ETH CPIN Actors of Protection

Country Policy and Information Note
Ethiopia: Actors of Protection
Version 2.0
February 2024
Contents
Assessment .............................................................................................................. 5
About the assessment ............................................................................................ 5
1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals ........................................ 5
1.1 Credibility.................................................................................................. 5
1.2 Exclusion .................................................................................................. 5
2. Protection ........................................................................................................ 6
Country information ................................................................................................. 9
About the country information ................................................................................. 9
3. Brief overview of political institutions ............................................................... 9
4. Legal framework ............................................................................................ 11
4.1 The constitution and criminal code ......................................................... 11
4.2 Arrest and detention ............................................................................... 12
4.3 Federal Attorney General ....................................................................... 13
4.4 Legal aid ................................................................................................. 14
5. Prison and detention system ......................................................................... 16
5.1 Overview ................................................................................................ 16
5.2 Training .................................................................................................. 17
5.3 Detention conditions ............................................................................... 18
6. The judiciary .................................................................................................. 20
6.1 Structure ................................................................................................. 20
6.2 Judicial independence ............................................................................ 22
6.3 Corruption in the judicial system ............................................................. 24
7. Security forces ............................................................................................... 25
7.1 Law and structures ................................................................................. 25
7.2 Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) ............................................. 27
7.3 National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) .................................. 27
7.4 Information Network Security Agency (INSA) ......................................... 28
7.5 Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP) .............................................................. 29
7.6 Regional police forces ............................................................................ 30
7.7 Regional ‘special’ forces ......................................................................... 31
7.1 Local militias ........................................................................................... 32
8. Capacity and effectiveness of security forces ................................................ 33
8.1 Security forces training ........................................................................... 33
8.2 Effectiveness of security forces .............................................................. 34
8.3 Corruption in the security forces ............................................................. 36
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8.4 Human rights violations by security forces ............................................. 37
9. Court system.................................................................................................. 39
9.1 Federal and state courts ......................................................................... 39
9.2 State courts ............................................................................................ 40
9.3 Religious and traditional courts .............................................................. 40
9.4 Municipality and social courts ................................................................. 42
9.5 Military courts ......................................................................................... 42
9.6 Justice needs and satisfaction survey results......................................... 44
10. Oversight mechanisms .................................................................................. 46
10.1 Regulation .............................................................................................. 46
10.2 Ethiopia Human Rights Commission (EHRC)......................................... 48
10.3 Ombudsman ........................................................................................... 49
10.4 Monitoring of detention centres .............................................................. 50
10.5 Complaint mechanism ............................................................................ 51
Research methodology .......................................................................................... 53
Terms of Reference ................................................................................................ 54
Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 55
Sources cited ........................................................................................................ 55
Sources consulted but not cited ............................................................................ 57
Version control and feedback ............................................................................... 60
Feedback to the Home Office ............................................................................... 60
Independent Advisory Group on Country Information ........................................... 60
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Executive summary
Ethiopia has a set of laws that criminalise behaviour and acts that might be
persecutory or cause serious harm. The constitution recognises secular, religious
and traditional courts. The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, the
presumption of innocence, and an independent judiciary. However due process
rights are not always respected while judicial independence is impaired by political
interference, corruption and bribery. A weak and overburdened judicial system
contributes to slow prosecutions and sometimes lengthy detentions without charge
or trial, undermining the courts’ effectiveness. Access to formal judicial systems is
limited in rural areas and for women.
The government has taken various measures to improve prison conditions and
passed a law to protect the rights of detainees. Prison conditions, however, remain
dire and life threatening.
The security sector consists of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF),
Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP), State (regional) police forces, local militias and
National Intelligence and Security Service. The EFP is responsible for maintaining
law and order at federal level and in any region when there is a deteriorating security
situation beyond the control of the regional government. It also investigates crimes
under the jurisdiction of federal courts. The State police maintain law and order in the
regions. They vary in size, structure, training and how they fulfil their role. Local
militias operate across the regions in co-ordination with regional police forces or act
on behalf of the ethno-linguistic communities they represent. The ENDF sometimes
provides internal security to support the police. There are internal and external
oversight mechanisms over security forces. The Ethiopian Human Rights
Commission receives and investigates complaints and state and federal institutions
have implemented some of its recommendations regarding human rights protections
and prison conditions.
The government generally retains control over federal security forces but in some
areas central government control is limited over regional forces due to ethnic and
regional loyalties. The effectiveness of the security forces is undermined by a lack of
resources, training and corruption. The army and police have been responsible for
harassment, excessive use of force, torture and extra-judicial killings especially in
areas of internal conflict such as Tigray and Amhara. Oversight is limited and
impunity is a significant problem.
In general, the state is willing and able to provide protection, which is accessible,
from non-state actors. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.
However, the state’s ability to provide protection is likely to be limited in areas
affected by conflict.
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Updated on 12 January 2024
Assessment
About the assessment
This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is information in the
country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw
– and provides an assessment of whether, in general:
• a person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies)
Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis,
taking into account each case’s specific facts.
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1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals
1.1 Credibility
1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing
Credibility and Refugee Status.
1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for
a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas
should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum
Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).
1.1.3 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of
origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing,
where available (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis.
Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section
The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home
Office use.
Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section

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1.2 Exclusion
1.2.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons for
considering whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses is applicable.
Each case must be considered on its individual facts and merits.
1.2.2 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be
excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of
exclusions than refugee status).
1.2.3 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction
on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention,
Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.
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Office use.

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2. Protection
2.1.1 Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution from non-state
actors, including ‘rogue’ state actors, decision makers must assess whether
the state can provide effective protection.
2.1.2 In general, the state is willing and able to do this. The onus is on the person
to demonstrate otherwise. Each case needs to be considered on its facts.
2.1.3 The Ethiopian Federal Police is responsible for maintaining law and order at
federal level and for investigating crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of
federal courts. The EFP also maintains law and order in any region when
there is a deteriorating security situation beyond the control of the regional
government, as do the military (see Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP)). The
Criminal Justice Reform Working Group noted there are reports of excessive
caseload among investigators that are triggered by lack of capability and
capacity, namely shortage of competent investigators, poor management of
caseload and lack of technology (see Capacity and effectiveness of security
forces). However, in general, the police are effective in maintaining law and
order and protecting the population from major crimes, including terrorism.
2.1.4 Each of the region has a special (para military) force (see Special forces
(paramilitary forces)). Local militias also operate across the regions in co-
ordination with regional police forces or act on behalf of the ethno-linguistic
communities they represent (see Local militias). State (regional) police are
responsible for law and order in the regional states. However, they vary in
size, structure, training and how they fulfil their role within the region they are
operating in. According to Freedom House petty bribery and corruption
among the police are widespread. In a national survey by the Federal Ethics
and Ant-Corruption Commission (FEACC) more than 60% participants
thought that local police were highly corrupt.
2.1.5 Ethiopia has an extensive intelligence and security services. Although there
is no reliable data on the size of the national intelligence security services, it
is broadly considered to have a strong capacity and is highly effective (see
National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and Information Network
Security Agency (INSA). The Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF)
play a role in internal security when community security is insufficient to
maintain law and order. It’s comprised of a ground force, air force, republic
guard (established in 2018 to protect senior officials) and navy. The RNDF
has an estimated 150,000 active personnel. The CIA World Factbook noted
that the ENDF has traditionally been one of sub-Saharan Africa’s largest,
most experienced, and best equipped militaries although it suffered heavy
casualties and equipment losses during the 2020-2022 Tigray conflict. The
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government generally retains control over federal and defence security
forces and their actions (see Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF)).
However, the proliferation of ethnic-based militias and other armed groups
has challenged state authority and eroded the rule of law in some parts of
the country. Decision makers need to consider each case on its facts, with
the onus on the person to demonstrate why they would not be able to obtain
protection.
2.1.6 Oversight mechanisms are generally limited and rely on internal
accountability systems and disciplinary policies within security forces, rather
than oversight through an independent external body (see Regulation). The
Ministry of Peace oversees the Federal Police and the government-funded
Ethiopia Human Rights Commission (EHRC) investigated human rights
abuses across the country. EHRC did not face adverse action from the
government despite criticizing it for disregarding the rule of law and abusing
human rights, and in some instances, federal and regional government
bodies appeared to follow EHRC reports and recommendations in taking
corrective measures to address human rights violations and abuses
(Ethiopia Human Rights Commission (EHRC)).
2.1.7 A national survey by The Hague Institute for Innovation of Law found that
approximately 80% of the people take some form of action to resolve their
most serious legal problems and that around 45% of all these problems are
resolved with 40% of the most serious problems are completely resolved.
43% of the people who have legal problems seek the support of village
elders and 18% of the most serious problems reach a formal court which is
higher than the usual 5% to 10% seen in some other countries (see Access
to justice).
2.1.8 The constitution provides the legal framework for establishing a criminal
justice system, providing for a national defence service, federal and state
(regional) police forces, federal and regional prisons, the recognition of
religious and traditional courts and an independent judiciary. The criminal
code establishes a series of laws criminalising behaviour and acts that might
be persecutory or cause serious harm, and outlines the available sentencing
options (see Legal Context).
2.1.9 The constitution and penal code prohibit and criminalise torture and other
cruel and inhuman treatment, prohibit arbitrary arrest and/or detention, and
provide for detainee rights. However, the security forces sometimes engage
in harassment, use of excessive force, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention,
enforced disappearances, sexual and gender-based violence against women
and girls, and extra-judicial killings. Many of these abuses occur particularly
in areas of internal conflict, such as Tigray (during the civil conflict between
November 2020 and November 2022) (see Human rights abuses).
2.1.10 The constitution provides for an independent judiciary but the government
maintains significant influence over the judicial process, which is subject to
political interference and reportedly affected by arbitrary decisions made by
the Prime Ministers Offices especially in cases involving political opponents.
However, the government took some steps to improve and bolster the
independence of the judiciary such as appointing judges based on merit and
experience rather than party loyalty and transferring the budgetary decisions
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for the judiciary from the executive to parliament (see Judicial
independence).
2.1.11 The constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial and the
presumption of innocence. This is however not respected in practice.
Criminal courts remain weak and overburdened. Corruption within the justice
system remains a significant challenge and judges caught accepting bribes
are rarely punished. A weak and overburdened judicial system contributes to
slow prosecutions and sometimes lengthy detentions without charge or trial,
undermining the courts’ effectiveness. However, as reported by the US State
Department, the courts pushed authorities to present evidence or provide
clear justifications within 14 days or release the detainee and also
demanded to see police investigative files to assess police requests for
additional time (see Judicial independence, Arbitrary arrest).
2.1.12 Many rural citizens had little access to formal judicial systems and relied on
traditional mechanisms for resolving conflict. By law, all parties to a dispute
must agree to use a traditional or religious court. Sharia (Islamic law) courts
heard religious and family cases involving Muslims if both parties agree and
received some funding from the government. Other traditional systems of
justice, such as councils of elders, functioned predominantly in rural areas.
Women often believed they lacked access to fair hearings in the traditional
court system because local custom excluded them from participation in
councils of elders and due to persistent gender discrimination (see Religious
and traditional courts).
2.1.13 There is a functioning prison system, with estimates of over 100,000
detainees. Despite some reported improvements, conditions in prisons are
reportedly harsh and life-threatening in some cases, with unreliable medical
care, unhygienic conditions and overcrowding. Some sources reported that
there are ongoing and consisted allegations and complaints of torture and ill
treatment in places of detention (see Detention conditions).
2.1.14 Various laws, including the Constitution, include the right to legal aid, which
is provided by Public Defenders under the Federal and Regional Supreme
Courts, the attorney general, Ministry of Women and Children Affairs,
lawyers in private practice, professional law associations, non-governmental
organisations and university-based law clinics. However, legal aid legislation
is fragmented and provision is uncoordinated.
2.1.15 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum
Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
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Country information
About the country information
This contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI)
which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research
methodology. It provides the evidence base for the assessment.
The structure and content of this section follow a terms of reference which sets out
the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note.
This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular
event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did
or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist.
Decision makers must use relevant country information as the evidential basis for
decisions.
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section updated: 12 January 2024
3. Brief overview of political institutions
3.1.1 The US Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook last updated 13
December 2023 (CIA Factbook 15 August 2023) noted that Ethiopia is a
federal parliamentary republic with a bicameral Parliament consisting of the
House of Federation (HoF) and the House of People's Representatives
(HopR). Members of the HoF (153 seats maximum; 144 seats current) are
indirectly elected by state assemblies to serve 5-year terms and members of
the HoPR (547 seats maximum; 470 seats current) are directly elected in
single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote. 22 seats are reserved for
minorities and all members serve 5-year terms1. The same source further
noted that the head of state is President Sahle-Work Zewde (since October
2018) and the head of government is Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali (since
April 2018)2.
3.1.2 The Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and
Documentation (ACCORD) report ‘Ethiopian COI Compilation November
2019, which is based on various sources, (ACCORD Report November
2019) stated:
‘According to the constitution, the highest executive powers of the federal
government are vested in the prime minister and in the Council of Ministers.
The powerful prime minister is head of government and is designated by the
ruling party in the lower chamber, which is also responsible to nominate a
candidate for the presidency… The prime minister is also Commander-in-
Chief of Ethiopia’s armed forces…In April 2018, Abiy Ahmed took office as
prime minister of … Ethiopia.
‘… According to the regime typology used in the Democracy Index of the
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the research and analysis division of The
Economist Group, Ethiopia is governed by an “authoritarian regime”…
1 US CIA World Factbook, ‘Ethiopia’ (Government), 13 December 2023

2 US CIA World Factbook, ‘Ethiopia’ (Government), 13 December 2023
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Freedom House, a US-based NGO which conducts research and advocacy
on democracy, political freedom and human rights, designates the Federal
Republic of Ethiopia in 2018 as “not free”.3
3.1.3 The 2023 Freedom House report on political rights and civil liberties, based
on events in 2022 (FH Report 2023), designated Ethiopia as ‘not free.’4
3.1.4 The US CIA Factbook last updated 13 December 2023 noted:
‘Ethiopia has over fifty national-level and regional-level political parties. The
ruling party, the Prosperity Party, was created by Prime Minister ABIY in
November 2019 from member parties of the former Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which included the Amhara
Democratic Party (ADP), Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), Southern
Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM), plus other EPRDF-
allied parties such as the Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP),
Benishangul Gumuz People’s Democratic Party (BGPDP), Gambella
People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM), Somali People’s Democratic Party
(SPDP), and the Harari National League (HNL).
‘Once the Prosperity Party was created, the various ethnically-based parties
that comprised or were affiliated with the EPRDF were subsequently
disbanded; in January 2021, the Ethiopian electoral board de-registered the
Tigray People’s Liberation Front or TPLF; national level parties are qualified
to register candidates in multiple regions across Ethiopia; regional parties
can register candidates for both national and regional parliaments, but only
in one region of Ethiopia.’5
3.1.5 The ACCORD Report November 2019 observed:
‘The foundation of Ethiopian federalism was established in 1995, when a
new constitution became effective…
‘Articles 1 and 2 of the 1995 constitution establish the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia [FDRE], which comprises the territories of the members
of the federation … Article 47 lists the nine member states of the federation,
often referred to as regions or Killil (Plural: Killiloch) … Additionally there are
two self-governing administrations: the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa and
the city of Dire Dawa, located in east-central of the country.’6
3.1.6 A detailed map A detailed map of Ethiopia’s regions (states) and zones (sub-
divisions within regions) is available from the UN Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
3.1.7 Nationsonlin.org has provided below map of Ethiopia showing neighbouring
countries, major cities and transport links7
3 ACCORD, Ethiopia COI Compilation’ (page 8), November 2019

4 FH, ‘Freedom in the World 2023 – Ethiopia’, 2023
5 US CIA, World Factbook, ‘Ethiopia’ (Government), 13 December 2023
6 ACCORD, Ethiopia COI Compilation’ (page 8), November 2019
7 Nationsonline.org, ‘Map of Ethiopia, Eastern Africa’ no date
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4. Legal framework
4.1 The constitution and criminal code
4.1.1 The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was
adopted on 8 December 1994 and promulgated by the Constitution of the
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 1/1995 which
entered into force on 21 August 1995. The Constitution includes the
protection fundamental rights and freedoms including to life, security of
person and liberty, to equality, and access to justice (chapter 3 -
Fundamental rights and freedoms) and provisions on the judicial system
(chapter 9 – Structure and powers of the courts)8.
4.1.2 The Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2004
came into force on 9 May 2005 and repealed the 1957 Penal Code and the
1982 Revised Special Penal Code of the Provisional Military. Article 1 –
Object and Purpose of the Code explains:
‘The purpose of the Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia is to ensure order, peace and the security of the State, its peoples,
and inhabitants for the public good.
8 Ethiopia Government, ‘Constitution’, adopted 1994, entered into force August 1994
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‘It aims at the prevention of crimes by giving due notice of the crimes and
penalties prescribed by law and should this be ineffective by providing for the
punishment of criminals in order to deter them from committing another
crime and make them a lesson to others, or by providing for their reform and
measures to prevent the commission of further crimes.’9
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4.2 Arrest and detention
4.2.1 The US State Department report on human rights practices in Ethiopia
covering events in 2022 and published on 20 March 2023 (USSD HR Report
2022) stated: ‘The constitution and federal law prohibit arbitrary arrest and
detention and provide for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness
of his or her arrest or detention in court. The government often did not
observe these requirements, especially regarding the mass detentions made
under the state of emergency.’10
4.2.2 With respect to arrest procedures the second periodic report submitted by
Ethiopia to the UN Committee Against Torture on 6 May 2020 (UNCAT
Ethiopia Report May 2020) noted:
‘Article 19 of the FDRE Constitution entitles that every individual has a right
to be informed of the reason why he/she is arrested...
‘... Article 27 of the Code obliges an arresting or investigating officer to
expressly inform a detainee that he/she has the right to remain silent and
that any statement he/she voluntarily gives can be brought before a court of
law as evidence against him/her. Similarly, Article 31 of the same Code
prohibits the police from inducing or threatening or applying any other
improper method in the process of examination of witnesses ...
‘Pursuant to Article 19 ... arrested persons have a right to be released on
bail.’11
4.2.3 USSD HR Report 2022 stated:
‘Under the constitution, accused persons have the right to a fair, public trial
without undue delay, a presumption of innocence, legal counsel of their
choice, appeal, the right not to self-incriminate, the right to present witnesses
and evidence in their defense, and the right to cross-examine prosecution
witnesses. The law requires officials to inform detainees of the nature of their
arrest within a specific period, according to the severity of the allegation. The
law requires that, if necessary, translation services be provided in a
language defendants understand. The federal courts are required to hire
interpreters for defendants that speak other languages and had staff working
as interpreters for major local languages.’12
4.2.4 The same source added:
‘The constitution and law require detainees to appear in court and face
charges within 48 hours of arrest or as soon thereafter as local
9 Ethiopia government, ‘Criminal code’, 2004, entered into force 2005

10 USSD, ‘2022 Country report on human rights practices: Ethiopia’ (section 1. d), 20 March 2023
11 UNCAT, Second periodic report submitted by Ethiopia…’ (paragraphs 48 to 49), 26 May 2020
12 USSD, ‘2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia’ (section 1. e), 20 March 2023
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circumstances and communications permit ... With a warrant, authorities
may detain persons suspected of serious offenses for 14 days without
charge. The courts increasingly pushed authorities to present evidence or
provide clear justifications within 14 days or release the detainee. Courts
also demanded to see police investigative files to assess police requests for
additional time.
‘A functioning bail system was in place. Bail was not available, however, for
persons charged with murder, treason, or corruption. In other cases, the
courts set bail between 500 birr ($11.60) and 100,000 birr ($1,900), [£7.01 to
1,402.3413] amounts that few citizens could afford. Often police failed to
release detainees after a court decided to release them on bail; sometimes,
police would file another charge immediately after the court’s decision.’14
4.2.5 The FH report 2023 noted: ‘Due process rights are generally not respected.
The right to a fair trial is often not respected, particularly for government
critics. In civil matters, due process is hampered by the limited capacity of
the Ethiopian courts system, especially in the peripheral regions where
access to government services is weak. As a result, routine matters regularly
take years to be resolved.’15
4.2.6 A September 2023 HRW report stated: ‘Federal and regional investigative
authorities have violated the due process rights of high-profile detainees,
such as critical journalists or political opposition figures, by forcibly
disappearing them or holding them incommunicado, denying them access to
their lawyers and family members for weeks or months, or moving them
between makeshift and official detention sites.’16
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4.3 Federal Attorney General
4.3.1 A 2020 article by Dr. Girmachew Alemu Aneme, an assistant Professor and
Head of the Research and Publications Unit, School of Law, Addis Ababa
University, published by the Hauser Global Law School Program, New York
University School of Law (Aneme 2020) stated:
‘The Federal Attorney General is part of the executive branch of the Federal
Government. The Federal Attorney General has the primary authority of
prosecution of cases falling under the jurisdiction of federal courts. Article 6
of Federal Attorney General Establishment Proclamation No. 943/2016
enumerates the powers and duties of the Attorney General ...
‘Article 10 of the Council of Ministers Regulation 44/98 deals with the
accountability of the Federal Prosecutors and according to Article 17 (2) of
Federal Attorney General Establishment Proclamation No. 943/2016
stipulate that prosecutors shall be accountable to the Attorney General as
well as to their immediate superior and division head. As the ultimate
superior of all prosecutors, the Attorney General may thus initiate a specific
criminal investigation or stop another. The Attorney General also has the
13 Xe, ‘Xe Currency Converter’ as at 8 January 2024

14 USSD, ‘2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia’ (section 1. d ), 20 March 2023
15 FH, ‘Freedom in the world 2023 – Ethiopia’ (section F, F2), 9 March 2023
16 HRW, ‘Q&A: Justice for serious international crimes committed in Ethiopia’, 4 September 2023
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authority to reverse a decision of a prosecutor or to dismiss a pending
case.’17
4.3.2 The UNCAT Ethiopia Report May 2020 stated:
‘Prosecutors are assigned to each police station and investigation center and
oversee the entire investigation process. They visit persons under custody
and take legal measures if there is any violation of human rights. Further
strengthening this scheme, OAG has now been legally mandated to lead,
supervise, follow up and coordinate the criminal investigation function of the
federal police pursuant to Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive
Organs of the FDRE Proclamation No. 1097/2018. Equivalent offices of
regional states are also entrusted with similar duties and responsibilities’18
4.3.3 The March 2021 report which explored different aspects of Ethiopia’s
criminal Justice system by March 2021 report by Criminal Justice Reform
Working Group (WG), which was established by the Federal Attorney
General to advise the government on the design and implementation of legal
and justice sector reform19 (CJWG Report March 2021) noted:
‘Attorney General Establishment Proclamation 943 Article 6 mandates OAG
to cause a criminal investigation to be started, follow up report to be
submitted on an ongoing criminal investigation, the investigation to be
completed appropriately, orders discontinuation or restart of discontinued
investigation based on public interest or when it is known that there could be
no criminal liability, ensures that investigation is conducted in accordance
with the law, and gives the necessary instruction. The essential questions to
ask are whether the OAG is capable and willing to lead investigations.
Whether there is an actual practice of leading investigation.’20
4.3.4 The same source noted several concerns about OAG's ability and
willingness to lead investigations, including power overlap between the
Attorney General and the police that causes misunderstandings and conflict
between the two sides, a lack of standardisation in the investigation process,
a lack of coordination between the police and prosecutors that results in
ineffective investigation and poor prosecution, the prosecutors' reluctance to
visit crime scenes, and a lack of specialised investigative skills.21
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4.4 Legal aid
4.4.1 A June 2015 article on access to justice and legal Aid in Ethiopia by
Abyssinia Law, an online free-access resource for Ethiopian legal
information (Abyssinia Law Report June 2015) stated that ‘Access to justice
is also recognized as a right in the FDRE Constitution.’22 However, according
to the same source, there are four main barriers to accessing justice: ‘lack of
legal identity, ignorance of legal rights, unavailability of legal services, and
17 Aneme, G. A., ‘Introduction to the Ethiopian Legal System ...’ (paragraph 4.1.1), February 2020
18 UN CAT, Second periodic report submitted by Ethiopia…’ (Para 41- 42), 26 May 2020
19 CJWG, ‘Diagnostic Study of the Ethiopian Criminal Justice System’ (pages ii to iii), March 2021
20 CJWG, ‘Diagnostic Study of the Ethiopian Criminal Justice… ’ (page 116), March 2021
21 CJWG, ‘Diagnostic Study of the Ethiopian Criminal Justice… ’ (pages 116-119), March 2021
22 Abyssinia Law, ‘Access to Justice and Legal Aid in Ethiopia’, 9 June 2015
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unjust and unaccountable legal institutions.’ 23 The source also noted that
unavailability, or expense, of obtaining legal representation or other forms of
legal assistance presented a serious barrier to accessing to justice for the
poor. Hence, various laws, including the constitution, include the right to
legal aid24.
4.4.2 The same source noted that lawyers licensed to practice law in the federal
courts are required by law to render a minimum of fifty hours legal service a
year free of charge or upon minimal payment to persons who cannot afford
to pay and to persons for whom a court requests legal service. The Ethiopian
Bar Association (EBA) and Alumni Association of Law Faculty of Addis
Ababa University provided legal aid services in the premises of the Federal
High Court/Federal First Instance Court and the EBA legal aid centre in
Addis Ababa while regional associations such as Biruh (Diredawa), Tesfa
(Hwassa), and Selam (Harrar) provided legal aid services in their respective
towns. Additionally, NGOs including the Children’s Legal Protection Center
(CLPC), the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA), Action of
Professionals Association for the People (APAP) and Association for Nation-
wide Action and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect (ANPPCAN)
provided legal services through voluntary or paid staff and paralegals25.
4.4.3 An undated entry on the Federal Supreme Court website stated: ‘Those
accused of a crime have the right to a representation during their trial to
ensure a fair trial. The Public Defenders’ Office …organized under the
Federal Supreme Court is mandated to provide free legal representation &
services to indigent persons, who can’t afford to have representation as per
the order of the bench/court.’26
4.4.4 The Foreign, Commonwealth & Development office information pack for
British nationals arrested or imprisoned in Ethiopia, last updated 30 August
2022, stated:
‘Article 20 (5) of the Ethiopian Constitution recognises the rights of an
accused person to be represented by a “legal counsel of their choice, and, if
they do not have sufficient means to pay and a miscarriage of justice would
result, to be provided with legal representation at state expense”. However,
in reality the government will assign defense counsel only for serious cases
which entail capital punishment. The Charities and Societies Proclamation
prevents Civil Society Organisations from providing free legal aid services.’27
4.4.5 An August 2023 UNHCR legal aid factsheet on Ethiopia noted: ‘UNHCR
Ethiopia, in collaboration with the Universities of Bule Hora, Dilla, Wollega,
Dembi Dollo, Assosa, Arba-Minch, and Wollo, and Danish Refugee Council
(DRC) provide free legal aid and legal awareness services to forcibly
displaced persons and members of the host community to promote the rule
of law through fairer, more consistent, and transparent delivery of legal
justice to women, the poor, and vulnerable populations.’28
25 Abyssinia Law, ‘Access to Justice and Legal Aid in Ethiopia’ 9 June 2015
26 Ethiopia Federal Supreme Court, ‘The Public Defenders’ Office’, no date
27 FCDO, ‘Information pack for British nationals arrested or imprisoned in ...’, updated 30 August 2022
28 UNHCR Ethiopia, ‘Legal aid factsheet January-June 2023’ 17 August 2023
Page 15 of 60
4.4.6 The USSD HR Report 2022 noted:
‘... The government provided public defenders for detainees unable to afford
private legal counsel, but defendants received these services only when their
cases went to trial and not during the pretrial phases. In some cases, a
single defense counsel represented multiple defendants in a single case ...
‘The federal Public Defender’s Office provided legal counsel to indigent
defendants, but the scope and quality of service reportedly were inadequate
due to attorney shortages. A public defender often handled more than 100
cases and might represent multiple defendants in the same criminal case.
Numerous free legal-aid clinics, primarily based at universities, also provided
legal services. In certain areas of the country, the law allows volunteers such
as law students and professors to represent clients in court on a pro bono
basis. There reportedly was a lack of a strong and inclusive local bar
association or other standardized criminal defense representation.’29
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5. Prison and detention system
5.1 Overview
5.1.1 A June 2021 report of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC report
June 2021) noted: ‘The prison system in Ethiopia is organized in one federal
prison system and 10 regional prisons systems. The Aleltu Training Centre
trains prison officers for both federal and regional prisons.30
5.1.2 Aneme 2020 stated:
‘The Federal Prisons Commission is established by Proclamation
No.365/2003 as an institution and according to “Federal Prisons Commission
Establishment (Amendment) Proclamation No. 945/2016 accountable to the
Attorney General. The objectives of the Commission are to admit and ward
prisoners, provide them with reformative and rehabilitative services in order
to enable them to make attitudinal and behavioral changes, and to help them
become law abiding, peaceful and productive citizens. The Federal Prisons
Commission has powers and functions akin to most prison facilities.’31
5.1.3 The same source added: ‘States are allowed to establish their own Police
and Prison Commissions. The Police and Prison Commissions of the states
are accountable to the State Justice Bureaus. Even though the State Police
and Prison Commissions are functionally independent, they are obliged to
cooperate with their federal counterparts in order to maintain improved
conditions of prisons across the nation.’32
5.1.4 The World Prison Brief, hosted at the Institute for Crime & Justice Policy
Research (ICPR) at Birkbeck, University of London, is a database that
provides free access to information about prison systems throughout the
world using data largely derived from governmental or other official
29 USSD, ‘2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia’ (section 1 D, E), 20 March 2023
30 UNDOC, ‘Ethiopia Prison Factsheet - Prison Reform and Rehabilitation in Ethiopia’ June 2021
31 Aneme, G. A., ‘Introduction to the Ethiopian Legal System ...’ (paragraph 4.1.3), February 2020
32 Aneme, G. A., ‘Introduction to the Ethiopian Legal System ...’ (para 4.2.2), February 2020
Page 16 of 60
sources.33 According to the source, the Ministry of federal affairs is
responsible for prisons and the prison administration consist of the federal
prison Commission and 9 State prison Administrations. The source noted
that as of 2015, there were 126 prisons - 6 federal and 120 regional – in
Ethiopia and as of March 2020 the prison population including pre-trial and
remand prisoners was 110,000.34 UNODC report 2021) stated that: ‘There
are approximately between 100,000 and 120,000 inmates in Ethiopia, with
approximately 4,800 (4%) female inmates.’ According to the same source
‘Approximately 40,000 inmates were released as part of the government’s
large-scale pardons in 2020 to prevent the transmission of COVID-19 in
places of detention.’35
5.1.5 The same source indicated a consistent reduction in the proportion of pre-
trial /remand prison population from 56.6% in 1999/200 to 14.0% in the year
2009/2010 before rising slightly to 14.9% in the year 2011/201236.. The
source, noted that the pretrial/remand prisons ‘consists of the number of pre-
trial/remand prisoners in the prison population on a single date in the year
(or the annual average) and the percentage of the total prison population
that pre-trial/remand prisoners constituted on that day37. CPIT could not find
current prison figures from the sources consulted (see Bibliography)
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5.2 Training
5.2.1 UNODC report June 2021 noted that in December 2020 ‘30 prison personnel
from the Prison Training Centre trained to deliver trainings to prison staff on
international standards in prison management, including on Nelson Mandela
Rules and Bangkok Rules.’38 The Nelson Mandela Rules refer to the United
nations Standard Minimum Treatment of prisoners (for further information
see Nelson Mandela Rules).
5.2.2 UNODC’s semi-annual progress report 1 January-30 June 2021 noted:
‘The Ethiopian Federal Prison Commission launched a national prison-
training curriculum at the annual consultation forum of Federal and Regional
Prison Commissions organized by the Federal Prison Commission. The
curriculum, developed with UNODC support, targets all prison wardens and
prison officials in Ethiopia. The curriculum has included certification in the
online training on the Nelson Mandela Rules, part of the education process
thereby institutionalizing human rights, rehabilitation and security related
best practices, setting an example for other countries in the region.
‘... The curriculum focuses on human rights, security and rehabilitations and
is informed by lessons learned from the targeted trainings conducted for
Ethiopian.’39
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33 WPB ‘About the World Prison Brief’, no date

34 WPB, ‘Ethiopia’ no date
35 UNODC, Ethiopia Prison Factsheet - Prison Reform and Rehabilitation in Ethiopia June 2021
38 UNDOC, ‘Ethiopia Prison Factsheet - Prison Reform and Rehabilitation in Ethiopia’ June 2021
39 UNODC ‘Semi Annual Progress Report 1 January – 30 June 2021’ (page 10), June 2021
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5.3 Detention conditions
5.3.1 The UNCAT Ethiopia Report May 2020 noted:
‘Ethiopia recognizes that the conditions of detention centers and prison
facilities lag behind and require significant improvements to meet
international standards. Accordingly, challenges such as overcrowding,
inadequate or obsolete infrastructure, lack of sanitary conditions, disease,
malnutrition and violence between prisoners remain to be addressed and
require relentless effort towards their significant improvement. The
Government is committed to resolve these shortcomings and is working
assiduously through the allocation of additional resources and capacity
building.’ 40
5.3.2 However, the same source noted government efforts to improve prison
conditions. It stated:
‘Extensive measures have been taken in Ethiopia to improve the conditions
of detention centres and prisons. Among the measures taken include
improvement of basic services with in police custody centres and prisons.
Accordingly, the daily budget for food and drink for a single prisoner at the
federal prison administration has doubled. A decision has been reached in
May 2019 to further increase the daily budget allotment. The OAG is also
working with development partners to improve conditions of detention in all
police stations in Addis Ababa including reduction of congestion, improved
water supply, better sleeping facilities and other basic amenities.
‘The Federal Prison Commission and regional state prison administrations
are building new prison facilities and upgrading existing ones to enhance
compliance with international human rights standards. For instance, the
Federal Government is building 4 new prison facilities to ensure prisoners
are kept in conditions that respect their human dignity. The facilities under
construction, inter alia, include modern cells, administrative blocks,
academic and vocational schools and are also fitted with ramps and
disability friendly latrines. 41
5.3.3 The UNODC report June 2021 noted that: ‘Despite progress, further
improvements are needed in the treatment of prisoners in prisons including
in the provision of basic services (rehabilitation support, health, education,
food).’42
5.3.4 The Committee Against Torture Concluding observations on the second
periodic report of Ethiopia adopted on 10 May 2023 (UNCAT Report May
2023):
‘While acknowledging the steps taken by the State party to improve
conditions in places of detention ... the Committee remains concerned at
reports indicating overcrowding in some prisons ... and poor material
conditions of detention ... in particular insalubrity and inadequate hygiene,
lack of ventilation, the poor quality and insufficient quantity of the food and
water provided and limited recreational or educational activities to foster
40 UNCAT, ‘Second periodic report submitted by …’ (paragraphs 114), 26 May 2020

41 UNCAT, ‘Second periodic report submitted by …’ (paragraphs 82 to 83), 26 May 2020
42 UNODC, Ethiopia Prison Factsheet - Prison Reform and Rehabilitation in Ethiopia June 2021
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rehabilitation. Furthermore, the limited access to quality health care
rehabilitation. Furthermore, the limited access to quality health care,
including mental health care, in particular for pregnant women and women
held in detention with their children and the lack of trained and qualified
prison staff, including medical staff, remain serious problems in the prison
system. The Committee is also concerned at reports indicating the
prevalence of violence in prisons, including violence perpetrated by prison
staff against detainees and inter-prisoner violence and sexual abuse, and
the practice of detaining pretrial detainees with convicted prisoners and
children with adults.’43
‘In view of the numerous, ongoing and consistent allegations and complaints
of torture and ill-treatment by police officers, prison guards and other
members of the security forces, as well as the military, in police stations,
detention centres, federal prisons, military bases and in unofficial or secret
places of detention, particularly during the investigation stage of
proceedings, the Committee remains deeply concerned at the lack of
accountability, which contributes to an environment of impunity ...’44
5.3.6 The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) report covering June
2022 to June 2023 which is based on a review of 126 police stations and 49
detention facilities (EHCR Report August 2023) noted:
‘The Commission has visited 49 detention/correction facilities and 346 police
stations during the reporting period.
‘There are marked improvements in acknowledging and implementing the
Commission’s recommendations. Some of the positive developments include
most prisons having slightly increased the budget for food supply taking into
account current market prices; improvement in prison health facilities;
increase in the number of detention cells and in some cases construction of
new facilities to reduce overcrowding; and notable improvements in terms of
visitation rights - access to family and friends, and legal and religion counsel.
‘There are, however, several issues of concern that are yet to be addressed
by the relevant authorities in some of the detention facilities. For instance,
lack of appropriate or digitized register of detainees in some prisons,
absence of special care and support for prisoners with communicable
diseases, insufficient or absence of adequate support for infants and children
... inadequate supply of sanitary products ... and failure to keep juvenile
detainees separate from adult prisoners.
‘Lack of a standardized pardoning system, and lack of special care for the
vulnerable including persons with disabilities, older persons, pregnant
women, and nursing mothers are also among issues that need to be
improved. The inadequacy of water supply and healthcare compared to the
size of the prison population, and over-crowdedness of sleeping areas in
many of these facilities also need to be addressed.’45
43 UNCAT, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report of ...’ (paragraph 34), 7 June 2023
44 UNCAT, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report …’, (paragraph 40), 7 June 2023
45 EHRC, ‘Executive Summary: Ethiopia Annual Human Rights ...’ (pages 6 to 7), 18 August 2023
Page 19 of 60
‘Notable improvements and changes have also been recorded in police
stations monitored in the last year. In Addis Ababa for instance, some police
stations installed CCTV cameras to monitor the treatment of persons in their
custody. Other positive steps include: police departments have set
up/established onsite healthcare facilities; separate detention quarters for
child detainees; efforts to transfer children in conflict with the law who are
between the ages of 9 and 15 to rehabilitation centers for juveniles;
improved hygiene in some police stations; taking administrative and legal
measures against police officers who have committed human rights
violations; and improvements such as at Kolfe Keraniyo, Arat Kilo and Lideta
police detention centers after relocating to newly constructed buildings.
However, problems such as inadequate provision of food, water and health
services; beatings and torture to compel confession; lack of a standardized
procedure to execute arrests including informing the suspect of the charges
and the reason for the arrest; and lack of formal internal complaints
procedures persist in most of the police stations monitored.
‘Other issues requiring urgent attention include prolonged pre-trial detention
in police stations; failure to execute bail order by courts; failure to provide
separate quarters/compounds for women detainees, overcrowding; and in
some cases, serious unsanitary conditions.’46
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6. The judiciary
6.1 Structure
6.1.1 The entry by Assefa Fiseha in the Oxford Constitutional law on relations
between the legislature and the Judiciary in Ethiopia noted that 79(1) of the
constitution stipulates that ‘Judicial powers are vested in the courts.’47 The
same source added:
‘[A]ccording to articles 62 and 83 of the constitution, the HoF is mandated to
interpret the constitution and resolve constitutional disputes ... [T]he HoF has
no law-making functions. The HoF is a quasi-political body composed of, to
use the words of the constitution, ‘nations, nationalities and people’. Each
group has at least one representative but each ‘nation or nationality shall be
represented by one additional representative for each one million of its
population. As for the selection/election process article 61(3) of the
constitution envisages two possibilities. Members of the HoF may be elected
indirectly by the state legislature or the state legislature may decide the
members to be elected directly by the people. So far experience indicates
that all members are indirectly elected by the states.’ 48
6.1.2 Aneme 2020 noted:
‘Ethiopia has a dual judicial system with two parallel court structures. In
46 EHRC, ‘Executive Summary: Ethiopia Annual Human Rights Situation ...’ (page 7), 18 August 2023
47 Fiseha , A., ‘Relations Between the Legislature and the Judiciary in Ethiopia’, March 2016
48 Fiseha , A., ‘Relations Between the Legislature and the Judiciary in Ethiopia’, March 2016
Page 20 of 60
addition to these courts, the FDRE Constitution allows the establishment of
Religious and Customary courts. The federal courts and the state courts with
their own independent structures and administrations. Judicial powers, both
at Federal and State levels, are vested in the courts. The FDRE Constitution
states that supreme federal judicial authority is vested in the Federal
Supreme Court and empowers the [House of Peoples’ Representatives]
HPR ... to establish subordinate federal courts, as it deems necessary,
nationwide or in some parts of the country. There is a Federal Supreme
Court that sits in Addis Ababa with national jurisdiction and until recently, the
Federal High Court and First Instance Courts were confined to the federal
cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. In recent years, Federal High Courts
have been established in five States. Federal courts at any level may hold
circuit hearings at any place within the State or “area designated for its
jurisdiction” if deemed “necessary for the efficient rendering of justice.” Each
court has a civil, criminal, and labor division with a presiding judge and two
other judges in each division.’49
6.1.3 The CJWG Report March 2021 observed:
‘… [T]he… Constitutions established a dual court structure: federal and State
Courts. At the federal level, the constitution creates a federal supreme court
vested with a supreme federal judicial authority and mandates the ... HPR by
two thirds majority vote, to establish the Federal High Court and First
Instance Court it deems necessary, either national [sic] wide or in some
parts of the country. Absent such establishment, the constitution further
states, the jurisdictions of the Federal High Court and First-Instance Court
are delegated to states’ supreme courts and high courts respectively …
‘The House of peoples representatives… has established Federal High court
and First –Instance courts in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa … Federal High
Courts in the regional states of Afar, Benshangul, Gambella, Somalia and
Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples …. The regional states also
created their own Supreme, High (Zonal) and Wereda Courts by means of
their respective states constitutions …
‘The FDRE constitution entitles regional states to establish Supreme Court,
High courts and First Instance Courts in their respective regions. The
Supreme Courts of regional states are seated in the capital city of the
regions, the High Court’s (Zonal courts) in cities of the Zones and Wereda
(first instance courts) in each Wereda of the region …’50
6.1.4 With respect to the administration of the judiciary, Aneme 2020 stated:
‘The FDRE Constitution provides that the President and Vice-President of
the Federal Supreme Court shall be appointed by the House of Peoples’
Representatives upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister; other
federal judges are appointed by the HPR from a list of candidates selected
by the Federal Judicial Administration Commission.
‘The FDRE Constitution prohibits the removal of judges before retirement
age except for violation of disciplinary rules, gross incompetence or
inefficiency, or illness that prevents the judge from carrying out his
49 Aneme, G. A., ‘Introduction to the Ethiopian Legal System ...’ (paragraph 2.2.1 A), February 2020
50 CJWG, ‘Diagnostic Study of the Ethiopian Criminal Justice… ’ (pages 194 to 197), March 2021
Page 21 of 60
responsibilities. Such determinations are made by the Federal Judicial
Administration Commission, which likewise decide issues of appointment,
promotions, disciplinary complaints, and other conditions of employment.
‘... The day-to-day operations of the Federal Courts in Ethiopia are
supervised and managed by court presidents, who therefore act both as
judges and administrators with responsibilities and obligations towards the
President of the Supreme Court.’51
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6.2 Judicial independence
6.2.1 The 2022 report by Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) project,
a collaboration of nearly 300 country and regional experts from leading
universities and think tanks that analyses and compares transformation
processes towards democracy and inclusive market economy worldwide,52
covering the period 2019 to 2021 (BTI Report February 2022) commented:
‘…[T]he judiciary is far from independent and heavily affected by arbitrary
decisions made by the Prime Minister’s Office. The legal system is to some
extent institutionally differentiated, but severely restricted by functional
deficits, insufficient territorial operability, scarce resources and nowadays by
political interferences. Judicial appointments have been made on the basis
of loyalty to the government to ensure that judicial decisions are consistent
with government policy, even when that means contravening the rule of law
and the constitution. Judges not loyal to the government run the risk of being
replaced by a “more suitable” candidate.’53
6.2.2 FH Report 2022 noted:
‘The judiciary is officially independent, but in practice it is subject to political
interference, and judgments rarely deviate from government policy.
Ethiopia’s security forces have maintained significant influence over the
judicial process, especially in cases against opposition leaders and other
political adversaries. Judges who attempt to exercise independence have
faced arrests by authorities. Courts remain complicit in ensuring impunity for
security forces, especially in relation to the political prisoners.’54
6.2.3 The 2023 Africa Integrity Indicators, a research project initiated by Global
Integrity, whose aim is to support locally-led efforts to solve governance-
related challenges in collaboration with the Mo Ibrahim Foundation focusing
on African governance in practice55 (Global Integrity 2022) noted:
‘In the Ethiopian Constitution of 1995, Article 78 states the separation of
government branches and the independence of the judiciary. Judges can
interpret laws, although legislation is still a power vested in parliament.
Regardless of the separation of powers, the judiciary in Ethiopia still has to
deal with interference by politicians trying to influence judges.
51 Aneme, G. A., ‘Introduction to the Ethiopian Legal System ...’ (section 2.4.1.2), February 2020
52 BTI ‘Who we are’, no date
53 BTI, ‘Ethiopia country report 2022’ (Rule of law), 23 February 2022
54 FH, ‘Freedom in the world 2023 – Ethiopia’ (section F, F1), 9 March 2023
55 Global Integrity, ‘About us’, no date
Page 22 of 60
‘Several reform attempts over the years have failed to tackle the issue of the
politicization of the judiciary and weak legislation. However, this is not a
problem specific to the judiciary but rather a widespread issue in public
institutions in the country.
‘Under the new government, the Ethiopian judiciary, led by Supreme Court
president Meaza Ashenafi, has tried to bring about change. An important
step was an amendment to the Federal Judges Code of Conduct and
Disciplinary Procedure Regulation, with the aim of improving transparency in
the system and requiring accountability from federal judges.
‘During the research period, the judiciary also has worked on securing
financial independence (by dealing with parliament directly for funds), a key
step in ensuring the branch is not dependent on other bodies of government.
‘Although these promising steps do not signify total independence for the
judiciary they indicate a strong willingness to reform the sector and detach
judicial institutions from their usual image of nondependent and unreliable
institutions.’56
6.2.4 The February 2023 report ‘Ethiopia: Overview of corruption and anti-
corruption efforts’ by Matthew Jenkins, a Research and Knowledge Manager
at Transparency International and S M Elsayed published by the Chr.
Michelsen Institute (CMI) U4 Helpdesk, which works to reduce the harmful
impact of corruption on society57, February 2023 report on corruption in
Ethiopia (Jenkins and Elsayed 2023) noted:
‘Since coming to power, Abiy’s administration has taken some steps to
improve the system of judicial appointments by nominating judges based on
merit and experience rather than party loyalty. In 2020, two proclamations
were approved by parliament that were intended to bolster the independence
and accountability of the judiciary, and a code of conduct for judges and new
performance standards have been developed to operationalise these
proclamations ... In his recent speech to parliament, Abiy also noted that
budgetary decisions related to the judiciary have recently been transferred
from the executive to the legislative branch.
‘However, the continued lack of security of tenure for judges renders it
difficult for them to rule against the government; analysts argue that in recent
years the judiciary has been used by the state to prevent opposition figures
from contesting elections. Moreover, while there have been some signs of
progress at the federal level, the picture is less encouraging at the regional
level where judges have apparently been beaten and detained by the police
and local officials for not making favourable decisions.’58
6.2.5 The Committee against Torture Concluding observations on the second
periodic report of Ethiopia adopted on 10 May 2023 (UNCAT Report May
2023) stated:
‘While noting the measures taken to strengthen the independence of the
judiciary, such as the adoption of Proclamation No. 1233/2021 on the federal
56 Global Integrity, ‘Africa Integrity Indicators Data’ (Ethiopia), 2023

57 CMI U4, ‘About U4’, no date
58 Jenkins, M and Elsayed, S., CMI U4 Helpdesk, ‘Ethiopia: Overview of corruption... ’ (page 13), 2023
Page 23 of 60
judicial administration and Proclamation No. 1234/2021 on federal courts,
the Committee remains concerned about reports regarding the lack of
independence of the judiciary vis-à-vis the executive branch and its
susceptibility to political pressure, which may contribute to impunity,
including for cases of torture. That concern is compounded by shortcomings
in the justice system, such as a shortage of resources, including a dearth of
judges and lawyers and a lack of basic training for them, delays in
processing cases and a failure to enforce some court decisions.’59
6.2.6 The International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia
(ICHREE) report on the situation of human rights in Ethiopia (UNGA Report
September 2023) stated:
‘...The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution, but constitutional interpretation favors political decision makers
over courts, both regional and federal. Courts are widely believed to lack
independence and to be subject to regular political interference.
‘In 2021 legislation placed the Office of the Attorney-General under the
Ministry of Justice, including the power to initiate and discontinue
investigations, and appoint, administer and dismiss public prosecutors,
undermining prosecutorial independence and impartiality. Prosecutors could
face increased pressure from political actors in their choices of
investigations, prosecutions and trials. There is the risk for further
centralization of power in the federal Ministry of Justice in proposals in the
draft Justice Sector Reform Policy Document (September 2023), seen by the
Commission.’60
6.2.7 A September 2023 HRW report observed:
‘… Concerns also remain over the influence that Ethiopia’s federal and
regional authorities have over judicial processes, where investigative
authorities have routinely appealed or ignored court decisions in cases
involving critics of the government or opposition figures.
‘There have also been cases where investigations and judicial decisions
have been subject to political interference, compromising the ability of
domestic bodies to act with impartiality and independence. For example, in
October 2022 police detained three Supreme Court judges in the Oromia
region after they granted bail to six security personnel of the opposition
political party leader.’61
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6.3 Corruption in the judicial system
6.3.1 Jenkins and Elsayed 2023 stated:
‘Corruption is certainly a topic that is recognised by the country’s political
leadership as being endemic. ‘Judicial corruption has been explicitly targeted
by Prime Minister Abiy...
59 UNCAT ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report of ... ’ (paragraph 42), 7 June 2023
60 UNGA, ‘Report of the International Commission of … ’ (paragraphs 88 and 90), 14 September 2023
Page 24 of 60
‘While the interference of the Prime Minister’s Office in the judiciary is
viewed by some analysts as part of the problem this has not prevented Abiy
from strongly criticising corruption in the judiciary in a speech to parliament
in November 2022. Abiy listed a lengthy set of corruption problems in the
judicial system, including prosecutors accepting bribes in exchange for
intentionally losing or dropping cases, abuse of power on the part of court
clerks overseeing case management resulting in evidence “disappearing”
and a general lack of transparency and ethical standards. In a recent
interview with The Reporter, Mesfin Erkabe, a member of the parliamentary
legal, justice, and democracy affairs standing committee from Abiy’s ruling
Prosperity Party also pointed to the reportedly widespread practice of
“trading justice for money” ...62
6.3.2 According to the same source, a Federal Ethics and Ant-Corruption
Commission [FEACC] corruption perceptions survey found that ‘57% of the
4,018 citizens questioned expressed the view that the judicial system was
not fair, although 89% of those that came into contact with the judiciary
indicated that they had not been asked to pay a bribe to a judge, prosecutor
or other court official.’63
6.3.3 The FH Report March 2023 also noted that ‘...Corruption within the justice
system remains a significant challenge, and judges caught accepting bribes
are rarely punished.’64
6.3.4 The BTI Report 2022 noted that although Abiy pledged to fight corruption, so
far, it is fair to assume that the political core of the federal executive
maintains control over the judiciary when it comes to cases of political
importance65.
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7. Security forces
7.1 Law and structures
7.1.1 The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia under
Articles 51 and 52, provides for the powers and functions of government: ‘It
shall establish and administer national defence and public security forces as
well as a federal police force’ and ‘[t]o establish and administer a state police
force, and to maintain public order and peace within the State.’66
The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (DFAT) Country
Information Report Ethiopia, ‘informed by DFAT’s on-the-ground knowledge
and discussions with a range of sources in Ethiopia [and]… takes into
account relevant and credible open source reports’, dated 17 August 2020
(DFAT report 2020), based on information prior to the conflicts in Tigray and
Amhara in 2020 to 202367,noted:
62 Jenkins and Elsayed, CMI U4 Helpdesk, ‘Ethiopia: Overview of corruption...’ (pages 12 to 13), 2023
63 Jenkins and Elsayed, CMI U4 Helpdesk, ‘Ethiopia: Overview of corruption...’ (pages 12 to 13),2023
64 FH, ‘Freedom in the World 2023 – Ethiopia’, (section C, C2), 9 March 2023
65 BTI ‘Ethiopia Country Report 2022’ (Rule of law), 2023
66 Ethiopia Government, ‘Constitution of the Federal ...’ (Art 51 (6) and 52 (2)(g)), 21 August 1995
67 DFAT, ‘Country Information Report Ethiopia’ (paragraphs 1.1 to 1.4 ), 17 August 2020
Page 25 of 60
‘Ethiopia has an extensive security and intelligence apparatus, a legacy of its
previous political systems. The state exercises control over most of the
country, and it has largely been effective in maintaining law and order and
protecting the population from major crimes, including terrorism. The security
and intelligence apparatus was used in the past to monitor and suppress
dissent, and had a history of using force to quell instances of unrest,
including large-scale anti-government protests.’68
7.1.2 USSD HR Report 2022 noted:
‘National and regional police forces are responsible for law enforcement and
maintenance of order, with the Ethiopian National Defense Force sometimes
providing internal security support. The Ethiopian Federal Police report to the
Prime Minister’s Office. The Ethiopian National Defense Force reports to the
Ministry of Defense. The regional governments control regional security
forces, which generally operate independently from the federal government
and in some cases operate as regional defense forces maintaining national
borders. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security
forces. There were reports that members of the security forces committed
numerous serious abuses.’69
7.1.3 The US CIA Factbook updated on 13 December 2023 observed:
‘… national and regional police forces are responsible for law enforcement
and maintenance of order, with the [Ethiopian National Defence Force]
ENDF sometimes providing internal security support; the Ethiopian Federal
Police (EFP) report to the Prime Minister’s Office… the regional
governments control regional security forces, including “special” paramilitary
forces, which generally operate independently from the federal government
and in some cases operate as regional defense forces maintaining national
borders; local militias also operate across the country in loose and varying
coordination with these regional security and police forces, the ENDF, and
the EFP; in April 2023, the federal government ordered the integration of
these regional special forces into the EFP or ENDF… in 2018 Ethiopia
established a Republican Guard military unit responsible to the Prime
Minister for protecting senior officials’.70
7.1.4 An April 2022 report by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations
(Clingendael), an independent think tank and academy on international
affairs (Clingedael Report April 2022) observed:
‘… the [Abiy]… administration has seemingly sought to centralise previously
dispersed powers into a single institution. In the early stage of the transition,
the internal security portfolio was placed under the powerful Ministry of
Peace, the successor of the Ministry of Federal Affairs… the new ministry
was granted supervising powers over Ethiopia’s main intelligence agencies,
the [National Intelligence and Security Service] NISS and the [Information
Network Security Agency] INSA, which had previously been directly
supervised by the PM’s office. The Ministry also took the lead in the sensitive
efforts to regulate the functioning of the various special forces and militias
68 DFAT, ‘Country Information Report Ethiopia’ (paragraph 5.1), 17 August 2020

69 USSD, ‘2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices …’ (executive summary), 21 March 2023
70 US CIA World Factbook, ‘Ethiopia’ (military and security), 13 December 2023
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operating in Ethiopia’s regions. In the wake of the 2021 general elections,
however, the new administration has moved both intelligence agencies back
under the PM’s direct oversight, together with the Federal Police
Commission …’71
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7.2 Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF)
7.2.1 According to the US CIA Factbook last updated 13 December 2023, ENDF is
comprised of ground forces, Ethiopian Air Force, a Republican Guard
(established in 2018 to protect senior officials) and a navy (re-established in
2020). The same source while noting that information about Ethiopia’s
military personnel varies it stated that prior to the 2020-2022 Tigray conflict it
had approximately 150,000 active-duty troops which included about 3,000
Air Force personnel with no figures available for the re-established Navy.
The source also estimated Ethiopia’s military expenditure in 2023 at 1.7% of
GDP compared to 0.8% in 2018.72
7.2.2 Similarly the 2024 US based Global Firepower Index (GFP), which measures
and ranks military power based on each nation’s potential war-making
capability fought by conventional means73, estimated that Ethiopia had
162,000 active military personnel comprising of 5,000 air force, 75,000 army
and 10,000 navy74.
7.2.3 The ENDF played a role in internal security. The March 2020 USSD human
rights report covering events in 2019 (USSD HR Report 2019) stated: ‘When
community security was insufficient to maintain law and order, the military
played an expanded role with respect to internal security; in particular,
setting up military command posts in parts of the country like West and
South Oromia, as well as Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’
(SNNP) Region.’75 According to multiple sources ENDF was, at the time of
writing, active in Tigray, Benshangul/Gumuz, Oromia, the Southern Nations,
Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR), and Amhara regions76 77 78.
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7.3 National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)
7.3.1 The September 2016 report by Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of
International Relations), a think tank and diplomatic academy on
international affairs79 noted that: ‘The Ethiopian National Intelligence and
Security Service was established in 1995 and currently enjoys ministerial
status, reporting directly to the Prime Minister. It is tasked with gathering
information necessary to protect national security. Its surveillance capacities
71 Clingedael, ‘A clash of nationalisms and the remaking of the Ethiopian …’ (section 4.3), April 2022
72 US CIA World Factbook, ‘Ethiopia’ (military and security), last updated 13 December 2023
73 GFP, ‘Global Firepower 2024’, 2024
74 GFP ‘2024 Ethiopia military strength’, January 2024
75 USSD, ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 …’ (executive summary), March 2020
76 Ethiopia Peace Observatory ‘Actor profiles’, (EPDF), August 2023
77 FH, ‘Freedom in the World 2023 – Ethiopia’, (section, C1), 9 March 2023
78 US CIA World Factbook, ‘Ethiopia’ (military and security), last updated 15 August 2023
79 Clingendael, ‘About Us’ no date
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have been used both to prevent terrorist attacks, such as those by Al-
Shabaab, and to suppress domestic dissent.’80
7.3.2 A January 2020 report by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for
East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), a UK Department for International
Development (DfID) funded centre that focuses on decision-making that
facilitates the use of ICT in support of good governance, human rights and
livelihoods81 (CIPESA Report January 2020) noted with respect to NISS:
‘In 2013, the government re-established the National Intelligence and
Security Services (NISS) with a ministerial status and as an autonomous
body of the federal government. This institution has broad intelligence and
security mandate and power to investigate threats “against the national
economic growth and development activities” and to gather intelligence on
serious crimes and terrorist activities. It is responsible for many of the human
rights violations that happened in the country before 2017 including mass
and illegal surveillance of citizens both online and offline, censorship of
dissenting voices, torture, and intimidation of dissenting voices online and
offline.’82
7.3.3 ACCORD Report November 2019 observed: ‘According to Proclamation No.
1097/2018 the “Ministry of Peace shall have powers and duties to […]
oversee and follow up national intelligence and security, as well as
information network and financial security functions”. The National
Information Security Service (NISS) is accountable to the Ministry of
Peace.’83
7.3.4 The USSD terrorism report covering events in 2017 stated that: ‘... The
National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), which has broad authority
for intelligence, border security, and criminal investigation, is responsible for
overall counterterrorism management in coordination with the ENDF and
EFP.’84 The USSD terrorism report covering 2019 noted: ‘... The National
Intelligence and Security Service continued to reorganize and reform to
focus on collecting intelligence to detect and disrupt terrorism in support of
EFP and attorney general efforts to conduct law enforcement investigations
and prosecutions.’85 According to the USSD terrorism report covering events
in 2021 ‘Al-Shabaab and ISIS terrorist threats emanating from Somalia
remain a high priority for the National Intelligence and Security Service.’ 86
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7.4 Information Network Security Agency (INSA)
7.4.1 Citing sources, the Accord Report 2019 noted that the Information Network
Security Agency (INSA), was established to safeguard the country’s
80 Clingendael, ‘Perpetuating power Ethiopia’s political settlement and ... (page 28), September 2016
81 CIPESA, ‘About us’, no date
82 CIPESA, ‘State of Internet Freedom in Ethiopia 2019’ (page 13), January 2020
83 ACCORD, ‘Ethiopia: COI Compilation’ (page 57), November 2019
84 USSD, ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2017’ (Ethiopia, legislation, law ... ), 19 September 2018
85 USSD, ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2019... ’ (Legislation, law enforcement ...) October 2019
86 USSD, ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: Ethiopia’ (Overview),February 2021
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information and to defend the country from cyber-attacks, that it is
accountable to the Ministry of Peace and PM Abiy Ahmed is its founder 87.
7.4.2 The CIPESA Report January 2020 noted:
‘In 2006, the Ethiopian government established the Information Network
Security Agency (INSA) and set up the country’s first cyber intelligence unit.
The Agency was re-established in 2013 ... with the objective of ensuring
“that information and computer based key infrastructures are secured, so as
to be enablers of national peace, democratization and development
programs.” Under Article 12 of the Proclamation, every concerned body has
an obligation to cooperate with the Agency in exercising its powers and
duties pursuant to the Proclamation.’88
7.4.3 The FH Freedom of the Internet Report November 2019 stated:
‘The Information Network Security Agency (INSA), a government agency
that has de facto authority over the internet with a mandate to protect the
communications infrastructure and prevent cybercrime, has been placed
under a new Ministry of Peace created by Abiy’s administration.
‘… In a positive step, Prime Minister Abiy—who is regarded as one of the
founders of INSA—forced the resignations of agency officials who were
accused of monitoring and hacking activists, leading to some optimism that
INSA may become less abusive regarding its surveillance powers.’89
7.4.4 DFAT Report 2020 noted that ‘The federal government operates a separate
cyber-intelligence and security organisation, the Information Network
Security Agency (INSA). INSA’s role includes investigating threats to
national security, combatting cyber-crime and preventing cyber-attacks on
critical infrastructure.’90
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7.5 Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP)
7.5.1 Aneme 2020 stated: ‘The Federal Police Commission is established by the
Federal Police Commission Proclamation No.720/2011. The Commission is
accountable to the Ministry of Federal Affairs (now the Ministry of Federal &
Pastoralist Development Affairs).’91 The same source noted that Article 6 of
Proclamation No.720/2011 defines powers and functions which include the
prevention and detection of crime, combatting and investigating crime, the
maintenance of public order, enforcement of the law, and providing
protection to citizens92.
7.5.2 The US Department of State’s Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC),
a public-private partnership between the U.S. Department of State’s
Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) and security professionals from U.S.
organizations operating abroad, which share timely security information and
87 ACCORD, ‘Ethiopia: COI Compilation’ (page 59), November 2019

88 CIPESA, ‘State of Internet Freedom in Ethiopia 2019’ (pages 9 to 10), January 2020
89 FH, ‘Freedom of the Net 2019 Ethiopia’ (sections A, A5 and C, C5), November 2019
90 DFAT, ‘Country Information Report Ethiopia’ (para 5.13), 17 August 2020
91 Aneme, GA, ‘Introduction to the Ethiopian Legal System ...’ (section 4.1.2), February 2020
92 Aneme, G. A., ‘Introduction to the Ethiopian Legal System ...’ (section 4.1.2), February 2020
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maintain strong bonds for the protection of U.S. interests overseas93, noted
in its October 2022 report:
'The Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP) are responsible for investigating crimes
that fall under the jurisdiction of federal courts, including any activities in
violation of the Constitution that may endanger the Constitutional order,
public order, hooliganism, terrorism, trafficking in persons, or transferring of
drugs. The EFP also maintains law and order in any region when there is a
deteriorating security situation beyond the control of the regional government
and a request for intervention is made, or when disputes arise between two
or more regional governments and the situation becomes dangerous for the
security of the federal government. The EFP safeguards the security of
borders, airports, railway lines/terminals, mining areas, and other vital
institutions of the federal government. The EFP delegates powers, when
necessary, to regional police commissions…’94
7.5.3 The DFAT report 2020 noted:
‘The Ethiopian Federal Police Force reports to the Ministry of Peace and is
subject to parliamentary oversight. It is responsible for preventing and
investigating crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Court,
including terrorism, drug trafficking and human trafficking ...
‘The Federal Police Force is responsible for coordinating regional police
commissions and setting national policing standards, and it provides training
and operational support to regional police forces.’95
7.5.4 The October 2021 report by the European Institute of Peace, an independent
body that partners with European states and the European Union to develop
strategic and practical approaches to conflict prevention, resolution,
dialogue, and mediation,96 (EIP Report 2021) stated: ‘Since 1991, the
Ethiopian police have, in principle, been subject to civilian control … At
present, the police at the federal level are accountable to the Ministry of
Peace (MoP), established in 2018 … The Ministers, in turn, are accountable
to the House of Peoples’ Representatives and the Prime Minister.’97
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7.6 Regional police forces
7.6.1 The DFAT report 2020 noted: ‘… all regional states have their own regional
police forces. These are responsible for law and order at the state level and
report to their respective state governments. Regional police forces are
dominated by the ethnic group that is the majority in the state for which the
force is responsible. One local source told DFAT that regional police forces
often show favouritism to the ethnic community from which they are
predominantly drawn.’98
93 OSAC, ‘About us’, no date

94 OSAC, ‘Ethiopia Country Security Report’, 5 October 2022
95 DFAT, ‘Country Information Report Ethiopia’ (paragraph 5.8 to 5.9), 17 August 2020
96 EIP, ‘About us’ no date
97 EIP, ‘The Special Police in Ethiopia’ (page 27), October 2023
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7.6.2 OSAC Report October 2022 noted: ‘Regional police forces handle local
crime under their jurisdiction and provide officers for traffic control and
immediate response to criminal incidents.’99
7.6.3 The EIP report 2021 noted:
‘The proclamations establishing the federal police (720/2011) define the
relationship between the Federal Police Commission and the Regional
Police Commissions. In principle, the relevant laws reinforce the dual
structure of the police, in which the federal police administer and discharge
federal mandates and regional states enforce regional state laws. The
respective laws also allow the delegation of federal mandates to regional
state police, such as investigating federal criminal cases. Otherwise, the
regional special police operate autonomously when it discharges its regional
state mandate.’100
7.6.4 The USSD HR Report 2021 stated: ‘The regional governments control
regional security forces, which generally operate independently from the
federal government.’101
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7.7 Regional ‘special’ forces
7.7.1 A July 2019 article by Professor Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, an Associate Fellow at
the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a UK independent think tank
engaged in defence and security research102 (Fitz-Gerald July 2019) stated:
‘The Liyu Haile (Amharic for “special force”) is a force of well-trained
professional soldiers, many of whom, according to author interviews with
regional and federal officials, have defected from the national defence force
and are attracted by a number of incentives including, certainly for some
regions, higher pay ...
‘Little is known outside Ethiopia about the exact numbers, structure, funding,
command arrangements and roles of these special forces. Yet they are
certainly extensive and media sources confirm that all regions have them.
Numbers range from thousands to tens of thousands, depending on the
region. Whereas some have existed for longer than others, and access to
weapon stockpiles and equipment differs between regions, the development
of others has only unfolded in recent years.’103
7.7.2 The EIP Report 2021 noted with respect to the special police force:
‘… In the last fifteen years … Ethiopia’s regional states have established
regional special police forces, in addition to the regular regional state police.
Established first in Ethiopia's Somali region in 2007 to conduct counter-
insurgency operations and riot control, special police quickly spread to all
other regions of Ethiopia.
99 OSAC, ‘Ethiopia Country Security Report’, 5 October 2022

100 EIP, ‘The special police in Ethiopia’ (page 18), 2021
101 USSD, ‘2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices’ (Executive summary), 12 April 2022
102 RUSI, ‘About Rusi no date
103 Fitz-Gerald, A. M., ‘Ethiopia’s Security Dilemmas’, 18 July 2019
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‘The role and status of special police forces in Ethiopia remain contested.
Resembling paramilitary forces, the regional special police units are well
armed and receive military training. They are rapidly growing in size and
have successfully recruited senior (former) army officers into their ranks.
Special police forces have become deeply involved in Ethiopia's interregional
conflicts and border disputes, most notably in the current conflict in Tigray.
They have … been involved in…coup attempts. They have also been linked
to severe human rights abuses.’104
7.7.3 On 12 April 2023 The Guardian reported that ‘some states have…built
powerful security services resembling small armies that sometimes clash.’105
7.7.4 With respect to the organisation of the special force, the EIP report 2021
stated:
‘The organisational structure of the special police varies from state to state.
In the Somali regional state, especially under the administration of Abdi Iley,
the Liyu police were directly accountable to the regional president. In other
regional states such as Amhara, Oromia, and the South, the Liyu police are
organised under the police commissions but with special links established
directly with the regional state president. The police commissioner has
several deputies: one of them is directly in charge of the special police. In
turn, the police commissioners are accountable to the “Administrative and
security affairs bureau,” which is accountable to the regional state president.
In theory, the regional state executive body is accountable to the regional
state’s elected legislative councils. Nevertheless … The special police
remain in most cases directly accountable to the regional state president.
The legislature has little knowledge and control over the special police.’106
7.7.5 For further information on special forces including origin, size, training and
recruitment see EIP, ‘The special police in Ethiopia’, 2021.
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7.8 Local militias
7.8.1 The USSD HR Report 2018 listed local militias as one of the several actors
of law enforcement in Ethiopia. It noted:
‘Local militias operated across the country in loose and varying coordination
with these regional police, the Federal Police, and the military. In some
cases militias functioned as extensions of the ruling party. Local militias are
members of a community who handle standard security matters within their
communities, primarily in rural areas. Local government authorities provided
select militia members with very basic training. Militia members serve as a
bridge between the community and local police by providing information and
enforcing rules.’107
7.8.2 Similarly, the USSD HR Report 2019 observed: ‘Local militias operated
across the country in loose and varying coordination with these regional
police, the Federal Police, and the military. Selected by community

105 The Guardian, ‘Gun battles erupt in Ethiopia as PM axes Amhara region’s …’, 12 April 2023
106 EIP, ‘The special police in Ethiopia’ (page 18), October 2021
107 USSD, ‘2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia’ (section 1, d), 14 March 2019
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leadership, local militias are empowered to handle standard security matters
within their communities, primarily in rural areas. It was widely reported that
civilian authorities at times did not maintain control over regional security
forces.’108On 11 October 2019 The Africa Report, a UK based news
organisation, reported that ‘Each village, or “kebele”, chairman heads a
militia consisting of, on average, 50 armed men.’109
7.8.3 According to USSD HR Report 2022 noted: ‘Local militia groups in Afar,
Oromia, and Somali Regions reportedly carried out attacks and killings of
civilians as part of long-running regional boundary disputes’110 The same
source added despite the law prohibiting detention in any facility other than
an official detention centre ‘local militias and other formal and informal law
enforcement entities reportedly operated an unknown number of unofficial
detention centers.’111
7.8.4 For a list and background of police, military and militia groups see Ethiopia
Peace Observatory (EPO), a project of the Armed Conflict Location & Event
Database (ACLED), Actor profiles.
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8. Capacity and effectiveness of security forces
8.1 Security forces training
8.1.1 Regarding ENDF the DFAT Report 2020 stated that ‘International partners,
including the US, provide funding for a range of training programs for the
ENDF, including peacekeeping, professional military education, military
training management and counter-terrorism operations.’112
8.1.2 With respect to police training, the UNCAT Report May 2020 noted:
‘… Ethiopia has widely conducted trainings on protection and promotion of
human rights including the right to be protected from acts of torture and ill-
treatments to different personnel of law enforcement institutions and the
public in general. So far, the training has been provided to police, military,
public prosecution, public defenders, courts, prison administration and
medical personnel.
‘The thematic areas of the trainings include constitutional safeguards,
protection of human rights during criminal investigations, weighing of
evidence in the administration of justice, interrogation and investigation
techniques, framing of criminal charges, techniques of public defending, and
skills of identifying and reporting acts of torture.’113
8.1.3 The USSD HR Report 2021 noted that ‘Police at the federal and regional
levels received training focused on human trafficking and exploitation.’114
108 USSD, ‘2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices...’ (Executive summary) 11 March 2020
109 The Africa Report, ‘Abiy Ahmed and the struggle to keep Ethiopia together’, 11 October 2019
110 USSD, ‘2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia’ (section 1, a) 20 March 2023
111 USSD, ‘2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia’ (section 1, a) 20 March 2023
113 UNCAT, Second periodic report submitted by Ethiopia …’ (paragraphs 41 to 42), 26 May 2020
114 USSD, ‘2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia’ (section 7. b), 12 April 2022
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8.1.4 The EIP Report 2021 noted that special and regular police received different
training. It observed:
‘Sources indicate that the special police's training is primarily military. It is
conducted in places separate from the institutions used to train the regular
police. Whereas regular police are trained in police training institutes, special
police are trained in areas that have strategic importance. Furthermore, the
content of the training stands in stark contrast. Training for regular "civil"
police focuses on the federal and regional constitution, criminal law, police
ethics, crime prevention, criminal investigations, community policing, traffic
management, and other policing-related social services. Regular police are
trained on using firearms and police offensive and defensive techniques, but
the intensity and coverage of those police tactics training are very minimal.
‘The training of the regional special police force is the near-opposite of the
regular police force ...
‘The special police's training is exceedingly focused on physical fitness,
building the skill and capacity of the police officers in defending from attacks
by an enemy – with or without a weapon – and how to take offensive actions
against enemy forces or criminals. It is a paramilitary training in which
recruits are taught tactical defence, counterinsurgency techniques, and anti-
terror skills. The training also includes building up "commando skills."’115
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8.2 Effectiveness of security forces
8.2.1 The DFAT Report 2020 stated:
‘Ethiopia has an extensive security and intelligence apparatus, a legacy of its
previous political systems. The state exercises control over most of the
country, and it has largely been effective in maintaining law and order and
protecting the population from major crimes, including terrorism ... A
proliferation of ethnic-based militias since 2018 has challenged state
authority and eroded the rule of law in some parts of the country, particularly
in western Oromia State.’116
8.2.2 With respect to the intelligence system, the same source observed:
‘Ethiopia has a highly capable domestic intelligence system. The NISS is an
autonomous federal government office, in theory accountable to the Minister
for Peace, but in practice directly accountable to the prime minister. While
reliable data on the size of the NISS is not available, it is broadly considered
to have a strong capacity to monitor the activities of persons of interest in
Ethiopia, and high priority areas along its borders. A civilian monitoring and
reporting system supports the intelligence network, whereby individuals
report on the activities of others in their community or household.’117
8.2.3 The CIA Factbook 2023 noted: ‘the ENDF has traditionally been one of sub-
Saharan Africa’s largest, most experienced, and best equipped militaries, but
it suffered heavy casualties and equipment losses during the 2020-2022

116 DFAT, ‘Country Information Report Ethiopia’ (paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2), 17 August 2020
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Tigray conflict.’118 According to the Clingedael Report April 2022, at the start
of the Tigray war in 2020 the ENDF suffered a significant loss of capacity
due to a large number of Tigrayan soldiers defecting from the ENDF and
taking with them a sizable share of the ENDF’s arsenal119.
8.2.4 The CJWG Report March 2021 noted with respect to police effectiveness:
‘Federal police lack of adequate number of police officers and budget to
enable to respond to all demands from the public remains a challenge. The
lack of well-trained and adequate number of professionals especially in the
area of investigation and forensics is apparent. Nor are there the required
infrastructures including equipped laboratories.
‘... [T]he forensics department is ... not equipped with modern technology,
sufficient budget, and well-trained and adequate number of professionals. It
is simply staffed with police officers as opposed to expertise and scientists in
the area. Even worse, there are reports that sometimes investigators are
selected not because of their competence but simply based on their legible
handwriting. Partly due this [sic] and poor management, the department is
burdened with caseloads.
‘While there are limited capacity and capability in such divisions as firearms
examination and ballistics, and explosives, there is no capacity and
capability at all to conduct DNA analysis ... There is also a lack of knowledge
and expertise or due to the absence of staff and materials. Equipment is
under-utilized due to a lack of expertise regarding its operation or because
equipment and software licenses have not been updated ... ‘... [T]here are
reports of excessive caseload among investigators that are triggered by lack
of capability and capacity, namely shortage of competent investigators, poor
management of caseload and lack of technology. 120
8.2.5 With respect to the effectiveness of special forces the EIP Report 2021
observed:
‘The special police began to take a different shape and role as many of the
regional states argued that they had lost faith in federal institutions, including
the army. These regions started using the special police as a means to
defend themselves from what they call "undue interference from the federal
government or other regional states ...
‘The special police are now considered a safeguard for the interests of the
dominant elites in regional states, which often hold strong ethno-nationalist
ideologies ...
‘‘Special police forces have been successful in recruiting (former) senior
officers from the armed forces...
‘The trend of senior army officers joining their region's special police forces
after retirement or dismissal has also taken place in other regional states...
‘According to a key informant from Oromia, the defense and federal security
apparatus is slowly losing its capable people as they continue to join the
118 US CIA World Factbook, ‘Ethiopia’ (military and security), last updated 15 August 2023
119 Clingedael ‘A clash of nationalisms and the remaking of the Ethiopian…’ (section 4.3), April 2022
120 CJWG, ‘Diagnostic Study of the Ethiopian Criminal Justice ...’ (pages 79 and 86), March 2021
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regional state special police. This brings two significant consequences:
regional state special police increasingly resemble Ethiopia's national
defense force and lead to the gradual weakening and perhaps even
liquidation of the defense force. It has compelled the federal government to
elevate the role of the special police, effectively making them a part of the
army.
‘Special police forces have also been engaged in border security ...’121
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8.3 Corruption in the security forces
8.3.1 The FH Report March 2023 noted without giving details that ‘petty bribery
and corruption, often involving local officials and police, are widespread.’122
8.3.2 The June 2023 USSD report on Trafficking in Persons stated:
‘Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant
concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action. Corruption among police and
judicial officials, especially the solicitation of bribes, remained a significant
concern. In 2022, the government investigated two officials – one police
officer in Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region and one
immigration official employed at Bole International Airport – for potential
trafficking and migrant smuggling crimes.’123
8.3.3 Citing sources, CMI U4 Report February 2023 stated:
‘A recent national corruption perception survey was conducted by the
Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC 2021) of 4,018
citizens. It must be noted that the reliability of the data provided by the
FEACC is open to question given that the Commission reports directly to the
Office of the Prime Minister and is reportedly subject to a high degree of
political influence. Nonetheless, the survey revealed that 84.6% of
respondents stated that they use acts of corruption to access services
provided by public institutions.’124
8.3.4 With respect to police corruption, the same source noted: ‘There seem to be
large discrepancies in the perceived incidence of corruption at different
institutions. While 71% of people questioned stated that they had not
witnessed any unethical or corrupt practices at health care institutions, more
than 60% of the 4,018 survey participants thought that local police were
highly corrupt.’125
8.3.5 The FH Report 2022 noted:
‘… The government established a national committee to coordinate an
anticorruption campaign in November 2022. The committee announced it
had received over 250 tips within a week of its creation and testified to the
widespread presence of corruption, labeling it as a major threat to national
security ...
121 EIP, ‘The special police in Ethiopia’ (page 8 to 9), October 2021
122 FH, ‘Freedom in the World 2023 – Ethiopia’, (section C, C2), 9 March 2023
123 USSD, ‘Trafficking in Persons Report 2023: Ethiopia’ (protection),15 June 2023
124 CMI U4, ‘Ethiopia: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption…’ (pages 7 to 8), 17 February 2023
125 CMI U4, ‘Ethiopia: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption…’ (page 14), 17 February 2023
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‘Despite these seemingly positive steps, the 2022 anticorruption campaign
only focuses on malfeasance within institutions at the federal level. Whether
the government intends to carry out new anticorruption investigations with
integrity, without using it to repress political opposition members, is
unclear.’126
8.3.6 USSD HR Report 2022 stated: ‘The law provides criminal penalties for
conviction of corruption. The government did not implement the law
effectively or comprehensively. The government enacted policies to hold
government officials more accountable.’127
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8.4 Human rights violations by security forces
8.4.1 The CJWG Report March 2021 noted:
‘The Constitution demands all state organs, including the executive to
respect and enforce human rights provisions of the Constitution. However,
Ethiopian police have no good reputation in terms of protecting and
respecting human rights ... Although there are some positive developments
post-2018, there still remains a lot to be done to break with the past and
ensure that policing in general and in the context of criminal justice in
particular complies with human rights standards.’128
8.4.2 The USSD HR Report 2022 observed:
Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or
arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings by the government; enforced
disappearance by the government; torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life-
threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; political
prisoners or detainees; serious abuses in a conflict, including unlawful or
widespread civilian harm; unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers by
government forces and militia groups; serious restrictions on freedom of
expression, including violence or threats of violence against journalists,
unjustified arrests of journalists, censorship, and the existence of criminal
libel and slander laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; interference
with the freedom of peaceful assembly; government corruption; lack of
investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence including rape
and conflict-related sexual violence; trafficking in persons; crimes involving
violence or threats of violence targeting members of racial or ethnic minority
groups; and existence or use of laws criminalizing same-sex sexual
conduct.’129.
8.4.3 According to the same source security forces targeted individuals on the
basis of ethnicity in conflict areas. It observed: ‘The constitution and law
provide for equal protection to all persons without discrimination on grounds
of race, nation, nationality, or other social origin. While the government
generally enforced the law effectively, there were widespread allegations of
126 FH, ‘Freedom in the World 2023 – Ethiopia’, (section C2), 9 March 2023
127 USSD, ‘2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia’ (section 4) 20 March 2023
128 CJWG, ‘Diagnostic Study of the Ethiopian Criminal Justice… (pages 88 to 89), March 2021
129 USSD, ‘2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia’, (section 1, d), 21 March 2023
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government security forces targeting individuals for arrest and detention
based on ethnicity in response to the conflict in the north of the country.’ 130
8.4.4 FH Report 2022 also noted that ‘human rights abuses and extrajudicial
punishments by security forces occur widely throughout the country.
‘In May 2022, Ethiopian security forces arbitrarily arrested more than 4,500
people in the Amhara region, including journalists and activists, in an attempt
to crack down on the Fano militia group that bases its operations there. The
government provided no justification for the arrests, and whether the people
arrested in May remained in custody at the end of the year was unclear.’131
8.4.5 With respect to torture, the USSD HR Report 2022 noted: ‘Although the
constitution prohibits such practices, there were reports that security officials
tortured and otherwise abused detainees.’132
8.4.6 Many of the documented human rights violations occurred in context of the
conflict. HRW Report 2022 noted: ‘Extrajudicial killings, mass arrests,
arbitrary detentions, and violence against civilians occurred in … regions
facing unrest, insecurity, and conflict.’133 The USSD HR Report 2022 noted:
‘According to HRW, Amnesty International, and numerous media reports, the
government engaged in torture in its security operations connected to the
armed conflict in the northern part of the country and failed to hold soldiers
accused of torture accountable.134
8.4.7 The UNCAT report May 2023 stated:
‘... the Committee is deeply concerned about the alleged extensive violations
of international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, including in the
regions of Tigray, Amhara and Afar, carried out against civilians suspected
to be members or supporters of armed insurgent groups and members of the
political opposition, in particular ethnic Tigrayans, as well as human rights
defenders, dissenting journalists and protesters. It is gravely concerned
about reports of summary executions, deliberate, sometimes ethnically
motivated, attacks on civilian populations, enforced disappearances, torture
and ill-treatment, arbitrary and prolonged detention without charge and
judicial process, incommunicado detention in unofficial facilities or military
centres, the recruitment and use of children in the hostilities, conflict-related
sexual and gender-based violence, trafficking in persons, denial of access to
humanitarian assistance and the destruction of civilian property by the
federal and local security forces, the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, the
Eritrean Defence Forces, the Tigrayan special forces, Tigrayan militias, the
Amhara special forces, the Amhara militias and other allied groups.’135.
8.4.8 A September 2023 HRW report stated:
‘In Oromia, a long simmering and abusive government counterinsurgency
campaign against an armed group, the Oromo Liberation Army, has been
underway since 2019. The operation resulted in serious rights abuses
130 USSD, ‘2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices…’ (section 6), 20 March 2023
131 FH, ‘Freedom in the World 2023 – Ethiopia’ (section F, F2), 9 March 2023
132 USSD, ‘2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices…’ (sections 1, c and g), 20 March 2023
133 HRW, ‘World Report 2023: Ethiopia’ (section on security force abuses…), 12 January 2023
134 USSD, ‘2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices…’ (section 1, c and g), 20 March 2023
135 UNCAT, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report …’ (paragraph 14), 7 June 2023
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against the civilian population, including arbitrary detentions, summary
executions, and large-scale massacres. Similar abuses are continuing in
2023 according to reporting from the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
and the media.’136
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9. Court system
9.1 Federal and state courts
9.1.1 Aneme 2020 noted:
‘The Federal Courts Proclamation allocates subject-matter jurisdiction to
federal courts on the basis of three principles: laws, parties and places. It
stipulates that federal courts shall have jurisdiction over, first, “cases arising
under the Constitution, federal laws and international treaties,’ second, over
parties specified in federal laws.” Article 3(3) of the Federal Courts
Proclamation states that federal courts shall have judicial power in places
specified in the FDRE Constitution or in federal laws. Article 5 of the same
proclamation stipulates that federal courts shall have civil jurisdiction over
“cases to which a federal government organ is a party ...
Article 4 of the Federal Courts Proclamation bestows upon federal courts
criminal jurisdiction over: offences against the national state; offences
against foreign states; offences against the law of nations; offences against
the fiscal and economic interests of the federal govern-ment; offences
regarding counterfeit currency; offences regarding forgery of instruments of
the federal government; offences regarding the security and freedom of
communication services operating within more than one region or at
international level; offences against the safety of aviation; offences of which
foreigners are victims or defendants; offences regarding illicit trafficking of
dangerous drugs; offences falling under the jurisdiction of courts of different
regions or under the jurisdiction of both the federal and regional courts as
well as concurrent offences and offences committed by officials and
employees of the federal government in connection with their official
responsibilities or duties.’137
9.1.2 The CJWG Report March 2021 stated:
‘The federal courts have jurisdiction over cases arising under the
constitution, federal laws and international treaties, involving parties
specified in the federal laws and place specified in the constitution or federal
laws …
‘The States[’] Supreme Courts have cassation [appeal] divisions empowered
to review final decision[s] of state courts, the states’ Supreme Courts and
High Courts exercise federal judicial power based on the constitutional
delegation.’138
138 CJWG, ‘Diagnostic Study of the Ethiopian Criminal Justice…’ (pages 195 to 197), March 2021
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9.1.3 For an outline on the structure and power of the courts see The Constitution
of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
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9.2 State courts
9.2.1 Amene 2020 noted:
‘The FDRE Constitution provides for the establishment of three levels of
state courts: the State Supreme Court (which also incorporates a cassation
bench to review fundamental errors of state law), High Courts, and First-
Instance Courts. State Supreme Courts sit in the capital cities of the
respective states and have final judicial authority over matters of State law
and jurisdiction. State High Courts sit in the zonal regions of states while
State First Instance Courts sit at the lowest administrative levels of states.
‘The FDRE Constitution delegates to State Supreme Courts and State High
Courts the jurisdictions of the Federal High Court and Federal First Instance
Courts respectively. In order to guarantee the right of appeal of the parties to
a case, decisions rendered by a State High Court exercising the jurisdiction
of the Federal First Instance Court are appealable to the State Supreme
Court while decisions rendered by a State Supreme Court on federal matters
are appealable to the Federal Supreme Court.’ 139
‘The state systems of judicial administration and accountability mirror the
federal process. The state governments have also established Judicial
Administration Commissions with a view to safeguarding the independence
and accountability of State Courts. With respect to appointment, the
President and Vice-President of the State Supreme Court are recommended
by the President (Chief Executive Officer) of the states and appointed by the
State Council; all other State judges are appointed by the State Council
based upon recommendations made by the State Judicial Administration
Commission. Similar guarantees of tenure of judges exist in State Judicial
Administration Commissions.’ 140
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9.3 Religious and traditional courts
9.3.1 The BTI Report 2022 observed that ‘The federal state of Ethiopia has a
unique legal pluralistic structure with many secular and religious courts.
Courts often have some degree of autonomy in cultural affairs, but less
autonomy in political dispute.’141
9.3.2 Aneme 2020 stated:
‘To date, Sharia Courts that apply Islamic law are the only religious courts
that have been officially established both at the federal and state levels.
Sharia Courts apply only Islamic law and have their own appellate system.
They are required, however, to follow the procedural rules of ordinary courts
and receive their budgets from the state. Parties must voluntarily submit to
139 Aneme, G. A., ‘Introduction to the Ethiopian Legal System...’ (section 2.4.2.1), February 2020
141 BTI, ‘Ethiopia Country Report 2022’, (Rule of law), 23 February 2022
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the jurisdiction of these courts, or the dispute should be redirected to the
regular courts. Proclamation 188/1999 spells out the circumstances under
which Islamic law can be applied by Sharia courts at the federal level. The
Sharia Courts at the federal level have been reconstituted into a three-level
judicial structure, distinct from the regular federal judicial structure. These
are: (1) Federal First-Instance Court of Sharia, (2) Federal High Court of
Sharia, and (3) Federal Supreme Court of Sharia. Like the federal state
judicial organs, all the federal Sharia courts have been made accountable to
the Federal Judicial Administration Commission. All of the State Councils
have also given official recognition to Sharia Courts within their respective
jurisdictions.’ 142
‘Federal First Instance, High and Supreme Courts of Sharia are established
pursuant to Article 2(4) of the [Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation
Proclamation No. 188/1999]. However, these courts have no jurisdiction in
criminal cases, and their civil jurisdiction in addition to being confined to
family and succession cases, is subject to the consent of both litigating
parties. Furthermore, the litigants in family disputes, and the deceased
whose estate is to be liquidated in succession cases, need to be followers of
Islam. Decisions rendered by Regional States’ and Federal Courts of Sharia
are subject to further scrutiny as an appeal against such decisions can be
lodged to the Cassation Bench of the Federal Supreme Court if a basic error
of law was made in the decisions.’143
9.3.4 With respect to tradition courts, the 2020 justice needs and satisfaction
survey report by the Hague Institute for Innovation of Law (HiiL), an
international civil society organisation committed to people-centred justice
based in The Hague, Netherlands144 observed:
‘Traditional dispute resolution are the diverse ways for resolving disputes
based on community customs and practices. In a multi-ethnic country as
Ethiopia, there is a wide variety of customary practices for resolving
individual and group disputes. Village elders (Shimagale in Amharic) are the
most common actors in the delivery of traditional justice. Their role is one of
“peace-maker, reconciler and/or mediator”. Historically, traditional justice has
been the main mean of resolving disputes ... The 1995 Constitution (Art.
34(5)) recognizes customary justice but grants it a relatively limited
jurisdiction. Family and personal matters are areas where religious or
customary laws can be applied. Such mechanisms can be used if the parties
consent. Other areas of legal disputes are not explicitly excluded from the
jurisdiction of customary dispute resolution mechanisms. However, the
explicit mention of family and personal matters is an indication that the
legislator foresees limited jurisdiction of customary law.’145
9.3.5 USSD HR report 2022 stated:
142 Aneme, G. A., ‘Introduction to the Ethiopian Legal System ...’ (section 2.4.5), February 2020
143 UNCAT ‘Second periodic report submitted by Ethiopia under …’ (paragraph 110), 26 May 2020
144 HiiL, ‘Who we are’, no date
145 HiiL, ‘Justice Needs and Satisfaction Survey in Ethiopia’ (page 76), 2020
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‘… The constitution recognizes both religious and traditional courts. Many
rural citizens had little access to formal judicial systems and relied on
traditional mechanisms for resolving conflict. By law, all parties to a dispute
must agree to use a traditional or religious court before such a court may
hear a case, and either party may appeal to a regular court at any time.
Sharia (Islamic law) courts may hear religious and family cases involving
Muslims if both parties agree before the start of the formal legal process to
use the sharia court. Sharia courts received some funding from the
government. Sharia courts adjudicated most cases in Somali and Afar
Regions, which are predominantly Muslim. Other traditional systems of
justice, such as councils of elders, functioned predominantly in rural areas.
Women often believed they lacked access to fair hearings in the traditional
court system because local custom excluded them from participation in
councils of elders and due to persistent gender discrimination.’146
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9.4 Municipality and social courts
‘The Ethiopian judicial system also incorporates courts named as
Municipality or City Courts and Social or Kebele courts. The City Courts of
Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa have First Instance, Appellate courts and a
Cassation division in the Appellate courts. These courts have criminal
jurisdictions over petty offences, offences in connection with fiscal matters
coming under the competence of the cities’ administration and matters
related to remand in custody and bail applications. Social courts or kebele
courts … also exist in the lowest levels of administrative hierarchy of regional
governments and also in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa …’ 147
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9.5 Military courts
‘… The Defence Force Proclamation No. 1100/2019 establishes two tiers
Military Courts: the Primary Military Court and the Appellate Military Courts.
The proclamation provides for the jurisdiction of these courts over “persons
responsible for military offences provided under Art. 284-322 of the Criminal
Code….”
‘The Appellate Military Court has appellate jurisdiction on cases disposed by
the Primary Military Court and the final decision of the Appellate Military
Court is subjected to the Cassation review of the Federal Supreme Court
The Military courts shall apply criminal procedure code in disposing cases.
‘… [T]he jurisdiction of military courts are not limited to military offences by
members of the Defence Force but extends to cover offences committed by
civilians and police members ... Subjecting civilians to the trial by military
146 USSD, ‘2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia’ (section 1, c), 20 March 2023
147 CJWG, ‘Diagnostic Study of the Ethiopian Criminal Justice System’ (page 198), March 2021
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courts is against the right enshrined under Art 14(1) of ICCPR, the right to be
tried by an independent court.’148
9.5.2 The UNCAT Ethiopia Report May 2020 stated:
‘… [T]he recently adopted proclamation No. 1100/2019 gives military courts
power to try any member of military force charged with having committed
any of the criminal acts specified under the Criminal Code of Ethiopia (see
article 270 (a), 271 (1) (a) and 272 (a)). Regulations have also been adopted
prohibiting members of the national defence force from violating citizen’s
right and human dignity and protection against bodily harm and inhuman
treatment in the course of their active duty.’149
9.5.3 The UNGA Report September 2023 noted:
‘The Commission notes that some recent reforms may embed or entrench
structural flaws and the potential for institutional bias or over-centralization.
Recent legislation handed military courts exclusive jurisdiction over all
crimes, including international crimes, that involve a member of the defence
forces, police or militia on active duty. Recourse to military courts as a
means to avoid accountability and transparency is contrary to international
standards.’150
9.5.4 With respect to the independence of the military courts, the CJWG Report
March 2021 observed:
‘The proclamation [Defence Force Proclamation No. 1100/2019] further
states that the judges of the Primary Military Courts shall be appointed by
the Council of Defence Commanders upon the recommendation of the Chief
of the General Staff and the judges of The Appellate Military Court by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces upon the recommendation of the
Minister. The judges are appointed for a fixed period of 5 years and
subjected to disciplinary measures including removal by the organ which
appointed them, on grounds of inability to carry out their duties due to illness
or being found guilty of disciplinary or criminal offence.’151
9.5.5 A September 2023 HRW report noted with respect to the independence of
military courts:
‘The Ethiopian government’s reliance on the military court system to try
serious violations committed by Ethiopian military forces continue to lack
transparency and raise concerns about due process and justice and redress
for victims and survivors of heinous crimes. At present, military court judges
are appointed at the recommendation of the Minister of Defense, or the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces at the recommendation of the
Minister, which raises serious issues about the impartiality and
independence of military courts.’152
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148 CJWG, ‘Diagnostic study of the Ethiopian criminal ...’ (pages, 198 to 199 and 203), March 2021
149 UNCAT ‘Second periodic report submitted by Ethiopia under … ’ (paragraph 16), 26 May 2020
150 UNGA, ‘Report of the International Commission of ….’ (paragraphs 88-89),14 September 2023
151 CJWG, ‘Diagnostic study of the Ethiopian criminal justice system’ (pages 199-200), March 2021
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9.6 Access to justice
9.6.1 In 2020, HiiL published a report of a Justice Needs and Satisfaction Survey
(JNS), which asked 5,400 randomly sampled people about the legal
problems they experienced in the last 4 years, what they did to solve them
and whether they managed to reach a fair resolution. The survey was
conducted with the Office of the Federal Attorney General and the Federal
Justice and Legal Research and Training Institute (JLSRTI)153 (HiiL report
2020). For detailed information on the methodology including sampling, data
analysis and limitations to data see ‘Justice Needs and Satisfaction Survey
in Ethiopia’ (chapter 2), 2020.
9.6.2 The HiiL report 2020 noted that ‘40% of the population (at least 7.4 million)
have to deal with one or more serious and difficult to resolve legal problems
every four years.’154 The report noted that respondents were asked ‘to
assess and rank the problems using the subjective criterion of impact on
life.’155 According to the report ‘The most frequently occurring types of legal
problem are disputes around land, crime, disputes with neighbours, family
issues, domestic violence, money-related disagreements, and employment
problems.’156
9.6.3 The report further stated that:
‘Most people in Ethiopia actively pursue resolution of their legal problems.
Local elders are the most frequently used dispute resolution mechanisms.
Almost half (43%) of the respondents who had to deal with a problem say
that they involved local elders ...
‘Another noticeable aspect is that Ethiopians go to formal courts quite often
compared with other countries. About 20% of the most serious legal
problems reached a court of law. This percentage is significantly higher
compared with other countries (around 5% on average). When looking at
some other countries in Africa, only Malians go to formal courts more often...
‘45% of the legal problems are resolved but 55% do not reach a resolution.
This means that every year in Ethiopia, 3.4M legal problems are resolved
and 4.05M problems are not ...
‘About 66% of the resolved problems were reported to have reached a fair
resolution (48% fair, 18% very fair). Through extrapolation, the absolute
number of problems that are perceived to be resolved fairly is around 2.2
million.
‘... Of all problems which were assessed as resolved, 18% were resolved
unfairly. Furthermore, 16% ended with a partially fair resolution. Together
with the unfairly resolved legal problems, the group accounts for 34% of all
problems defined as resolved. In absolute numbers, this makes 1.2 million
legal problems which reach a resolution but this resolution is not perceived
as fair every year. 157
153 HiiL, ‘Justice Needs and Satisfaction Survey in Ethiopia’, 2020

154 HiiL, ‘Justice Needs and Satisfaction Survey in Ethiopia’ (page 5,), 2020
155 HiiL, ‘Justice Needs and Satisfaction Survey in Ethiopia’ (page 48,), 2020
156 HiiL, ‘Justice Needs and Satisfaction Survey in Ethiopia’ (page 5, 28), 2020
157 HiiL, ‘Justice Needs and Satisfaction Survey in Ethiopia’ (pages 44 to 45, 74), 2020
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9.6.4 The report added
‘When we focus on the most serious problems, we see that approximately
80% of the people take some form of action to resolve their legal problems.
Some people do not take action because they do not expect a positive
outcome...
‘... 40% of the most serious problems are completely resolved; 4% are
partially resolved; 31% are in the process of resolution and 26% are not
resolved and people do not take further actions ...
‘With 40% of the most serious problems completely resolved, Ethiopia
scores well compared with other countries in the region. Only Nigeria has a
higher percentage of problems completely resolved. In the other countries in
which HiiL has conducted a JNS study, a lower percentage of the most
serious problems is completely resolved. However, people in both Mali and
Nigeria have fewer problems that are completely abandoned.
‘The main reasons for legal problems remaining unresolved are that the
people who encounter them do not know what to do, the other party in the
dispute is not cooperating, or the procedures are difficult to understand.’158
9.6.5 In November 2023 Pham, P, and others at the Harvard Humanitarian
Initiative (HHI), a University of Harvard academic and research centre in
humanitarian crisis and leadership159 published a report based on a national
survey conducted from May to July 2023 to assess the needs, perceptions
and attitudes about peace and justice in Ethiopia160. (For details of
methodology, design and data analysis see Ethiopia Peace & Justice Survey
2023’, November 2023). Among other things, respondents were asked about
their trust in the justice system. The report noted that that less than 30% of
the respondents expressed trust in judges. It observed:
‘More generally, 26% of participants express trust in the Ethiopian justice
system; an opinion shared by just 3% of the participants in Tigray, 10% in
Addis Ababa, 14% in SNNP, 16% in Amhara and 18% in Gambela. Lack of
trust is generally associated with a perceived lack of judicial independence
(71%), corruption (56%), or involvement in violence (44%). In addition, the
survey finds that half of the population or more sees the Ethiopian justice
system as too expensive for ordinary people (50%), inaccessible (53%) and
too complicated (53%161.
9.6.6 The same source has provided below figure showing the results of
Ethiopian’s confidence in justice162.
158 HiiL, ‘Justice Needs and Satisfaction Survey in Ethiopia’ (pages 178 to 179), 2020
159 HHI, ‘Who we are’ no date
160 Pham, P, and others, HHI, ‘Ethiopia Peace & Justice Survey 2023’ (page 13) November 2023
161 Pham, P, and others, HHI, ‘Ethiopia Peace & Justice Survey 2023’ (page 29), November 2023
162 Pham, P, and others, HHI, ‘Ethiopia Peace & Justice Survey 2023’ (page 31), November 2023
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10. Oversight mechanisms
10.1 Regulation
10.1.1 The Law on Police Use of Force Worldwide organisation on their Ethiopia
webpage, last updated in April 2021 (Law on Police Use of Force Worldwide
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April 2021) stated: ‘In Ethiopia, most oversight mechanisms are in the form
of internal disciplinary rules or regulations within the police and prison
services, rather than an independent external body established for the
purpose. According to a 2012 Regulation, for example: Any police officer
shall be liable for the damages caused as a result of his decision or action in
violation of the law.’163 The same source added: ‘The judicial system in
Ethiopia has proved largely unwilling to prosecute police and prison officers
for excessive, discriminatory, or abusive use of force. This issue has been
highlighted by the UN Human Rights Committee and the Committee against
Torture.’164
10.1.2 The EIP Report 2021 observed:
‘The chain of command between the police, the civilian ministers, and the
respective legislative bodies indicates a mechanism for ensuring
transparency and accountability. Yet, several reports show there is no
effective oversight by the respective legislative bodies, and reports of human
rights abuses both at the federal and regional state level continue to be a
significant concern ...
‘In a focus group discussion held with stakeholders ... in the Amhara regional
state, participants thought the special police was not accountable: visible
human rights violations went unaddressed, and the special police were said
to operate with a high degree of legal impunity. Minorities face widespread
terror from special police forces. It was not subject to the rule of law. The
same observation was made in Oromia – and at the federal level. A few
internal accountability systems within the police itself relate to self-discipline,
ethics, and dress codes. Still, there is little systematic accountability
concerning their essential duties in the process of law enforcement.’165
10.1.3 USSD HR Report 2022 stated: ‘The government took limited steps to
prosecute officials who committed human rights abuses or were involved in
corruption, resulting in impunity for most abuses. The government took some
steps toward holding government security forces accountable for abuses.’166
However, the same source observed:
‘The Federal Police Internal Investigative Bureau investigated cases of
criminal acts perpetrated by police. The internal unit’s decisions regarding
penalties against police were confidential.
‘The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) had a military police division
with a military investigative unit that reported to the military attorney
general’s office. Military police passed evidence from their investigations to
the prosecutors and defense counsels. The ENDF attorney general directed
the investigations and heard the cases in military court.
‘Reports of impunity for security forces continued, although some measures
were taken to hold them accountable for human rights abuses. Lack of
163 The Law on Police Use of Force Worldwide, ‘Ethiopia’, last updated 13 April 2021
164 The Law on Police Use of Force Worldwide, ‘Ethiopia’, last updated 13 April 2021
165 EIP, ‘The special police in Ethiopia’ (page 18), October 2021
166 USSD, ‘2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices’ (Executive Summary), 12 April 2022
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transparency regarding those being charged and tried in courts of law made
it difficult to assess the government’s accountability efforts.’167
10.1.4 FH Report 2022 also noted that ‘most security forces who commit … abuses
go unpunished.’168 However, some sources noted that the government
investigated abuses committed by security forces in Tigray and punished the
perpetrators.
10.1.5 A June 2023 report by HRW stated ‘… In September 2022, an Inter-
Ministerial Task Force established by the Ministry of Justice reported that it
would investigate violations in Western Tigray by December 2022. The
government so far has not released details of these investigations nor held
anyone responsible for serious violations.’169
10.1.6 USSD HR Report 2022:
‘… Government investigators examined allegations that members of the
ENDF engaged in killing of civilians, rape and other forms of gender-based
violence, and looting and destruction of property. Military prosecutors
charged 28 soldiers for killing civilians without military necessity, and 25
soldiers for committing acts of sexual violence, including rape. As of August,
according to a report of the government’s Inter-Ministerial Task Force, the
military court had sentenced 25 persons with imprisonment of up to 25
years, including one life sentence, and two acquittals; 33 cases involving
rape (16), extrajudicial killings (9), bodily injury (7), and assault (1) were still
pending trial. At year’s end, the military police were also investigating several
other cases of alleged conflict-related crimes. Human rights groups criticized
the military’s accountability efforts for lacking transparency.’170
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10.2 Ethiopia Human Rights Commission (EHRC)
10.2.1 ACCORD Report November 2019 stated: ‘The Human Rights Commission of
Ethiopia was established by law on 4 July 2000.’171
10.2.2 In a report dated 7 December 2021 EHRC stated that its rating was
upgraded from grade B (partial compliance) to grade A (full compliance) of
the Paris Principles by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights
Institutions for operation in accordance with the UN Paris Principles, a global
network of 118 National Human Rights Institutions that promotes the
establishment and strengthening of National Human Rights Institutions
(NHRIs) in conformity with the Principles Relating to the Status of National
Institutions (known as the Paris Principles). The Paris Principles serve as the
internationally agreed benchmark for assessing the credibility of NHRIs.
They require NHRIs to be independent in law, membership, operations,
policy and control of resource172.
10.2.3 USSD HR Report March 2022 observed:
167 USSD, ‘2022 Country Report on Human Rights ...’ (sections 1a, and 1, c), 20 March 2023
168 FH, ‘Freedom in the World 2023 – Ethiopia’ (section F, F2), 9 March 2023
169 HRW, Ethiopia: Ethnic Cleansing Persists Under Tigray Truce’ 1 June 2023
171 ACCORD, ‘Ethiopia COI Compilation’ (page 89), November 2019
172 EHRC,EHRC thanks its stakeholders for their support in its success in…’ 7 December 2021
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‘The EHRC is a quasi-independent government agency accountable to
parliament and responsible for investigating and reporting on the country’s
human rights.
‘The EHRC investigated human rights abuses across the country. The
EHRC did not face adverse action from the government despite criticizing
the government for disregarding the rule of law and abusing human rights,
including through ethnic profiling of Tigrayans, arbitrary arrests of journalists,
and ethnically and politically motivated killings. International human rights
experts, however, accused the EHRC of systematic bias against Tigrayans
when reporting on the conflict, and of deliberately censoring information
about alleged atrocities attributed to the government and its allies. In some
instances, federal and regional government bodies appeared to follow EHRC
reports and recommendations in taking corrective measures in response to
human rights violations and abuses.’173
10.2.4 The August 2023 EHRC report stated: ‘EHRC continues to monitor the
impact of the conflict in the Amhara region on the human rights situation.
The Commission is also receiving complaints of human rights violations both
before and after the declaration of the state of emergency including from
Addis Ababa and other areas of the country.’174
10.2.5 According to the UNCAT Report June 2023 ‘adopted Proclamation No.
1224/2020 of 18 August 2020, which aimed to strengthen the effectiveness
and independence of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission’175 but added
that EHRC sometimes faced undue restrictions during its visits and received
insufficient resources to allow it to perform all its functions effectively176. This
is corroborated by the EHRC which noted in its August 2023 EHRC report
that: ‘The Commission has not yet been granted access to monitor the
conditions of detentions since the declaration of the State of Emergency.’ 177
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10.3 Ombudsman
10.3.1 USSD HR Report 2022 stated: ‘The Office of the Ombudsman has the
authority to investigate complaints regarding administrative mismanagement
by executive branch offices and officials, and to investigate prison
conditions. A 2019 proclamation gives foreign nationals the right to present
administrative complaints or rights abuse cases to the office.’178
10.3.2 Citing other sources, the Jenkins and Elsayed 2023 noted:
‘The ombudsman was created by Proclamation No. 211/2000 with the
responsibility to “rectify or prevent unjust decisions and orders of executive
organs and officials” and encourage efficient and transparent governance in
line with the rule of law. As such, corruption is taken to fall within the purview
of the ombudsman alongside other forms of maladministration.
173 USSD, ‘2022 Country report on human rights practices: Ethiopia’ (section 5), 20 March 2023
174 EHRC, ‘The human rights impact of the armed conflict on civilians …’ 14 August 2023
175 UNCAT, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report ...’ (paragraph 22), 7 June 2023
176 UNCAT, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic …’ (paragraph 22 and 38), 7 June 2023
177 EHRC, ‘The human rights impact of the armed conflict on civilians in Amhara …’ 14 August 2023
178 USSD, ‘2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia’ (section 5), 20 March 2023
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‘The operations of the ombudsman were amended by Proclamation No.
1142/2019, which granted the ombudsman the authority to make
recommendations to other state agencies but does not give powers to make
determinations or enforceable orders. A recent study found this to be a
particular problem with regards to the police force, which can in practice
ignore interventions and requests by the ombudsman.’179
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10.4 Monitoring of detention centres
10.4.1 With respect to oversight of prisons the UNCAT Ethiopia Report May 2020
noted:
‘Federal Police Commission and National Defence Force ... established
disciplinary committees to receive complaints from or on behalf of detained
persons ...
‘Independent observers are… given access to places of detention. The ICRC
and local [Civil Society Organisations] CSOs that work on human rights
issues visit places of detention. The ICRC has signed a MoU with the
Government to allow them free access to all prison facilities … These
independent observers and CSOs give their findings to the prison
administrations for any concern that need their immediate attention and
appropriate measures will be taken accordingly. Furthermore, the findings of
these independent observers and CSOs, to the extent they are found
credible and useful, are incorporated into the [National Human Rights Action
Plan] NHRAP for further measures towards the improvement of conditions of
detention.’180
10.4.2 The same report added:
‘EHRC regularly visits prison facilities and submits its findings and
recommendations to the Government ...
‘So far as judicial supervision is concerned, a joint committee including the
President of the Federal Supreme Court, the Attorney General and the
Federal Police Commissioner conduct a bi-annual supervision of prisons and
attempt to give solution to prisoners’ complaints concerning their respective
Bureaus.
‘The new prison proclamation puts obligation on the administration including
to: allow prisoners take their grievances against the Commission to formal
courts, permit researchers as well as mandated national and international
bodies including various UN committees and special rapporteurs, access to
and inspect the conditions of prisons and prisoners. These all are
encouraging measures towards the betterment of conditions of detention.’181
10.4.3 According to the USSD HR Report 2022: ‘From January to June [2002], the
International Committee of the Red Cross visited 21,407 prisoners in 34
places of detention throughout the country as part of its normal activities.’ 182
The EHRC Report August 2023 stated that the Commission visited 49
179 Jenkins and Elsayed, CMI U4 Helpdesk, ‘Ethiopia: Overview of corruption...’ (page 21), 2023
180 UNCAT, ‘Second periodic report submitted by Ethiopia …’ (paragraphs 21 and 53), 26 May 2020
181 UNCAT, ‘Second periodic report submitted by …’ (paragraphs 56, 125 and 126), 26 May 2020
Page 50 of 60
detention/correction facilities and 346 police stations form June 2022 to June
2023]’183. However, the same source observed that: ‘The Red Cross and
international human rights monitors were denied access to alleged detention
facilities in Western Tigray … where many thousands of ethnic Tigrayans
reportedly remained detained in life-threatening conditions.’184
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10.5 Complaint mechanism
‘… An arrested person can lodge his/her complaint before a judge
concerning ill treatment in police custody. The Court may order the
commencement of criminal investigations and that the detainee receive
medical treatment, release of the victim from custody or any other remedy
that is deemed appropriate to the particularities of the case. Arrested
persons are also regularly visited by public prosecutors who are legally
required to ensure the physical and mental wellbeing of persons in custody
and take appropriate legal measures where violations of rights have been
committed or complaints are received.
‘Besides the above mentioned complaint mechanisms, EHRC serves as a
complaint outlet for victims of torture or ill treatment. The EHRC is
empowered to conduct investigation into complaints and put forward
recommendations and remedial measures. Failure, without due cause, to
implement the recommendations of the Commission is punishable by
imprisonment and/or fine.
‘… pursuant to Article 28 of the Council of Ministers Regulation on the
Treatment of Federal Prisoners 138/2007, prisoners have the right to lodge
any complaint, including complaints of torture or ill treatment either orally or
in written form before concerned officials of the Prison Commission or
Administration. The new Federal Prison Proclamation allows complaints to
be lodged before courts of law in addition to the prison administration.’185
10.5.2 The same report further noted that: ‘The existing complaint mechanisms,
even those that were considered impartial (including EHRC’s regular visits to
police detention centers and prisons across the country to evaluate their
compliance with international human rights standards) were revealed to have
at times been ineffective in preventing wide ranging human rights violations
in police detention centers and prisons in many parts of the Country.’186
10.5.3 USSD HR Report 2022 observed: ‘The law provides citizens the right to file
cases in civil court, including in cases with human rights abuses. For human
rights abuses where a government agency is the accused perpetrator, the
victim initiates the process by filing a complaint at the EHRC. The EHRC
investigates and makes recommendations to the concerned government
agency.’ 187 [For further information of EHRC and its role see Ethiopia
183 EHRC, ‘Executive Summary: Ethiopia Annual Human Rights Situation...’ (page 6), 18 August 2023
185 UNCAT ‘Second periodic report submitted by Ethiopia… ’ (paragraphs 67 to 69), 26 May 2020
186UNCAT ‘Second periodic report submitted by Ethiopia… ’ (paragraph 120), 26 May 2020
187 USSD, ‘2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia’ (section 1, e ), 20 March 2023
Page 51 of 60
Human Rights Commission (EHRC)].
10.5.4 However, according to the same source:
‘There were reports that prisoners were mistreated by prison guards and did
not have access to prison administrators or ombudspersons to register their
complaints. Legal aid clinics operated in some prisons. At the regional level,
these clinics had good working relations with judicial, prison, and other
government officials. Prison officials allowed some detainees to submit
complaints to judicial authorities without censorship, but courts sometimes
declined to hear such complaints.’188
10.5.5 The UNCAT Report May 2023 noted:
‘[T]he Committee is concerned at reports that detainees often do not lodge
complaints owing to their fear of retaliation and, in cases where such
complaints are lodged, the information on investigations carried out and their
outcome is lacking. Moreover, it is concerned that there is still no specific,
independent, effective and confidential mechanism for the receipt of
complaints of torture or ill-treatment in all places of deprivation of liberty and
that existing investigation bodies lack the necessary independence, as they
belong to the same structure that employs the alleged perpetrators.’189
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188 USSD, ‘2022 Country report on human rights practices…’ (section 1, c), 20 March 2023
189 UNCAT, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report...’ (paragraph 40), 7 June 2023
Page 52 of 60
Research methodology
The country of origin information (COI) in this note has been carefully selected in
accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common
EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI),
April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and
Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training
Manual, 2013. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy,
balance, currency, transparency and traceability.
All the COI included in the note was published or made publicly available on or
before the ‘cut-off’ date(s). Any event taking place or report/article published after
these date(s) is not included.
Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion.
Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information
include:
• the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source
• how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used
• the currency and detail of information
• whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources
Wherever possible, multiple sourcing is used and the COI compared and contrasted
to ensure that it is accurate and balanced, and provides a comprehensive and up-to-
date picture of the issues relevant to this note at the time of publication.
The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s)
expressed.
Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote.
Full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed
alphabetically in the bibliography.
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Page 53 of 60
Terms of Reference
A ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) is a broad outline of the issues relevant to the scope of
this note and forms the basis for the country information.
The Home Office uses some standardised ToR, depending on the subject, and these
are then adapted depending on the country concerned.
For this particular CPIN, the following topics were identified prior to drafting as
relevant and on which research was undertaken:
• Legal context
o Criminal code
o Constitution
• Judiciary
o Court system
o Judicial independence
o Fair trial
o Legal aid and other assistance
o Prison system
• Security apparatus
o Federal security apparatus - Ethiopian National Défense Forces,
intelligence services, Ethiopia Federal Police
o Regional security forces (special forces, state police, local militias)
o Training
o Corruption
• Human rights violations
o Torture and ill treatment
o Arbitrary arrest, detention, enforced disappearances
o Extra-judicial killings
o Sexual and gender based violence
• Avenues of redress
o Police oversight / complaints mechanisms
o Judicial remedy
o Accountability and impunity
o Ethiopian human rights commission
Back to Contents
Page 54 of 60
Bibliography
Sources cited
Abyssinia Law, ‘Access to Justice and Legal Aid in Ethiopia’, 9 June 2015. Last
accessed 12 January 2024
Africa Report (The), ‘Abiy Ahmed and the struggle to keep Ethiopia together’, 11
October 2019. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Amnesty International (AI), ‘The State of the World's Human Rights; Ethiopia 2022’
23 March 2023. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Aneme, GA., ‘Introduction to the Ethiopian Legal System and Legal Research’,
Updated February 2020. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (DFAT), ‘Country Information
Report Ethiopia’, 17 August 2020. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation
(ACCORD), ‘Ethiopia: COI Compilation’ November 2019. Last accessed 12 January
2024
Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI), ‘Ethiopia country report 2022’, 23
February 2022. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA),
‘State of Internet Freedom in Ethiopia 2019’ January 2020. Last accessed 12
January 2024
Criminal Justice System Working Group (CJWG), ‘Diagnostic Study of the Ethiopian
Criminal Justice System’, March 2021. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael),
‘A clash of nationalisms and the remaking of the Ethiopian State’ April 2022 .
Last accessed 12 January 2024
‘Perpetuating power – Ethiopia’s political settlement and the organization of
security’, September 2016. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Ethiopia Government,
‘Constitution’, adopted 1994, entered into force August 1994. Last accessed
12 January 2024
‘Criminal code, 2004, entered into force 2005. Last accessed 12 January
2024
Ethiopia Federal Supreme Court, ‘The Public Defenders’ Office’, no date. Last
Ethiopia Peace Observatory ‘Actor profiles’, August 2023. Last accessed 12 January
2024
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), ‘Executive Summary: Ethiopia Annual
Human Rights Situation Report (June 2022 – June 2023), 18 August 2023. Last
Page 55 of 60
European Institute of Peace (EIP), ‘The Special Police in Ethiopia’, October 2023.
Fiseha , A., ‘Relations Between the Legislature and the Judiciary in Ethiopia ‘,
March 2016. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Fitz-Gerald, AM, ‘Ethiopia’s Security Dilemmas’, 18 July 2019. Last accessed 12
January 2024
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), ‘Information pack for
British nationals arrested or imprisoned in Ethiopia’, updated 30 August 2022. Last
Freedom House (FH)
‘Freedom in the world 2023 – Ethiopia’, 9 March 2023. Last accessed 12
January 2024
‘Freedom of the Net 2019 Ethiopia’, November 2019. Last accessed 12
January 2024
Global Firepower (GFP),
‘Global Firepower 2024’, 2024. Last accessed 12 January 2024
2024 Ethiopia Military Strength’, January 2024. Last accessed 12 January
2024
Guardian (The), ‘Gun battles erupt in Ethiopia as PM axes Amhara region’s security
force’, 12 April 2023. Last accessed 12 January 2024
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September 2023. Last accessed 12 January 2024
‘World Report 2023: Ethiopia’, 12 January 2023. Last accessed 12 January
2024
‘Ethiopia: Ethnic Cleansing Persists Under Tigray Truce’ 1 June 2023. Last
International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Ethiopia’s Ominous New War in Amhara’, 16
November 2023. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Jenkins, M; and Elsayed, SM; Chr. Michelsen Institute U4 Helpdesk, ‘Ethiopia:
Overview of corruption and anti-corruption efforts’, February 2023. Last accessed 12
January 2024
Nationsonline.org, ‘Map of Ethiopia, Eastern Africa’ no date
Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), ‘Ethiopia Country Security Report’, 5
October 2022. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Pham, P, Metekia, TS; Deyessa, N; Mah, A; Vosniak, L; and Vinck, P; Harvard
Humanitarian Initiative, ‘Ethiopia Peace & Justice Survey 2023’, November 2023.
The Law on Police Use of Force Worldwide, ‘Ethiopia’, last updated 13 April 2021
UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT),
Page 56 of 60
Second periodic report submitted by Ethiopia under Article 19 of the
Convention , due in 2014 (received 6 March 2020)’, 26 May 2020. Last
‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Ethiopia’, 7 June
2023 . Last accessed 12 January 2024
UN Assembly (UNGA), ‘Report of the International Commission of Human Experts
on Ethiopia’, 14 September 2023. Last accessed 12 January 2024
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Legal aid factsheet January-June
2023’ 17 August 2023. Last accessed 12 January 2024
UN Office on Drugs and Crime Ethiopia (UNDOC),
Prison Reform and Rehabilitation in Ethiopia’ June 2021. Last accessed 12
January 2024
‘Ethiopia, Semi Annual Progress Report 1 January – 30 June 2021’ June
2021. Last accessed 12 January 2024
‘Ethiopia Prison Factsheet - Prison Reform and Rehabilitation in Ethiopia’
June 2021. Last accessed 12 January 2024
United States Department of State (USSD),
‘2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia’, 14 March 2019.
‘2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia’, 11 March 2020.
‘2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices’, 12 April 2022. Last
‘2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia’, 20 March 2023.
‘Trafficking in Persons Report 2023: Ethiopia’ 15 June 2023. Last accessed
12 January 2024
‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2017: Ethiopia ’ 19 September 2018. Last
‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Ethiopia’, October 2019. Last accessed
12 January 2024
‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: Ethiopia’ , February 2021. Last
US Central Intelligence Agency (US CIA) World Factbook, ‘Ethiopia’ (section on
government), 13 December 2023. Last accessed 12 January 2024
World Prison Brief (WPB),‘Ethiopia’ no date. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Xe, ‘Xe Currency Converter’, as at 8 January 2024. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Back to Contents
Sources consulted but not cited
Addis Standard, ‘PM Abiy forms new gov’t; adds 20 institutions including NISS,
INSA, investment & financial security accountable to his office’ 6 October 2021. Last
Page 57 of 60
Africa Business, ‘Abiy’s reforms embolden Ethiopian regionalists’, 19 August 2019.
Last accessed 12 January 2024 African Confidential, ‘Abiy disarms regional forces
and riles his old backers’, 20 April 2023. Last accessed 7 September 2023
The Conversation, ‘Ethiopia's Amhara crisis: Abiy's political failures threaten a return
to war’, 24 August 2023. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), ‘The human rights impact of the
armed conflict on civilians in Amhara Regional State’ 14 August 2023. Last accessed
12 January 2024
European Union (EU), ‘EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the
World: 2022 Country Updates – Ethiopia’, 31 July 2023. Last accessed 12 January
2024
Federal Republic of Ethiopia,
‘Ethiopian Federal Police Commission Establishment Proclamation No.
720/2011’, 28 November 2011. Last accessed 12 January 2024
‘National Intelligence and Security Service Re-establishment Proclamation
No. 804/2013’, 23 July 2013. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission Establishment (Amendment)
Proclamation No. 1224/2020’,18 August 2020. Last accessed 12 January
2024
Fiseha, A, ‘Federalism and Security: The Special Police in Ethiopia’ JASA vol 6(2),
2022. Last accessed 7 September 2023
Information Network Security Administration (INSA), ‘Duties and responsibilities’
2022. Last accessed 12 January 2024
International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Abiy Ahmed and the struggle to keep Ethiopia
together’ 11 October 2019. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), ‘Broken Promises: Conflict-Related Sexual
Violence Before and After the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in Tigray, Ethiopia’,
24 August 2023. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Reuters, ‘Ethiopia to dismantle regional special forces in favour of 'centralized army'’,
6 April 2023. Last accessed 12 January 2024
Sudan Tribune, ‘528 Tigrayan peacekeepers in Abyei refuse to return to Ethiopia’, 24
April 2022. Last accessed 12 January 2024
UNHRC, ‘Ethiopian government national report’, 6-17 May 2019. Last accessed 12
January 2024 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human rights
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),
‘Report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC)/Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Joint
Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights,
Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties’, November 2021.
‘Ethiopia: Deteriorating human rights situation’, 29 August 2023. Last
Page 58 of 60
World Organisation Against (OMCT), Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia
(AHRE), Consortium of Ethiopian Human Rights Organizations (CEHRO), Ethiopian
Human Rights Council (EHRCO), Ethiopia Human Rights Defenders Center
(EHRDC) and Center for Justice (CJ), ‘Ethiopia: One step forward two steps back in
fighting torture Joint Alternative Report submitted under article 19 of the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’,
March 2023. Last accessed 12 January 2024
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Page 59 of 60
Version control and feedback
Clearance
Below is information on when this note was cleared:
• version 2.0
• valid from February 2024

Office use.

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Changes from last version of this note
All sections updated with latest published country of origin information. Assessment
updated in light of new COI.
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Feedback to the Home Office
Our goal is to provide accurate, reliable and up-to-date COI and clear guidance. We
welcome feedback on how to improve our products. If you would like to comment on
this note, please email the Country Policy and Information Team.
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Independent Advisory Group on Country Information
The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in
March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to
support him in reviewing the efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of approach of
COI produced by the Home Office.
The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. It is not the
function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy.
The IAGCI may be contacted at:
Independent Advisory Group on Country Information
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration
1st Floor
Clive House
70 Petty France
London
SW1H 9EX
Email: [email protected]
Information about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the documents which have been
reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s pages of
the gov.uk website.
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1 US CIA World Factbook, ‘Ethiopia’ (Government), 13 December 2023

3 ACCORD, Ethiopia COI Compilation’ (page 8), November 2019

9 Ethiopia government, ‘Criminal code’, 2004, entered into force 2005

13 Xe, ‘Xe Currency Converter’ as at 8 January 2024

33 WPB ‘About the World Prison Brief’, no date

40 UNCAT, ‘Second periodic report submitted by …’ (paragraphs 114), 26 May 2020

56 Global Integrity, ‘Africa Integrity Indicators Data’ (Ethiopia), 2023

68 DFAT, ‘Country Information Report Ethiopia’ (paragraph 5.1), 17 August 2020

87 ACCORD, ‘Ethiopia: COI Compilation’ (page 59), November 2019

93 OSAC, ‘About us’, no date

99 OSAC, ‘Ethiopia Country Security Report’, 5 October 2022

104 EIP, ‘The special police in Ethiopia’ (page 3), 2021

115 EIP, ‘The special police in Ethiopia’ (page 14), 2021

153 HiiL, ‘Justice Needs and Satisfaction Survey in Ethiopia’, 2020

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