[FREE PDF sample] Interpersonal Cognition 1st Edition Mark W. Baldwin Phd ebooks

Full download ebook at ebookname.
com
Interpersonal Cognition 1st Edition Mark W.

Baldwin Phd
https://ebookname.com/product/interpersonal-cognition-1st-
edition-mark-w-baldwin-phd/
OR CLICK BUTTON
DOWLOAD NOW
Download more ebook from https://ebookname.com

More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...
Origins of Religion Cognition and Culture 1st Edition

Armin W. Geertz
https://ebookname.com/product/origins-of-religion-cognition-and-
culture-1st-edition-armin-w-geertz/
Brain Development and Cognition A Reader 2nd Edition

Mark H. Johnson
https://ebookname.com/product/brain-development-and-cognition-a-
reader-2nd-edition-mark-h-johnson/
The Neuropsychiatry of Headache Mark W. Green
https://ebookname.com/product/the-neuropsychiatry-of-headache-
mark-w-green/
Clinical Cases in Physical Therapy 2nd Edition Mark A.

Brimer Phd Pt
https://ebookname.com/product/clinical-cases-in-physical-
therapy-2nd-edition-mark-a-brimer-phd-pt/
The Oxford Handbook of Regulation 1st Edition Robert
Baldwin
https://ebookname.com/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-
regulation-1st-edition-robert-baldwin/
Pretend Play in Childhood Foundation of Adult

Creativity 1st Edition Sandra W. Russ Phd
https://ebookname.com/product/pretend-play-in-childhood-
foundation-of-adult-creativity-1st-edition-sandra-w-russ-phd/
Nursing Knowledge Science Practice and Philosophy 1st

Edition Mark W. Risjord
https://ebookname.com/product/nursing-knowledge-science-practice-
and-philosophy-1st-edition-mark-w-risjord/
The Space Industry of the Future 1st Edition Mark W.

Mcelroy
https://ebookname.com/product/the-space-industry-of-the-
future-1st-edition-mark-w-mcelroy/
The community college experience plus 2nd Edition

Baldwin
https://ebookname.com/product/the-community-college-experience-
plus-2nd-edition-baldwin/
INTERPERSONAL
COGNITION
This page intentionally left blank
INTERPERSONAL
COGNITION
Edited by
MARK W. BALDWIN
THE GUILFORD PRESS

New York London
© 2005 The Guilford Press
A Division of Guilford Publications, Inc.
72 Spring Street, New York, NY 10012
www.guilford.com
All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced, translated, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording,
or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher.
Printed in the United States of America
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Last digit is print number: 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data available from the Publisher.
ISBN 1-59385-112-X
About the Editor
About the Editor
Mark W. Baldwin, PhD, received his doctorate in 1984 from the University
of Waterloo and held postdoctoral fellowships at the Research Center for
Group Dynamics at the University of Michigan and the Clarke Institute of
Psychiatry at the University of Toronto. He then spent several years pursu-
ing an opportunity to cowrite and cohost the award-winning children’s
television series Camp Cariboo. Returning to academia, Dr. Baldwin
taught and researched psychology at the University of Winnipeg for 8 years
before assuming, in 1998, his current position in the Department of Psy-
chology at McGill University in Montreal. Along the way, he served as
Chair of the Social and Personality section of the Canadian Psychological
Association and Associate Editor of the Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, and coauthored (with Rick Hoyle, Michael Kernis, and Mark
Leary) the book Selfhood: Identity, Esteem, Regulation. His major re-
search interests include interpersonal cognition, self-esteem, and adult
attachment theory. Most recently, Dr. Baldwin and his students have been
exploring the possibility of designing computer-based exercises to modify
maladaptive automatic social cognition and have established the website
www.selfesteemgames.mcgill.ca to report this research.
v
Contributors
Contributors
Susan M. Andersen, PhD, Department of Psychology, New York

University, New York, New York
Arthur Aron, PhD, Department of Psychology, State University of
New York, Stony Brook, New York
Elaine N. Aron, PhD, Department of Psychology, State University
of New York, Stony Brook, New York
Ozlem Ayduk, PhD, Department of Psychology, Columbia University,
New York, New York
Jodene R. Baccus, PhD candidate, Department of Psychology, McGill
University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Mark W. Baldwin, PhD, Department of Psychology, McGill University,
Montreal, Quebec, Canada
John A. Bargh, PhD, Department of Psychology, Yale University, New
Haven, Connecticut
Kimberly Burton, PhD, Department of Psychology, McGill University,
Jessica Cameron, PhD, Department of Psychology, University
of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Tanya L. Chartrand, PhD, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University,
Durham, North Carolina
Stéphane D. Dandeneau, PhD candidate, Department of Psychology,
McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Jaye Derrick, BA, Department of Psychology, State University
of New York, Buffalo, New York
vii
viii Contributors
Geraldine Downey, PhD, Department of Psychology, Columbia

Beverley Fehr, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Winnipeg,
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Alan Page Fiske, PhD, Department of Anthropology, University
of California, Los Angeles, California
Gráinne M. Fitzsimons, MA, Graduate School of Business, Stanford
University, Stanford, California
Melanie Fox, MA, Department of Psychology, Graduate Faculty
of Political and Social Science, New School University, New York, New
York
Paul Gilbert, FBPsS, Mental Health Research Unit, Kingsway Hospital,
Derby, United Kingdom
Nick Haslam, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne,
Parkville, Australia
Hubert J. M. Hermans, PhD, University of Nijmegen, Nijmegen,
The Netherlands
John G. Holmes, PhD, Department of Psychology, University
of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
Mardi J. Horowitz, MD, Department of Psychiatry, University
of California, San Francisco, California
Mark R. Leary, PhD, Department of Psychology, Wake Forest
University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina
Gary Lewandowski, PhD, Department of Psychology, Monmouth
University, West Long Branch, New Jersey
John E. Lydon, PhD, Department of Psychology, McGill University,
Debra Mashek, PhD, Department of Psychology, George Mason
University, Fairfax, Virginia
Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe, PhD, Department of Psychology, University
of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont
Danielle Menzies-Toman, PhD candidate, Department of Psychology,
McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Mario Mikulincer, PhD, Department of Psychology, Bar-Ilan University,
Ramat Gan, Israel
Sandra L. Murray, PhD, Department of Psychology, State University
of New York, Buffalo, New York
Contributors ix
Janina Pietrzak, PhD, Department of Psychology, Columbia University,

New York, New York
Jeremy D. Safran, PhD, Department of Psychology, Graduate Faculty
York
S. Adil Saribay, PhD candidate, Department of Psychology, New York
Polly Scarvalone, PhD, Department of Psychology, Graduate Faculty
York
James Shah, PhD, Department of Psychology, Duke University, Durham,
North Carolina
Phillip R. Shaver, PhD, Department of Psychology, University
of California, Davis, California
Stephen Wright, PhD, Department of Psychology, University
of California, Santa Cruz, California
Preface
Preface
The human mind is profoundly attuned to the contingencies of social life.

Over the past decade, we have seen an explosion of research into interper-
sonal cognition. The core tenet of this research is that human social cogni-
tion is not primarily about isolated social objects, such as self and other,
functioning independently. Rather, social cognition is fundamentally about
the dynamics of interpersonal interaction. People think about their signifi-
cant relationships: about whether their loved ones love them in return,
about how they fit in with the people they deal with each day, about how
to meet their goals within a social network. They wonder why a new friend
reminds them of their mother; they worry about the possibility of rejec-
tions and humiliations in their interactions; they seek to change the dis-
torted expectancies that seem to lead to problems. This is the stuff of inter-
personal cognition.
This volume brings together the world’s leading researchers in the
field, from a variety of backgrounds. All of them have developed models of
the mechanisms whereby people think about their interpersonal experi-
ences and the effects this thinking has on their subsequent interactions and
sense of self. Much of the work in this area represents an attempt to inte-
grate social-cognitive models of personality with models drawn from inter-
personal, attachment, symbolic interactionist, and psychodynamic tradi-
tions. As such, the theoretical background encompasses some of the classic
ideas from social and personality psychology, including working models
(Bowlby), transference (Freud), the looking-glass self (Cooley), and so on.
The recent work in this area combines these insights with current models
and research techniques from the social cognition literature. Indeed, the
topic of interpersonal cognition has quickly taken its place alongside per-
son perception and self-cognition as one of the central topics in social and
personality psychology.
As editor, I encouraged the contributors to devote a portion of their
xi
xii Preface
chapters to tracing the theoretical background of their work and outlining

the major contributions they have made along the way. I asked them to de-
vote the balance of each chapter to outlining the issues they have studied
most recently and isolating the key questions for future research. I encour-
aged them to present a balance between theory and method, so that read-
ers would come away with an overview of the core issues involved as well
as a sense of how to go about studying them.
In the chapters that follow, several themes emerge. First, there is a fo-
cus on the basic social-cognitive processes that characterize interpersonal
cognition, addressing questions of how information about interpersonal
experiences is perceived, interpreted, stored in memory, and recalled. Issues
related to the motivational and affective nature of interpersonal informa-
tion are often front and center. Second, the social construction of identity is
a central theme, and notions of the relational self and the interpersonal
roots of self-esteem are included in many models presented. Third, several
writers ask whether there are meaningful and identifiable constraints on
the nature of interpersonal cognition, imposed by the dynamics of social
life and the evolutionary history of humankind. Finally, the issue of stabil-
ity versus variability and change is addressed in several chapters, particu-
larly as clinicians examine the question of how to undo the harmful effects
of distorted or maladaptive interpersonal cognition.
In the first chapter, Andersen and Saribay present their analysis of the
relational self and the phenomenon of transference. They review over 15
years of research findings, demonstrating that significant-other representa-
tions can be activated via triggering cues and then applied in the perception
of a novel person. This body of research shows the cognitive, self-
evaluative, and, most recently, affective and motivational effects of simply
being unconsciously reminded of a significant relationship.
Baldwin and Dandeneau (Chapter 2) focus on the role played by
knowledge activation, which makes certain kinds of interpersonal informa-
tion more or less influential in the perception of ongoing relationships and
the self. They review findings linking low self-esteem and insecurity to ex-
pectations about social rejection, and then turn to recent work applying
learning theory to try to modify activation patterns and thereby increase
people’s feelings of security.
Pietrzak, Downey, and Ayduk (Chapter 3) present their research on in-
dividual differences in rejection sensitivity, in which some people’s expecta-
tions of rejection are shown to lead to a lower threshold for perceiving
negative feedback from others. They combine insights from affective neu-
roscience with developmental and cognitive models of personality to ex-
plain the depression, hostility, conformity, and dissatisfying interpersonal
dynamics that can result from anxiously anticipating rejection by valued
others.
Leary (Chapter 4) considers the special case of interpersonal cognition
Preface xiii
in which a person wonders “What does this person think about me?” He
reviews his sociometer theory of self-esteem, in which self-evaluative reac-
tions are hypothesized to reflect not a freestanding need for self-esteem
but, rather, a hardwired motive for inclusion, valuing, and acceptance by
others. He discusses several specific questions arising from his formulation,
such as why healthy self-esteem is often seen as largely independent of the
opinions of others.
Fitzsimons, Shah, Chartrand, and Bargh (Chapter 5) examine the in-
terplay between interpersonal cognition and goal striving: for example,
when—and how—would being reminded of one’s mother make one more
motivated to achieve? Under what conditions does being in a specific goal
state bring to mind one or more specific relationships? They examine ques-
tions such as these in the light of current social-cognitive work on goal rep-
resentation and activation.
Lydon, Burton, and Menzies-Toman (Chapter 6) investigate motivated
interpersonal cognition, specifically the sorts of illusions and biases that
people often exhibit as they try to maintain a committed relationship
important to their identity. The authors consider in detail the delicate cali-
bration often evidenced between individuals’ exposure to threatening
information of some kind and the motivated cognitive processes that are
marshaled in response.
Murray and Derrick (Chapter 7) analyze the complex and consequen-
tial process of deciding whether, and how much, to trust an intimate part-
ner. The balance between risk-averse strategies of self-protection and
relationship-promoting behaviors based in a confidence about one’s part-
ner’s acceptance and love is defined by expectations and a range of motivated
cognitive processes. This research demonstrates the exquisite interplay be-
tween interpersonal cognition and real-world relationship outcomes.
Fehr (Chapter 8) examines the representation and organization of in-
terpersonal knowledge. She reviews research showing that concepts such as
love, commitment, anger, and intimacy are organized as prototypes around
key exemplars, and that this prototype structure shapes inferences about
new interpersonal experiences. She also presents her recent work on the
scripts people draw on to define an intimate friendship.
Aron, Mashek, McLaughlin-Volpe, Wright, Lewandowski, and Aron
(Chapter 9) propose a form of interpersonal cognition in which a relation-
ship partner is “included” in the self. They review and organize their past
research, which has used novel experimental paradigms to show that
another person’s resources, perspectives, and identities can become experi-
enced as one’s own. They also introduce some more recent findings, includ-
ing the discussion of what it means to feel “too close” to a relationship
partner.
Mikulincer and Shaver (Chapter 10) have developed a social-cognitive
model of attachment behavior, and they argue that social psychology’s ex-
xiv Preface
tensive documentation of human foibles (including defensive self-enhancement,

outgroup hostility, and the like) actually best characterizes response pat-
terns associated with insecure attachment. Their research with chronic and
contextually activated attachment orientations supports their argument for
a more optimistic view of human nature and grounds the positive psychol-
ogy movement firmly in attachment theory and interpersonal cognition.
Fiske and Haslam (Chapter 11) review their theory that interpersonal
cognition—indeed, interpersonal life—can largely be reduced to four fun-
damental categories, representing discrete relationship patterns. Their the-
ory builds on anthropological observation, social-cognitive experiments,
and neuroscientific explorations, and they use it to analyze phenomena
ranging from personality disorders to political structures.
Gilbert’s (Chapter 12) theory of social mentalities is based in evolu-
tionary theory and the premise that interpersonal cognition is profoundly
shaped by specific information-processing systems that have evolved over
millions of years. He analyzes the motives and cognitive competencies that
give rise to a set of familiar and influential social role enactments, includ-
ing care eliciting, social alliance formation, and social ranking.
Baccus and Horowitz (Chapter 13) present a view of interpersonal
cognition that is strongly influenced by psychodynamic theory and, more
generally, by issues that tend to be confronted in psychotherapy. They re-
view an approach for mapping out the interpersonal structures that define
a person’s personality conflicts. Then they turn to the issue of schema
change, which is always central to psychotherapy, and discuss the pro-
cesses and difficulties often associated with cases of spousal bereavement.
Scarvalone, Fox, and Safran (Chapter 14) present a model of interper-
sonal schemas that combines insights from Sullivan’s interpersonal psycho-
analytic and Bowlby’s attachment approaches with modern social-cognitive
theory. They propose that people learn implicit, procedural knowledge of
how to behave in their significant relationships, and that these schemas can
be problematic if they rigidly represent dysfunctional patterns. They review
research relating individual variation on the Interpersonal Schema Ques-
tionnaire, which assesses expectancies on the axes of affiliation and domi-
nance, with a range of variables including childhood trauma, depression,
and transference dynamics in psychotherapy.
Hermans (Chapter 15) explores the thesis that the human mind is in-
herently interpersonal, a product of an imagined dialogue among a set of
voices or positions that make up the individual’s inner world. Likening the
self to a society, he examines issues of relative power and dominance
among different positions and discusses therapeutic change and the an-
thropological phenomenon of “shape-shifting” as representing the adop-
tion and emphasis of new identity positions.
Holmes and Cameron, in the final chapter, examine selected develop-
ments in the field in light of their recent theoretical and empirical work on
Preface xv
interdependence theory. For this chapter, which teams one of the field’s
most experienced scholars with one of its talented young researchers, I en-
couraged the authors to take a critical look at some of the unresolved and
problematic issues they see in this still relatively young literature. Their
analysis reminds us that despite the impressive progress that has been
made, several thorny questions remain in our attempts to understand inter-
personal cognition.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
It is a rare treat to have the opportunity to invite one’s favorite thinkers

and researchers to come together in a volume such as this, and I must say
that I have enjoyed the process from start to finish. I would like to thank
Seymour Weingarten, Editor-in-Chief at The Guilford Press, for his guid-
ance and encouragement throughout this project, and all of the staff at
Guilford who helped to bring the book together. Of course, I am extremely
grateful to each of the authors, who replied enthusiastically to my initial
requests for contributions and then delivered timely and stimulating chap-
ters. My research has for many years been supported by the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and I am grateful for that
support. Finally, I thank ma conjointe, Patricia, for her love, her encour-
agement, and her immeasurably positive effect on my own interpersonal
cognition.
MARK W. BALDWIN
Contents
Contents
1 The Relational Self and Transference: Evoking Motives, Self-Regulation, 1

and Emotions through Activation of Mental Representations
of Significant Others
Susan M. Andersen and S. Adil Saribay
2 Understanding and Modifying the Relational Schemas 33
Underlying Insecurity
Mark W. Baldwin and Stéphane D. Dandeneau
3 Rejection Sensitivity as an Interpersonal Vulnerability 62
Janina Pietrzak, Geraldine Downey, and Ozlem Ayduk
4 Interpersonal Cognition and the Quest for Social Acceptance: 85
Inside the Sociometer
Mark R. Leary
5 Goals and Labors, Friends and Neighbors: 103
Self-Regulation and Interpersonal Relationships
Gráinne M. Fitzsimons, James Shah, Tanya L. Chartrand,
and John A. Bargh
6 Commitment Calibration with the Relationship Cognition Toolbox 126
John E. Lydon, Kimberly Burton,
and Danielle Menzies-Toman
7 A Relationship-Specific Sense of Felt Security: 153
How Perceived Regard Regulates Relationship-Enhancement Processes
Sandra L. Murray and Jaye Derrick
8 The Role of Prototypes in Interpersonal Cognition 180
Beverley Fehr
9 Including Close Others in the Cognitive Structure of the Self 206
Arthur Aron, Debra Mashek, Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe,
Stephen Wright, Gary Lewandowski, and Elaine N. Aron
xvii
xviii Contents
10 Mental Representations of Attachment Security: Theoretical Foundation 233

for a Positive Social Psychology
Mario Mikulincer and Phillip R. Shaver
11 The Four Basic Social Bonds: Structures for Coordinating Interaction 267
Alan Page Fiske and Nick Haslam
12 Social Mentalities: A Biopsychosocial and Evolutionary Approach 299
to Social Relationships
Paul Gilbert
13 Role-Relationship Models: Addressing Maladaptive Interpersonal 334
Patterns and Emotional Distress
Jodene R. Baccus and Mardi J. Horowitz
14 Interpersonal Schemas: Clinical Theory, Research, and Implications 359
Polly Scarvalone, Melanie Fox, and Jeremy D. Safran
15 Self as a Society: The Dynamics of Interchange and Power 388
Hubert J. M. Hermans
16 An Integrative Review of Theories of Interpersonal Cognition: 415
An Interdependence Theory Perspective
John G. Holmes and Jessica Cameron
Index 449
INTERPERSONAL
The Relational Self and
COGNITION
Transference
The Relational Self and Transference

Evoking Motives, Self-Regulation, and Emotions through
Activation of Mental Representations of Significant Others
SUSAN M. ANDERSEN and S. ADIL SARIBAY
The notion that people hold mental representations of significant others—

individuals who have been influential in their lives—in memory is not con-
ceptually new. In some respects, it has been present in psychology since the
field arose as a separate discipline. It is also central to theories of personal-
ity and clinical psychology of historical import (e.g., Freud, 1912/1958) in
the discipline of psychology, across prevailing theory and empirical re-
search in social psychology in recent years. Past relationships influence
present patterns of thought, feeling, and behavior. Moreover, this is consis-
tent with the fundamental assumption in social cognition that previous
knowledge is used to give meaning to present people and situations.
Our research has focused on the social-cognitive process of transfer-
ence as a way to give meaning to everyday experience in the context of
everyday relations. Our work thus has its roots in early theory, while also
relying very heavily on basic principles of social cognition and the experi-
mental research methods that characterize the field. Research on transfer-
ence has formed the basis of the model of the relational self (Andersen &
Chen, 2002), which holds that people have a repertoire of relational selves
in memory, each linked with a specific significant other. In this chapter, we
introduce the concept of transference and give an overview of our ap-
proach with a focus on issues particularly relevant to motivation and
emotion.
1
2 INTERPERSONAL COGNITION
CONCEPTUALIZING THE RELATIONAL SELF

Our Theoretical Framework: An Overview
Our model of the relational self emphasizes dyadic relationships with sig-
nificant others, individuals who have had a substantial impact on the self,
whom one knows very well and cares (or has cared) deeply about (Chen &
Andersen, 1999). The relationship may involve a family member or not,
and may also be from the long-ago past or from one’s current relational
life, so long as the relationship partner is (or once was) deeply influential.
One acquires particular ways of relating with the other and of experienc-
ing the self in the context of the relationship. Aspects of the self experi-
enced with this person thus become “entangled” in memory with knowl-
edge about the significant other (Andersen & Chen, 2002; Andersen,
Reznik, & Chen, 1997; Hinkley & Andersen, 1996). These individuals
thus circumscribe the kinds of selves that are both privately experienced
and publicly realized (e.g., Higgins, 1989; Higgins & Silberman, 1998).
The influence of the significant other on the self can then be reexperienced
with a new person, so that this past relationship pattern arises in the pres-
ent, even when the significant other is not present. One becomes the rela-
tional self typically experienced in the original relationship (Andersen &
Chen, 2002). For this reason, early (and also later) relationships offer a
substrate for the relational selves that develop, and also underlie both resil-
ience and vulnerability (Downey & Feldman, 1996; Gurung, Sarason, &
Sarason, 2001; McGowan, 2002; Murray & Holmes, 1999; Pierce &
Lydon, 1998; Shields, Ryan, & Cicchetti, 2001). Overall, our model is de-
velopmental in this respect, even though the research has not made use of a
developmental paradigm.
Representations of significant others are n-of-1 representations or ex-
emplars (Linville & Fischer, 1993; Smith & Zarate, 1992) in that each des-
ignates a specific, unique individual, rather than a shared notion of a social
category, type, or group (e.g., Andersen & Klatzky, 1987; Brewer, 1988;
Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Higgins & King, 1981).
One aspect of significant-other representations that makes them different
from representations of nonsignificant others and also different from ge-
neric constructs (e.g., specific beliefs about all people) is the link of these
representations to affect, expectancies, and motives that are thus likely to
arise when these representations are activated and used—for example, in
transference. Private experiences one has with significant others are en-
coded in memory and then reexperienced in relation to new persons. Close
relationships are characterized by familiarity (e.g., Andersen, Reznik, &
Glassman, in press; Prentice, 1990), as well as by their emotional and mo-
tivational relevance for the self, and are based in no small measure on exi-
gencies of interdependence as well. In interdependent relationships, one’s
outcomes are (or once were) symbolically or concretely interdependent
with those of the other (e.g., Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996; see also Mills &
The Relational Self and Transference 3
Clark, 1994); this idea parallels our conception of a significant other. Like-
wise, interdependence casts acceptance or rejection by the other in a special
light because of the needs that one has in this relationship, given the kind
of unit relation (Heider, 1958) one has with the other, a bondedness that is
not readily set aside. Needs arising in close relationships are especially im-
portant, in part because of this interdependence, especially in relation to
caretakers when young, when sheer survival depends on them (Andersen et
al., 1997). We discuss these issues more fully later in the chapter.
Our relational-self model is grounded in particular in the literature on
transference, which itself is grounded in social cognition and in social con-
struct theory (Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986; Higgins, 1996a;
Higgins & King, 1981; see also Kelly, 1955), which focuses on transient
sources of accessibility (such as priming), chronic sources of accessibility
(frequency of prior use), as well as on the applicability of the construct to
the stimulus. The theory of the relational self also adopts the assumptions
of if–then models of personality (Mischel & Shoda, 1995). That is, it ex-
tends transference in part by proposing that the transference process un-
derlies variability in the relational self because significant-other representa-
tions are relatively stable over time and yet contextual shifts (based on who
is present in the situation) introduce shifts in the relational self across dif-
fering interpersonal contexts. In other words, within our relational-self
model, we use this if–then framework from personality psychology to con-
sider long-standing influences on the self that people bring to situations as
“baggage.” Contemporaneous contexts provoke differing long-standing
aspects of the self, and do so because cues in these contexts overlap in
some way with prior experience stored in memory. In the relational-self
model, specific interpersonal cues in the situation are the “ifs” and the ex-
periences and behaviors that result are the “thens.”
Historical Context
Transference in Psychoanalytic Thought and Psychoanalysis
The clinical concept of transference has long been an essential component
of psychodynamic theory, psychoanalysis, and psychotherapy (e.g., Ehren-
reich, 1989; Greenson, 1965). The literature on transference has thus
tended to consider transference theoretically, applying the notion to clini-
cal case studies and in clinical practice, rather than examining it empiri-
cally using scientific methods (although see Luborsky & Crits-Christoph,
1990).
In classical Freudian theory, transference (Freud, 1912/1958) is said to
occur when childhood fantasies and conflicts about a parent are imposed
by the patient onto the analyst during psychoanalysis (Freud, 1912/1963;
see also Andersen & Glassman, 1996). Freud assumed that people hold in
memory “imagoes” of significant others and that they may influence rela-
tions with new individuals, both in psychoanalysis and in everyday life

(Freud, 1912/1958; Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1990; Schimek, 1983).
Although such imagoes were proposed, they also carry little causal weight
in the central drive-structure model Freud proposed. The drive-structure
model and the tripartite structure of mind (id, ego, superego) fueled by
psychosexual drive is the bedrock of Freudian theory, embodying and ac-
counting for unconscious conflicts and personality. In the process of trans-
ference, then, Freud assumed that the analyst should consider the transfer-
ence in terms of the patient’s unconscious psychosexual conflicts.
Although we do not adopt Freud’s complex model or his assumptions
about instincts, nor necessarily regard the transference process as irreplace-
able as a focus of psychotherapy, our social-cognitive model of transfer-
ence assumes that mental representations of significant others exist in
memory, as do other social constructs and categories, even though they are
n-of-1 exemplars. Likewise, we assume that it is precisely the activation
and use of a significant-other representation in relation to a new person
that leads one to “go beyond the information given” (Bruner, 1957) about
the new person in ways that define the transference process (e.g., Andersen
& Cole, 1990). That is, we assume, as Freud and others did, that transfer-
ence is not limited to therapeutic settings. We also assume it is not limited
to individuals suffering from psychopathology or “neurosis.” We focus on
transference among “normal” populations as a normal process in the con-
texts of everyday life, thus depathologizing the concept, even though there
may be implications for psychotherapy. Our focus is daily life.
To contrast with a different clinical theory, Harry Stack Sullivan
(1953) proposed that early interpersonal relations result in what he called
“personifications” of the self and the significant other (i.e., the caretaker),
and that “dynamisms,” or dynamics, provide the link between the self and
the other (as personifications) by characterizing the typical relational pat-
terns enacted by self and other. The idiosyncratic and subjective content of
each person’s personifications of significant others and of their associated
dynamisms then form the basis of transference. Sullivan termed the trans-
ference process parataxic distortion.
His notion of parataxic distortion is close to our conception and is
distinct in many ways from how transference is conceptualized by Freud.
Sullivan’s emphasis is on models of self and other and assumed basic needs
that have little to do with (go well beyond) infantile sexuality. In addition,
and in particular, he assumed a fundamental need for satisfaction that in-
cludes a motive to experience tenderness and to be connected with the
other, as well as motives for self-expression and effectiveness and compe-
tence in relations with significant others. To protect the self, a need for
overall safety and security is also fundamental in his view. These basic
needs for connection and security are also central in our thinking (Ander-
sen et al., 1997).
Still other conceptions of transference also exist, of course (e.g.,
Horney, 1939; Horowitz, 1989, 1991; Kernberg, 1976; Kohut, 1971;

Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1990). There is great variability among these
theories. The methods of analysis used also vary widely. The most widely
adopted definition of transference appears to be “the experiencing of feel-
ings, drives, attitudes, fantasies, and defenses toward a person in the pres-
ent which are inappropriate to the person and are a repetition, a displace-
ment of reaction originating in regard to significant persons of early
childhood” (Greenson, 1965, p. 156; see also Andersen & Baum, 1994). In
our model, observed in our data, the transference we demonstrate fits this
general definition reasonably well (for related theoretical work, see Singer,
1988, and Westen, 1988).
The Relevance of Attachment Theory

A theoretical model that is fundamentally integrative and relevant to how
the self is bound up with important others is attachment theory. Attach-
ment theory is integrative with respect to psychoanalytic and cognitive-be-
havioral theories, as well as with ethological and evolutionary psychology.
It also assumes that mental models of the self and other are important and
are shaped largely through early experiences with caregivers (e.g.,
Ainsworth, Blehar, Walters, & Wall, 1978; Bombar & Littig, 1996;
Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; Bretherton, 1985; Thompson, 1998). Attach-
ment theory has generated a great deal of empirical research since Bowlby
(1969, 1973, 1980) laid its foundations. Going beyond research on infants
and children, the research on adult attachment has tended to focus on
trait-like attachment styles and relatively little on internal working models
of the self and other. Even though the latter are centrally a part of the as-
sumptive framework of attachment theory, they were not subjected to care-
ful experimental examination until quite recently. Fortunately, recent re-
search has begun to fill in this gap (e.g., Baldwin, Fehr, Keedian, Seidel, &
Thompson, 1993; Baldwin, Keelan, Fehr, Enns, & Koh-Rangarajoo, 1996;
Mikulincer, 1998; Mikulincer & Horesh, 1999; Pierce & Lydon, 2001;
Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002).
Still more work is needed to incorporate attachment theory into
social-cognitive and other social-psychological models of the self and rela-
tionships. From our point of view, our model of the relational self is com-
patible with assumptions about internal models of self and other, and with
the notion that the need for connection should make the responsiveness of
caretakers particularly important in emotional suffering and resilience in
the relationship (see Thompson, 1998). In our view, transference may be a
mechanism underlying attachment processes, that is, underlying how inter-
nal working models in interpersonal relationships are used. This assump-
tion is implicit in attachment theory and fits with an activation model in
which specific situational cues evoke the attachment system, through acti-
vating a representation of a significant other in transference.
EVIDENCE ON THE RELATIONAL SELF AND TRANSFERENCE
To test the assumptions that follow from our conceptualization of transfer-

ence and our model of the relational self, prior experimental research has
systematically examined the processes thought to underlie transference and
its consequences for social relations. We now turn to the specific findings
on which our conceptions of the relational self and transference are based.
We first describe our paradigm in brief (see Andersen & Chen, 2002, for a
more complete presentation) and then present our basic findings. The re-
search addresses the transference process and its implications for manifes-
tations of the relational self, including basic needs, motives, emotions, self-
evaluation, and self-regulatory efforts.
Methodology in Brief
Research on the social-cognitive process of transference involves activating
a significant-other representation through the presentation of triggering
cues. The cues themselves typically take the form of features about a new
person derived from those that the research participant in fact generated in
a previous session to describe a significant other. We begin with a prelimi-
nary session in which we ask participants to think of a significant other
and to write descriptive sentences in freehand to portray this individual.
Such features tend to include apparent habits and activities, ways of relat-
ing, physical features, attitudes, preferences, traits, and so on. The actual
experiment is presumed to be unrelated and takes place at least 2 weeks af-
ter this preliminary session. Participants arrive to a lab setting with multi-
ple rooms and are led to believe they will meet an “interaction partner”
later in the session. They are exposed to sentence predicates about this new
person, which suggest that this person does (or does not) share a small
number of the significant other’s qualities (based on the features they had
listed about their significant other). Following this exposure, their memory,
evaluation, affect, motives, expectancies, self-ratings, and behavior are as-
sessed, depending on the purposes of the particular study. In most studies,
each participant in the control condition (i.e., the nontransference condi-
tion) is yoked on a one-to-one basis with another participant who is in the
experimental condition (i.e., the transference condition). In this way, each
pair of yoked participants is exposed to the exact same features about the
new person. This allows the content of the experimental stimuli to be per-
fectly controlled across conditions, and enables unequivocal conclusions
about the consequences of being exposed to significant-other resemblance
in a new person, which we show provokes the phenomenon of transfer-
ence.
In this combined idiographic–nomothetic design, the content of trans-
ference is specific to each participant but the processes we investigate are
generalizable. Moreover, the process does not require a particular standing on

a predisposing individual difference factor, such as relational-interdependent
self-construal (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000). Though we have not tested
this particular question, the process readily occurs without any such
preselection. Moreover, it is not a phenomenon that occurs only for
women (whom research suggests are more relationally oriented than men),
nor one that occurs only in interdependent cultures (e.g., Japan), and thus
does not occur in the United States. To the contrary, all our research has
been conducted in the United States and most of it includes both males and
females.
Inference and Memory

Initial research on the social-cognitive process of transference focused on
memory and inferences about a new person, resulting from triggering a
significant-other representation. This work clearly indicates that people
tend to fill in the blanks about new people on the basis of their knowledge
of significant others—when a particular significant-other representation is
triggered. People exposed to features of a new person that are distinctively
associated with a significant other have their significant-other representa-
tions activated. This is assessed through recognition memory. When tested,
people indicate that they are more confident when they were exposed to
significant-other features about the new person—features not actually
presented—than do people in a control condition (e.g., Andersen, Glass-
man, Chen, & Cole, 1995; Andersen & Cole, 1990). This effect has been
demonstrated repeatedly.
Several experimental controls have been used to rule out possible al-
ternative explanations for this basic effect. For example, because the very
stimuli that the participant encounters in the experiment in our paradigm
are self-generated by the individual him- or herself in a previous session, one
needs to be concerned about the well-known influence of self-generation,
which could potentially account for the phenomenon. Both enhanced
memory and other mnemonic processes result from self-generation of stim-
uli and can thus offer a compelling alternative explanation for transference
unless ruled out. In a series of studies, we compared significant-other rep-
resentations with other kinds of representations that were also self-gener-
ated by the individual before the experiment—that is, they also generated
descriptors of a nonsignificant other, of a variety of public figures, and of a
social category as well (e.g., a stereotype they use), such that all the stimuli
in the experiment were self-generated, holding constant self-generation.
Overall, our inference and memory effect turns out to be strongest when
significant-other features are presented, leading to a greater tendency to go
beyond the information given about the new person, which suggests that
the effect simply cannot be accounted for merely by self-generation or the
activation of a social stereotype (e.g., Andersen et al., 1995; Glassman &

Andersen, 1999a).
Another most pressing alternative explanation that must also be ruled
out (and that we thus hold constant in most of our research) involves the
specific content of the features the individual lists at pretest: perhaps there
is just something special about the content of the significant-other features
that drives the effect. We address this issue through one-to-one yoking of
research participants in the significant-other-resemblance condition with
participants in the control condition. As noted, each participant in the con-
trol condition is yoked with one participant in the experimental condition
so that both in the pair are exposed to exactly the same features about the
new person in the experiment. Stimulus content is thus perfectly con-
trolled.
The phenomenon has been widely demonstrated. The evidence also
clearly shows that this inference and memory effect also occurs for both
positive and negative significant others (e.g., Andersen & Baum, 1994;
Andersen, Reznik, & Manzella, 1996), and holds across gender and indi-
vidual differences such as those who have one kind of self-discrepancy as
opposed to another kind from a parent’s standpoint (Reznik & Andersen,
2003; this research is described below) or who happen to have been physi-
cally abused by a parent (or not abused; see Berenson & Andersen, 2003).
It has also been shown that the effect can persist over time, so that once it
occurs, it can remain over, say, a week’s duration (Glassman & Andersen,
1999b).
It is also of interest that this inference and memory effect has been
shown to occur in part due to chronic accessibility of significant-other rep-
resentations. Our research has shown that even when the significant-other
representation has no particular applicability to a new person (i.e., there is
no applicability-based cueing), and when there is no immediately preceding
prime, there is a low-level tendency to use significant-other representations
more than, for example, other social category or person representations.
People tend to fill in the blanks about new people in accord with what they
know about significant others (Andersen et al., 1995; Chen, Andersen, &
Hinkley, 1999). This chronic effect is increased, however, with the presence
of cues indicating that a novel person is similar in some way to the signifi-
cant other. Other interpersonal work in social psychology has also demon-
strated similar additive effects of contextual cueing and chronic accessibil-
ity (e.g., Baldwin et al., 1996).
Automatic and Unconscious Activation

Perhaps the most commonly agreed upon assumption about transference
as proposed by Freud, and as revised by Sullivan, is that it should arise out-
side of conscious awareness. Although Freud’s conceptualization of con-
scious processes differs from ours, our assumption is and has been that
one’s knowledge about significant others is brought to bear on responses to
new people and that this happens quite automatically—without much in
the way of attention, effort, control, or conscious awareness (Andersen et
al., in press; see also Bargh, 1989).
There is also evidence supporting the idea that significant-other repre-
sentations may be used with particular ease or efficiency even outside of
transference. For example, research in which participants were asked to re-
trieve from memory and to list various features of a significant other has
shown that features of these representations are retrieved from memory ex-
ceptionally quickly as compared with features of other people or categories
(Andersen & Cole, 1990; Andersen et al., 1995).
To test the specific hypothesis about the unconscious activation of
transference, the question was framed in terms of whether or not the sig-
nificant-other representations could be activated subliminally—in a way
that would lead to transference. The research involved participants in a
computer game with another participant, allegedly seated elsewhere in the
building, about whom they might learn something. Afterward they com-
pleted an inference task about this person. During the “computer game,”
significant-other features were flashed for less than 90 milliseconds in
parafoveal vision and pattern-masked. In the yoked-control condition, par-
ticipants were exposed to these exact same features—that is, of someone
else’s significant other—and were also presented with these stimuli sublimi-
nally (Glassman & Andersen, 1999a). As predicted, across two studies, the
results clearly showed that participants in the significant-other condition
made more inferences about the new person that derived from their own
significant other than did participants in the control condition. Conscious-
ness is not a precondition for transference. In our research, we ask partici-
pants to be accurate in their perception of the new person, and we do not
ask them to compare the new person to anyone from their lives. Indeed,
when participants are excluded from the experiment if they happen to
spontaneously mention seeing the link between the new person’s features
and those listed weeks previously about a significant other, the inference
and memory effect still holds (e.g., Berenson & Andersen, 2003).
Overall, the transference phenomenon and the relational self should
arise relatively automatically, that is, effortlessly and even when one is un-
aware of it, does not intend to respond in this way, and has little control
over the process. Other evidence from within this paradigm, which we re-
view below, is also consistent with this assumption.
Evaluation and Affect

The relative immediacy with which we seem to form evaluations of new
people—and the minimal information we apparently need in order to do
this—are in some ways surprising. Once introduced to a stranger, we typi-

cally have an idea of how much we like the person, without devoting much
(or any) effort to scrutinizing the qualities this new person has. Our re-
search suggests that such rapid evaluations are often driven by significant-
other representations. Although we discuss evaluative and affective aspects
of transference in more detail later in the chapter, it is worth reviewing
some basic findings here.
A central tenet of social cognition is that when a mental representa-
tion, such as a stereotype, is activated in interpersonal perception and
applied to a new person, it should elicit the same positive or negative
evaluation—in accordance with the theory of schema-triggered affect
(Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986). We have shown that this occurs in transfer-
ence. That is, when participants learn about a new person who resembles
their own significant other (vs. that of a yoked participant), the new person
is evaluated more positively when he or she was portrayed so as to resem-
ble a positive significant other rather than a negative one (Andersen et al.,
1996; Andersen & Baum, 1994; Berk & Andersen, 2000) or when the new
person resembles the participant’s own rather than another participant’s
positive significant other (Baum & Andersen, 1999; Reznik & Andersen,
2003). That is, under the condition of resemblance to a positive significant
other, the new person comes to be particularly well liked, and this does not
occur in the control condition. Even evoking a parental representation in
transference associated with a self-discrepancy will also lead to the trans-
ference response as indexed by a more positive evaluation of the new per-
son (Reznik & Andersen, 2003).
Depending on how positively one regards any particular significant
other, one’s most basic and immediate emotional response to the person
should reflect this overall regard. If one loves a parent, then one should feel
a rather primordial and simple positive affect in relation to him or her: the
warm glow of familial bonding. Given this affect, it also makes sense that,
when such a positive significant-other representation is activated in trans-
ference, a relatively immediate positive emotional response should be expe-
rienced. Indeed, this is exactly what occurs in the form of subtle facial ex-
pressions (Andersen et al., 1996).
That is, when learning about a new person in our standard paradigm
by reading about him or her, participants’ facial expressions take on the
overall affect associated with the significant other—at the instance they see
each feature. This affective response, coded by trained judges who viewed
videotapes of participants’ faces while they were in this phase of the exper-
iment, reflected the overall evaluation of the significant other. These facial
expressions are emitted rapidly, apparently with little forethought, as auto-
matic evaluation is known to be (Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes,
1996). These data are thus suggestive about the relatively automatic nature
of such immediate affective responses (Andersen et al., in press), and also
the likely pervasiveness of such automatic affect in everyday social encoun-

ters, including those involving transference.
It is worth mentioning as well that our treatment of emotion and
affect in transference is compatible with the notion that people tend to ex-
perience a kind of “core affect” relatively instantaneously (Russell, 2003).
Such core affect is thought to involve the conscious experience of neuro-
physiological states that are heavily defined by sheer positivity or nega-
tivity (the dimension of pleasure), but also by the dimension of arousal.
Core affect is the building block of more finely tuned categories of
emotional experience that should result largely from attributional and ap-
praisal processes. A general tendency to evaluate even novel objects as pos-
itive or negative suggests that this kind of automatic evaluation is ubiqui-
tous (Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002). We argue that such
core affect in the form of positive and negative affective experiences should
be triggered in transference, and find that it in fact is. This research on
facial affect in transference has shown the basic positive versus negative
affective response based on the activation of a positive significant-other
representation. In later pages, we address the question of what kinds of
specific emotions are evoked in transference, and the conditions under
which this occurs based on the nature of the self–other relationship.
Expectancies of Acceptance and Rejection

In line with the need for connection as a fundamental human motive, re-
search also suggests that people are especially sensitive to contingencies of
acceptance and rejection in close relationships and that they store relevant
perceptions in memory as part of relationship structures (e.g., Andersen et
al., 1996; Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996; Downey & Feldman, 1996). We have
argued, in particular, that people’s expectations for the significant other’s
acceptance or rejection should also come into play in the context of trans-
ference. That is, when in a transference a new person resembles a positive
significant other, rather than a negative one, people should be more likely
to report expecting to be accepted by the new person and not rejected by
him or her. This is exactly what the evidence shows (e.g., Andersen et al.,
1996; Berk & Andersen, 2000).
Likewise, when the overall view of the significant other is held con-
stant as positive, as would typically be the case for a parent, research also
shows that even those individuals who have a conflictual relationship with
a particular parent—by having a self-discrepancy (see Higgins, 1987) from
this parent’s standpoint—still report acceptance expectancies in transfer-
ence. That is, they expect to be evaluated more positively (i.e., to be more
accepted) in a transference even when this transference involves a parent in
whose eyes they are self-discrepant relative to a control condition in which
they are exposed to control stimuli (Reznik & Andersen, 2003), which
shows how robust the phenomenon can be. On the other hand, there are
also limits. That is, when a parent who is reportedly loved was also physi-
cally abusive during one’s childhood, one is in fact more likely to expect re-
jection in the transference condition relative to the control condition
(Berenson & Andersen, 2003). In addition, when a significant other is
someone from one’s own family of origin and is positive, but is also some-
one with whom one tends to experience a dreaded self, one is also more
likely to expect rejection in the context of transference (Reznik & Ander-
sen, 2004). In short, anticipated acceptance or rejection from a new person
arises in transference in ways that can derive from a number of different
sources. One such source is how positive or negative the significant other is
seen to be. Another is the degree of negativity one experiences about the
self in the relationship. Expected acceptance or rejection in transference
thus depends more intricately on the content and quality of the relation-
ship than do some other indices of transference.
Other work has shown that people who are sensitive to rejection are
especially vigilant to cues of disapproval from others, and that their per-
ceptions of rejection and expectancies of more rejection are readily acti-
vated (Baldwin & Meunier, 1999; Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996; Downey &
Feldman, 1996). If rejection expectancies are stored with significant-other
representations, then the chronic accessibility of such representations,
which we have demonstrated, suggests one way in which rejection expec-
tancies with various significant others may generalize and be used in inter-
preting new social encounters.
Interpersonal Behavior
The notion that the patterns of behavior that one engages in with a partic-
ular significant other should be stored in the knowledge linking the signifi-
cant other with the self in memory is central to our assumptions. Hence,
another line of research has extended the paradigm into the realm of overt
behavior in a brief dyadic interaction, specifically, an unstructured tele-
phone conversation between the individual experiencing (or not experienc-
ing) transference and another entirely naïve individual (Berk & Andersen,
2000). In this kind of behavioral confirmation paradigm (Snyder, Tanke, &
Berscheid, 1977), we were thus able to examine each participant’s re-
sponses in the conversation and to focus particularly on the behavior of the
“target” person in the interaction when the main participant was or was
not experiencing a positive or a negative transference.
The results indicated that when the new person resembled the per-
ceiver’s own significant other, and hence transference occurred, the target’s
own interpersonal behavior was rated as containing more of the same
affect associated with the significant-other representation in memory,
whether positive or negative. The ratings of independent judges, who as-
sessed the target’s contributions to the conversation without being able to

hear what the perceiver was saying in the encounter, indicated more posi-
tive affect in the target’s voice in the positive versus the negative transfer-
ence, which did not occur in the control condition (Berk & Andersen,
2000). In short, behavioral confirmation—also known as the “self-fulfilling
prophecy”—arose in the target person’s behavior in transference. The tar-
get’s conversational behavior took on the emotional tone of the overall
affect linked with the significant-other representation and relationship.
Of course, the behavioral confirmation process is not thought to re-
quire any conscious intention to induce the other person into confirming
one’s expectations (see, e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1997), and hence it presum-
ably takes place more or less outside of perceivers’ awareness. In the pro-
cess, the affect triggered in transference unfolds sequentially in the interac-
tion in a way that involves it being reciprocated by the new person.
Minimally, this evidence concretizes the literature on transference by trac-
ing the transference process into its unfolding in behavior in an interaction,
further attesting to the power of the phenomenon.
The Working Self-Concept and Self-Evaluation

A common thread running through many findings in the interpersonal lit-
erature is that the self is experienced and expressed in different ways ac-
cording to the present interaction partner, whether this person is physically
present or absent (and thus mainly psychologically present). At the sim-
plest level, we posit that how the self is reflected upon, experienced, and
expressed in a relationship is encoded as part of the general relationship
structure and activated upon the activation of other elements. That is, peo-
ple experience different versions of the self with differing significant others,
and once reminded of a significant other, whether implicitly or explicitly,
this should evoke the relational self with that other.
Supporting this idea, knowledge of the self typically experienced with
a significant other comes flowing into the working self-concept when a
new person activates that significant-other representation (Hinkley &
Andersen, 1996). This occurs for both positive and negative significant
others. That is, one becomes the self one is with this significant other in the
context of transference, controlling for baseline self-definition (elicited at
pretest). Beyond the fact of this change to bring the features of the rela-
tional self into the transference, it is also possible to ask about the valence
of this shift in the self that occurs. Valence in the self is important because
self-evaluation and self-worth are of abiding interest. Indeed, the results
show that negative transference (when a negative significant-other repre-
sentation is activated) provokes an influx of especially negative features
into the working self-concept. A positive change in self-worth is evoked in
a transference involving a positive significant other, in each case control-
ling for baseline self-evaluation (at pretest) (Hinkley & Andersen, 1996).
Hence, shifts in self-evaluation and self-worth do occur in transference.
Moving beyond the positive–negative dichotomy in significant oth-
ers, it is also possible to examine self-evaluation when holding constant sig-
nificant-other evaluation and varying the nature of the self typically expe-
rienced with the significant other. That is, we examined transference with
a positive significant other associated with a dreaded self (rather than a
desired self; see Reznik & Andersen, 2004). It is entirely possible to like
or love a significant other, and yet to repeatedly find oneself enacting a
dreaded version of the self with this person. The results indicate that
when a significant other is associated with a dreaded self and this signifi-
cant-other representation is triggered in transference, the shift in self-
evaluation that occurs in the direction of the self-with-the-significant-
other becomes considerably more negative. This does not occur in the
absence of transference. Moreover, it does not occur when the transfer-
ence involves a significant other associated with a desired self. As an-
other way of verifying these findings, this research has also indicated
that when a dreaded self is elicited in a positive transference, the features
of the dreaded self become especially accessible, as indicated by response
latencies (Reznik & Andersen, 2004).
In our view, these findings suggest that transference may be a mecha-
nism both for stability in the relational self—due to the long-standing pres-
ence of these significant others in an individual’s life (and the chronic ac-
cessibility of these representations)—and for variability in the relational
self, through shifts in the self provoked by triggering cues in new people.
The latter—the triggering cues—are the “ifs”. The “thens” are the trans-
ference process and the shifts in the self that it entails (Andersen & Chen,
2002; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). In fact, heightened accessibility of relevant
relational-self features is consistent with our assumption that spread of ac-
tivation from the significant-other representation to relevant self-aspects
should occur when the significant-other representation is triggered in
transference (see Andersen et al., in press).
The shift in self-evaluation as a function of the relational self in trans-
ference is largely the kind of shift characterized in the model of contingent
self-worth, which also adopts an if–then approach (Crocker & Wolfe,
2001). In that model, and in the research based on it, cues that are particu-
larly relevant to contingencies of worth are the ones most likely to induce
shifts in self-evaluation. Our view is comparable and specifically focused
on the relational context of the self (see also Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996).
Shifts in the self are evoked in transference, as are shifts in expectancies for
rejection. Indeed, both kinds of shifts are also predicted to occur as a func-
tion of context and preexisting sensitivity to rejection, and this does tend
to occur, as the if–then model of rejection sensitivity suggests (e.g., Downey
& Feldman, 1996).
Activated Specific Needs and Motives in Transference
We have alluded to our assumptions about basic needs and motivations in

transference. In our view, motivation must be central to conceptualizing
the self in relation to others because of the emotional investment people
have in their relationships. As noted, motivation is also central both to at-
tachment theory and to interpersonal psychodynamic theories. Consistent
with many approaches to motivation and interpersonal functioning, we as-
sume the need for human connection—for relatedness, tenderness, attach-
ment, or belonging—to be central in our theory. The need for connection
fuels the “significance” of significant others, and also the desire for an ex-
perience of mutual caring, respect, trust, and love. On the other hand, we
acknowledge that other needs besides the basic need for connection are
also important. Needs for autonomy or freedom (e.g., Deci & Ryan,
1985), for competence or control (e.g., Seligman, 1975), for meaning (e.g.,
Becker, 1971), and for felt security (e.g., Epstein, 1973) figure prominently
in our model. Although research has yet to examine how all of these needs
might arise in transference, and potentially when they might combine
additively or interact in a relationship, research has demonstrated a role
for the motive to be connected in transference and also a role for the mo-
tive to protect the self (or for felt security).
In our theory, we take the view that motives and goals that involve
significant others are stored in memory as mental constructs linked with
those significant others and, like any other construct, can be activated by
contextual triggers (e.g., Bargh, 1990, 1997; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994).
When a significant-other representation is activated in transference, it
therefore influences cognition, affect, and behavior in goal-based ways—in
the context of the new relations experienced. The goal-based ways in
which transference influences people’s interpersonal responses can be seen
as falling into four classes: activating specific needs and goals; activating a
self-regulatory focus; producing a self-protective regulatory response; or
producing an other-protective regulatory response. We now consider each
of these in turn.
First, there is the simple matter that the motives and goals one has
with a significant other, which are stored with the significant-other repre-
sentation in memory, should be pursued with a new person in transference.
In particular, when experiencing a transference that involves a positive sig-
nificant other, rather than a negative one, people tend to experience a moti-
vation to approach the new person, in short, a motive to be emotionally
open with him or her overall—rather than to withdraw and to be distant
(Andersen et al., 1996; Berk & Andersen, 2000). A comparable effect also
arises when the significant other is a parent and one has a self-discrepancy
from that parent’s perspective. In spite of the self-discrepancy, emotional
closeness motivation is still evoked in transference (compared with a con-
trol condition) (Reznik & Andersen, 2003). In addition, complementing

the motivation to be close, evidence also suggests that people not only
“want” to be close to a new person who resembles a positive significant
other, but they also report that they in fact do “feel” closer to him or her
(Andersen & Strasser, 2000).
On the other hand, when the transference involves a positive signifi-
cant other with whom one tends to have a goal for love and acceptance
that is chronically unsatisfied, the transference will evoke less emotional
closeness motivation, presumably due to prior disappointment (Berk &
Andersen, 2004). With a transference involving such significant others,
people report less motivation to be intimate than they do in other condi-
tions. Hence, chronic goals with a significant other are evoked in transfer-
ence, along with the significant other’s typical responses to such bids.
Thus, this work links up nicely with other literatures in social cogni-
tion including research that has shown that goal states are automatically
activated (Bargh & Barndollar, 1996; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh,
Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; see also Aarts &
Dijksterhuis, 2000). Recent research has now begun to extend the auto-
motive perspective into the realm of behavior in interpersonal relationships
(Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; Shah, 2003a, 2003b).
Self-Regulatory Focus
Beyond the activation of a need or a goal by means of activating a signifi-
cant other, it is also of importance to ask about how self-regulation arises
in transference (Reznik & Andersen, 2003). To the extent that a particular
self-regulatory style or focus—that is, whether one is geared toward
obtaining positive outcomes or toward avoiding negative outcomes—is as-
sociated with the significant other, this self-regulatory focus should be acti-
vated in transference. For example, if a significant other has tended to
withhold affection or rewards based on poor performance, reaching his or
her ideals should become paramount (given the threat of the loss of love),
and should thus be triggered in transference. Likewise, if the other has
tended to threaten punishments (harsh treatment) based on poor perfor-
mance, then averting or avoiding these punishments should become impor-
tant, and should be triggered in transference (e.g., Andersen & Chen,
2002; also see Higgins, 1987). Self-regulatory responses should become
profoundly relevant in relation to significant others because these others
are uniquely positioned to comfort and enable an affective equilibrium.
Likewise, they are uniquely positioned to disturb one’s equilibrium simply
because of one’s emotional investment in their various responses.
According to self-discrepancy theory and self-regulatory focus theory,
self-discrepancies in which ideal standards are operative and discrepant
from the self are part of a broader self-regulatory system focused on pro-
motion and on attaining positive outcomes. By contrast, self-discrepancies
in which ought standards are operative and discrepant from the self are
also part of a broader self-regulatory system, in this case, focused on pre-
vention and on detecting and avoiding negative outcomes (Higgins, 1996b,
1996c). In particular, research has examined the degree to which activation
of a significant-other representation in transference would indirectly acti-
vate a self-discrepancy from the other’s perspective (Reznik & Andersen,
2003). That is, participants experiencing transference involving a signifi-
cant other from whose point of view they have an ideal self-discrepancy or
an ought self-discrepancy should experience the activation of this particu-
lar discrepancy, which should lead to the relevant self-regulatory focus.
Indeed, the results showed just this. More motivation to avoid the new
person in transference was evoked among ought-discrepant participants
expecting to meet a new person relative to when they were told they would
not need to do this, that is, during the precise moment that prevention was
relevant (Reznik & Andersen, 2003). On the other hand, among ideal-
discrepant participants, transference evoked less motivation to avoid the
new person while expecting to meet him or her as compared to when no
longer expecting to do so. No such pattern occurred for either group in the
no-resemblance condition. Hence, activation of the significant-other repre-
sentation in transference evoked the distinct self-regulatory system known
to be part of having an ideal versus an ought discrepancy. We see this as an
important contribution to regulatory focus research, since transference
arises in the face of novel interaction partners and shows the subtle impact
of significant others on the motivational system. Other recent research also
supports this, as well as the notion that such processes may occur outside
of awareness (Shah, 2003b, Study 3).
Self-Protective Self-Regulation
We now look at two forms of self-regulation based on the experience of
threat in the context of the transference. Both forms of self-regulation de-
pend on what exactly is threatened. Specifically, a threat to the self is likely
to produce self-protective self-regulation (e.g., Hinkley & Andersen, 1996),
and a threat to the other is likely to evoke other-protective self-regulation
(e.g., Andersen et al., 1996). In each case, the result is that one inflates
one’s view or enhances one’s positive emotions about whatever it is that is
under attack.
When a threat to the self is experienced with reference to a significant
other, then a kind of compensatory self-enhancement or self-inflation
should arise to protect the self. This kind of process has been widely ob-
served in other research literatures (e.g., Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985;
Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Showers, 1992; Steele, 1988; Taylor & Brown,
1988). Hence, such a process should arise in transference when what is
threatened in the transference is the self because the transference has nega-
tive implications for the self. One way in which a significant other may be
experienced as a threat to the self—as negative for the self—is when he or

she is disliked or not positively evaluated. As we have described, a negative
transference provokes an influx of negative self-features into the working
self-concept, the kind of threat to the self that ought to provoke a compen-
satory response, which we term “self-protective self-regulation” (Hinkley
& Andersen, 1996). The results show that this is exactly what occurs.
When the negative influx occurs, a parallel recruitment of positive (but
transference-unrelated) features into the self-concept also occurs, which
bolsters self-regard. The influx of negativity in self-evaluation provokes a
complementary self-enhancement.
Indeed, this should occur not only in a transference involving a nega-
tive significant other but also in a transference involving a positive signifi-
cant other—so long as this positive significant other is one with whom one
tends to experience a dreaded self (Reznik & Andersen, 2004; see also
Andersen et al., in press). As described earlier, the evidence indicated that
when the significant other associated with a dreaded self was activated in
transference, the relevant relational-self features flowed into the self-
concept that was negative in the dreaded self condition. The working self-
concept shifted toward the relational self with this significant other, reflect-
ing a threat to the self in the dreaded self condition. However, those aspects
of the self that did not shift in the direction of the relational self revealed a
compensatory self-enhancement. That is, when the dreaded self was
evoked in transference, an influx of positive self features also flowed into
the working self-concept, counteracting the threat.
Other-Protective Self-Regulation
The second form of self-regulation based on threat is other-protective. Peo-
ple are motivated to protect their perceptions of the significant others in
whom they are invested. The interdependence one has with significant oth-
ers for one’s own outcomes and well-being makes it clear why one may be
motivated to view a positive significant other as basically good, loving and
caring, and safe in spite of flaws. Indeed, people tend to transform the
flaws of their loved ones into virtues, thereby finding ways to regard short-
comings as particularly charming, funny, or endearing (e.g., Murray &
Holmes, 1993). The negative aspect of the other, which might otherwise be
problematic or threatening to one’s view, becomes a plus. Finding a way to
respond positively to negative qualities of the other may in fact be essential
to maintaining a close relationship, and may thus be very well practiced. If
this is well practiced, it ought to take place relatively automatically, which
is what our evidence on affect regulation in transference suggests.
In short, the relatively immediate expression of facial affect in trans-
ference yields especially positive affect in a positive transference when trig-
gering features were in fact negative (Andersen et al., 1996). In a positive
transference, people actually express more positive affect in their facial ex-
pressions in response to negative characteristics deriving from their posi-

tive significant other—as these negative features are encountered about a
new person. In the absence of transference, nothing of the kind occurs. The
positive regard for the significant other, not the valence of the features, de-
termines the emotion. Even though participants themselves classified these
features as negative at pretest (when they listed them before the experi-
ment), they also tended in the experiment to express positive affect to these
negative features
Cast in this light, this form of self-regulation would seem to be adap-
tive and useful for healthy relationships. When considered differently,
however, it becomes feasible that instead of minor annoyances in the be-
havior of a significant other, the negative qualities in question could actu-
ally be harmful. If one were to find oneself responding positively to nega-
tive behaviors that are potentially dangerous, this could be maladaptive.
Registering no alarm to signals of imminent danger could be profoundly
unhealthy.
In one study, for example, we asked how adults abused by a parent
would respond emotionally to the parent in terms of their automatic facial
affect (Berenson & Andersen, 2003). In general, when participants learned
about a new person who resembled their parent and this parent was one
who had been physically abusive while participants were growing up, they
actually showed far more positive facial affect than did comparable partici-
pants in the control condition (who were exposed to the same triggering
cues but did not experience transference). Schema-triggered facial affect
emerged in their facial expressions in spite of their painful history with this
parent.
Even more remarkably, this effect even obtained when we assessed
responses to a negative contextual cue about the new person in transfer-
ence (Berenson & Andersen, 2003). That is, because the abuse sequence
in abusive relationships often begins with signs of frustration or simmer-
ing anger in the abuser, responses of this kind may be signals of trouble.
This contextual cue was thus presented in the form of information that
the new person seemed to be in an increasingly irritable, angry mood,
and this was presented after the participant learned about the new per-
son who resembled his or her parent (or did not). In the transference
condition, participants came to express considerably more positive facial
affect in response to the cue that the new person was becoming increas-
ingly irritable and angry than they did in the nontransference condition.
Moreover, this held regardless of abuse status. Even among individuals
physically abused by the relevant parent (possibly even threatened with a
gun or a knife), learning about the new person’s increasingly irritable
mood evoked more positive facial affect in the transference than in the
control condition. In short, other-protective self-regulation appears to be
a common response to threatening cues in the context of a positive
transference.
Activating Subtle Shifts in Emotional Responses in Transference

We have shown, as noted, that a generic positive or negative affect will
tend to arise in transference. As we have argued, people are deeply emo-
tionally invested in those people in their lives whom they regard as person-
ally significant. Because of this investment, it stands to reason that signifi-
cant others would hold considerable sway in emotions. In this light, it is
curious that researchers interested in interpersonal aspects of the self have
focused relatively little research attention on the emotions (although see
Berscheid, 1994), although there have been some major exceptions, such as
self-discrepancy (Higgins, 1987) and attachment theories (e.g., Collins,
1996). We now turn to two areas where we have examined complexities in
the activation of affect: the dynamics of positive mood and the influence of
individual differences.
Generic Positive Mood and Its Disruption in a Positive Transference

Given that significant others are heavily laden with affect, these representa-
tions should be expected to influence, beyond the kind of relatively imme-
diate facial affect we have mentioned, more free-floating self-reported
mood as well. Evidence has in fact shown that transference may sometimes
evoke mood states consistent with the overall positivity or negativity of the
significant other. In one study, for example, participants experiencing a
transference involving a positive, rather than a negative, significant other
reported significantly less depressive mood, an effect that did not occur in
the absence of transference (i.e., in the control condition; see Andersen &
Baum, 1994). The effect size in this case, however, was quite small; more-
over, other studies have failed to replicate the effect in these simple terms
(Andersen et al., 1996).
Of course, as we have noted, research in our lab has shown that posi-
tive facial affect is evoked relatively immediately in the context of a posi-
tive transference, that is, when a positive significant-other representation is
activated (Andersen et al., 1996; Berenson & Andersen, 2003). Hence, us-
ing more sensitive measures, unbiased by the influences that impinge upon
self-reports, we found that transference clearly does have a relatively direct
effect on emotional responses. Indeed, we have argued, based on this evi-
dence on facial affect, that transference may evoke a kind of immediate
and generic “core affect” (see Russell, 2003). Moreover, it is feasible that
such subtle and immediate emotional responses may in part be the basis of
the overall mood states that do (or do not) arise in transference.
This makes it even more pressing to understand exactly how it is that
positive mood states do not always arise in the context of positive transfer-
ence. Perhaps the explanation has to do with the fact that affective re-
sponses that arise slowly over the course of an experimental session are
likely to be influenced by numerous expectancies and cognitions in the ses-

sion beyond the first moments of learning about the new person. In exam-
ining this question, we thus consider a number of factors that may interfere
with a positive mood in the context of a positive transference. The nature
of the disruption of positive mood can stem from contextual factors with
the new person, aspects of the relationship with the significant other, or as-
pects of the self in the relationship. We consider each in turn.
Contextually Based Expectancy Violation through Interpersonal

Roles. Most significant-other relationships are defined partly by norms
that derive from the particular role relationship one has with the signifi-
cant other. The interpersonal role with the other involves well-developed
expectations and is stored in memory with the relationship. In this respect,
a role is normative and prescriptive. It specifies what is expected of each
person. Hence, when the significant-other representation is activated in
transference, the relevant role relationship should also be activated, along
with the expectancies that are part of the role. As this implies, even though
these expectancies may be (and may have been) typically fulfilled by the
significant other, contextual factors may make it unlikely that the new per-
son in the transference will be able to fulfill the expectations—for example,
if he or she is in a different role. Role violations violate expectations,
which in turn should provoke negative mood.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that this is exactly what occurs (Baum &
Andersen, 1999). When signals indicate that a new person will not be able
to adopt the complementary interpersonal relational role that the signifi-
cant other adopts, positive affect is attenuated. Authority figures who are
positive and significant, for example, do many things well, ranging from
supporting and encouraging, to tutoring, guiding, and critiquing. When an
activated significant-other representation activates the authority role and
the new person then turns out not to be an authority but to be a novice,
however, the role violation disrupts positive affect. This evidence is impor-
tant both because it begins to show how positive affect may be compro-
mised in a positive transference and because there is a considerable litera-
ture on interpersonal roles and norms, along with associated motives and
expectancies, and the notion of role violation (e.g., Fiske, 1992; Mills &
Clark, 1994; see also Bugental, 2000; Kenrick, Li, & Butner, 2003). Dem-
onstrating the link between these literatures and research on the relational
self is important and shows the further reach of the relational self.
Chronic Needs Violation and Chronically Unsatisfied Goals. In some

relationships with positive significant others, of course, one’s needs,
wishes, and expectancies in the relationship may go unmet rather chroni-
cally, as part of the dynamic of the relationship (Berk & Andersen, 2004).
This should be associated with disappointment in the relationship, even
though the relationship is positive. For example, an important goal with

any positive significant other is to be liked or loved and accepted, and this
particular goal may chronically go unmet in the relationship, or, by con-
trast, may regularly be satisfied. Research thus examined such relation-
ships in the context of transference with an eye toward understanding the
limiting conditions on positive affect in the context of a positive transfer-
ence.
As predicted, the results indicated that activation of chronically unsat-
isfied goals for acceptance and affection with a loved significant other oc-
curs indirectly in transference when the significant-other representation is
activated. Moreover, this leads to increases in negative affect, specifically in
hostility, in spite of the fact that the significant other is loved. Beyond this,
when the individual was actually bound to the significant other by blood,
as is the case with family (i.e., of origin) members, it is specifically the case
that increases in hostility in transference, presumably based on the prior
disappointments, was nonetheless associated with an increased tendency to
engage in overt behavior designed to get the new person to respond more
positively. This suggests that a tendency to persistently pursue strategies to
gain acceptance in prior relationships (even when they have not worked in
that relationship) may sometimes be evoked in transference. In short, the
evidence shows that positive affect is disrupted in a transference involving
a relatively positive significant other when goals for love and acceptance
that have chronically gone dissatisfied are triggered, based on significant-
other activation. Yet, precisely to this extent, behavioral striving for this
love and acceptance may persist.
Chronic Self-Violation of Own Preferences in Transference. Another

way of thinking about chronic violations with significant others is to focus
on the self—that is, on an individual’s own responses (Reznik & Andersen,
2004). It is entirely possible to like or love a significant other, and yet to re-
peatedly find oneself enacting a dreaded version of the self with this per-
son. As aversive as this may be, if one is bound to the other, for example,
by blood because the person is in one’s family of origin (a parent, sibling,
etc.), it may not seem feasible to exit the relationship or to change patterns.
When the significant-other representation is activated in transference, the
dreaded self typically experienced with the other should also be activated.
In turn, the emotional concomitants of this dreaded self should also be
evoked in decreased positive and increased negative affect.
The results have emerged just as predicted. Activating a mental repre-
sentation of a positive family-of-origin significant other associated with a
dreaded self, rather than with a desired self, leads to increases in global
negative mood as well as to decreases in global positive mood. In the ab-
sence of transference, no such effects occurred. Overall, one’s global regard
for a significant other is not sufficient to predict free-floating mood states
in transference. It is important instead to take into account the specific na-

ture of the self typically enacted with the significant other. When the as-
pects of self experienced with the other violate the individual’s own prefer-
ences and wishes, this disrupts positive mood in a positive transference.
In sum, the weight of the evidence in the arena of global positive and
negative affect in transference suggests that the violation of expectancies—
of goals linked to interpersonal roles, of chronic needs with the significant
other, and of preferences about which aspects of the self will and will not
be expressed with a significant other—may all disrupt positive mood in an
otherwise positive transference.
Specific Negative Emotions in Transference Rooted in Individual Differences

Evoking specific negative emotions (e.g., sadness/dysphoria as distinct
from hostility or anxiety) in a positive transference requires, in our view,
more refined conceptualization taking the self better into account. Self-
discrepancy theory and self-regulatory focus theory both suggest that spe-
cific emotional vulnerabilities are associated with self-discrepancies and
also that one may have a self-discrepancy from one’s own perspective or
from the perspective of a parent (e.g., Higgins, 1987, 1996b). People’s be-
liefs about their parent’s hopes for them (their parent’s “ideals”) and their
beliefs about their parent’s sense of their duties and obligations (their par-
ent’s “oughts”) are standards that may be particularly influential for a per-
son, and may indeed be discrepant from how the parent actually views
them (i.e., their “actual self” from the parent’s perspective). When the ac-
tual self is discrepant from ideal standards, it evokes depression and dejec-
tion-related affect, whereas when the actual self is discrepant from ought
standards, it evokes agitation-related affect. The model implies that repre-
sentations of parents are linked to representations of self, by being linked
to the self-standards and self-discrepancies held from the parent’s perspec-
tive. If this is correct, it should be the case that activating a parental repre-
sentation will activate any self-discrepancy from the parent’s standpoint,
triggering the concomitant emotional vulnerabilities.
In research involving a liked or loved parent and self-discrepancies
held from the parent’s perspective (Reznik & Andersen, 2003), the evi-
dence indicated that individuals with an ideal self-discrepancy from the
perspective of one of their parents did in fact end up experiencing more
depressed mood in transference when the representation of their parent
was activated, than when not, an effect that did not occur among ought-
discrepant individuals. Likewise, ought-discrepant individuals showed more
agitation-related affect as indexed by resentful and hostile mood in the
context of the transference condition than in the control condition (see
also Strauman & Higgins, 1988), an effect that did not occur among ideal-
discrepant participants. In short, the evidence shows that specific negative
emotions relating to individual differences in self-discrepancy can be

evoked as a function of a positive transference. The evidence (see also
Andersen & Chen, 2002) thus forges a theoretical and empirical link be-
tween our work on the relational self and transference and research and
theory on self-discrepancies and self-regulatory focus, thereby enabling
specific affects to be predicted in transference (Reznik & Andersen, 2003;
for related evidence, see also Shah, 2003b).
In our recent work, we theorize and attempt to demonstrate that
transference may be a basic mechanism underlying the attachment system.
Future research will show the usefulness of attachment style as yet another
important individual difference allowing us to predict specific emotions
arising in transference.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Research in our lab on the social-cognitive phenomenon of transference

spans a period of more than 15 years. It springs from psychoanalytic theo-
ries, borrowing the century-old concept of transference from Freud’s psy-
choanalysis, as later extended by Sullivan, as well as from assumptions
about fundamental needs and motives, including the need for human con-
nection and those related to attachment theory. Assumptions about social
cognition also fundamentally frame the work and make it possible. The re-
search has provided experimental evidence for the phenomenon of trans-
ference. It has also demonstrated that the phenomenon involves basic cog-
nitive, affective, and motivational effects that occur as people make sense
of novel persons in terms of those important people from their own lives
whom new people tend to resemble to some greater or lesser degree. The
research focuses on the activation and use of mental representations of sig-
nificant others. Because of linkages between each significant other and the
self, this research on transference forms the basis for the theory of the rela-
tional self (Andersen & Chen, 2002), which shows how the self shifts
across differing interpersonal contexts (see also Andersen et al., 1997).
Our work has thus helped address the long-standing conundrum in social
psychology about whether the self is malleable or stable in its experience
and expression, through highlighting the relational nature of the self.
The research has made use of an innovative methodology in a labora-
tory setting to overcome obstacles to a harnessing of the otherwise elusive
phenomenon of transference. The conceptual and methodological tools of
social cognition have been essential both in building a framework for un-
derstanding the transference process and for bringing the basic notion of
transference to empirical life in social psychology. The research shows that
inferences and evaluations of the new person change based on transference—
when the significant-other representation is activated and used in relation
to a new person—and so do feelings about the new person and motives to

approach or avoid him or her, and even one’s own sense of self and at-
tempts at self-regulation in relation to him or her. The research has shown
that several forms of self-regulation are evoked in transference and are a
part of the operation of the relational self across varying life contexts. In
short, the self fluctuates across the contexts of life in terms of which signifi-
cant-other representation is activated in the transference experience.
Indeed, the evidence also suggests that emotions are evoked in trans-
ference, and that these depend on the exact nature of the self with the sig-
nificant other. Emotions cannot be reduced to the global evaluation of the
activated significant-other representation (such as how liked and loved vs.
how disliked and detested the person is). How much one loves or detests a
significant other is insufficient to fully account for emotions in transfer-
ence. The relational self with this specific significant other is what is rele-
vant in these varying emotions.
This line of research combines various methodologies and crosses
bridges to different subdisciplines of psychology including clinical psychol-
ogy (e.g., psychodynamic thinking), social psychology and cognitive psy-
chology, as well as to subareas of social psychology such as those focused
on the self, relationships, emotion, self-regulation, and so on (see Andersen
& Saribay, in press). Beyond our specific methodological procedures, our
use of a combined idiographic–nomothetic method has made it possible to
tap the specific, idiosyncratic aspects of an individual’s actual life—and
this assures the meaningfulness of the stimuli used in the research. At the
same time, this allows us to examine generalizable mental processes in an
experimental paradigm to show the impact that transference has across a
range of people. The fact that the evidence extends into the realms of moti-
vation, self-regulation, and emotion also shows the breadth of the effect’s
relevance for emotional suffering and vulnerability, as well as for what
may contribute to resilience. It is likely, beyond this, that specific linkages
to psychopathology—as linked to interpersonal relationships—may be illu-
minated in future work.
More broadly, it is our view that future work in this area is especially
valuable to the degree that it continues to unfold in integrative ways, in-
voking specific paradigms from individual subfields of personality and so-
cial psychology, as linked with the transference phenomenon, to illustrate
the utility and relevance of the transference concept. Simultaneous exami-
nation of cognitive, affective, motivational, and behavioral microprocesses
can also be especially valuable in yielding insights about exactly how prior
relationships influence present ones and also simple, daily encounters. In
addition to this level of analysis, it is also likely that research at a more
macro- or superordinate level of analysis, that shows how these levels of
analysis are linked to significant others, the relational self, and relation-
ships more broadly, will be important in future research. That is, the link-
ages between phenomena in social and personality psychology involving

social identities and social identification in the context of societal institu-
tions and cultural context, with the relational level of analysis, deserves
considerably more inquiry than they have received. Such research may be-
gin to shed further light on the broader relevance of relational aspects of
identity for social identifications (with groups), which is sorely needed (see,
e.g., Andersen, Tyler, & Downey, in press; also see Sedikides & Brewer,
2001). While this was not the focus of the present chapter, pursuit of this
kind of extension is ongoing among research that is likely to further trace
the potential reach of the relational self. Simply put, people experience
themselves in relation to those who are most significant to them, which has
implications for everyday social encounters, and is likely to have broader
societal implications as well.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This research was funded in part by Grant No. R01-MH48789 from the National
Institute of Mental Health.
REFERENCES
Aarts, H., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2000). Habits as knowledge structures: Automaticity

in goal-directed behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 53–
63.
Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Walters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attach-
ment: A psychological study of the Strange Situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Andersen, S. M., & Baum, A. (1994). Transference in interpersonal relations: Infer-
ences and affect based on significant-other representations. Journal of Personal-
ity, 62, 459–498.
Andersen, S. M., & Chen, S. (2002). The relational self: An interpersonal social-cog-
nitive theory. Psychological Review, 109, 619–645.
Andersen, S. M., & Cole, S. W. (1990). “Do I know you?”: The role of significant oth-
ers in general social perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
59, 383–399.
Andersen, S. M., & Glassman, N. S. (1996). Responding to significant others when
they are not there: Effects on interpersonal inference, motivation, and affect. In
R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cogni-
tion (Vol. 3, pp. 262–321). New York: Guilford Press.
Andersen, S. M., Glassman, N. S., Chen, S., & Cole, S. W. (1995). Transference in so-
cial perception: The role of chronic accessibility in significant-other representa-
tions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 41–57.
Andersen, S. M., & Klatzky, R. L. (1987). Traits and social stereotypes: Levels of cate-
gorization in person perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
53, 235–246.
Andersen, S. M., Reznik, I., & Chen, S. (1997). The self in relation to others: Motiva-
tional and cognitive underpinnings. In J. G. Snodgrass & R. L. Thompson
(Eds.), The self across psychology: Self-recognition, self-awareness, and the self-
concept. New York: New York Academy of Science.
Andersen, S. M., Reznik, I., & Glassman, N. S. (in press). The unconscious relational
self. In R. Hassin, J. S. Uleman, & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The new unconscious. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Andersen, S. M., Reznik, I., & Manzella, L. M. (1996). Eliciting facial affect, motiva-
tion, and expectancies in transference: Significant-other representations in so-
cial relations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 1108–1129.
Andersen, S. M., & Saribay, S. A. (in press). Thinking integratively about social psy-
chology: The example of the relational self and the social-cognitive process of
transference. In P. A. M. Van Lange (Ed.), Bridging social psychology. Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Andersen, S. M., & Strasser, T. (2000). Self-maintenance processes in transference:
Dis-identifying with aspects of self to remain close to another and to regulate af-
fect. Unpublished manuscript, New York University.
Andersen, S. M., Tyler, T. R., & Downey, G. (in press). Becoming engaged in commu-
nity: Personal relationships foster social identification. In G. Downey, C.
Dweck, J. Eccles, & C. Chatman (Eds.), Social identity, coping, and life tasks.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Baldwin, M. W., Fehr, B., Keedian, E., Seidel, M., & Thompson, D. W. (1993). An ex-
ploration of the relational schemata underlying attachment styles: Self-report
and lexical decision approaches. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19,
746–754.
Baldwin, M. W., Keelan, J. P. R., Fehr, B., Enns, V., & Koh-Rangarajoo, E. (1996). So-
cial-cognitive conceptualization of attachment working models: Availability
and accessibility effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 94–
109.
Baldwin, M. W., & Meunier, J. (1999). The cued activation of attachment relational
schemas. Social Cognition, 17, 209–227.
Baldwin, M. W., & Sinclair, L. (1996). Self-esteem and “if . . . then” contingencies of
interpersonal acceptance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71,
1130–1141.
Bargh, J. A. (1989). Conditional automaticity: Varieties of automatic influence in so-
cial perception and cognition. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended
thought (pp. 3–51). New York: Guilford Press.
Bargh, J. A. (1990). Auto-motives: Preconscious determinants of social interaction.
In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cogni-
tion: Foundations of social behavior (Vol. 2, pp. 93–130). New York: Guilford
Press.
Bargh, J. A. (1997). The automaticity of everyday life. In R. S. Wyer Jr. (Ed.), Ad-
vances in social cognition (Vol. 10, pp. 1–61). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bargh, J. A., & Barndollar, K. (1996). Automaticity in action: The unconscious as re-
pository of chronic goals and motives. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A. Bargh (Eds.),
The psychology of action: Linking cognition and motivation to behavior (pp.
457–481). New York: Guilford Press.
Bargh, J. A., Bond, R. N., Lombardi, W. L., & Tota, M. E. (1986). The additive nature
of chronic and temporary sources of construct accessibility. Journal of Personal-

ity and Social Psychology, 50, 869–878.
Bargh, J. A., Chaiken, S., Raymond, P., & Hymes, C. (1996). The automatic evalua-
tion effect: Unconditionally automatic attitude activation with a pronunciation
task. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32, 185–210.
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. Ameri-
can Psychologist, 54, 462–479.
Bargh, J. A., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1994). Environmental control of goal-directed ac-
tion: Automatic and strategic contingencies between situations and behavior.
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 41, 71–124.
Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P. M., Lee-Chai, A., Barndollar, K., & Trötschel, R. (2001).
The automated will: Nonconscious activation and pursuit of behavioral goals.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 1014–1027.
Baum, A., & Andersen, S. M. (1999). Interpersonal roles in transference: Transient
mood states under the condition of significant-other activation. Social Cogni-
tion, 17, 161–185.
Becker, E. (1971). The birth and death of meaning (2nd ed.). New York: Free Press.
Berenson, K., & Andersen, S. M. (2003). Childhood physical abuse by a parent:
Transference-based manifestations in adult interpersonal relations. Unpub-
lished manuscript, New York University.
Berk, M. S., & Andersen, S. M. (2000). The impact of past relationships on interper-
sonal behavior: Behavioral confirmation in the social-cognitive process of trans-
ference. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 546–562.
Berk, M. S., & Andersen, S. M. (2004). Chronically unsatisfied goals with significant
others: Triggering unfulfilled needs for love and acceptance in transference. Un-
published manuscript, New York University.
Berscheid, E. (1994). Interpersonal relationships. Annual Review of Psychology, 45,
79–129.
Bombar, M., & Littig, L. Jr. (1996). Babytalk as a communication of intimate attach-
ment: An initial study in adult romances and friendships. Personal Relation-
ships, 3, 137–158.
Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and loss: Vol. 1. Attachment. New York: Basic Books.
Bowlby, J. (1973). Attachment and loss: Vol. 2. Separation: Anxiety and anger. New
York: Basic Books.
Bowlby, J. (1980). Attachment and loss: Vol. 3. Loss: Sadness and depression. New
York: Basic Books.
Bretherton, I. (1985). Attachment theory: Retrospect and prospect. Monographs for
the Society for Research in Child Development, 50, 3–35.
Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual process model of impression formation. In T. K. Srull &
R. S. Wyer Jr. (Eds.), A dual process model of impression formation (pp. 1–36).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bruner, J. S. (1957). Going beyond the information given. In H. E. Gruber, K. R.
Hammond, & R. Jessor (Eds.), Contemporary approaches to cognition (pp. 41–
69). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bugental, D. B. (2000). Acquisition of algorithms of social life: A domain-based ap-
proach. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 187–219.
Cantor, N., & Mischel, W. (1979). Prototypes in person perception. In L. Berkowitz
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 12, pp. 3–52). New
York: Academic Press.
Chen, M., & Bargh, J. A. (1997). Nonconscious behavioral confirmation processes:
The self-fulfilling consequences of automatic stereotype activation. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 541–560.
Chen, S., & Andersen, S. M. (1999). Relationships from the past in the present: Sig-
nificant-other representations and transference in interpersonal life. In M. P.
Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 31, pp. 123–
190). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Chen, S., Andersen, S. M., & Hinkley, K. (1999). Triggering transference: Examining
the role of applicability and use of significant-other representations in social
perception. Social Cognition, 17, 332–365.
Collins, N. L. (1996). Working models of attachment: Implications for explanation,
emotion, and behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 810–
832.
Crocker, J., & Wolfe, C. T. (2001). Contingencies of worth. Psychological Review,
108, 593–623.
Cross, S. E., Bacon, P. L., & Morris, M. L. (2000). The relational-interdependent self-
construal and relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78,
791–808.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in hu-
man behavior. New York: Plenum Press.
Downey, G., & Feldman, S. I. (1996). Implications of rejection sensitivity for intimate
relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 1327–1343.
Duckworth, K. L., Bargh, J. A., Garcia, M., & Chaiken, S. (2002). The automatic
evaluation of novel stimuli. Psychological Science, 13, 513–519.
Ehrenreich, J. H. (1989). Transference: One concept or many? Psychoanalytic Re-
view, 76, 37–65.
Epstein, S. (1973). The self-concept revisited or a theory of a theory. American Psy-
chologist, 28, 405–416.
Fiske, A. P. (1992). The four elementary forms of sociality: Framework for a unified
theory of social relations. Psychological Review, 99, 689–723.
Fiske, S. T., & Pavelchak, M. (1986). Category-based versus piecemeal-based affec-
tive responses: Developments in schema-triggered affect. In R. M. Sorrentino &
E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition (pp. 167–203).
New York: Guilford Press.
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-
Hill.
Fitzsimons, G. M., & Bargh, J. A. (2003). Thinking of you: Nonconscious pursuit of
interpersonal goals associated with relationship partners. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 84, 148–164.
Freud, S. (1958). The dynamics of transference. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The
standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol.
12, pp. 97–108). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1912)
Freud, S. (1963). The dynamics of transference. In P. Rieff (Ed.), Therapy and
technique (pp. 105–115). New York: Macmillan. (Original work published
1912)
Glassman, N. S., & Andersen, S. M. (1999a). Activating transference without con-
sciousness: Using significant-other representations to go beyond what is sublim-

inally given. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 1146–1162.
Glassman, N. S., & Andersen, S. M. (1999b). Transference in social cognition: Persis-
tence and exacerbation of significant-other based inferences over time. Cogni-
tive Therapy and Research, 23, 75–91.
Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1985). Compensatory self-inflation: A response to
the threat to self-regard of public failure. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 49, 273–280.
Greenson, R. R. (1965). The working alliance and the transference neurosis. Psycho-
analytic Quarterly, 34, 155–179.
Gurung, R. A. R., Sarason, B. R., & Sarason, I. G. (2001). Predicting relationship
quality and emotional reactions to stress from significant-other-concept clarity.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1267–1276.
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relationships. New York: Wiley.
Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. Psychologi-
cal Review, 94, 319–340.
Higgins, E. T. (1989). Knowledge accessibility and activation: Subjectivity and suffer-
ing from unconscious sources. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended
thought (pp. 75–123). New York: Guilford Press.
Higgins, E. T. (1996a). Knowledge: Accessibility, applicability, and salience. In E. T.
Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic prin-
ciples (pp. 133–168). New York: Guilford Press.
Higgins, E. T. (1996b). Ideals, oughts, and regulatory focus: Affect and motivation
from distinct pains and pleasures. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The
psychology of action (pp. 91–114). New York: Guilford Press.
Higgins, E. T. (1996c). The self-digest: Self-knowledge serving self-regulatory func-
tions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 1062–1083.
Higgins, E. T., & King, G. (1981). Accessibility of social constructs: Information pro-
cessing consequences of individual and contextual variability. In N. Cantor & J.
F. Kihlstrom (Eds.), Personality, cognition and social interaction (pp. 69–121).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Higgins, E. T., & Silberman, I. (1998). Development of regulatory focus: Promotion
and prevention as ways of living. In J. Heckhausen & C. Dweck (Eds.), Motiva-
tion and self-regulation across the life span (pp. 78–113). Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Hinkley, K., & Andersen, S. M. (1996). The working self-concept in transference: Sig-
nificant-other activation and self change. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 71, 1279–1295.
Horney, K. (1939). New ways in psychoanalysis. New York: Norton.
Horowitz, M. J. (1989). Relationship schema formulation: Role-relationship models
and intrapsychic conflict. Psychiatry, 52, 260–274.
Horowitz, M. J. (Ed.). (1991). Person schemas and maladaptive interpersonal pat-
terns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kelly, G. A. (1955). The psychology of personal constructs. New York: Norton.
Kenrick, D. T., Li, N. P., & Butner, J. (2003). Dynamical evolutionary psychology: In-
dividual decision rules and emergent social norms. Psychological Review, 110,
3–28.
Kernberg, O. (1976). Object relations theory and clinical psychoanalysis. New York:
Jason Aronson.
Kohut, H. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities
Press.
Linville, P. W., & Fischer, G. W. (1993). Exemplar and abstraction models of per-
ceived group variability and stereotypicality. Social Cognition, 11, 92–125.
Luborsky, L., & Crits-Christoph, P. (1990). Understanding transference: The CCRT
method. New York: Basic Books.
McGowan, S. (2002). Mental representations in stressful situations: The calming and
distressing effects of significant others. Journal of Experimental Social Psychol-
ogy, 38, 152–161.
Mikulincer, M. (1998). Adult attachment style and affect regulation: Strategic varia-
tions in self-appraisals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 420–
435.
Mikulincer, M., & Horesh, N. (1999). Adult attachment style and the perception of
others: The role of projective mechanisms. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 76, 1022–1034.
Mills, J., & Clark, M. S. (1994). Communal and exchange relationships: Contro-
versies and research. In R. Erber & R. Gilmour (Eds.), Theoretical frameworks
for personal relationships (pp. 29–42). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive-affective system theory of personality:
Reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in person-
ality structure. Psychological Review, 102, 246–268.
Morf, C. C., & Rhodewalt, F. (2001). Unraveling the paradoxes of narcissism: A dy-
namic self-regulatory processing model. Psychological Inquiry, 12, 177–196.
Murray, S. L., & Holmes, J. G. (1993). Seeing virtues in faults: Negativity and the
transformation of interpersonal narratives in close relationships. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 65, 707–722.
Murray, S. L., & Holmes, J. G. (1999). The (mental) ties that bind: Cognitive struc-
tures that predict relationship resilience. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 77, 1228–1244.
Pierce, T., & Lydon, J. (1998). Priming relational schemas: Effects of contextually ac-
tivated and chronically accessible interpersonal expectations on responses to a
stressful event. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 1441–1448.
Pierce, T., & Lydon, J. E. (2001). Global and specific relational models in the experi-
ence of social interactions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80,
613–631.
Prentice, D. (1990). Familiarity and differences in self- and other-representations.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 369–383.
Reznik, I., & Andersen, S. M. (2003). Individual differences and the emotions evoked
in transference: Indirect triggering of self-discrepancies and self-regulatory fo-
cus through significant-other representations. Unpublished manuscript, New
York University.
Reznik, I., & Andersen, S. M. (2004). Becoming the dreaded self: Diminished self-
worth with positive significant others in transference. Unpublished manuscript,
New York University.
Rusbult, C. E., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (1996). Interdependence processes. In E. T.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
"And you came from the Lazy S just to see it?"
"Yes, but why all the questions? It's a free country, isn't it?"
"For some people," the man scowled.
"Well, it is for us, so we'll be going. Come on, boys." She gathered up
her reins as if about to mount.
"Not quite so fast," the man snapped. "I've got another question to ask
you."
"Well, make it snappy. It's getting late."
"Why did you hide when you heard us coming?"
"I thought you'd ask that. Suppose I don't choose to tell you."
"You'd better."
"Why?"
"Never mind why. You answer my question."
"Is that a threat?"
"Perhaps."
"Well, I don't like threats." Sue's black eyes snapped as she spoke and
both the boys wondered what was coming next. "So I don't think I will tell
you. Now what are you going to do about it?"
"I'll soon show you," and the man took a step forward, but Bob, unable
to keep his hands off any longer, sprang in front of him.
"You keep your hands off her," he demanded.
"And if I don't?"
"I'll make you."
"You'll do what?" the man sneered.
"Try it and see."
The man hesitated a moment, and Bob wondered what was passing in his
mind. It was hardly conceivable, he thought, that he was afraid of him,
especially when he had his friends so near at hand. Perhaps it was
something in the girl's eyes that made him draw back. At any rate, he made
no further movement toward her, and after giving Bob an angry look, turned
and strode off without another word.
"Well, what do you know about that?" Jack asked as soon as he had
disappeared.
"I thought I could bluff him," Sue said, "but if you hadn't stepped up to
him as you did, I don't know as it would have worked," she added turning to
Bob.
"Well, I'm mighty glad he let it go at that," Bob assured her. "I would
have been a baby in his hands."
"I'm not so sure of that," Sue said with an admiring glance at him. "I'll
bet you would have kept him busy."
"I'll say he would," Jack assured her. "Bob's some scrapper and knows
how to take care of himself when it comes to a rough and tumble."
They waited as the sound of the men's voices grew more and more faint
and when they could no longer be heard, Sue proposed that they start.
"I was afraid that they'd come back, but I guess they've really gone," she
said.
They made their way slowly back to the trail stopping to listen now and
then, but there was no sign of the men and, as soon as they reached the path,
they started for home as fast as they dared urge the horses. They had
covered about half the distance down the other side of the mountain when
Bob, who was in the lead, rounded a huge rock which hid the trail from
view, and almost ran into a man, mounted on a roan horse. He was a man
well over the average in size and had an abundant crop of long red hair: Red
Hains beyond the shadow of a doubt.
Bob looked at the man for a moment too dazed to speak, and the big man
returned the scrutiny, a cynical smile parting his lips.
"Wall, do yer see it?" he finally growled.
"I beg your pardon," Bob smiled. "You see, the surprise was so great that
I fear I was a bit rude."
"Rude, eh, wall, I should say yer was rude, staring at a man like he was a
wild animal. Whar yer goin'?"
"Down the hill."
"Don't yer 'spose I kin tell that much? I mean, what's yer destination? Is
that plain?"
"Oh, you want to know where I live?"
"That's it."
"I live in Maine."
"Yer trying ter kid me?"
"No. You asked me where I live and I told you."
"Whar yer stoppin' now?" the man demanded in an angry tone.
"At the Lazy S."
"Now yer gettin' down ter brass tacks. Why didn't yer say so in the first
place and save all the wind?"
Bob made no reply to this question and, after a moment, the man asked:
"Did yer meet some men a while back?"
"Yes."
"Whar 'bouts?"
"Just over the top of the hill."
"Wall, if yer know when yer well off yer'll keep a still tongue in yer head
'bout havin' seen them an' me, too," the man threatened as he started his
horse and pushed past them.
"That was Red Hains," Sue said as soon as he was out of hearing.
"I reckon there's no doubt of it," Bob agreed.
"And those others must be his gang," Jack added.
"Surest thing you know," Bob assured him.
"Well, he sure does look the part," Sue declared with a shrug of her
shoulders. "I wish they could catch him."
"A consummation devoutly to be desired," Bob smiled. "But I imagine

he's a pretty slippery customer."
"You said it," Sue affirmed.
"Do you suppose his hiding place is anywhere in these hills? I mean the
place where he hides the cattle he steals," Jack asked.
"It's more than likely," Sue replied. "You see, it's only a few miles to the
border and he'd naturally choose a place not too far from the line so that he
wouldn't have to drive them very far."
"It seems likely," Bob agreed. Then, after a moment's pause, he said:
"I've an idea. Jack, you ride home with Sue and I'll follow that fellow a bit
and who knows but I may find out where they hang up."
"Not on your life," Sue objected. "Boy, you don't know what you'd be up
against. It's not like your Maine woods where you know your way around.
Besides, they're bad men, who would think no more of killing you than they
would of shooting a steer."
"But I wouldn't let them catch me," Bob argued.
"Maybe not, but then again they might. They know this country and you
don't and that gives them a big advantage."
"But think of the opportunity. They are probably on the way to their
hiding place and there may never be so good a chance again. It's worth the
risk."
"No, it isn't. Remember, I'm responsible for you till we get back to the
ranch."
"But I'll be mighty careful and won't go far."
"Suppose you get lost?"
"Not a chance. You see, I couldn't get lost on these hills, as all I'd have to
do would be to keep on down hill till I got to the bottom and then I'd be out
of the woods."
They argued the matter for some moments and finally Sue gave a
reluctant consent, although Jack shook his head and urged him to go on
with them. But Bob declared that it would be almost criminal to let such a
chance slip, and after a while he, too, gave in.
"But you be home before dark," was Sue's final command as they started
off again.
"Sure thing," Bob agreed as he turned his horse up the trail.

CHAPTER VI.
BOB CAPTURED.
"Maybe I am doing a fool thing," Bob thought as he urged the horse up

the rough trail. "One thing's dead sure. I've got to be mighty careful,
because I'm up against a bad bunch and no mistake."
For a half-hour he pushed on as fast as he dared urge the horse, stopping

to listen every few minutes. But no sound, save the rustle of the tree-tops as
hey swayed in the light breeze, came to him. Whether or not he was gaining
on the man he could not tell, but he had seen no sign of him when he
reached the top of the mountain.
"He must be making good time," he thought as he paused to allow Satan

to get his breath. "I wonder how far they'll follow the trail." Then the
thought struck him that he was doing a very foolish thing to expose himself
there where there were no trees to hide him from view and he at once
started to follow the trail down the other side. "I must keep my eyes open
for a side trail," he thought a few minutes later as he again plunged into the
thick forest.
He had gone, perhaps, a mile from the top when his eye caught sight of a
narrow path running off toward the north. The place where it branched off
the main trail was just beyond a huge pine tree and was so well hidden that,
had he not been on the watch for just such a thing, he would never have
seen it.
"Now I wonder," he mused as he drew rein. Then he slipped from the

saddle and closely scrutinized the entrance to the narrow path. There had
been no rain for several weeks and the ground was very hard and dry, but
his knowledge of woodcraft stood him in good stead and he had little
trouble in reading that several horses had turned off there not long since.
The pathway was so narrow and filled with rocks that it seemed to him
almost impossible that a horse could traverse if, and, after a moment's
thought, he decided to leave Satan there and follow the new path on foot.
He led the horse into a deep thicket where there was little likelihood that
he would be seen by any one passing along the trail and tied him to a small
sapling. Then he plunged into the narrow trail jumping from rock to rock
the better part of the time. He figured that he could probably make better
time on foot than they would make on horseback, as they would be obliged
to go very slowly or risk breaking a horse's leg. It got worse as he went
along and had it not been for unmistakable signs, which his trained eye was
able to read, he would not have believed it possible that a horse could get
over the ground.
"I must be gaining on them," he thought after he had covered what he

judged was a mile from the main trail.
A moment later a rattlesnake gave his ominous warning only a foot or

two in front of him as he reared his ugly head above a rock and the boy
jumped to one side so quickly that he slipped from a rock and came down in
a heap, giving his right foot a sharp wrench. The pain, for an instant, made
him sick but he crawled hastily backward until he was several feet away.
"Here's a pretty kettle of fish," he thought as he stood up and tested his

weight on the injured leg.
To his great joy, however, he found that it was only a slight sprain and
that he could bear his weight on it without causing a great amount of pain.
For a moment he seriously considered the advisability of giving it up and
going back, but he was not made of the stuff that gives up easily and he
determined to push on for a while at least. But another sharp rattle in front
fold him that an enemy was protesting his right of way. He had an
automatic in his pocket and, as he was a good shot, he knew that there
would be little difficulty in disposing of the protestor were it not for the fact
that the shot would be certain to alarm the men somewhere ahead of him.
"That would never do," he thought as he picked up a stone about the size
of his fist.
The snake's head was out of sight as he straightened up but rose into
view as he took a step forward. The distance was about ten feet and he
hurled the stone with all his strength but, to his disappointment, he missed.
But he was more fortunate the second time, the rock striking the snake's
head fair and square. The head went down out of sight behind the rock and
he could hear it thrashing about. He waited a few minutes then, picking up
another larger rock, stepped cautiously forward. He had no way of knowing
how badly he had injured his snakeship and, as the noise of the writhing had
stopped, he judged that he had either killed it or else it was coiled ready to
spring. So he tossed the stone in the air in such a way that it fell just behind
the rock which hid the snake from his sight. It made no sound when it
struck from which he judged that it must have landed on the snake. He
waited a moment longer and, hearing nothing, judged that the sake must be
dead. So he stepped nearer until he could see over the rock.
The snake was dead, its head mashed to a jelly by the second rock which
had landed fairly on it. It was a large one, fully as long as the one Sue had
shot earlier in the day.
"I'm going to keep those rattles," he said to himself as he drew his knife
from his pocket and cut them off.
He could not make quite so fast time now as he was obliged to favor his
leg which now gave him considerable pain when he bore his weight on it.
"If I don't meet up with something before long I'll have to give it up, as I
promised to turn up before dark," he thought as he pulled out his watch and
noted that it was nearly four o'clock. "If I don't strike something in another
half-hour I'll turn back. That'll give me time to get back before dark, I
guess."
It was about twenty minutes later when the sharp crack of a rifle brought
him to a quick stop.
"That wasn't very far away," he thought as he listened.
Then, a moment later he heard the sound of a man's voice off to his right.
He was unable to distinguish the words although, from the sound, he could
not be far away. The forest was very dense and he felt sure that he could
creep fairly close to them without running much risk. So he turned from the
path and, moving with extreme caution, crept from tree to tree, listening all
the while. Soon he heard the voice again and now it was nearer, so near, in
fact, that he had no difficulty in hearing what he said.
"It's about time Red was gettin' here, don't you think?" the voice asked.
"He'll get here all right, give him time," a second voice replied.
"Wall, I don't like him bein' so confounded long 'bout it," the first voice
growled.
"Aw, yer always a stewin' 'bout somethin' or other. Why don't yer take
things easy like I do?" a third voice broke in.
All the time the boy was creeping nearer until finally, peering out from
behind a thick clump of bushes, he could see the men sitting beneath the
limbs of a large tree while their tired horses were hobbled only a few feet
away. To his disappointment there was no sign of any place which would
serve as a hiding place for stolen cattle. He watched for a few minutes and
then, judging that he had probably learned all that he could and that he
would have barely time to get back to the ranch before dark, he got
carefully to his feet and was about to start when, suddenly a pair of
powerful arms were thrown about him and he was borne to the ground. He
realized at once that it would be useless to resist, so he kept quiet and after a
moment the man seized him by the collar and jerked him to his feet.
"So it's you, eh," he said roughly.
"It would seem so," Bob replied quietly.
"Perhaps yer won't be quite so fresh in answerin' my questions now."
Bob made no reply and the man asked:
"What yer doing here?"
"I guess it's plain enough," Bob replied.
"It's plain enough ter me that you were spying on us."

Bob knew that it would be useless to deny the obvious fact, so he said
nothing.
"Can't yer speak?" the man growled.
"I can, but what's the use?"
"I guess yer're right thar. I caught yer red-handed, so ter speak. But come
on an' we'll see what the rest of the gang think about it."
Still keeping his great hand on Bob's collar he half-dragged and half-led
him to where the others were waiting.
"What yer got thar, Red?" one of them called as soon as they came in
sight.
"Name it an' yer kin have it," Hains laughed. Then as he came into their
midst, he continued:
"I caught this feller a piece back thar watchin' of yer. What'll we do with
him?"
"Why, that the same boy that was with the girl and other boy we found
back a little way off the main trail."
Both because he used better language than the others and by his black
hair and beard, Bob recognized the speaker as the man who had found them
earlier in the day.
"So you met 'em?" Hains asked.
"Yes, and believe me the girl was as pretty as a picture and she had some
tongue, believe me."
"An' I 'spose that on account of her prutty face yer let 'em go," Hains
snapped.
"Not exactly on account of that," the man replied. "But there didn't seem
any reason not to."
"I 'spose not, but how 'bout this feller? Want me ter let him go?"
"That's a different thing entirely," the man said. "He was caught spying
on us and that makes a difference."
"I'll say it does, a heap of difference," one of the other men broke in.
"Wall, boys, what'll we do with him?" Hains demanded.
"Give him a necktie party," one proposed.
"String him up," another shouted.
"Aw jest put a bullet whar it'll do the most good," a third suggested.
Bob was scared. He knew that he was in the hands of desperate men,
men who would stop at nothing if they thought their safety was threatened,
and his heart sank as he heard the suggestions from the different members
of the band. How he wished he had listened to Sue and his brother and was
safe back at the ranch.
"He's only a kid," suggested the black-haired man.
"But he big enough ter tell what he's seen," another declared.
"Sure he is, but what has he seen?"
"He's seen us, ain't he?"
"And so have a lot others."
"Aw, what's the use o' arguin' 'bout it I'll do the trick," a man who had
not spoken before, said as he drew an ugly-looking revolver from his belt,
and Bob gave an involuntary shudder.
"Hold on thar, Tim," Hains ordered and the man replaced the gun,
growling something which Bob did not catch. "Let's get supper first an' then
we'll tend ter him. Now, kid, you stay put right thar and if yer try to get
away yer'll get a bullet that'll stop yer. Get me?"
Bob did not doubt that the man meant exactly what he said and he sank
down on a rock with a sigh which he could not repress. Not that he had
given up hope, but he could not help feeling that his situation was desperate
in the extreme. Perhaps after all, he thought, the men were only trying to
scare him. He tried to force himself to believe that such was the case but got
little comfort from the hope. Closing his eyes for a moment he breathed a
silent prayer for protection and, somehow, after that he felt better.
By this time the men had a big fire going and all were busy getting ready
the meal except Hains and the black-haired man. They were talking
earnestly together a little apart from the rest, and it seemed to the watching
boy that the black-haired man was urging the other to some course of
action. But, if so, it appeared that his argument was not meeting with much
success, for Hains frequently shook his head and finally turned away and
went to where the horses were hobbled and carefully looked each one over
as though to satisfy himself that none could wander away.
The entire party seemed, for the time at least, to have forgotten all about
the boy, for no one paid the slightest attention to him. He watched them
carefully and, had it not been for his injured leg, he told himself, he would
have made the attempt to slip away into the dense woods, trusting that he
might get enough of a start before he was missed to enable him to escape.
But hampered, as he knew he would be, with the sprain, he dared not
risk it. So he waited as patiently as possible, wondering what the outcome
would be. Finally the supper, consisting of lamb, which they had roasted
over the fire, potatoes and hot coffee, was ready and the men began to eat
hungrily, still completely ignoring him. Again he was minded to attempt to
get away, but the fear of the injured leg again held him back. He pulled out
his watch and saw that it was well past six o'clock and he began to feel
hungry.
After what seemed a long time, one of the men, at an order from Hains,
came to him bearing a good-sized hunk of meat and a couple of potatoes on
a piece of birch bark, and a tin cup about half-filled with coffee.
"Here yer are, Kid," he said. "Eat, drink and be merry, for ter-morrow,
who knows."
He sat the food down on the ground and turned back. Bob picked it up
and, although there was neither knife, fork or spoon, he managed to eat it
all. The potatoes were a bit soggy, but the meat was good and he was
surprised at the quality of the coffee.
"The fellow who made that coffee knows his job all right," he said to
himself as he drained the last of it.
Greatly to his surprise the men, after they had cleaned up after the meal,
continued to pay not the slightest attention to him, and soon dusk began to
steal over the forest. He could see that a number of the men were playing
cards on a blanket, which they had spread on the ground in front of the fire,
while others, rolled up in their blankets, for it was beginning to grow cool,
were already fast asleep. Apparently it was their intention to pass the night
there, and he began to wonder if, after all, it would not be best to make the
attempt to escape. He could hardly suppose that they had forgotten him, but
he could see no indication that they were aware of his existence.
He had seen neither Hains or the black-haired man since he had eaten
and he wondered what had become of them. Were one or both of them
concealed somewhere where they could watch him? If he made the attempt
to get away would it be to give them the chance for which they were
waiting?
"It's a toss up either way," he thought. "If they intend to put me out of
business they'll do it sooner or later unless I give them the slip, so I don't
know that I'd be much worse off even if I don't succeed. I'm going to make
a stab at it just as soon as it gets a bit darker."
The game of cards evidently was getting more and more exciting and he
could hear the men as they made their bids and often a violent oath broke
from the lips of first one and then another as the card went against them.
Darkness settled rapidly and, a few minutes after he had made his
decision, he was able to see only a few feet from where he sat unless he
looked toward the fire.
"As well now as any time," he thought as, without making the slightest
sound, he began to hitch himself farther away from the fire. He moved three
or four feet and then stopped and listened, watching the men to see if they
were aware of his movements. But the game went on with no abatement
and foot by foot he increased the distance between them and him. At no
instant would he have been in the least surprised to have felt those powerful
arms close about him or even to have felt the impact of a bullet. But nothing
happened and soon he felt that he was far enough away to get up and run
for it. Although he was in the dense forest the trees were not very close
together and there was little or no underbrush, which enabled him, even in
the darkness, to make fairly good speed, and at the end of another ten
minutes, he felt that he was reasonably safe, at least so far as they were
concerned.
But he well knew that not yet was he out of the woods, either literally or
figuratively speaking. Could he find his way back to where he had left
Satan? He was not so sure that he could, but he thanked God that he had, at
least, escaped from what had at the time, seemed almost certain death. If he
only had a flashlight, he thought as he slowed down his pace and began to
hunt for the narrow trail which led to the main path. Once he found that he
felt that he would be reasonably safe and he thought that he was moving in
the right direction but could not be certain. He knew how difficult it was to
maintain a correct sense of direction in the woods, especially at night.
Soon he was sure that, had he been going in the right direction, he ought
to have reached it and turned sharply to the left. He was walking very
slowly now, both on account of the injured leg which was giving him
considerable pain every time he stepped on it, and because he knew that
should he cross it without being aware of it, the chances were that he would
not find it, at least, until morning. For another fifteen minutes he pushed on
and then stopped suddenly. Was that a shout he heard? He listened and
almost at once the sound was repeated. Someone was calling and the shout
was answered by another not very far away. They had missed him and were
searching the woods.
A shudder passed through him as he thought what would probably

happen to him if they again got him into their clutches. Another shout,
which sounded only a short distance in front of him answered almost
immediately from off at his right, made him realize that his enemies had
him nearly if not quite surrounded. Unless he found some way of safety
very soon he would be caught for sure. He could now and then see flashes
of light as his pursuers made use of their electric torches. He had not the
slightest idea of which way to go and, for a moment, despair settled on him.
It seemed impossible that he could escape. Then as he took a step forward,
his cap was brushed from his head by the limb of a tree. As he stooped to
recover it, an idea struck him. Although it was so dark that he could see but
a few feet he could tell that the tree in front of him was thick-branched and,
in another minute, he was rapidly making his way toward the top. The tree
was tall and he did not stop until he was so near the top that the trunk was
only a few inches through. Then, straddling a limb, he crouched as close to
the trunk as he could get and waited. He had done all he could and he
breathed a fervent prayer that they would not find him.
As he crouched there he could hear the men calling one to the other and
all the time they were coming nearer. Flashes of light stabbed the darkness
but, so dense were the branches beneath him, he only caught an occasional
glimpse like the gleam of a firefly. Soon he was aware that two of them had
met directly beneath him, and strained his ears to hear what they were
saying.
"I told Pete to keep an eye on him," were the first words he could
distinguish, and he thought it was Hains' voice.
"I guess Pete got too much interested in his cards," the other said.
"Wall, I'll larn him ter get mixed up with other things when I tell him to
do sumpin'."
"I wouldn't be too hard on Pete, Red. The kid isn't worth it and after all,
what does it matter if he does get away. It's already known that we are in the
country and what he could tell wouldn't hurt us any."
From the language as well as the voice Bob knew that it was the black-
haired man talking. He was the only one in the gang who, so far as he had
heard, used decent English and he wondered how the man came to be
associated with such a crowd.
"'Tain't that I mind the kid so much, but it's the principle o' the thing that
makes me mad. Long's I'm boss they've got to mind what I say."
"That's right so far as it goes, but I warn you that you'll make a big
mistake if you go to rubbing Pete the wrong way just now. He doesn't like
you any too much and the all the boys do like him. First thing you know
he'll get the drop on you and then your rule will be over."
"Aw, what yer givin' us? I tell yer I kin handle a dozen Petes and any o'
the rest of 'em, fer that matter."
"All right, have it your own way," the other replied nonchalantly. "But
don't forget that I warned you."
At this moment two more of the gang joined them and Bob heard one of
the newcomers say:
"I guess the kid's flew der coup."
"Looks like it," Hains replied in a sullen tone. "Where's Pete?"
"Dunno."
"Wall, I guess we might's well get back ter camp. 'Tain't much use
huntin' round here in the dark."
Bob breathed a deep sigh of relief as he heard the men move off in the
darkness. For some time he could hear them talking and shouting as they
called to others of the gang. Gradually their voices grew fainter and soon all
was still and he deemed it safe to descend. But when he reached the ground
he found that he had entirely lost his sense of direction and had not the
slightest idea as to which way to go.
"Guess the safest thing will be to stay right here till morning," he
concluded after thinking the matter over for some time. "If I start out I'll be
just as apt to blunder into their camp again as I am to find that trail."
A glance at the luminous face of his watch told him that it was nearly ten
o'clock. The sky had clouded over and it was steadily growing colder, but
he was dressed fairly warm in his woolen shirt and knew there was little
danger of catching cold.
"I don't knew whether to chance it on the ground or to roost up in that

tree," he thought as he groped about on the ground to find a soft spot.
Finally he found a place about twenty feet from the tree which he had
climbed which was thick with dry moss and decided to risk it. His foot was
giving him considerable pain and he quickly pulled off his shoe and
stocking and felt of the ankle. It was pretty sore and he judged that it was
swollen slightly, but he was thankful that it was no worse. For some time
the ache in his ankle kept him awake but finally wearied nature asserted
itself and he slept.
CHAPTER VII.
BOB MAKES A CONVERT.
It was about five o'clock when Sue and Jack reached the ranch. Jeb was
on the porch as they drove up.
"Where's Bob?" he asked.
Sue told him what had happened and he listened until she had finished
the frown on his face getting deeper and deeper.
"And you let him do that fool thing?" he said as she paused.
"I didn't let him. He just did it. I told him not to and tried to get him to
give it up," she replied.
"It was not her fault," Jack told him. "You see, when Bob makes up his
mind to do a thing wild horses couldn't stop him and he was bound to do
this so you mustn't blame her."
"But that was Red Hains and his gang you met," Jeb groaned. "If they
catch him spying on them, good night."
"But they won't catch him," Jack asserted.
"How can you tell that?" Jeb asked quickly.
"I guess it's only a hunch, but I feel it in my bones that he'll turn up all
right. You see, he always does."
But the man was not convinced and the frown was still on his face as
they led the horses toward the corral.
"I feel mighty guilty," Sue confided to Jack as they removed the saddles.
"You needn't. You did all you could to keep him from going."
"Just the same if anything happens to him I'll never forgive myself."
"Nor I for that matter," Jack agreed.
As they turned back to go to the house they; saw two men riding in
through the gateway.
"There's Slim and Slats and they seem some excited," Sue said.
That the two boys were excited became more apparent as, their horses
reeking with sweat, they pulled up in front of the corral.
"Where's the fire?" Sue asked.
"It's worse nor fire," Slats asserted as he slid to the ground.
"Tell us quick," Sue cried impatiently.

"It's more cattle stealin', that's what 'tis," Slim declared as he undid his
saddle girth.
"Where and when?" Sue was now fully as excited as the men.
"Last night over at the Bar Z."
"How many?"
"Close onter 150, so Herb Walters told us. We met him 'bout five miles
out."
"Do they think it was the Hains Gang?" Jack asked anxiously.
"Course it was. Who else could it been?" Slim looked at the boy with a
glance of pity.
"But we met Hains and his gang up in the mountains along about noon,"
Sue told them.
"You what?" Both the men asked the question together.
"You heard me the first time. I said we met Hains and his gang up in the
mountains.
"Well, of all the horned toads," Slats began but Slim interrupted.
"Where was they goin' at?"
"You'll have to ask Bob that when he gets back."
"Gets back from where?"
"I don't know where. He insisted on following them to see if he could

learn where they were going."
"Was he tryin' to commit suicide?"
"Do you think there is much danger?" Sue looked from one to the other.
"Would there be any danger if yer held a sidewinder in yer hand and
invited him ter have a free lunch off yer?"
Jack turned pale as Slats was speaking. "But he won't let them catch
him," he protested.
"If he can help it, you mean," Slats snapped. "When did he aim ter get
back?"
"He promised to get to the ranch before dark," Sue told them.
"Well, I hope he keeps his word."
While talking they had been walking toward the house and Jeb met them
at the steps.
"What do you think of this fool move of Bob's?" he asked.
"Fool is right," Slim replied.
"Think we'd better go hunt for him?"
"If he don't show up afore long I reckon we'll have ter do it."
"Well, we'll have supper first. Any news?"
Slim told him of the raid on the stock at the Bar Z and Jeb looked very
thoughtful as he finished.
"It's bad, mighty bad," he said. "It's only a question of a short time
before it'll be our turn unless something's done."
"You said it, boss," Slats agreed and Slim nodded his head.
Supper was a very quiet meal as no one seemed inclined to talk much
each one being busy with his own thoughts. First Sue and then Jack would
step to the door and look off across the prairie to see if Bob was in sight but
each time a shake of the head announced their disappointment to the others.
"But it's not dark yet," Jack said as he sat down after his fourth trip to the
porch.
"Not for nearly two hours," Jeb added.
As soon as the meal was finished they all three gathered on the porch
and it is probable that not one of them took their eyes from the distant hills
during the next half hour.
"We'll wait till seven o'clock and if he don't show up by that time we'll
start," Jeb said as he started down the path which led to the 'shack' where
the cowboys lived. "I'll tell the boys to get the horses ready and, if we have
to go, we can pretty near get to the hills before dark," he added.
When the hour came and brought no sign of the missing boy they set out.
Three of the men were left behind, much against their wishes, as Jeb did not
wish to leave the ranch entirely unprotected. At first he refused to allow Sue
to accompany them, but the girl pleaded so hard that she finally had her
way, as she usually did, and of course, Jack would not hear to being left
behind.
"We'll probably meet him before we get very far," Jeb said as they swept
out of the yard.
"I hope so," Jack replied trying to make his voice sound cheerful.
* * * * * * * *
When Bob awoke the sun was shining. He opened his eyes slowly and,
for an instant, wondered where he was. Then memory returned and he sat
up.
"Well, I had a good sleep anyway," he said half aloud as he got to his
feet.
Although his ankle still hurt when he bore his weight on it he was glad to
note that the pain was considerable less than it had been the night before.
"Now if I can only find Satan," he thought as he looked about trying to
determine which way to go. "Wonder if he's as hungry as I am."
Ordinarily the position of the sum would have told him which way to go
but, inasmuch as he was not at all certain of the direction in which he had
fled during the darkness, he could not be sure. So he determined that he
would again climb the tree in the hopes that the view from the top would set
him straight. The tree was a very tall one overtopping any other near by
and, when he had reached the limb on which he had rested before, he had a
good view over a considerable distance. But it all looked so much alike that
he could pick out no distinguishing mark which was at all helpful to him.
"I'm pretty sure that the path is over that way," he said aloud, pointing
toward the top of the ridge. "I must have crossed it in the darkness without
knowing it."
Feeling reasonably certain that he was right he quickly descended and

set off. He had not gone very far when he came to a small brook running at
right angles to the way he was going. The water was clear and cold and he
was very thirsty but, although he welcomed the stream for the sake of the
water, it caused him much uneasiness as he could not remember having
crossed it the night before.
"I guess I'm lost all right," he thought as he straightened up after

drinking his fill. However he was convinced that he was moving in the right
direction in a general sense at least, in that the top of the ridge lay that way.
"Perhaps this brook takes a sharp turn not far away and that may be the
reason I didn't cross it."
And a few minutes later he was sure that he was right for he came to a
small path leading through the woods.
"I'm all right now," he thought turning to the right and, with a light heart,
he pushed on as rapidly as the injured ankle would permit.
For an hour he hurried along. The fact that the path seemed much less
rough than it had been yesterday caused him much uneasiness, but he
trusted that it was due to his imagination but, when a second hour had
nearly passed and he had not struck the main trail, he was obliged to
acknowledge to himself that it was not the path he had taken before.
"Guess there's only one thing to do and that's to get up to the top of the
ridge and go down the other side. I'm bound to come somewhere. Looking
for Satan now would be like hunting for a needle in a hay stack," he thought
as he came to a stop. "I ought to have known that this wasn't the right path."
So he turned off to the left and plunged into the thick forest. Once off the
narrow pathway it was very rough going. The trees were so close together
that it was impossible to keep in anything like a straight course and there
was much underbrush through which, at times, he had literally to push his
way. But Bob was a boy who did not easily get discouraged and, although
he was tired and hungry, he kept steadily on never doubting, but that he
would find his way out sooner or later.
He had been off the trail for about half an hour and had been climbing
nearly all that time when he heard a shout. He thought it was off to his right
and paused undecided whether or not it would be advisable to answer it. It
probably was one of the boys hunting him but, then again, it might be one
of the Hains' gang and he hesitated to take the chance. For several moments
he listened, but the shout was not repeated and he started on again. In
another half hour he had reached the top of the ridge but whether he was
above or below the main trail he was unable to determine as, at that point,
the top was heavily wooded. So, after a moment's thought, he decided that
he had better go straight down trusting that he would strike open ground
and be able to get his bearings. It was now ten o'clock and he thought he
ought to reach the foot of the mountain by noon.
"I suppose they're wondering what has become of me," he thought as he

started off again. "If I only had something to eat it wouldn't be so bad, and it
wouldn't make much difference what it was just so it was grub."
He had hardly started when he heard another shout and this time it was
much closer but he did not dare venture to answer it. As before the call was
not repeated but, as he stood listening, he heard the sound of something
making its way through the underbrush and it was coming directly toward
him. Was it a beast or a man, and if the latter, was he friend or foe? The boy
glanced hastily about to find a place of concealment where he could see
without being seen. But, as bad luck would have it, there seemed no such
place at hand and the best he could do was to hide behind the trunk of a big
tree. The man, for by this time he knew by the sound that it was a man, was
close at hand and he could hear him breathing heavily as he stopped not ten
feet from the tree. If only he dared peep out. But he knew that would be to
risk discovery, so he waited hoping that the man would speak and that from
the sound of his voice, he would be able to tell who he was. He did not have
long to wait for, almost immediately he heard him mutter:
"I dunno what in thunder Red wanted ter send me off on a wild goose
chase like this fer."
"It's one of the gang," Bob thought and he feared that the man would
hear his heart beating it sounded so loud to him.
"I'm jest agoin' ter take a rest here," he heard him say and was aware that
he had thrown himself on the ground.
"I hope he doesn't rest long," Bob thought as he carefully shifted his
weight onto the other leg.
But, although he moved with the most extreme caution, he was unable to
avoid a slight rustling of leaves which evidently caught the man's ear, for he
heard him start up and, a moment later he could hear him getting to his feet.
Then he came directly toward the tree.
Knowing that further concealment was out of the question, the boy
determined to put on as bold a front as possible and stepped out to face him,
holding his revolver in his hand.
"Well, if it ain't the kid," the man said as he saw the boy. "Thought thar
was sumpin' behind that tree."
"You thought right," Bob assured him. Then, putting as much

indifference as possible into his voice, he asked: "Were you looking for
me?"
"Laws, no," the man replied. "What made yer think that?"
"I just thought it possible," Bob replied easily.
"Well, put up yer gun, sonny. Thar's no need o' guns atween friends. I
ain't a goin' ter hurt yer any."
Bob had recognized the man as one of those who had advised giving him
a necktie party the night before and was not at all deceived by his friendly
attitude. But he was a small man, not much over a hundred and twenty
pounds, and he felt sure that if it should come to a fight he could hold up his
end. So he slipped the revolver back in his pocket.
"Where were you going?" he asked indifferently.
"No where in particular," the man answered. "Whar you hittin' it fer?"
"I'm going back to the ranch."
"Oh."
For the moment Bob was looking the other way and, when he turned, he
was gazing straight into the barrel of an ugly looking automatic.
"What's the big idea?" he asked quietly.
"Yer're easy you are," the man grinned.
"So it would seem. May I ask what you are going to do with me?"
"Yer'll find out soon 'nough."
"Good. I hate to be held in suspense."
"Yer may be suspended sooner yer think fer," the man grinned. "But if
yer try any funny business it won't be necessary."
"But why should it be necessary in any event?"

"That's our business. Now turn 'bout face an' start up the hill and mind
yer step."
Bob knew that the time to start anything was not yet so he did as he was
ordered without hesitation, but his brain was busy. He did not intend to be
led back, or driven for that matter, to the Hains gang. He was only too well
aware of the reception that awaited him, for he did not doubt for a minute
but that the man had been hunting for him, and, as he trudged along, he was
busy thinking how he get hold of his captor without getting shot. That the
man would shoot him if he felt that his safety was in danger, he had not the
slightest doubt. Then again, he knew that the quicker he acted the better
chance of success he would stand because there was no telling how soon
they might meet some other member of the gang.
Determined to act as soon as the slightest chance of success offered he

watched his opportunity and it soon came. A large tree trunk lay directly in
front of him and, instead of going around it, he climbed over it taking all the
time he dared so that when he jumped down on the other side his captor was
just pulling himself up on to it. He hesitated as though uncertain which way
to go until he knew that the man was standing up on the trunk ready to jump
down. Then like a flash he turned and, catching hold of the man's ankles,
gave a strong pull. The move was so sudden and unexpected that the man's
feet were yanked from beneath him before he had time to realize what had
happened, his gun going off as he fell.
Before he had time to recover himself Bob was on top of him and they
were thrashing about each trying to get a firm hold on the other. Bob almost
at once got a hold on the hand which held the gun and with a sudden twist
sent it flying. Although the man was undersized he was wiry and the boy
was amazed at his strength but, to his great satisfaction, he soon discovered
that he knew nothing regarding the science of wrestling. All he had was
brute strength while Bob was an adept. So, once the gun was out of the way
he felt fairly confident. But the man was fighting like a wild cat and Bob
had all he could manage for some moments to keep his hands away from
his throat.
He hoped that his exertions would soon wind him but, as the struggle
continued, there was no abatement of his fury and Bob decided that he had
better take the offensive without waiting longer. He was underneath at the
moment and with a sudden twist of his body he succeeded in throwing him
off and, an instant later, he had a half Nelson about his neck. Back he bent
the arm until it seemed that the bone must snap, but the man continued to
struggle.
"It'll snap pretty soon," Bob told him. "Better give up."
"All right, you win," the man gasped his face distorted with pain.
Bob immediately released his hold and sprang to his feet. For a moment
the other lay on the ground rubbing his arm then he too got slowly up.
Bob was pretty certain that he had no other gun as he had taken the
opportunity of feeling for it while they were on the ground, but he watched
him closely ready to spring for him if he made a movement toward his
pocket.
"What you call it, that hold?" he panted.
"That was a half Nelson."
"Half Nelson, eh. Well all I got ter say is that I'd sure hate ter run up
against a whole one."
"It's pretty good when you know how to handle it."
The man had taken a step forward and, as Bob spoke, he suddenly aimed
a blow at his head. Although Bob was on the watch for some such move,
the quickness of it deceived him and the fist landed squarely on the point of
his chin, and he went down. With an exultant cry the man sprang forward,
but before he could reach him again the boy was on his feet. The blow,
although a heavy one, had not landed with its full force as Bob had drawn
his head back in time and he had fallen more because of catching his heel
on a root than from the blow itself. The man hesitated as though surprised at
the quickness with which Bob had got to his feet.
"So that's the way you play the game," Bob said.
"What you mean play the game?"
"Why, up where I come from when a man cries quits he's done, that's
all."
"But I'm not done yer'll find out in 'bout a minute," he snarled as he
sprang forward.
Bob dodged the blow without any great effort and, as he lurched by from
the force with which he had struck, he got in a clip behind the ear which
almost but not quite knocked him over. The man recovered himself and
returned to the attack with a snarl of rage. But Bob was ready for him and
as he rushed he caught him fairly on the point of the chin. It was a heavy
blow and the man went down but he was not knocked out and was on his
feet almost immediately. Evidently he realized by this time that he was no
match for the boy with his fists for this time he rushed at him head down in
an effort to catch him about the knees. It was exactly what Bob had been
hoping for and he set himself to meet it, and the next instant a very
surprised outlaw was flying through the air over his head to fall with a thud
all the fight and most of the wind knocked out of him. It was a trick Bob
had learned from the Jap teacher of wrestling at the college and it now
stood him in good stead.
The outlaw writhed on the ground gasping for breath as Bob stepped up
and stood over him.
"That's another good one," he told him, but he had not yet recovered his
breath sufficiently to be able to speak.
Seeing that he was "hors de combat" for the present at least, Bob stepped
a few feet away and began looking for the outlaw's gun. He knew the
direction in which it had been cast, but it was some moments before he
located it. When he returned the man was sitting up with his back against a
tree but he was still having a hard time breathing.
"Getting your wind back?"

The man simply scowled in reply as Bob held the gun so that he could
see that he had it.
"No use in being ugly about it," he told him. "I'm the one who ought to
be mad. You had two chances and you can bet your sweet life I'm not going
to give you a third."
Bob was intending to leave at once being confident that the man would
not dare to follow him now that he knew that he was armed, but something
in his face made him hesitate. For the first time he realized that the outlaw
was very young. In fact, as he sat there he did not look much over twenty
and a wave of pity swept over the boy.
"How old are you?" he asked kindly.
"I'll be twenty-one next month."
"And what's your name?"
"What you want to know that for?"
Bob was impressed by the fact that the outlaw was now using better
English than he had been and was becoming more and more convinced that
he had seen better days.
"No reason in particular," he told him.
"Well, it's Fred Royce if it'll do you any good to know.
"Then you're an American?"
"Sure thing, but I guess I'm not much of a credit to the nation."
"Do you like the life you're leading?"
For an instant the man did not reply and Bob could see that a struggle
was taking place in his mind.
"Like it? Of course I don't."

"Then why not get out of it?"
"That's easier said than done," the outlaw said sadly.
"Would you mind telling me how you happened to get into it?"
Again he hesitated and Bob was surprised to see that tears were in his
eyes. Finally he spoke.
"I suppose it's a common enough story. I lived in Boston and my father
is rich. I had plenty of money but I got in with a fast set, got to gambling
and, of course, lost. I didn't dare to ask father for the money so I forged his
name to a check. It was only for a couple hundred dollars, but I realize now
that it was just as bad as if it had been a million. Then a fellow in our crowd
found it out and threatened to go to father and tell him about it unless I paid
him ten thousand dollars. The only way I could get the money was to forge
another check, but I didn't do it. I skipped and beat my way out here. That
was a little over a month ago and I've had a pretty rough time of it. You see
I never had to work and so don't know how to do anything. I tried a number
of jobs but every time I got fired and I don't blame them for that because I
know I made a mess of it. Then three days ago I fell in with this man,
Hains. I was about starved at the time and he staked me to a good meal, the
first one I've had for most a week. Well I was pretty desperate and when he
asked me to join his gang I, like a weak fool, consented."
"Then you've only been with him a couple of days?"
"That's all, and I haven't had anything to do with stealing cattle, not yet.
He said I have to wait awhile and learn the ropes before I'd be any good.
Honestly I'm sorry I tried to double cross you, but you see Hains sent me
out to see if I could find out what had become of you and I thought if I
could bring you in it'd be a big feather in my cap. But now I'm glad I got
licked."
"So am I for your sake as well as my own."
There was silence for a moment and then the outlaw said:

[FREE PDF sample] Interpersonal Cognition 1st Edition Mark W. Baldwin Phd ebooks

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

[FREE PDF sample] Interpersonal Cognition 1st Edition Mark W. Baldwin Phd ebooks

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

[FREE PDF sample] Interpersonal Cognition 1st Edition Mark W. Baldwin Phd ebooks

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Full download ebook at ebookname.

Interpersonal Cognition 1st Edition Mark W.

Download more ebook from https://ebookname.com

Origins of Religion Cognition and Culture 1st Edition

Brain Development and Cognition A Reader 2nd Edition

The Neuropsychiatry of Headache Mark W. Green

Clinical Cases in Physical Therapy 2nd Edition Mark A.

Pretend Play in Childhood Foundation of Adult

Nursing Knowledge Science Practice and Philosophy 1st

The Space Industry of the Future 1st Edition Mark W.

The community college experience plus 2nd Edition

THE GUILFORD PRESS

All rights reserved

No part of this book may be reproduced, translated, stored in

Printed in the United States of America

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Last digit is print number: 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data available from the Publisher.

About the Editor

Susan M. Andersen, PhD, Department of Psychology, New York

Geraldine Downey, PhD, Department of Psychology, Columbia

Janina Pietrzak, PhD, Department of Psychology, Columbia University,

The human mind is profoundly attuned to the contingencies of social life.

chapters to tracing the theoretical background of their work and outlining

tensive documentation of human foibles (including defensive self-enhancement,

It is a rare treat to have the opportunity to invite one’s favorite thinkers

1 The Relational Self and Transference: Evoking Motives, Self-Regulation, 1

10 Mental Representations of Attachment Security: Theoretical Foundation 233

The Relational Self and Transference

SUSAN M. ANDERSEN and S. ADIL SARIBAY

The notion that people hold mental representations of significant others—

CONCEPTUALIZING THE RELATIONAL SELF

tions with new individuals, both in psychoanalysis and in everyday life

Horney, 1939; Horowitz, 1989, 1991; Kernberg, 1976; Kohut, 1971;

The Relevance of Attachment Theory

EVIDENCE ON THE RELATIONAL SELF AND TRANSFERENCE

To test the assumptions that follow from our conceptualization of transfer-

generalizable. Moreover, the process does not require a particular standing on

Inference and Memory

activation of a social stereotype (e.g., Andersen et al., 1995; Glassman &

Automatic and Unconscious Activation

Evaluation and Affect

this—are in some ways surprising. Once introduced to a stranger, we typi-

the likely pervasiveness of such automatic affect in everyday social encoun-

Expectancies of Acceptance and Rejection

sessed the target’s contributions to the conversation without being able to

The Working Self-Concept and Self-Evaluation

Activated Specific Needs and Motives in Transference

We have alluded to our assumptions about basic needs and motivations in

trol condition) (Reznik & Andersen, 2003). In addition, complementing

experienced as a threat to the self—as negative for the self—is when he or

pressions in response to negative characteristics deriving from their posi-

Activating Subtle Shifts in Emotional Responses in Transference

Generic Positive Mood and Its Disruption in a Positive Transference

likely to be influenced by numerous expectancies and cognitions in the ses-

Contextually Based Expectancy Violation through Interpersonal

Chronic Needs Violation and Chronically Unsatisfied Goals. In some

though the relationship is positive. For example, an important goal with

Chronic Self-Violation of Own Preferences in Transference. Another

in transference. It is important instead to take into account the specific na-