Director’s dishonesty about the use of State Bar funds.

While the court acknowledges the potential for reputational harm to the State Bar due to

the improper actions of its former Executive Director, SDTC has not provided specific evidence

to substantiate any harm resulting from Respondent’s actions, let alone the substantial harm

required under this aggravating factor. According to standard 1.5, SDTC must demonstrate

aggravating circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the connection

between Respondent’s actions and the alleged harm is speculative. (Calvert v. State Bar (1991)

54 Cal.3d 765, 784-785 [significant harm to client was not appropriate factor in aggravation

without evidence that client suffered harm attributable to the attorney’s misconduct].) Therefore,

the court finds no aggravation under this factor.

Indifference (Std. 1.5(k))—Not Found

While OCTC argues for aggravation based on Respondent’s “indifference toward

rectification or atonement for the consequences of the misconduct” (standard 1.5(k)), the

evidence presented does not meet the clear and convincing standard required to establish such

indifference.

Although Respondent’s conduct is undoubtedly concerning, it does not indicate a

fundamental disregard for the disciplinary process or ethical standards. Respondent has

explicitly recognized his fiduciary responsibility to the Board, demonstrating an awareness of his

professional obligations. Although he disputes the violations of section 6106, the court does not

interpret this disagreement to be a contempt for ethical norms. Respondent’s reluctance to admit

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culpability, despite compelling evidence, is troubling. However, this alone does not conclusively

prove an unwillingness to comply with his ethical duties or indifference toward his misconduct.

Consequently, the court finds that SDTC has not proven by clear and convincing

evidence that aggravation for indifference or lack of insight is warranted. The court therefore

declines to assign aggravation under this factor, based on the current record.

Failure to Make Restitution (Std. 1.5(m))—Not Found

SDTC contends that this factor should be considered an aggravating circumstance

because Respondent did not attempt to make restitution to the State Bar for the funds expended

in the Mongolia trip. The court disagrees with this assertion. The State Bar has not alleged that

Respondent owes it any money. There are no findings of misappropriation, an unpaid debt, or

any other financial obligation that the State Bar is entitled to collect from Respondent.

Therefore, the court does not consider Respondent’s failure to reimburse the State Bar for the

funds expended in the Mongolia trip to be an aggravating circumstance.

Mitigating Circumstances

Respondent bears the burden to provide mitigating circumstances by clear and

convincing evidence. (Std. 1.6.) The court finds four mitigating factors, no prior record of

discipline, cooperation, good character and community service.

No Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.6(a)) – Substantial Weight

Respondent’s discipline-free record over an extended period of practice, coupled with

misconduct that is unlikely to recur, constitutes a significant mitigating circumstance under

standard 1.6(a). Respondent was admitted to the State Bar of California in 1986. At the time of

his misconduct, he had been a licensed attorney for 28 years without discipline. (In the Matter of

Kopinski (Review Dept. 1994) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 716, 724 [prior record of discipline-free

practice measured from the time attorney was admitted to the time misconduct began].) Given

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the narrow range of the misconduct and the absence of further infractions since 2014, the court

concludes that Respondent’s wrongdoing is unlikely to recur.

While the evidence does not definitively establish continuous law practice throughout the

entire 28-year period (see In the Matter of Blum (Review Dept. 1994) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr.

170, 177 [appropriate to depreciate years of practice by time not spent practicing law]), the court

reasonably infers from the available evidence that Respondent has engaged in a considerable

period of discipline-free practice. Consequently, the court assigns substantial weight in

mitigation for Respondent’s lack of prior discipline. (Hawes v. State Bar (1990) 51 Cal.3d 587,

596 [significant weight for more than 10 years of practice].)

Cooperation (Std. 1.6(e)) – Nominal Weight

Mitigation may be assigned under standard 1.6(e) for cooperation with the State Bar.

Respondent demonstrated minimal cooperation with SDTC by entering into a stipulation as to

facts and admission of documents. However, Respondent stipulated to only a few facts, all of

which were easily proven. Respondent did not admit culpability and “more extensive weight in

mitigation is accorded those who, where appropriate, willingly admit their culpability as well as

the facts.” (In the Matter of Johnson (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179, 190.)

Thus, the court affords nominal weight for Respondent’s cooperation.

Good Character (Std. 1.6(f))—Substantial Weight

Mitigation is available for “extraordinary good character attested to by a wide range of

references in the legal and general communities, who are aware of the full extent of the

misconduct.” (Std. 1.6(f).)

Respondent presented the testimony of six credible witnesses in support of his good

character from a wide range of references in the legal and general communities, including two

law school deans, one university professor and chief executive officer of a biomedical company,

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two lawyers and one judge. The court gives serious consideration to the attorney and judge

testimonies in support of Respondent’s character. (In the Matter of Brown (Review Dept. 1993)

2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 309, 319 [favorable character testimony from judges and attorneys is

entitled to considerable weight because they have “strong interest in maintaining the honest

administration of justice”].) The vast majority of these witnesses have known Respondent for a

considerable period of time, some over three decades. Further, they have shown understanding

and familiarity with these disciplinary proceedings and the claims leveled against Respondent.

Despite their awareness of the pending charges, these witnesses consistently and uniformly

testified to Respondent’s good character, praising his trustworthiness, integrity, and honesty.

The court finds strong evidence of Respondent’s good character and accords substantial

weight in mitigation. (In the Matter of Davis (Review Dept. 2003) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr.

576, 591–592 [significant mitigation for good character for three witnesses who had

longstanding familiarity with attorney and broad knowledge of good character, work habits, and

professional skills].)

Community Service – Limited Weight

An attorney’s community service can be a mitigating circumstance. (Calvert v. State Bar

(1991) 54 Cal.3d 765, 785 [community service entitled to mitigation].)

Testimony was offered regarding Respondent’s long-standing efforts to seek justice for

victims of sexual abuse. As part of those efforts, Respondent co-founded the National Institute

of Child Sexual Assault (NICSA), a nonprofit organization dedicated to raising funds and

supporting programs to address the problem of child sexual abuse worldwide. He receives no

compensation for his role at NICSA. One focus of this organization is finding treatment for

severe behavior abnormalities resulting from sexual abuse. The court notes, however, that the

record provides no specific quantifiable information regarding the level of his community

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service. (In the Matter of Dyson (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 280, 287 [little

weight given to pro bono activities where attorney gave minimal testimony regarding pro bono

activities and evidence fails to demonstrate level of involvement].) Therefore, for Respondent’s

contributions to the community, the court affords limited weight.

Discussion

The purpose of attorney discipline is not to punish the attorney, but to protect the public,

the courts, and the legal profession; to preserve public confidence in the profession; and to

maintain high professional standards for attorneys. (Std. 1.1; Cooper v. State Bar (1987) 43

Cal.3d 1016, 1025.) In determining the level of discipline, the court first considers the standards,

which are not mandatory but entitled to great weight. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 91-

92.) The Supreme Court has instructed this court to follow the standards “whenever possible to

help ensure greater consistency in disciplinary sanctions for similar offenses.” (In re Young

(1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) A compelling reason must be articulated to deviate from the

standards. (Aronin v. State Bar (1990) 52 Cal.3d 276, 291.) To determine the appropriate level

of discipline, the court also looks at comparable case law for guidance. (In the Matter of Elkins

(Review Dept. 2009) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 160, 168.)

Standard 1.7 provides that the appropriate sanction for the misconduct found must be

balanced with any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Here, standard 2.11 applies to

Respondent’s act of moral turpitude, and provides for disbarment or actual suspension as the

presumed sanction. The degree of discipline depends on the magnitude of the misconduct; the

extent to which the victim was harmed or misled; any impact on the administration of justice;

and the extent to which the misconduct related to the practice of law. SDTC argues that

Respondent should receive a 60-day actual suspension. Respondent disputes culpability and

seeks a dismissal.

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 Respondent’s misrepresentation to the Board amounts to a significant ethical violation.

The gravity of his transgression is amplified by the fact that it occurred during his tenure as

Executive Director of the State Bar, a position of significant responsibility and public trust

within the legal community. Although his actions were not directly related to the practice of law,

they were made in his crucial role as a leader of the organization that governs the practice of law

in California, thereby undermining the integrity of the legal profession.

However, although his misconduct is serious, the overall record supports a downward

departure from the presumed sanction. His misconduct is confined to a single violation that

occurred over a decade ago. The absence of further misconduct since 2014 demonstrates his

willingness and ability to conform to ethical responsibilities. This, coupled with his considerable

mitigating circumstances—including the absence of any prior record of discipline over many

years, good character, community service, and cooperation—and the absence of any aggravating

factors, indicates that a lesser sanction is sufficient to fulfill the primary purposes of discipline.

(Std. 1.7(c).) The totality of these circumstances suggests that while his wrongdoing

undoubtedly warrants serious attention, discipline less than the presumed sanction under standard

2.11 is appropriate in this case.

The court has not found controlling case law directly on point or substantially analogous

to the facts of this case.11 However, the court finds helpful guidance in In the Matter of Downey

(Review Dept. 2009) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 151. There, Downey was culpable of moral

turpitude for his grossly negligent execution and filing of a false verification and a lesser

violation of failing to update his address with the State Bar. Downey received limited mitigating

11
The cases cited by SDTC in its closing argument brief are not applicable to the present
situation. These cases involve substantially different circumstances, more egregious misconduct,
and generally more aggravating factors than those present in the current case, which render those
precedents of limited value in determining the appropriate degree of discipline here.

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credit for good character and for entering into a fairly comprehensive pretrial stipulation of facts.

His misconduct was significantly aggravated by one prior record of discipline where he received

a four-month actual suspension for moral turpitude, and concealment. Applying progressive

discipline, the court imposed a 150-day actual suspension.

Like Downey, this case essentially involves a singular act of misrepresentation.

However, Respondent’s misconduct warrants less severe sanction than that in Downey due to

two important differences. First, Downey’s misconduct was compounded by subsequent

dishonesty and concealment, which has not been proven in the current case. Second, this is

Respondent’s first discipline, whereas Downey had a serious prior act of misconduct involving

moral turpitude that resulted in a four-month actual suspension. Application of the principle of

progressive discipline required a greater suspension than his prior discipline, whereas this

principle does not apply here. Indeed, as the court in Downey noted, “[h]ad this been Downey’s

first offense, the limited nature of the misconduct ordinarily may have called for a shorter or

even stayed period of actual suspension.” (Id. at p. 157.) This observation is particularly

relevant to the present case. While Respondent’s misrepresentation was intentional, as opposed

to Downey’s grossly negligent conduct, the absence of subsequent dishonesty, concealment, and

prior disciplinary record justifies a less severe sanction than that imposed in Downey.

Having considered the nature and extent of the misconduct, the mitigating circumstances

in balance with the absence of aggravating circumstances, as well as guided by the standards,

case law, and the purposes of attorney discipline—protection of the public, courts, and legal

profession; maintenance of the highest professional standards; and preservation of public

confidence in the legal profession—the court recommends that Respondent receive a one-year

stayed suspension with a one-year period of probation with conditions, which will impress upon

Respondent the seriousness of the misconduct and serve the goals of professional discipline.

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 RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that Joseph Lawrence Dunn, State Bar Number 123063, be suspended

from the practice of law for one year, that execution of that suspension be stayed, and that he be

placed on probation for one year with the following conditions:

1. Comply with State Bar Act, Rules of Professional Conduct, and Probation Conditions.
Joseph Lawrence Dunn must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act, the Rules of
Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation.

2. Review Rules of Professional Conduct. Within 30 days after the effective date of the
Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, Joseph Lawrence Dunn must
(1) read the California Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules of Professional Conduct) and
Business and Professions Code sections 6067, 6068, and 6103 through 6126, and (2) provide
a declaration, under penalty of perjury, attesting to his compliance with this requirement, to
the State Bar’s Office of Probation in Los Angeles (Office of Probation) with Joseph
Lawrence Dunn’s first quarterly report.

3. Complete E-Learning Course Reviewing Rules and Statutes on Professional Conduct.

Within 90 days after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this
matter, Joseph Lawrence Dunn must complete the e-learning course entitled “California
Rules of Professional Conduct and State Bar Act Overview.” Joseph Lawrence Dunn
must provide a declaration, under penalty of perjury, attesting to Joseph Lawrence Dunn’s
compliance with this requirement, to the Office of Probation no later than the deadline for
Joseph Lawrence Dunn’s next quarterly report due immediately after course completion.

4. Maintain Valid Official State Bar Record Address and Other Required Contact
Information. Within 30 days after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing
discipline in this matter, Joseph Lawrence Dunn must make certain that the State Bar
Attorney Regulation and Consumer Resources Office (ARCR) has his current office address,
email address, and telephone number. If he does not maintain an office, he must provide the
mailing address, email address, and telephone number to be used for State Bar purposes.
Joseph Lawrence Dunn must report, in writing, any change in the above information to
ARCR, within 10 days after such change, in the manner required by that office.

5. Meet and Cooperate with Office of Probation. Within 15 days after the effective date of
the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, Joseph Lawrence Dunn must
schedule a meeting with his assigned Probation Case Coordinator to discuss the terms and
conditions of his discipline and, within 30 days after the effective date of the court’s order,
must participate in such meeting. Unless otherwise instructed by the Office of Probation,
Joseph Lawrence Dunn may meet with the Probation Case Coordinator in person or by
telephone. During the probation period, Joseph Lawrence Dunn must promptly meet with
representatives of the Office of Probation as requested by it and, subject to the assertion of
applicable privileges, must fully, promptly, and truthfully answer any inquiries by it and
provide to it any other information requested by it.

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6. State Bar Court Retains Jurisdiction/Appear Before and Cooperate with State Bar
Court. During Joseph Lawrence Dunn’s probation period, the State Bar Court retains
jurisdiction over him to address issues concerning compliance with probation conditions.
During this period, Joseph Lawrence Dunn must appear before the State Bar Court as
required by the court or by the Office of Probation after written notice mailed to his official
State Bar record address, as provided above. Subject to the assertion of applicable privileges,
Joseph Lawrence Dunn must fully, promptly, and truthfully answer any inquiries by the court
and must provide any other information the court requests.

7. Quarterly and Final Reports.

a. Deadlines for Reports. Joseph Lawrence Dunn must submit written quarterly reports to
the Office of Probation no later than each January 10 (covering October 1 through
December 31 of the prior year), April 10 (covering January 1 through March 31), July 10
(covering April 1 through June 30), and October 10 (covering July 1 through September
30) within the period of probation. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that
report must be submitted on the next quarter date and cover the extended deadline. In
addition to all quarterly reports, Joseph Lawrence Dunn must submit a final report no
earlier than 10 days before the last day of the probation period and no later than the last
day of the probation period.

b. Contents of Reports. Joseph Lawrence Dunn must answer, under penalty of perjury, all
inquiries contained in the quarterly report form provided by the Office of Probation,
including stating whether he has complied with the State Bar Act and the Rules of
Professional Conduct during the applicable quarter or period. All reports must be:
(1) submitted on the form provided by the Office of Probation; (2) signed and dated after
the completion of the period for which the report is being submitted (except for the final
report); (3) filled out completely and signed under penalty of perjury; and (4) submitted
to the Office of Probation on or before each report’s due date.

c. Submission of Reports. All reports must be submitted by: (1) fax or email to the Office
of Probation; (2) personal delivery to the Office of Probation; (3) certified mail, return
receipt requested, to the Office of Probation (postmarked on or before the due date); or
(4) other tracked-service provider, such as Federal Express or United Parcel Service, etc.
(physically delivered to such provider on or before the due date).

d. Proof of Compliance. Joseph Lawrence Dunn is directed to maintain proof of

compliance with the above requirements for each such report for a minimum of one year
after either the period of probation or the period of actual suspension has ended,
whichever is longer. Joseph Lawrence Dunn is required to present such proof upon
request by the State Bar, the Office of Probation, or the State Bar Court.

8. State Bar Ethics School. Within one year after the effective date of the Supreme Court
order imposing discipline in this matter, Joseph Lawrence Dunn must submit to the Office of
Probation satisfactory evidence of completion of the State Bar Ethics School and passage of
the test given at the end of that session. This requirement is separate from any Minimum
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and he will not receive MCLE credit for
attending this session. If he provides satisfactory evidence of completion of the Ethics
School after the date of this decision but before the effective date of the Supreme Court’s
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 order in this matter, Joseph Lawrence Dunn will nonetheless receive credit for such evidence
toward his duty to comply with this condition.

9. Commencement of Probation/Compliance with Probation Conditions. The period of

probation will commence on the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing
discipline in this matter. At the expiration of the probation period, if Joseph Lawrence Dunn
has complied with all conditions of probation, the period of stayed suspension will be
satisfied and that suspension will be terminated.

MULTISTATE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EXAMINATION

It is further recommended that Joseph Lawrence Dunn be ordered to take and pass the

Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination administered by the National Conference of

Bar Examiners within one year after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing

discipline in this matter and to provide satisfactory proof of such passage to the State Bar’s

Office of Probation within the same period. Failure to do so may result in suspension. (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 9.10(b).) If Joseph Lawrence Dunn provides satisfactory evidence of the

taking and passage of the above examination after the date of this decision but before the

effective date of the Supreme Court’s order in this matter, he will nonetheless receive credit for

such evidence toward his duty to comply with this requirement.

MONETARY SANCTIONS ARE NOT APPLICABLE

Monetary sanctions are inapplicable here. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.137(A).)

COSTS

It is further recommended that costs be awarded to the State Bar in accordance with

Business and Professions Code section 6086.10, and are enforceable both as provided in

Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment, and may be collected

by the State Bar through any means permitted by law.

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 Unless the time for payment of discipline costs is extended pursuant to subdivision (c) of

section 6086.10, costs assessed against an attorney who is actually suspended or disbarred must

be paid as a condition of applying for reinstatement or return to active status.

Dated: July 24, 2024

WW"
YVETTE D. ROLAND
Judge of the State Bar Court

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