China, Taiwan, The UK and The CPTPP: Global Partnership or Regional Stand-Off?

TAIWAN AND WORLD AFFAIRS
China, Taiwan, the UK

and the CPTPP
Global Partnership or
Regional Stand-off?
Edited by
Chun-yi Lee · Michael Reilly
Taiwan and World Affairs
Series Editors
Chun-yi Lee, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
Michael Reilly, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
Taiwan is a significant world economy. A major trading nation, but for
geopolitics it would most likely be a member of the G20. Taiwanese
companies supply more than half the world’s total production of semi-
conductors and are crucial to the global value chain especially China and
South East Asia. While there are already some book series devoted to
Taiwan, these focus on domestic matters, such as Taiwanese politics and
society and to date there is no series that looks at Taiwan’s contribu-
tion to, or place in the world more broadly. Despite, or because of, its
diplomatic isolation, interest in this is growing, however, and this series is
intended to fill a lacuna in the current academic coverage of Taiwan.
Chun-yi Lee · Michael Reilly
Editors
China, Taiwan,
the UK
and the CPTPP
Global Partnership or Regional Stand-off?
Editors
Chun-yi Lee Michael Reilly
Taiwan Research Hub, School Taiwan Research Hub, School
of Politics and International Relations of Politics and International Relations
University of Nottingham University of Nottingham
Nottingham, UK Nottingham, UK
ISSN 2731-9334 ISSN 2731-9342 (electronic)

Taiwan and World Affairs
ISBN 978-981-99-3196-5 ISBN 978-981-99-3197-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3197-2
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
Cover credit: Andrew Haimerl from Pexels/Canva
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore
189721, Singapore
Contents
1 Introduction 1
Michael Reilly and Chun-yi Lee
2 CPTPP Membership for Taiwan: Rationales,
Challenges, and Outlook 19
Roy Chun Lee
3 Not a Fast Pass for China at CPTPP 47
George Magnus
4 Regulatory Constraints and the Political Economy
of the UK’s Joining the CPTPP 67
Minako Morita-Jaeger
5 Perspectives of CPTPP Membership Expansion and Its
Implications on a Shifting Paradigm of Economic
Integration in Asia Pacific 89
Peter C. Y. Chow
6 Australia’s Perspective on the Applications
from the UK, China, and Taiwan to Join the CPTPP 117
Richard Pomfret
7 Gatekeeper’s Dilemma: Japan Facing CPTPP
Applications from China and Taiwan 141
Saori N. Katada
v
vi CONTENTS
8 Divergent Interests for Taiwan’s CPTPP Bid

from Washington and Tokyo 165
Shihoko Goto
9 Not Quite Déjà Vu All Over Again: CPTPP Accession
and Taiwan–China–US Relations 181
Jacques deLisle
Index 217
Notes on Contributors
Peter C. Y. Chow is a professor of economics at the City Univer-

sity of New York (CUNY). He was a visiting professor at the Academic
Sinica, Nagoya National University, and National Taiwan University. He
published more than 60 papers in referee articles and chapters of book.
He wrote and edited more than 10 books in trade, development and
economic integration and served as a contractual consultant at the World
Bank. During 1998–2021, he served as the Executive Director of the
American Association for Chinese Studies. In the recent past, he was in
testified to testify at the U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission
and at the hearings at the joint session of USTR, Treasury and Commerce
Departments on the US-China -Taiwan economic and trade relations.
Jacques deLisle is Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law, Professor of
Political Science, and Director of the Center for the Study of Contem-
porary China at the University of Pennsylvania, and Director of the
Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. His writings, on
China’s engagement with the international order, Chinese law, US-China
relations, and China-Taiwan and China-Hong Kong issues have appeared
in Journal of Contemporary China, Asia Policy, Orbis, China Review,
Administrative Law Review and other journals and edited volumes. He
is the co-editor of, and contributor to The Party Leads All: The Role
of the Chinese Communist Party in China’s Politics, Governance, Society,
Economy, and External Relations (2022), After Engagement: Dilemmas
in U.S.-China Security Relations (2021), Taiwan in the Era of Tsai
vii
viii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Ing-wen (2021), To Get Rich is Glorious: Challenges Facing China’s

Reform and Opening at Forty (2019), China’s Challenges (2014) and
Political Changes in Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou (2014).
Shihoko Goto is the Acting Director of the Asia Program and Deputy
Director for Geoeconomics at the Wilson Center Asia Program. She is
also a columnist for The Diplomat magazine and contributing editor to
The Globalist. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, she was a financial jour-
nalist covering the international political economy with a focus on Asian
markets for Dow Jones News Service and United Press International. She
was also formerly a donor country relations officer at the World Bank.
She received the Freeman Foundation’s Jefferson journalism fellowship at
the East-West Center and the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation’s
journalism fellowship for the Salzburg Global Seminar. She received an
M.A. in international political theory from the Graduate School of Polit-
ical Science, Waseda University, Japan, and a B.A. in Modern History,
from Trinity College, University of Oxford.
Saori N. Katada is Professor of International Relations and the director
of the Center for International Studies at University of Southern Cali-
fornia. Her book Japan’s New Regional Reality: Geoeconomic Strategy in
the Asia-Pacific was published by Columbia University Press in July 2020.
She has co-authored two recent books: The BRICS and Collective Finan-
cial Statecraft (Oxford University Press, 2017), and Taming Japan’s
Deflation: The Debate over Unconventional Monetary Policy (Cornell
University Press, 2018). She holds a Ph.D. is from the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Political Science), and her B.A. from
Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo. Before joining USC, she served as a
researcher at the World Bank in Washington D.C., and as International
Program officer at the UNDP in Mexico City.
Chun-yi Lee is Associate Professor at the School of Politics and Inter-
national Relations, University of Nottingham. She is also the director
of the Taiwan Research Hub at Nottingham. Chun-yi’s first single
authored book was published by Routledge in 2011: Taiwanese Busi-
ness or Chinese Security Asset. The book is under Leiden Series in
Modern East Asia History and Politics. The most recent co-edited
book Chun-yi worked on was with Professor Gunter Schubert, entitled
Taiwan During the First Administration of Tsai Ing wen, published in
October 2021 by Routledge. In March 2021, Chun-yi co-edited a book
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS ix
with Dr. Michael Reilly, A New Beginning or More of the Same? The
European Union and East Asia After Brexit, published by Palgrave
Macmillan. Chun-yi is working on her second manuscript, titled as:
Sticky decoupling? Geopolitics and semiconductor supply chain.
Roy Chun Lee has been Taiwan’s Deputy Foreign Minister since
February 2023. Previously, he was the senior deputy director of the
Taiwan WTO and RTA Centre at the Chung-hua Institution for
Economic Research (CIER). Dr. Lee specialised in liberalization policy,
WTO, regional integration, regulatory reform and global supply chain.
His recent main research agendas include digital trade, the economic
implications of US-China rivalry, economic security, global supply chain
diversification, and the new dynamics of regional integration, especially
Taiwan’s participation of the CPTPP. In this capacity, Dr. Lee serves
as a policy advisor on Taiwan’s liberalization and trade policy for both
the public and private sectors. In other capacities, Dr. Lee is a frequent
column writer and commentator on trade and economic policy for major
media outlets in Taiwan. Dr. Lee received his Ph.D. in Public Policy from
the Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University in
2006.
George Magnus is an economist and commentator, and Research
Associate at the China Centre, Oxford University, and at the School of
Oriental and African Studies, London. From 1995–2016, he was the
Chief Economist, and then Senior Economic Adviser at UBS Invest-
ment Bank. He had previously worked as the Chief Economist at SG
Warburg (1987–1995), and before that at Bank of America in London
and San Francisco. George writes, is cited regularly and contributes
to media outlets such as the Financial Times, Times, New Statesman,
The Spectator, Bloomberg, and South China Morning Post, the BBC,
Sky, Deutsche Welle and other international TV and radio programmes.
His public work can be found on his website at www.georgemagnus.
com. George’s current book, Red Flags: Why Xi’s China is in Jeopardy
examines China’s contemporary economic, political and commercial
challenges in the light of Xi Jinping’s controlling and authoritarian gover-
nance system and the harshest external environment for China since the
Mao era.
Minako Morita-Jaeger is a Senior Research Fellow in International
Trade of University of Sussex Business School and a Policy Research
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Fellow of the UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO). She is an inter-

national trade policy expert who has been working for international trade
policy across the globe. Prior to her research work at the University of
Sussex and the LSE, she was intensively engaged in trade policy in prac-
tice as an Economic Affairs Officer at the UNCTAD in Geneva, a WTO
services trade negotiator at the Japanese delegation in Geneva, and a Prin-
cipal Trade Policy Analyst at the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren)
in Tokyo. She studied international political economy, economics and
international economic law and applies the inter-disciplinary approach for
her research in order to elaborate multi-dimensional factors that shape
today’s world trade. Her areas of research include FTAs, WTO, regulatory
cooperation, services trade and UK trade policy.
Richard Pomfret was Professor of Economics from 1992 to 2020 at the
University of Adelaide, and is now Professor Emeritus. Before moving
to Adelaide, he was Professor of International Economics from 1979
to 1991 at the Johns Hopkins University in Washington, Bologna, and
Nanjing, and since 2006 he has been Senior Adjunct Professor in Inter-
national Economics at Johns Hopkins SAIS Europe (in Bologna). He
has acted as adviser to the Australian government and consultant to the
World Bank, Asian Development Bank, OECD and UNDP. In 1993
he was seconded to the United Nations for a year, advising the Asian
republics of the former Soviet Union. His books include The Economics of
Regional Trading Arrangements (Oxford UP, 2001), The Age of Equality:
The Twentieth Century in Economic Perspective (Harvard UP, 2011),
The Central Asian Economies in the Twenty-first Century (Princeton UP,
2019), and The Economics of European Integration (Harvard UP, 2021).
Michael Reilly has been a Senior Fellow in the Taiwan Research Hub
of the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of
Nottingham since 2015. A former British diplomat, his final position was
as the British representative in Taiwan from 2005–2009. He has also held
a senior position as the chief representative in China for one of the UK’s
largest manufacturing companies, was a Visiting Fellow in the Institute for
European and American Studies at Academia Sinica in Taipei in 2016 and
2019 and is a member of the Advisory Board of the Global Taiwan Insti-
tute. His most recent book, The Great Free Trade Myth: British Foreign
Policy and East Asia Since 1980, was published in 2020.
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 The two-step accession process of CPTPP (Source Author

based on CPTPP Decision on Accession Process) 34
Fig. 4.1 CPTPP shares of UK trade with the world, 2019
(Source Gasiorek et al. [2022]. The value of the CPTPP
for the UK, UKTPO blog, 3 February 2021. At: The value
of the CPTPP for the UK « UK Trade Policy Observatory
[sussex.ac.uk]; ONS data on international trade; author’s
calculations. Note Shares calculated as the total value
of UK trade with CPTPP countries divided by the total
value of UK trade with the World; CPTPP-FTA are those
CPTPP countries the UK already has an FTA with) 74
Fig. 4.2 UK’s total trade with CPTPP countries, 2019 (Source
UN Comtrade and ONS combined data. Note Shares
calculated as the value of UK trade with a CPTPP country
(or countries) divided by the total value of UK trade
with the CPTPP) 74
xi
xii LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 4.3 Top concerns on the CPTPP selected by different

respondent groups (DIT consultation) (Data Source
DIT [2019]. Public consultation on the UK potentially
seeking accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
Summary of responses, Table 7: Top concerns selected
by different respondent groups. https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/817865/Public_consultation_on_the_
UK_potentially_seeking_accession_to_CPTPP.pdf. Note
The figure was created by the author based on the data) 77
Fig. 7.1 Indo-Pacific regional trade arrangements (Source Author’s
compilation) 147
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Bilateral trade between Taiwan and CPTPP members

(2021) 21
Table 2.2 FTA coverage rate among selected East Asian Economies 23
Table 2.3 Tariff structure of Taiwan’s Exports to CPTPP countries 24
Table 2.4 Tariff structure for selected sectors 25
Table 2.5 Examples of discriminatory tariff treatment in selected
CPTPP markets 26
Table 2.6 Result of the legal gap analysis and relevant legislative
actions 28
Table 2.7 Taiwan’s Global Value Chain (GVC) participation index,
2018 32
Table 2.8 Taiwan’s average trade-weighted tariff rates (2014–2020) 38
Table 4.1 UK’s bilateral relations with CPTPP members 73
Table 5.1 Income, population, export and import for CPTPP-11,
United States, China, United Kingdom, and Taiwan
(Estimated 2021) 91
Table 6.1 Chapter structure of TPP compared to RCEP
and the EU-Canada agreement 121
Table 6.2 CPTPP and RCEP Signatories’ average ad valorem
applied tariffs, 2020 122
Table 6.3 Australia’s top ten two-way trading partners, 2019–2020 123
Table 6.4 Recommendations of the joint standing committee 131
Table 6.5 Composition of Australian Parliament
before and after the 2022 election 133
Table 7.1 Gate-keeper’s dilemma for Japan: pros and cons 158
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Michael Reilly and Chun-yi Lee
Not just US trade policy, some might say. In November 2022, a former
British agriculture minister criticised his own government’s trade deal
with Australia, announced to much fanfare the previous December, as
having given away ‘far too much for far too little in return.’1 British
citizens could be forgiven for wondering why the government had even
negotiated a free trade agreement with Australia, the economic benefits
of which were admitted to be minuscule, while being so keen to walk
‘Sometimes international diplomacy is so inept that it becomes genuinely

entertaining: Recent US trade policy is a case in point.’ Alan Beattie: The US
doesn’t need CPTPP to assert itself in the Asia–Pacific, Financial Times, 2
February 2022.
M. Reilly (B) · C. Lee

Taiwan Research Hub, School of Politics and International Relations, University
of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
e-mail: [email protected]
C. Lee
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
C. Lee and M. Reilly (eds.), China, Taiwan, the UK and the CPTPP,
Taiwan and World Affairs,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3197-2_1
2 M. REILLY AND C. LEE
away from a far bigger and more comprehensive free trade agreement
with its neighbours in the European Single Market. That agreement was
the brainchild of Margaret Thatcher, a former leader of the same ruling
party and still a heroine to many in it. Liz Truss, the chief negotiator of
the agreement with Australia, also went on to lead her party and serve
as prime minister but in contrast to Thatcher’s eleven years in office, her
premiership collapsed amidst chaos after just 44 days.
The common thread in recent US and British trade policy, inept or
otherwise, has been the focus on trade with countries in the Pacific Basin,
more specifically the members of the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, more usually and easily known
by its initials as the CPTPP. The original driving force behind the agree-
ment was the USA, keen to secure an ambitious, wide-ranging free trade
agreement with like-minded countries around the Pacific Basin. Promoted
first by President George W Bush then by his successor, Barack Obama,
the deal was finished only for Donald Trump to pull the USA out as part
of his populist ‘Make America Great Again’ approach.
Meanwhile, under its mantra of ‘Global Britain,’ a similarly populist
government in the United Kingdom (UK) chose to pull the country out
of the vast EU Single Market, preferring to seek trade deals with coun-
tries on the other side of the world to easier trade with its neighbours. To
suggest that doing so is a misplaced priority is surely a polite understate-
ment. To most neutral observers, judged by trade and economic benefits
alone the policy defies all logic. In 2018, the UK’s combined exports to
all eleven members of the CPTPP were not even three-quarters those to
Germany.
It was widely assumed that following American withdrawal, the original
Trans-Pacific agreement would collapse. Instead, it was resuscitated by
Japan which had, ironically, been only a reluctant early partner (Warren
2021), while China, Taiwan, and South Korea have all since applied to
join, along with the UK, Ecuador, and most recently Costa Rica. Thailand
is also expected to submit a formal application.
At one level, this interest in joining a regional trading arrangement is
simply an inevitable consequence of the failure to make progress with
further multilateral trade liberalisation after the collapse of the Doha
Round negotiations in 2005. Amongst the academic works on the subject,
Whalley offered six reasons why countries would opt for joining or
establishing regional trade agreements (Whalley 1998: 71–74).
1 INTRODUCTION 3
First, by lifting or removing tariff barriers they aggregate the gains

to trade; secondly, they can be a good opportunity to improve domestic
trading or financial markets by exposing them to higher standards and
more competition. Much has been made of this in respect of China, with
accession to the WTO having improved its domestic market openness,
transparency, and accountability (Breslin 2004: 664–669) although the
argument is also applicable to Taiwan, South Korea, and other countries.
Third, membership of a regional agreement should increase the leverage
and bargaining power of members, especially for smaller and medium-
sized economies. The best example is surely that of the EU, whose
members have gained hugely, not only from the abolition of internal
barriers to trade in the Single Market but also from the power and influ-
ence this has brought the European Commission in international trade
negotiations.
In Asia, the evidence so far is less clear-cut. The Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) wields international political influence far
greater than its members could hope to achieve individually. In the 1990s,
for example, the South Korean economy was larger than that of all the
then-ASEAN members combined, but it had only a fraction of the global
influence. Although the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement was signed by
the original members in 1992, ostensibly to serve as a ‘building block’
for members to expand global trade (Calvo-Pardo et al. 2011: 182), until
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP)
was established in late 2020, and except for a free trade agreement (FTA)
with China, ASEAN countries had opted to pursue individual bilateral
FTAs, for example with the EU, rather than pan-ASEAN agreements. At
the time of writing only four ASEAN states are members of the CPTPP.
The ASEAN–China FTA reflects the fourth reason for pursuing
regional agreements, the desire to guarantee access to resources. ASEAN
members could be confident of easier access to the Chinese market for
their semi-manufactured goods and raw materials, and China to ASEAN
markets for its finished goods (Wong and Chan 2003: 507).
Some, or all, of these reasons help explain why South Korea, Thailand,
and some smaller countries such as Ecuador wish to join the CPTPP. But
they hardly explain the UK’s interest, or China’s, and only partially that
of Taiwan. Here Whalley’s final two reasons for pursuing regional trade
agreements are the most interesting. These are, respectively, the ability to
link to or strengthen security linkages through an associated trade agree-
ment, and to use membership of a regional agreement in pursuing to
advantage broader multilateral agreements and vice versa. Trade, in other

words, is a means to an end of building political influence and linkages
rather than an end in itself.
In the original TPP, the implicit linkage between trade and security
was clear. In return for persuading other members to accept American
positions on intellectual property rights, investment protection, disputes
settlement, subsidies and regulatory regimes in areas ranging from agri-
cultural produce to culture (access for Hollywood producers to domestic
film markets, for example), other members would not only get prefer-
ential access to the huge US market for their products but reassurance
over continued US security guarantees. For Asian members, worried by
an increasingly assertive China, the latter was important, for Latin Amer-
ican members and Canada the preferential access undoubtedly weighed
more heavily, or at least a fear of being left behind if neighbours joined
and got the benefits, but they did not.
US withdrawal from the TPP therefore becomes hard to understand
as anything more than a populist knee-jerk reaction. The overall bene-
fits to the USA were considerable, but not appreciated at the micro-level
of those who felt they were losing out. Too many in the USA felt they
were the victims of their country’s openness to a protectionist rest of
the world, oblivious to the fact that much of the rest of the world saw
matters in reverse. As the then British foreign secretary put it in 2001: the
USA has the rhetoric of free trade but is protectionist in practice.2 Belat-
edly recognising the impact withdrawal from the TPP would have on its
wider influence and standing, the USA has since launched an alterna-
tive, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), in a bid to recover
or maintain its influence in the Pacific.
From this perspective, China’s application to join the CPTPP seems
only secondarily related to the presumed trading benefits. It is a founding
member of the RCEP, which is shallower in the depth of its measures
but broader in its membership than the CPTPP, and its commitments
require much less by way of adjustment to free market strictures than
those of the CPTPP. But underlying the original concept of the TPP
was the status of the USA as the dominant power in the Pacific Basin,
a position increasingly open to challenge by a rising China. China was
not therefore included in the TPP, one reason for its enthusiasm for the
RCEP. With the USA not a member, it may well feel able to influence
the development of the CPTPP in line with its own hegemonic ambitions,
assuming current members agree its application.
1 INTRODUCTION 5
The economic arguments for joining the CPTPP may look more
persuasive for Taiwan than for China but the absence of diplomatic rela-
tions with all but a handful of mostly tiny states means that membership
of any such agreement becomes important to it as a means of projecting
its own sovereignty (Magcamit and Tan 2015). That in turn risks bringing
it directly into conflict with China, which has long resisted all attempts
by Taiwan not just to try to assert its sovereignty but even to expand its
international space.
Precedents exist for dealing with bids from China and Taiwan in their
near-simultaneous accessions to the WTO and to APEC (Asia–Pacific
Economic Co-operation).3 In common with both APEC and the WTO,
statehood is not a prerequisite for membership of the CPTPP, so there
should be no political barrier to Taiwanese membership. But China in
2001, when it joined the WTO, was not the global economic powerhouse
it is today, and even then the WTO deal had taken years of wrangling to
achieve, with the USA insisting that Taiwan must be allowed to join too.
It is far from clear that the USA enjoys similar influence today, even if it
decided to use it. One former senior American diplomat with wide expe-
rience in East Asia told one of the editors that while the USA would speak
out in support of Taiwan joining the CPTPP, it would not do anything
more. It lacks the leverage to do so and is probably reluctant to expend
much effort in supporting Taiwan’s bid. If such a view seems at odds with
the rhetoric of American leaders, let alone support for Taiwan in the US
Congress, one need only look at the USA’s hitherto lukewarm attitude
even to discussing a bilateral trade agreement with Taiwan (although that
now seems to be changing).
That leaves the UK. In pure trade terms, its application is surely the
least likely and least logical of the three. Not only is its bilateral trade
with most CPTPP members far smaller than that with its neighbours
in Europe, but it also has bilateral FTAs with Japan, South Korea, and
Canada, all three largely legacies of its membership of the EU, plus a
new agreement with Australia. The trade gains from CPTPP member-
ship will be so modest as to be scarcely noticeable. But could there be a
strategic motive to the bid? Implausible though it may seem, since Brexit
the UK has been building up its security relationship with Japan. To date
it remains modest, and question marks must remain over its long-term
sustainability given geography, affordability, and the different strategic
threats both countries face. CPTPP membership would help underpin
that and allow the British government to claim that its ‘Global Britain’
campaign was more than just a memorable strapline. Furthermore, former

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe once suggested that Japan’s bilateral
FTA with the EU could be aligned with the CPTPP. Were the UK already
to be a member of the CPTPP, this would allow it a degree of leverage
over the shape of any subsequent CPTPP agreement with the EU.
None of the three bids can be considered in isolation on their
individual merits, another factor that distinguishes them from other appli-
cations. While British membership could have a bearing on whether
China’s application will succeed, undoubtedly the most consequential
relationship is that between the Chinese and Taiwanese bids.
There is a widespread assumption that Taiwan’s application is doomed
to fail in the face of strong Chinese opposition. But this may not be
as clear-cut as often assumed. Many observers seem to have forgotten
or choose to overlook the fact that Xi Jinping was the first Chinese
leader to meet a leader of Taiwan, when he met then Taiwan president
Ma Ying-jeou in Singapore in November 2015. China and Taiwan also
have a bilateral trade agreement (the Economic Co-operation Frame-
work Agreement or ECFA), negotiated while Ma was president, but
which has largely survived since, despite some unilateral measures taken
by China to bar the import of certain Taiwanese products. Since the
2016 election victories of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and
President Tsai Ing-wen, China has consistently made them the focus of
its ire, rather than Taiwan generally. Precedent suggests that should the
Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party, KMT) win a future presiden-
tial election, China could react positively and ease its hostility towards
Taiwan. Should the KMT win the next presidential election in Taiwan
in 2024, it is therefore plausible that China might react by lowering, or
even dropping, its opposition to Taiwan joining the CPTPP, in much the
same way as its attitude changed after the KMT won the 2008 presiden-
tial election. If that improved China’s chances of being admitted too, so
much the better.
Nor should it be assumed that Chinese accession to the CPTPP would
only benefit its own interests. To do so is to overlook the enormous
changes in the patterns of international trade that have taken place since
China and Taiwan joined the WTO at the end of 2001. For most of
the 1990s, Taiwan was a more important trading partner for many EU
countries than was China, while the USA was the primary export market
for Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. For all three, as well as for most
of their neighbours in Pacific Asia, indeed for the majority of members
1 INTRODUCTION 7
of the CPTPP, China is now a more important market than the USA,
even though they continue to look to the latter for security assurances.
In contrast to Australia and Canada, however, whose exports to China
are mainly of agricultural produce and raw materials, much of the Asian
trade with China has been a direct result of investment in China from
other Asian countries, especially Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. In many
manufacturing sectors, China remains little more than the final assembly
point of components from other countries in the region and there is a
strong mutual interest in facilitating such trade further.
Thus, for the UK, China, and Taiwan, wider strategic reasons appear
to be the factors driving their membership applications to the CPTPP
rather than potential trade gains, although one cannot rule out ideologi-
cally driven knee-jerk ‘anti-EU’ attitudes or a lingering and long outdated
imperial nostalgia as the factors driving the UK’s bid.4
This was the context for a conference held under the auspices of the
Taiwan Studies Programme at Nottingham University in June 2022, with
some of the papers and subsequent discussion forming the basis of this
book. The conference built on a previous one, also at Nottingham, which
considered how Brexit might affect or influence the European Union’s
(EU) relations with East Asia in which trade is foremost. The underlying
assumption, to which participants broadly if not wholly subscribed, was
that for China, Taiwan and the UK, their applications to join the CPTPP
were indeed driven primarily by broader strategic reasons rather than by
potential trade gains. This set them apart from other applications for
which, while strategic aspects were not negligible, the trade gains were
relatively more important. Consideration of South Korea’s application
during the conference did nothing to dispel this assumption, although
its own position is far from straightforward. It had not applied to join
the TPP when it was under US auspices despite its security relationship
with the latter, but has now felt compelled to apply to join the CPTPP,
notwithstanding its often difficult political relationship with Japan.
The ‘exam question’ for participants to discuss therefore was how
CPTPP members will respond to these three applications. (That by South
Korea was generally agreed to be more straightforward.) Participants in
the conference were widely drawn, from the applicants, from current
CPTPP members and from the USA, whose influence on the outcome
may yet be decisive, even if it is not actively engaged in the process. For
most participants, it was apparent that the applications, principally those
from China and Taiwan, have created tensions within the CPTPP and in
turn pose a dilemma for its members. Do they accept both applications,
one but not the other, and if so, which, or neither?
The British government would be naïve to think its own applica-
tion would be immune from this dilemma, however. It may lack the
controversy surrounding the bids from China and Taiwan but with its
application now accepted ahead of those of the other two, it will be able
to influence the outcome of them, while its membership of the EU for
forty years means that its regulatory tradition is different to that of USA,
whose approach has hitherto been the guiding principle of the CPTPP.
Those hoping that reading this book will provide ready answers to
the question of membership are likely to be disappointed, for not even
CPTPP members themselves seem sure of the answer at this stage. Both
the following chapters and the conference discussions suggest that while
the applications for membership may not align neatly with Whalley’s ratio-
nales as outlined above, nor are the ultimate decisions likely to be taken
solely, or even primarily, based on perceived trade benefits.
In contrast to the applications from China and the UK, in the following
chapter Roy Lee argues that there would be a straightforward economic
benefit for Taiwan from accession to the CPTPP. Of the three countries,
Taiwan also seems the most likely to accept CPTPP regulatory standards
without question. In response to the argument that even for Taiwan the
trade gains may not be as great as might be assumed, given that its
exports are dominated by those of the ICT sector, semiconductors and
computer-related products especially, which are already almost entirely
free of tariffs under the WTO’s Information Technology Agreement
(ITA), Lee explains that membership would allow Taiwan to integrate
further into regional trade.
He makes a very strong case for Taiwan’s application to be judged
purely on objective criteria, namely its actual compliance or willing-
ness to comply with CPTPP standards. Even for Taiwan however, the
process is not straightforward. Although the country already has a free
trade agreement with Singapore, signed in 2013, together with one with
New Zealand, both CPTPP members, the latter is primarily an agree-
ment to reduce or remove tariffs and both are much less comprehensive
in scope than the requirements of the CPTPP. Taiwan has in the past
shown considerable reluctance to ease or remove non-tariff barriers to
trade, although recent developments in this regard are considered further
by Shihoko Goto in Chapter 8. In short, Taiwan’s application is also
underpinned by strategic motives which must be considered.
1 INTRODUCTION 9
If we consider the case of China, by contrast, it already enjoys close

trading relationships with most CPTPP members either through bilat-
eral agreements, or joint membership of the RCEP, or both. (Seven
members of the CPTPP are also members of the RCEP.)5 It is diffi-
cult at this stage to know whether its application to join the CPTPP is
driven by strategic ambitions, namely to expand its influence in the formu-
lation of multilateral trade policy as well as its influence in the Pacific
region more generally, simply a spoiling tactic to ensure that both its and
Taiwan’s applications are put in the ‘too difficult’ tray and left for future
leaders to try to resolve, or a combination thereof. In Chapter 3, George
Magnus argues the first: the application is less about enhancing China’s
economic growth and more an opportunity to influence the shape, scope,
and future direction of the CPTPP. Its success in doing just this in other
international organisations lends weight to this view.
A key thrust of Magnus’ argument is that an important aim of the
CPTPP, and one which survived the exit of the USA from the original
TPP agreement, is the promotion of the market economy. But China
is not a market economy as understood by the EU and USA. Under
Xi Jinping, it is steadily moving in the other direction, with renewed
emphasis on the role of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as the leading
engines of growth. It is also difficult to envisage China under Xi signing
up to CPTPP standards of protection for foreign investors, commit-
ments to reducing subsidies, or tolerating independent trade unions.
This presents CPTPP members with a dilemma. That wider geopolitical
circumstances are more adversarial now than when China joined the WTO
in late 2001 only heightens the dilemma.
In Chapter 7, however, Saori Katada is careful not to dismiss the
market economy aspect in respect of China, pointing to domestic voices
there advocating membership of the CPTPP to help liberalise and reform
the economy. She also argues that for China, membership of the CPTPP
should be seen as a defensive measure to protect it better against the
sorts of unilateral measures imposed by the Trump administration. Nor,
it should be remembered, was a lack of market economy status an imped-
iment to Vietnam being admitted to the CPTPP. The key difference
according to Magnus is not, or not only, that the Chinese economy
is several times larger than that of Vietnam, bigger indeed than the
economies of all current CPTPP members combined, but that it prob-
ably seeks membership to change the rules to the benefit of its own
political economy. The dilemma for existing members is that its current
importance to them in trade terms makes its application hard to refuse.
From this perspective, UK membership of the group becomes attrac-
tive. At the time of writing, it is the world’s sixth largest economy and its
accession to the CPTPP makes the combined economic size of the group
greater than that of China, albeit by only a narrow margin. Its application
to join was submitted well before that of China and its accession could
prove problematic for China as it will allow the UK to scrutinise its bid
along with other members and add to the number of ‘China hawks’
within the agreement. That does not mean China’s application is doomed
to fail but it does increase the likelihood of it being scrutinised thor-
oughly, reduce the likelihood of it being allowed any exemptions to the
membership criteria and make it harder for China to rewrite the rules
to its own benefit. This assumes that the UK’s policy, and that of other
‘China hawks,’ does not change but this assumption might be dangerous.
Before it left the EU, for example, the UK was a stand-out in supporting
the granting of market economy status within the WTO to China. The
current bilateral relationship is much cooler than it was a decade ago but
that does not mean the pendulum could not swing back, although that
does seem unlikely while Xi Jinping remains in power.
Of the three applications, the UK’s appears most obviously driven
by domestic politics and a knee-jerk anti-EU attitude of many in its
governing political party, seemingly oblivious to the damage this is doing
to the economy.6 In Chapter 4, Minako Morita-Jaeger argues that the real
motive for the UK’s application was indeed strategic, but not in respect of
its relations with countries in the Asia–Pacific region. Rather, she argues,
it was seen as an important stepping stone to a bilateral Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA) with the USA. Given former President Trump’s aversion to
multilateral deals, and withdrawal from the TPP, plus the Biden admin-
istration’s lack of interest in a bilateral deal with the UK, such a strategy
surely looks quixotic—if so, it is consistent with much of UK policy more
generally since Brexit. Certainly, the objective of a bilateral FTA with the
USA is not one that will be achieved by the current British government.
The UK may have been surprised, even irritated, to find its own regula-
tory standards placed under scrutiny as part of its membership application
process, but notwithstanding the oft-professed desire of some of its ruling
politicians to make a ‘bonfire’ of EU regulations and to pursue a ‘light-
touch’ regulatory approach, there does appear to be a growing awareness
1 INTRODUCTION 11
in the country’s government of the importance of adhering to interna-

tionally recognised standards. On the other hand, Morita-Jaeger argues
that had the country been required to move to a regulatory regime more
closely based on American norms, as would have been the case had the
TPP remained in force, the reaction from British society generally may
well have been negative. She cites domestic opposition to plans for a
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), promoted under
the Obama administration in the USA, with especially strong differences
over matters such as food-safety standards and genetically modified crops.
With discussions over a possible transatlantic trade deal now dormant
those concerns may no longer apply, but the UK is likely to remain
uncomfortable with the CPTPP’s approach to rules on data sharing,
especially if China is also a member (Sabbagh, October 2022).
Like Roy Lee in Chapter 2, Peter Chow argues in Chapter 5 that
Taiwan meets the regulatory criteria for membership. He also suggests
that Taiwanese accession will have a strong positive effect on trade
creation in the region. But he argues that Taiwan’s motives in applying
are driven less by economic factors or attempts to protect or enhance
its international sovereignty and more by a desire to lessen its depen-
dence on China. (Given China’s own reliance on Taiwanese investment it
is surprising that the issue of whether Taiwan could leverage this depen-
dence to its own advantage does not receive more attention.) This is a
key aim of President Tsai Ing-wen’s flagship ‘New Southbound Policy’
which has faced hurdles and opposition in South East Asia from China’s
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Black 2019), especially in attempts to
increase Taiwanese investment in the region. Membership of the CPTPP
would help circumvent this, facilitate wider market access and, according
to Chow, encourage more foreign direct investment (FDI) in countries in
the region by Taiwanese companies, further boosting their economies.
Chow is clear that whether or not China, Taiwan and the UK fulfil
the economic and regulatory criteria of membership, in all cases the final
decision will almost certainly be a political not economic one. How the
current members of the CPTPP feel about the applications, and how
they might be influenced by other members, by the applicants and by
third countries such as the USA therefore becomes of crucial impor-
tance. Taiwan’s application is less a matter of it meeting the regulatory
benchmarks and more one of overcoming Chinese opposition.
Can it do so successfully? Wider attitudes towards China have been
undergoing a rapid reassessment since the start of Xi Jinping’s second
term of office in 2016. This was most immediately noticeable in the USA
with the clear shift in attitude under Donald Trump, its allies only gradu-
ally falling into line, and sometimes then only reluctantly. The UK was a
case in point. Here the official government position on China has swung
from a ‘golden era’ in bilateral relations when Xi paid a state visit to
London in autumn 2015, to China being a ‘systemic challenge’ seven
years later and the previous attitude dismissed as naïve, all it should be
noted, under the same ruling party.7
China’s reactions to the shift in British policy have so far been largely
confined to rhetoric. That has not been the case, however, in its reac-
tions to similarly shifting attitudes in Canada and Australia, both CPTPP
members, which have suffered high-profile backlashes from China. In
retaliation for Canada’s arrest on a US extradition request of Meng
Wanzhou, daughter of the Huawei founder, two Canadian citizens were
arbitrarily detained in China and temporary Chinese embargos were
placed on certain Canadian agricultural exports. Australia has also felt
Chinese wrath in the form of trade embargos as bilateral relations
deteriorated.
Thus, both Canada’s and Australia’s positions on China’s application
take on an even greater interest. Richard Pomfret explains in Chapter 6
that Australia has been a traditionally strong proponent of an open multi-
lateral trading regime but that in recent years this approach has been
over-ridden by foreign policy considerations, creating in his words ‘a
combustible mixture.’ He draws comparisons with the dramatic shifts
in US policy under Donald Trump, notably a more aggressive attitude
towards China, its largest trading partner. At the time, Australia, the UK,
and USA all had populist leaders who enjoyed a good personal rapport
between themselves—one factor perhaps in the signing of the tripartite
AUKUS defence agreement, aimed very directly at countering Chinese
assertiveness (and as Magnus reminds us, signed just before China applied
to join the CPTPP). Pomfret suggests the personal rapport was one
reason why the then Australian prime minister seemed inclined to rubber-
stamp the UK’s application to join the CPTPP. All three leaders have since
been replaced, although the hawkish approach towards China has survived
so far largely unscathed in the three countries.
Australian attitudes towards China’s application also seem bound to be
affected by the ongoing disputes between the two countries in the WTO
arising from the unilateral actions taken by China. In short, Australia
seems set to continue to take a rigorous stance on China’s application
1 INTRODUCTION 13
while examining the UK’s bid more carefully without, however, changing
its support for this. Pomfret does say that Australia has so far shown little
political interest in Taiwan’s application.
While one can presume that this might change if the USA itself were
to lobby members on Taiwan’s behalf, Taiwanese hopes for support are
therefore likely to rely heavily on Japan, whose probable stance is analysed
by Saori Katada in Chapter 7. She suggests that the burden of expec-
tations puts Japan in an uncomfortable position, the ‘dilemma of the
gatekeeper state’ as she describes it, forced to strike the right balance
between expanding membership of the group and maintaining the coher-
ence of its organisational characteristics. Get them right and Japan’s
influence and standing would increase; get them wrong and they would
be weakened, together with the CPTPP itself.
She notes that while Japanese politicians and businesses have so far
taken a cautious line on China’s application, Japan would be uncomfort-
able in taking a lead in opposing it, not least because some smaller CPTPP
members such as Singapore and Vietnam are believed to support it. But
Japan must balance this against its deep security and economic relation-
ship with the USA. Furthermore, she suggests that Japan has not yet
abandoned the hope that the USA might decide to re-enter the CPTPP,
a move that would be unlikely if China had become a member in the
interim. Her conclusion is that Japan is therefore likely to place great
emphasis on adherence to the formal requirements of the CPTPP and
expect all new applicants to demonstrate convincingly their ability and
willingness to meet and respect them.
In Chapter 8, Shihoko Goto explains what Taiwan has done in this
respect and how recent geopolitical developments may have helped its
cause. At home, the Taipei government showed its willingness and deter-
mination to face down domestic opposition to joining the CPTPP in
January 2021, then again in February 2022. In the first case it lifted a ban
of many years’ standing on the use of the ractopamine additive in pork.
Although primarily at the behest of the USA, which for many years had
insisted on it as a prerequisite for even considering opening discussions
about a possible bilateral trade agreement, doing so sent an important
wider signal about Taiwan’s willingness to sign up to internationally
agreed measures.
The second was its lifting of a ban on agricultural produce from the
Fukushima region of Japan, first imposed after the nuclear disaster there
in 2011. Japan had made clear that its support for the CPTPP applica-
tion was dependent on the ban being removed. After this, any additional
adjustments to comply with CPTPP standards should be less contentious,
although in Taiwan’s divided politics one should never underestimate the
tendency of the opposition party to make life difficult for the government
just because it can. But as both Roy Lee and Peter Chow argue, Taiwan
is already a member of the WTO and has taken many, if not all, of the
measures necessary to comply with CPTPP standards, so there should be
no legal or economic constraints upon it joining.
Goto also considers the potential impact of geopolitical reactions to the
Covid pandemic on Taiwan’s application. She argues that this has both
highlighted the island’s exclusion from key international organisations, in
this case the World Health Organisation, and the valuable contributions
it could make if it was a member, and its critical role in the supply of
semiconductors to the rest of the world.
Paradoxically, the very importance of the latter means that it may not
be to Taiwan’s ultimate long-term benefit, for Goto points to agreements
between Japan and the USA to co-operate in the development of new
technology for semiconductors and other critical components. In other
words, the strategic considerations of Taiwan’s ostensible allies may not
align with those of Taiwan itself, and Goto therefore feels that it has
only a short-lived window of opportunity in which to try to exploit these
advantages.
Katada’s analysis also shows clearly how the position of the USA will
remain influential, even while it is no longer a member of the CPTPP, and
even though it may not play an active role in deciding on the applications.
Consistent with this, in Chapter 9, Jacques de Lisle argues that the USA
will be more pro-active in supporting Taiwan’s bid than often assumed,
including by the former American diplomat cited in the opening of this
chapter.
He concedes that US influence today is less than it was when it
brokered the near-simultaneous accession of China and Taiwan to the
WTO in 2001. It remains considerable, however. In security fields,
including formal guarantees, Freedom of Navigation Operations in the
South China Sea, intelligence sharing and more, and its domination of the
world financial system and consequent ability to use financial sanctions as
a weapon, American influence in the Pacific remains strong.
De Lisle argues that the US position owes less to diminished influence
and more to a lack of political will. He sees the US as having moved away
1 INTRODUCTION 15
from the liberal, high-minded values of the Obama era and a desire to set
the rules for the global economy, towards adopting measures it once criti-
cised, including subsidies and protectionist barriers. As one columnist has
separately observed, perhaps the magnitude of the perceived China threat
has caused the US to decide that it cannot afford the laissez-faire approach
to private sector decision-making when it affects the national interest.8 One
upshot in de Lisle’s eyes has been that while the USA is more than
ever willing to signal its support for Taiwan through statements, or occa-
sional gestures, it has been unwilling or unable to include it even in quite
limited multilateral initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Frame-
work (IPEF). While the USA might be reluctant, or no longer command
the influence, to persuade CPTPP members to support Taiwan’s bid for
membership, however, it does retain the ability to block China’s appli-
cation and de Lisle feels that Chinese accession would be such a blow,
both politically and economically, to American prestige and influence that
it will ensure it does not happen.
De Lisle’s conclusion therefore is that neither China nor Taiwan—
nor the USA for that matter—will join the CPTPP in the near or
even medium term. Instead, ‘the can will be kicked down the road’
for future leaders to grapple with, perhaps when economic and political
circumstances have changed. This was a view with which no one in the
conference demurred.
That does not mean it will never happen. Populist leaders in the USA,
Australia and UK have already been succeeded by more pragmatic leaders
although growing unease about Chinese policy and behaviour remain.
But Chinese self-confidence has been battered by its stumbling response
to the Covid pandemic, especially its adherence to a ‘zero Covid’ policy
and mass lockdowns followed by a sudden, unheralded, and unplanned
abandonment of the policy, and the damage this has done to the coun-
try’s economy. The hubris that followed its response to the 2008 global
financial crisis may yet be followed by nemesis.
The election of a new president in Taiwan in 2024 will give China a
face-saving opportunity to adjust its policy towards Taiwan should it so
wish. Even without China and Taiwan as members, the CPTPP could
undergo a major change now that the UK is a member although it is
surely fanciful to imagine, as some Brexiters seem to, that membership
will lead to a fundamental realignment of British trade from Europe to the
Pacific Basin. Geography and relative economic size alone will preclude
that.
If a consensus is emerging from these contributions therefore, it is that

the application and decision-making process for China and Taiwan is likely
to be protracted, perhaps as long as the one that preceded their entries
into the WTO.
With the USA not being a member of the CPTPP, however, and after
four years of the administration of Donald Trump, the linkages and trade-
offs between US trade interests and security guarantees are no longer so
obvious, despite the efforts of the Biden administration to reassure allies
that for the USA it is ‘back to business as usual.’ At the time of writing,
it is still possible that Donald Trump could return as the next Amer-
ican president, a possibility that is no doubt causing a degree of caution
and hedging of bets in the policy planning of many other governments.
Chinese hegemonic ambitions are also under threat, not from external
factors but from the downturn in its economy following its mis-handling
of the response to the 2020 pandemic and the domestic impact this has
had. In these circumstances it would take a brave person to argue against
de Lisle’s view. But we live in uncertain times.
Notes
1. UK risks being too soft in India trade talks says ex-minister, Financial Times,
16 November 2022.
2. British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook in conversation with Canadian
Foreign Minister John Manley, 2001, private record.
3. China became a member of the WTO on 11 December 2001 and Taiwan
(formally, ‘The separate customs territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and
Matsu’) on 1 January 2002. They were both admitted to APEC, along with
Hong Kong, in 1991.
4. See for example Daniel Hannan: Free Britain to trade with the World,
Financial Times, 21 June 2016.
5. Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam
are members of both RCEP and CPTPP, while China has bilateral FTAs
with CPTPP members Chile and Peru.
6. Chris Giles: Brexit and the economy: the hit has been ‘substantially negative’,
Financial Times, 1 December 2022.
7. Aubrey Allegretti: Rishi Sunak signals end of ‘golden era’ of relations between
Britain and China, The Guardian, 28 November 2022.
8. Leo Lewis: Is US trade policy undergoing Japanification? Financial Times,
30 September 2022.
1 INTRODUCTION 17
References
Black, L.O., 2019, Evaluating Taiwan’s new southbound policy: going south or
going sour? Asian Survey, 59(2): 246–271.
Breslin, S., 2004, Globalisation, international coalitions, and domestic reform,
Critical Asian Studies, 36(4): 657–675.
Calvo-Pardo, H., C. Freud, E. Ornelas, 2011, The ASEAN Free Trade Agree-
ment: Impact on Trade Flows and External Trade Barriers, in R. J. Barro and
J.-W. Lee eds., Costs and Benefits of Economic Integration in Asia, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Magcamit, M.I., Tan, A.C, 2015, Crouching tiger, lurking dragon, International
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 15(1).
Sabbagh, D., October 11, 2022, UK to designate China a ‘threat’ in hawkish
foreign policy shift, the Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/
2022/oct/11/uk-to-designate-china-a-threat-in-hawkish-foreign-policy-shift,
accessed on 24 October 2022.
Warren, D., 2021, The Japanese Government’s response to Brexit, in M. Reilly
and C.-Y. Lee eds., A new beginning or more of the same? The European
Union and East Asia after Brexit, Palgrave 2021.
Whalley, J., 1998, Why do countries seek regional trade agreement? in J. Frankel
ed., The Regionalisation of the World Economy, University of Chicago Press,
63–90.
Wong, John and Sarah Chan, 2003, China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement.
CHAPTER 2
CPTPP Membership for Taiwan: Rationales,

Challenges, and Outlook
Roy Chun Lee
Introduction
Taiwan formally applied for CPTPP membership in September 2021.
Since the conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)
in 2015, Taiwan has started its application preparation; the prepara-
tion continued as TPP was transformed into CPTPP in 2018. Taiwan’s
strong interest comes from the following rationales. First, international
trade is crucial to Taiwan’s economic development. With the current
surplus accounting for 14.84% of Taiwan’s GDP in 2021,1 reducing
tariff and non-tariff barriers and receiving treatments of trade terms vis-
a-vis competing economies are critical to Taiwan. Second, Taiwan has
significant and growing investment footprints in the Asia–Pacific region.
Participating in mechanisms such as CPTPP is vital to improving stability
R. C. Lee (B)
Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER), WTO and RTA
Centre, New Taipei, Taiwan

20 R. C. LEE
and protection and providing better market access opportunities. Consid-

ering the growing pressure for supply chains to increase resiliency through
diversification, the value of investment facilitation mechanisms offered by
the CPTPP becomes even higher for Taiwanese companies seeking new
manufacturing locations in the Asia Pacific region. Third, CPTPP disci-
plines, notably those relating to regulatory coherence, transparency, and
digital trade, provide an external impetus to lock in its commitments to
regulatory reform.
More broadly, CPTPP provides a strategic opportunity for Taiwan
to escape from the regional integration exclusion deadlock. Although
due to the Cross-Strait political situation between Taiwan and China,
Taiwan often encounters strong political opposition from Beijing when
seeking to engage in trade negotiations to the contrary, the CPTPP is a
regional undertaking with multiple members, and the original accession
clause (CPTPP Article 30.4(a)) expressly welcomes all APEC economies
and separate customs territory that are ready to comply with the obliga-
tions in the agreement to apply. As such, Taiwan’s agreed participation
in the CPTPP as an APEC economy, in tandem with the CPTPPs
collective decision-making process, is considered one of the few feasible
opportunities to alleviate the political hurdle.
Following Taiwan’s former application in September 2021, crit-
ical challenges remained. Taiwan has relaxed the controversial ban on
Japanese food in 2022, yet other bilateral concerns require solutions.
Under the CPTPP, Taiwan also needs to face the most significant tariff
liberalisation effort of the agricultural sector since WTO accession in
2002. The surprise decision by China to apply for CPTPP membership
in 2021 also creates uncertainties for Taiwan, as China has already openly
opposed Taiwan’s participation.2 This paper will start with a review of
key policy rationales for Taiwan’s CPTPP accession, followed by an anal-
ysis of crucial challenges and impediments and discussions on the prospect
of CPTPP membership for Taiwan.
The Rationales of CPTPP Membership for Taiwan

Economic Importance
Taiwan has a close trade relationship with CPTPP Members. In 2021,
for instance, CPTPP accounted for a quarter of Taiwan’s global trade
value, with 21% of global exports and 29% of total imports (Table 2.1).
2 CPTPP MEMBERSHIP FOR TAIWAN: RATIONALES … 21
Table 2.1 Bilateral trade between Taiwan and CPTPP members (2021)
CPTPP Bilateral Export value Import value Share of Taiwan’s total

members trade total trade (%)
Japan 85,315 29,209 56,106 10.30

Singapore 37,794 25,720 12,075 4.56
Malaysia 25,125 13,328 11,797 3.03
Vietnam 20,106 13,968 6139 2.43
Australia 19,571 4809 14,762 2.36
Mexico 5386 3747 1640 0.65
Canada 5364 3010 2355 0.65
Chile 2283 255 2028 0.28
New 1646 642 1004 0.20
Zealand
Peru 627 281 346 0.08
Brunei 173 24 148 0.02
Sub 203,391 94,992 108,398 –
Total trade 827,914 446,393 381,521 –
CPTPP 24.57% 21.28% 28.41% –
share
Unit US$ Million

Source Bureau of Foreign Trade, https://reurl.cc/ER31Y1 (Accessed 23 September 2022)
Moreover, Taiwan’s outbound investment in the CPTPP area has grown

steadily, from 24% of total outbound investment in 2017 to 31% in 2019.
Likewise, investment from CPTPP members to Taiwan is also rising: from
15.4% of total inbound investment in 2017 to 20.6% in 2019. Such a
close relationship warrants positive gains for Taiwan and CPTPP members
through removing trade and investment barriers and better coherence
of regulatory measures. Petri et al. (2012) support this observation and
conclude that CPTPP membership, similar to other Regional Economic
Integration (REI) undertakings, provides an opportunity for Taiwan and
all participating countries to expand trade and investment growth, and
non-participating will result in a decrease in trade and investment due to
diversion effects.
On the other hand, Ciuriak et al. (2017) find that positive gains will be
limited for Taiwan under CPTPP, with just a 0.16% increase in export to
CPTPP members and no increase to the rest of the world. As a result,
Taiwan will experience a negative real GDP growth of 0.005% under
22 R. C. LEE
the CPTPP membership.3 Even the Taiwan government’s own simula-

tion suggests that CPTPP membership can only increase Taiwan’s GDP
by a nominal 0.52%.4
One possible explanation for this expected outcome is that tariff
rates are already low for Taiwan’s main export products, and thus the
trade creation effect will be smaller vis-vis other CPTPP members. Trade
statistics appear to support this scenario. In 2021, semiconductor and
computer-related products accounted for 40.5% of Taiwan’s total export
value,5 and they face no tariffs in CPTPP markets because all 11 coun-
tries are also members of WTO’s Information Technology Agreement
(ITA) and have committed to eliminating tariffs for the majority of
semiconductor and computer related products. There is also a possible
technical reason. Under a general equilibrium simulation model adopted
for trade effect simulation in the literature discussed above, trade and
other resources will be directed toward members with larger gains under
CPTPP. As such, Taiwan’s export structure renders a relatively lower
benefit.
These discussions suggest that the economic benefits of CPTPP
membership for Taiwan are limited, yet they fail to reflect some of
the main economic reasons for Taiwan to apply. First, for most trading
countries in the Asia Pacific region, CPTPP is just an additional REI
undertaking to their existing, in many cases, multi-layered, preferential
trade relations in the region. On the contrary, Taiwan has effectively been
excluded from meaningful participation in REI activities in the last two
decades. CPTPP appears to be the only possible solution to address this
limitation. The value of the unique opportunity nature of CPTPP is not
captured in the analysis. Second, the limitation on the benefits is an obser-
vation made from a macro/aggregate perspective. Yet, for many non-ITA
exporting sectors, the discriminatory tariff treatments are significant and
widening for many CPTPP markets, creating serious competitive disad-
vantages vis-a-vis their competitors. Furthermore, there is a benefit of
numbers. Lloyd et al. (2018) find that while the proliferation of prefer-
ential trade agreements only has a very weak effect on changes in trade
patterns, the size of participating members of a given agreement, however,
does contribute to the increase in the level of bilateral trade flows among
group members.6
To illustrate the first challenge, Table 2.2 denotes the seriousness of
Taiwan’s disadvantaged situation by comparing the Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA) coverage rate—the indicator that measures the proportion
Table 2.2 FTA coverage rate among selected East Asian Economies
Countries FTA Coverage rate in 2020 (%) FTA relationships with

(2022)
Singapore (SGP) 95.01 ROKa , JPNb , PRCa ,

CT
South Korea (ROK) 73.58 SGPa , JPNc , PRCa
Japan (JPN) 50.08b SGPb , ROKc , PRCc
China (PRC) 34.02a SGPb , JPNc , ROKa
Taiwan (CT) 12.08 SGP
a Both bilateral FTA and as a member of RCEP. b Bilateral FTA and as members of both RCEP and
CPTPP. c Only as members of RCEP
Source CIER, author
of exports that enjoy preferential tariff treatment under a country’s

FTA to total exports without considering the actual utilisation rate—
between Taiwan and Singapore, Korea, Japan and China. Amongst all
five economies, Taiwan’s FTA coverage stands at only 12.08%, signifi-
cantly below other exporting countries in this region. Next to Singapore,
Korea’s FTA coverage stands at 73.58%; even China considered a later
comer in FTA negotiation, has an FTA coverage rate of 34%. Because all
four countries are RCEP members, the agreement only came into force
in 2022, and the gap in FTA coverage will continue to grow. Among this
group of countries, with Taiwan as the exception, there is also a complex
network of free trade relationships between them. For instance, Singa-
pore’s exports will be able to receive a cascade of preferential treatments
offered by Japan through the pair’s bilateral FTA, RCEP and CPTPP
commitments. While the trilateral FTA between China, Korea and Japan
has been stalled due to geopolitical disputes, there is still a free trade
relationship among them under the auspice of RCEP.
The impact of non-participation for non-ITC sectors is obvious. Table
2.3 provides an overview of tariff structures faced by Taiwan in CPTPP
countries. On average, over 59% of Taiwan’s exports are already tariff-
free under WTO’s Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff commitments,
while 41% of exports face an average tariff rate of 7.05%. Among the 11
CPTPP countries, there are more zero-tariff items than non-zero-tariff for
Singapore (100%), Malaysia (62.06%), Canada (71.32%), New Zealand
(100%), Peru (66.30%) and Brunei (80.06%). Still, regarding non-zero
tariffs, the average tariff rates faced by Taiwan in Vietnam, Malaysia and
24 R. C. LEE
Table 2.3 Tariff structure of Taiwan’s Exports to CPTPP countries
CPTPP Zero tariff Non-zero tariff

Country
Tariff lines Ratio (%) Tariff lines Ratio (%) Average tariff rate
(%)
Australia 2467 47.41 2737 52.59 4.72

Brunei 4167 80.06 1038 19.94 5.75
Canada 3712 71.32 1493 28.68 8.11
Chile 10 0.19 5195 99.81 5.99
Japan 2595 49.87 2609 50.13 6.19
Malaysia 3230 62.06 1975 37.94 13.32
Mexico 2197 42.21 3008 57.79 11.90
New 5204 100.00 0 0.00 –
Zealand
Peru 3451 66.30 1754 33.70 7.31
Singapore 5205 100.00 0 0.00 –
Vietnam 1700 32.66 3505 67.34 14.23
Average 3085 59.28 2119.455 40.72 7.05
Source WTO IDB database
Mexico are punitively high. The average tariff rates stand above 13% for
Malaysia and Vietnam and nearly 12% for Mexico. Even exports to Japan
face an average of 6.19% tariff rate.
As for individual sectors, the top five exporting sectors from Taiwan
to CPTPP members measured in terms of import values are7 elec-
trical machinery and equipment (at H.S. two-digit level, which includes
semiconductors, information and communications products and other
electronic parts and components), machinery and mechanical appliances,
plastics and their products and steel. The benefits of removing tariff
restrictions seem limited at the aggregated level because a major part
of Taiwan’s export to CPTPP markets are already tariff-free. Moreover,
as reflected in Table 2.4, less than 3% of products belong to electrical
machinery and equipment, which is by far the largest exporting product
category from Taiwan to CPTPP, accounting for over 60% of total
CPTPP-bound exports. The same applies to exports under the machinery
and mechanical appliances category. On average, only 15% of Taiwan’s
exports face tariffs at the MFN level. Yet the sectoral benefits for those
categories still subject to ultra-high tariff treatment, in particular plastics,
textile, paper and proceed foods and other sectors where over 40% of their
exports face an average tariff rate of 10%, remain significant.
Table 2.4 Tariff structure for selected sectors
Sectors Average Import % of export Subject Distribution of

value from Taiwana to tariffs tariff rates
0–5% 5–10% 10%
(%) (%) and
above
Electrical machinery 56,245,833 2.70 19.29 34.88 45.83

and equipment
Machinery, 7,503,854 9.30 28.10 55.03 16.87
mechanical
appliances
Chemicals 4,908,039 25.77 70.73 20.90 8.37
Plastics 4,309,713 73.66 62.47 27.21 10.32
Steel 3,155,097 33.40 3.68 30.60 65.73
Textile 2,761,453 88.46 10.57 14.49 74.94
Optical display 2,577,610 6.71 4.94 46.60 48.46
Articles of iron or 1,871,087 42.96 31.35 50.47 18.18
steel
Vehicles 1,457,295 43.17 0.12 74.23 25.66
Metal products 1,367,445 51.40 62.04 17.86 20.10
Paper and products 560,284 59.14 0.44 30.06 69.50
Processed food 461,373 60.96 31.47 34.65 33.88
Glass and products 333,912 19.25 51.00 18.82 30.18
Sub 87,512,995 15.01 34.13 30.49 35.38
Total 96,187,554 16.47 34.06 32.17 33.76
a Average export value for the three years of 2017, 2018 and 2019
Source CIER, author
To further highlight the impact of discriminatory tariff treatment faced

by different sectors, Table 2.5 compares tariff rates applied to Taiwanese
exports to those from main competitors. In the case of synthetic fibres
export to Vietnam, Taiwan’s import market share currently ranks second
next to China, with a tariff rate of 12% for both economies, yet exports
from Korea are receiving zero-tariff treatment under the South Korea-
Vietnam FTA; of note is that China’s tariff will also be moved at the end
of the 7-years transition period under Vietnam’s RCEP tariff schedule.8
For Malaysia, Taiwan is currently the largest source of import of “other
steel products,” with a tariff rate of 15%, followed by Japan with the same
rate. However, Japan’s 15% tariff rate will be removed under Malaysia’s
CPTPP commitment. The situation is even more challenging for elec-
trical machinery and equipment export from Taiwan to Malaysia, with
26 R. C. LEE
Table 2.5 Examples of discriminatory tariff treatment in selected CPTPP

markets
Importing Products Main exporting Tariff rates

country countries (share (2020)
ranking)
Vietnam Electrical devices for connection Japan (1) 6 (to 0a )

with line V ≤ 1000 China (2) 0
Taiwan (6) 17.22
Dyed other knitted or crocheted China (1) 12 (to 0b )
articles of synthetic fibres Taiwan (2) 12
S. Korea (3) 0
Malaysia Other steel products Taiwan (1) 15
Japan (2) 15 (to 0a )
Vietnam (5) 0
Other Electrical machinery and Taiwan (1) 20
equipment and parts S. Korea (2) 0
China (3) 0
Japan PET plastic China (1) 3.1 (to 0b )
Taiwan (2) 3.1
Thailand (3) 0
Refined copper foil, unlined Taiwan (1) 3
S. Korea (2) 3 (to 0b )
Malaysia (3) 0
a Under CPTPP commitments
b Under RCEP commitments
Source CIER
major competitors such as Korea and China already enjoying a tariff rate
preference of 20%. CPTPP membership provides a playground for espe-
cially non-ITA sectors and enhances the Taiwan government’s ability to
pursue a balanced industrial structure beyond ITA products.
Another economic benefit of CPTPP membership is to mitigate the
threat of the hollowing-out of Taiwan’s manufacturing sector. As reflected
in Table 2.6, there is a continued decline in the number of Taiwanese
companies delivering their export orders from Taiwan; in 2010, less
than half of the export contracts were delivered from Taiwan, and by
2020 the share reduced to 46%. China is by far the largest recipient
of the offshoring capacity from Taiwan. Yet, with the rising costs and
the ongoing US-China trade and technology rivalry, its share has been
declining. Vietnam is one of the popular destinations for relocating
Taiwanese firms. Its attractiveness comes from the lower cost, quali-
fied workforce, and Vietnam’s ASEAN, CPTPP, RCEP and Vietnam-EU
FTA memberships.9 Taiwan’s continued exclusion from REI activities will
exacerbate the “exodus” of Taiwan’s manufacturing capacity in the long
run.
The Impetus for Regulatory Reform

Since the inception stage of Taiwan’s preparation for TPP/CPTPP acces-
sion, one key effort is the mandate for relevant government agencies
to undertake reviews of regulatory consistencies and divergencies against
CPTPP obligations. Referred to as “regulatory gap analysis,” it was one
of the key elements of the “TPP Promotion Strategies Action Plan,”
first published in late 2014. The objective was to identify discrepancies
between Taiwan’s current domestic regulations and CPTPP obligations.10
The outcome of the exercise is an ambitious legislative package of 12
laws and by-laws that require amendments to eliminate inconsistency. As
summarised in Table 2.6, all amendments will have completed the relevant
legislative processes by 2022.
These amendments are part of the regulatory reform process to update
and calibrate Taiwan’s regulatory regimes in line with the CPTPP disci-
plines. To this end, CPTPP membership is an external impetus for
Taiwan’s regulatory reform agenda. In particular, enhancing the evidence-
based administrative decision-making process and elevating administrative
transparency and regulatory coherence are two key areas where Taiwan is
set to benefit from CPTPP membership.
One good example is the reform of food safety regulatory practices in
Taiwan. CPTPP’s chapter on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS;
Chapter 7) builds upon and reinforces the WTO SPS agreement. The
main elements of the SPS chapter include adherence to international stan-
dards, science-based risk analysis, least trade restrictive consideration in
deciding regulatory approaches, transparency, and consultation on draft
SPS regulations. There are also rules on recognition of equivalence, certi-
fication and emergency measures. Most obligations are binding as they
are subject to dispute settlement mechanisms.
The set of rules is clearly defined, but Taiwan has been questioned by
trading partners, including the U.S. and Japan, for its failure to observe
them; there is a long-standing issue between Taiwan and U.S. on zero-
tolerance policy on pork meat additive bans,11 and Japan has repeatedly
28 R. C. LEE
Table 2.6 Result of the legal gap analysis and relevant legislative actions
Relevant Key amendments Related CPTPP Year of

legislations chapter legislative
approval
Statute for Distant Preventing overfishing and limiting Environment 2016

Water Fishing excess fishing capacity (Article 20.16)
Regulation on
Investment in the
Operation of
Foreign Flag
Fishing Vessels
The Fisheries Act
Patent Act Stipulating a basis for patent Intellectual 2016
litigation in response to the Property (Article
introduction of patent linkage 18.83) (note:
(Extending grace period from 6 to suspended under
12) CPTPP)
Pharmaceutical • Extending data exclusivity to Intellectual 2018
Affairs Act new indications of an existing Property (Article
medicine 18.53)
• Strengthening/Establishing a
patent-linkage system
The Plant Variety Extending the protection of rights Intellectual 2018
and Plant Seed in plant varieties to cover plants Property (Article
Act protected by international 18.7.2(d))
conventions like UPOV
Cosmetic Hygiene Removing the requirement of the Annex D of the 2018
and Safety Act labelling permit number and TBT chapter
registration number for cosmetics
to get a marketing permit
Postal Act Defining postal mail (post Cross-Border 2018
monopoly) items by value or weight Trade in Services
(Annex 10-B):
Express Delivery
Services
Agro-pesticides Extending the length of protection Intellectual 2018
Management Act for data exclusivity from 8 to Property (Article
10 years 18.47)
Copyright Act Empowering prosecutors to actively Intellectual 2022
bring charges against severe Property (Article
copyright infringement 18.77.6(g))
Trademark Act Stipulating criminal penalties for Intellectual 2022
counterfeiting trademarks or Property (Article
collective trademarks labels 18.77.3)
Source Executive Yuan

asked Taiwan to remove the total ban on agricultural products from

five specific prefectures.12 As discussed below, in both cases, the debates
in Taiwan are highly politicised and divorced from the evidence. The
calls from U.S. and Japan convey similar requests: review the bans based
on scientific evidence and follow international guidelines. The ability of
Taiwan to move away from political-based decisions and observe WTO/
CPTPP rules in these two high-profile cases becomes a major test for
Taiwan’s qualification to apply.
With a view of reforming the food safety regime in Taiwan to be consis-
tent with CPTPP disciplines, Taiwan removed both bans in 2020 and
2022 based on scientific evidence, which unsurprisingly brought about
political controversies. The liberalisation of the U.S. pork ban triggered
a referendum motion by the opposition party to sustain the zero-
residual restriction on ractopamine in imported pork (the ractopamine
pork motion) in December 2021. The Maximum Residual Level (MRL)
of ractopamine, a feed additive used mainly by the U.S. pork farming
industry, has been at the centre of food safety and political controversies
in the past 15 years. The U.S. has constantly asked Taiwan to observe
the obligations under the WTO SPS Agreement, which require members
intending to regulate imports based on health concerns to follow interna-
tional standards. The restrictions must be underpinned by risk assessments
with science-based evidence. Pressure grew after the Codex Alimenta-
rius Commission (Codex) formally adopted the international standard
for ractopamine MRL in 2012.13 Taiwan adopted the Codex standard
for beef muscle cuts in the same year after risk assessments that consid-
ered Taiwanese dietary habits demonstrated no significant food safety risk;
other beef products (e.g., offal) and pork were carved out due to strong
industrial and political opposition.14 The commitment of President Tsai
Ing-wen in 2020 to add pork to the list of ractopamine MRL, also based
on a second risk assessment undertaken in 2019, was, in essence, an effort
to demonstrate that Taiwan is committed and able to adhere to the afore-
mentioned international trade obligations and to bring closure to the
enduring dispute with the U.S.15
The opposition party initiated and led the motion on sustaining
the zero-residual restriction for pork meat (the pork motion) to pass
the referendum threshold (i.e., 1.5% of eligible voters) for the 2021
National Referendum.16 As in any society, people always refuse to believe
in scientific evidence and prefer a “precautionary” approach to food
30 R. C. LEE
safety issues. Unfortunately, food safety concerns were again manipu-

lated in the pork motion for political objectives, as the opposition party
campaigned to use the ractopamine pork motion to “teach the govern-
ment a lesson.”17 Had the motion passed, not only would there have
been likely unfavourable reactions from the U.S., but Taiwan’s ability to
deliver on WTO and CPTPP obligations would also have been discred-
ited. The Taiwanese people rejected the pork motion, with 51.2% of the
votes against the motion.18 The rejection has several implications. First,
it denotes a new paradigm in which politically motivated policy motions
unsupported by valid evidence seem increasingly difficult to convince
society. Second, it demonstrates the consensus in Taiwan regarding the
importance of adhering to and implementing international trade rules
and the support of reforms to remove regulatory practices inconsistent
with international obligations. Third, it provides a positive foundation for
Taiwan to consider removing other food safety-related restrictions that
have led to trading partners’ complaints as inconsistent with international
disciplines.
The new consensus reflected in the rejection provided President Tsai’s
administration confidence to swiftly remove the total ban targeting agri-
cultural products from five Japanese prefectures in March 2022. The ban
was first imposed after the 2011 Japan nuclear incident as part of the
emergency measures. While agricultural products from most cities and
prefectures were subsequently allowed to enter as long as they passed
radiation and other tests, products from Fukushima and four surrounding
prefectures remained restricted. The restriction was mandated by a similar
motion led by the opposition party in the 2018 National Referendum
when the government indicated its intention to consider removing the
ban. Japan had always requested Taiwan to reconsider the ban based on
scientific evidence and practices adopted by other importing countries. It
implicitly indicated the removal as a prerequisite for supporting Taiwan’s
CPTPP application.19 Similar to the pork ractopamine case, the deci-
sion to remove the prima facie discrimination is also based on scientific
evidence and risk assessment, which show no additional risks associated
with products from the five prefectures.20 There were sporadic political
protests against the decision, but they did not attract wider attention and
support from society this time.
The contribution of these reform efforts towards CPTPP accession
remains to be seen. Still, the benefits of bringing Taiwan’s regula-
tory practices in line with WTO and CPTPP disciplines, including a
higher level of predictability and consistency, as well as less regulatory

arbitrariness and political distortions, can already be enjoyed by Taiwan.
Global Supply Chain Reform and the Value of CPTPP

Taiwan is deeply interconnected with the Global Supply Chain (GSC).
According to the “Trade in value-added and global value chains country
profiles” index established by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2019, Taiwan has one of the highest global value chain participation rates
worldwide. As demonstrated in Table 2.6, Taiwan’s total participation
rate stood at 60.8% of gross exports in 2018. All participation indices
are significantly higher than the regional average for all global regions. In
addition, the relatively high level of backward participation vis-a-vis other
parts of the world strongly indicates Taiwan’s linkage with the GSC.
Moreover, the continuation and broadening of the U.S.-China
economic and technology rivalry indicate that it is now beyond disputes
regarding technical issues of unfair economic practices. As reflected in its
first Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, the Biden administra-
tion has formally maintained the “strategic competition” with China.21
Elements of the strategic competition are relatively vague in substance,
but it is not a new concept; the European Commission already defined
the strategic relationship with China in 2019 as “a cooperation partner
with whom the E.U. has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner
with whom the E.U. needs to find a balance of interests, an economic
competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival
promoting alternative models of governance.”22
Although the trade war only applies directly to products from the U.S.
or China, Taiwan’s high dependence on offshore manufacturing in China
indicates that the impact on Taiwan’s economy is equally significant.
As reflected in Table 2.5, the overall ratio of Taiwan companies having
offshore production in China dropped from 49.8% in 2016 to 45.2% in
2020. Return to Taiwan appears to be an effective option adopted by
many Taiwanese firms, yet this approach tends to focus on expanding
existing production facilities.23 ASEAN (especially Vietnam, Thailand and
Malaysia) is the hotspot for investment in new production capacities, with
60% of the companies choosing the region as their preferred location for
next-generation production base (Table 2.7).24
Considering the GSC reform development, CPTPP membership offers
a unique opportunity to facilitate the migration of Taiwanese firms from
32 R. C. LEE
Table 2.7 Taiwan’s Global Value Chain (GVC) participation index, 2018
Participation Taiwan S. Japan China Regional average

Rate Korea
Asia Europe North South
America America
Total 60.8 53.5 42.7 36.3 44.4 48.8 37.8 36.5

Forward 20.9 21.5 25.5 19.3 20 21.2 22 23.5
participation
Backward 39.8 32 17.2 17.2 24.4 27.6 15.8 13
participation
Unit % share of total gross export

Source WTO, “Trade in value-added and global value chains: statistical profiles”: https://www.wto.
org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/countryprofiles_e.htm
China to ASEAN, with Vietnam and Malaysia already a member or a

signatory of CPTPP, and Thailand having signalled its interest.25 In addi-
tion to the benefits of market access and liberalisation commitments,
the facilitation effect mainly comes from liberalisation. First, CPTPP
disciplines on the non-tariff measure, trade and investment facilitation,
regulatory harmonisation and transparency increase ex-ante certainty and
confidence concerning the quality of the domestic regulatory environ-
ment. Second, CPTPP’s requirements for creating focal and communi-
cation points in most chapters elevate the effectiveness and efficiency in
conveying and solving issues new investors often face.
Unique Opportunity Rationale

Given the importance of CPTPP and other REI activities, the direct and
intuitive solution for Taiwan is unquestionably to engage in all possible
undertakings. One of the primary reasons that prevents Taiwan from
doing so is the strong opposition from China, which considers official
contact between Taiwan and other countries, including negotiating and
signing of trade agreements, to involve sovereign connotations and to
be of an official nature.26 At the height of cross-strait political inter-
action during President Ma Ying-jeou’s administration (denoted by the
first-ever cross-strait leaders’ summit in 2015), Taiwan could conclude
FTAs with two important yet small APEC economies, namely Singapore
and New Zealand, with some special arrangements.27 China’s approach
at that time was to “discuss the appropriate and feasible way to link the
common development of the cross-strait economy with the process of

regional economic cooperation path.”28
This vague approach implies at least three prerequisites for Taiwan’s
REI participation. The first is that the deepening of cross-strait economic
integration between Taiwan and China must take place before discussing
the “linkage” with regional REI. The second is that Taiwan’s engagement
in REI is an issue that needs to be discussed bilaterally with China. Finally,
the term “link” suggests that China might require a special modality
(e.g., under China’s sponsorship) for Taiwan to join any REI mechanisms.
During the Ma administration, Taiwan repeatedly expressed interest in
joining TPP and RCEP between 2013 and 2014 during high-level cross-
strait meetings. China responded with a reiteration of this approach.29
However, during the same period, China opposed Taiwan’s proposal to
engage with Malaysia and Australia to undertake a feasibility study of a
potential FTA in 2014.30
Several factors suggest China’s prerequisites are increasingly unlikely
to be achieved. First, with the acceleration of the strategic competi-
tion between the U.S. (and E.U.) and China, economic policies are
now dominated by economic security and global supply chain agenda in
Taiwan and elsewhere; diversification rather than deepening integration
with China is now the key policy and business consideration alike. Second,
the growing political tension between Taiwan and China indicates that
China is unlikely to make any concessions on Taiwan’s REI participation.
Third, the sentiments and consensus in Taiwan suggest accepting that
Taiwan’s REI participation has to be “linked” to China’s will be politically
challenging.
Considering these geopolitical situations, CPTPP membership appears
to be the only option for Taiwan to join the REI bandwagon. Moreover,
article 5 of CPTPP states that after the date of entry into force of CPTPP,
any state or “separate customs territory” may accede to the agreement,
subject to such terms and conditions as may be agreed between the parties
and that state or separate customs territory. The WTO certified Taiwan’s
status as a separate customs territory in 2002.31 Therefore, there is no
legal debate concerning the qualification of Taiwan to apply for CPTPP
membership.
Furthermore, CPTPP is the only regional undertaking to which some
current members have openly welcomed Taiwan to apply; in addition
to Japan’s official welcome statement made by its foreign minister, the
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade of
34 R. C. LEE
the Australian parliament also recommended the Australia government

to “encourage and facilitate the accession of Taiwan to the CPTPP” in
2022.32 Finally, CPTPP is the only regional undertaking in which China
is not a formal member or signatory. With the collective decision-making
process of the CPTPP, in theory, it would potentially lower the political
threshold if there were positive support from some current members.
Challenges and Outlook

The CPTPP Process
Taiwan formally notified its intention to join CPTPP in September
2021.33 As a result, Taiwan and all CPTPP applicants face a two-step
negotiating process (Fig. 2.1). This paper refers to the first step as the
“acceptance of application phase,” with creating a working group as the
endpoint. The second step is the accession negotiation phase, with the
signing of an accession agreement at the end of the process. According
to the Decision by the Commission of the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership regarding the Accession Process of
the CPTPP (hereinafter the Accession Process Decision) and its annexe,
it encourages interested parties to engage informally with all CPTPP
Signatories regarding their interest in joining the CPTPP. In addition,
aspirant economies must notify New Zealand, serving as CPTPP deposi-
tary, of their formal request to commence negotiations on acceding to
the CPTPP.
Bilateral
consultation and 1st meeting of
current members the WG
Negotiation
Application 3
1 2 4 5 6 Accession
Creation of a Initial offers on

Working Group tariffs, Approval of
(WG) based on investment and accession
consensus government
procurement
Acceptance of application phase Accession negotiation phase
Fig. 2.1 The two-step accession process of CPTPP (Source Author based on
CPTPP Decision on Accession Process)
In accepting the application phase, Article 2.2 of the Accession

Process Decision “encourages” the aspirant economy to consult with each
Party to address each Party’s questions or concerns on interested areas.
However, these consultations will not constitute a negotiation process.
Schott et al. (2016) describe this step as the “down payment” phase,
whereby current members require reform commitments on addressing
current bilateral issues before accepting the aspirant economy’s request
to start the accession negotiation. The CPTPP Commission will then
determine, based on consensus,34 whether to commence the accession
process with the aspirant economy within a reasonable period after the
date on which the aspirant economy made the Accession Request. For the
acceptance of the application phase, Taiwan faces two critical challenges:
opposition from China and the ability to commit and deliver a “down
payment” in addressing the current trade dispute with CPTPP members.
The China Conundrum

Taiwan and China previously submitted accession requests to New
Zealand in September 2021. Historically, there were two precedents
where Taiwan and China applied for membership to the same interna-
tional economic organisation at a close time range. The first occasion
was the Asia Pacific Cooperation (APEC); the next was the WTO. On
both occasions, Taiwan convinced members to accept its application in
tandem with China’s. The final accession times were carefully arranged
to minimise China’s objections.35 In the case of APEC, the decision to
accept the entry of both China and Taiwan (as well as Hong Kong) was
announced at the APEC Ministerial Meeting in 1991. A “China-first”
approach was adopted for WTO accession, whereby China acceded to
the WTO in December 2001, followed by Taiwan’s accession in January
2002.
In this regard, despite the relatively welcoming nature of the CPTPP
accession rules and comments by some current members, the China factor
as a roadblock to Taiwan’s CPTPP membership remains critical. In addi-
tion to expressing outright opposition to Taiwan’s application at the
outset, China can effectively block Taiwan’s accession by the following
two approaches. First, with the growing economic (the largest trading
partner for most CPTPP members except Canada and Mexico) and polit-
ical power, China could easily achieve this objective by convincing some
current members to disagree in reaching the consensus of forming a
36 R. C. LEE
working group for Taiwan at the acceptance of the application phase.

Alternatively, China could also call on current members to decline
Taiwan’s request for bilateral consultations. In a second and relatively
light-handed approach, China could request that CPTPP members follow
the “China-first” precedent, whereby the working group to process
Taiwan’s application must be deferred until a consensus is reached to
create a working group for China.
Both scenarios could undermine the prospect of Taiwan’s accession.
Even under the relatively accommodating second scenario, it could still
seriously delay Taiwan’s application. While CPTPP members such as
Singapore have expressed their support for China,36 Japan, Australia, and
other CPTPP members appear to be sceptical towards China’s application
due to both the strategic consequences and China’s readiness to meet
CPTPP standards.37 There are also ongoing trade and maritime territo-
rial disputes between China, Australia, Japan, and Vietnam. This suggests
that it could be a lengthy process for China to satisfactorily address the
concerns and reservations of current members even at the acceptance of
the application phase.
Schott et al. (2016) recommend that considering the growing number
of countries entering the admission process, CPTPP members could
introduce approaches to avoid a “traffic jam” at the acceptance of appli-
cation stage by pairing applicants who can receive consensus to move
on with the accession process. There is a possible “safety in numbers”
scenario for Taiwan, suggesting that Taiwan could team up with other
applicants with a similar degree of readiness to avoid being trapped
by China’s complexity. Unfortunately, as suggested by Singapore Prime
Minister Lee Hsien Loong, the actual development appears to be heading
towards a situation unfavourable to Taiwan. In a May 2022 media inter-
view, Lee indicated that for Taiwan’s application process, “the consulta-
tion will take a while. Individual countries will have different views.”38 It
is not clear the exact content of the “different view” expressed by CPTPP
members. Yet, it is plausible that it is intertwined with issues regarding
China’s position and admission process.
Interestingly, the sixth CPTPP commission meeting in October 2022
did not reach any decisions on new applications except for a progress
report on the U.K.’s accession negotiation. Officially, CPTPP members
wanted to focus on concluding the negotiations with the U.K. to create
a precedent.39 However, the precious content of the precedent that
CPTPP members have agreed on is unclear. Still, the group had previ-
ously declared its commitment that “the CPTPP is open to accession by
economies committed to the Agreement’s objectives,” including meeting
and adhering to CPTPP’s high standards and ambitious market access
commitments and having demonstrated a pattern of complying with
trade commitments.40 Yet, developments are already derogating from
the U.K.’s accession experience. For instance, the decisions to create a
working group for the U.K. and to commence the negotiation process
were reached four months after U.K.’s formal request to initiate the
accession process.41
On the contrary, thirteen months had elapsed since both Taiwan and
China lodged their accession request by the time of the sixth CPTPP
commission meeting, and still no decision was made. Moreover, Singa-
pore’s prime minister openly admitted after the Commission meeting
that there was no consensus on China’s application.42 In a best-case
scenario, the U.K. precedent can support the “safety in numbers” theory
discussed above. Taiwan’s advancement will be based on the same factors
and merits as applied to all applicants. This suggests that the conclusion of
the U.K. negotiations will be a decisive development, and Taiwan needs
to work harder with key supporters to facilitate this scenario. Still, the
reality that a growing number of countries in the region are cautiously
not making decisions that would be interpreted as ‘taking sides’ will be a
major roadblock for Taiwan.43
Challenges Concerning the Level of Readiness

One of the most critical bilateral issues that Taiwan had to address before
accepting the application phase was removing the agricultural products
ban from five Japanese prefectures. The removal of the ban in March
2022 underscored a major milestone in elevating readiness. Other, less
contentious, bilateral issues, such as SPS testing of agricultural products
from Australia and Vietnam, also require solutions. Still, they are unlikely
to create substantial impediments to the acceptance of the application
phase.
For domestic liberalisation readiness, the most challenging issue will
be removing tariff protection for the agricultural sector. As summarised
in Table 2.8, the average trade-weighted tariff rate of manufactured goods
entering Taiwan is only 1.49%; to the contrary, the rate for agricultural
imports stands at 9.44%. As a rule of thumb, CPTPP aims to eliminate
38 R. C. LEE
Table 2.8 Taiwan’s average trade-weighted tariff rates (2014–2020)
Year 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Average
Agricultural goods 9.89 9.40 9.54 9.47 9.79 9.44

Manufactured goods 1.57 1.49 1.43 1.41 1.48 1.49
Unit %
Source Tariff database, Ministry of Finance
tariffs for all members with a very limited list of exceptions. On average,
zero-tariff coverages are 100% and 96.2% for manufactured and agricul-
tural goods, respectively, for current CPTPP members. This implies that
most of the tariff protections for Taiwan’s agricultural sector must be
phased out.
Taiwan’s Council (ministry level) of Agriculture identifies a list of 20
“sensitive agricultural products,” including rice, peanuts, red beans, garlic,
pineapples, mangoes, bananas, chicken and pork belly, that are currently
protected not only by high tariff rates but also tariff-rate quotas and
special safeguard measures for the most vulnerable.44 In preparation, the
Council of Agriculture vowed to accelerate the reform process, elevate
the support level, and pursue a negotiation strategy of maintaining the
maximum level of protection.45 For the manufactured sector, the only
sector identified as sensitive is the “whole-car” production sub-sector
under the automobile industry, which is currently protected by a 17.5%
tariff against imported cars, and preparations are underway for complete
removal.46
Conclusion
There is ample evidence to support the economic importance and value-
added benefits for Taiwan to join the CPTPP. Moreover, the CPTPP
accession clause’s language suggests that Taiwan’s inclusion was envi-
sioned at the outset. On the other hand, the most critical impediment to
Taiwan’s CPTPP admission is China’s objection as part of its strategy to
prevent Taiwan from official engagements with trading partners. To this
end, the future of Taiwan’s CPTPP accession depends on the following
factors. First, regardless of the potential political obstacles, Taiwan must
demonstrate that it is fully prepared and ready to undertake commitments
consistent with the standard of the CPTPP and to lock in support from
key CPTPP members such as Japan and Australia.
To this end, strategic competition between the U.S. and China creates
new geopolitical dynamics for Japan, Australia, and Canada, creating both
opportunities and uncertainties. One potential opportunity is the recent
call for collective action against China’s economic coercions voiced by
Canada, Australia, and Japan. As the effectiveness of China’s objection
depends critically on the threat and enforcement of economic coer-
cion, this development could potentially provide a chance for Taiwan to
work with key supporters to limit the impact of the China conundrum.
To achieve this, Taiwan and its supporters need to advocate positively
that ensuring openness and the inclusiveness nature of the CPTPP is
fundamental to defining the values of the CPTPP. Like the WTO and
other experiences, trade and economic merits should dominate the acces-
sion process rather than geopolitical considerations. This is not only for
Taiwan’s benefit but also to save CPTPP from future political dilemmas.
Notes
1. (Taiwan) National Development Council (NDC), 2022. Handbook of Key
National Statistics, NDC, September 2022, Table 3.
2. Staff writers, “Taiwan Joining WTO Is Not a Precedent for CPTPP,
China Says,” Bloomberg News, 29 September 2021, https://www.bloomb
erg.com/news/articles/2021-09-29/taiwan-joining-wto-is-not-a-preced
ent-for-cptpp-china-says?sref=HFaHEoGx (accessed 23 September 2022).
3. Dan Ciuriak, Jingliang Xiao and Ali Dadkhah, 2017. “Quantifying the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,”
East Asian Economic Review 21(4), December 2017, pp. 343–384.
4. (Taiwan) Bureau of Foreign Trade (BOFT), 2022. Frequent Questions on
CPTPP Impact Assessment (in Chinese), BOFT, Ministry of Economic
Affairs, April 2022, https://cptpp.trade.gov.tw/Information/Detail?sou
rce=Xw2cYGaxxFKgyPxKRZHH%20srTZeku2kiGjQW4vp914Fg.
5. https://cuswebo.trade.gov.tw/FSC3020F/FSC3020F.
6. Peter Lloyd et al., 2018. Is World Trade Becoming More Regionalised? The
Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT) Working
Paper No. 176, 2018.
7. Using importing value instead of exporting value is for the benefit of
analysing the tariff structure of the importing country.
8. J. Y. Kao, “The Short- and Long-Term Impact of RCEP’s Tariffs Liber-
alization on Taiwan,” Economic Outlook Bimonthly (經濟前瞻) No. 197,
September 2021 (in Chinese).
40 R. C. LEE
9. J. Y. Wu, 2020. Vietnam Remains the Top Investment Choice in ASEAN

Post the Pandemic, KPMG Taiwan, https://home.kpmg/tw/zh/home/
media/press-releases/2020/06/tw-invest-in-vietnam-seminar-2020.html.
10. https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/9277F759E41CCD91/2b6ec745-633d-
4105-9eaf-669de14a973a.
11. See for instance the Office of the United States Trade Representative
(USTR). The 2018 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade
Barriers, USTR, March 2018.
12. Madoka Fukuda, 2021. “Recent Developments in Japan & Taiwan Rela-
tions,” in Yuki Tatsumi and Pamela Kennedy (eds.), Japan-Taiwan
Relations, Opportunities and Challenges, Stimson Center, March 2021.
13. USTR, 2020 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,
pp. 462–463.
14. Id., at p. 463.
15. Executive Yuan, 2021. Taiwan Eases Rules on US Pork, Beef Import,
Department of Information Services, Executive Yuan, https://english.ey.
gov.tw/News3/9E5540D592A5FECD/b935c5ed-2476-4f95-8d9c-dd0
58791570a.
16. The motion reads: “Do You Agree That Government Should Put a Ban of
the Importation of Pork, Internal Organs and Pork Products Containing
Ractopamine (β-Adrenergic Receptor Agonists)?
17. W. T. Wang, 2021. KMT: Say Yes to Referendum to Teach the State
Machine a Lesson, Radio Taiwan International, November 29, 2021,
https://www.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/21180980 (in Chinese).
18. Kathrin Hille, 2021. “Taiwan Voters Back Government on US Pork Refer-
endum,” Financial Times, December 19, 2021, https://www.ft.com/con
tent/cee59ee9-f549-47fb-baf3-d2c3942f99b0.
19. K. Shin, 2022. Taiwan Finally Lifts Japan Food Import Restrictions, The
Diplomate, March 8, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/taiwan-
finally-lifts-japan-food-import-restrictions/.
20. Executive Yuan, 2022. Updating Control Measures for Japanese Food
Imports, Department of Information Services, Executive Yuan, https://
english.ey.gov.tw/News3/9E5540D592A5FECD/cdb519ae-a692-4082-
a136-0ca9938f128f.
21. The White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March
2021, www.whitehouse.gov.
22. European Commission and HR/VP, EU-China: A Strategic Outlook, Joint
Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and
the Council, JOIN (2019) 5 final, 12 March 2019.
23. Department of Statistics, 2020 Annual Survey of Offshore Manufacturing
Activities for Export Orders, Ministry of Economic Affairs, August 2021.
24. Id.
25. S. Hayden and J. Heine, 2022. “CPTPP: Can We Expect Addi-

tional Southeast Asian Members Soon?” The Diplomat, March
10, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/cptpp-can-we-expect-add
itional-southeast-asian-members-soon/.
26. Staff writers, 2022. “China ‘Firmly’ Opposes U.S.-Taiwan Trade Initia-
tive,” Reuters, June 2, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china-
says-opposes-us-taiwan-trade-initiative-2022-06-02/.
27. M. Okano-Heijmans, S. Wit and F. P. van der Putten, Cross-Strait Rela-
tions and Trade Diplomacy in East Asia: Towards Greater EU-Taiwan
Economic Cooperation? Clingendael Report, Clingendael, March 2015,
https://bit.ly/36Qi8sP (accessed 23 June 2021).
28. C. D. Tso and Y. C. Lai, 2017. “Taiwan’s Journey to Free Trade Agree-
ments: From the Proposed Taiwan-US FTA to the Cross-Strait ECFA,”
Review of Social Sciences Vol. 11(1), June 2017, p. 72.
29. Id., pp. 59–82.
30. J. Y. Chiu, and Y. S. Wang, 2014. “Economic Ministers Confirms the
Opposition from China Against Taiwan’s FTA Talk with Australia,” China
Times, October 5, 2014, https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/201
41005000363-260108?chdtv.
31. World Trade Organization (WTO), 2001. Protocol of Accession of the Sepa-
rate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu to the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, WTO
Document No. WT/L/433, November 23, 2001.
32. Parliament of Australia Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade, 2022. Expanding the Membership of the Comprehensive
and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, https://www.aph.gov.au/Par
liamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_
Trade/CPTPPMembership/Report.
33. Department of Information Services, Taiwan Applies to join CPTPP, Exec-
utive Yuan, September 23, 2021, https://english.ey.gov.tw/Page/61B
F20C3E89B856/4ba3bc36-9a82-41eb-b00a-e8d0532edf5a.
34. Article 27.3 (Decision Making) and Article 27.4 (Rules of Procedure of
the Commission) of the CPTPP.
35. Jeffrey J. Schott, Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, Zhiyao (Lucy) Lu, and Sean
Miner, Prospects for Taiwan’s Participation in the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership, PIIE Briefing 16–7, 2016, Peterson Institute for International
Economics.
36. D. Loh, 2022. “Singapore to join Biden Indo-Pacific pact, back China’s
CPTPP entry: Lee,” Nikkei Asia, May 23, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.
com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Singapore-to-join-Biden-Indo-Pacific-
pact-back-China-s-CPTPP-entry-Lee.
42 R. C. LEE
37. T. Ebuchi, I. Kawate and T. Hoyama, “China’s CPTPP bid

greeted with skepticism and caution,” Nikkei Asia, September 18,
2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade/China-s-CPTPP-bid-gre
eted-with-skepticism-and-caution.
38. D. Loh, 2022. “Singapore to Join Biden Indo-Pacific Pact, Back China’s
CPTPP Entry: Lee,” Nikkei Asia, May 23, 2022.
39. Staff writers, 2022. “Japan Says Britain May Join CPTPP Free Trade
Pact This Year,” Japan Times, October 9, 2022, https://www.japantimes.
co.jp/news/2022/10/09/business/japan-britain-trans-pacific-free-trade-
pact/.
40. CPTPP Commission, 2021. Joint Ministerial Statement on the Occasion of
the Fifth Commission Meeting, September 1, 2021, https://www.dfat.gov.
au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/commission-meetings.
41. CPTPP Commission, 2021. Decision by the Commission of the Compre-
hensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership regarding
the United Kingdom’s Formal Request to Commence the Accession
Process, June 2, 2021, https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-
force/cptpp/commission-meetings.
42. CPTPP Commission, 2021. Decision by the Commission of the Compre-
hensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership regarding
the United Kingdom’s Formal Request to Commence the Accession
Process, June 2, 2021, https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-
43. Don’t Make Us Choose: Southeast Asia in the throes of US-China rivalry,
Brookings Institute, October 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-con
tent/uploads/2019/10/FP_20191009_dont_make_us_choose.pdf.
44. (Taiwan) Council of Agriculture. Common questions regarding the impact
on joining the CPTPP, https://www.coa.gov.tw/ws.php?id=2503923 (in
Chinese).
45. Id.
46. (Taiwan) Office of Trade Negotiation, Ministry of Foreign Affair, Ministry
of Economic Affairs and Council of Agriculture, Impact Assessment and
Adjustment Strategies in Relation to CPTPP Accession, Written Commu-
nications to the Legislative Yuan, December 2021, https://www.ey.gov.
tw/File/B324D1648F4CC9C0.
References
(Taiwan) Bureau of Foreign Trade (BOFT), 2022. Frequent Questions on
CPTPP Impact Assessment (in Chinese), BOFT, Ministry of Economic Affairs,
April 2022, https://cptpp.trade.gov.tw/Information/Detail?source=Xw2cYG
axxFKgyPxKRZHH%20srTZeku2kiGjQW4vp914Fg (Accessed 19 October
2022).
M. Okano-Heijmans, S. Wit and F. P van der Putten, Cross-Strait Relations
and Trade Diplomacy in East Asia: Towards Greater EU-Taiwan Economic
Cooperation? Clingendael Report, Clingendael, March 2015, https://bit.ly/
36Qi8sP (Accessed 23 June 2022).
(Taiwan) National Development Council (NDC), 2022. Handbook of Key
National Statistics, NDC, September 2022 (Accessed 19 October 2022).
(Taiwan) Office of Trade Negotiation, Ministry of Foreign Affair, Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Council of Agriculture, Impact Assessment and Adjust-
ment Strategies in Relation to CPTPP Accession, Written Communications to
the Legislative Yuan, December 2021, https://www.ey.gov.tw/File/B324D1
648F4CC9C0 (Accessed 14 October 2022).
C. D. Tso and Y. C. Lai, 2017. “Taiwan’s Journey to Free Trade Agreements:
From the Proposed Taiwan-US FTA to the Cross-Strait ECFA,” Review of
Social Sciences 11(1), June 2017 (Accessed 11 October 2022).
CPTPP Commission, 2021. Decision by the Commission of the Comprehen-
sive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership Regarding
the United Kingdom’s Formal Request to Commence the Accession Process,
June 2, 2021, https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/
commission-meetings (Accessed 11 October 2022).
CPTPP Commission, 2021. Joint Ministerial Statement on the Occasion of
the Fifth Commission Meeting, September 1, 2021, https://www.dfat.gov.
au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/commission-meetings (Accessed 11
October 2022).
D. Ciuriak, J. L. Xiao and A. Dadkhah, 2017. “Quantifying the Comprehen-
sive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,” East Asian
Economic Review 21(4), December 2017.
Department of Statistics, 2020. Annual Survey of Offshore Manufacturing
Activities for Export Orders, Ministry of Economic Affairs, August 2021.
European Commission and HR/VP, EU-China: A Strategic Outlook, Joint
Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the
Council, JOIN (2019) 5 final, March 12, 2019.
Executive Yuan, 2021, Taiwan Eases Rules on U.S. Pork, Beef Import, Depart-
ment of Information Services, Executive Yuan, https://english.ey.gov.tw/
News3/9E5540D592A5FECD/b935c5ed-2476-4f95-8d9c-dd058791570a
(Accessed 19 October 2022).
44 R. C. LEE
Executive Yuan, 2022. Updating Control Measures for Japanese Food Imports,
Department of Information Services, Executive Yuan, https://english.ey.
gov.tw/News3/9E5540D592A5FECD/cdb519ae-a692-4082-a136-0ca993
8f128f (Accessed 19 October 2022).
J. Schott, C. Cimino-Isaacs, Z. (Lucy) Lu, and S. Miner, Prospects for Taiwan’s
Participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, PIIE Briefing 16-7, 2016,
Peterson Institute for International Economics.
J. Stromseth, Don’t Make Us Choose: Southeast Asia in the Throes of US-China
Rivalry, Brookings Institute, October 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2019/10/FP_20191009_dont_make_us_choose.pdf
(Accessed 22 October 2022).
J. Y. Kao, “The Short- and Long-Term Impact of RCEP’s Tariffs Liberalisation
on Taiwan,” Economic Outlook Bimonthly (經濟前瞻) No. 197, September
2021 (in Chinese) (Accessed 20 October 2022).
J. Y. Wu, 2020. Vietnam Remains the Top Investment Choice in ASEAN Post
the Pandemic, KPMG Taiwan, https://home.kpmg/tw/zh/home/media/
press-releases/2020/06/tw-invest-in-vietnam-seminar-2020.html (Accessed
19 October 2022).
K. Shin, 2022. Taiwan Finally Lifts Japan Food Import Restrictions, The Diplo-
mate, March 8, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/taiwan-finally-
lifts-japan-food-import-restrictions (Accessed 12 October 2022).
M. Fukuda, 2021. “Recent Developments in Japan & Taiwan Relations,” in Y.
Tatsumi and P. Kennedy (eds.), Japan-Taiwan Relations, Opportunities and
Challenges, Stimson Center, March 2021.
P. Chow, “Taiwan in International Economic Relations,” Orbis 60(4), 2016,
pp. 531–549.
P. Lloyd et al., 2018. Is World Trade Becoming More Regionalised? The Asia-
Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT) Working Paper
No. 176, 2018.
P. Petri, M. Plummer, and F. Zhai, 2012. The Trans-Pacific Partnership and
Asia-Pacific Integration: A Quantitative Assessment, Peterson Institute for
International Economics (PIIE), June 2012, Chapter 4.
Parliament of Australia Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade, 2022. Expanding the Membership of the Comprehensive and
Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamen
tary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/CPT
PPMembership/Report (Accessed 19 October 2022).
S. Hayden and J. Heine, 2022. CPTPP: Can We Expect Additional Southeast
Asian Members Soon? The Diplomat, March 10, 2022, https://thediplomat.
com/2022/03/cptpp-can-we-expect-additional-southeast-asian-members-
soon (Accessed 13 October 2022).
T. H. Thian and K. C. Yeh. “Determinants of Taiwan’s Outward Investment in

Southeast Asia: Economic Factors and Institutional Issues,” Pacific Economic
Review (2020), October 2020, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/
10.1111/1468-0106.12348 (Accessed 7 October 2022).
The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). The 2018
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, USTR, March
2018.
The White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021,
www.whitehouse.gov (Accessed 13 October 2022).
World Trade Organization (WTO), 2001. Protocol of Accession of the Separate
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu to the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, WTO Document No.
WT/L/433, 23 November 2001.
CHAPTER 3
Not a Fast Pass for China at CPTPP
George Magnus
Introduction
In September 2021, China announced that it would apply to join the
CPTPP, a decision which China had flagged a year earlier when it also
signed up with other Asian countries to form the Regional Comprehen-
sive Economic Partnership (RCEP).1
In the world of trade area acronyms, RCEP is unquestionably a pan-
Asian grouping, but the CPTPP, while currently smaller in terms of
population, trade and GDP, is a Pacific Rim construct, and in many
ways, it throws a greater focus on geopolitics, leadership and statecraft.
The term Indo-Pacific is also used to describe CPTPP members and
their interests, but with new applicants including China, Taiwan and
Ecuador, and South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Colombia among possible applicants in the future, Pacific Rim may be
better parlance.
G. Magnus (B)
The China Centre, Oxford University, London, UK
The China Institute, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, UK

48 G. MAGNUS
Even though China’s CPTPP application is not flippant or oppor-

tunist, the timing was interesting. The application came just a day after
the United States, United Kingdom and Australia, under the acronym,
AUKUS, announced a decision to supply the technology to Australia to
build nuclear-powered submarines, and a few days before Taiwan also
applied to join CPTPP. Politics and trade are two sides of the same coin,
as we shall see in this chapter.
A lively discussion has ensued about both the technical and political
aspects of China’s application. CPTPP chapters provide for compli-
ance with high standards in important areas such as labour markets,
competition rules governing state enterprises, market access, intellectual
property protection, information, data and communications management
and usage, and the environment. CPTPP members that have ratified the
agreement, in accepting new applicants, must agree unanimously to a
sequencing that starts with the establishment of a working party to draw
up a negotiation framework, sets the terms and provisions of the subse-
quent negotiations, and then concludes with a judgement on whether the
terms have been fulfilled or that a direction of travel has been formulated
according to which full compliance can be expected over an acceptable
timeframe.
Trade integrationists inside and outside China wonder if CPTPP
membership might offer China a WTO-type template to spur liberalising
economic reforms, for example to state enterprises, which might other-
wise be difficult. Others think it naïve to imagine China would choose to
meet many of the required standards, given the momentum in its own
regulatory and governance system under its current leadership.
There is no question, then, that China’s application will present
CPTPP members with awkward issues, not the least of which is trust in
China’s sincerity and intent with regard to pledges and commitments to
align with CPTPP chapter provisions, especially after the last few years in
which trust relations with several countries have become badly frayed.
Canada, Japan, and Australia are three large CPTPP members with
which China has difficult, if not hostile relations. Others, especially in
Asia, are torn between economic and defence-security interests, in which
China and the United States, respectively, are centre-stage. The decision
as to how to deal with China’s application, alongside that of Taiwan, was
going to be tough even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine In February
2022.
3 NOT A FAST PASS FOR CHINA AT CPTPP 49
Political tensions have been exacerbated, though, by the aftermath of

the summit meeting in Beijing at the start of the 2021 Winter Olympics
at which Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin issued a more than 5000 word
statement, proclaiming a ‘friendship without limits’. China’s support for
Russia has turned out to have limits after all, but even so, there is no
question as to where China’s sympathies and support lie. This has not
only undermined some nations’ perceptions of China, but also jolted
many around the Pacific Rim to wonder that what happened to Ukraine
in Europe, might one day happen to Taiwan. Amidst talk of Western
countries, defined politically rather than according to their geography,
reducing their dependence on China, and vice versa, how might CPTPP
members then weigh the benefits of more trade on the one hand, and the
prospect of China joining and becoming the largest and most influential,
perhaps controlling, member on the other? Whatever governments may
decide, moreover, how will the behaviour and strategies of regional and
global companies change in this new era of strategic competition between
China and the U.S. in which they will increasingly be drawn into the
cross-hairs of conflicting laws and regulations?
China’s application to join CPTPP reminds us of the way in which the
American thinker, Edward Luttwak, reflected more than 30 years ago on
the European and Japanese trade threat to the United States, namely as
‘the logic of conflict in the grammar of commerce’.2 The description is
even more apt now than it was then. In the 1980s, the severe tension in
US-Japan trade and commercial relations sent US politicians and thinkers
into a tailspin in which they extrapolated economic and technological
panic, political crises and the formation of power relations in Asia that
never came to pass.3 Today, though, the leaders of the world’s two largest
autocracies, China and Russia, seek to exploit a moment in which they see
the United States and the West in terminal decline, and stand shoulder to
shoulder in wanting to re-shape and restructure the global system to suit
their interests and values.
China’s CPTPP application, therefore, has to be considered not just as
an illiberal and nationalistic China seeking access to a liberal and perhaps
globally important state-of-the-art trade agreement, but also as a political
strategy to control, influence, and shape it in adversarial circumstances
that did not exist when China was preparing to join and then exploit its
membership of the World Trade Organisation in the 1990s and 2000s.
50 G. MAGNUS
This doesn’t necessarily mean its application will fall at the first hurdle,
but it serves notice about the nature and implications of the negotiations
that might lie ahead.
Chapters and Verse

It is important to note some of the principal features of the CPTPP agree-
ment and what signing up means to them. Bear in mind that the original
TPP agreement, the bulk of which is embedded in CPTPP, was written
with a strong US hand, predicated on the view that trade in goods and
services should be liberalised, unless specifically ruled out for some reason.
CPTPP aims to promote a market-driven economy. It provides for
the elimination of tariffs and other trade barriers in a broad range of
manufacturing and agricultural commodities. It seeks the liberalisation of
services trade by removing cross-border restrictions and protection against
discrimination. It establishes rules to open markets to foreign investment
and protect investors, lays out guidelines for e-commerce, intellectual
property protection, labour market and environmental standards, and
spells out rules and standards for the digital and communications sectors,
and for transparency in business, state enterprises, competition, and
procurement. It differs from TPP mainly in respect of some excisions.4
China is deemed to be a non-market economy, certainly as far as
the United States and the EU are concerned for world trade regula-
tion purposes, even though it has over the years tried to blend some
market mechanisms and discipline into its own Communist Party- and
state-driven economy. This pragmatism lay at the heart of China’s will-
ingness to reform laws and regulations resulting in economic success and
opportunities to take advantage of integration into global institutions and
the world economy. The big issue for China and for CPTPP members
today is the extent to which China’s economy has changed under the
stricter ideological and regulatory control of Xi Jinping, even to the point
of weakening its suitability for admission to CPTPP.
On labour rights, for example, the agreement emphasises the ILO
declaration of principles and rights at work, including freedom of asso-
ciation, the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of forced,
compulsory and child labour, and labour conditions that have to be
met for government procurement.5 China is in a murky area, because
while it has passed significant legislation to frame and develop labour
and social insurance law,6 enforcement is often lax, there are no inde-
pendent trades union, there is no rule of law as commonly understood,
and government policies also conflict with many CPTPP labour standards
and requirements.
China might point to trades union and labour law that came into being
in the mid-1990s, not least because of requirements provided for as China
sought membership of the WTO. It could also cite even greater efforts
to enact the Labour Contract Law in 2008, and 2013.7 Nevertheless,
the contentious area to which many lawyers will draw attention revolves
around allegations of the use of forced labour and other policies both in
Xinjiang Province, and in internal Chinese supply chains of which it is a
part.
On state enterprises and monopolies, the agreement seeks to elim-
inate ‘non-commercial assistance’ and market distortions, for example,
subsides, cheap finance, credit and resources, including land, and to estab-
lish a level playing field in which state firms do not get unfair advantages
in relation to imports and investment.
This could also be a big issue for CPTPP members, not in the least
because Article 7 of China’s state constitution states that the ‘state
sector of the economy, that is, the sector of the socialist economy under
ownership by the whole people, shall be the leading force in the econ-
omy’.8 Under Xi Jinping, the already strong state sector accounts for
a quarter of the $17 trillion economy and dominates sectors such as
finance, telecommunications, defence, aviation, transportation, energy,
and advanced technologies. This state sector is receiving even more
emphasis and priority.
Digital trade could be another of the more sensitive areas for
negotiations if China’s application is taken up. CPTPP promotes free
cross-border data flows, prohibits data localisation requirements, forces
disclosure of source codes, and sets high thresholds for government inter-
ventions to meet public policy objectives by applying WTO-type general
exception clauses.
China’s state-led digital governance regime regards data as national
security, and a commodity owned by the state, and is insistent about
data sovereignty and control. The Personal Information Protection Law
does provide tighter personal information protection against processing
activities conducted by the state, but in handling data, the state does
not differentiate between personal and other data, according to the
52 G. MAGNUS
Data Security Law. China also imposes data localisation requirements,

according to the Cybersecurity Law.
How these conflicts might be resolved is not clear, despite there being
clauses under which China and others can claim exemption, for example,
national security grounds. Yet national security is a very woolly term and
used widely, especially by China, to embrace a wide array of activities
and operations. One interesting clue might be found in China’s applica-
tion in 2021 to join New Zealand, Singapore, and Chile in the Digital
and Economic Partnership Agreement (DEPA).9 DEPA self-evidently has
a strong focus on data usage, management, storage, and export issues,
which are also central to CPTPP.
It seems unlikely on one level that China will be allowed to join
DEPA unless it first changes, or vows to change its own laws governing
data openness and transparency, in particular existing provisions of
the Personal Information Protection, Cybersecurity and Data Security
Laws.10 These laws are quite specific about, for example, the localisation
of data storage and cross-border transfers of data, which contrast strongly
with DEPA provisions. On another level, there are exceptions and clauses
in DEPA to which China might have recourse, and it will certainly want
to press claims that its own data laws do align with principles expressed
in the DEPA provisions.
In August 2022, a special task force was set up to help negotiate
China’s application but it is unclear if it will be able to overcome the stum-
bling block of the compatibility of any carve-out clauses for China’s data
and cybersecurity regime with the standards applied for other members
and acceptability by global firms.
Drawn-out political negotiations on these and many other matters are
likely as all sides seek to make their positions clearer. These negotiations
will be worth noting as a guide to similar and broader discussions within
CPTPP if China’s application proceeds. There are plenty of devils in the
details of these data agreements. Yet the details are also subordinate to
the more thematic and political issues of setting standards, and defining
systems and procedures. These lie at the heart of trade deals, and confer
political advantages on those who dominate in setting them.
Alignment with the labour, state enterprise, digital and other chap-
ters of the CPTPP is designed to be a challenge for countries with very
different approaches to economic, financial and industrial policies, such
as China, but is not a pass/fail option. So much ground is covered in the
agreement that China might find itself compliant on some things and not
on others. There is flexibility also built into the text of the agreement, and
there are get-outs and exceptions in the provisions for example, of foreign
investment, intellectual property protection, rules affecting trademarks,
copyrights and patents, and even digital governance. In some areas, such
as data privacy and protection, China might well be able to pitch, based
on its own recent laws and governance, that it is not only moving towards
CPTPP but that it may already be compliant.
What we can say for sure is that in CPTPP, member states and China
will put to the test the notion that free trade reduces the potential for
conflict and worse, for war. This commonly accepted notion overlooks
the argument that most of the conflicts and confrontations that have
occurred in the last decades have involved countries that were members
of either the WTO or its predecessor and of other regional free trade
agreements. Russia and Ukraine were both members of the WTO before
Russia invaded. China and India clashed on their border in 2020, while
the former has also had significant trade conflict with Australia, Lithuania,
Canada and in the past Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Several conflicts
in Sub-Sahara Africa, the Middle East and Western Asia have involved
nations bound by trade agreements.
The key then is not so much trade, per se, but trust in the governments
and institutions that govern trade and that are responsible for negotia-
tions. Trust is fundamentally about playing by the rules. The problem
with China’s application to join CPTPP is that it probably wants to
change the rules to better its own political economy.
Assuring other member states about the direction of travel in terms of
policy settings and future changes is important to each applicant’s case,
and perhaps none more so than to China. Several members will certainly
have reservations about China’s policies in recent years. They may have
profound reservations about China’s intent when it comes to setting out
new policies and whether they can trust the government in Beijing now
committed to an infrastructure of illiberal policies that has been in the
making for several years including Made in China 2025, the 14th Five
Year Plan, Dual Circulation Strategy, and the current Common Prosperity
campaign.
In the end, the plethora of technical trade issues, agreements, fall-outs
and get-outs that are part and parcel of complex trade agreements like
CPTPP may simply follow the politics. China has its own political drive
to want to get into CPTPP and settle down inside it to shape Asia–
Pacific and global economic relations, and may want to appear sufficiently
54 G. MAGNUS
compromising to at least get out of the starting block. Equally, individual

members may balk at the prospect of being seen to refuse China initially,
knowing that protracted negotiations mean that it is their successors, not
they, who will have to make the tough decisions. Then again, one or more
may think China’s application in current circumstances is a bridge too far.
CPTPP’s Trade Appeal to China

As things stand, the eleven members of CPTPP make up a free trade bloc
that is nowhere as large as the RCEP area comprising fifteen countries,
which also include China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Indonesia.11
CPTPP members account for about 13% of world GDP, compared with
about 29% for RCEP members. The population of RCEP members is five
times as large as that for CPTPP members, and RCEP countries do twice
as much trade.
One might ask then what China might hope to gain by also joining
CPTPP, especially as nine of the eleven CPTPP members also have bilat-
eral free trade agreements with China, and seven of those nine are in the
RCEP as well.12
From a strictly trade standpoint, RCEP is an inferior and much
less comprehensive arrangement. CPTPP is important and compares
favourably because it not only sets much higher and more pervasive
standards, but also epitomises the significance and inter-connectedness
of supply chains. China ships about a fifth of its exports to CPTPP
members, of which about a half are intermediate goods that are subse-
quently processed for final consumers. A slightly higher 27% of Chinese
imports comes from CPTPP members, of which about three quarters are
intermediate goods, again processed further for final consumers inside or
outside China.13
These supply chain links are a large part of an even larger Asian
phenomenon in which Asia–Pacific countries supply two-fifths of world
exports and imports, but about 70% of the former are used as inputs
in production processes elsewhere, while the remainder represent final
foreign demand, that is consumer goods.14
The institutional and interlocking structure of trade relations in the
Asia–Pacific, therefore, gives China a prima facie reason to join CPTPP,
and also because the United States is not in it. Given the comprehensive
nature of CPTPP, and its high standards, it is easy to see through a trade
lens both why China is attracted to CPTPP, and why China’s size makes
it a difficult case to refuse.
It has been suggested, for example, that if China joined the CPTPP,
the risk of trade conflict, now perversely enjoying a heyday, might
be mitigated, and lead instead to greater co-operation and construc-
tive agreements.15 In a recent book about China and the WTO, for
example, it was argued that the existence of a web of multilateral rules-
based systems and agreements has cemented international relations into
concrete legal obligations, and that by increasing interdependence, these
have increased significantly the cost of unilateral, bellicose behaviour.16
There is an extensive literature surrounding the controversial discus-
sion as to whether trade integration reduces the potential for conflict that
lies beyond the scope of this paper. It is important and relevant, however,
to consider another argument about why the Chinese membership of
CPTPP might appeal to both China and other protagonists.
The argument is that just as China used the goal of WTO membership
to make the case for extensive and difficult economic and financial reforms
at home that persevered into the 2000s, it could also now use its CPTPP
application and the need to comply with high standards and principles
as a vehicle to facilitate the introduction of, or re-energise the process
towards, new liberalising reforms of state firms, labour markets, market
institutions and access, and governance practices. This reasoning is highly
contentious, to say the least.
China’s CPTPP application probably has roots that go back to Xi
Jinping’s celebration of the Shanghai International Import Expo in 2019,
which placed a big emphasis on pilot free trade zones, and improved
market access, and to the 2020 articulation of Dual Circulation Strategy.
At the time, CPTPP would certainly have been seen, and possibly still is,
by more liberal policy-makers as a vehicle to advance domestic economic
reforms, using trade policy as a sort of Trojan Horse to change the state
enterprise and industrial policy regimes, including policies on subsidies
and market access.
So much has happened to economic and industrial policies and to
governance since then, however, that it is hard to view China’s CPTPP
application simply in terms of checking boxes and drawing up policy
adjustment schedules. Ultimately, CPTPP members may end up doing
this, but they will also be looking at China differently from the way they
viewed Vietnam. China is not a relatively poor country seeking access to a
wider regional and global economic set-up, but the world’s second largest
56 G. MAGNUS
economy looking to influence and control the economic and governance

system in the Pacific Rim. To what extent is China’s WTO experience
even relevant?
Over 30 years ago, China was still poor and unsophisticated, and rela-
tively naïve on global trade matters, inclined to accept principles of market
access and market mechanisms, and it was in no mind to stipulate or
defy the rules of world trade or the ethos of globalisation. The goal of
joining the WTO was used to frame a strategy that helped China develop
market-oriented, law-based agreements requiring, for example, to make
progress towards greater transparency, adherence to level playing fields,
wider market access, and fewer controls over state enterprises. Yet even
by 2016, the date that accompanied China’s WTO accession process to
become a market economy, China was still a long way from resembling
what we understand by the term.
Xi Jinping had already turned away by then from what might have
been a last attempt to promote market-oriented reforms, and set China
firmly on course for an ideological shift back in time and a recalibration
of both industrial policies and social and political goals. There is nothing
about China’s economy today or its policy and governance regimes that
bears any resemblance to the 1990s or to WTO accession in 2001, and it
is based upon a tired reasoning that still tries to draw parallels.
Trade integrationists in the Chinese Communist Party and in state
institutions, who are prepared to talk to the world, argue how China
could and should benefit from the kind of reforms that CPTPP member-
ship might herald but they do not really speak for China’s leadership.
Integrationists outside China, moreover, have a blind spot for the sharp
lurch in Chinese political discourse and governance that has characterised
the government of Xi Jinping, and which is laying a heavy burden on
China to choose between the statism that it is prioritising today, and the
flexibility and more productive growth it had in the past under different
political conditions.17 For now at least, politics are in command as Xi
Jinping’s system takes Chinese policy-making both backwards in time,
and further away from the ideals and standards of the CPTPP.
The Communist Party’s insistence on the concentration of power and
control at home, and the heightened sensitivity of nations to contem-
porary geopolitics and international statecraft, exacerbated by the conse-
quences of China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine, mean that China’s
CPTPP application is first and foremost, a political decision.
Elephant in the Room

In the 2010s, when the United States was in the original TPP, it certainly
conceived of it as a tool of economic integration to counter China’s rising
influence in Asia, but it didn’t rule out the possibility that China might
join it one day if it were able to meet stringent standards for trade liberal-
isation and transparency.18 President Trump had different ideas. Yet even
though he pulled his country out of the TPP in 2017, the United States
in the wings certainly has strong interests in CPTPP strategy discussions,
and in the geopolitics surrounding China’s application.
Trump’s trade war, which was initially only about punitive tariffs
against China, evolved into something quite different, which has spilled
over into and been developed by the Biden Administration and the
Congress. All of America’s trade partners, whether bound bilaterally or
multilaterally, have to acknowledge Washington’s whole-of-government
infrastructure of restraint, much of which is aimed at China. Thus, the
Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security oversees tech-
nology and export controls, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control administers sanctions, including on individuals and entities in
Xinjiang and Hong Kong, the interagency Committee on Foreign Invest-
ment in the United States polices foreign direct investment, especially
involving high technology, and the Justice Department’s National Secu-
rity Division authorises criminal prosecutions in the event of theft of trade
secrets and intellectual property.
Washington has enacted legislation aimed at China including, for
example, the Uighur Forced Labour Prevention Act which aims to restrict
imports from Xinjiang, the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act,
which aims to enforce standard accounting practices on all companies
or delist them (aimed at China), and passed in 2022 both the America
Competes Act, which commits the country to take actions at home and
abroad as part of its strategy to stand up to China19 and the CHIPS and
Science Act which provides significant resources to fund domestic research
and manufacturing of semiconductors in the United States.20
The Biden Administration is not only focused on security and defence
ties with other members of the ‘Quad’—Japan, India, and Australia—but
is also trying to reach out again to existing allies and potential friends in
the Indo-Pacific region, especially South Korea and members of ASEAN,
with all of whom it has on-going bilateral trade and commercial ties.
58 G. MAGNUS
These countries know that there is no substitute for the United States
in their region when it comes to security and the balance of power against
China, in which trust relations are generally low. However, they are also
recognising China as the more influential economic power.
For the time being, the chances of the United States re-applying
to CPTPP are considered very low, much to the disappointment and
annoyance of several of Asian nations, but the United States does at
least acknowledge that it has to do something to compensate. President
Biden’s Indo Pacific Economic Framework, to which 14 countries have
signed up, was launched in 2022, and comprises about two-fifths of global
GDP. It involves all the CPTPP nations except for Canada, Mexico, Chile,
and Peru, but also has India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. It
is focused on trade and supply chains, clean energy and decarbonisation,
infrastructure, and tax and anti-corruption. If, from its embryonic form,
it matures into something more substantial, it could rival or overtake
CPTPP.
The United States will doubtless monitor China’s application to
CPTPP closely and any developments in which third parties’ trade links
and agreements might contravene its own commercial rules and laws. This
applies increasingly to sanctions legislation and orders that might involve
US firms, and its security and businesses presence in the Indo-Pacific.
There may be a particular CPTPP focus on the actions of Canada and
Mexico, both of which are in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agree-
ment (USMCA), a free trade pact that replaced NAFTA that came into
force in 2020, and which requires any of the three to inform the others
if it intends to initiate talks towards a free trade agreement with a ‘non-
market economy’. Technically, Canada and Mexico wouldn’t be signing
up to any new agreement as such but even so, if USMCA expulsion
provisions were invoked in current circumstances, it could prove highly
disruptive for all three members –an outcome none of them would want,
given the much higher levels of trade integration between them than with
China.
It is worth pointing out also that the United States is self-evidently not
an enthusiast of China-based foreign policy initiatives. It was not enthu-
siastic about the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and is
trying, along with Japan, Australia and India, to offer different economic
ties and relationships to other nations, including in Asia, to those propa-
gated by China under the Belt and Road Initiative and the newer Global
Security Initiative. Motivated by the entanglement of trade, defence and
national security in the rivalry for leadership in the region, it probably

wants China’s CPTPP application to be kicked into the long grass, if not
actually refused. The United States could, of course, bolster its case if it
were to persuade members either that IPEF might bear real economic and
commercial fruit, or that it might yet re-apply to CPTPP at some point
in the future.
The Politics of China’s Membership

While the United States should want to boost its relevance to Asian coun-
tries as regards economics and trade, China is certainly keen to exploit
any vacuum for as long as it exists. Economically, CPTPP could confer
advantages that neither RCEP nor China’s several bilateral free trade
agreements do. Politically, joining CPTPP would give China serious brag-
ging rights as an integral and the largest member of the world’s newest
and broad ranging free trade area, but also a major opportunity to shape
its governance, and ultimately lead it.
We can imagine that this means different things to different members.
The question of China’s CPTPP membership comes with a lot of polit-
ical baggage at a time when many governments and multinational firms
want to lessen their dependence on China, diversify investment and supply
chains away from China, or even regionalise supply chains, which is to
say, build new ones closer to home. China too is pursuing strategies to
de-americanise its own supply chains, and build economic and financial
infrastructure and institutions to insulate itself form an American and US
dollar-dominated global system, Or it is at least intent on trying to do
so, even if the realties are more sobering. It has no qualms, moreover, of
using coercion, including in trade, to pressure countries into complying
with its wishes.
Singapore, which chairs the CPTPP from 2022, and, Malaysia, when
it has ratified CPTPP, are likely to support the inauguration of negotia-
tions with China, as might Vietnam. Smaller countries in Southeast Asia
are indeed conflicted between their economic interests, which have been
shaped increasingly by their involvement with China, and their security
interests, which have tended to be aligned with the United States. Typi-
cally these nations bemoan the rise in Sino-US tensions and insist they do
not want to take sides, or cause displeasure to either side. The likelihood,
though, is that smaller CPTPP members, perhaps even including Peru and
Chile, once the latter has also ratified, will feel that there is no harm in at
60 G. MAGNUS
least voting to start talks. Mexico’s position is more complicated, bound

as it is by its FTA with the United States and Canada. Perhaps in time,
if or as national security concerns come to dominate normal trade and
commercial interests, their behaviour will also alter. For now, however,
tough decisions can be deferred for some time, and there may be little
mileage for these countries in standing up to oppose China, unless they
do so as one.
For larger developed countries typically associated with the politi-
cally defined ‘West’, such as Australia, Canada and Japan, the decision
about China is more nuanced and laden with political and trade conflicts.
Canada and Australia will chair the CPTPP in 2024 and 2025, respec-
tively, after New Zealand in 2023. As far as Australia is concerned, espe-
cially, it is noteworthy that its own decision to join with the United States
and the United Kingdom in a decision to share nuclear powered subma-
rine technology lead immediately to China’s announcement formally
to join CPTPP in 2021. China certainly saw fit to contrast its own
‘peaceful and commercial interests’ with ‘AUKUS’ as the promotion or
encouragement of aggressive intent and potentially war.
China’s peaceful and commercial interests are in any case not always
agreed upon. The government and people of Taiwan, which applied
to join CPTPP a few days after China, might have something to say
about this. The government and people of both Australia and the United
Kingdom, whose CPTPP application is first among new applicants and
progressing well, can also be expected to take a view on this, in partic-
ular, and on China’s application in general. It seems that the British
government’s position on China has, if anything, become more hawkish,
especially since Beijing’s alignment with Russia over Ukraine, and if
the British government has ratified CPTPP when China negotiations
have to be approved, it is likely to be on the sceptical side. Simi-
larly, Australia, which retains a much less enthusiastic position regarding
China’s proposed entry than do either the United Kingdom or Taiwan.
The reasons are principally political rather than trade-related, specifically.
In any event, it is quite clear that the virtually simultaneous applications
of China and Taiwan present member states with a delicate and highly
sensitive political problem.
Taiwan is pretty much oven-ready for CPTPP, certainly compared to
China, and its status is even more centre-stage than normal, geopolitically,
in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United States is naturally
keen to support Taiwan in whatever ways it can, short of recognising its
independence formally. Australia, Canada, and Japan have all reached out
to deepen their ties to Taiwan, along with the EU.21 CPTPP members,
therefore, will have to consider how they are going to approach China’s
application if Taiwan is pretty much ‘good to go’. It is possible that both
could be offered working party negotiations as a starter, or neither, but
it is hard to imagine that one could be offered and not the other. There
seems little question that negotiations would be conducted separately and
it is highly probable that those with Taiwan would be concluded sooner
than those with China. Ultimately, the ‘safest’ thing for negotiators to do
at the outset might be to decide not to decide ‘in or out’, and to offer
negotiations to China, hoping to kick them into long grass, and for others
to pick up the harder decision in the future.
Perhaps CPTP members will collectively come up with more admin-
istratively innovative solutions to avoid any one China-reluctant member
taking political flak, but they will, in any event, have to ask questions, now
and in the future, as to what it might mean for CPTPP if China were to be
admitted. Would Beijing stigmatise Taiwan, regardless of CPTPP rules, or
other countries with strong US ties or that supported Taiwan or refused
to comply with Chinese naming and cartographical preferences?
China does, after all, propagate a narrative about itself as a defender
of free trade, and of rules-based institutions, but does itself no favours
with its track record of using trade measures and punishments against
countries and companies with which it disagrees, or which do not support
its narratives and preferences.
China acted in 2010 against imports of Norwegian salmon over the
Nobel Prize awarded to Chinese dissident, Liu Xiaobao, and imple-
mented a rare-earth export embargo against Japan and other western
nations, related to a dispute over the disputed Senkaku or Diaoyu islands.
It encouraged anti-Japan protests in 2012 and acted against Japanese
companies again over the same islands. It also curbed tourism to and
banana imports from the Philippines over the disputed Scarborough Shoal
in the South China Sea. In 2016, angry about the visit of the Dalai
Lama to Mongolia, it imposed punitive fees on the country’s commodity
exports. It restricted tourism with South Korea in 2017 as a protest
against Seoul’s adoption of a controversial US-supplied missile shield.
More recently, of course, China and the United States have been
engaged in a trade war that has spilled into technology, investment,
finance, human rights, and tit-for-tat sanctions. In 2018, a number of
global firms and brands were threatened or punished for using the name
62 G. MAGNUS
‘Taiwan’ on their websites, or marketing or product information.22 The

pandemic and China’s support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine have
added further to international trade and commercial tensions, restraints
and sanctions. In 2021, the tiny European state of Lithuania incurred
China’s displeasure and trade sanctions by announcing the opening of a
Taiwanese representative office in its capital, Vilnius.
Japan, Canada, and above all, Australia have all been at the sharp end
of China’s disapproval. Australia, which initially demanded an indepen-
dent inquiry into the causes of Covid, has lost tens of billions of dollars
of export revenues as a result of Chinese trade bans, regardless of the
bilateral free trade agreement and both being members of the WTO. It
has been grappling with alleged Chinese interference in Australian politics
and academia, and become embroiled in regional security tensions, most
recently over arrangements between China and the Solomon Islands.
China’s relationship with Canada was soured over the extradition-
related detention at Vancouver airport of Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer
in 2018 in response to which China incarcerated two Canadian citizens
then in China. Even though they were all released as part of a deal in
2021, relations between the two countries are not good, and Canada’s
own free trade agreement with the United States and Mexico could be
at risk if any of the parties agree to another free trade agreement with
a ‘non-market economy’, or China. The circumstances are complex, and
the fear might be exaggerated, but it is quite likely to cause political fric-
tions to which both Canada and Mexico will be sensitive as they do much
less of their trade (less than 10%) with China.
Japan seems to cycle through phases of competition and coopera-
tion with China, but there is little question that under Prime Minister
Kishida Fumio, the former is in the ascendant. Relations with China
matter a lot to Japan not only because of their history and geographic
rivalry, but because despite this, their integration has gone a long way.
China takes about 22% of Japanese exports. Nevertheless, Japan, as a
staunch economic and security ally of America, has become increasingly
wary of China, and been lukewarm about China’s application. It has
re-emphasised a commitment to defence spending and to the protec-
tion of human rights, passed legislation, aimed principally at China to
protect sensitive Japanese technologies and strengthen critical supply
chains from being overly dependent on China, and has become much
more anxious about the security of the Taiwan Strait and of Taiwan,
including supporting Taiwan’s CPTPP application.23
There is a sort of consensus view that Japan, driven predominantly by

its China and Asian economic interests, will be sympathetic to China’s
application, and as a nation that wants to try and maintain good relations
with both the United States and China, wouldn’t want to be singled out
as the country that said ‘no’ to China. Whether Japanese and others’
scepticism about China is usable as an instrument of leverage to get China
to change its economic policy ways is a moot point, and probably one
that won’t be readily taken on trust. However, it may also be that the
politics of at least starting the process are too awkward not to proceed, in
particular since the decision to kick things off has to be unanimous. By
the name token, of course, that might mean no decision is made for quite
some time.
Conclusion
That trade and politics are two sides of the same coin is beyond ques-
tion. China’s application to join CPTPP is being considered at a trenchant
moment in the outlook for both.
In trade matters, CPTPP is a state-of-the-art, modern trade arrange-
ment that stretches around the Pacific Rim, and is likely to acquire a
European member in the form of the United Kingdom. It may have a
future that increases its global appeal and leaves its more stuck-in-time
and inflexible WTO peer in the shadows. Seen in this light, China’s appli-
cation, market economy caveats and reservations notwithstanding, might
be hard to refuse though negotiations might be protracted, difficult and
with no certainty about the outcome. Member states will be under few
illusions that CPTPP will open pathways to reforms that Xi Jinping is
unwilling to implement, or consider, but technical negotiators on rela-
tively loose reins, will be minded to try and find ways of making possible
some form of agreement.
The question is how loose those reins will be because in terms of poli-
tics and geopolitics, the circumstances and arguments are quite different.
It is impossible, moreover, to ignore the role of the United States.
Trade experts are all too quick to point out that the American decision
to abandon TPP was a decisive blow to its influence in and among Asian
and Asia–Pacific countries, opening the door to China. It was decisive in
the sense that America did cede economic advantage to China, but this is
neither a sufficient nor necessary reason to doubt that America’s presence
and interest in the Pacific Rim will continue to be strong, or that for most
64 G. MAGNUS
counties involved, its presence is also welcomed and needed, and its voice
heard. CPTPP members are all cognisant of this, to a greater or lesser
degree.
US multinationals and brands, especially in advanced technologies and
financial services, carry important flags for the United States, regardless of
CPTPP. The US dollar system, with its sanctions leverage, will remain at
the heart of global finance. The Indo Pacific Economic Framework may
evolve into a modern commercial agreement, which even if it doesn’t
confer ready access to the US market, provides for important develop-
ments that signatories value. America’s defence, intelligence and security
umbrella, moreover, is worth more to many countries in current circum-
stances than many of the small (in terms of GDP) advantages that much
of CPTPP’s chapters offers. Further, trade deals can’t protect against a
determined coercive power, as for example, Australia is discovering about
China.
Politics suggest then that as members consider and weigh the
competing appeals and drawbacks of their relations with China and the
United States, the case for refusing or at least delaying China’s application
or initial negotiations has considerable substance. Or, at the very least, we
can imagine that if negotiations did start, they would set high thresholds
for compliance with high standards for all the principal areas that make
CPTPP attractive.
The bottom line is that China’s application to join CPTPP is about
much more than tweaking data, labour, enterprise and environmental
laws, or procurement provisions, to accommodate and integrate a large
new member. Fundamentally, it is first, about whether to believe that an
illiberal China intends to and has the will to adhere to important CPTPP’s
liberal requirements, and second, about a vital judgement call between the
rules-oriented governance system members have worked hard to establish,
and the more ideological, coercive and mercantilist system that Xi’s China
presents and would doubtless want to pursue as it does at home.
Notes
1. Premier Sends ‘Powerful’ Signal for China to Join Asia–Pacific’s Largest
Trade Pact. Caixin Global Limited, 9 May 2020, https://www.caixinglo
bal.com/2020-05-29/premier-sends-powerful-signal-for-china-to-join-
asia-pacifics-largest-trade-pact-101560855.html.
2. Edward Luttwak, From Geopolitics to Geo-economics: Logics of Conflict

in the Grammar of Commerce, National Interest, Summer 1990.
3. George R. Packard, The Coming US-Japan Crisis, Foreign Affairs,
Winter 1987/88, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1987-
12-01/coming-us-japan-crisis.
4. CPTPP versus TPP, New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, https:/
/www.mfat.govt.nz/nl/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreem
ents-in-force/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-
partnership-cptpp/understanding-cptpp/cptpp-vs-tpp/.
5. Integrated Strategy on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 2017–
2023, ILO, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/
@ipec/documents/publication/wcms_648801.pdf.
6. ICLG.com, Employment and Labour Laws and Regulations in China
2022, 25 March 2022, https://iclg.com/practice-areas/employment-
and-labour-laws-and-regulations/china#:~:text=ICLG%20%2D%20Empl
oyment%20%26%20Labour%20Laws%20and,leave%20rights%20and%20b
usiness%20sales.
7. China Labour Bulletin, Workers’ Rights and Labour Relations in China,
30 June 2020, https://clb.org.hk/content/workers%E2%80%99-rights-
and-labour-relations-china.
8. Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, National People’s
Congress of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.npc.gov.cn/
zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372963.htm.
9. See for example, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/cn/trade/free-trade-agreem
ents/free-trade-agreements-in-force/digital-economy-partnership-agreem
ent-depa/. DEPA, signed in 2020, is designed to facilitate digital trade,
enable cross-border data flows, and create a system of trust in which
data are shared equitably, and personal and online consumer data are
protected. South Korea has applied to join, and Canada is also expected
to lodge an application.
10. See for example, https://www.skadden.com/Insights/Publications/
2021/11/Chinas-New-Data-Security-and-Personal-Information-Protec
tion-Laws.
11. CPTPP = Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New
Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam.
RCEP = Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, South
Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singa-
pore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
12. Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam,
which are in both free trade blocs, plus Chile and Peru in CPTPP. Only
Canada and Mexico in CPTPP do not have free trade agreements with
China, but in both cases, the volume of China trade is relatively small.
66 G. MAGNUS
13. Minako Morita-Jaeger and Guillermo Larbalestier, The economics and

politics of China’s accession to the CPTPP, UK Trade Policy Obser-
vatory, Sussex University, 7 October 2021, https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/
uktpo/2021/10/07/chinas-accession-to-the-cptpp/.
14. Asia Pacific Trade and Investment Trends 2020/21, Economic and Social
Commission for Asia Pacific, 20 December 2020, https://www.unescap.
org/resources/trade-goods-outlook-asia-and-pacific-20202021.
15. Peter Petri, Michael Plummer, Why the CPTPP could be the answer to
the US-China trade war, VoEU, 30 October 2019, https://voxeu.org/
content/why-cptpp-could-be-answer-us-china-trade-war.
16. Petros C. Makroidis and André Sapir, China and the WTO, Princeton
University Press, 2021.
17. Dan Rosen, The Age of Slow Growth in China, Foreign Affairs, 15
April 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-04-15/
age-slow-growth-china.
18. Obama: China may join trade deal eventually, Politico, 6 April
2015, https://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/barack-obama-china-
join-trade-deal-tpp-118598.
19. America Competes Act 2022, Key points, https://www.speaker.gov/
sites/speaker.house.gov/files/America%20COMPETES%20Act%20of%
202022%20HR%204521.pdf.
20. Fact Sheet: The CHIPS and Science Act 2022, The White House,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/
08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-str
engthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/.
21. European Commission, Questions and Answers: EU Strategy for Coop-
eration in the Indo-Pacific, 16 September 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_21_4709, and European
Parliament, EU-Taiwan relations: MEPs push for stronger partnership, 21
October 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/
20211014IPR14926/eu-taiwan-relations-meps-push-for-stronger-partne
rship.
22. China warns Western firms over Taiwan, BBC, 29 June 2018, https://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-44614106.
23. Victor Lin, What the 2022 Diplomatic Blue Book Reveals About Japan’s
Taiwan Policy, The Diplomat, 4 May 2022, https://thediplomat.com/
2022/05/what-the-2022-diplomatic-blue-book-reveals-about-japans-tai
wan-policy/.
CHAPTER 4
Regulatory Constraints and the Political

Economy of the UK’s Joining the CPTPP
Minako Morita-Jaeger
Introduction
The UK formally applied for accession to the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in
February 2021. The UK has reached an agreement in principle to join this
plurilateral mega-FTA on 31st March 2023. Following the UK, China,
Taiwan, Costa Rica and Ecuador applied for a new CPTPP membership,
and South Korea officially decided to join the CPTPP.1 These coun-
tries are watching the UK’s accession process with great interest. On
the surface, the UK’s accession to the CPTPP does not seem difficult
since the country stands on democracy and is a highly developed open
economy. However, the fact that the UK is a European country located
geographically far from the Asia–Pacific and that its regulatory culture
M. Morita-Jaeger (B)
Senior Research Fellow in International Trade, University of Sussex Business
School, Brighton, UK

68 M. MORITA-JAEGER
is very different from regulatory regimes in CPTPP countries cannot be

overlooked.
Existing International Political Economy (IPE) literature has analysed
the CPTPP from the geopolitical context, such as the evolution from the
TPP to the CPTPP and the strategic value of the CPTPP compared with
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Concerning
the UK’s joining the CPTPP, existing academic literature is mostly about
economic impact assessment contributed by economists. To date, little
contribution has been made from the IPE perspective. This chapter aims
to create a political and economic narrative of the UK’s joining the
CPTPP.
We aim to answer the three questions: (I) How did the UK get moti-
vated to join the CPTPP, and how were its motives evolving? (II) Can the
UK government’s economic opportunism of joining the CPTPP be justi-
fied from the trade policy perspective? and (III) What are the domestic
constraints of the UK’s joining the CPTPP? To answer these questions,
we first look at political factors that shaped UK’s trade policy strategy
from pre-Brexit to post-Brexit and analysed how the UK government’s
rhetoric of ‘Global Britain’ and ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’ strategy shaped its
motive of joining the CPTPP. Second, we examine whether the CPTPP
can produce economic gains for the UK by looking at UK’s FTA rela-
tions with CPTPP members and trade relationships with them. Third,
we examine domestic constraints and societal implications by shedding
light on regulatory and ideological challenges in the field of digital trade
and food standards and safety. In conclusion, we address implications for
future accessions and areas of future research.
The UK’s Motivations for Joining the CPTPP

We first analyse major political and economic factors that shaped the UK’s
strategy of joining the CPTPP. The UK’s ambition towards independent
trade policy evolved after the 2016 United Kingdom European Union
membership referendum (23 June 2016). Six months after the refer-
endum, Prime Minister Theresa May introduced the rhetoric of ‘Global
Britain’—the opportunity to boost trade by striking Free Trade Agree-
ments with countries worldwide. Theresa May’s government argued that
leaving the EU was a great opportunity for the UK to exercise indepen-
dent trade policy while creating a new relationship with the EU based on
an FTA.2 ‘Independent’ trade policy was sold to the British public as one
4 REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS AND THE POLITICAL … 69
of the tangible gains from Brexit (Holmes and Rollo 2020). The appeal
was made that the UK could make quick progress in striking tailor-made
trade deals suited to the UK at a speed that cannot be achievable inside
the EU (HM Government 2017).
The UK government saw ‘Global Britain’ as an opportunity to re-
engage with the British Commonwealth. But the UK’s core economic
ambition was striking a trade deal with the US immediately. Given that the
US is the UK’s most significant trade and investment partner by country
(the EU is the largest if counted as a single partner), a trade deal with the
US was politically promoted as a replacement for the EU. Then Foreign
Minister Boris Johnson stated that “Britain was first in line” for a trade
deal.3 Once the Trump administration was inaugurated, the differences
between the US and UK’s views on the world became clear. While the
populist nationalism drove Brexit, the UK denied the Trump administra-
tion’s protectionism given that it took the political rhetoric of promoting
liberal world order (Schuyler and Raymond 2017). In addition, the UK
government faced the British public’s strong concerns on lowering food
standards and the impacts of allowing American companies access to the
National Health Service (NHS) (Heron and Sile-Brugge 2021). The UK
was forced to shift away from promoting the particular trade relation with
the Trump administration. In addition to the US, the UK government
included Australia and New Zealand and the CPTPP in its FTA priority
list. The Trump administration’s protectionism prompted the UK’s action
to seek to join the CPTPP.
Since Boris Johnson inaugurated a new Prime Minister in July 2019,
the Johnson government promoted a free trade project by setting the
target that 80% of trade be covered by new trade deals by 2022.4
However, the Biden administration’s America first approach further
diminished the UK government’s ambition of starting the FTA negoti-
ation with the US during his presidency. The UK’s political motive of
joining the CPTPP became much more robust as prospects of a trade
deal with the US faded.
The UK’s rationale for joining the CPTPP was officially claimed as the
Indo-Pacific tilt strategy. In 2021, the UK’s post-Brexit security, defence,
development and foreign policy strategy in Integrated Review revealed
the UK’s strategic choice of tilting from Europe to the Indo-Pacific
region.5 The Government underlined the strategic value of building
deeper engagement in the area since the geopolitical and economic impor-
tance of the region will be growing for the coming decades. The CPTPP
70 M. MORITA-JAEGER
was set as a core policy framework to strengthen the UK’s strategic

diplomatic ties with the Indo-Pacific.
The political motive behind the “Indo-Pacific tilt” approach appeared
to be UK’s antagonism towards the EU and recouping economic loss
incurred by leaving the EU if not by a trade deal with the US in a foresee-
able future. Then Prime Minister Johnson took the antagonism approach
since his ‘get Brexit done’ campaign successfully achieved his parliamen-
tary majority in 2019.6 Through the negotiations for Trade and Coop-
eration Agreement negotiation and the Northern Ireland Protocol, and
the implementation of the Post-Brexit arrangements, mistrust between
the EU and the UK deepened.7 From the Leave campaign to the antago-
nism approach, it was difficult for then Prime Minister Johnson to change
his political tactic towards rebuilding a positive relationship with the EU
(Niblett 2022).
The UK government’s expectation for the CPTPP market seems
further growing given the low likelihood of striking a trade deal with the
US in the foreseeable future and growing mistrust between the EU and
the UK. The UK government highlighted that joining the CPTPP will
open an opportunity of accessing a dynamic Indo-Pacific market that will
generate 56% of global growth between 2019 and 2050 (Department
for International Trade 2021b). The UK government underlined that
economic power shifts from West to East in the coming decades and
emphasised the economic importance of the Indo-Pacific as follows.
Currently, four regions, Europe, North America, China and the Asia
Pacific, are major global trade players. In the future (2019–2050), 44%
of the growth in global import demand is expected to come from the
Indo-Pacific, increasing from 42% (2005–2019). In comparison, the EU’s
global import demand is expected to decrease from 30% (2005–2019)
to 19% (2019–2050). The CPTPP (current 11 members) import market
size is estimated to go up from 48% (2019) to 54% (2050) of the EU 27
market (DIT 2021b, pp. 23–24).
Limited Economic Impact

of Joining the CPTPP for the UK
Although the “Global Britain” rhetoric and independent trade policy
including joining the CPTPP appears to promise a tremendous economic
opportunity, the UK’s FTAs are unlikely to offset trade losses incurred by
leaving the EU customs union and single market (Brakeman et al. 2018).
Leaving the EU, which incurs trade diversion away from the EU and
trade creation with non-EU countries, will be trade and welfare-reducing
for the UK (Van Tongeren et al. 2021). According to the Office for
Budget Responsibility assessment in October 2021, Brexit will reduce UK
imports and exports by 15% lower than had the UK stayed in the EU.8
And GDP will be reduced by 4%.9
To date (May 2022), the UK successfully achieved 35 ‘continuity
agreements’ (rolled-over agreements of the EU’s FTAs) with 67 coun-
tries. Since these agreements are replicas of the EU’s FTAs, positive
economic impacts cannot be expected. Apart from the ‘continuity agree-
ments’, the UK concluded the three new FTAs. In precise, the FTA with
Japan (entered into force in January 2021) was almost a copy and paste
of the EU-Japan FTA except for some improvements in rules, such as
the digital trade chapter. Thus, no economic impact or just a minor
impact at most is expected. The UK government’s estimate was 0.07%
gain relative to no FTA (a failure of succeeding the EU-Japan FTA).
The two FTAs, which were signed with Australia (December 2021) and
New Zealand (February 2022) were the UK’s tailor-made FTAs. Even
though the economic impacts of these two FTAs projected by the UK
government itself—Australia: 0.01–0.02 (revised estimate was 0.08%) and
New Zealand: 0.00% show economic gains from these agreements are
negligible. Even a trade deal with the US is projected to produce only
0.07–0.16% GDP gains.
Although the Johnson government conveyed to the public that joining
the CPTPP could create enormous economic opportunities,10 potential
financial gains looked slim. The UK government projected that joining
the Agreement could increase UK GDP by an extra £1.8 billion and boost
trade by £3.3 billion, which is about 0.08% GDP increase in the long run
(Department for International Trade 2021a). The UK government’s own
estimates indicate that trade and welfare increase driven by the ‘Global
Britain’ FTA project will be far below the loss incurred by the UK leaving
the EU, which is the UK’s largest and closest trade partner.
The significant economic reason why the UK’s FTAs with the Indo-
Pacific region are likely to make a little economic contribution is that
geographic proximity matters for trade. Although pro-Brexit govern-
ment ministers claimed that distance does not matter for trade in their
‘Global Britain’ discourse, there are a plenty of strong theoretical and
empirical work that support the gravity equation, which is a country’s
trade exports proportionally reflect economic size and inversely reflect
72 M. MORITA-JAEGER
geographic distance. The evidence well explains today’s international

trade (Chaney 2018; Borchert and Yotov 2017). For the UK, according
to some economic studies, the EU is overwhelmingly like to remain as
the most important trade partner in the future (Kaczmarczyk 2018).
For example, services trade and even digitisation of trade are strongly
affected by distance (Kimura and Lee 2006; Spring and Lowe 2018).
This indicates that the UK as a services economy accounting for 80%
of total economy output with a comparative advantage in services trade
would continue to export services to its neighbour, the EU, even if
volumes of exports will be reduced from the current level (40% of total
UK service exports in 2020).11 Also the distance effect still matters for
global value chains even Information and Communications Technology
(ICT) develops (Baldwin 2016). Furthermore, it is worth noting that the
future trade environment is full of uncertainties as the world has been
going through China-US decoupling, Covid-19 pandemic, and is experi-
encing Russia’s invasion in Ukraine. In fact, many governments shifted to
promote reshoring or friend-shoring to avoid unpredicted risks (Gasiorek
2022).
In addition to the strong economic theory and evidence of the gravity
equation as well as increasing geographical uncertainties mentioned
above, there are two specific policy reasons why the CPTPP’s economic
value is very limited for the UK. First, the UK already has the bilateral
FTAs with nine countries (Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, Peru, Singa-
pore, Vietnam, Australia (signed) and New Zealand (signed)) out of
eleven (Table 4.1). Although the FTA with Canada and Singapore are
continuity agreements, which is a replica of the EU’s FTAs, these are
EU’s ‘New Generation’ FTAs that provide for regulatory cooperation in
a wide range of areas. The FTA with Japan is almost same as the EU-
Japan FTA, but its digital chapter goes beyond the CPTPP. Australia is
a completely new FTA negotiated from scratch and reflects the UK’s
interest of promoting cooperation in technology and innovation. The
coverage of these FTAs is comprehensive, and the level of liberalisation
commitment is high. The CPTPP, which was negotiated in 2010s, is no
longer a novel FTA in comparison with the UK’s tailor-made new FTAs.
Thus, the Agreement does not seem to bring added values to the UK.
The second reason is that the UK’s major trade partners among
CPTPP member countries are the ones with which the UK has a bilat-
eral FTA. For example, goods exports accounted for 7.92 of UK’s total
exports, among which, 5.99% are to the countries which the UK has
Table 4.1 UK’s bilateral relations with CPTPP members

New Australia New
bilateral Zealand
FTA with the
UK
Continuity Japan
agreement
plus (EU-
Japan
EPA
(2019?)
Continuity Canada Mexico

agreement
(to be
renegotiated)
Continuity Singapore Vietnam Chile Peru

agreement
No bilateral Malaysia
FTA and
Brunei
(Brunei
not yet
ratified
the
CPTPP)
Note The figure was created by the author
already have an FTA. In the case of services, 9.05% of UK’s total exports
went to the CPTPP, among which, 6.20% were to the countries with the
FTA relation. 5.66% out of 7.03% of UK’s total goods imports and 6.31%
out of 7.91% of UK’s total services imports are from the CPTPP countries
with the FTA relations. Note that these figures do not include Australia
and New Zealand as the FTAs are not yet ratified. If these two countries
are included, these shares would become a slightly higher (Fig. 4.1).12
Among the CPTPP member countries, the UK’s major trade partners
are Canada, Japan, Australia and Singapore. The four countries account
for 87% of services exports, 80% of goods exports, and 84% of services
imports and 75% of goods imports (Fig. 4.2). Potential economic gains
depend on the CPTPP’s future expansion, such as China, with which the
UK has a strong trade relation (13.3% of total goods imports and 5.8%
of total goods exports).
Because the CPTPP is a plurilateral agreement, efficiency gains through
regulatory cooperation among the 11 CPTPP members can be expected.
74 M. MORITA-JAEGER
Fig. 4.1 CPTPP shares of UK trade with the world, 2019 (Source Gasiorek
et al. [2022]. The value of the CPTPP for the UK, UKTPO blog, 3 February
2021. At: The value of the CPTPP for the UK « UK Trade Policy Observa-
tory [sussex.ac.uk]; ONS data on international trade; author’s calculations. Note
Shares calculated as the total value of UK trade with CPTPP countries divided
by the total value of UK trade with the World; CPTPP-FTA are those CPTPP
countries the UK already has an FTA with)
Fig. 4.2 UK’s total trade with CPTPP countries, 2019 (Source UN Comtrade
and ONS combined data. Note Shares calculated as the value of UK trade with
a CPTPP country (or countries) divided by the total value of UK trade with the
CPTPP)
For example, the CPTPP’s rules of origin arrangements allows for the
full cumulation of inputs from the CPTPP partner countries. However,
as the empirical evidence of gravity equation shows, companies may not
get strong incentives to increase trade, such as exporting or importing
intermediate inputs for global supply chains, with geographically distant
CPTPP members only because of the CPTPP rules of origin arrange-
ments.
Regulatory Constraints and Societal Implications

Regulatory Divergence Between the Asia Pacific and the UK
as a Former EU Member
This section examines regulatory constraints and potential societal impli-
cations of the CPTPP in the UK. Unlike bilateral FTAs which the UK has
previously concluded, the UK has to unconditionally accept all CPTPP
rules to become a new member. The CPTPP rules on accession process
require an acceding country to demonstrate that its relevant domestic laws
and regulations are all compatible with the CPTPP rules.13 In practice,
CPTPP members use what is called ‘side letters’ to derogate specific legal
obligations under the Agreement. However, to what extent the UK will
be allowed to use such a mechanism is unknown (Morita-Jaeger 2021a).
Depending on ways the UK accedes, the CPTPP would potentially cause
frictions to UK’s public interests and its regulatory environment.
The origin of the CPTPP is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the
negotiations of which were driven by the Obama administration and
signed in February 2016. The Agreement strongly reflects the US’s
economic interests that time by resembling the US’s existing FTAs
(Schott 2018; Elms 2016). This means that the CPTPP is the trade
agreement adopted the US style regulatory approach and regulatory
cooperation.
There is a regulatory divergence between the EU and the US. Their
regulatory approaches are different, reflecting political, economic, insti-
tutional and other societal values (Bercero et al. 2018; Young 2015). In
general, the EU esteems its public policy objectives, such as protection
of individual rights, environment, health, safety and consumer rights, in
designing its regulatory policies. In comparison, the US takes the market-
driven approach and regulations are administered at the state level in
many areas.
76 M. MORITA-JAEGER
It is worth recalling that regulatory differences between the EU and

the US caused the civil society opposition to the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. Consumer and environ-
mental civil society organisations and the general public in the EU were
concerned that the regulatory cooperation between the EU and the US
under the TTIP would lower the EU’s safety and environmental protec-
tion. Also, civil society organisations expressed a vital concern about the
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). They claimed that ISDS has a
chilling effect on social regulations such as environment, human rights
and worker rights protection as transnational corporations (TNCs) can
challenge hosting countries’ social regulations (De Ville and Siles-Brugge
2016). In the case of the UK, a group of British civil society organisa-
tions, which consists of about 50 organisations, formed a coalition with
some civil society organisations in the EU member states and organ-
ised demonstrations (Van Loon 2018). The presence of non-business
stakeholders as well as the general public, played an influential role in
the TTIP negotiations instead of conventional export-oriented interests
versus import-competing actors (Young 2016).
Although a trade negotiation for the UK-US FTA is unlikely to be
materialised due to the US’s lack of interest, the British public has already
expressed strong concerns that such a trade deal might lower UK’s high
regulatory standards (Heron and Siles-Brugge 2021). The UK was an EU
member for almost a half-century since 1973, until it left the EU customs
union and single market in January 2020. Thus, its regulatory culture and
ideology are deeply rooted in the EU style societal norms and ideology.
British stakeholders’ concerns about the CPTPP accession mirror
concerns about the TTIP negotiation and the potential UK-US FTA.
Regarding the export-oriented and import-competing interests in the
UK, it is almost only the agricultural sector that has a concern about an
increase of imports in agricultural and food products. Other significant
concerns are concentrated in the CPTPP’s rules. The British public and
civil society organisations’ main problems lie in regulatory issues, such as
‘product standards, regulation and certification’, ‘intellectual property’,
and ‘labour and environment’ according to the UK government’s public
consultation (Fig. 4.3).
At the domestic level, the UK government has a strong appetite for
regulatory sovereignty to permit a regulatory divergence from the EU or
deregulation (Duncan et al. 2021). However, the substance of the regu-
latory sovereignty exercise lacks clarity.14 After a series of consultations
Fig. 4.3 Top concerns on the CPTPP selected by different respondent groups
(DIT consultation) (Data Source DIT [2019]. Public consultation on the UK
potentially seeking accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement
for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) Summary of responses, Table 7: Top
concerns selected by different respondent groups. https://assets.publishing.ser
vice.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/817
865/Public_consultation_on_the_UK_potentially_seeking_accession_to_CPTPP.
pdf. Note The figure was created by the author based on the data)
with the UK stakeholders, the UK House of Lords International Agree-

ment Committee reported that the CPTPP agreement conflicts with the
UK’s regulatory environment, such as intellectual property, food stan-
dards, data protection, professional qualifications, ISDS and environment
standards (House of Lords 2021).
British stakeholders, especially the agriculture sector and non-business
stakeholders, such as consumer organisations and civil society groups, are
expressing concerns that the CPTPP can be used as a footstep towards
lowering high regulatory standards amid unclarity in the domestic policy
(DIT 2019). For example, the British consumer organisation, ‘Which?’
identified health and safety standards for food and products, data security
and protecting’, and digital consumer rights as the areas of importance
(Which? 2021).
78 M. MORITA-JAEGER
Digital Trade
Digital trade, defined as ‘all trade that is digitally ordered and/or digitally
delivered’,15 is a critical policy area of 21st-century trade. While govern-
ments find potential opportunities to support the digital economy and
promote innovation and new technologies, they are learning to manage
markets at national and international levels. CPTPP countries, such as
Australia, New Zealand and Singapore, are actively creating a compre-
hensive digital chapter in their FTA or a digital economy agreement. But
these societal impacts are still unknown (Aaronson 2021).
The UK government is trying to set its national agenda of leading
digital trade policy. It set out a vision that the UK secures a position
as a digital and data hub. To achieve this vision, promoting FTAs and
digital economy agreements is framed as a significant policy tool (HM
Government 2021). The UK government argues that becoming a rule-
setter in digital trade is economically rational as digital trade is significant
for the UK economy. Eighty per cent of UK economic output is services,
and more than half of UK trade (67% of imports and 52% of exports
in 2018) are digitally delivered. Also, the UK will be the third largest
investment destination for tech venture capital in 2020 (UK Board of
Trade 2021).
On the policy front, the UK’s policy journey of signing FTAs shows
a clear trend that the UK is shifting towards the Asia–Pacific style
digital trade governance from the EU style digital governance. The Asia–
Pacific countries, including the US, takes a market-driven and open rules
approach, whereas the EU aims to ensure public policy objectives, such
as protecting human rights. The UK signed the FTAs that include a
comprehensive digital trade chapter with Australia, New Zealand, and
Japan and a digital economy agreement with Singapore. The digital
agreements which the UK recently concluded used these four coun-
tries’ previous agreements, including the Japan-US Digital Trade Agree-
ment, the Chile-NZ-Singapore Digital Economy Partnership Agreement,
and the Australia-Singapore Digital Economy Agreement, as a template
(Morita-Jaeger 2021b).
Given that the CPTPP was negotiated in 2010s, its e-commerce
chapter is not so ambitious in terms of scope and depth compared with
the UK’s latest FTAs and the digital economy agreement that reflect
current digital innovation and technological development such as Arti-
ficial Intelligence (AI) and algorism. However, the CPTPP e-commerce
chapter constrains the UK since the rules oblige the UK to promote free
data flow with countries with lower levels of data governance.
In this context, it should be noted that there is a divergence in data
governance among CPTPP members and the countries which applied for
its membership. The UK is the best performer of data governance and
other European countries show strong performance in digital governance,
according to the Global Data Governance Map.16 While some CPTPP
countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Canada, are showing
good performance, other CPTPP countries, especially Chile, Malaysia and
Vietnam, show weak performance (Morita-Jaeger 2022).
The above indicates the two significant policy implications for the
UK. First, the UK may not be able to maintain a high standard data
protection under the UK GDPR regime since the UK has to commit
free cross-border data to flow with CPTPP members, including the
countries with lower levels of data protection. Although the CPTPP
members are required to ensure free cross-border data transfer (Article
14.11), the approach taken for personal data protection is weak (Article
14.8). The provision only recommends each Party consider the prin-
ciples and guidelines of relevant international bodies for developing a
legal framework without any specific reference. It should be noted that
international standards, such as the APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules
system, take a self-regulatory regime and cannot provide a high-level data
privacy protection than the UK’s GDPR does. To promote compatibility
among CPTPP members, the CPTPP only listed autonomous recognition
and mutual arrangement or broader international frameworks as possible
mechanisms (Morita-Jaeger 2021b). Given the divergence of data gover-
nance among CPTPP members, ensuring regulatory compatibility looks
legally and technically very difficult.17
Second, UK’s commitment of cross-border data flow with countries
with lower data protection may endanger the EU’s adequacy decision to
the UK. The EU sets its adequacy decision as a condition of free data flow.
Among the CPTPP countries, only three countries, Canada, Japan and
New Zealand, have received adequacy decisions from the EU.18 Suppose
the UK commits free data flow with the rest of CPTPP members that do
not obtain an adequacy decision from the EU without any legal and tech-
nical safeguarding mechanism. In that case, EU citizens’ data transferred
through the UK cannot be protected under the GDPR equivalent condi-
tion. Since the EU’s adequacy decision to the UK has a four-year sunset
clause that makes the decision automatically expire in 2024, the UK may
80 M. MORITA-JAEGER
not be able to receive a new adequacy decision in the future. Or the EC

might revoke the adequacy decision anytime if the EC finds the UK’s
divergence from the EU data privacy standards.19 Business fears losing
the EU’s adequacy decision as the potential economic cost of losing the
EU’s adequacy decision for the UK firms was estimated at £1 billion to
£6 billion.20
Given that the UK government intensively negotiated and concluded
the bilateral FTAs with Australia and New Zealand and digital economy
agreement with Singapore within a limited period after the leaving
the EU, the discussions of digital trade agreement is not yet fully
discussed at the national level (International Trade Committee, House
of Commons 2021). As for the CPTPP, both UK business stakeholders
and non-business stakeholders shared the concern that CPTPP’s provi-
sions constraint UK’s ability to regulate cross-border data flows.21 They
especially expressed a vital concern about how British citizens’ data
protection and privacy is ensured once private data is transferred to a
CPTPP member country with lower data privacy standard. For example,
according to the consumer survey conducted by the UK consumer organ-
isation, 88% of people said that the UK’s future trade deals should
not reduce the level of data and digital protection (Which? 2021). The
Scottish government requested the UK government to apply a digital
rights-based approach to digital trade and balance economic and social
considerations (Scottish Government 2021).
Food Standards and Safety

Increased competitive pressure on the UK farm sector from tariff removal
is linked to concerns about a reduction in UK animal welfare and envi-
ronmental standards. Food standards and safety is an area of regulatory
threats as to the UK’s joining the CPTPP. Although the US adopts
science-based risk assessment approaches that requires governments to
take decisions based on scientific evidence, the EU’s approach is more
ex-ante that reflects ‘precautionary principle’, under which precautionary
measures can be justified where safety is uncertain (Bercero et al. 2018).
The UK is, like the EU, an international outlier in its ‘precautionary’
approach to risk arrangement.
The CPTPP’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) system is different
from UK’s continuity agreements (so as EU’s FTAs). Its SPS chapter was
strongly driven by the US’s exports interests and its strategy of future SPS
governance. Thus, the SPS chapter takes the approach that risk assess-
ment is based on scientific evidence and relies more upon international
standards (Wagner 2017). The CPTPP provisions (Article 7.9(2)) basi-
cally narrow the scope of using precautionary principle under the WTO
when scientific evidence is uncertain. It is warned that the CPTPP SPS
rules could lead to lowering the level of UK food standards in the future
(Lydgate 2021).
During the CPTPP public consultation conducted in 2019, UK stake-
holders, both business associations and non-business associations shared
concerns about lower SPS standards and regulations in CPTPP countries.
And they requested the UK government to maintain the current UK food
standards and regulatory alignment with the EU. Some business stake-
holders are worried whether joining the CPTPP would still allow business
to adhere to EU standards and potential regulatory divergence may create
additional administrative burden for accessing the EU market (or vice
versa). Civil society organisations are concerned that the CPTPP provi-
sions might limit the UK’s ability to deploy the precautionary principle,
which could undermine public health and safety. Also, concerns on poten-
tial imports of chlorine-washed chicken, hormone-fed beef, and GMOs
from CPTPP countries were expressed from individual and civil society
organisations during the government consultation (DIT 2019) and the
parliament scrutiny process.22
The domestic political environment surrounding food standards in the
UK looks uncertain. The Johnson administration desired regulatory diver-
gence from the EU exercising its post-Brexit regulatory freedom. On
the other hand, the Department of International Trade promised that
the UK would maintain the current high-level food standards without
providing how to avoid legal conflicts between the UK’s precautionary
approach and CPTPP’s science-based approach (House of Lords 2021).
The current intensifying political tensions between the UK and the EU
over the Northern Ireland Protocol indicates that the UK abided by
the CPTPP’s SPS rules might endanger maintaining the UK level statu-
tory protection in the area of animal welfare. The different regulatory
approach in the CPTPP constrains the UK’s regulatory alignment with
the EU. In other words, the less the UK aligns itself with EU rules, the
more frictions there will be at the border between the EU and the UK
(Holmes 2022).
82 M. MORITA-JAEGER
Conclusion
Each country has different motives for joining the CPTPP and the
domestic and international environments surrounding an acceding
country are different. This chapter tries to make an academic contribution
of creating a narrative of the UK’s case.
We analysed how the UK’s motivations for joining the CPTPP were
shaped and examined potential economic and social implications from
the political and economic perspective. The UK’s joining the CPTPP was
motivated by the Global Britain agenda and was strategically integrated
into the Indo-Pacific tilt project. From the foreign policy perspective, the
CPTPP is a critical step for the UK to advance its historical geo-strategic
project, which is a shift of its focus from Europe to the Asia–Pacific
region. As a chance of striking a trade deal with the US, which was once
the UK’s strongest desire, was much diminished due to a lack of US’s
interest, UK’s political and economic expectations to the CPTPP grows.
In spite of the UK government’s motive, which is to use the CPTPP for
recouping trade loss incurred by leaving the EU, the CPTPP seems to
have little economic value. Likely economic benefits depend on CPTPP’s
future expansion.
While economic value looks very slim, there are potential regulatory
constraints and societal impacts. British stakeholders have strong concerns
of sacrificing its high regulatory standards for food safety, environment,
consumer protection and human rights. Since the UK takes the EU style
regulatory approach that esteems public policy objectives, the CPTPP,
which strongly reflects the US’s market-driven regulatory approach, may
create domestic policy constraints. Digital trade and food standards and
safety are the major areas where we see possible regulatory conflicts. In
the case of digital trade, ensuring free cross border data flow with some
CPTPP countries which have lower data privacy protection regimes are
causing concerns on how British citizens’ private data is protected under
the CPTPP rules. The UK accepting such a rule also risks the EU’s
adequacy decision on data privacy for the UK. As for food standards,
the CPTPP’s narrow scope of using precautionary principle may permit
lowering the UK’s food standards in the future.
This paper created a narrative of UK’s joining the CPTPP by focusing
on a regulatory issue, which is a contradiction between willingness of the
Johnson’s administration to diverge from the EU regulatory framework
(possibly towards the Asia–Pacific style regulatory framework) and British
public’s desire to retain the high level of regulatory standards and regu-
latory alignment with the EU. The UK accession to the CPTPP is the
first case that a country outside the Asia–Pacific region joins the CPTPP.
Although there are always devils in detail in trade negotiations, we can
conclude that the UK’s joining the CPTPP is unique case as the UK is
an European country which stands on the different regulatory regime
reflecting its history, ideology and culture.
Future research could further extend discussion on other areas of
policy that have potential conflicts with the CPTPP. These include
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), patent rights (a direct conflict
between CPTPP Art. 13.38 and the UK’s participation in the Euro-
pean Patent Office (EP) and European Patent Convention (EPC)), and
NHS (a potential conflict between the CPTPP Article 18.53 and Costs
of generic medicines). From the international perspective, UK’s acces-
sion would create a dynamism to the CPTPP -changing the CPTPP from
a like-minded regional FTAs to a cross-regional mega-FTA and creating
synergy for further expansion. How the UK’s joining could contribute
to CPTPP’s development from the institutional perspective would be
another area of future study.
Notes
1. To date (September 2022), Colombia Indonesia, Thailand, and the
Philippines expressed interest in joining the CPTPP.
2. Speech by Prime Minister Theresa May, “The government’s negoti-
ating objectives for existing the EU”, January 2017, The government’s
negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM speech—GOV.UK (www.
gov.uk).
3. US wants post-Brexit free trade deal with UK ‘fast’, says Boris Johnson |
Politics News | Sky News.
4. UK wants 80% of trade covered by new trade deals by 2022 | Reuters.
5. HM Government (2021). Global Britain in a competitive age -The inte-
grated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,
March 2021: Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review
of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy—GOV.UK (www.
gov.uk).
6. Get Brexit done and unleash Britain’s potential (conservatives.com).
7. Politico, EU and UK struggle to overcome Brexit bad blood, February 3,
2021: EU and UK struggle to overcome Brexit bad blood—POLITICO.
8. Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and fiscal outlook -October
2021, The initial impact of Brexit on UK trade with the EU: The
84 M. MORITA-JAEGER
initial impact of Brexit on UK trade with the EU—Office for Budget

Responsibility (obr.uk).
9. Office for Budget Responsibility: Economic and fiscal outlook, October
2021: CCS1021486854-001_OBR-EFO-October-2021.pdf.
10. UK applies to join huge Pacific free trade area CPTPP—GOV.UK (www.
gov.uk).
11. House of Commons Library, Statistics on UK-EU trade, 3 December
2021: CBP-7851.pdf (parliament.uk).
12. The value of the CPTPP for the UK, UKTPO blog, 3 February 2021;
The value of the CPTPP for the UK « UK Trade Policy Observatory (sus
sex.ac.uk).
13. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship (CPTPP) Accession Process, Annex to CPTPP/COM/2019?D002;
Accession-Process.pdf (mfat.govt.nz).
14. Financial Times, ‘Across the board industries from cars to chemicals are
craving clarity’, by Peter Foster, May 19, 2022.
15. OECD, WTO and IMF (2020). Handbook on measuring digital trade
version 1, https://www.oecd.org/sdd/its/Handbook-on-Measuring-Dig
ital-Trade.htm.
16. See: Global Data Governance Map; https://datagovhub.letsnod.com/.
17. House of Commons International Trade Committee, Oral evidence:
Digital trade and data, HC 1096; https://committees.parliament.uk/ora
levidence/2062/pdf/.
18. Each country has special technical safeguard arrangements for the EU.
19. Commission adopts adequacy decisions for the UK (europa.eu).
20. New Economics Foundation and UCL European Institute (2020). The
cost of data inadequacy—The economic impacts of the UK failing to
secure an EU data adequacy decision, November 2020; ucl_nef_data-ina
dequacy.pdf
21. House of Lords, 2021.
22. For example, concerns about the SPS provisions in the CPTPP and
its impacts on the UK food standards and safety can be seen in the
written evidence to the House of Lords, International Trade Agreement
Committee from the RSPCA (CPT0014), Greener UK (CPT 0027),
Trade Justice Movement (CPT0008), Trade & Animal Welfare Coalition
(CPT0020) and the Scottish Government (CPT0045).
Bibliography
Aaronson, S. A. (2021). Listening to users and other ideas for building trust
in digital trade, CIGI papers no. 258, September 2021. https://www.cigion
line.org/publications/listening-to-users-and-other-ideas-for-building-trust-in-
digital-trade/.
Baldwin, R. E. (2016). The great convergence: Information technology and the
new globalization. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press.
Bercero, I. G. et al. (2018). EU-US engagement on regulatory issues: Lessons
learnt, notably in the context of the TTIP negotiations. European Foreign
Affairs Review, Vol. 23(2), 149–165.
Board of Trade. (2021). Digital trade—A board of trade report, November
2021; https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/1035370/digital-trade-a-board-of-trade-
report.pdf.
Borchert, I. and Yotov, Y. (2017). Distance, Globalisation, and International
Trade. Economics Letters, 153(C), 32–38.
Brakeman, S., Garretsen, H., and Kohl, T. (2018). Consequences of Brexit and
options for a ‘Global Britain’. Regional Science, Vol. 97(1).
Chaney, T, C. (2018). The gravity equation in international trade: An explana-
tion. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 126(1), 150-177.
De Ville, F., and Siles-Brugge, G. (2015) TTIP: The truth about the transatlantic
trade and investment partnership. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016.
Department for International Trade. (2019). Public consultation on the UK
potentially seeking accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agree-
ment for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) summary of responses. https:/
/assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/817865/Public_consultation_on_the_UK_potentially_see
king_accession_to_CPTPP.pdf.
Department for International Trade. (2021a, April). UK accession to CPTPP:
The UK’s strategic approach. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/govern
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1027860/dit-cptpp-
uk-accession-strategic-approach.pdf.
Department for International Trade. (2021b, September). Global Trade
Outlook. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/1036243/global-trade-outlook-septem
ber-2021b.pdf.
Duncan Smith, I., Villiers, T., and Freeman, G. (2021, May). Taskforce on
innovation, growth and regulatory reform. https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/994
125/FINAL_TIGRR_REPORT__1_.pdf.
86 M. MORITA-JAEGER
Elms, D. (2016). The origins and evolution of the Trans-Pacific partnership trade
negotiations. Asian Survey, Vol. 56(6).
Financial Times. (2021). Why striking trade deals abroad is creating hedaches for
Johnson at home. May 20.
Gasiorek, M. (2022, April). Supply chain resilience: The dangers of ‘pick n mix’,
UKTPO briefing paper 67. https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/files/2022/
04/67.pdf.
Heron, T., and Siles-Brugge, G. (2021, October–December). UK-US trade
relations and ‘Global Britain’. The Political Quarterly, Vol. 92, No. 4.
HM Government. (2017, February). The United Kingdom’s exit from and new
partnership with the European Union. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/589191/
The_United_Kingdoms_exit_from_and_partnership_with_the_EU_Web.pdf.
HM Government. (2021, March). Global Britain in a competitive age—The inte-
grated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy integrated
review. http://www.gov.uk/.
Holmes, P. (2022, May). How to salvage something from the wreckage of
Brexit. Progressive Economy Forum. https://progressiveeconomyforum.
com/publications/reviewing-the-tca-how-to-salvage-something-from-the-wre
ckage-of-brexit/.
Holmes, P., and Rollo, J. (2020). EU-UK Post-BREXIT trade relations:
Prosperity. European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 25, No. 4.
House of Lords. (2021, November). UK accession to the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP): Scrutiny of the
government’s negotiating objectives, House of Lords International Agree-
ment Committee, 10th Report of Session 2021–22. https://committees.par
liament.uk/publications/7859/documents/81612/default/#page=13.
International Trade Committee, House of Commons. (2021, June 23). Digital
trade and data, First report of session 2021–22. https://committees.parlia
ment.uk/publications/6451/documents/70389/default/.
Kaczmarczyk, P. (2018, February 23). Why distance matters in trade, LSE
Brexit Blog 2015–2021. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/02/23/why-
distance-matters-in-trade/.
Kimura, F., and Lee, H. (2006). The gravity equation in international trade in
services. Review of World Economics, Vol. 142(1), 92–12.
Lydgate, E., and PAN UK Sustain (2021, June). Toxic trade—How joining
the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP) threatens to weaken US pesticide standards. Pesticide Action
Network UK and Sustain. https://coherent-commons.s3.amazonaws.com/

artifacts/file/file/testpresigned/f55cd25a-e491-4757-8c02-075124aec6fc.
pdf?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIA23
B6R4NTBYK5TUNC%2F20220516%2Fus-east-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&
X-Amz-Date=20220516T122439Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-Signed
Headers=host&X-Amz-Signature=4335d3a4b9caf5be062e6625dfc3be344
7a5833abd2a9cb9aabfa66082aa02b1.
Morita-Jaeger, M. (2021a, April). Challenges ahead for the UK to join CPTPP,
UKTPO blog, https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/2021a/04/16/challenges-
ahead-for-the-uk-to-join-cptpp/.
Morita-Jaeger, M. (2021b, July). Accessing CPTPP without a national digital
regulatory strategy?—Hard policy challenges for the UK. UKTPO Briefing
Paper 61. https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/files/2021b/07/Briefing-paper-
61.pdf.
Morita-Jaeger, M. (2022, May 4). What a digital divide and divergence
of data governance in the Asia-Pacific mean for the UK, UKTPO
Blog. https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/2022/05/04/what-a-digital-divide-
and-divergence-of-data-governance-in-the-asia-pacific-mean-for-the-uk/.
Niblett, R. (2022, March). Global Britain in a divided world—Testing
the ambitions of the integrated review. Chatham House Research
Paper. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/2022-
03-29-global-britain-in-a-divided-world-niblett_1.pdf.
Schott, J. J. (2018). The TPP: Origins and outcomes. In Handbook of Interna-
tional Trade Agreements: Country, regional and global approaches, edited by
Robert E. Looney, London: Routledge.
Schuyler, F., and Raymond, R. (2017). The US-UK ‘special relationship’ at
a critical crossroads, Atlantic Council. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep
03496.
Scottish Government. (2021). Written evidence (CPT 0045), House of Lords
International Agreement committee. https://committees.parliament.uk/wri
ttenevidence/39865/html/.
Springford, J., and Lowe, S. (2018, February 5). Britain’s service firms can’t defy
gravity, alas, Centre for European Reform. https://www.cer.eu/insights/bri
tains-services-firms-cant-defy-gravity-alas.
Van Loon, A. (2018). Diverging German and British governmental trade
policy preferences in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) negotiations. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 26 (2),
165-179.
Van Tongeren, F., Arriola, C., Mourougane, A., and Benz, S. (2021). Trade
impacts of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European
Union and the United Kingdom, OECD Economics Department Working
88 M. MORITA-JAEGER
Papers, No. 1698, Paris: OECD Publishing. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/

docserver/eeeea3ec-en.pdf?expires=1654036502&id=id&accname=guest&
checksum=73B291697D40E5DBFBA1998EF4EC524D.
Wagner, M. (2017). The future of sanitary and phytosanitary governance: SPS-
Plus or SPS-Minus? Journal of World Trade 51(3), pp. 445–470.
Which? (2021). Written evidence (CPT0049), House of Lords International
Agreement committee. https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/
40748/pdf/.
Young, A. R. (2015). Liberalising trade, not exporting rules: The limits to regula-
tory co-ordination in the EU’s ‘new generation’ preferential trade agreements.
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 22(9), 1253–1275.
Young, A. R. (2016). Not your parents’ trade politics: The Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership negotiations, Review of international political
economy, Vol. 23(3), 345–378.
CHAPTER 5
Perspectives of CPTPP Membership

Expansion and Its Implications on a Shifting
Paradigm of Economic Integration in Asia
Pacific
Peter C. Y. Chow
Introduction
After the collapse of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotia-
tion in 2005, economic integration in Asia Pacific regained momentum
generated ever since the proliferation of preferential trade accord in the
1990’s. Yet the momentum was undercut by the inward-looking policy
The author would like to thank Tun-Jen Cheng, Christopher Dent,

Yung-Hsing Guo and Wei-Chin Lee for their constructive comments on an
earlier draft of this paper. He also likes to thank the editor’s comment as well.
However, the usual caveats apply.
P. C. Y. Chow (B)
City University of New York, New York, NY, USA

90 P. C. Y. CHOW
undertaken by the Trump Administration. After President Donald Trump

withdrew the U.S. from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017,
the remaining 11 countries led by Japan signed the Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) trade
agreement in February 2018 (hereafter CPTPP-11).
As indicated in Table 5.1, CPTPP-11 accounts for 12.53% of world
GDP, 17.72% of global exports, and 11.58% of global import trade, with
a population of 513 million in the increasing dynamism of the Asia Pacific
region in 2021. In spite of freezing several chapters such as delaying the
requirement of intellectual property rights and narrowing the mechanism
on the investor and state dispute settlement mechanism (ISDS) from the
original trade pact, CPTPP is still one of the highest quality trade agree-
ments with a high degree of trade liberalization and covers many new
rules-based trade related issues such as labor and environment standards,
trade-in services and regulation on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for fair
competition, etc. It is a ‘WTO-plus’ trade accord which deepens commit-
ment on trade liberalization beyond WTO and a ‘WTO-extra’ one which
covers many new areas beyond the WTO (Chow, 2016, p. 9).
TPP and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)
were considered as the pathway to a Free Trade Area of Asia Pacific
(FTAAP) during the APEC meeting in 2014. Hence, membership
enlargement in each trading bloc will enhance their respective sphere
of influence moving toward the path of free trade in the Asia Pacific
(Chow, 2016, pp. 15–21). Therefore, CPTPP is aggressively expanding
its membership by inviting “like-minded” members of the APEC to join.
Even though the UK is not a member of the APEC, the UK applied for its
membership in February 2021. China filed its application on September
16, 2021, and Taiwan followed suit six days later.
Whether or not all these three applicants will be admitted to the
CPTPP depends on their respective qualifications to be decided by the
incumbent CPTPP members. It is not the purpose of this study to predict
which country will be accepted or rejected by the CPTPP-11. Instead, this
study examines the significance of these three perspective new members
in the trade bloc as they had officially applied for the accession to this
trade bloc and their respective implications for the shifting paradigm of
economic integration in the Asia Pacific. Section “UK as the First-Per-
spective New Member of CPTPP” addresses the geopolitical significance
of UK membership at the CPTPP. As China is the second largest
Table 5.1 Income, population, export and import for CPTPP-11, United States, China, United Kingdom, and Taiwan
(Estimated 2021)
Country GDP GDP, PPP GDP per GDP per Population Export Import
Current International$capita capita, PPP Millions
US$ Current International$
Billions US$
Australia 1610.56 1427.264 62,618.59 55,492.205 25.72 4.90092E+11 2.73096E+11

5
Brunei 15.686 30.317 33,979.37 65,674.961 0.462 6,608,177,852 5,342,500,814

Darussalam
Canada 2015.98 2027.371 52,791.23 53,089.455 38.188 2.35445E+11 6.36622E+11
Chile 331.25 522.79 16,799.37 26,513.324 19.718 73,479,930,615 59,215,009,302
Japan 5103.11 5633.505 40,704.30 44,934.938 125.37 2.5906E+12 7.72276E+11
Malaysia 337.008 969.039 10,231.34 29,048.363 32.939 4.67862E+11 3.79404E+11
Mexico 1285.52 2685.253 9967.39 20,820.363 128.972 1.66793E+12 1.53192E+12
New Zealand 247.64 234.992 48,348.99 45,879.609 5.122 38,877,144,400 37,098,380,733
Peru 225.858 453.652 6676.52 13,410.254 33.829 38,757,234,044 36,064,030,332
Singapore 378.645 615.293 66,263.42 107,677.221 5.714 3.73684E+11 3.28624E+11
Vietnam 343.114 1141.3 3522.51 11,607.891 97.406 2.81441E+11 2.61309E+11
TPP11 11,894.37 15,740.78 351,903.03 474,148.58 513.44 6,264,775,835,355.00 4,320,971,538,390.00
World 94,935.114 144,636.38 7900.00 3.53544E+13 3.73127E+13
CPTPP11 Share 12.53% 10.88% 6.50% 17.72% 11.58%
UK 3108.42 3276.143 46,200.26 48,693.183 67.281 1.58277E+12 2.5367E+12
World 94,935.114 144,636.38 7900.00 3.53544E+13 3.73127E+13
CPTPP11+UK 15,002.79 19,016.92 398,103.29 522,841.77 580.72 7,847,544,181,693.00 6,857,671,019,137.00
CPTPP11+UK Share 15.80% 13.15% 7.35% 22.20% 18.38%
China 14,866.74 27,071.959 10,511.34 19,090.228 1414.35 2.5906E+12 2.5906E+12
World 94,935.114 144,636.38 7900.00 3.53544E+13 3.73127E+13
PERSPECTIVES OF CPTPP MEMBERSHIP EXPANSION …
(continued)
91
92
Table 5.1 (continued)
Country GDP GDP, PPP GDP per GDP per Population Export Import
Current International$capita capita, PPP Millions
US$ Current International$
Billions US$
CPTPP11+China 26,761.11 42,812.74 362,414.37 493,238.81 1927.79 8,855,376,501,820.00 6,911,572,204,855.00

P. C. Y. CHOW
CPTPP11+China 28.19% 29.60% 24.40% 25.05% 18.52%

Share
Taiwan 785.589 1443.41 56,160.76 33,401.71 23.519 3.4528E+11 2.8649E+11
World 94,935.114 144,636.38 12.02 7900.00 3.53544E+13 3.73127E+13
CPTPP11+Taiwan 12,679.96 17,184.19 408,063.79 507,550.29 536.96 6,610,055,835,355.00 4,607,461,538,390.00
CPTPP11+Taiwan 13.36% 11.88% 6.80% 18.70% 12.35%
Share
USA 22,939.58 22,939.58 69,375.38 69,375.375 330.659 1.43025E+12 2.40538E+12
CPTPP11+USA 34,833.95 38,680.36 421,278.41 543,523.96 844.10 7,695,029,458,844.00 6,726,353,096,057.00
World 94,935.114 144,636.38 12.02 7900.00 3.53544E+13 3.73127E+13
CPTPP11+USA Share 36.69% 26.74% 10.68% 21.77% 18.03%
CPTPP+UK+CH+TW+US 53,594.70 70,471.87 534,150.77 644,709.08 2349.25 12,213,678,471,647.00 12,140,143,243,269.00
World 94,935.114 144,636.376 7,900.00 3.53544E+13 3.73127E+13
CPTPP+UK+CH+TW+US 56.45% 48.72% 29.74% 34.55% 32.54%
Share
Sources http://imf.org/world.economic.outlook.databases, UN Comrade database at: comtrade.un.org; google.com/Taiwan total export/import 2020
Note Those figures in bold values are the sum of different trade groups calculated by the author based on the original data in the data source under
the table
5 PERSPECTIVES OF CPTPP MEMBERSHIP EXPANSION … 93
economy in the world, its membership at the CPTPP will have a signifi-
cant impact on the trade bloc and regional integration. Section “China’s
Membership at the CPTPP” addresses China’s possible accession under
various scenarios of admission conditions to the trade bloc in regional
perspective. Taiwan is a vital actor in the global supply chain. Yet, it has
only signed two free trade agreements (FTA) with two members of the
CPTPP-11. Taiwan’s accession to the trade bloc will have significant trade
creation effect.1 Yet its entry to this trade bloc is based more on geo-
political than geo-economic rationales. Section “Taiwan’s Membership at
the CPTPP” will deal with the complicated political economy of Taiwan’s
accession to the CPTPP. The final section is for summary and conclusions.
UK as the First-Perspective New Member of CPTPP

In the new era of great power competition in a globalized economy, no
country can afford not to seek partnership and alliance with others for
its national interest. A seamless trade and investment environment among
countries is the key to economic growth in the globalized economy. No
country can naively expect to maintain its growth and prosperity while
being marginalized from the emerging trade blocs. After the Brexit in
2020, UK has been deliberately seeking more preferential trade agree-
ments to complement with its Trade and Cooperation Agreement with
European Union (EU). The UK first expressed its interest in a bilateral
FTA with the U.S. soon after Brexit and signed a trade accord with Japan
in October 2020.
The UK applied for CPTPP membership in February 2021. Initially,
APEC wished to invite “like-minded” APEC members to join, and even
rejected the aspiration of Colombia to participate in the TPP negotiation
because it was not a member of the APEC. UK is not a member of the
APEC. If UK is admitted to the CPTPP, then it means that the trade
bloc will extend its geographic horizon beyond Asia Pacific. Under such
circumstance, the UK may serve as a bridge to link the free trade regime
in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, at least symbolically. Hence, the deci-
sion on whether to accept the UK as a new member will have strong
implication on the DNA of CPTPP’s membership enlargement, even an
expansion beyond the Asia Pacific region. It will also offer the UK with an
opportunity on its effort of pursuing “Global Britain” after the Brexit.2
As reported in the Appendix, UK has bilateral trade accords with seven
of the 11 countries in the CPTPP and is negotiating with Australia and
94 P. C. Y. CHOW
New Zealand for preferential trade deals as well. If the UK is admitted

to the CPTPP, then it will benefit from “tariff free” on nearly 99% of its
exports to all those member countries. Moreover, the perspective growth
of service trade is even more fascinating than that of merchandise trade
for UK. As the second largest exporter of service trade in the world, the
UK definitely will enjoy the trade creation effect in its service trade with
the CPTPP countries.
Citing a report from the Brooking Institution, Department of Inter-
national Trade of UK is enthusiastic about the potential service market in
the Asia Pacific region which will account for 65% of the world’s 5.4
billion middle class consumers by 2030 (Department of International
Trade, 2021). Generally speaking, when income increases, demand for
service will grow more proportionally than food and beverage consump-
tion as dictated by the Engle’s law.3 As the “middle class” is projected to
grow fascinatingly in the dynamic Asia Pacific region, the UK is counting
its strong service export after its aspired CPTPP membership is achieved.
Department of International Trade projected that the UK’s trade
with CPTPP countries will increase 65% by 2030. With its perspective
membership of this trade bloc, it will grow ever more than that projec-
tion. Moreover, as the CPTPP set up the rules-based system for digital
trade, it will enable the UK to benefit from opening up trade in financial
and professional services, which will further enhance its development in
cutting-edge technology.
However, the significance of UK’s membership at the CPTPP is more
geopolitics than geoeconomics. The economic benefit of membership for
the UK is relatively smaller than its impact on the geopolitics of economic
integration. The UK’s trade with current CPTPP-11 is less than its trade
with Germany. It is not realistic to anticipate that the UK’s membership
in CPTPP will be able to compensate its loss of market access to EU
if the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with EU could not generate
the same benefit as its EU membership. The market share of CPTPP-11
for UK’s total export to the world is averaged at 8.3% in 2016–2020.4
Hence, the possible gain of market access from CPTPP may not be able
to compensate the possible loss from Brexit.
The UK’s motivation of joining the CPTPP is more for geo-politics
than economics. The UK, if admitted, will be the second largest economy
after Japan in the trade bloc. As reported in Table 5.1, the UK will add $
3.1 trillion of GDP to this trade bloc and raise the share of CPTPP plus
UK in the global economy to 15.8% (the 18th row in column 1 on Table
5.1). The UK may play a more proactive role in the Asia Pacific region
after it is admitted to the CPTPP; the UK can play a role of ‘middle
power’ to promote the free trade principle amid the rising protectionism
implemented in the two big powers. Different from the inward-looking
policy under the “make America great again” in the U.S. and dual circula-
tion which downplays foreign trade as the engine of growth in China, the
UK can level the playing field in the global economy by advocating free
trade policy beyond the Asia Pacific region. This is a significant contribu-
tion that UK can do to promote the free trade framework for the global
economy.
The CPTPP is a high-quality trade agreement under which not only
95% or more of the trading commodities will be tariff-free, but also there
will be a setup of a rules-based regulatory regime on service trade. Hence,
there is a strong implication in the ongoing competitive paradigm shift
of the digital trade regime. At present, there are three different regula-
tory regimes of digital trade which deal with issues such as restrictions on
cross-border data flows and requirements of data localization. They are (a)
the firm-sovereignty model adopted in the U.S., (b) the state sovereignty
model adopted in China and (c) the individual sovereignty model in EU
(Gao, 2022). Trade agreements may not be able to completely resolve
the differences of data regulations among these three regulatory regimes
(Mishra, 2022). Under the UK-Japan Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership Agreement (CEPA), the UK has already made a policy shift
from EU-style digital trade governance—that treats the protection of data
as a fundamental right—to the US/Asia–Pacific market-driven approach
of firm sovereignty such as CPTPP. In March 2022, EU reached an
agreement known as “Digital Market Act” which “is aimed broadly at
limiting the ability of the biggest tech firms from taking advantage of their
powerful presence in digital markets—including the app ecosystem, online
shopping and online advertising” (Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2022).5
This development will be crucial for big tech companies to manage the
digital trade under different regulatory regimes. In other words, the UK’s
accession to the CPTPP, on top of UK-Japan CEPA, will imply that it is
leaning toward the U.S. model of firm sovereign in the ongoing devel-
opment of digital economy.6 In that regard, the UK may be the first
European country to join the US model of digital trade.
In June 2021, the Working Group Minister of CPTPP-11 agreed to
begin the accession process for UK. The negotiation will take a while
before a final decision is made. Reportedly, the CPTPP members wish
96 P. C. Y. CHOW
to go through a thorough review process by demanding that all criteria

be met before a final decision is made. The UK does not have many
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which cause unfair trade practices to
foreign multinationals as what China had. The UK also has high labor
and environmental standards which are compatible with the criteria of
the CPTPP. Yet, negotiations on some tenuous issues such as disputes
settlement mechanisms and economic empowerment for women are very
time-consuming. Since the UK is the first applicant, the CPTPP-11 may
wish to set up a rigid criterion for the UK to serve as a role model for
other applicants. This is especially relevant to China’s application to be
addressed in the next section.
Another thorny issue is the UK’s attitudes on China’s membership
application if the UK is admitted as the first new member. China’s
tensions with Australia, Canada, and Japan could jeopardize Beijing’s
bid. As admission to the CPTPP requires unanimous consent from its
members, if the UK becomes the first new member, then the UK will
have to spell out its position on China’s application. Before the US-China
trade war, the UK welcomed China’s investment. But the UK boycotted
Huawei and other Chinese tech-products in alliance with the Trump’s
trade policy. UK’s reservation of China’s human rights records in Hong
Kong and Xingjiang would make it difficult on its decision on China’s
membership. The reluctance of the UK on China’s membership at the
CPTPP could be aggravated by the on-going war in Ukraine because
China did not collaborate with the U.S. and NATO on the sanction
against Russia. The tension between Beijing and Washington, which was
aggravated after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in
August 2022,7 would make it even harder for the UK to make up its
mind on China’s membership at the CPTPP. Therefore, UK’s accession
to the CPTPP, if it gets into the CPTPP before China, will symbolize a
new geopolitics competition beyond its economic interest.
China’s Membership at the CPTPP

Among CPTPP-11, China has signed FTAs with Australia, Chile, New
Zealand, Peru, and Singapore. Seven countries of RCEP, Australia,
Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam have
dual memberships in both RCEP and CPTPP. These two factors may
provide Beijing with some advantages in its membership negotiations,
even though the admission criteria for CPTPP is much higher than that of
RCEP. Therefore, China has the advantage of having more allies within
the CPTPP than both UK and Taiwan.
As reported in Table 5.1, China will add $14.9 trillion of GDP to the
CPTPP-11 and raise the share of CPTPP-11 plus China in the global
economy to 28.19%. China is also the largest trading partners for most of
the CPTPP countries. Among CPTPP-11, except for Canada and Mexico,
all countries have greater shares of trade with China than with the U.S. If
the CPTPP-11 admits China’s application, then the CPTPP will include
the second and the third largest economies in the world to become a
mega trade bloc. Hence, China’s application is important for CPTPP to
increase its sphere of influence.
However, the political economy for China to join the trade bloc
is much more complicated than that for UK and Taiwan. President
Xi Jinping expressed his interest in joining the CPTPP at the APEC
Submit in 2020. It was reconfirmed at the National People’s Congress in
March in 2021. But China applied its membership only shortly after the
AUKUS-a trilateral security pact among Australia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States was signed. Under the AUKUS, the U.S. will
transfer technology, sell nuclear-powered submarines to Canberra, and
collaborate with Australia on the hypersonic missiles against China. China
may consider its entry to the CPTPP as a venue to circumvent the
strategic alliance of AUKUS and Quad—a quadrilateral security among
Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. as well to overcome the damage
caused from trade frictions with the U.S.
In the past two decades, China has been benefitting from the WTO
trading framework since its accession to the WTO in 2001; China’s GDP
per capita increased more than 10 times in nominal terms and its total
GDP surpassed that of Japan in 2010 as the second largest economy in
the world. China also surpassed the U.S. and became the largest trading
country in 2012. Therefore, China understands that membership at a
multilateral free trade agreement such as the CPTPP, which has a freer
trade regime within the bloc than that of WTO, will further foster its
trade growth if it is admitted.
However, many CPTPP members, especially those in Asia, are wary of
China’s increasing assertiveness in its foreign policy, which is described as
‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ by many countries, and trade practice. More-
over, many countries question the commitments that China pledged
when it applied for its WTO membership. Many western countries
which supported China’s membership at the WTO anticipated that the
98 P. C. Y. CHOW
rules-based trade regime under the WTO will expedite China’s further
economic reform toward a market economy. Some naive policymakers
even wishfully thought that a market economy with free enterprise would
lead to political reform in China toward a democratic country. However,
not only that China maintains its one-party rule, its SOEs still accounts
for 25% of its total GDP (Borst, 2021). Moreover, the significance of
SOEs on China’s economy is far beyond its percentage share in total
GDP, but its control of strategic industrial sectors and banking industry.
China has been pushing the ambitious “Made in China 2025” plan with
heavy government subsidy in many key strategic industries to overpass
the US. China also applied some unconventional practices in its trade
with many of its trading partners such as Australia, Korea, the Philip-
pines, and Taiwan in recent years. Twenty years down the road after its
WTO membership proved that it is China which re-wrote the rules of
world trade rather than the other way round as what was anticipated by
many western countries.
Among them, China’s trade friction with Australia is the most crit-
ical one on its CPTPP accession; the Sino-Australia trade war started
in 2013–2015. It was aggravated after Australia supported a call for an
international investigation into China’s handling of the Covid-19 when
the pandemic became an international issue in 2020.8 China retaliated
Canberra by imposing high tariffs on import of wine (107–212%), barley
(80.5%) and applied rigid restrictions on import of lobsters, timber, red
meat, and cotton from Australia.9 Though trade friction is a common
phenomenon in the world, few countries weaponize tariffs and trade
restrictions as a diplomatic instrument to manage dispute on interna-
tional public health policy, which is a jurisdiction under the World Health
Organization.
As an Australian Parliament Report indicates, China will have to stop
its coercive trade measures against Australia “to demonstrate its ability and
willingness to commit to the CPTPP’s high standards, prior to supporting
the commencement of an accession process.”10 Since CPTPP requires the
consensus from all existing members, China would need to resolve its
trade friction with Australia before Canberra can approve its application.
Meanwhile, Japan’s position on China’s application is also significant
in determining Beijing’s entry to the trade bloc. As the leader which
wrapped up the CPTPP after the withdrawal of the U.S. from the original
TPP, Japan would like to preserve the high-quality standard and rules-
based trade agreement and to algin more new members to the trade bloc
without diluting the CPTPP standard.
In a meeting between Minister Hagiuda of Economy, Trade and
Industry and his counterpart in Singapore on January 12, 2021, both
Japan and Singapore agreed that the membership of the CPTPP has to
expand, but any new member must meet the admission criteria.11 In the
joint statement between Prime Minister Kishida and New Zealand’s Prime
Minister Jacinda Ardern on April 22, 2022, it reiterated that Japan and
New Zealand “welcomed the future expansion of CPTPP to economies
that are able to fully meet, implement and adhere to its high standards and
with a demonstrated pattern of complying with trade commitments.”12
This can be considered an official statement from Japan and New Zealand
that China cannot expect to become a new member without engaging in
genuine reform of its economic system, especially on government subsidy
on SOEs, labor and environment standards, as well as the regulation on
cross-border data flows in E-commerce. Moreover, China still prohibits
its import of food product from 10 prefecture surrounding Fukushima.
This issue may complicate Japan’s decision on China’s accession as well.13
Many Asian countries rely on U.S. commitment for their security but
count on China’s market as the major outlet of their export destinations.
So far, the U.S. only offers its security commitment to those Asian coun-
tries but has no interest in rejoining the CPTPP, at least in the near future.
Trade dependency on China’s market made it hard for those Asian coun-
tries, in spite of their reliance of security commitments from the U.S., to
say ‘no’ to Beijing on its membership application up front. In accepting
China’s application to the trade bloc, many CPTPP member, especially
Australia and Japan have expressed their reservation on China’s qualifica-
tion for the trade bloc. President Xi Jinping’s decision to partner up with
Russian President Vladimir Putin just weeks before Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine on February 24, 2022 could further undercut the willingness of
CPTPP-11 to admit China to this trade bloc. How would the CPTPP
members react to China’s membership application is a big challenge for
them.
Therefore, China’s qualification for the trade bloc is not without
doubt. In addition to its lack of transparency under the one-party author-
itarian system, China is so far away from the principles set up by the
CPTPP; there is a chapter on SOEs which requires a fair competition
100 P. C. Y. CHOW
between SOEs and multinational corporations (MNCs) in the host coun-

tries, and China has a long way to go to reach the CPTPP criteria.
On the labor standard, CPTPP demands that members must comply
with the standard of International Labor Organization under which labor
can organize union and practice collective bargaining. Other chapters
on the protection of intellectual property right also make it hard for
China to comply with the CPTPP standard. On the digital trade, China’s
state sovereignty model is in stark contrast with the US-led individual
sovereignty model as noted in previous section.14
As the largest trading partner for many CPTPP-11, China may wish
to use its market size to entice them to accept its application to the
trade bloc in spite of its lack of qualifications. If the CPTPP waters
down the criteria before China’s full compliance with its admission stan-
dard, then the high quality of the CPTPP will be undercut substantially.
CPTPP will include an autocratic socialist economy with entirely different
socio-political system and trading regime within the bloc. The damage of
China’s entry to the CPTPP probably is much higher than the economic
benefits from China’s accession to the trade bloc. The gold or plat-
inum standard of the CPTPP-11 with WTO-plus and WTO-extra trade
liberalization will be ridiculed as a metaphor rather than in actual practice.
If China is serious to meet the CPTPP standard on the SOEs, labor
and environmental standards, China can use its international commitment
as a leverage to push for domestic reform.15 If Beijing really engages in
a full-scale reform of its economic and trade system to comply with the
criteria of the CPTPP, which is highly doubtful to many observers, then
the significance of China’s accession to the CPTPP is far beyond regional
economic integration. It will carry strong political economic implication
in reforming a socialist economic system rather than reform within the
socialist system through commitments made to a multilateral trade agree-
ment. It will be an unprecedented development in world development
history.
This scenario based on “big ifs” is the most optimistic picture that
liberal trade economist aspires. However, many people are rightly skep-
tical about China’s sincerity of fulfilling its promise. Shelton (2021)
pointed out that, instead of fulfilling its pledge of systemic reform to
make its economic system more transparent and closer to WTO norm of
openness, non-discrimination, and market-oriented policies when China
was admitted to the WTO in 2001, China under President Xi Jinping
has increased the role of government and party in nearly all aspects of
the economy. Maria Adele Carrai (2022) also argued that “in the current
geopolitical world, where countries seem increasingly willing to sacrifice
economic gains derived from globalization in the name of values and
polarized political views, China’s quest to join the CPTPP will be even
more strenuous, if not impossible” (p. 12). How likely will the CPTPP-11
entrust China’s promised reform remains to be seen in the future.
Between these two scenarios, a third alternative is for China to pledge
to the CPTPP for a long grace period to fulfill those requirements as
what Vietnam and Malaysia did. But, as pointed by Kimura (2022)
the new entrants may not be able to obtain the same levels of excep-
tion or exemption as the existing members as specified in the accession
code.16 Moreover, international perception on China’s sincerity to honor
its pledges and promises now is quite different from what it was in 2001
when China entered the WTO. The trade war between China and the
US has made the global economy bifurcated. If some CPTPP members
are still naive about China’s pledge of further reform to meet the CPTPP
standard, they may be considered by Washington as siding with China
in a bi-polarized hegemonic competition, which many CPTPP member
cannot afford to annoy Washington. Even if CPTPP-11 is convinced by
China’s pledge of further reform, then there must have a high monitor
cost for them. If an additional clause of monitoring a trade accord is
added, then it may be interpreted by Beijing as an insult to its national
dignity. This is a thorny issue for the CPTPP to decide.
The trade war between the U.S. and China and the tensions between
Washington and Beijing may have ripple effect against China’s member-
ship application; Theoretically speaking, the U.S. is not a member of the
CPTPP-11, so the U.S. won’t have any leverage on China’s entry to this
trade bloc. Yet, if the relations between Washington and Beijing further
deteriorates, the U.S. may not wish China to expand its sphere of influ-
ence in Asia Pacific where the U.S. has strong strategic interest and has
been a big actor for decades. As it is well known, the original TPP was
designed by the U.S. to write the trade rule in accordance with the U.S.
standard to undermine China’s increasing influence in the Asia Pacific. If
China is admitted to the CPTPP, then the opportunity for the U.S. to
rejoin it is gone even if Washington decides to come back. In geopoli-
tics, it is hard to believe that Washington will take no action on China’s
accession to the trade bloc which was originally designated to block China
from joining in.
102 P. C. Y. CHOW
In Section 32.10 of the United States-Mexico-Canada (USMCA)

trade agreement, a revision of the North America Free Trade agreement
(NAFTA), there is a ‘poison pill’ clause which mandates that if any signa-
tory enters a trade deal with a “non-market country,” then the other
two are free to quit in six months and form their own bilateral trade
deal. China is not a market economy by American standard. Therefore, if
Washington insists on the “poison pill” clause, then Canada and Mexico
may be reluctant to approve China’s membership application for fear of
losing their preferential trade status in the U.S. Whether Washington will
block China’s CPTPP membership by applying the ‘poison pill’ clause
under the USMCA depends on the US-China relations and how the US
would calculate China’s expanding sphere of influence at the expense of
the US in the region, which the US has strong strategic interest. It is
also noted that President Biden announced a new Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework (IPEF) which invited 12 Indo-Pacific countries to join in May
2022.17 Symbolically, it demonstrates that the US is linking its strategic
interest with economic interest in the region. Of course, IPEF is not a
substitute for the TPP as it does not include market access through trade
liberalization between the US and those 13 countries invited in the first
round. How would the IPEF functions and how would it affect China’s
accession to the CPTPP will be an interesting development in the region.
Taiwan’s Membership at the CPTPP

Taiwan has long aspired to join the CPTPP. It is a rare consensus between
the ruling and opposition parties in Taiwan on joining the trade bloc.
However, in 2018 election, the opposition party of Kuomintang (KMT)
initiated a referendum on banning the import of food product from five
prefectures surrounded in Fukushima, Japan. The bill was passed because
of public concern of food safety due to Fukushima nuclear accident on
March 11, 2011.18 There is a two-year period of moratorium whenever
a referendum is passed. Taiwan government cannot revoke any policy
resolution passed by the referendum in the two-year period.
Understanding Tokyo’s reaction on the ban of food import, Taiwan
government held up its application for CPTPP membership despite the
amical relation between Taipei and Tokyo during the Abe-Suga Adminis-
tration. Due to its election cycles, Taiwan waited for a long time to apply
for its membership even after the two-year moratorium was over.
President Tsai was re-elected for her second term with a great
majority of 57% of popular votes in January 2020. But Taiwan submitted
its application only until after China did in September 2021. Many
commentators criticized that Taiwan might have missed the golden
opportunity of strong support from Japan during the Abe-Suga Adminis-
tration. However, after taking over the leadership, Prime Minister Kishida
expressed his strong support for Taiwan’s bid for the CPTPP member-
ship as well. Moreover, Japan has expressed its concern on the stability
of the Taiwan Strait, and even openly supported Taiwan’s defense in
case China invades Taiwan. CPTPP membership is one of the best
ways to strengthen Taiwan’s international status, which China has been
undermining (Fischett and Roth 2021).
After Taiwan government declared to lift its ban on food product from
the five prefectures surrounding Fukushima area on February 8, 2022,
Taiwan’s membership is more promising than ever before though it is still
an uphill battle for Taiwan in international politics. The major challenge is
from China’s opposition. In power politics, the bargaining power of any
negotiations including trade accord depends on the statecraft and national
strength of the participating country.
Taiwan has been an important investor and trading partners for many
CPTPP countries. It has been playing an indispensable role in the global
supply chain. Its role as the major chip manufacturer as evidenced in
the global shortage of advanced chips will enhance its position in the
membership negotiations.
Among CPTPP-11, Taiwan has signed only two FTAs with Singapore
and New Zealand. If Taiwan is admitted to the CPTPP-11, then the trade
creation effect will greatly expand the trade and investment flows in the
trade bloc. There are both static and dynamic effects of joining a multi-
lateral trade accord such as the CPTPP. The static effect is the increased
trade flows after trade barriers are removed. The dynamic effect is the
ripple effect of trade liberalization on the increase of investment, both
foreign and domestic.
In a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model simulation, Chow
and Guo (2020) found that, most of the CPTPP-11 will be bene-
fitted from Taiwan’s accession under various admission conditions of
trade liberalization for Taiwan’s accession.19 This empirical finding that
all incumbent members of the CPTPP-11 will be benefitted and none
of them will suffer from Taiwan’s accession to the trade bloc is very
persuasive for Taiwan to solicit the supports from all CPTPP countries.
104 P. C. Y. CHOW
Other than trade liberalization, most countries in the trade bloc will
be benefitted from the increase of foreign direct investment under the
investment-trade nexus. Therefore, economically, Taiwan will become a
strong partner in the trade bloc if it is admitted. If Taiwan can capitalize its
cutting-edge technology in semiconductor and other high-tech industries,
and overcome its international political obstacles, then its membership at
the CPTPP will be much smoother than that of China.
Taiwan’s membership at the CPTPP is more geopolitical than geoe-
conomics for the CPTPP-11. Economically, it is hard for the CPTPP-11
not to accept Taiwan as a valued member because Taiwan’s membership
is beneficial to them. But Beijing has never held its secret in opposing
Taiwan to join any international organization and trade agreement at all.
That is the major stumbling block for Taiwan to join this trade bloc.
Nevertheless, many CPTPP members have been trying to overcome it20 ;
First of all, Taiwan applied it as an independent Custom Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu (TPKM) as what its status is at
the WTO. The following report from Australian Parliament pointed out
that the “One China policy” was not a ‘fundamental stumbling block’ for
Taiwan due to:
…the language of the agreement itself allows for non-state accession. It talks
about separate customs, territories and the like. Taiwan is already a full
member of the WTO, and that same sort of language, clearly, could be used
to allow and promote the accession of Taiwan to the CPTPP. A similar point
could be made of Taiwan’s membership in APEC, which it actually joined
alongside of the PRC and Hong Kong.21
Australia has an FTA with China but its bilateral negotiation for an
Australia-Taiwan trade accord is still pending. Nevertheless, Australia
Parliament recommended its government to support Taiwan’s acces-
sion while concurrently engage in the bilateral negotiation on FTA
with Taiwan. On the China’s objection of Taiwan’s accession, Australia
Parliament cited the following statement from Dr. Richard Herr:
if Australia retreats from the proposal to permit Taiwan’s accession solely—

and I underscore ‘solely’ there—in the face of PRC objections, it really would
damage our standing as an effective global middle power by making it fairly
clear that another country’s interest has bent our interest to their will, and I
don’t think it’s a good look for us to be seen to be sacrificing our own national
interest in deference to another nation’s interest.22
Given what is said, Taiwan still has to seek more allies such as Chile
and Mexico to support its membership bid because those countries may
be influenced by China’s active commerce diplomacy. China can entice
those countries to boycott Taiwan’s application by offering them with
fanciful economic aid. Taiwan may have to compete with China on its
pursuit of the admission ticket to the trade bloc. A competitive commerce
diplomacy between Taiwan and China have been a reality in the past.
Taiwan will have to explore its statecraft intensively in pursuing any trade
accords. It will be even more salient in the race of CPTPP accessions.
Based on their respective qualifications, China seems to have to less
chance and will have to wait for longer period than Taiwan before being
admitted to the trade bloc. However, some commentators offer a WTO
model of admission, under which China and Taiwan joined the WTO in
2021 almost simultaneously with a negligible time lag. However, it took
15 years for China to be admitted to the WTO. It may even take a longer
time for the CPTPP to decide China’s application. It is unfair for Taiwan
to suffer from an indefinite waiting period to delay its accession to the
trade bloc just because of China’s prolong application process.
Finally, if both China and Taiwan join the trade bloc, then there
is another implication on the economic integration in the region; the
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between China
and Taiwan signed in 2011 will become obsolete because both of them
are the CPTPP members. Taiwan’ asymmetric trade dependency on China
may be mitigated because Taiwan can access to other markets in the
trade bloc. The bilateral trade and investment across the Taiwan Strait
will be ruled by an international trade accord rather than based on bilat-
eral trading framework under the ECFA across the Taiwan Strait. Other
than diversify its trade and investment flows, it will also generate some
“political dividends” for Taiwan by enhancing its international status.
Conclusion
From a regional and global perspective, each applicant, if admitted, will
transform the CPTPP into a new trade bloc different from its current
status. If UK becomes a new member of the CPTPP, then a freer trade
regime will be integrated between the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean. APEC’s
initiative to use CPTPP as the pathway toward the Free Trade Area in Asia
Pacific region will be expanded to the Atlantic Ocean, at least symboli-
cally. UK may also play the role of “middle country” power to become
106 P. C. Y. CHOW
the second largest member in the CPTPP, which will highly enhance the
sphere of influence of the trade bloc by deepening economic integration
beyond the Pacific Ocean. In that regard, CPTPP will become the first
inter-regional multilateral trade agreement.
As the second largest economy in the world, if China is admitted to
the trade bloc, the CPTPP will become a mega trade bloc in the global
economy, compatible with EU and USMCA. If China engages in substan-
tial reform in its economic system before becoming a CPTPP member,
then trade agreement will unprecedently become an important instru-
ment to transform a socialist economy into a market-oriented economy.
On the contrary, if CPTPP waters down the standard by accepting China
as a member before China fully comply with the ‘golden standard’ of
the CPTPP, then it will downgrade the trade bloc as a role model of
trade liberalization. It seems that CPTPP-11 encounters a big dilemma
on China’s accession to the trade bloc. Geopolitically, it may not be easy
for them to turn down China’s application. But, economically, for the
CPTPP as a trade bloc and many members, they cannot and will not
accept China as it is now.
Taiwan is a vital actor in the global and the regional economy in Asia
Pacific. If Taiwan is admitted to the trade bloc, then CPTPP will embed
a dynamic economy with high tech producer. It will benefit all members
of the trade bloc through trade creation effect on trade and investment
flows in the region. It will also provide the CPTPP with a reliable supply
of high-tech products. Taiwan’s accession to the trade bloc will enhance
the role of CPTPP as the leeway for trade and economic collaboration and
cooperation. Geoeconomically, it is hard for the CPTPP-11 not to accept
Taiwan as a member of the trade bloc. But geopolitically, the CPTPP-11
has to overcome China’s objection on Taiwan’s application.
If both China and Taiwan are admitted to the CPTPP, then the
economic integration across the Taiwan Strait as it is now will be
expanded to a greater geographic area under multilateral trade agreement.
Taiwan will derive some political dividend from its membership at the
trade bloc to overcome its isolation in the international community.
Appendix: Liberalized and Non-Liberalized

Bilateral and Multilateral Free Trade Agreements
of the CPTPP-11 and the First Three Applicants
Australia Brunei Canada Chile
Australia ASEAN-Australia- CPTPP Australia-Chile

New CPTPP
Zealand
CPTPP
Brunei ASEAN-Australia- CPTPP Trans-Pacific
New Strategic
Zealand Economic
CPTPP Partnership
CPTPP
Canada CPTPP CPTPP Canada-Chile
CPTPP
Chile Australia-Chile Trans-Pacific Strategic Canada-
CPTPP Economic Partnership Chile
CPTPP CPTPP
Japan ASEAN-Japan Brunei-Japan CPTPP Chile-Japan
Australia-Japan ASEAN-Japan CPTPP
CPTPP CPTPP
Malaysia ASEAN-Australia- ASEAN-China CPTPP GSTP
New ASEAN-Australia- Chile-Malaysia
Zealand New CPTPP
Malaysia-Australia Zealand
CPTPP CPTPP
Mexico ASEAN-Australia- CPTPP CPTPP LAIA
New USMCA/ Pacific
Zealand CUSMA/ Alliance
CPTPP T-MEC GSTP
CPTPP Chile-Mexico
CPTPP
New ASEAN-Australia- Trans-Pacific Strategic CPTPP Trans-Pacific
Zealand New Economic Partnership Strategic
Zealand ASEAN-Australia- Economic
CPTPP New Partnership
ANZCERTA Zealand CPTPP
SPARTECA CPTPP
PACER Plus Zealand
ANZCERTA
Peru Australia-Peru CPTPP Canada-Peru LAIA
CPTPP CPTPP Pacific
Alliance
GSTP
Peru–Chile
CPTPP
(continued)
108 P. C. Y. CHOW
(continued)
Australia Brunei Canada Chile
Singapore Australia-Singapore Trans-Pacific Strategic CPTPP Trans-Pacific

CPTPP Economic Partnership Strategic
ASEAN-Australia- ASEAN-China Economic
New CPTPP Partnership
Zealand GSTP
CPTPP
Vietnam ASEAN-Australia- ASEAN-Japan CPTPP Vietnam-Chile
New ASEAN-Australia- GSTP
Zealand New CPTPP
CPTPP Zealand
ASEAN-China
CPTPP
China Australia-China ASEAN-China China-Chile
Taiwan
UK UK-Canada UK-Chile
Japan Malaysia Mexico New Zealand
Australia ASEAN-Japan ASEAN-Australia- ASEAN-Australia-New

Australia-Japan New Zealand
CPTPP Zealand CPTPP
Malaysia-Australia ANZCERTA
CPTPP SPARTECA
PACER Plus
Brunei Brunei-Japan ASEAN-China CPTPP Trans-Pacific Strategic
ASEAN-Japan ASEAN-Australia- Economic Partnership
CPTPP New CPTPP
Zealand ASEAN-Australia-New
CPTPP Zealand
Canada CPTPP CPTPP CPTPP CPTPP
USMCA/
CUSMA/
T-MEC
Chile Chile-Japan Pacific Alliance Pacific Trans-Pacific Strategic
CPTPP GSTP Alliance Economic Partnership
Chile-Malaysia LAIA CPTPP
CPTPP Chile-
Mexico
GSTP
CPTPP
Japan Japan-Malaysia Japan- ASEAN-Japan
ASEAN-Japan Mexico CPTPP
CPTPP CPTPP
(continued)
(continued)
Japan Malaysia Mexico New Zealand
Malaysia ASEAN-Australia- GSTP Malaysia-New Zealand

New CPTPP CPTPP
Zealand ASEAN-Australia-New
ASEAN-Japan Zealand
Japan-Malaysia
CPTPP
Mexico Japan-Mexico CPTPP CPTPP
CPTPP
New CPTPP Malaysia-New CPTPP
Zealand Zealand
CPTPP
ASEAN-Australia-
New
Zealand
Peru Japan-Peru GSTP Pacific CPTPP
CPTPP CPTPP Alliance
LAIA
Peru-
Mexico
GSTP
CPTPP
SingaporeSingapore-Japan GSTP GSTP Trans-Pacific Strategic
CPTPP ASEAN-Australia- CPTPP Economic Partnership
ASEAN-Japan New New
Zealand Zealand-Singapore
CPTPP CPTPP
ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand
Vietnam Japan-Vietnam ASEAN-Japan CPTPP ASEAN-Australia-New
CPTPP ASEAN-China Zealand
ASEAN-Japan ASEAN-Australia- ASEAN
New CPTPP
Zealand
CPTPP
China ASEAN-Japan ASEAN-China Chile-New Zealand
Taiwan New Zealand-Chinese
Taipei
UK UK-Japan PTN
UK-Mexico
Peru Singapore Vietnam China Taiwan UK
110
Australia Australia-Peru Australia-Singapore ASEAN-Australia-New ASEAN-China

CPTPP ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Australia-China
Zealand CPTPP
CPTPP
Brunei CPTPP ASEAN-China ASEAN-Japan ASEAN-China
Trans-Pacific Strategic ASEAN-China
P. C. Y. CHOW
Economic Partnership ASEAN-Australia-New

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand
Zealand ASEAN-China
CPTPP ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand
CPTPP
Canada Canada-Peru CPTPP CPTPP UK-Canada
CPTPP
Chile LAIA GSTP GSTP China-Chile UK-Chile
GSTP Trans-Pacific Strategic Chile-Vietnam
Pacific Alliance Economic Partnership CPTPP
Peru–Chile GSTP
GSTP CPTPP
CPTPP
Japan Japan-Peru Singapore-Japan Japan-Vietnam UK-Japan
CPTPP CPTPP CPTPP
ASEAN-Japan ASEAN-Japan
(continued)
Malaysia GSTP GSTP ASEAN-China ASEAN-China

CPTPP ASEAN-Australia-New ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand Zealand
CPTPP CPTPP
5
Mexico Pacific Alliance CPTPP CPTPP UK-Mexico

LAIA GSTP PTN
GSTP
Peru-Mexico
CPTPP
New CPTPP Trans-Pacific Strategic ASEAN-Australia-New ASEAN-China New
Zealand Economic Partnership Zealand Chile-New Zealand-Chinese
New Zealand-Singapore CPTPP Zealand Taipei
CPTPP
ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand
Peru CPTPP Peru-Singapore GSTP Peru-China US-Ecuador
GSTP CPTPP and Peru
CPTPP
Singapore GSTP ASEAN-Japan ASEAN-China Chinese UK-Singapore
Singapore-Peru ASEAN-China Singapore-China Taipei-Singapore
CPTPP GSTP
ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand
CPTPP
PERSPECTIVES OF CPTPP MEMBERSHIP EXPANSION …
111
(continued)
112
Vietnam GSTP ASEAN-Japan ASEAN-China UK-Vietnam

CPTPP GSTP
ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand
P. C. Y. CHOW
CPTPP
China Peru-China Singapore-China ASEAN-China
ASEAN-China
Taiwan Chinese
Taipei-Singapore
UK UK-Singapore UK-Vietnam
Notes
1. Trade creation refers to the increase of benefit from joining a free trade
area. It occurs when trade liberalization, either reduction of tariffs or non-
tariff trade barriers or both leads to lower prices of trading commodities
and resultantly the increase of consumer and producers’ surplus.
2. I am indebted to Christopher Dent for sharing his vision on this particular
aspect with me.
3. Ernest Engels, a nineteenth century German statistician stated that as
household income increases, the percentage of income spent on food
consumption decreases whereas that spent on other such as luxury goods
increases. It was further elaborated that luxury goods includes services.
4. From Office for National Statistics at the website: UK trade and invest-
ment with CPTPP countries—Office for National Statistics (https://www.
ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/articles/ukt
radeandinvestmentwithcptppcountries2016to2020/2021-12-02).
5. Those big tech firms—the gatekeepers are defined as those firms with
revenue exceeds 7.5 billion pounds in Europe and a capitalization of at
least 75 billion pounds. The U.S. and EU also reached a Trans-Atlantic
Data Privacy deal on March 25, 2022, which, if implemented, will “restore
legal certainty for thousands of businesses that routinely transfer commer-
cial data between the EU and U.S.” (Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2022.
A2).
6. I am indebted to Christopher Dent for pointing out that about 60 to
70% of the text the UK-Australia FTA had verbatim or near verbatim
similarity to the USMCA due to UK’s attempt in to parallel with the
CPTPP. Meanwhile, Wheeler (2022) argued that the U.S. was behind the
EU on regulatory actions of internet.
7. China suspended eight cooperation projects with the US including the
climate crisis, anti-drug efforts and military talks on August 5, 2022. But
after President Biden met with China’s President Xi Jinping before G 20
in Bali, Indonesia, some cabinet level contacts between the U.S. and China
resumed.
8. I would like to thank the editor for pointing the sequential order of the
trade war and Australia’s action on an international inquiry of China’s
handling of the Covid-19 pandemic.
9. “Australia China Trade War And Its Implications” from https://www.int
uition.com/australia-china-trade-war-and-its-implications/.
10. From Australia Parliament Report at Applications to the CPTPP: The
United Kingdom, China, Taiwan and South Korea—Parliament of
Australia (https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Commit
tees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/CPTPPMembership/
Report/section?id=committees%2freportjnt%2f024826%2f78218).
114 P. C. Y. CHOW
11. Japan Times, Japan and Singapore vow to maintain TPP free trade pact’s
high standards. January 12, 2021. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/
2022/01/12/business/japan-singapore-tpp/.
12. From Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting | Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Japan (https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/nz/page3e_001192.html).
13. For Japan’s concerns about China’s trade-related policies, see the
following report from Ministry of economy, Trade and Industry at The
2021 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade
Agreements-WTO, EPA/FTA and IIA (Tokyo: METI, 2021). (https:/
/www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/2021WTO/gCT2021coe.html).
14. China passed three laws on digital trade: the Cybersecurity Law (2017),
the Data Security Law (2021), and the Personal Information Protection
Law (2021). But these laws are so divergent from the principles of “free
cross-border data flows” and “no data localization” under the CPTPP
(Kimura, 2021).
15. Armstrong (2021) “China’s bid to join Pacific trade pact a strategic
opportunity for Canberra” East Asian Forum https://www.eastasiaforum.
org/2021/09/20/chinas-bid-to-join-pacific-trade-pact-a-strategic-opport
unity-for-canberra/.
16. Annex to CPTPP/COM/2019/D002, Jan. 19th, 2019 at the first
TPP Commission (https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade-agreements/
CPTPP/Accession-Process.pdf).
17. IPEF includes Australia, Brunei Darussalam, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thai-
land, and Vietnam, but not Taiwan. Nevertheless, the Biden Administra-
tion initiated a “US-Taiwan Initiatives for the 21st Century Trade at a
bilateral level.” It is noted that Fiji joined the first ministerial meetings in
Los Angeles in September 2022.
18. In fact, the public concern of food safety was misled by the misinfor-
mation provided by the KMT. Many commentators pointed out that
Taiwanese tourists to Japan purchased quite a lot of food products from
the surrounding area of Fukushima.
19. There are five scenarios on Taiwan’s admission based on various degree
of trade liberalization including the Taiwan-New Zealand model, liberal-
ization of all trading commodities but phasing out agricultural protection
to full scale comprehensive liberalization in all trading commodities. See
Chow and Guo (2020).
20. A typical example can be found in Australia. Former Australian Prime
Minister, the Hon Tony Abbott AC downplayed potential outrage from
China:
The only argument that occurs to me is that it might upset China,

but given that China is not a member of the TPP, is unlikely to
become a member of the TPP and is already in a state of high

dudgeon against Australia and many other countries, I don’t see
that China is going to be any more upset than it already is. (Source
Applications to the CPTPP: the United Kingdom, China, Taiwan
and South Korea—Parliament of Australia [https://www.aph.gov.
au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_
Defence_and_Trade/CPTPPMembership/Report/section?id=com
mittees%2freportjnt%2f024826%2f78218])
21. From Applications to the CPTPP: the United Kingdom, China, Taiwan
and South Korea—Parliament of Australia (https://www.aph.gov.au/Par
liamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_
Trade/CPTPPMembership/Report/section?id=committees%2freportjnt%
2f024826%2f78218). Downloaded on March 29, 2022.
22. Ibid.
References
Australian Parliament. 2021. Applications to the CPTPP: The United Kingdom,
China, Taiwan and South Korea.
Borst, Nicholas. 2021. Has China Given Up on State-Owned Enterprise
Reform. The Intepreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/has-
china-given-state-owned-enterprise-reform Accessed 15 Sep 2022.
Carrai, Maria Adele. 2022. Can China Succeed in Join the CPTPP? The Hinrich
Foundation. April.
Chinese Taipei (XXB) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners | OEC—The
Observatory of Economic Complexity.
Chow, Peter C. Y. 2016. The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Path to Free
Trade in the Asia Pacific (eds.), Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA:
Edward Elgar.
Chow, Peter C. Y. and Yun-Hsin Guo. 2020. The Impact of Taiwan’s CPTPP
Membership on Its Macroeconomy and Industries. A Research Report
Submitted to Taipei Foreign Exchange Foundation (in Chinese).
Department of International Trade. 2021. UK Accession to CPTPP: The UK’s
Strategic Approach. C:\Users\pcych\Downloads\UK-CPTPP Accession_DIT
(1).pdf.
Fischetti, Andrea A., and Antonio Roth. 2021. China’s CPTPP Acces-
sion Bid: A New Dilemma for Tokyo. Tokyo Review, November 4,
2022. https://www.tokyoreview.net/2021/11/chinas-cptpp-accession-bid-a-
new-dilemma-for-tokyo/.
Gao, Henry. 2022. Data sovereignty and Trade Agreements: Three Digital
Kingdoms. The Hinrich Foundation, January.
116 P. C. Y. CHOW
International Monetary Fund. http://imf.org/world.economic.outlook.dat

abases.
Japan Times. 2021. Japan and Singapore Vow to Maintain TPP Free Trade Pact’s
High Standards, January 12. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/.
Kimura, Fukunari, 2022. The Rules-based Approach to Cope with China: The
Case of E-Commerce. In Strategic Japan 2022. https://www.csis.org/pro
grams/japan-chair/projects/strategic-japan.
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 2021. The 2021 Report on Compli-
ance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements-WTO, EPA/FTA
and IIA. Tokyo: METI. https://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/202
1WTO/gCT2021coe.html.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting.
http://mofa.go.jp/.
Mishra, Neha. 2022. Can Trade Agreements Narrow the Global Data Divide? A
Novel Agenda for Digital Trade. The Hinrich Foundation, January.
Office for National Statistics. UK trade and investment with CPTPP countries—
Office for National Statistics. http://ons.gov.uk/.
Parliament of Australia. Applications to the CPTPP: The United Kingdom,
China, Taiwan and South Korea. http://aph.gov.au/.
Shelton, Joanna, 2021. Look Skeptically at China’s CPTPP Application. Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), November 18. https://www.
csis.org/analysis/look-skeptically-chinas-cptpp-application.
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Annex to CPTPP/COM/
2019/D002, January 19th, 2019 at the first TPP Commission. https://www.
mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade-agreements/CPTPP/Accession-Process.pdf.
United Nations. UN Comrade Database. https://comtrade.un.org/.
Wall Street Journal. 2022. EU Reaches a Deals on Law To Curb Tech Firms’
Power. March 25. A1 and A12.
Wheeler, Tom. 2022. US Regulatory Inaction Opened the Door for the EU to
set up Internet. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, March 29. https:/
/www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2022/03/29/u-s-regulatory-inaction-
opened-the-doors-for-the-eu-to-step-up-on-internet/?utm_campaign=Brooki
ngs%20Brief&utm_medium=email&utm_content=208527385&utm_source=
hs_email.
CHAPTER 6
Australia’s Perspective on the Applications

from the UK, China, and Taiwan to Join
the CPTPP
Richard Pomfret
The evolution of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for

Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP ) has been a combustible mixture. On
the one hand, the CPTPP, as an international trade agreement that
goes beyond WTO commitments, involved lengthy negotiations before
consensus on the text could be reached and the CPTPP could be imple-
mented. On the other hand, the CPTPP, as an instrument of domestic
politics and of international relations, has been subject to dramatic coups
de théâtre. The USA signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership after eight years
of negotiations, but President Trump refused to ratify the agreement
three days after taking office in January 2017. Both elements—careful
negotiation of a legal text and grand political gesture—are visible in
Australia’s approach to the CPTPP.
R. Pomfret (B)
University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA, Australia

118 R. POMFRET
The chapter starts by reviewing the evolution of Australian trade policy,

emphasizing the shift away from protectionism in the 1980s and subse-
quent establishment of Australia as one of the most liberal trading nations
and supporter of WTO rules. The second section contrasts the careful
and successful trade diplomacy with episodes in recent years when major
political decisions have had negative impact on trade policy. The next
three sections contrast negative and positive approaches to relations with
China and with the UK since 2019 and review Australia’s shifting position
towards Taiwan. The sixth section contrasts the political reactions with
institutional aspects of the CPTPP accession process. The final section
offers conclusions.
The Evolution of Australian Trade Policy

For most of the twentieth century Australia had one of the most protec-
tionist trade policies among high-income countries. Although a signatory
of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Australia resisted
tariff reductions and other trade-liberalizing measures even as other
high-income countries reduced tariffs in rounds of multilateral trade
negotiations (Pomfret, 2015, 2019). In 1983, major domestic and trade
policy reforms were initiated. In the twenty-first century, Australia has
been a strong supporter of the liberal international trade system, repre-
sented by the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995. Australia has
almost eliminated tariffs on imports and has been keen to extend world
trade law into new areas.
Australia reduced tariffs to the extent that today about half of its most-
favoured nation tariffs are zero and half are 5%.1 Beyond longer-standing
agreements with New Zealand and other Pacific islands, Australia signed
twelve bilateral agreements between 2003 and 2020 that reduced or elim-
inated tariffs on bilateral trade.2 By 2020, the average applied tariff on
imports into Australia was less than one per cent. Special measures to
protect sensitive industries, notably car producers, were gradually termi-
nated; the last three carmakers ended the manufacturing of motor vehicles
in Australia in 2016 (Ford) and 2017 (Toyota and General Motors).
Australia shed its defensiveness over trade negotiations and became
more active in international economic diplomacy. The 1983 Closer
Economic Relations Agreement with New Zealand was an early example
of deep integration, not only extending WTO commitments but also
including areas that the WTO did not yet cover.3 As leader of the Cairns
6 AUSTRALIA’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE APPLICATIONS … 119
Group of agricultural exporters, Australia played a key role in highlighting

agriculture in the final round of GATT trade negotiations that started in
1986 and in reducing agriculture’s exceptional status in the WTO charter.
Australia was also the founder in 1989 of Asia Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (APEC) whose open regionalism was a precursor of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP).
Australia initiated APEC as a forum to coordinate trade liberalization.
At the 2002 APEC summit, New Zealand, Singapore, and Chile began
negotiations towards a high-quality beyond-WTO agreement. They were
joined by Brunei in the 2006 P4 agreement. In 2008 Australia, Peru,
the USA, and Vietnam opened negotiations to extend the P4. The
first formal round of TPP negotiations was held in Melbourne on
15–19 March 2010, with the participation of over 200 officials from
Australia, the USA, New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, Brunei, Peru, and
Vietnam. They were later joined by Malaysia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan.
The twelve countries concluded the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2016,
but President Trump’s non-ratification meant that the TPP could not
enter into force. Before the US withdrawal was even formalised, Japanese
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turn-
bull on 14 January 2017 in Sydney, where both governments agreed to
salvage the deal. Australia and Japan led the remaining eleven countries
in negotiating and ratifying the CPTPP.4
The CPTPP is the prime example of a modern megaregional trade
agreement, whose emphasis is less on traditional trade barriers such as
tariffs or quotas and much more about WTO+ and WTO-X agreements.5
Reasons for this development include the increased share of global value
chains in international trade, new technologies for conducting trade, and
the failure of the WTO to address new issues.6 At the 1996 ministerial
meeting in Singapore, WTO members already recognized the desir-
ability of extending WTO rules, and working groups were established
in four areas: transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation
(customs issues), trade and investment, and trade and competition. A
quarter century later, the only progress had been the 2017 Trade Facilita-
tion Agreement, and even this rather general agreement had been delayed
by lack of consensus. An alternative approach within the WTO has been
for subsets of members to sign plurilateral agreements, most notably the
Information Technology Agreement, which entered into force in 1997
and now has 82 participants, accounting for 97% of world trade in IT
products.7 Plurilateral agreements have, however, become a source of
120 R. POMFRET
dispute as some members argue that they undermine the universality of

WTO commitments.
In an age when progress at the WTO is hampered by the consensus
requirement, the CPTPP has become the benchmark for a modern
trade agreement (Pomfret, 2021a). Other examples of beyond-WTO
agreements include the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) between the ten ASEAN countries and five regional part-
ners (Australia, China, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand), the European
Union’s deep agreements with countries such as Canada and Japan
(Pomfret, 2021c, 156–60), and the agreement between Canada, Mexico
and the United States signed in November 2018 and in force since July
2020.8
Table 6.1 illustrates the similar chapter structures of the TPP/CPTPP,
RCEP, and the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agree-
ment (CETA).9 The agreements are generally consistent although they
vary in coverage and in depth of commitment; any inconsistencies or even
lack of clarity in addressing new issues such as e-commerce and digitaliza-
tion would increase the complexity and costs of international trade.10 The
twenty RCEP chapters have similar coverage to corresponding CPTPP
chapters, with slightly different ordering, a single chapter for services,
and omission of seven chapters. Tariffs in RCEP countries are higher
than in CPTPP countries (Table 6.2) and market access for goods and
rules of origin were of greater importance in RCEP negotiations, but
trade in goods still only occupies a small fraction of RCEP chapters.11
Some CPTPP chapters are not in RCEP—environment, labour, state-
owned enterprises, competitiveness, development, regulatory coherence,
and transparency and corruption—and RCEP is less comprehensive than
CPTPP in sensitive areas such as trade in agricultural products and in
services. Nevertheless, RCEP illustrates the usefulness of the chapter
structure approach to trade agreements, following the pattern of CPTPP
or EU deep agreements, while making weaker commitments and ignoring
some controversial areas.
In sum, in the twenty-first century Australia has been a strong propo-
nent of the liberal multilateral trade regime.In the March 2020 trade
policy review, WTO members praised Australian trade policies and adher-
ence to WTO norms (Pomfret, 2021b).12 Moreover, Australia has been
willing to push further in negotiating agreements on WTO+ and WTO-
X measures with like-minded countries. Australia played a leading role in
Table 6.1 Chapter structure of TPP compared to RCEP and the EU-Canada
agreement
TPP/CPTPP RCEP CETA TPP/CPTPP RCEP CETA
1. Definitions 1 1 16. Competition policy 13 17

2. Market access for 2 2 17. SOEs & monopolies 18
goods
3. Rules of origin 3 A 18. Intellectual property 11 20
4. Textiles & A 19. Labor 23
apparel
5. Custom 4 6 20. Environment 24
administration
6. Trade remedies 7 3&7 21. Cooperation & 15 25
(AD&CVD) capacity building
7. SPS 5 5 22. Competitiveness &
investment facilitation
8. TBTs 6 4 23. Development 22
9. Investment 10 8 24. SMEs 14
10. Services 8 9 25. Regulatory 12&21
coherence
11. Financial 8 13 26. Transparency & 27
services corruption
12. Temporary 9 10 27. Administration & 18 26
migration institution provision
13. Telecoms 8 15 28. Dispute settlement 19 29
14. e-commerce 12 16 29. Exceptions & general 17 28
provisions
15. Public 16 19 30. Final provisions 20 30
procurement
Notes A = included in annexes

Source Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade provides the text of the CPTPP at https:/
/www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/official-documents and for RCEP at https://
www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/rcep/rcep-text. The text of CETA is available at: https:/
/trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf
negotiations for the TransPacific Partnership and especially in the tran-

sition to CPTPP after the US failed to ratify TPP, a positive role in
concluding RCEP, and an active role since 2017 in negotiation of an
agreement with the European Union.13 In some areas, Australia was
willing to move faster than other CPTPP or RCEP partners, e.g. the
Australia-Singapore Digital Economy Agreement that entered into force
in December 2020 extended the digital trade component of the CPTPP.
122 R. POMFRET
Table 6.2 CPTPP and RCEP Signatories’ average ad valorem applied tariffs,
2020
CPTPP
RCEP
Canada 1.5% Australia 0.7% Cambodia 6.2%

Chile 0.4% Brunei 0.0% PRC 2.5%
Mexico 1.2% Japan 2.2% Indonesia 2.0%
Peru 0.7% Malaysia 3.6% ROK 5.5%
New Zealand 0.8% Lao PDR 1.0%
Singapore 0.1% Myanmar 1.8%
Vietnam 1.3% Philippines 1.7%
Thailand 3.5%
Notes weighted average based on bilateral trade at HS 6-digit level

Source World Bank at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TM.TAX.MRCH.WM.FN.ZS (accessed
3 September 2022)
Australian Trade Policy in the 2020s

In contrast to the careful and successful trade diplomacy described in
the previous section, in 2020 and 2021 Australian policy became char-
acterized by major political decisions announced suddenly, with negative
impact on trade policy.14 A striking example was the clumsily managed
announcement in 2021 of the Australia–UK–US agreement that included
tearing up a large contract for French submarines, stalling negotiations for
an Australia-EU trade agreement that had been progressing since 2017.
The most important example for the CPTPP has been the aggres-
sive policy stance towards China, which is by far Australia’s largest
trade partner (Table 6.3). After Prime Minister Morrison irritated China
in April 2020 by advocating an inquiry into the Chinese origins of
the COVID-19 virus, relations rapidly degenerated into a trade war
with Chinese restrictions on Australian exports of wine and barley
and Australian anti-dumping actions on several Chinese products. The
Australian government justified its measures by highlighting the scale of
Chinese government intervention in the domestic market and Morrison
carried this on to the CPTPP stage by stating that China was not a
suitable CPTPP member due to the extent of its non-market economy.
The speed and simplicity of this reaction and of Australia’s imme-

diate positive response to the UK application to join CPTPP (see
Section “Australia-China Relations” below), contrasted to the detailed
negotiations creating the CPTPP and anticipated for accession candidates.
The Australian government has maintained a lower profile with respect
to other applicants: Taiwan, which like China applied in September
2021, and Ecuador which applied in December 2021.15 An appropriate
response would be to examine each applicant’s policies to ensure compat-
ibility with CPTPP rules and make membership conditional on reforms
to remove incompatible policies. A further reason for more measured
responses to applications is the connection between the applications from
the PRC and Taiwan. APEC managed this issue by preparing for simul-
taneous admission of the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in 1991. The
WTO accessions of the PRC and Taiwan were approved on 11 and 12
November 2001. For the CPTPP to achieve a similar coordinated result
would require subtler diplomacy than Australia was offering in 2021.
Table 6.3 Australia’s top ten two-way trading partners, 2019–2020
(A$ billion)
Rank Trading partners Goods Services Total % share
1 China 232.4 18.7 251.1 28.8

2 United States 55.4 25.4 80.8 9.2
3 Japan 73.0 6.1 79.1 9.1
4 EU27 35.9 6.1 42.0 4.8
5 Republic of Korea 36.5 2.4 38.9 4.5
6 United Kingdom 22.8 13.9 36.7 4.2
7 Singapore 21.7 9.6 31.3 3.6
8 New Zealand 17.6 11.1 28.7 3.3
9 India 15.7 10.6 26.2 3.0
10 Malaysia 18.2 3.4 21.6 2.5
Note Taiwan was Australia’s 12th largest trading partner, with two-way trade of $16.1 billion
Source Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Trade and Investment at a
glance at https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade-and-investment/trade-and-investment-glance-
2021#exports (accessed 24 May 2022)
124 R. POMFRET
Australia–UK Relations
Australia has had close relations with the UK ever since the first European
settlement in 1788. Before the 1960s, the UK was Australia’s main trade
partner and source of foreign investment. Following the minerals boom
of the 1960s and the rise of Japan and the newly industrializing Asian
economies in the 1970s, the UK share of Australian trade fell rapidly
as the Australian economy reoriented towards Asia. On a policy level,
preferential access to UK markets ceased in 1973, when the UK joined
the European customs union; until 2020, British trade policy was the EU
common commercial policy.
In 2019 Australian prime minister Morrison established a personal
rapport with UK prime minister Boris Johnson that was maintained
despite travel restrictions during the COVID pandemic. After Brexit was
concluded on 31 January 2020, Australia moved to the head of the queue
for negotiating a new trade agreement with the UK, as opposed to rolling
over EU agreements. Negotiations were launched in June 2020, amidst
mutual assertions that an agreement would right the historical wrong of
the UK abandoning Australia for Europe in 1973. The friendship was
reinforced by Johnson extending a special invitation to Morrison to attend
the July 2021 G7 summit in Cornwall, although Australia seemed isolated
when the G7 leaders adopted a cautiously worded communiqué about
China.
Negotiations for the Australia-UK trade agreement were concluded in
December 2021. According to Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade website: “The Australia-United Kingdom Free Trade Agree-
ment (Australia–UK FTA), signed virtually on 17 December 2021, is a
gold standard trade agreement that represents a once in a generation deal
for Australia and an historic moment in our relationship with the UK”.16
Unlike the Australia-EU agreement for which negotiations had started
in 2017, a positive outcome was never in doubt in view of the enthusi-
astic support of the two leaders. There was also no doubt in the Australian
leader’s mind that the UK’s February 2021 application to join the CPTPP
should be successful.
Australia-China Relations
Australia and the People’s Republic of China established diplomatic rela-
tions in December 1972. Economic ties strengthened during the 1980s
and 1990s and especially after the turn of the century. During the global
resource boom China was the main destination for Australian coal, iron
ore and other minerals, as well as a major source of fee-paying students for
Australian educational institutions. Australia supported China’s member-
ship in APEC and the WTO. The China–Australia Free Trade Agreement
entered into force on 20 December 2015. Economic matters were sepa-
rated from political and security issues such as concerns about human
rights and Australia’s alliance with the United States. However, such
separation was harder to maintain when US relations with China dete-
riorated.17
Separation of economic and political relations became more difficult
after 2013, when Xi Jinping became China’s president. In Australia, the
2013–2015 Abbott government was openly split over the response to Xi’s
Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,
with some ministers focusing on the security implications and others
on the economics. Official responses to these major Chinese initiatives
were late and limited. Australia–China relations soured further during
the government of Malcolm Turnbull (from September 2015 to August
2018). Both Turnbull and foreign minister Julie Bishop were openly crit-
ical of China’s record on human rights and actions in the South China
Sea. Bishop did not visit China in the final two and a half years of her
tenure.
Turnbull’s successor Scott Morrison had a chance to reset the rela-
tionship, after meeting President Xi Jinping on the sideline of a G20
meeting in June 2019.18 Morrison also held a meeting with Chinese
premier, Li Keqiang at the November 2019 East Asia Summit, and
foreign minister Marise Payne met Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi
in August and September. In 2019 Morrison appeared to distance himself
from the widening rift between the USA and China. After a meeting
in the Oval Office in September 2019, President Trump challenged
Morrison to express his “very strong opinions on China” to which
Morrison responded “We have a comprehensive strategic partnership with
China. We work well with China […] we have a great relationship with
China”. Trump, in contrast, went on to describe China as “a threat to
the world” (Laurenceson, 2022a).
126 R. POMFRET
Australia-PRC relations cooled rapidly in 2020 and became outright

hostile in 2021. In what was seen as a direct attack on China’s reputa-
tion, in April 2020 Australia called for an independent investigation into
the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, and Australia echoed US crit-
icism of the World Health Organization for its alleged pro-China bias.
In contrast to Morrison’s distancing from Trump in 2019, as US–China
relations became more strained in 2020 Australia took positions similar
to those of the Trump administration and often seemed to be leading the
charge against China. In November 2020, a leaked Chinese document
listed fourteen grievances, starting with blocking Chinese investment
in Australia and the Huawei decision, but mostly focused on polit-
ical disagreements such as Australia’s intervening in China Sea disputes,
interfering in China’s internal affairs, and spreading anti-Chinese propa-
ganda.19 Meanwhile, Chinese authorities suspended the import licences
of major Australian beef producers, instructed some power plants and
steel mills to stop buying Australian coal, and imposed punitive tariffs on
barley and wine. In December 2020, Australia challenged China’s barley
and wine tariffs at the World Trade Organisation; WTO panels were estab-
lished in May and October 2021 to adjudicate on the barley and wine
disputes respectively, but they were unlikely to report before 2023.
As Australia maintained its position, China retaliated. In the second
half of 2020, many non-tariff measures targeted Australian exports; for
example, new sanitary concerns halted Chinese imports of Australian
rock lobsters, Chinese textile companies reduced purchases of Australian
cotton, and ships bringing coal from Australia were prevented from
unloading in Chinese ports. In March 2021, China announced that it
would extend the 220% anti-dumping duties on Australian wines for
the next five years. Australia launched new anti-dumping cases against
Chinese exporters. In June 2021, China requested WTO consultations
on Australian anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures on imports
from China. Against a backdrop of security-related disputes, a trade war
simmered. Facing a general election in May 2022 and behind in opinion
polls, the Morrison government made standing up to China a central
plank of its election strategy.
In March 2022, a nadir in Australian diplomacy followed an
airliner crash in southern China when 132 people died (Laurenceson,
2022b). In contrast to the leaders of other countries in conflict with
China (e.g. the UK, Canada, and India), neither prime minister Morrison
nor foreign minister Payne issued even a short statement of condolences.
Unlike the government, shadow foreign minister Penny Wong took time
to express her condolences. Wong’s action raised the prospect of better
relations after the Morrison government’s defeat in the May 2022 general
election.
Australia–Taiwan Relations
Australia–Taiwan relations have fluctuated in response to Taiwan’s impor-
tance as an economic partner and Australian relations with the PRC.
During the 1950s Australian relations with Taiwan were not close. Bilat-
eral trade grew rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s, and in 1966 Australia
established an embassy in Taipei. However, in 1971 Australia recog-
nized the PRC as the sole legal government of China, acknowledging
that Taiwan is a province of China. After this was confirmed in the
Joint Communiqué with the PRC, diplomatic links with Taiwan were
discontinued.
Nevertheless, trade between Australia and Taiwan continued to flourish
and unofficial institutions were strengthened in the 1980s and 1990s.
The Australian Commerce and Industry Office (ACIO) was established
in 1981 under the control of the Australian Chamber of Commerce. In
the absence of formal diplomatic relations, the ACIO was operating as
an unofficial embassy by the end of the decade. The 1989 Tiananmen
massacre in Beijing and democratisation of Taiwan contributed to a
warmer relationship, and in 1990, after a review of Australia’s policy
towards Taiwan, Minister for Technology and Commerce John Button
declared government support for closer Australia economic relations with
Taiwan. In 1993 Taiwan was Australia seventh largest trade partner, with
trade roughly equal to that with the PRC (just over five billion dollars).
During the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Australia was perceived by the
PRC to be supporting a US containment strategy. The Howard govern-
ment reacted by trying to strengthen relations with the PRC while
balancing this with US pressure to commit to supporting the USA in
any Taiwan-PRC conflict. As trade and other economic relations between
Australia and the PRC flourished in the twenty-first century, Australian
relations with Taiwan were pushed into the background despite strength-
ening institutional arrangements.20 In 2020, Taiwan was Australia’s
twelfth largest trade partner, far behind the PRC (Table 6.3).
The situation changed as Australia-PRC relations rapidly deteriorated
in 2020 and 2021. In late 2021, both PM Morrison and Defence Minister
128 R. POMFRET
Peter Dutton, apparently playing up security issues for a domestic audi-

ence, asserted that Australia would follow the US lead if the PRC invaded
Taiwan. The position was welcomed in Taipei but criticized by shadow
Foreign Minister Wong for using Taiwan as a pawn in the Liberals’
opposition to the PRC (Stünkel, 2022).
Expanding the CPTPP

In contrast to the rapid response of Prime Minister Morrison to the
applications by the UK and PRC to join the CPTPP, the institutional
response from CPTPP members has been more measured. The 2019
CPTPP Commission document Comprehensive and Progressive Agree-
ment for Trans-Pacific Partnership Accession Process outlined the following
benchmarks for accession: (a) demonstrate the means by which the appli-
cant will comply with all of the existing rules contained in the CPTPP;
and (b) undertake to deliver the highest standard of market access offers
on goods, services, investment, financial services, government procure-
ment, state-owned enterprises and temporary entry for business persons in
an outcome that strengthens the mutually-beneficial linkages among the
aspirant economy and the existing CPTPP members. Consensus among
ratified parties (currently all members except Brunei, Chile, and Malaysia)
is required to agree to the accession of any aspirant economy.21
The UK application was announced in February 2021 and formally
lodged in June. This was followed by the CPTPP members establishing
an accession working group and the UK submitting a 192-page report
“outlining how we’d meet the high standards of the CPTPP”.22 A first
meeting of the applicant and the eleven CPTPP countries was held virtu-
ally on 28 September 2021. This was followed by negotiations within
smaller technical working groups, presumably focusing on individual
chapters and on questions of whether the UK meets the commitments
in the CPTPP.23
The UK accession process should be relatively easy. The UK has already
rolled over EU agreements with CPTPP signatories Canada, Chile, Japan,
Mexico, Singapore, and Vietnam, as well as having signed new agreements
with Australia in December 2021 and with New Zealand in February
2022. Most of these are deep agreements. However, it is important
to establish a thorough and transparent accession process for the first
applicant before considering other outstanding applications.
In September 2021, China applied to join the CPTPP. The PRC’s

application faces resistance from CPTPP members concerned about
Chinese competition in their markets or doubting market-opening
commitments. Such doubts do not include PRC’s tariff barriers, which
have declined substantially since 1978, and PRC has accepted elimina-
tion of tariffs in trade agreements with Singapore and New Zealand
(Su and Zang, 2020). China has already signed RCEP, which contains
many commitments in areas covered by the CPTPP, as well as bilateral
agreements with Australia, Chile, New Zealand, Peru, and Singapore.
However, many CPTPP chapters go further than RCEP commitments.
For example, both the CPTPP and RCEP contain a chapter on e-
commerce, but the CPTPP’s digital provisions are stronger (e.g. forbid-
ding forced disclosure of source code), are subject to dispute settlement
procedures, and do not permit self-defined national security exemp-
tions. Moreover, unlike RCEP, the CPTPP has chapters on labour and
state-owned enterprises that mandate freedom of association, elimination
of all forms of forced labour, and establishment of disciplines on the
commercial activities of public enterprises.
In sum, there are areas where members can challenge China’s readiness
to accept CPTPP commitments, but the process must be transparent. The
UK accession negotiations can establish such a process and should not be
rubber-stamped as Australian prime minister Morrison seemed to promise
UK prime minister Johnson. A trickier balancing act will be to depoliticize
the applications from China and Taiwan. The Australian government has
shown limited interest in the Taiwan application, in contrast to its adroit
support in the 1990s for linking PRC and Taiwan applications to APEC
and the WTO.
Australia’s official position on Taiwan’s bid was neutral. Trade Minister
Dan Tehan stated: ‘Australia will work with the CPTPP membership to
consider Taiwan’s application on a consensus basis, in accordance with the
CPTPP Accession Guidelines’. However, Australia is aware of PRC oppo-
sition to the bid and to other potential problems (Lai, 2021). Taiwan
made its accession request to the CPTPP as the ‘Separate Customs Terri-
tory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu’, which had been acceptable
to the PRC in the WTO context. As Taiwan has not applied to the CPTPP
as a sovereign state, its application need not be incongruous with China’s
‘One-China’ interpretation.
Although Australian discussion of Taiwan’s application has been
primarily through the prism of the PRC relationship, other obstacles
130 R. POMFRET
lie on the horizon. Taiwan’s lack of experience with trade agreements,

whose negotiation has been constrained by limited international recogni-
tion of Taiwan as a nation state, has left the government unaccustomed
to dealing with trading partners’ insistence on binding commitments.24
Referenda in 2018 and 2021 highlighted popular opposition to imports
that the exporting countries thought were unjustified. Following the
2011 Fukushima nuclear plant disaster, Taiwan imposed a ban on agri-
cultural and food imports from five Japanese prefectures; despite efforts
to lift the ban, in a November 2018 referendum almost four-fifths
of voters supported maintaining the prohibition. In a December 2021
referendum, almost half of voters favoured banning pork imports with
ractopamine residue, reflecting Taiwanese voters’ concerns on food safety
issues even when foreign suppliers cited scientific evidence of the addi-
tive’s harmlessness. The ractopamine ban was vetoed in December 2021
and the ban on food imports from the five prefectures was lifted in
February 2022, but they highlight the domestic political challenges that
Taiwan may face during its CPTPP accession process. For example, if
Taiwan accedes to the CPTPP, twenty Taiwanese agricultural products
currently protected by tariff quotas and special safeguard measures will
face increased competition from imports. In sum, beyond China’s oppo-
sition to its CPTPP accession bid, Taiwan will face a delicate balancing test
between expectations of current CPTPP members and domestic politics.
In contrast to the prime minister’s rapid responses in 2021 to the
applications of the UK and PRC, the parliamentary approach to CPTPP
expansion moved along more measured paths. In October 2020, trade
minister Simon Birmingham referred the question of CPTPP expansion to
the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade of
the Parliament.25 The Committee invited relevant companies and organ-
isations to make submissions; the Committee received 69 submissions
and seven exhibits. Public hearings were conducted by the Committee in
Canberra. The February 2022 report of the Joint Standing Committee
included soundings of a wide variety of stakeholders and made eight
recommendations (Table 6.4).
Some submissions reflected predictable political preferences with
respect to the applications of PRC and Taiwan, but the political need
to recognize the connection between the two applications was gener-
ally acknowledged, despite the more positive slant of recommendation
5, compared to recommendation 4. Most submissions from trade bodies,
think tanks and others emphasized the benefits from wider acceptance of
Table 6.4 Recommendations of the joint standing committee26
1 The Australian Government continue to embrace an ambitious free trade agenda

by working with other CPTPP members to expand the CPTPP to include new
members that (a) support an open, transparent, and stable trading environment
in the Indo-Pacific; (b) demonstrate an ability and willingness to meet the
agreement’s high standards including a commitment to deliver against its rules
and norms; and (c) offer export potential through enhanced market access
2 The Australian Government work with other CPTPP members to leverage the
process that applied to the United Kingdom as the first aspiring economy to
formally request accession as a template for future aspirant economies while also
learning lessons from the United Kingdom experience including the (a) benefits
that accrue from negotiating a bilateral FTA with the United Kingdom while
concurrently encouraging and facilitating its accession to the CPTPP; (b)
importance of government-to-government engagement during the CPTPP
accession process, including at the ministerial level; (c) value of clear guidance
on the CPTPP accession process such as deal stages and related expectations
3 The Australian Government work with other CPTPP members to encourage and
facilitate the accession of the United Kingdom to the CPTPP
4 The Australian Government work with other CPTPP members to encourage
China to re-establish full trading relations including ending its coercive trade
measures and reengaging in ministerial dialogue, and to demonstrate an ability
and willingness to commit to the CPTPP’s high standards, prior to supporting
the commencement of an accession process
5 The Australian Government work with other CPTPP members to encourage and
facilitate the accession of Taiwan to the CPTPP and to consider negotiating a
bilateral Taiwan-Australia FTA concurrently, noting the benefit of a similar
approach taken with the United Kingdom
6 The Australian Government work with other CPTPP members to support South
Korea in submitting a formal request to accede to the CPTPP, and to provide
encouragement and facilitation of its accession upon a formal request being
submitted
7 The Australian Government work with other CPTPP members to encourage the
United States to renew its interest in the CPTPP
8 The Australian Government work with other CPTPP members to encourage
informal discussions with Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and other
economies which have expressed an interest in acceding to the CPTPP
Source Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade of the Parliament of
the Commonwealth of Australia, Expanding the Membership of the Comprehensive and Progressive
Trans-Pacific Partnership, Canberra, February 2022
CPPTP standards in reducing noodle bowl effects of differing regulations

and in facilitating trade. In contrast, the submission by the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) emphasized the market access bene-
fits that Australia had already derived from CPTPP membership; in view
of agriculture’s role in today’s Australian economy (1.9% of GDP and
132 R. POMFRET
2.5% of employment in 2020–2021), improved market access in a handful

of mainly farm products is unlikely to contribute large national bene-
fits.27 Highlighting benefits to specific exporters is similar to the focus
on market access in Taiwanese CPTPP debates (footnote 24), although
such benefits are unlikely to be large for the economy as a whole and
trade in goods is only one of the CPTPP’s thirty chapters.
The May 2022 Australian General Election

The May 2022 general election resulted in a decisive rejection of the
Morrison government, which won only 58 of the 151 seats in the House
of Representatives (Table 6.5). The Labor Party’s majority of seats in
the House of Representatives was sufficient for it to form a government
under Anthony Albanese, but the majority is slim and in the Senate the
government is dependent on the support of the Greens and at least one
independent senator to pass legislation opposed by the Liberals (Table
6.5).28 The success of the Greens and independents was interpreted
as reaction to the previous government’s grudging policy response to
climate change. The new government’s priorities will be to increase focus
on environmental matters (in the face of powerful mining and motoring
lobbies) and to manage domestic economic and social challenges. During
the election, the Labor Party was careful not to appear soft on secu-
rity, although the expectation was that in government it would be less
confrontational towards China than its predecessor.
In their first months in office, PM Albanese and Foreign Minister
Wong were careful to emphasize continuities in foreign policy (their first
event was a Quad meeting) with fence-building in the South Pacific,
Southeast Asia and the EU, apparently in that order of priority (Abbon-
danza, 2022).29 On trade policy issues, such as ratifying the Australia-UK
trade agreement, there was little change as trade minister Don Farrell
emphasized the importance of a rules-based international economic
system. The new government was cautious in setting out its position on
China or on CPTPP expansion, but the contrast between the political and
institutional responses of Australia to the applications of the UK, PRC and
Taiwan are likely be reduced after the May 2022 general election.
Table 6.5 Composition of Australian Parliament before and after the 2022
election
House of Representatives Senate

(151 seats) (76 seats)
Before After Before After
Liberal/National Coalition 75 58 35 32
Labor 67 77 26 26
Greens 1 4 9 12
Independents 7 12 6 6
Notes in a general election all House seats are contested in single-member constituencies. Senators
sit for six years with half facing re-election every three years; Senate results are determined by a form
of proportional representation in each state or territory
Source Australian Electoral Commission website at https://results.aec.gov.au/27966/Website/Hou
seDefault-27966.htm
Conclusions
Australia’s trade policy in the twenty-first century has been among the
most liberal and progressive in the world. The country’s policies are, with
a few minor exceptions, consistent with WTO world trade law. In areas
where the WTO has been slow to progress since 1995, Australia has often
been among the leaders, whether in WTO plurilateral agreements like
the ITA or in bilateral trade agreements or in broader agreements like
the CPTPP and RCEP. However, especially between 2020 and 2022,
Australia became involved in diplomatic contretemps that had negative
consequences for trade policy. A poorly managed shift in defence policy
in September 2021 derailed negotiations for a trade agreement with the
European Union and aggressive criticisms of China contributed to a trade
war in 2020–2022.
Australia’s position on CPTPP expansion will depend on whether the
astute trade diplomacy of recent decades or the clumsy political diplomacy
displayed in relations with France and with China dominates. The CPTPP
agreement implies treaty-level compliance with trade rules beyond WTO
commitments. Applications for membership should depend on the appli-
cant’s willingness and ability to observe the CPTPP rules. Even if an
applicant is a strategic rival with a distinctive economic system, the appli-
cation should be measured against compatibility with CPTPP rules, and
diplomacy should aim to dampen other considerations.
134 R. POMFRET
In reaching a decision on applications to join the CPTPP, Australia

would be best advised to work with like-minded CPTPP members than
staking out an individual position without reflection or discussion. With
respect to China’s position, Australia’s concerns should not differ much
from those of other CPTPP members such as Canada, Japan and New
Zealand who may worry about China’s strategic intentions and disagree
with its internal policies. The result of the May 2022 Australian elec-
tion offers the prospect of such an approach, although early signs are
of the new government being most concerned with domestic issues
such as inflation, disaster response and balancing demands of carbon-
intensive industries with climate change commitments, while maintaining
an approach of general continuity to foreign policy.
Notes
1. Australia’s import-weighted average MFN tariff fell from 6.9% in 1996 to
2.7% in 2020; https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TM.TAX.MRCH.
WM.FN.ZS?locations=AU (accessed 3 September 2022). The same
database estimates an average applied tariff of 0.7% in 2020.
2. Bilateral trade agreements were agreed with Singapore (in force 2003), the
USA (2005), Thailand (2005), Chile (2009), the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (2010), Malaysia (2013), South Korea (2014), Japan
(2015), China (2015), Hong Kong (2020), Peru (2020), and Indonesia
(2020).
3. In addition to tariff reductions on bilateral trade, Closer Economic Rela-
tions between Australia and New Zealand covered non-tariff barriers to
bilateral trade, including a timetable to eliminate all quantitative restric-
tions and to address subsidies and government procurement. Additional
protocols in 1988 and 1992 extended the CER to services and to
harmonization of business law and competition policy.
4. After the USA announced its intention not to ratify the TPP, the eleven
remaining TPP countries agreed in May 2017 to renegotiate the agree-
ment and in March 2018 they signed the CPTPP. The CPTPP is the
same as the TPP apart from a list of twenty-two “suspended provisions”,
primarily from chapters on investment, public procurement, and intel-
lectual property rights, that were of primary interest to the USA. After
ratification by Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Singa-
pore, the CPTPP entered into force for those countries on 30 December
2018. Vietnam ratified the CPTPP in 2019 and Peru in 2021. Brunei,
Chile, and Malaysia have yet to ratify.
5. A distinction is often made between extending WTO commitments

(WTO+ ), e.g. by strengthening rules about application of anti-dumping
duties or about the scientific basis for sanitary and phytosanitary measures
that restrict trade, and commitments in areas not covered by the WTO
(WTO-X), such as e-commerce and digitalization.
6. An overarching factor has been the internet, whose implications for inter-
national trade were unobservable when the WTO was established in 1995
but had become significant by the end of the century (Freund and Wein-
hold, 2004). Chapters on e-commerce or digitalization are a prominent
feature of modern trade agreements.
7. ITA participants commit to eliminating tariffs on the IT products covered
by the Agreement. In December 2015, over 50 members, including
Australia, agreed on expansion of the ITA to cover an additional 201 prod-
ucts. Australia was also a willing adopter of other optional or new WTO
commitments, e.g. Australia ratified the 2017 Trade Facilitation Agree-
ment with 100% implementation of commitments and in 2019 Australia
joined the Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement.
8. The agreement called the United States–Mexico–Canada Agree-
ment (USMCA) in the USA is in Canada officially known as the Canada–
United States–Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) in English and the Accord
Canada–États-Unis–Mexique (ACEUM) in French, and in Mexico
as Tratado entre México, Estados Unidos y Canadá (T-MEC).
9. In addition to 30 chapters, CETA has three protocols (on rules of origin,
on mutual acceptance of the results of conformity assessment, and on
good manufacturing practices for pharmaceutical products), as well as
annexes, which address topics like rules of origin and textiles and clothing.
CETA chapters 11 (mutual recognition of professional qualifications) and
14 (international maritime transport services) could be included within
the existing CPTPP chapter structure.
10. Consistency is not surprising; seven CPTPP signatories are also in RCEP,
and CPTPP signatories Canada, Japan, and Mexico have deep agreements
with the EU or USA. This aids drafting, as some clauses reappear verbatim
in different agreements, but the need to write a legal text covering areas
beyond WTO commitments explains the long negotiating process behind
these agreements.
11. Negotiations leading to the RCEP included lengthy detailed bargaining
on preferential tariff rates and rules of origin, especially with India, which
ultimately withdrew from the negotiations. The text of RCEP, including
the trade in goods chapters, is concise. However, the annexes specifying
preferential tariffs and defining rules of origin run to thousands of pages.
12. The main criticisms concerned Australia’s frequent use of anti-dumping
investigations (344 initiated between 1995 and 2018, and 156 anti-
dumping measures imposed), use of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
136 R. POMFRET
restrictions, and country-specific concerns about Australia’s luxury car tax,

wine equalisation tax and cigarette packaging rules. Although mostly valid,
the product-specific criticisms do not represent huge overall trade barriers.
13. The RCEP position was facilitated by existence of a 2010 agreement
between Australia, New Zealand, and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations. The benefits from deep agreements are harder to predict than
benefits from eliminating tariffs, but they could be substantial. Petri and
Plummer (2018) estimated annual future gains to Australia of USD17
billion from CPTPP and RCEP and emphasized the benefits from joining
global value chains.
14. Trade policy was bipartisan for thirty years after 1983; although elections
included colourful rhetoric, trade policy was scarcely an issue. Carbon
pricing was a major issue in the 2013 election, and repeal of the carbon
tax after the Liberal victory hampered future trade policy as other coun-
tries responded to climate change concerns (notably the EU’s move to
adopt a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism announced in July 2021).
Explicit politicization of trade policy or subjugation of trade policy to
other concerns became clearer after the 2019 election.
15. In April 2022, the Republic of Korea announced its intention to apply.
Costa Rica applied in August 2022.
16. At https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/aukfta
(accessed 24 May 2022). Despite differences in background between the
evangelical Morrison and the libertine Johnson, they shared a common
penchant for the big announcement and lack of concern over details that
was evident in both Johnson’s attitude towards the UK’s withdrawal from
the EU and Morrison’s attitude towards the UK application to join the
CPTPP.
17. The fluctuating global background is illustrated in Australia’s engagement
in meetings of the Quad (India, Japan, the United States and Australia)
that began in 2007, under George W Bush and John Howard. Kevin
Rudd, Australian prime minister after the 2007 election, pulled back
because of concerns about America’s approach to China. In 2017, Prime
Minister Turnbull revived the arrangement as concerns mounted about
China’s military expansion in the South China Sea. In a March 2021
statement, the four leaders spoke of “The Spirit of the Quad” as a “rules-
based maritime order in the East and South China seas” that supported a
“Free and Open Indo-Pacific”. In the week following the 2022 election,
new prime minister Anthony Albanese and foreign minister Penny Wong
made a point of attending the Quad meeting.
18. A less positive augury was Morrison’s role as the Turnbull government
minister (Treasurer and Acting Minister for Home Affairs) signing off in
2018 on banning Huawei from participation in Australia’s 5G rollout.
19. Jonathan Kearsley, Eryk Bagshaw and Anthony Galloway, ‘If you make
China the enemy, China will be the enemy’: Beijing’s fresh threat to
Australia, Sydney Morning Herald, November 18, 2020.
20. The ACIO was renamed the Australian Office in Taipei in 2012 and
operated more clearly as the de facto embassy.
21. The Accession Process starts when aspirant economies notify New
Zealand, as CPTPP depositary, of their formal request to commence
negotiations on acceding to the CPTPP. Following notification, if the
CPTPP Commission decides to commence the accession process, it will
establish an Accession Working Group comprised of government repre-
sentatives from each party. The aspirant economy will negotiate with
the Accession Working Group its market access offers and demonstrate
how it will meet the benchmarks. After finalising negotiations, the Acces-
sion Working Group will submit a written report to the Commission on
terms and conditions for the aspirant economy’s accession to the CPTPP.
CPTPP Commission, Annex to CPTPP/COM/2019/D002: Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) Acces-
sion Process, available at https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-
22. Natalie Black, UK Trade Commissioner for the Asia–Pacific Region,
quoted by Hoang (2021).
23. Breen (2022) argues that the CPTPP accession process is incompatible
with the UK government’s claim to have left the EU in order to imple-
ment an independent trade policy because an applicant must accept “the
rules and standards already agreed to by existing members”. This is true
(just as for applicants to join the WTO and other international insti-
tutions) but having agreed rules for the conduct of international trade
is mutually beneficial. Breen’s argument, which emphasizes the “limited
economic benefits”, misses the point that the CPTPP is about establishing
rules for trade that go beyond the WTO rather than old-fashioned trading
of preferential market access.
24. Taiwan’s WTO accession was accompanied by demonstrations against
reduced restrictions on rice imports, and memories of those events remain
strong. Debate within Taiwan has highlighted the benefits of preferential
access to CPTPP members’ markets but considering those countries’ low
MFN tariffs this is unlikely to be a major factor. A more important benefit
is establishment of rules in areas such as digitalization that are crucial for
efficient international supply chains.
25. Previous parliamentary committee inquiries into Australia’s free trade
agreements by the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties included an
inquiry examining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (tabled November 2016),
a separate inquiry examining the newer Comprehensive and Progres-
sive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (tabled August 2018), an
138 R. POMFRET
inquiry into access to free trade agreements by small and medium enter-
prises (tabled February 2019), and an inquiry on the Regional and
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (tabled August 2021).
26. The primary focus of the inquiry was the applications of UK, PRC, and
the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu.
Other areas of interest included major prospective applicants such as, but
not limited to, the USA, the Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, and
the Philippines. Ecuador’s application to join the CPTPP was filed after
the inquiry’s call for submissions and public hearings, and the Committee
received no evidence on Ecuador’s application.
27. DFAT highlighted the following improved market access: reductions in
Japan’s tariffs on beef and elimination of beef tariffs in Canada within five
years and Mexico within ten years, preferential access for some dairy prod-
ucts into Japan (cheese), Canada (milk protein) and Mexico (yoghurt),
new sugar access into Japan, Canada and Mexico markets, tariff reductions
and new access for cereals and grains exporters into Japan, elimination of
all tariffs on sheepmeat, cotton and wool by all parties, elimination of
Canada’s 2.5% tariff on salt, elimination of tariffs on seafood, horticulture
and wine, and elimination of all tariffs on certain manufactured goods
by all parties (Submission 49, page 5). DFAT also highlighted CPTPP
benefits for Australian investors in areas such as mining and resources,
telecommunications, and financial services.
28. A striking feature was the success of teal (blue-green) independents, who
identified with the principles of Liberals and Greens and criticized the
misogyny and lack of integrity of the Morrison government. Teal candi-
dates won seven previously safe Liberal seats; the seven winners were all
women, and all but one of the losers were men.
29. The EU has shown renewed urgency in concluding a trade agreement
with Australia, recognizing Australia’s desire for trade diversification
(reducing dependence on the PRC as a trade partner), new climate poli-
cies, and support for Ukraine. Tory Shepherd: “Australia-EU Free Trade
Agreement back on Track with Albanese Government”, The Guardian at
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/aug/05/australia-
eu-free-trade-agreement-back-on-track-with-albanese-government-ambass
ador-says.
References
Abbondanza, Gabriele (2022): Le Sei Sfide della Politiica Estera Australiana,
Affari Internazionali, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, posted on August
1 at - https://www.affarinternazionali.it/australia-politica-estera/.
Breen, John Harley (2022): Prospects for the United Kingdom’s CPTPP
Accession, East Asia Forum, February 1.
Freund, Caroline, and Diana Weinhold (2004): On the Effect of the Internet on
International Trade, Journal of International Economics 62(1), 171–89.
Hoang, Lien (2021): UK ‘On Track’ to Join CPTPP by 2022, Trade Official
Says, Nikkei, November 16 – at https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Int
erview/U.K.-on-track-to-join-CPTPP-by-2022-trade-official-says.
Joint Standing Committee (2022): Expanding the Membership of the Comprehen-
sive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, Joint Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade of the Parliament of the Commonwealth
of Australia, Canberra.
Lai, Bernie (2021): Taiwan’s bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), on the Australian Parlia-
ment House website at - https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parlia
mentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2021/December/
Taiwan_CPTPP_bid (posted 20 December).
Laurenceson, James (2022a): From Handshakes to Threats: Can the Elec-
tion Bring a Fresh Start in Our Fractured Relationship with China? The
Conversation, April 14, 2022a.
Laurenceson, James (2022b): With a new Australian Government and Foreign
Minister comes Fresh Hope for Australia-China Relations, The Conversation,
May 22, 2022b.
Petri, Peter, and Michael Plummer (2018). Australia Will Gain from Continued
Asia-Pacific Trade Integration. Modelling Report, Australian Chamber of
Commerce. Available at: https://minerals.org.au/sites/default/files/180
905%20Australia%20will%20gain%20from%20continued%20Asia-Pacific%20t
rade%20integration.pdf.
Pomfret, Richard (2015): Reorientation of Trade, Investment, and Migration,
in Simon Ville and Glenn Withers (eds.) The Cambridge Economic History of
Australia (Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne), 397–418.
Pomfret, Richard (2019): Australian Trade Policy in the Twenty-First Century,
Australian Economic Review 52(4), 462–7.
Pomfret, Richard (2021a): Regionalism’ and the Global Trade System, The World
Economy 44(9), 2496–514.
Pomfret, Richard (2021b): Trade Policy Review of Australia, The World Economy
44(12), 3507–15.
Pomfret, Richard (2021c): The Economics of European Integration (Harvard
University Press: Cambridge MA).
Stünkel, Larissa (2022): Australia All Bark and No Bite on Taiwan, East Asia
Forum, February 25.
140 R. POMFRET
Su, Qingyi, and Chengwei Zang (2020): How Will the Implementation of Zero
Tariffs affect Employment in China? China and World Economy 28(2), 123–
42.
CHAPTER 7
Gatekeeper’s Dilemma: Japan Facing CPTPP

Applications from China and Taiwan
Saori N. Katada
Introduction
For more than a decade, the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) trade agree-
ment has been a vital part of the Japanese government’s economic agenda.
This mega free trade agreement encompassing the Asia Pacific has aimed
not only at creating a large free trade area among the members, but also
at installing the most advanced trade and investment rules in the region.
The TPP can spread these rules by expanding its membership through
accession.1 After Japan joined its negotiation in 2013, and especially after
This is a revised version (as of September 2022) of the conference paper drafted
for the Nottingham Conference, “Racing to join the club: The implication of
China’s, Taiwan’s, and the UK’s applications to join the CPTPP” 17–18 June
2022. I thank Mike Liu for his excellent research assistance.
S. N. Katada (B)
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA

142 S. N. KATADA
the 2017 US exit from the agreement, the Japanese government has been
taking the leading role in shaping and protecting this trade and invest-
ment institution. Once the revived TPP came into effect in late 2018,
however, nothing has been as immense of a challenge for Japan as China’s
application in September 2021 to join the TPP. A few days after China’s
application, Taiwan also applied to join.
China’s application to the CPTPP imposes a significant dilemma to
its members, and particularly Japan, the largest member economy and
with close ties to the United States. China’s participation in this high-
standard agreement would open up more economic opportunities for
the region, but it would also introduce economic security tensions, espe-
cially since the United States is now seriously working to counter China’s
economic expansion. Meanwhile, the rules-based trade and investment
order in the region continues to be an important factor for this highly
integrated region with supply chains criss-crossing borders. How to both
integrate China’s massive economy and maintain the important features
of the institution defies the existing IR theory and a difficult policy propo-
sition. That is what Japan and the other CPTPP members are grappling
with.
Due to the contemporary nature of the event, there is still uncertainty
in ways to go until we reach the end point. Given that, this chapter exam-
ines how these two sides of Japan’s dilemma have been discussed so far as
it struggles to play the role of “gatekeeper” and strives to shape regional
economic order in the accession debate. The chapter starts first with the
brief history of how Japan became the leading actor in guarding the TPP,
and after briefly outlining how we see China’s interests in joining the
TPP, which includes complex considerations involving the Taiwan factor,
the chapter examines two aspects of Japan’s dilemma before concluding
with the importance of Japan’s role in the process.
Politics of Free Trade Agreement Enlargement

When states engage in establishing and expanding a free trade agreement,
they pursue multiple objectives that can range from simple expansion of
their market access without trade barriers and security guarantees to the
establishment and diffusion of effective rules (Solís et al. 2009). For the
smaller economies, the access to markets of larger states would dominate,
while for larger and more powerful states, security incentives and rule-
setting motivations are leading incentives (Stallings and Katada 2009).
7 GATEKEEPER’S DILEMMA: JAPAN FACING CPTPP … 143
Once a free trade agreement forms and starts to function as an inter-

national institution and/or regional integration framework, its original
members are faced with a trade-off between how to spread its scale and
influence without undermining the feature of the agreement.
Membership is an important feature of institutions. The European
Union is known to apply its acquis communautaire and other norms to
its aspiring members as its conditionality of membership (For example,
Kelley 2004). The membership and accession challenge for preferential
trade agreements, such as TPP, is also a crucial part of geoeconomics
as these agreements define not only bilateral power relations (such as
Gowa 1995; Wesley 2008), but also the structural power underpinning.
In that sense, the inclusion and exclusion related to the membership
derives from the dominant power’s (or powers’) political objectives. The
membership itself is a critical factor. According to the existing theoretical
discussions regarding international organization (IO) enlargement, acces-
sion of diverse members is not only unlikely (Mansfield and Pevehouse
2013), but also bound to lead to the long-term shifts in the organiza-
tion’s characteristics (Gray et al. 2017). Meanwhile, many scholars have
argued that international institutions and regional institutions are great
forums to socialise diverse and new members (Checkel 2005; Bearce and
Bondanella 2007), and even the rapidly rising power of China was bound
to be socialised (Johnston 2008; Sohn 2008).
Counting on the enforcing and socialising power of institutions, TPP’s
goal has been to expand membership in order to disseminate liberal trade
and investment rules. Of course, once such ambition faces the reality of
China’s accession, the vetting process starts. It is in this context that the
dilemma of the gatekeeper state––in this case, Japan––becomes serious,
as it has to strike the balance between membership expansion and the
coherence of organizational characteristics.
Japan’s Road to the CPTPP with the US

Lead and China as a “Shadow” Negotiator
The Japanese government often cites the success of regional free trade
agreements––especially the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement
for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)––as a vital part of protecting rules-
based economic order. In the process, the Japanese government has
always kept China in mind, not as an immediate member, but a “shadow
144 S. N. KATADA
negotiator” against which to shape the rules of trade and investment in

the region (Solís 2012, 330).
Japan’s long road to establishing regional trade and investment rules
in the Indo-Pacific started at about the same time as the Japanese govern-
ment began FTA promotion. Expanding ASEAN+3 framework into what
the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi called “expanded Asia” in 2005
became the core of the regional framework for Japan’s geoeconomic
strategy in trade. In the context of China–Japan rivalry, the first host
government of the East Asian Summit, Malaysia, was able to create
ASEAN centric framework involving ten member countries of ASEAN
as well as China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India
(Terada 2010, 82–83).2 Based on this “ASEAN+6” format, the Japanese
government proposed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East
Asia (CEPEA) at the EAS second Summit held in the Philippines in
January 2007. CEPEA was a proposal of a free trade area that would
include all the major members of the Indo-Pacific except for the United
States,3 whereas China advocated for the East Asia Free Trade Agreement
(EAFTA) to be implemented among ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and South
Korea).
The US Obama administration (2009–2016) focused on the TPP to
enhance its influence in Asia’s trade governance. Asia’s high-standard free
trade agreement originated from the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
Partnership (P-4), signed by Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, and
Singapore in 2006. The main promoters of the P-4 were New Zealand
and Singapore. The leaders from these small countries saw this FTA as a
way to expand liberal economic order beyond what they can achieve bilat-
erally or through already stagnant WTO rounds. Additionally, they also
hoped that such an FTA would engage the United States strategically and
economically in the Asia Pacific region (Fergusson and Vaughn 2010, 3–
4; Lynch 2015). The TPP’s advent was also helped by the international
climate of the period. Faced with the global financial crisis that started
in mid-2007, the Bush administration (2001–2008) sought to pursue a
higher degree of trade liberalization and placed this agreement at the
center of creating a framework for economic partnerships in the Asia–
Pacific region. The agreement included high-standard rules on trade and
investment that were tailored to the twenty-first century global economy.
In 2010, the US government officially started TPP negotiations, giving
a heavy impetus to this process. The Obama administration saw TPP as
a way to create a framework for regional FTAs, as it became the most
important pillar of the US pivot to Asia. After the domestic political

battle against joining the TPP in Japan led by the protectionist agricul-
tural groups and their supporters, the Abe government officially joined
the TPP negotiations in July 2013 as the twelfth and last negotiating
member.4 Following a series of complex and difficult negotiations, the 12
countries finally reached an agreement in October 2015. February 2016,
all 12 signed the agreement in Auckland, New Zealand, and they were
awaiting ratification.5
The TPP was in line with the US rule-setting strategy and became
vital in strengthening the Obama administration’s engagement with East
Asia, with the purpose of countering China. This mega-trade agreement
would help the United States rebuild its status and influence in the Asia–
Pacific region, which was weakened by the war on terror under the
Bush administration, the global financial crisis as well as by the rise of
emerging economies competing for influence in the region, such as China
and India. At the same time, the TPP also aimed at promoting struc-
tural reforms among Asian economies, where they house a high level
of barriers to liberalization (Kikuchi 2015). The main objectives of the
TPP were then to create a model of Asia–Pacific trade rules in line with
US interests and to integrate China eventually into that orbit, instead
of explicitly excluding China from the Asia–Pacific free trade order. For
example, regulations on state-owned enterprises included in the competi-
tion policy domain of TPP negotiations were designed to control China’s
economic competitiveness. In other words, President Obama was explicit
in his intention that the US should write the rules of the global economy
instead of China (Obama 2015), while it is more desirable for the US to
pressure China to accept the US rulebook.
The TPP turned to CPTPP (or TPP-11) when the new US Presi-
dent Donald J. Trump withdrew the United States from the 12-member
TPP agreement on his third day in office in January 2017. The Japanese
government swiftly managed to take the helm and led the remaining 11
countries to the CPTPP after freezing 22 items from the original TPP
agreement.6 During the same time, a trade scheme originally following
the CEPEA membership that included India, concluded its negotiation
in 2020 and came into effect in January of 2022. This mega-FTA that
included all the ASEAN members, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia
and New Zealand, is the largest grouping so far covering a third of global
GDP and a third of global trade. However, due to its diverse member-
ship with many emerging economies resistant to rapid liberalization, the
146 S. N. KATADA
negotiated degree of trade and economic liberalization and the speed

of rule adoption through RCEP have been adjusted to the participating
countries’ stage of development both in terms of the level of tariff elimi-
nation and elimination of behind-the-border barriers (Petri and Plummer
2020, 6–9). Some of the high-standard rules on labor, environment and
e-commerce are therefore not included in the RCEP.
India, which was the RCEP’s negotiating member, constituted an
important geostrategic component, but it withdrew from the RCEP
negotiation in Fall 2019. Despite the country’s keen interest in engaging
with the more economically vibrant East Asia since its “Look East Policy”
of the 1990s and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s more proactive “Act
East Policy,” India was the most recalcitrant player throughout the
RCEP negotiations (Sugawara 2018). In fact, RCEP negotiation was
quite frustrating for India, and the reasons went beyond its fear of
China’s dominating position in manufacturing. India proposed several
issues important for its economy during RCEP negotiations including
liberalization in service trade, a Special and Differential Treatment provi-
sion for India, higher rule-of-origin protection, special safeguard duties
against surging imports, and different digital localization standards as
well as movement of natural person; none of which were accepted by the
RCEP members (Gaur 2020). India’s retreat was disappointing for many,
but especially Japan, which was counting on its coalition with India to
counter the power of China. As a way to make India’s re-entry to RCEP
easier, all ministers of the RCEP members issued “Ministers’ Declaration
on India’s RCEP” and installed an article (20.9) that has made it easier
for India to rejoin the RCEP if it so chooses (Sugawara 2020).
Throughout the establishment of the CPTPP and the RCEP, both
of which are in effect as of 2022, the Japanese government played a
major role. At present, the United States is left out from these two mega-
FTAs in the Indo-Pacific. Some countries in Southeast Asia (Singapore,
Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei) and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand)
are in both CPTPP and RCEP, while RCEP has connected the Japanese
economy to two important Northeast Asian economies of China and
South Korea (Fig. 7.1). Despite different “quality” or stringency of rules
for trade and investment between the CPTPP and the RCEP, both are
vital arrangements in shaping the future of regional economic order.
Fig. 7.1 Indo-Pacific regional trade arrangements (Source Author’s compila-

tion)
China’s Interests in the TPP

In the early negotiation phase of the TPP, China was quite defensive,
as it tended to interpret this mega-FTA as a means to “contain China”
(e.g., Jin 2012). Indeed, it was deemed difficult for China to partici-
pate in this high-standard FTA at that point, since the rules included
measures such as high-level intellectual property rights and labor protec-
tion as well as the regulation against special treatment of state-owned
enterprises. Nonetheless, Chinese leadership’s attitude on the TPP visibly
shifted to a more favorable stance since 2013, especially under its new
leader Xi Jinping and after Japan’s participation in TPP negotiations in
July of that year. China’s positive view on the TPP was clear in Premier
148 S. N. KATADA
Li Keqiang’s speech at the 2014 Boa Forum where he noted that “[a]s
long as the TPP is conducive to the development of global trade and the
fostering of an equitable and open trading environment, China is happy to
see its conclusion.”7 Such counter-intuitively positive rhetoric on the part
of China towards TPP is attributed to China’s internal and external poli-
tics. Internally, casting China’s great power ambition with the favorable
portrayal of the TPP could entrap those who were opposed to domestic
economic reform. By placing the TPP as an aspirational goal for China
to become a great power, the reform-minded leaders can now constrain
any opposition against liberal reforms (Lin and Katada 2022). Externally,
the Chinese leaders were able to project their accommodation of follower
nations, especially in Southeast Asia. China’s positive message on the TPP
would allow these smaller countries to join this US-led initiative and
others, as well as Chinese-led ones such as the Belt-and-Road Initiative
or RCEP without having to choose between the two great powers in the
region. By depicting the TPP as a part of the “win–win” or non-zero-sum
initiative in relation to what China promotes, the Chinese leaders could
not only avoid the backlash from the United States against China’s own
initiatives, but also entice the follower states to continue to expand their
dependence on China (Lin and Katada 2023).
Nonetheless, no one had expected that Beijing was serious about
or ready to join the TPP anytime soon. Hence, despite the fact that
China’s President Xi Jinping already announced that China will “favor-
ably consider joining CPTPP” almost ten months prior at the time of the
2020 APEC summit, China’s official application still came as a surprise.
China clearly has mixed objectives for applying to join the CPTPP,
ranging from economic to strategic goals. On the economic front as
discussed above, China has been interested in using external levers to
reform its domestic economy. Many developing countries had utilized
external agreements to “lock-in” economic reforms resisted by domestic
vested interests (see Baccini and Urpelainen 2014). With complex winners
and losers from FTAs, large mega-FTAs have been useful for China’s
reformist leaders in their efforts to liberalize the economy and make the
country more productive and efficient. Chinese reformers such as Zhou
Xiaochuan, the former Governor of the People’ Bank of China, pushed
for China’s application to the CPTPP repeatedly since 2019, and China’s
main economic journal Caixin Media published eight editorials between
2019 and 2021 in support of using CPTPP to liberalize and reform
Chinese economy (Watanabe et al. 2021, 3).
In addition, China’s concerns on trade diversion rose during this

period not only due to the free trade agreements excluding China.
Furthermore, the intensification of the trade war between China and the
United States under the Trump administration’s push towards “decou-
pling” has forced China to scramble for ways to maintain its economic
connection to the rest of global economy. Furthermore, supply chain
disruption emerged either naturally-induced, such as in the aftermath
of the 3–11 disaster in Japan or the Covid pandemic of 2020–2021,
or man-made, such as the case of trade sanctions and export bans seen
against Iran under the nuclear agreement or Japan’s use of similar strate-
gies against South Korea’s semiconductor sector. The US government
implemented reshoring and near-shoring policies in order to reduce the
country’s production dependency on China, and recent discussion of
“alliance shoring” and “friend shoring” emphasize how the countries
should trade more with those sharing the fundamental values such as
human rights, thus possess high trust.
On the strategic side of China’s motivation, it would be important for
China to join the CPTPP while the US is absent. If the US government
is to come back to the table, the 22 frozen articles including stringent
rules on IPR and rigorous investor protection through ISDS could be
revived. Furthermore, the Biden administration could demand more strict
conditions on China including possible introduction of topics covered
by the newer United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA),
such as labor regulations and anti-currency manipulation (Su 2022).
Furthermore, there has been considerable speculation regarding China’s
geostrategic motives behind the timing of its application, which came
at the heels of the announcement of the Australia–UK–US (AUKUS)
pact. At this time, the RCEP ratification process was also getting close
to conclusion among many members, which would make it more likely
for the RCEP come into effect in early January 2022.8
Another forceful effort by the Chinese leadership in recent years is
casted as its ambition to establish “institutional discourse power” first
introduced at the 5th Plenum of the 18th Communist Party of China
Central Committee in October of 2015 (Aoyama 2018, 17). By calling
the establishment of ‘international order’ reflecting the Chinese power,
the Chinese leadership is keen to defy the ‘global order’ dominated by
the United States, which is often hostile to China’s role in shaping global
rules (Watanabe et al. 2021, 14–18).
150 S. N. KATADA
Finally, China would support initiatives that would allow smaller

regional economies to continue to hedge and increase their integra-
tion with the Chinese economy. China wants to appear reconciliatory
to its neighbors by agreeing to support efforts towards fostering global
economic order. As the international community began to alert against
China’s challenge on the Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO),
it became important for China to demonstrate its willingness to support
global economic initiatives (Chen and Zhang 2020). With the time and
economic size in its favor, the heavy dependence China projects among its
neighbors will, sooner or later, enhance China’s power in the region and
create potential, in the case of need, for China to use chokepoint effects
of weaponized interdependence (Farrell and Newman 2019).
Taiwan Factor
An additional and important factor for China’s decision to apply to join
arose from the moves taken by Taiwan in the face of TPP development.
Taiwan has aspired to join the TPP for quite some time. Its govern-
ment has been preparing for its application for the last eight years under
Tsai Ing-wen’s DPP administration by pre-emptively engaging in regu-
latory reforms so that Taiwan would meet the accession conditions for
TPP entry (Lee 2022). In addition, the Taiwanese government, despite
strong agricultural opposition against TPP, including high public sensi-
tivity to food safety issues, removed two major hurdles to TPP in the
area of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures in the last two years. One
was the referendum to backtrack regulations requiring zero residual of
ractopamine in imported pork (targeting US-imported pork products),
and the other was the lifting of an import-ban on agricultural products
produced around the contamination area of Fukushima, Japan, exposed
to nuclear fallout during the March 2011 disaster (see chapters by Goto
and deLisle in this volume).
For Taiwan, TPP is one of the most effective tools to enhance
its footing in regional economic integration, which will allow Taiwan
to diversify its heavy economic dependence away from China. In that
sense, CPTPP has constituted an important part of President Tsai’s New
Southbound Policy, initiated in 2016, as the CPTPP includes several of
Taiwan’s important economic partners such as Japan, Australia and Singa-
pore despite the US absence. The urgency of strengthening economic ties
with the region and diversifying away from China intensified in the 2020s,
as Taiwan faced reversal of the trade diversity gains made in the last five
years (Aggarwal 2021). The successful activation of the RCEP in January
of 2022, which covers all the Western Pacific nations except Taiwan put
added pressure.
CPTPP, based on the institutional norm of the APEC, has the advan-
tage for Taiwan to join as it does not follow a “states only” structure of
most international organizations, and consciously opens its membership
to “economies” (deLisle in this volume). Since CPTPP narrowly focuses
on trade and investment issues, Taiwan can hope to join the agreement
in the same way that it was able to join the APEC in 1991 and the WTO
in 2002 alongside China. This could also reverse the intense marginal-
ization that Taiwan has experienced, especially in the last two decades
China’s campaign to direct diplomatic recognition away from Taiwan.
Taiwan’s accession issue, overall, is closely and directly connected to
that of China’s, as China has ways to block Taiwan’s entry from within
or outside of CPTPP. In fact, some have reported that the very timing
of China’s application to CPTPP right before that of Taiwan was China
making its move in anticipation of Taiwan’s application and pre-emptively
working to complicate Taiwan’s accession process (see chapter by deLisle
in this volume).9
In the Gate-Keeper’s Dilemma

Having received China’s CPTPP application on September 16, 2021
along with Taiwan’s six days later, Japan has encountered a thorny task.
With the United States absent, Japan, the country that “saved” the TPP,
became one of the focal members to work with the current CPTPP
members to respond to Chinese and Taiwanese requests. At the time of
Chinese and Taiwanese application announcements, Japanese leaders were
clearly in support of Taiwan’s accession, while quite cautious about that
of China. Right after China’s announcement, then-Minister of Economy,
Trade and Industry Kajiyama Hiroshi noted that “we have to ascertain
if China is ready to meet the high standards (of CPTPP).”10 During the
LDP party presidential debate on the same day, three candidates (Kishida,
Kono and Takaichi) were skeptical about China’s ability to meet such high
standards, and only one (Noda) supported the bid.11 Even the Japanese
businesses, which tended to support Japan’s economic engagement with
China, were quite cautious. For example, Tokura Masakazu, the President
152 S. N. KATADA
of Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) noted that the high-level frame-

work of TPP should not be compromised, and Mimura Akio, Chairman
of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry also emphasized the
same point.12
Japan’s final position on China’s TPP accession is not at all clear due
to the dilemma Japan faces. There are various pros and cons of including
China into the CPTPP scheme. We can categorize Japan’s dilemma in
two major aspects. The first is where Japan is caught between geoeco-
nomic considerations of power and economic security on the one hand,
and economic gains and prosperity of the region by integrating China,
on the other. On this topic, Japan’s alliance relationship with the United
States is critically important for the Japanese government in its evalu-
ations. The second aspect is in relation to Japan’s role as a regional
provider of public goods in the form of maintaining and promoting the
rules-based economic order. Once CPTPP is becoming a vital basis for
economic connectivity, trade, and investment in the region, the method
to expand CPTPP’s rules for more members while keeping the existing
high standards intact is a vital challenge.
Japan Between the US and China:

Economic Gains Versus Economic Security
Given TPP’s long history of being negotiated with China as the shadow
negotiator, China’s accession to the CPTPP would have been an impor-
tant milestone for Japan’s trade diplomacy and regional leadership. The
economic impact of China’s entry into the CPTPP itself is significant.
According to a widely-cited estimation by Petri and Plummer (2019),
China’s membership will quadruple the global income gains from $147
billion annually to $632 billion. Despite the fact that trade between
Japan and China is covered by the RCEP as of 2022, China’s CPTPP
membership would integrate itself into the regional trade order under
the higher standards, not available in the RCEP, ranging from rules
on e-commerce, labor and environmental standard as well as rules on
the State-Owned Enterprises. Furthermore, the Japanese government will
surely accrue diplomatic gains in touchy Sino-Japanese relations to nego-
tiate and support, at least in principle, China’s entry. Such a process
will provide Japan with “a valuable platform for dialogue with China”
(Tsugami 2022). Essentially, Japan would not want to be the one (seen
as) blocking China as other nations that have already ratified CPTPP, such
as Singapore and Vietnam, are in favor of China’s membership.13
By contrast, supporting China’s CPTPP accession would intensify the
economic security challenge and put Japan in a difficult position vis-à-vis
its important ally, the United States. As discussed, the Japanese govern-
ment had taken a leading role in keeping the TPP alive since the US exit
in 2017, but Japan was also anxiously waiting for a potential US return.
The US has been left out in the cold in the Asia Pacific mega-FTAs as
it is a member of neither the CPTPP nor the RCEP. Nonetheless, it has
been difficult for the Biden Administration with its emphasis on middle-
class jobs to take up the US market opening through the CPTPP. Even
under strategic concerns when China officially applied to the CPTPP
in September 2021,14 the Biden administration has been for the next
9 months quite clear that it would not come back to the TPP.15
The US government does not welcome Chinese entry into the CPTPP,
however, especially after the conclusion of the RCEP with Chinese
membership, since that will only propagate a China-centric regional
economic order. In addition, if China manages to be a CPTPP member
before the United States, it would be much harder and more unlikely for
the US to return.16 The coronavirus pandemic, in addition to the US–
China trade war, has cast a heavy shadow on the interdependent global
economy and resilience of the extended supply chains from the start of the
2020s. The US government heightened its alarms on critical technology
and began a campaign of “reshoring:” to bring US manufacturing back
to the United States, and “friend-shoring:” where the production takes
place among the members whom they can trust and cooperate. In addi-
tion, the US has focused on strengthening supply chain resilience among
a number of Indo-Pacific member states excluding China, creating an
implicit coalition against China.
Finally, to demonstrate the US’ clear commitment to the Indo-
Pacific after dodging to join the CPTPP, the US government officially
proposed the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in May 2022,
whose negotiations started in September 2022. Currently (May 2023),
the IPEF includes 14 countries around the Indo-Pacific, including four
Quad members (Australia, India, Japan and the US), seven ASEAN
members (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thai-
land, and Vietnam), along with New Zealand, South Korea, and Fiji.
With these members, the framework covers four pillars under the banners
of connected (trade and investment facilitation), resilient (supply chain
154 S. N. KATADA
resilience and rules-based integration), clean (climate related issues), and

fair economy (tax and anti-corruption). To the dissatisfaction of many
Asian partners, missing from the scheme is US commitment to allow
further market access in the United States, which would require the
US Congressional approval.17 Although there is heavy emphasis on e-
commerce and sustainability as well as rule-setting in the IPEF, the
connection between the IPEF and CPTPP is uncertain. The IPEF does
not include Taiwan as its member, but the United States and its trade
representatives began to work with their Taiwanese counterparts in June
2022 to start the negotiation for strengthening mutual economic ties.
Taiwanese products such as semi-conductors are crucially important for
the US manufacturing sector and US national security (see Goto’s chapter
in this volume). Even with heightened tensions around the Taiwan straits
at the heels of US Congressional visits to the island, the US efforts to
include Taiwan in its regional economic scheme.
The heightened importance in increasing securitization of its national
economy has intensified for Japan, too. The Japanese concern is reflected
in the way that its government began to formulate institutions to tackle
economic security issues during this period. First, the Economic Divi-
sion within the National Security Secretariat was installed under Prime
Minister Abe’s administration in April 2020. Prime Minister Kishida
upgraded this function to the Economic Security Council with its proper
Minister for the first time in Japanese history in November 2021 after
his electoral victory, and the Council was upgraded to the Economic
Security Office in March 2022. Other ministries also set up divisions
focused on economic security issues in 2021.18 In addition, both the
majority Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the LDP-led cabinet office
put forward their respective strategic visions on Japan’s new economic
security strategies.19 Finally, the Economic Security Promotion Act was
passed by both the lower and house of the Japanese parliament to protect
four areas of economic security, encompassing supply chain resilience,
protection of critical infrastructure, public–private sector cooperation in
technology development, and patent safety. Since a predominant part of
Japan’s economic security concerns are targeted towards China, Japan’s
current challenge is in balancing the prospect of enlarged economic inte-
gration through China’s possible access to CPTPP versus the efforts
towards securitizing certain aspects of such integration.
Maintaining the CPTPP Standards:

Accession and Enforcement of Rules
Despite possible benefits of China’s membership to the CPTPP through
integration and socialization, there are concerns on the accountability and
credibility of the Chinese government in respecting CPTPP rules after
its accession into the agreement. Meanwhile, the analysis for an indica-
tion of China’s future behavior comes from its past track-record, which
is provided by the World Trade Organization (WTO). After evaluating
the last 20 years of China’s performance since its accession into the WTO
in late 2001, the US Trade Representative’s office published a Report
to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance and determined that China’s
compliance record has been poor.20 The Japanese assessment was not as
blunt, and has been quite mixed.21
With the WTO not functioning effectively especially since the late
2010s with its appalled body in paralysis (Petersmann 2019, for example),
the CPTPP is an important entity to maintaining rules-based trade and
investment order in the Indo-Pacific region. How it can sustain its sound-
ness depends on both the accession conditions and the enforcement of the
CPTPP rules on the members. CPTPP requires support from all member
states to admit new members (unanimity accession rule), and this theoret-
ically creates a high hurdle for any economies that apply to join to strictly
follow CPTPP requirements (Schneider and Urpelainen 2012). Although
this should benefit incumbent member states––especially a key actor like
Japan––the asymmetrical power of China introduces multiple challenges.
Evaluation of eligibility at the time of accession is one important
way of making sure China will become a rule-abiding member of the
CPTPP. The trade agreement came into effect in late 2018 with the
seven members (Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Singa-
pore, and Vietnam; while the eighth member Peru ratified in September
2021) ratifying. Then the first CPTPP Commission adopted an “acces-
sion process” to the CPTPP, which includes the principle “benchmark.“
That is that all aspirant economies must (a) demonstrate the means by
which they will comply with all of the existing rules contained in the
CPTPP; and (b) undertake to deliver the highest standard of market
access offers on goods, services, investment, financial services, govern-
ment procurement, state owned enterprises and temporary entry for
business persons.22
156 S. N. KATADA
The United Kingdom became the first economy to formally apply to

join the CPTPP on February 1, 2021, and an approval was granted by
the CPTPP Commission to commence the accession process in June of
that year. The Japanese government along with other members upheld
high-standards to evaluate the UK case and plan to hold this case as the
model for the future applications. As such, in the process of UK approval,
the CPTPP members demonstrated strong commitment to adhering to
the benchmark. The declaration notes:
[The members] emphasized the need to maintain and advance the high-
standard rules of the CPTPP, and they pointed to the United Kingdom’s
experience with high-standard trade and investment rules; its clear commit-
ment to promote transparency, predictability, and confidence in the
rules-based trading system; and its affirmation of its intention and ability
to meet the high standards of the CPTPP.23
Following such guidelines, Japanese politicians (above) and scholars

reiterated the importance that Japan maintains the CPTPP’s high-level
rules (Kawase 2021).24 Furthermore and moving forward, Japan and
the CPTPP members have to make sure that the CPTPP rules are
implemented properly and the actions of the members are monitored
adequately. CPTPP’s Inter-State Dispute Settlement mechanism needs to
be strengthened.
The other component would be to make sure that the CPTPP main-
tains, into the future, strong enforcement of the rules against violation.
There is no question that enforcement of CPTPP rules, under possible
accession by a large economy with a questionable track-record such as
that of China’s, put the onerous tasks of monitoring and enforcement
on the member states’ shoulders without having the US on board. To
supplement such political weight, Japan (and Australia25 ) have also advo-
cated engaging the European Union (EU) in this matter. This is another
method to secure the high-level rules in the CPTPP and maintain the
implementation of such rules in the case of China’s access request. For
such efforts, the op-ed written by Cecilia Malström, the former Euro-
pean Commissioner for Trade (2014–2019), for the Peterson Institute for
International Economics advocating the EU to join the CPTPP resonated
eagerly in Japan.26 Following the UK accession request submitted in
2021, the EU could put heft on the CPTPP and counter China’s room of
potential abuse in the system (Tamura 2022). Given that Japan is already
an EPA partner to the EU (effective February 1, 2019) and the UK

(effective December 31, 2020), the Japanese government could play an
active role in engaging with both European players.
Conclusion: Balancing the Pros

and Cons: Gate-Keeper’s Dilemma
For the last few decades, the Japanese government has put significant
efforts into shaping the regional economic order under liberal and high-
standard rules in multiple issue areas (Katada 2020). The US–China trade
rivalries during this period have provided Japan with an opportunity to
pursue its economic statecraft by adopting a new and proactive geoeco-
nomic strategy in the region. The conclusion of the CPTPP has been
the pinnacle of such strategic efforts and Japan has become a de facto
gate-keeper to protect liberal economic order in the region. In a way,
with requests from the UK, China, Taiwan and beyond, the CPTPP is
reaching one of its main objectives: expanding membership to cover as
many countries abiding by the high-standard rules of trade and invest-
ment in the region as possible in order to facilitate a cooperative regional
trade structure. Meanwhile, possible accession of new members, especially
China, has introduced a difficult challenge not only to the CPTPP as an
institution but also to the major member like Japan as the gate-keeper of
the arrangement.
The Japanese government faces multiple dilemmas (Table 7.1). under
this challenge. Geooeconomics and the nexus of politics and economics
is the underlying dilemma. For Japan, China’s accession to the CPTPP
is associated with the rising economic security concerns, and it relates
to how to keep the United States engaged in the region as Japan tries
to avoid isolating China at the same time. Because China is an impor-
tant economic power in the region and will continue to be an essential
source of economic growth and regional prosperity, decoupling from
China is not an option for Japan or for many of the regional economies.
The trends towards economic security have further complicated accession
issues particularly when the Chinese government’s recent drive of national
technology developments and its track-record of economic securitization
raises increased concerns for the country’s commitment to the “free and
open” rules. Furthermore, the other important factor lies in maintaining
the high standard rules, as the grouping aims to expand further to where
it would inevitably include countries that are not-so-like-minded such as
158
Table 7.1 Gate-keeper’s dilemma for Japan: pros and cons

S. N. KATADA
Pros Cons
Pros and Power and – Expanding market access and deepening regional economic integration with more members – The US
Cons of prosperity: – Increase the prospect of simultaneous accession of China and Taiwan concern over
Permitting Economic Japan
China’s Security and accommodating
accession engaging with China
the US – Taiwan’s
accession could
be delayed or
even rejected
by China
Region’s – Liberalize and reform of the Chinese market – China can
rules-based order: – Implement CPTPP standards on China, and protect Japanese businesses possibly revise
Maintaining the or dilute high
CPTPP rules and standard rules
standards – Difficulty of
enforcement
Source Author’s compilation

China. Despite the IPEF initiative, the US presence and commitment in

Asia look increasingly precarious and fickle. That is where it makes Japan’s
role vitally important for the future of orderly trade and investment in
the region. The Japanese government’s handling of China’s accession will
provide a clear indication not only of its capability but also for its future
direction.
Notes
1. That is why the TPP is called a “living agreement” (see for example, Elms
2013).
2. The ASEAN sat “in the driver’s seat” for the EAS process as governments
that wish to join the Summit had to have close relations with ASEAN
including the membership to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.
3. At that point, the United States was hoping that the 21-member APEC
would continue to be the framework for the region-wide free trade area
under the name of Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP).
4. Until then, the TPP was negotiated by 11 countries, including the
United States, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Canada, and Mexico,
in addition to the four original P-4 members.
5. According to Chapter 30 of the TPP agreement, it requires at least six
countries whose combined GDP surpasses 85% of total TPP member GDP
to ratify for the agreement to come into effect. It would have taken both
the United States and Japan to ratify to reach this 85 percent threshold,
as the GDP of the others combined would not reach 85%.
6. Negotiations began swiftly, and an agreement was reached within one
year. Signed at Santiago, Chile, in March 2018, and then entered into
force in December of the same year, less than two years after the U.S.
withdrawal. CPTPP required six countries to ratify to come into effect.
After that, remaining members can complete the ratification process and
its agreement will come into effect within 60 days.
7. People’s Daily. 2014. “Full Text of Li Keqiang’s Speech at Opening Cere-
mony of Boao Forum.” People’s Daily, April 14, 2014 (http://en.people.
cn/business/8594954.html).
8. Asahi Shimbun, September 15, 2021. After the ratification of Australia and
New Zealand on November 1, 2021, the RCEP has reached the required
number of country ratification.
160 S. N. KATADA
9. Also the quotes from the Taiwanese minister Deng Chen-chun on June
7, 2022 (https://tw.stock.yahoo.com/news/%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%
E4%BD%95%E6%99%82%E8%83%BD%E5%8A%A0%E5%85%A5cptpp-%
E9%84%A7%E6%8C%AF%E4%B8%AD-%E5%8F%AF%E8%83%BD%E9%
82%84%E8%A6%81%E7%AD%89-%E4%B8%8B-013549366.html) I thank
Yang Mingmin for providing me this quote.
10. Nihon Keizai shimbun September 18, 2021.
11. Nihon Keizai shimbun, September 18, 2021.
12. News Switch, October 19, 2021.
13. On Vietnam’s view on China’s entry see Tu Anh, “Vietnam willing to
share information with China in its drive to join CPTPP,” Hanoi Times,
September 23, 2021 (http://hanoitimes.vn/vietnam-willing-to-share-inf
ormation-with-china-in-its-drive-to-join-cptpp-318799.html). On Singa-
pore, “Singapore MTI welcomes any eligible economy to join CPTPP
trade pact.” Strait Times, September 23 (https://www.straitstimes.com/
asia/east-asia/singapore-mti-welcomes-interest-of-any-economy-to-join-
cptpp-trade-pact).
14. For example, Jeffrey Schott “China’s CPTPP bid puts Biden on the
spot,” September 21, 2021 (https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-inv
estment-policy-watch/chinas-cptpp-bid-puts-biden-spot).
15. One evidence of the US unwavering stance came when the Singaporean
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong responded at the Press Conference
(with New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern) on April 19, 2022
after their visit to the United States that the US officials told them
quite clearly that “[US joining TPP] is just off the table because their
politics does not make it possible at present” (https://www.pmo.gov.sg/
Newsroom/PM-Lee-at-the-QnA-Segment-of-the-Joint-Press-Conference-
with-New-Zealand-PM-Ardern-April-2022).
16. Many US officials and former officials were telling Asian counterparts that
it would shut the case for the United States to join the TPP if China is
allowed in.
17. Inu Manak, Unpacking the IPEF: Biden’s First Big Trade Play, June 8,
2022. Council on Foreign Relations (https://www.cfr.org/article/unpack
ing-ipef-bidens-first-big-trade-play).
18. At MOFA, the Emerging Security Challenges Division (renamed the
Economic Security Policy Division later), and at METI, the Economic
Security Division, as well as the Economic Security Information Planning
Officer post at the Ministry of Defense (Igata and Glosserman 2021).
19. Cabinet Office published “the Basic Policy for Economic and Financial
Management Reform” in July 2020, and the LDP Strategic Headquarters
published “the Creating of New International Order” in September 2020.
See Solís (2021).
20. USTR, “Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance,” February

2022 (https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2022/february/ustr-releases-annual-report-chinas-wto-compli
ance).
21. For example, RIETI’s online discussion on the topic see “Chugoku to
WTO kamei 20 nen wo furikaeru” June 8, 2022 (https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=iad6loPRb_g).
22. Decision by the Commission of the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership regarding Accession Process
of the CPTPP, CPTPP/COM/2019/D002, 19 January 2019. Avail-
able at https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade-agreements/CPTPP/
Accession-Process.pdf.
23. 4th Meeting of the Commission of the Comprehensive and Progres-
sive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. CPTPP/COM/2021/
R001, Available at https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/tpp/tppinfo/2021/pdf/
20210602_cptpp_hokoku_en.pdf.
24. Also validated by interview with a trade expert in Tokyo, May 31, 2022.
25. For the view of Australia, see Peter Draper and Naoise McDonagh, “The
missing anchor: Why the EU should join the CPTPP” October 20,
2021 (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/missing-anchor-why-
eu-should-join-cptpp.
26. Cecilia Malström “The EU should use its trade power strategically”
January 4, 2022 (https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-
watch/eu-should-use-its-trade-power-strategically).
References
Aggarwal, Vinod. (2021). “Taiwan’s Trade Policies: Strategies and Constraints.”
NBR Commentary, January 6 (https://www.nbr.org/publication/taiwans-
trade-policies-strategies-and-constraints/).
Aoyama, Rumi. (2018). “China’s Foreign Policy as a Rising Power.” in Leng,
Tse-Kang, and Rumi Aoyama, eds. Decoding the Rise of China: Taiwanese and
Japanese Perspectives. Springer, 11–38.
Baccini, Leonardo, and Johannes Urpelainen. (2014). “International Institutions
and Domestic Politics: Can Preferential Trading Agreements Help Leaders
Promote Economic Reform?” The Journal of Politics 76(1), 195–214.
Bearce, D. H., and S. Bondanella. (2007). Intergovernmental Organizations,
Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence.”International Orga-
nization, 61(4), 703–733.
Checkel, J. T. (2005). “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe:
Introduction and Framework.” International Organization, 59(4), 801–826.
162 S. N. KATADA
Chen, Zhimin, and Xueying Zhang. (2020). “Chinese Conception of the World
Order in a Turbulent Trump Era.”The Pacific Review, 33(3–4), 438–468.
Elms, Deborah Kay. (2013). “The Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Negotiations:
Some Outstanding Issues for the Final Stretch.”Asian Journal of WTO and
International Health Law and Policy, 8, 379–399.
Farrell, Henry, and Abraham L. Newman. (2019). “Weaponized Interdepen-
dence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion.” Interna-
tional Security 44(1), 42–79.
Fergusson, I. F., and B. Vaughn. (2010). “The Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement.” Congressional Research Service, R40502.
Gaur, Pankhuri. (2020). “India’s Withdrawal from RCEP: Neutralising National
Trade Concerns.”Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 74(2), 1–19.
Gowa, Joanne. (1995). Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade. Princeton;
Princeton University Press.
Gray, J., R. Lindstädt, and J. B. Slapin. (2017). “The dynamics of enlargement
in international organizations.” International Interactions, 43(4), 619–642.
Igata, Akira, and B. Glosserman. (2021). “Japan’s New Economic Statecraft.”
The Washington Quarterly, 44(3), 25–42.
Jin, J. (2012). RCEP vs TPP. Retrieved from Fujitsu Souken Opinion
website: https://www.fujitsu.com/jp/group/fri/column/opinion/201211/
2012-11-5.html.
Johnston, Alastair I. (2008). Social States: China in International Institutions,
1980–2000. Princeton University Press.
Katada, Saori N. (2020). Japan’s New Regional Reality: Geoeconomic Strategy in
the Asia-Pacific. New York: Columbia University Press.
Kawase, Takeshi. (2021). “Chugoku Taiwan no CPTPP kanyu shinsei to Nihon
no taiou: Koushijun na ruru wo ijishi FTAAP keisei ni mukau senryaku
[Entry Application of China and Taiwan to the CPTPP and Japan’s Response:
Strategy to Maintain the High Standard Rules and build the Road to Form
FTAPP]. Gaiko, Vol. 70, Nov. Dec. 2021.
Kelley, Judith. (2004). “International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Member-
ship Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions.” Interna-
tional Organization, 58(3), 425–457.
Kikuchi, T. (2015). Ajia Taiheiyo no Tsusho Chitsujo to TPP [Trade Order in
the Asia Pacific and the TPP]. America-Pacific Research, 15 (Special Issue on
Economic Order of the Asia Pacific and the United States: Will a New Order
Emerge?), 79–95.
Lee, Roy. (2022). “CPTPP Membership for Taiwan: Rationales, Challenges, and
Outlook.” Taiwan Insight. June 30, 2022 (https://taiwaninsight.org/2022/
06/30/cptpp-membership-for-taiwan-rationales-challenges-and-outlook/).
Lin, Alex Y., and S. Katada. (2022). “Striving for Greatness: Status Aspirations,
Rhetorical Entrapment, and Domestic Reforms.” Review of International
Political Economy, 29(1), 175–201.
Lin, Alex Y., and S. N. Katada. (2023). “Manufacturing Consensus: China’s
Information Warfare and Geoeconomic Competition.” Mimeo.
Lynch, B. (2015). New Zealand and Asia-Pacific Integration: Sailing the Waka
in Ever-Widening Circles. Center for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Victoria
University of Wellington. Discussion Paper, No. 17/15.
Mansfield, E. D., and J. C. Pevehouse. (2013). “The Expansion of Preferential
Trading Arrangements.” International Studies Quarterly, 57(3), 592–604.
Obama, Barack. (2015). Statement by the President on the Trans-Pacific
Partnership at the US Congress, October 5 (Available: https://obamaw
hitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/statement-president-
trans-pacific-partnership).
Petersmann, E. (2019). “How Should WTO Members React to their WTO
Crises?” World Trade Review, 18(3), 503–525.
Petri, P. A., and M. Plummer. (2019). “China Should Join the New Trans-
Pacific Partnership.” Petersons Institute for International Economics, Policy
Brief. No. P 19–1.
Petri, P. A., and M. Plummer. (2020). “East Asia Decouples from the United
States: Trade War, COVID-19, and East Asia’s New Trade Blocs.” Petersons
Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief. No. W 20–09.
Schneider, C. J., and J. Urpelainen. (2012). “Accession Rules for International
Institutions: A Legitimacy-Efficacy Trade-off?.” Journal of Conflict Resolution,
56(2), 290–312.
Sohn, I. (2008). “Learning to Co-Operate: China’s Multilateral Approach to
Asian Financial Co-Operation.” The China Quarterly, 194, 309-326.
Solís, Mireya. (2021). “Japan’s Balancing Act: Interdependence and Economic
Security.” Paper presented at “Japan, the United States, and the Future of
World Order,” Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, SAIS, March 24, 2021b.
Solís, Mireya, Barbara Stallings, and S. Katada (eds.) (2009). Competitive
Regionalism: FTA Diffusion in the Pacific Rim. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Stallings, Barbara, and S. Katada. (2009). “Conclusion: Free Trade Agreements
in a Competitive World.” In Solís, Stallings, and Katada (eds.) Competitive
Regionalism: FTA Diffusion in the Pacific Rim. London: Palgrave Macmillan,
236–251.
Su, Qingyi. (2022). “Should China Join the CPTPP?” Bin Zhang (ed.) China’s
Role in Global Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore, 2–54.
Sugawara, J. (2018). RCEP Kosho nen-nai daketsu ho kanouka [Would it be
possible to conclude the RCEP negotiations this year?]. Tokyo, Japan: Mizuho
Insight.
164 S. N. KATADA
Sugawara, Jun’ichi. (2020). “Seicho ga kadai no RCEP: TPP Miman, WTO

ijo no mega EPA [Expansion is the future task of RCEP: EPA that is less
than TPP and more than WTO.]” Mizuho Insight. Mizuho Sogo Kenkyujo.
November 30.
Tamura, Jo. (2022). “Can the EU Save the CPTPP? T e CPTPP Needs More
Market Share. The EU Needs to Expand Its Trade Leadership in the Asia-
Pacific.” The Diplomat, June 8, 2022 (https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/
can-the-eu-save-the-cptpp/).
Terada, T. (2010). “The Origins of ASEAN+6 and Japan’s Initiatives: China’s
Rise and the Agent–Structure Analysis.” The Pacific Review, 23(1), 71–92.
Tsugami, Toshiya. (2022). “Simultaneous Application for CPTPP Membership
by China and Taiwan: A Valuable Platform for Dialogue with China?” AJISS-
Commentary, JIIA (http://www.jiia.or.jp/commentary).
Watanabe, M., F. Kawashima, T. Kamo, and T. Kawase. (2021). “Chugoku no
CPTPP Sanka Ishihyoumei no Haikei ni Kansuru Kosatsu [China and CPTPP]
(revised version).” Research Institute of Economic, Trade and Industry
(RIETI), Policy Discussion Paper, September 2021 21-P-016.
Wesley, Michael. (2008). “The Strategic Effects of Preferential Trade Agree-
ments.” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 62(2), 214–228.
CHAPTER 8
Divergent Interests for Taiwan’s CPTPP Bid

from Washington and Tokyo
Shihoko Goto
When Taiwan announced its interest to join the Comprehensive and

Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement in late September 2021,
few were taken by surprise. After all, Taipei had made clear its interest in
joining the preceding Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement especially after
the United States declared its interest in joining the pact in November
2009.1 The fact that Japan became the 12th and final member country
of the TPP in 2013 only increased the allure of the pact for Taiwan’s
leadership on both sides of the political aisle. U.S. withdrawal from the
TPP in 2017 did not diminish Taipei’s interest in joining, and Beijing’s
announcement that it too would seek entry into the subsequent CPTPP
has only heightened the urgency for Taiwan to follow suit. Granted,
domestic opposition to the treaty from Taiwan’s agricultural sector in
particular over market access has been, and remains, a challenge. Never-
theless, Taiwanese leaders are highly attuned to the fact that being part
S. Goto (B)
Asia Program at the Wilson Center, Washington, DC, USA

166 S. GOTO
of the CPTPP is vital not just from an economic perspective, but more
importantly, can safeguard Taipei’s standing on the international stage.
Taiwan’s bid to join the pact also comes at a time when global atten-
tion on cross-Strait relations has reached new heights. No longer are
tensions between Taipei and Beijing simply an issue of interest to them-
selves and their surrounding neighbours. There is far greater awareness
of the precariousness of Taiwan’s future, and the risks to the global
economy that would ensue by marginalizing Taiwan from the interna-
tional community. The question for Taiwan, though, is whether joining
CPTPP must be a core part of resolving some of the significant challenges
facing its future. For Washington and Tokyo, meanwhile, the question is
whether moving forward with trade deals with Taipei is an essential part of
ensuring Taiwan’s economic future, or whether it ultimately puts Taiwan
and their own respective interests at greater risk of Chinese backlash.
Like all trade agreements, the economic value of the TPP and
the ensuing CPTPP have been called into question by a number of
constituents, especially from those in industries that would be hard hit by
open markets, principally agriculture but in Taiwan’s case the food, auto-
motive and possibly pharmaceutical sectors too.2 Amid a trend towards
deglobalization and rallying cries for reshoring, it is hardly surprising that
Taiwan too has its fair share of trade deal naysayers. Yet no other govern-
ment stands to benefit more politically through CPTPP accession than
the Republic of China (RoC).
Washington had walked out of TPP in 2017, and has shown no signs
of wanting to return. One of the biggest factors driving the country away
from the regional trade pact has been the lackluster economic allure of
such a deal. Indeed, according to Peter Petri and Michael Plummer in
a 2016 Petersen Institute study, the TPP would have boosted real U.S.
income only by 0.5%.3 That is not an insignificant contribution, but it
is hardly a figure that could rally significant public support, especially
when public opinion was far more sympathetic to stories about jobs lost
to cheaper competition overseas as a result of trade deals. Yet while its
economic value may be questioned, the political opportunities and diplo-
matic gains to be made by joining the world’s most ambitious mega-trade
deal to date are clear.
That has been especially the case for Japan. Even as it remains the
world’s third-largest economy, Tokyo has clearly been concerned not only
about losing ground economically, but also about a diminishing presence
politically as a result. Then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made the case for
8 DIVERGENT INTERESTS FOR TAIWAN’S CPTPP BID … 167
Japan to become the 12th and final member of the TPP in March 2013 by
arguing that without joining the pact, the country not only risked losing
its standing as an economic powerhouse, but could even be marginal-
ized from the global economic rule-making process. In announcing his
administration’s decision to apply for membership in March 2013, Abe
stated that “if Japan alone should become inward-looking, we would have
no chance of growth. Companies would not invest in Japan then. Talent
would not be attracted either. The TPP is a framework which promises
‘prosperity in the future’ in the Asia–Pacific.”4 While domestic opposi-
tion from the agricultural sector was hardly negligible, the urgency of
Japan needing to secure its economic footing in the region in the face
of ever-mounting Chinese pressure ultimately overcame opposing forces
from within and led to the adoption of TPP membership.
A Trade Deal as a Means as Well as an End

If Japan as the world’s third-largest economy found an urgency to join
a multilateral trade deal as a means not only to boost its exports but
more importantly to secure its economic footing on the international
stage, then it is hardly surprising that Taiwan too has found a similar
need to join. In fact, Taiwan’s need to join to give greater clarity to its
position in the international community is particularly acute, given the
risk that ever-growing pressure from China will lead to it being marginal-
ized from the world order still further. Of all the governments that are
or are applying to be part of the CPTPP, Taiwan stands to benefit the
most by joining from a political perspective, in addition to the economic
gains to be made. However, precisely because CPTPP has drawn so much
attention as a political instrument in defining the regional order and the
accession process is likely to be drawn out given the number of stake-
holders in the mix, it would be prudent for Taipei to concentrate on
seeking trade deals that can be reached quickly and secure its economic
foothold in the future.
The focus to date has been on CPTPP. Given the high stakes of joining
the deal, there has been no shortage of analysis by experts both within and
outside of Taiwan advocating what the government should do to ensure
accession to the CPTPP.5 With some estimating that the Taiwanese GDP
would grow by 2 percentage points after joining the trade deal, the case
for entry to the pact has had the support of most economists.6 But from
168 S. GOTO
a foreign policy perspective, the risks that accession could pose to the
regional order are significant.
Granted, as the threat of China destabilizing global stability continues
to rise amid mixed messaging from Washington regarding its One China
policy, there is greater global support too for Taipei’s desire to join the
group as one means to give greater clarity to its position in the interna-
tional space. At the same time, disruptions caused by the global pandemic
since 2020 have made clear to the world what has been all too apparent
in East Asia for several years now: that Taiwan’s semiconductor industry
is at the heart of the global technology sector, and that without the input
of Taiwanese chips, the world’s advanced critical industries would falter.
Ensuring Taiwan’s stability and prosperity, in short, has taken on a
greater sense of urgency that has led both Washington and Tokyo closer
together in their commitment to protect Taiwan. The question, though, is
whether CPTPP fits into the broader strategy of ensuring Taiwan’s future
growth, both on the economic front as well as to ensure its future secu-
rity more broadly. With the United States absent from the CPTPP and
moving on to establish a new trade regime vision itself in the Indo-Pacific
Economic Framework (IPEF), there are questions about whether or not
the pact can deliver on some of Taipei’s most pressing concerns about its
future in the longer term.
Bending to U.S. and Japanese

Pressure for Liberalization
Even after the United States abandoned the TPP, the push from Wash-
ington for Taipei to further open its economy by adopting TPP standards
had persisted. Allowing U.S. agricultural goods access to the Taiwanese
market in particular had been a constant demand from Washington that
went across party lines and was seen as key to ensure continued U.S.
political support for Taiwan. The de facto quid pro quo for U.S. commit-
ment to the island was essentially for Taiwan to open up sectors of its
agricultural market, pork imports especially, in return for continued U.S.
support more broadly. Indeed, both Democratic and Republican leader-
ships have continuously called for Taipei to allow U.S. pork and beef into
the market despite food safety concerns among Taiwanese voters.7 As one
senior U.S. official said in a private discussion, it was “insulting” that the
Taiwanese would label food that was deemed safe by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration as not suitable for Taiwan’s consumers, overlooking
the fact that the EU also bans the use of ractopamine altogether, not
just in pork. The official argued that it would be politically challenging
to rally U.S. support including potentially U.S. lives for the survival of
Taiwan when the Taiwanese themselves were not willing to accommodate
the political needs of the United States.
The situation came to a head in late 2021, as Taiwanese voters went to
the polls in December to voice their position in a referendum regarding
banning imports of pork containing ractopamine. The opposition Kuom-
intang Party (KMT) had positioned the issue as a way to undermine
public confidence in President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration.8 Had the
referendum passed, it would have undermined Tsai’s efforts to position
Taiwan to be accession-ready for CPTPP. To be sure, the administration
acknowledged that some industries could be hard hit by losing to ensuing
foreign competition. Indeed, in concluding its announcement in bidding
for entry, the Ministry of Economic Affairs stated that “the people and
related citizens’ groups must also be educated on the numerous new high-
standard trade rules involved. For sensitive industries that may affect local
businesses, complementary measures may be necessary for Taiwan to be
fully prepared for entry.”9
There were, however, far greater political risks jeopardizing U.S. public
support for Taiwan had the 2021 referendum passed. Not only would
U.S. agricultural producers have cried foul against Taiwanese legislators,
but it would have also shaken Washington’s confidence and indeed the
world in the ability of Taipei to deliver its commitments. After all, it was
only the previous year, in December 2020, that after years of opposing
such a move, the Legislative Yuan had passed the bill to allow U.S. pork
imports back onto its shores despite considerable internal opposition. The
timing of the bill’s passage was noteworthy insofar as it came four months
after an official visit by the Trump administration’s Secretary of Health
and Human Services Alex Azar, who was then the first sitting U.S. cabinet
member to make way to the island.10
Should Taiwan have backtracked on its commitment to open its doors
to U.S. pork, not only might it have jeopardized relations with the United
States, but it would have also brought into question the reliability of
commitments made by the Taiwanese government more broadly. Voting
against imports of American pork would have risked undermining broader
support in Congress for Taiwan and raised questions in Washington about
the ability of Taiwan’s government, whether under the KMT or DPP,
170 S. GOTO
to deliver on its commitments, given that the referendum would have

reflected the public opinion of Taiwanese voters.
This needs to be kept in perspective, however. As is explained below,
in its wish to maintain Japanese support, the Tsai government was willing
to over-ride an earlier referendum, also KMT inspired, against resuming
the import of food products from the Fukushima region and there is no
reason to assume that it would not have done the same in the case of
the referendum on pork imports, given the even greater importance of
its relations with the USA. For the United States, however, the refer-
endum about importing pork was regarded as a litmus test of the extent to
which Taiwan would be able to accommodate U.S. interests in return for a
greater commitment from Washington to invest in bilateral relations more
broadly. At the same time, it was also a test to reassure the United States
that Taiwan would remain committed to its agreements and support
Washington’s efforts to highlight the need for further engagement.
That need to compromise and to cultivate stronger partnerships had
led Taiwan to lift its ban on most food products from Japan’s Fukushima
region. The government had imposed a ban on such imports from five
Japanese prefectures in 2011 following the Fukushima nuclear disaster.
At the time, many countries around the world had done the same, but
while the United States and some others subsequently lifted the restric-
tions following scientific findings that deemed the food safe, restrictions
remained in place in Europe.11 Japanese food exports to these coun-
tries were never significant, however, and by 2018, only South Korea
and China as well as Taiwan remained as notable remaining standouts
in continuing to block Fukushima-produced foods. Given Japan’s politi-
cally challenged relations with both Seoul and Beijing to date, there was
an understanding that it was not simply food safety concerns alone that
motivated Seoul as well as Beijing to maintain the ban on Fukushima
imports. (It should also be noted that of Taiwan’s two main political
parties, the KMT has traditionally favoured closer ties with China than
with Japan and this may well have been a factor in its advocacy of the
ban.12 ) Japanese expectations for Taiwan to lift the ban soon were far
higher, however, given the otherwise close relations between Tokyo and
Taipei, and Tokyo’s expectations for Taipei to accommodate Japan’s own
concerns about restoring global confidence worldwide post-Fukushima.
As such, the 2018 referendum in which the Taiwanese electorate voted to
keep the ban in place had caught many Japanese legislators off-guard and
remained a particularly thorny political issue between Taipei and Tokyo.13
With Japan as the single-biggest country in terms of GDP among the

11-member CPTPP, as Taiwan made its official bid to join the group, the
need for Taipei to address the Fukushima food issue increased in urgency.
The government’s decision largely to lift the ban in February 2022 was
greatly welcomed by Tokyo and seen to be an appropriate action in light
of Japan’s growing commitment in defense of Taiwan’s security and pres-
ence on the international stage (restrictions on imports of wild game and
mushrooms remain in place but these are of minor importance compared
to those of shellfish and other seafood).
Cashing in the Chips

As countries closed their borders and the global economy came to a halt
during the first months of the pandemic, there was far greater apprecia-
tion of Taiwan’s role in the world. For one, the government’s ability to
keep the spread of covid under control, and its ability to manufacture and
distribute necessary medical goods including face masks across the globe
at a time when supplies were sorely lacking put Taiwan on the map as a
model for efficient governance. Yet even as it set standards in how to deal
with the pandemic, from effective use of data technology to nimbleness
of industry to produce necessary goods, the fact that it was not a part of
the World Health Organization or the United Nations due to its singular
international status was especially noted.
More significantly, though, was the fact that Taiwan’s dominance in
the technology sector became all too apparent as demand for semicon-
ductors surged amid the covid shutdown. Shortages of materials for
production and disruptions in supply chains became headline news at
the height of the pandemic. From the temporary closure of automobile
manufacturing plants to computer makers being unable to keep up with
production output because of a shortage of chips, supply chain disrup-
tions made clear to the wider global market of consumers anxious for tech
goods that Taiwan dominated global semiconductor manufacturing. All
of the world’s most advanced semiconductor capacity in nodes below 10
nanometers are manufactured in Northeast Asia, with Taiwan accounting
for 92% of market share. The remaining 8% is produced in South Korea.14
When the global economy was running efficiently and supply chains
were driven first and foremost by cost considerations, dependence on two
locations for critical technology supplies did not seem so risky. Or at least
it was in line with production practices more generally in which an eye on
172 S. GOTO
the bottom line predominated, from depending on cheap generic drugs

made in India to importing the bulk of healthcare products from China.
The disruptions caused by COVID have, however, led to a reassess-
ment of economic priorities and the role of supply chains. No longer
is cost effectiveness the single biggest driving force. Rather, the need for
resilience to survive disruptions caused by geopolitical turmoil, natural
disasters, and other unexpected risks has taken on greater importance as a
result of the covid shutdowns. When it comes to Taiwan, the geopolitical
risks are particularly high, given its vulnerability to economic coercion as
well as military intervention from China. Moreover, its geographic loca-
tion makes it susceptible to earthquakes and other environmental risks,
adding to concerns about the consequences of depending so heavily on
Taiwanese produced technology goods.
In the near term, however, surging consumer demand for technology
products has been a boon for Taiwan. In 2021, Taiwanese exports
reached record levels, hitting nearly $447 billion, rising consecutively for
18 months amid the pandemic.15 The leader of the pack is Taiwan Semi-
conductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which accounts for nearly
50% of the global output of advanced chips.16 Revenue in the first quarter
of 2022 rose almost 36% from the previous year to nearly $17 billion, in
part because of increasing prices as well as continued demand worldwide.
TSMC also supplies computer chips to the US military, including those
used in F-35 fighter jets. It would not be too much of a stretch to say
that since the pandemic, TSMC has become the face of Taiwan, and the
world has taken on an outsized interest in the company’s performance as
well as its future growth strategy.
Limited Window of Opportunity

for Global Presence
Through TSMC, Taiwan currently dominates the advanced semicon-
ductor industry, and for now, the interests of both the Taiwanese
government and the Taiwanese semiconductor giant align. The danger of
putting all of Taiwan’s economic expectations on the shoulders of TSMC
and the small and medium enterprises that support it, however, is a risky
one. It is a risk that is readily acknowledged by Taiwanese government
officials as they look to diversify their innovation portfolio.
Granted, the outlook for the chip sector for now is rosy and demand
is expected to continue to climb. Global semiconductor revenue was
projected to rise by nearly 14% from one year earlier in 2022, and
earnings projections continue to be revised upward amid a seemingly insa-
tiable appetite worldwide for technology products. Still, once the supply
chain disruptions come under control and supply constraints ease, prices
are expected to stabilize.17 Moreover, some analysts would argue that
demand for high-end semiconductors is not infinite, and that as govern-
ments focus their attention on producing chips within their own borders,
or at least closer geographically, the need for chips made in Taiwan would
decrease significantly.
For TSMC itself, however, its earnings are unlikely to be hurt for some
time. The chipmaker’s advanced, proprietary technology ensures that it is
the most sought-after partner as countries vie to boost their own capa-
bilities. Indeed, TSMC inked a deal with Sony in November 2021 to
build a $7 billion chip fab with a monthly production capacity of 45,000
12-inch wafers. The announcement came with the full blessing of the
Japanese government as it looks to increase its own chip making capabil-
ities amid growing tensions between Washington and Beijing that could
disrupt supply chains, in addition to mitigating against natural disaster
risks. In the United States, meanwhile, TSMC started building a $12
billion fab in Arizona in June 2021 which is expected to produce 5
nanometer chips. Meanwhile, the European Union too has been courting
TSMC to invest on the continent as it looks to move forward on its own
roadmap for greater chip-producing capability. While the most advanced,
high-capacity semiconductors will continue to be produced in Taiwan for
now, TSMC is positioning itself so that it can hedge its own geographical
risks by investing in more fabs overseas, whilst maintaining its position as
the unshakeable semiconductor leader.
There are coordinated global efforts too, that could not move forward
without TSMC’s technology but could lessen the strategic value of
Taiwan. For instance, calls by some Japanese officials including former
foreign minister Kono Taro to establish a coalition of like-minded coun-
tries to share research and manufacturing capabilities amongst themselves
may seem more of an idea than an actual plan for now. But should
such collective efforts to build up the global semiconductor sector bear
fruit, then the need to depend so fully on Taiwanese efforts would fall
considerably.
TSMC’s successes and plans for expanding overseas, however, come
without Taiwan being a member of the CPTPP or indeed any other
regional trade group. In fact, when it comes to growth prospects, Taipei
174 S. GOTO
clearly needs TSMC driving the Taiwanese government more than the
chipmaker needs government intervention on its behalf to secure its
market share. As TSMC spreads strategically to diversify its manufacturing
worldwide to key locations, Taiwan’s position as the epicenter of chip
manufacturing will diminish as well. That in turn risks decreasing the visi-
bility of Taiwan and its position as a technology hub, which in turn could
hamper Taipei’s bid to boost its standing in the international arena. The
irony, of course, is that the more successful the Taiwanese semiconductor
industry becomes in hedging against the risks of concentrating too heavily
in Taiwan, the less will be the world’s dependence on chips that are actu-
ally made in Taiwan. That in turn runs the risk of deflecting from the need
for support to ensure the future resilience of the Taiwanese economy.
IPEF and the Unknown

Entry into CPTPP may not be necessary for TSMC’s future success, but it
would certainly benefit the SMEs that supply the chip giant and support
the Taiwanese economy. Looking ahead, the emerging rivalry between
Taiwan and South Korea over production of advanced chips is expected
to intensify. While South Korea is already a member of the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement and has bilat-
eral trade deals with most major countries, it too is seeking CPTPP
accession.18 Should Seoul be able to secure membership before Taipei,
it would put Korean manufacturers at a considerable advantage, espe-
cially as the deal would facilitate access to Japanese markets. Although
Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturers benefit from the WTO Infor-
mation Technology Agreement, which has progressively eliminated tariffs
on semiconductors and manufacturing equipment, as countries look to
develop comprehensive ecosystems that include the testing and packaging
of chip products, there are fears that not being part of major regional
trade agreements could put Taiwan at a clear disadvantage compared to
Korea.19
Still, neither RCEP nor CPTPP are gateways for furthering trade
relations with the United States. That will now come in the form of Wash-
ington’s latest initiative, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)
which was launched in May 2022. Granted, at a time when Washington
is unable to sign on to new trade agreements due to domestic polit-
ical considerations, the framework continues to come under criticism as
merely a poor substitute for CPTPP, to which neither the Democrats nor
the Republicans have any real appetite to push for U.S. reentry. It is easy
to dismiss IPEF as a temporary solution to the glaring absence of the
United States from being engaged in the economic rule-making process
of the Indo-Pacific region which is now home to two major multilat-
eral trade deals. That said, 13 countries across the region have signed up
to the IPEF, including India, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thai-
land, Malaysia, and Fiji.20 While the IPEF focuses on addressing issues of
particular concern for the Indo-Pacific, including supply chain resilience
and environmental sustainability, just how it will be able to contribute
to economic growth per se remains in question. Until the unveiling of
the initial membership, Taipei’s hope had been to join as well, but it had
become clear that Taiwan would have jeopardized the willingness of key
Southeast Asian nations to be part of the group amid fears of Chinese
retaliation, should it have been allowed to join.
In short, IPEF is a small political victory for the Biden administration
at a time when Washington’s economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific
has been lacking in contrast to its military engagement. By bringing
together a diverse range of countries across the region to join and not
simply staunch U.S. allies such as Japan and Australia, the administration
is able to claim that it has an economic roadmap for growth as well as
security in the Indo-Pacific. For Taiwan, the possibility of a bilateral deal
increasing as a result of IPEF can be seen as a significant step forward
in its relations with the United States, even if there is understandable
frustration about not being invited to join IPEF itself.21
Coordination on Economic Security

As Taiwan looks to join new trade deals and bolster its competitiveness
beyond TSMC, the biggest barrier by far remains its unique international
status and the prospect of China taking action against any move that
would seemingly jeopardize the One China policy. That situation is hardly
new. Still, current geopolitical realities will both elevate Taiwan’s standing
and also raise awareness of its challenges. Yet expectations for Taiwan to
be able to enter new trade deals and economic partnerships are rapidly
evolving.
With the lifting of the ban on U.S. pork and produce from the
Fukushima area, the Tsai administration has finally eliminated the major
stumbling blocks in trade negotiations with the two countries. Looking
ahead, though, both Washington and Tokyo are now focusing on
176 S. GOTO
economic security cooperation and resilience, rather than market access

or tariff issues, as the biggest challenges to trade.
At the summit meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Fumio
Kishida and President Biden in May 2022, the two countries unveiled a
joint action plan to further bilateral economic cooperation that included
enhancing supply chain resilience. From supply chain resilience and coop-
eration in diversifying semiconductor manufacturing capabilities to 5G
supplier diversification, it is clear that interoperability and cooperation
will be a key part of the bilateral Competitiveness and Resilience Part-
nership (CoRe).22 The partnership can be seen as the groundwork for
the development of a US-Japan led technology sphere in which the two
countries will be seeking to work closely with Taiwan for technological
compatibility.
The Kishida government in particular has been proactive in taking
action to protect the Japanese economy from Chinese coercion, sabo-
tage, and espionage. One of the first actions taken by the administration
had been to appoint the country’s first economic security minister, who
then spearheaded efforts to draft economic security legislation. In May
2022, the Japanese Diet passed a law consisting of four pillars, namely
to secure supply chains; safeguard infrastructure; identify and invest in
emerging technologies; and protect critical technologies through patents
and other legal means.23 Implementing these new rules will require not
only greater coordination between the Japanese government and private
Japanese companies, but also between the governments of Japan and the
United States as well as with the European Union. It will be critical too
for Taiwan’s economic future to ensure that its own economic security
standards also comply and are compatible with the rules emerging from
these international negotiations.
Maximizing the Window

of Opportunity Beyond CPTPP
Although global supply chain disruptions in recent years have elevated
awareness of Taiwan’s role in the global economy, the policy of strategic
ambiguity continues to define its economic as well as diplomatic standing.
Taipei’s bid to join the CPTPP will not be part of the solution to bring
greater clarity to the situation, and even runs the risk of creating divisions
among the 11 member countries. The fact that even a new economic
initiative established by the White House finds its hands tied about the
possibility of bringing Taiwan to the table indicates the extent to which

wariness of Chinese backlash defines relations in the Indo-Pacific.
But greater awareness of Taiwan’s role in the global economy has
expanded the range of stakeholders vested in ensuring its future stability.
With the possibility of a bilateral trade deal with the United States at
long last on the table, Taipei must now ensure that it is not just CPTPP
accession-ready, but also be on standby to negotiate bilateral deals with
the United States and potentially Japan.
If Taiwan’s ultimate goal is to ensure that its economy remains resilient
and irreplaceable on the global stage, then its priority must be to ensure
that its technology industry is compatible and compliant with the stan-
dards that are now being established between the United States and
Japan. With market access no longer a stumbling block for Taiwan’s
critical technology sector, its motivations to join CPTPP are more polit-
ical than they are economic. The political drive and public push to have
Taiwan join the global trade agreement should persist as part of a broader
strategy to ensure Taiwan’s foothold in the international order and in
demonstrating its willingness to confront the challenge from the PRC
head on. Nevertheless, to protect and further Taiwan’s competitive edge
in the technology sector and the semiconductor industry in particular,
Taipei’s focus must be to ensure that it remains part of the rule-making
process as countries look to harmonize and standardize technologies. The
role that Taiwanese technology plays in the global economy has become
all too apparent. That momentum must be leveraged so that Taiwanese
corporate interests are furthered together with the continued drive to
further Taiwan’s international standing by being part of global trade deals.
Notes
1. The White House, Office of the Secretary, Fact Sheet: The United States
in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 2011. https://obamawhitehouse.arc
hives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/12/fact-sheet-united-states-trans-
pacific-partnership.
2. M. Reilly: Towards and EU-Taiwan Investment Agreement: Prospects and
Pitfalls, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
3. P. Petri and M. Plummer, “The Economic Effects of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership: New Estimates”. https://www.piie.com/publications/wor
king-papers/economic-effects-trans-pacific-partnership-new-estimates,
2016.
178 S. GOTO
4. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Press Conference by Prime

Minister Shinzo Abe,” 2016. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statem
ent/201303/15kaiken_e.html.
5. An analysis in 2014 by former American Institute in Taiwan Chairman
Richard Bush on what steps Taiwan should take to join the TPP
exemplifies the prescriptions made by US analysts at the time to
press for Taiwanese reform in order to meet the demands of
accession. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
taiwan-tpp-bush-012014.pdf.
6. M. Strong, “CPTPP Membership Would Add 2% to Taiwan’s Economic
Growth,” 2021. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4294942.
7. The U.S. National Pork Producers Council was jus one of a number of
industry groups that had continually pressed for Taiwan to lift its ban on
ractopamine. https://nppc.org/issues/issue/taiwan/.
8. Financial Times, “Taiwan Voters Back Government on US Pork Refer-
endum,” 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/cee59ee9-f549-47fb-baf3-
d2c3942f99b0.
9. Ministry of Economic Affairs Bureau of Foreign Trade, “Taiwan’s Bid for
CPTPP Membership,” 2022. https://www.trade.gov.tw/english/Pages/
Detail.aspx?nodeID=4572&pid=735704.
10. Nikkei Asia, “Taiwan Passes Bill to Allow Imports of US Pork Containing
Additive,” 2021. https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Agriculture/Taiwan-
passes-bill-to-allow-imports-of-US-pork-containing-additive.
11. J. McCurry, The Guardian, “The UK only Lifted Its Last Remaining
Restrictions in June 2022,” 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/env
ironment/2022/jun/29/uk-to-lift-import-restrictions-on-food-from-fuk
ushima.
12. Brian Hioe: Taiwan’s Tsai Lifts Import Ban on Food From Nuclear
Disaster-Hit Area of Japan. https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/taiwans-
tsai-lifts-import-ban-on-food-from-nuclear-disaster-hit-area-of-japan.
13. Articles to explain why the Taiwanese voted against lifting the ban on
Japanese food imports proliferated in the Japanese media after the 2018
referendum. https://wedge.ismedia.jp/articles/-/14894.
14. https://www.bcg.com/publications/2021/strengthening-the-global-sem
iconductor-supply-chain.
15. M. Strong, Taiwan News, “Taiwan Sets New Export, Import Records for
2021,” 2023. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4402193.
16. Robyn Klingler-Vidra and Yu Ching Kuo: Brexit, Supply Chains and
the Contest for Supremacy: The Case of Taiwan and the Semiconductor
Industry, in M. Reilly and C.-Y. Lee eds. A New Beginning or More of the
Same? The European Union and East Asia after Brexit, Palgrave Macmillan
2021.
17. Gartner, “Gartner Forecasts Worldwide Semiconductor Revenue to

Grow 13.6% in 2022,” 2022. https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/
press-releases/2022-04-26-gartner-forecasts-worldwide-semiconductor-
revenue-to-grow-13-6-percent-in-2022.
18. The RCEP, which was signed in November 2020, is a trade deal between
the ten members of ASEAN and Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand,
and South Korea.
19. World Semiconductor Council, “Free and Open Markets,” 2023. https:/
/www.semiconductorcouncil.org/issuesactivities/free-open-markets/.
20. The White House, “Statement by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan
on Fiji Joining the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity,”
2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/
2022/05/26/statement-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-fiji-
joining-the-indo-pacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity/.
21. The White House, “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre
and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan En Route Tokyo, Japan,”
2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/
2022/05/22/press-gaggle-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-and-nat
ional-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-en-route-tokyo-japan/.
22. The White House, “Fact Sheet: The U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and
Resilience (CoRe) Partnership,” 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/bri
efing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-the-u-s-japan-
competitiveness-and-resilience-core-partnership/.
23. Sangiin, 2023. https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/gian/
208/pdf/t1002080052080.pdf.
CHAPTER 9
Not Quite Déjà Vu All Over Again: CPTPP

Accession and Taiwan–China–US Relations
Jacques deLisle
It’s déjà vu all over again. —Yogi Berra
RTAs today go beyond market access in goods and services and related WTO
rules…. [T]oday [the WTO Commission on RTAs] will be considering one of
the largest and most complex RTAs, the CPTPP. —WTO Director-General
Okonjo-Iweala (2021)
Introduction
Taiwan’s and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) bids to join the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for a Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship (CPTPP), and the US’s position on CPTPP-related issues (including
US membership), pose familiar challenges in an altered context. For
J. deLisle (B)
Center for the Study of Contemporary China, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, PA, USA

182 J. DELISLE
Taiwan and China, the reasons for joining the significant trade agreement
are partly economic but are also political. Taiwan’s and China’s parallel
pursuits of CPTPP inevitably implicate issues of Taiwan’s international
status and stature and US–China–Taiwan relations.
The CPTPP bids from Taipei and Beijing resonate with an earlier
instance of simultaneous attempts by the two to join a central interna-
tional economic accord Washington had taken a leading role in devel-
oping: the World Trade Organization (WTO). But much—including
much that matters in Taiwan’s quest for international status and security—
has changed since the PRC’s and Taiwan’s WTO accessions more than
twenty years ago. For Taiwan, China, and the United States, there have
been substantial shifts in relative power, relations among one another, and
the appeal of participating in a new international economic regime.
Taiwan’s imperative to accede to such pacts arguably has grown while
the obstacles—especially from China—have mounted. China’s stake in
joining has changed and, in some respects, weakened as China has gained
power, both generally and in economic affairs, but has drawn deepening
suspicion and growing opposition from many quarters and critical coun-
terparties. The US’s influence has diminished, partly due to China’s rise
but also through self-inflicted wounds, including opting out of the orig-
inal Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Washington’s strategy to reinvigo-
rate support for a “rules-based international order”, enhance coordination
among like-minded partners, and counter perceived rising threats from
China should make reengagement with the CPTPP appealing. But the
US has not yet found such incentives compelling.
For Taiwan and China (and the US as well), CPTPP accession is
unlikely in the near future. The questions of Taiwan’s and China’s
memberships are, and are likely to remain, politically fraught, partly due
to the implications for Taiwan’s international status and China’s inter-
national influence. This is so even though—seemingly paradoxically—the
promise of a new phase of transformative global economic integration
has waned since the WTO’s early years or the TPP’s gestation. In this
context, the most likely outcome is kicking the can down the road—that
is, no near-term resolution of the PRC’s and Taiwan’s applications to
the CPTPP or the US’s possible (re)entry. Not bedeviled by the fraught
politics of the Taiwan and China bids or the US’s reluctance the United
Kingdom’s application has proceeded more quickly and smoothly.
9 NOT QUITE DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN: CPTPP ACCESSION … 183
Taiwan
Taiwan’s pursuit of CPTPP accession, like its earlier quest to enter the
WTO, fits the conventional logic of international economic liberalism.
The agreement obliges parties to reduce barriers to trade and other
border-crossing economic activities, limits policies and practices that can
confer unfair competitive advantages or constitute predation, and provides
for authoritative and binding dispute resolution. In principle and poten-
tially in practice, such arrangements raise overall productivity and wealth,
with benefits flowing to all participating economies. More immediately,
membership avoids the competitive disadvantages a non-member faces
under regime rules that reduce barriers facing those member states that
are a non-member’s competitors.
Such issues are particularly salient for Taiwan, even more so than
was the case when Taiwan joined the WTO. Its economy is (as it long
has been) highly trade-dependent, with trade totalling more than 100%
of GDP. More qualitatively, Taiwan has become increasingly integrated
into the international economy, including through dense global value
chains that have developed in recent years (CEIC Data 2022; WTO
2022a). Taiwan also lacks access to options that might serve as substi-
tutes for membership in the CPTPP. This problem has become more
acute during the twenty years following Taiwan’s WTO entry. WTO
accession secured for Taiwan rights to relatively level playing-field access
to international trade (and some beyond-trade activities) with almost all
of the world’s significant economies. Taiwan’s WTO entry was followed
by the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between
Taiwan and the PRC—forged a decade into the era of their concurrent
WTO membership—and numerous follow-on agreements, including a
controversial proposed Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA).
But ECFA was not followed, as Taiwan hoped, by Taiwan’s entering
preferential agreements with other key trading partners. Beijing’s oppo-
sition has been a principal, and often decisive, impediment. Taiwan has
fewer than a dozen operative bilateral free trade or economic coopera-
tion agreements, several with diplomatic partners that do not account
for a substantial share of Taiwan’s trade (Taiwan Ministry of Economic
Affairs 2022; Tsai and Liu 2017; Shapiro 2013). Taiwan has been
unable to join increasingly important regional trade agreements, including
the TPP/CPTPP and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partner-
ship (RCEP), in their initial rounds. Taiwan also was excluded from
184 J. DELISLE
the initial group invited into the US-led—and institutionally thin and
still-inchoate—Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).
The WTO now offers Taiwan less than it used to—or once appeared
to—provide. The WTO’s centrality in regulating and ensuring access to
the international economy has diminished. The Doha Round of negotia-
tions stalled. The WTO’s once-impressive law-shaping dispute resolution
process has been hamstrung (in part because the US blocked appoint-
ments necessary for the appellate body to function). The WTO’s reach in
addressing some of the most dynamic “trade plus” issues—including elec-
tronic commerce, investment, regulatory harmonization, and more—has
been exceeded by the CPTPP and other regional initiatives (Bown 2016;
Alden 2020; Duesterberg 2021; Noland 2018). With the proliferation of
bilateral and multilateral agreements, a shrinking share of international
trade makes use of the privileges provided by general WTO rules and
commitments (Baldwin 2016).
Such economic arrangements have political significance, especially for
Taiwan and its quest for international space and security. Taiwan’s ECFA-
related agreements with China, and lack of economic agreements with
other states, have amplified complementarities between Taiwan’s and the
mainland’s economies, and increased Taiwan’s economic dependence on
China and, in turn, fears about political risks for Taiwan (Lin and Shieh
2017; Matsuda 2015; Chang and Yang 2020).
Asymmetrical economic interdependence can bring political vulnera-
bility, including—where the stronger partner is so inclined—threats to the
autonomy and sovereignty of the weaker party. This danger, classically
articulated by Albert O. Hirschman, has become increasingly resonant
for Taiwan (Hirschman 1945). It has provided much of the impetus
behind Taiwan’s initiatives to diversify external economic activities and
limit cross-strait economic integration. Examples include Lee Teng-
hui’s “southbound policy,” Tsai Ing-wen’s “new southbound policy,”
and Taipei’s attempts to access non-China-centered trade arrangements,
from bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) to the TPP, CPTPP, and
IPEF. Concerns about the political consequences of economic ties also
helped drive the opposition (including the Sunflower Movement) that
stymied ratification of the CSSTA (Rowen 2015; Kaeding 2015). CPTPP
membership appeals, in part, because it could help alleviate this source of
Taiwan’s international insecurity.
Taiwan’s imperative to join the CPTPP reflects accession’s potential

impact on Taiwan’s international status. Membership in major interna-
tional bodies and other modes of participation in international accords
and organizations matter because they are opportunities for Taiwan to
act as a state or near-equivalent entity on the international stage. More
narrowly, they are an aspect of the “capacity to engage” in interna-
tional relations that is among the indicia of statehood in international
law (deLisle 2000).
For decades, Taiwan has sought membership in international organi-
zations and agreements where possible and some lesser form of engage-
ment—observer status, “meaningful participation,” or more ad hoc
access—where membership is unattainable (deLisle 2021a; Goto 2021).
Accession to the WTO was a milestone in this dimension of Taiwan’s
pursuit of international status (Charnovitz 2006; Hsieh 2005). Taiwan
had entered the most significant then-recently-created near-universal insti-
tution, one of the most potent international regimes (given the WTO’s
authority to make and interpret rules governing international trade and
related issues of economic regulation in member states, and given the
WTO dispute resolution system’s authority to make binding decisions
concerning members’ rights and obligations and to authorize reme-
dies), and arguably the second-most important international body of any
type (behind only the UN). WTO entry recovered some of the ground
lost through Taiwan’s exclusion from major international organizations
(primarily after the 1971 General Assembly resolution that gave Beijing
the “Chinese seat” in the UN system) and Taipei’s subsequent loss of
diplomatic partners.
In some ways, prospects for Taiwan’s joining the CPTPP—and reaping
gains on this front—should be promising. Taiwan’s bid can play to
Taiwan’s relative strengths—and reprise past successes—in seeking inter-
national status and participation (deLisle 2000, 2021a; Goto 2021). First,
like the WTO and unlike the UN, the CPTPP is not a “states member
only” body. Taiwan’s quest for inclusion thus does not necessarily or
immediately implicate questions of Taiwan’s sovereignty or statehood—
which invariably elicit strong opposition from Beijing and raise difficult
issues for other members. The CPTPP’s economic focus puts the fraught
political issues of sovereignty at one remove. The distinction also matters
for US support: Washington’s long-standing policy of backing Taiwan’s
186 J. DELISLE
international participation excludes supporting membership in organiza-

tions for which statehood is a requirement (US Department of State
2022). Second, like the WTO, the CPTPP principally addresses an arena
in which Taiwan is an important actor. The CPTPP’s ambit—the regional
economy—is one where excluding Taiwan makes the regime much less
comprehensive and effective.
Third, although Taiwan faces some challenges in meeting the
demanding criteria for CPTPP membership, Taiwan is already largely
compliant (Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022a; Schott et al.
2016)—particularly in contrast to the PRC, which faces many obstacles
born of its still (and in some respects increasingly) state-involved economy
(Congressional Research Service 2021; Solis 2021). Taiwan’s possible
shortcomings appear less persuasive as a reason for exclusion given that
Vietnam was admitted as an original CPTPP member, notwithstanding
its significantly illiberal economic order. These attributes give Taiwan a
relatively compelling normative card to play, stressing its already-close
alignment with the CPTPP’s principles and values.
Fourth, as with the WTO, Taiwan’s bid for CPTPP membership does
not come after the PRC has already joined and thus is positioned to
veto Taiwan’s entry (under the CPTPP’s unanimity rule on new member-
ships). Here, the WTO example could serve as a precedent, with the two
candidates’ bids proceeding as a de facto package deal, albeit with China
nominally acceding first and Taiwan joining under a name that sounds
less “state-like” than “Taiwan” (Tucker 2000; People’s Republic of China
2001; WTO 2001).
Finally, as with Taiwan’s WTO bid, the US—still the world’s largest
economy, sole genuinely global power, and significant economic and
security partner for key CPTPP states—today supports Taiwan’s member-
ship and participation in international organizations and agreements and
encourages other states, including CPTPP member states, to do so as
well. US support is all the more likely to be reliable in the context of
growing wariness in Washington—and among “like-minded” states in the
region (including some CPTPP members) and beyond—about Beijing’s
expanding influence and assertive agenda, both generally and concerning
Taiwan.1
But such factors are not enough to make Taiwan’s accession to the
CPTPP feasible in the near term. Taiwan’s will and ability to address
compliance issues with CPTPP requirements are real (with agriculture
being among the sticking points), but they do not look insurmount-
able, particularly when compared to China’s. The principal obstacle,
instead, is Beijing. Official PRC statements have pointedly rejected the
idea of Taiwan’s concurrent accession, despite the apparent WTO prece-
dent (China Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021a2 ; Mayger and Li 2021;
Hille and White 2021).
This opposition comes against the backdrop of years of mounting PRC
efforts to constrain Taiwan’s engagement with international organiza-
tions and other states. After Tsai Ing-wen became president in 2016,
Beijing clawed back gains Taiwan had reaped during Ma Ying-jeou’s
presidency: ending Taiwan’s eight-year run of attendance at the annual
meetings of the World Health Assembly (the World Health Organiza-
tion’s plenary body); blocking a recurrence of Taiwan’s participation
in the triennial session of the assembly of the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization (like the WHO, a core UN-affiliated entity) (deLisle
2009; Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021a, 2022b); terminating an
informal “diplomatic truce” that had paused Beijing’s chipping away at
Taipei’s dwindling cohort of states maintaining formal ties; and generally
squeezing Taiwan’s international space (Niewenhuis 2021; deLisle 2016;
Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021b).
Beijing has considerable influence with other CPTPP members, rooted
in its geopolitical clout, standing as the top trading and a leading invest-
ment partner for many CPTPP states, and position as the largest economy
in the RCEP (to which seven of the eleven CPTPP members also belong).
One plausible explanation for Beijing’s seemingly sudden application for
CPTPP membership in September 2021 is that, knowing Taiwan was
about to file, Beijing sought to deter CPTPP members from opening
accession discussions with Taiwan (Lester and Zhu 2021; Freeman 2021).
China’s stance on Taiwan’s bid also parallels Beijing’s wider use of incen-
tives—ranging from development assistance to diplomatic support to
diplomatic pressure and more—to induce other states, especially but not
only in the Global South, to toe its line on Taiwan more generally (and
other issues as well) (Thibaut et al. 2022; Shinn and Eisenman 2020;
Drun and Glaser 2022; Shattuck 2020). In a high-profile example that
roughly coincided with China’s and Taiwan’s CPTPP bids, China recalled
its ambassador and imposed severe de facto restrictions on trade with
Lithuania—prompting an EU complaint against China at the WTO—
because Lithuania allowed Taiwan to use the name “Taiwan” for its
188 J. DELISLE
unofficial presence in Vilnius (Higgins 2022; China Ministry of Foreign

Affairs 2021b3 ; WTO 2022b).
Another vulnerability in Taiwan’s bid are the limits to US support.
Washington’s capability and will—generally and in the CPTPP context—
have suffered significant erosion since the heady days of the creation of the
WTO or even the TPP. The long-term relative decline in US economic
and political power, the Trump-era “proof of concept” that Washington
might lastingly abandon its postwar and post-Cold War global roles, and
the US’s opting out of the TPP are among the markers of a lowered
ceiling on US influence from its position as clearly preeminent global
power and principal architect, and backer, of the WTO and other major
international institutions.4
China
China, too, is seeking CPTPP membership. In a short period, it
has moved from suspicion toward the TPP as a US-steered “anyone
but China” pact to “favourably consider[ing]” and then “actively
promot[ing]” the process of joining the CPTPP while also pledging “an
active and open attitude” in negotiating over sensitive issues such as subsi-
dies and state enterprises (Ye 2015; McGee and Yoon 2015; Xinhua 2020;
Wang 2022; Tan 2021). Economic prospects provide part of the impetus.
The absolute and relative gains to be reaped—through international trade,
inbound foreign investment, and other aspects of international economic
liberalization that CPTPP membership would enhance—remain econom-
ically valuable for China. The opportunity membership confers to shape
the rules of a major “trade plus” regime to better suit Beijing’s interests
and preferences is another evident motivation. In all these respects, there
are echoes of China’s earlier quest to join the WTO (deLisle 2006; China
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022b).
Yet, the economic imperative for China is limited, and less compelling
with the CPTPP than it was with the WTO. China’s application to the
CPTPP occurs in the context of a very different relationship between
China and international economic regimes than in the late 1990s. During
the two decades following WTO entry, China has been very active in
establishing bilateral and regional trade agreements (RTAs), including
with some of the largest economies in the CPTPP (China Ministry
of Commerce 2022; Wang 2004). The biggest of China’s RTAs—the
RCEP—has a membership that overlaps substantially with the CPTPP
(although the RCEP’s liberalization requirements and substantive reach

are considerably less than the CPTPP’s) (Schott 2022; Zhang 2021;
Economist 2020).
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) offers another vehicle for multiple
arrangements that promote China’s expanding economic engagement
with other states in its region and beyond (partly in the form of access
for Chinese outbound investment to build infrastructure-underpinned
connectivity and, in turn, trade). More broadly, China now has the
leverage—much of it derived from its status as the top trading partner
and a significant investment partner for many states (Sampson 2021;
Marukawa 2021)—to get some of what it seeks in other states’ foreign
economic laws and policies through ad hoc negotiations or unilateral
measures that generate economic incentives and pressure (Seppanen
2018; Wolff 2020). China thus has less need to rely on the WTO’s limited
legal commitments and enforcement mechanisms.
More fundamentally, China’s economic gains from CPTPP would be
less transformative than those facilitated by China’s WTO accession.
Measured against the baseline of nearly a quarter-century ago, China’s
economy is much larger, more developed, more mature, and intractably
slower growing. It is also less heavily dependent on foreign trade and
inbound investment. Domestic demand, investment, and innovation play
much more prominent roles now. Some Xi Jinping-era economic poli-
cies, including the “dual circulation” economy, the quest for greater
self-sufficiency in crucial technologies, and a re-expansion of the party-
state’s roles in firms and the economy, reinforce this relatively organic
trend. Other policies, to be sure, cut the other way, including those
seeking international dominance in emerging technologies and promoting
Chinese trade and investment through the BRI (Petri and Plummer 2020;
Lin and Wang 2022; Blanchette and Polk 2020). Still, China’s CPTPP
accession would not be—and is not meant to be—the crucial lever for
opening China to the outside world and driving liberalizing economic
reform at home that WTO entry sought and served to provide.
Political considerations figure prominently in China’s pursuit of
CPTPP membership, arguably overshadowing economic reasons. China’s
CPTPP membership would give Beijing surer and more formal
authority—enhancing (albeit perhaps only marginally) its formidable
informal power—to block or set the terms for Taiwan’s admission and,
in turn, advance the PRC’s agenda of squeezing Taiwan’s international
space, denying it the appearance of parity with the PRC, and promoting
190 J. DELISLE
unification. More broadly, China’s full membership would give it more

robust options to shape the rules of the regime—and to influence future
accessions (including potentially the US’s)—in ways that suit China’s
interests and preferences. Still more broadly, China’s inclusion—or, more
accurately, avoidance of exclusion—would marginally advance its quest
for the deference and respect due a great power, second only, perhaps, to
the United States (all the more so if the US remains outside the pact).
While such prospective gains should not be gainsaid, the political upside
for China in joining the CPTPP is much less than it was with entering
the WTO, when a much poorer and weaker China sought membership as
a pivotal step in accelerating economic development and securing accep-
tance in an international order from which it had previously absented itself
or been excluded.
China’s bid for CPTPP membership can draw on many of the same
strengths that enable Beijing to stymie Taiwan’s chances and to pursue
China’s international objectives more generally. The more unrestricted
access to economic interaction with China that the PRC’s CPTPP
membership would promise is a potential lure for CPTPP members.
China’s positions as a leading trade and investment partner and a great
power—and Beijing’s demonstrated penchant for deploying carrots and
sticks to induce others to comply with its preferences—would seem to
enhance Beijing’s chances for CPTPP accession. So, too, would factors
that limit the effectiveness of opposition from Washington, including, not
least, the US’s absence from CPTPP.
Yet, Beijing’s CPTPP initiative is undercut by significant vulnerabili-
ties. The PRC’s increased ability and will to press other states on a wide
range of issues have emerged alongside—and helped foster—wariness and
opposition toward China and its agenda among critical actors, including
gatekeepers to the CPTPP. In several respects, the optimistic view of
economic engagement with China that brought widespread international
support for China’s WTO entry has faded markedly over the last two
decades.
First, and perhaps most fundamentally, worries that economic integra-
tion with and dependence on China—which China’s CPTPP membership
would promote—bring undue political risks are not limited to Taiwan.
Other states, including members of the CPTPP, have witnessed troubling
instances of China’s assertive use of economic levers to political ends.
Although some examples are ambiguous or contested, the peril is widely
perceived. Beijing threatened an export embargo on rare earths—a vital
input for electronics of which China is the predominant global supplier—

amid a flare-up of long-running maritime territorial disputes with Japan
(Bradsher 2010; King and Armstrong 2013). China limited Australian
commodity exports amid a row over Canberra’s national security concerns
about Chinese technology, cyber activities and more, and Australian criti-
cisms of China’s political behavior at home and abroad. Canadian exports
and business opportunities in China also faced restrictions in response to
Canada’s detention of a senior Huawei executive at Washington’s request.
(Reuters 2020; Kearsley 2020; Hufbauer and Jung 2020).
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (which includes seven of the eleven
CPTPP members) has drawn criticism—and questionable charges of
“debt trap diplomacy”—over concerns that China will use the economic
leverage BRI projects provide to press host states to adopt policy posi-
tions that align with Beijing’s preferences (Chellaney 2017; Truman
2018). Beijing faced allegations that its COVID-19 diplomacy (which
targeted many of the CPTPP member states) reflected a significant
political component, including offering vital public health supplies with
political strings attached, or based on the politics of its relations with
importing countries (China Power Project 2021; Lin et al. 2021; deLisle
2021b). The US-China economic conflict that surged during the Trump
presidency and continued under Biden demonstrated the potential—in
relations with China—for spiralling cycles of politically driven restrictions
on trade in vital or sensitive goods or investment in purportedly sensitive
sectors.
China has been especially likely to use economic means to pursue polit-
ical ends when Taiwan has been at issue: imposing sanctions and other
economic measures against foreign governments, officials, and firms that
have adopted positions or taken actions opposed by China on Taiwan
(Hufbauer and Jung 2020; European Parliament 2021; China Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 2022a5 ); offering material rewards (including aid packages
and prospects of increased trade and investment) to induce governments
in the Global South to switch diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing;
and adopting measures to expand or contract Taiwan’s opportunities for
economic engagement with China and others, especially in response to
moves by Taipei that Beijing sees as addressing Taiwan’s international
status (deLisle 2021a).
To be sure, the political use of economic power is a common feature
of major powers’ statecraft (Baldwin 2020). But Beijing’s version gives
192 J. DELISLE
special reasons for concern among China’s potential CPTPP counterpar-

ties, who must contemplate the prospect of China’s membership bringing
both greater economic engagement with China and greater ability of
China to influence the CPTPP’s trajectory. Principal reasons for concern
include: the vast scale of PRC trade and investment (absolutely and rela-
tive to other partners); China’s dominance in key sectors and supply chain
links; the range and types of political ends to which Beijing uses economic
leverage; and the party-state’s pervasive power to control the behaviour of
China-based economic actors (making Beijing’s efforts more potent and
harder to police under existing international rules). Each of these factors
is much more formidable at the time of China’s CPTPP bid than when
the PRC sought WTO entry a generation earlier.
Second, China faces doubts about its prospective compliance with the
requirements of the CPTPP—and the downstream consequences of non-
compliance—that are more serious than those that accompanied China’s
efforts to join the WTO. There is room for debate about whether the
gap between China’s laws, policies, and practices and WTO require-
ments in the late 1990s was more than the gap between China’s current
system and behaviour and the CPTPP’s rules. Judgments about the scale
and significance of such gaps are subjective and the gaps themselves are
not easily commensurable. But some contrasts are clear, especially in
external perceptions and expectations concerning China’s actions, which
will greatly affect China’s prospects for accession (Stephens and Kucharski
2022).
In the run-up to its successful WTO bid, China pledged substantial,
wrenching changes—including “WTO plus” obligations that exceeded
other members’ commitments (especially to monitoring) and “WTO
minus” privileges (which gave China less protection against anti-dumping
duties and export-limiting safeguards and denied China special treatment
accorded other developing and transitioning-from-socialism economies)
(Qin 2003; Gao 2007). Before achieving membership, China had
substantially reduced its trade barriers and revised many laws to become
WTO-conforming, and seemed to be on a positive trajectory. It was
widely believed that Premier Zhu Rongji and other Chinese leaders
sought WTO entry to impose external legal obligations that would help
drive market-oriented economic reforms at home (see p. 364 in Pearson
2001; Fewsmith 1999; deLisle 2006).
A principal (and notably “constructivist”—in the international relations
theory meaning of the term) premise of what would become the US’s
long-lasting policy of “constructive engagement” was that welcoming

China into the WTO and other elements of the international order would,
at least, make China more rule-following and status quo-supporting, and,
more ambitiously, foster an internal economic transformation—and, still
more aspirationally and less plausibly, political change—that would make
China more like the developed capitalist democracies that were the gate-
keepers to China’s WTO membership (Clinton White House, n.d.6 ; NY
Times 20007 ).
By the time of China’s CPTPP application, all of this has changed
markedly. Doubts are much more profound and widespread about
whether China will comply, or try to comply, with the CPTPP’s exacting
requirements—especially if reforms are not completed before accession
(Tucker 2000; People’s Republic of China 2001; WTO 2001; Ebuchi
et al. 2021). Complaints and concerns about China’s non-compliance—or
mere “paper compliance”—with WTO requirements across two decades
have been chronic and severe, breeding profound scepticism about
Beijing’s good faith and reliability (USTR 2022a; Webster 2014; Zhang
and Li 2014). Some critics have lamented that the WTO is fundamen-
tally ill-equipped to deal with the liberal-economic-order-undermining
and trade-partner-damaging consequences of China’s economic structure,
laws, policies, and actions (Wu 2016).
Third, these developments have occurred in the context of, and have
reinforced, a broader turn toward sceptical and critical views of China and
its international behaviour in the US and among some CPTPP members.
China, especially during the Xi era, has shown declining interest in conver-
gence with foreign, primarily Western, liberal norms—including but not
limited to areas addressed by the CPTPP (Tiezzi 2021). Recent PRC
statements and actions have prompted assessments abroad that Beijing
has begun to try to reshape foreign and international norms and rules
to align with Chinese models and preferences (Economy 2020; deLisle
2018). The era of constructive engagement in US China policy has
ended. Rightly or wrongly, policy debates in the US now focus on how
tough to be on China, whether constructive engagement was a terrible
mistake rooted in a dangerous delusion, and how severe and intractable a
threat China poses to a rules-based, primarily liberal, international order
and the interests of the US and other pro-status quo states, including
members of the CPTPP (deLisle and Goldstein 2021; Ikenberry 2022;
White House 2021a). Although the US may be a relatively extreme or
194 J. DELISLE
unsubtle case, such concerns are increasingly serious and evident among
CPTPP members and other states in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
China’s recalcitrance toward international collective efforts to address
the Ukraine crisis and the PRC’s de facto alignment with Russia have
entrenched such perspectives (deLisle 2022). Especially resonant in the
context of Beijing’s and Taipei’s CPTPP bids, China’s growing pressure
on Taiwan—underscored by extensive debates over the implications of
the Russia-Ukraine conflict for cross-strait scenarios, and by the military
exercises China launched after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit
to Taiwan—has prompted expressions of heightened concern about the
challenges China poses in authoritative statements issued jointly by US
and key CPTPP states’ leaders (US-Japan and US-Korea), the G7, and
the EU (White House 2021b, c, 2022a, b; EEAS 2021a, b, 2022). The
shared wariness toward China that underpins such declarations reinforces
a narrative of a bullying and disruptive China that would be a problematic
partner in vulnerability-enhancing relationships, including the CPTPP.
While views of the US-China rivalry continue to vary (including among
CPTPP members), the room for other states to avoid “choosing sides”
appears to be shrinking, to the detriment of China’s CPTPP bid (Strom-
seth 2019). In the context of China’s CPTPP bid, the US’s potential
leverage is formidable: Washington can trigger the “poison pill” clause in
the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which allows the US to
opt out of the USMCA if Mexico or Canada enters a trade agreement
(including the CPTPP) with a “non-market economy” (such as China)
(Lan 2020; Liang 2020).
United States
Unlike Taiwan and China, the United States is not, at least for now,
seeking to join the CPTPP. Washington’s influence on matters such as
others’ CPTPP bids is less than when Beijing and Taipei pursued WTO
entry in the 1990s, and less than it would be if the US had not with-
drawn from the TPP in 2017 or if it were prepared to (re)join the
CPTPP today. A key impediment to US influence is, of course, the US
not itself being a party. It cannot unilaterally block an application under
the CPTPP’s unanimity rule. Washington also has foregone the diffuse
but sometimes-decisive leverage that a leading member can exert within
a regime, bargaining with, persuading, or cajoling its fellow gatekeepers.
More broadly, foundations of US influence have eroded since the time

of the WTO’s creation and the PRC’s and Taiwan’s accessions. The
US’s share of international economic activity—the principal focus of the
CPTPP as well as the WTO—has been waning. The same is true of
US hard power, compared to the early post-Cold War years. On many
accounts, US soft power has been faltering as well (World Bank 2022a;
Djankov et al. 20218 ; Koka and Mastro 2021; Nye 2004). Much of the
relative decline is due to the rise of China, including its place in the global
economy, its economic importance to many CPTPP members, and its
greatly increased hard power. With some states and at some times, China
has also accrued substantial soft power (World Bank 2022b; DNI 2021;
Ding 2008; Repnikova 2022).
Still, the US retains significant and recently reviving resources to affect
prospects for China’s and Taiwan’s bids. Sway over CPTPP decisions is
not, of course, limited to members. The US still derives considerable
(if, in the CPTPP context, informal) influence from: its importance as
a trade and investment partner—and in several cases a security partner—
for key CPTPP member states (including Japan and Korea); its broader
economic and geopolitical clout; its resurgent, pivotal role in addressing a
wide range of now-widely-perceived and increasingly-concern-provoking
challenges posed by China; and—if it is willing to risk large economic
and diplomatic costs—the ability to threaten an end to the USMCA to
coerce Canada or Mexico to block China’s CPTPP entry. The US thus
can still expect to affect the decisions of current CPTPP members that act
as gatekeepers to the PRC and Taiwan. In supporting Taiwan’s candidacy
or, more clearly, in impeding China’s, US efforts would have the addi-
tional advantage of targeting an audience that is increasingly receptive to
critical views of China.
The challenges for US efforts to affect CPTPP decisions—and the
trajectory of a liberal international economic order more generally—are
only partly problems of limited and diminished capacity. They are also
issues of questionable will. During the early 1990s, the US had taken
the lead in creating the WTO as an ambitious, substantively more expan-
sive, and legally and institutionally more robust successor to the original
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). At the end of the
decade, the US’s consent was the most significant remaining factor in
determining when China’s quest for accession (to the GATT from 1986
and the WTO from its inception) would succeed. Washington demanded
that China make extensive changes and promises to change—explicitly
196 J. DELISLE
to adopt market-regarding and internationally open economic laws and

policies and implicitly to undertake institutional and structural changes
that were presumed to be prerequisites to, or consequences of, fulfilling
general WTO requirements and China’s specific WTO pledges (in its
protocol of accession) (Clinton White House 2000; Abbot 1998).
At the TPP’s inception, US agendas and aims were less ambitious. The
Obama administration framed the TPP as a gold-standard accord, one
that would reach beyond the WTO, and that was the US’s more liberal
entry in a competition with China over who would “write the rules of
the global economy for the twenty-first century” (Obama 2016; Obama
White House, n.d.). The tone was still-relatively-high US confidence, but
in a newly ideationally tinged struggle in which the US and like-minded
states were on the right side.
By the mid-2010s, this vision had darkened further. The TPP was
stalled in Congress during the final months of Obama’s presidency. Both
major party candidates—Clinton and Trump—criticized the pact. Once
in power, Trump withdrew from the TPP, leaving Japan to pick up the
pieces and forge a shrunken CPTPP. Although the Biden administration
moved away from the heated and erratic economic nationalism of its
predecessor and moderated the volatility and virulence of the Trump-era
approach to China, it did not return to Obama-era, or earlier, baselines.
Biden declared that “China’s goal” of “becom[ing] the leading…wealth-
iest….most powerful country in the world” is “not going to happen on
my watch” (Renshaw et al. 2021).
The Biden administration has been less willing to embrace the asserted
virtues of trade liberalism than its pre-Trump predecessors. It has reaf-
firmed that the US would “not rejoin the TPP as it was initially put
forward” (White House 2021d). It has retained Trump’s tariffs, bans on
some Chinese firms from access to crucial US inputs and markets, and
other restrictions targeting China (at least partly because of the domestic
political consequences of removing restrictions without reciprocal conces-
sions from Beijing). It has continued the long-developing “securitization”
of US foreign economic policy, invoking national security concerns to
restrict trade (especially in sensitive high technology) and inbound invest-
ment, especially from China. It has adopted elements of what in other
systems would be called industrial policy—including subsidies and protec-
tionist barriers to promote industries deemed vital or promising for future
national economic strength. Some of these measures are found in headline
initiatives and legislation, such as Build Back Better, the US Innovation
and Competition Act (USICA)/America COMPETES Act/CHIPS and

Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act (Bader 2022; Khalid 2021;
Deese 2021; White House 2021e).
In lieu of the CPTPP, the Biden administration offered IPEF (White
House 2022c; Curran and Jamrisko 2022). While IPEF includes commit-
ments to principles found in the CPTPP and arguably goes farther in
addressing cutting-edge issues in the management of a largely liberal
international economic order (such as data privacy, anti-corruption stan-
dards, sustainability, and supply chain resilience), IPEF is in crucial ways
less than the CPTPP—or the former TPP. Its substantive scope is more
limited. It lacks the CPTPP’s structure as a multilateral pact with distinct
institutions for interpretation and enforcement. It seeks to substitute a
series of overlapping bilateral deals for a full-fledged multilateral treaty.
At its launch, IPEF did not appear to spawn the breadth and depth of
enthusiasm the TPP had attracted.
Like the TPP/CPTPP, IPEF excluded Taiwan from the inaugural
group, despite Taiwan’s strongly expressed interest in joining (Taiwan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022c; CNA 2022b). This omission—partly
driven by other IPEF states’ concerns about the pressure China would
exert if Taiwan were included—denies Taiwan the gains, in terms of inter-
national status, that could have come from membership in the US-led
regional trade initiative. Taiwan’s exclusion broadly reprises the pattern
in the initial rounds of the TPP and the WTO—and which continues
under the CPTPP.
These disappointing developments for Taiwan have been tempered by
the Biden administration’s pledges to engage Taiwan in ways that parallel
IPEF (principally, the US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade) and
the reinvigoration of discussions of a US-Taiwan FTA (with, at best,
still-uncertain prospects of success) (Sacks and Hillman 2021; USTR
2021a, 2022b; White House 2022d; Lawder 2022). Such moves come
in the context of a broader trend of offering more robust US support
for Taiwan and its international space. Other Biden administration signals
of strengthened support for Taiwan have included: statements that US
support for Taiwan is “rock solid”; calls for Taiwan’s participation in
high-profile international organizations (including restoration of Taiwan’s
access to the WHA annual meeting amid the COVID crisis); condem-
nation of China’s economic coercion of Taiwan; and comments from
the President that were widely interpreted as implying a clearer commit-
ment to defend Taiwan from military pressure by China (to the point
198 J. DELISLE
where some observers inferred an end to the long-standing norm of

“strategic ambiguity”) (US Department of State 20219 ; Blinken 2021a;
Wei 202110 ; White House 2022e; CBS News 2022; Kanno-Youngs and
Baker 2022).
Congress, too, has been unprecedentedly active in passing ‘pro-
Taiwan’ legislation, much of it speaking to issues of Taiwan’s international
status. Congress has called on the administration to support Taiwan’s
membership or participation in international organizations, to pursue
closer diplomatic and military cooperation and visits by higher-level offi-
cials (some of which have been undertaken), and to reward or punish
other states that make, retain, or break diplomatic ties with Taipei (Taiwan
Travel Act 2018; TAIPEI Act 2020; Asia Reassurance Initiative Act 2018;
Reuters 2021; Wang 202211 ; Pollard 2022; CNA 2022c). A bipartisan
group in Congress called on the Biden administration to include Taiwan
in IPEF (Menendez et al. 2022).
All of this has been reinforced by an ideational element. Since Taiwan’s
democratic transition (fully achieved only a few years before WTO entry),
the US has routinely stressed Taiwan’s stature as a liberal democracy. This
pattern continued, and arguably sharpened, around the time of Taiwan’s
CPTPP bid. One illustration is the Biden administration’s inviting Taiwan
to its Summit for Democracy. Such moves emphasize Taiwan’s higher-
status place on what the US and other liberal democracies—including key
CPTPP members—have framed as the right side of a normative divide
from (and competition with) autocracies (including China) (Blinken
2021b12 ; White House 2021f, g13 ).
Across these dimensions, there are elements of substantial and
increased US support for Taiwan’s international status that would be
further enhanced by Taiwan’s CPTPP accession. Still, what the US is
currently willing and able to muster to help Taiwan’s bid—on its own
or in concert with others—is unlikely to be enough to secure success any
time soon.
At the same time, US skepticism toward China’s CPTPP gambit can
damage China’s already-weak chances, especially given the similar views
and closer cooperation on China-related issues that have emerged among
the US, key CPTPP members, and other like-minded states. Washington
has been, unsurprisingly, less than enthusiastic about China’s prospective
CPTPP membership.14 The US’s escalating critiques of China’s economic
model and its international economic policies and behaviours—including
departures from liberal, market-oriented, and level-playing-field norms
(USTR 2021b; Meltzer and Shenai 2019)—read like a brief against

China’s case for CPTPP membership.
The turn toward more adversarial US-China relations—reflected in the
Trump and Biden administrations’ designation of China as a strategic
competitor (Trump White House 2017; White House 2021h) and many
harsh rhetorical exchanges with Beijing—implies an aversion in Wash-
ington toward developments that would enhance China’s international
influence, stature, and economic opportunities, especially relative to the
United States. A CPTPP that includes China but not the US would—
on almost all analyses—mean a win for China and a loss for the US in
terms of GDP growth and shares of global trade. It would also be a polit-
ical blow, giving credibility to China’s claim, prevalent in the post-Global
Financial Crisis era, that China (and not the US) is a leading supporter of
economic globalization (World Economic Forum 2017; China Ministry
of Foreign Affairs 201415 ). The contrast to what was expected when
the US was pushing for the original, China-excluding TPP would be a
striking—and unwelcome—instalment in the narrative that the US has
retreated from world leadership while China has advanced.
A Protracted Contest Over

an Elusive and Shrinking Prize?
CPTPP membership is unlikely in the near future for Taiwan, the PRC,
or the United States. With China’s stern opposition and the US’s
constrained support, Taiwan’s chances are slim. China’s CPTPP bid faces
significant questions on the merits and deepening doubts among CPTPP
gatekeepers about China’s possible actions and aims as a CPTPP member.
The US is not yet reconsidering its withdrawal from the TPP, and such
a reversal would face significant resistance domestically (White House
2022f).
Moving to decide soon on Taiwan’s and China’s applications would
be contentious, subjecting CPTPP members to considerable pressure,
including from China and likely from the United States. The process
could strain the still-new institution and create rifts among its members.
For the applicants, a negative resolution—the most likely outcome if
a decision were reached promptly—would be costly, especially politi-
cally. For Taiwan, it would be a definitive rebuke—rather than mere
protracted ambiguity—in its pursuit of modestly enhanced international
status. For China, rejection could validate the storyline that China is
200 J. DELISLE
not a responsible stakeholder in prominent international organizations.

A forced—rather than a US-style self-imposed—exclusion would be a
setback for China’s Xi-era pursuit of full acceptance as a normal great
power. For the US, a high-profile and high-stakes tussle over Taipei’s and
Beijing’s applications could reemphasize the harm to the US’s interna-
tional stature that attended opting out of the TPP. On that score, China’s
accession would be still worse for the US and would further reduce the
prospects for the US’s return (which is an outcome sought by several
CPTPP members).
In this context, delay is the most likely and probably the wisest course
for all concerned. While the China-Taiwan dynamic is unlikely to improve
any time soon, other factors affecting the CPTPP’s future might. The
UK’s less contentious bid has proceeded, expanding the pact’s economic
scale and geographic reach, proving that orderly accession is possible, and
perhaps paving the way for still more entries. The US might move toward
some degree of reengagement with the CPTPP, and reentry is not defini-
tively off the table. The Biden administration has left the door slightly ajar
(White House 2021d, 2022d16 ). Rejoining the agreement would dove-
tail with fundamental elements of current US foreign policy, including the
focus on countering China, supporting a rules-based international order,
and aligning with like-minded states. The view is widely and deeply held
in US policy and some political circles that walking away from the TPP/
CPTPP was a significant unforced error (Carper and Cornyn 2021; Solis
2017; Heath 2017). If such developments were to occur, a more WTO-
like solution to Taipei’s and Beijing’s concurrent CPTPP bids might
become more plausible or, at least, rejection or withdrawal of their appli-
cations might be less damaging to what likely would be a more robust
and resilient CPTPP.
While the prize—membership for China and Taiwan and revived
interest in membership from the US—is, thus, likely to remain elusive
in the near term, it may also be of diminishing value. For all its impres-
sively liberal contents and broad substantive scope, the CPTPP (unlike the
WTO) will not be a near-universal-membership organization nor an inter-
national economic institution clearly without peers (given the RCEP, the
EU, and other recently created multilateral economic accords). The polit-
ical importance of membership (or exclusion) is further cabined by the
CPTPP’s limited normative heft. The CPTPP has come into existence in
an era of doubt about the wisdom or desirability of liberal trading regimes
(when measured against the baselines of when the WTO was founded and
China and Taiwan joined).
The “low politics” of trade and economic interdependence loomed
large in the early post-Cold War era. They helped make the WTO so
central an institution, and membership such a marker of acceptance and
importance, in the international order. This is no longer the case. CPTPP
membership decisions are significantly more likely to be seen as “politi-
cal” amid the sharpening US-China rivalry (again, in contrast to the more
benign tone in US-China relations on the eve of China’s and Taiwan’s
WTO accessions). Economic issues have become more “securitized,” and
traditional—and nontraditional—security issues have again taken center
stage in international affairs, not least due to China’s rise and growing
tensions with the United States. Large-scale war—including across the
Taiwan Strait and between great powers—seems a less remote possibility
than it was in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In such contexts, the
CPTPP and membership in it (and other international economic orga-
nizations) are likely to matter less, including for issues of members’ and
non-members’ international status and stature—and much else.
Notes
1. These issues are discussed in later sections of this chapter. Taiwan has been
in active discussions with other CPTPP members about its bid and the
UK has sent notably positive signals (CNA 2022a; Office of the President
2022).
2. Statement by spokesperson Zhao Lijun that “China firmly opposes all offi-
cial interactions between Taiwan and any country, firmly rejects Taiwan’s
accession to any agreement or organization of official nature. China’s
position on this issue is clear.” Zhao also rejected the WTO precedent.
3. Explaining China’s actions against Lithuania.
4. These issues are addressed in more detail later in this chapter.
5. Sanctions on US officials and firms over Taiwan issues, including arms
sales.
6. WTO membership “will entangle China more deeply in a rules-based
international system and change China internally.”
7. Transcript of speech by President Clinton asserting that WTO entry is
the “…most significant opportunity…to create positive change in China”
including political reform.
8. Trade’s rise as percentage of GDP is lower for the US than for other
advanced economies. Other measures also point to US economic “disen-
gagement”.
202 J. DELISLE
9. Stating “rock-solid” support.

10. Concerning economic coercion.
11. Concerning visits by former high-ranking national security and defense
officials.
12. “Taiwan is a critical partner to the United States and a democratic success
story.”
13. Concerning contests between democracy and autocracy and between the
US and China.
14. The initial reaction from the White House to China’s bid was muted and
perhaps disingenuous: “we’d leave it to those countries”—that is, CPTPP
members—“to, certainly, determine” (White House 2021d).
15. Li Keqiang speech at Davos World Economic Forum.
16. Remarks of Katherine Tai.
References
Abbot, F.M. (1998). China’s Accession to the WTO. American Society of Inter-
national Law Insights, 3(1). https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/3/issue/
1/chinas-accession-wto. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Alden, E. (2020, September 22). Preparing for a world without the World
Trade Organization. World Politics Review. https://www.worldpoliticsre
view.com/articles/29074/after-the-trump-trade-wars-prepare-for-a-world-wit
hout-the-wto. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018. (2018). Public Law 115-409, 115th
Congress.
Bader, J.A. (2022, January 25). Biden’s China policy needs to be more than
just Trump lite. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2022/01/25/bidens-china-policy-needs-to-be-more-than-just-trump-
lite/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Baldwin, D.A. (2020). Economic statecraft. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Baldwin, R. (2016). The World Trade Organization and the future of multilat-
eralism. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(1), 95–116.
Blanchette, J., & Polk, A. (2020, August 24). Dual circulation and China’s new
hedged integration strategy. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/dual-circul
ation-and-chinas-new-hedged-integration-strategy. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Blinken, A.J. (2021a, October 26). Supporting Taiwan’s participation in the UN
system. US Department of State. https://www.state.gov/supporting-taiwans-
participation-in-the-un-system/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Blinken, A.J. (2021b, October 26). Tweet. https://twitter.com/secblinken/sta
tus/1452997840825892881. Twitter. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Bown, C.P. (2016). Mega-regional trade agreements and the future of the WTO.
Global Policy, 8(1), 107–112.
Bradsher, K. (2010, September 22). Amid tension, China blocks vital exports to
Japan. New York Times, p. B1.
Carper, T., & Cornyn, J. (2021, June 13). The US needs to learn
from its TPP mistake—And get back its seat at the table. Washington
Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/06/13/dont-cede-
asia-pacific-china-us-must-learn-its-tpp-mistake/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
CBS News. (2022, September 18). President Joe Biden: The 2022 60 Minutes
interview. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/president-joe-biden-60-minutes-
interview-transcript-2022-09-18/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
CEIC Data. (2022). Taiwan total trade of goods and services: % of
nominal GDP. https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/taiwan/total-trade-
of-goods--services--of-nominal-gdp. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Charnovitz, S. (2006). Taiwan’s WTO membership and its international implica-
tions. Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy, 1(2),
401–431.
Chang, C., & Yang, A.H. (2020). Weaponized interdependence: China’s
economic statecraft and social penetration against Taiwan. Orbis, 64(2),
312–333.
China Power Project. (2021). Is China’s Covid-19 diplomacy succeeding? Center
for Strategic and International Studies. https://chinapower.csis.org/china-
covid-medical-vaccine-diplomacy/. Accessed 5 Jan 2023.
Chellaney, B. (2017, January 23). China’s debt trap diplomacy. Project
Syndicate. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-
one-road-loans-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-01. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Clinton White House. (n.d.). The Clinton presidency: A foreign policy for
the global age. https://clintonwhitehouse5.archives.gov/WH/Accomplishme
nts/eightyears-10.html. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Clinton White House. (2000, March 8). The US-China WTO acces-
sion deal: A strong deal in the best interests of America. Office of
the Press Secretary. https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/textonly/WH/
New/html/20000308_1.html. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
CNA. (2022a, November 21). No current objections to Taiwan CPTPP bid:
Foreign Minister. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202211210006. Accessed
11 Jan 2023.
CNA. (2022b, May 22). Taiwan not part of new Indo-Pacific economic initia-
tive: White House. Focus Taiwan. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202205
220020. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
CNA. (2022c). Funding bill giving loan to Taiwan to buy arms signed into law.
Focus Taiwan. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202212300005. Accessed 11
Jan 2023.
204 J. DELISLE
Congressional Research Service. (2021, September 24). China and Taiwan both
seek to join the CPTPP. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/
IN11760. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Curran, E., & Jamrisko, M. (2022, May 24). Understanding IPEF and how it
counters China’s clout. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/energy/understanding-ipef-and-how-it-counters-chinas-clout-quickt
ake/2022/05/23/078b6b18-da99-11ec-bc35-a91d0a94923b_story.html.
Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Deese, B. (2021, June 23). The Biden White House plan for a new US industrial
policy. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/tra
nscript/the-biden-white-house-plan-for-a-new-us-industrial-policy/. Accessed
31 Oct 2022.
deLisle, J. (2000). The Chinese puzzle of Taiwan’s status. Orbis, 44(1), 35–62.
deLisle, J. (2006). China and the WTO. In J. deLisle, T.J. Cheng, & D. Brown
(Eds.), China Under Hu Jintao (pp. 229–292). Singapore: World Scientific
Press.
deLisle, J. (2009, May 13). Taiwan in the World Health Assembly: A victory,
with limits. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/taiwan-in-the-
world-health-assembly-a-victory-with-limits/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
deLisle, J. (2016). Taiwan’s Quest for International Space. Orbis, 60(4), 550–
574.
deLisle, J. (2018, October 24). The Chinese model of law, China’s agenda
in international law, and implications for democracy in Asia and beyond.
ASAN Forum. https://theasanforum.org/the-chinese-model-of-law-chinas-
agenda-in-international-law-and-implications-for-democracy-in-asia-and-bey
ond/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
deLisle, J. (2021a). Taiwan’s quest for international space in the Tsai era:
Adapting old strategies to new circumstances. In J.T. Dreyer & J. deLisle
(Eds.), Taiwan in the era of Tsai Ing-wen (pp. 239–283). London: Routledge.
deLisle, J. (2021b). The COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitics in the Indo-
Pacific: A view from the United States. Joint US-Korea Academic Studies,
32, 31–61.
deLisle, J. (2022). China’s Russia/Ukraine problem, and why it’s bad for almost
everyone else too. Orbis, 66(3), 404–423.
deLisle, J., & Goldstein, A. (2021). Rivalry and security in a new era for
US-China relations. In J. deLisle & A. Goldstein (Eds.), After engage-
ment: Dilemmas in US-China security relations (pp. 1–47). Washington, DC:
Brookings.
Ding, S. (2008). To build a “harmonious world”: China’s soft power wielding
in the global south. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 13(2), 193–213.
Djankov, S., Huang, T., Jung, E., Kister, M., Li, H., Posen, A.S., Sarsen-
bayev, M., Xu, D., & Zhang, E. (2021, April 19). The United States has
been disengaging from the global economy. Peterson Institute for Interna-
tional Economics. https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/united-states-
has-been-disengaging-global-economy. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Drun, J., & Glaser, B. (2022, March). The distortion of UN Resolution 2758
to limit Taiwan’s access to the United Nations. German Marshall Fund of the
United States. https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Drun%
26Glaser-distortion-un-resolution-2758-limit-taiwans-access.pdf. Accessed 31
Oct 2022.
Duesterberg, T.J. (2021, November 29). The WTO’s fast track to irrelevance.
Wall Street Journal (Online). https://www.wsj.com/articles/world-trade-
organization-fast-track-irrelevance-tpp-cptpp-china-ministerial-conference-omi
cron-11638201072. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Ebuchi, T., Kawate, I., & Hoyama, T. (2021, September 18). China’s SPTPP
bid greeted with skepticism and caution. Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.
com/Economy/Trade/China-s-CPTPP-bid-greeted-with-skepticism-and-cau
tion. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Economist. (2020, November 15). The meaning of RCEP, the world’s biggest
trade agreement. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/
2020/11/15/the-meaning-of-rcep-the-worlds-biggest-trade-agreement.
Economy, EC. (2020, March 13). Exporting the China Model, Testimony
before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Council on
Foreign Relations. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/testimonies/
USCCTestimony3-13-20%20(Elizabeth%20Economy)_justified.pdf. Accessed
31 Oct 2022.
European External Action Service (EEAS). (2021a, May 5). G7 foreign and
development ministers’ meeting: Communiqué. https://www.eeas.europa.
eu/eeas/g7-foreign-and-development-ministers%E2%80%99-meeting-com
muniqu%C3%A9_en. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
European External Action Service (EEAS). (2021b, October 19). EU-Taiwan
political relations and cooperation: Speech on Behalf of High Representative/
Vice President Josep Borrell at the EP Plenary. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/
eeas/eu-taiwan-political-relations-and-cooperation-speech-behalf-high-repres
entativevice-president_en. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
European Parliament. (2021). Resolution of 20 May 2021 on Chinese Counter-
sanctions on EU Entities and MEPs and MPs. https://www.europarl.europa.
eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0255_EN.html. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
European Union External Action (EEAS). (2022, April 6). EU-China Summit:
Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell at the EP
206 J. DELISLE
Plenary. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-china-summit-speech-high-rep
resentativevice-president-josep-borrell-ep-plenary_en. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Fewsmith, J. (1999, December 1). China and the WTO: The politics behind the
agreement. NBR Analysis, 10(5), 23–39.
Freeman, C. (2021, October 7). How will China’s Bid to join a trans-pacific
trade pact affect regional stability? US Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.
org/publications/2021/10/how-will-chinas-bid-join-trans-pacific-trade-pact-
affect-regional-stability. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Gao, H. (2007). China’s participation in the WTO: A lawyer’s perspective.
Singapore Yearbook of International Law, 11, 41–74.
Goto, S. (2021, November 19). The CPTPP isn’t just a trade deal for Taiwan,
it’s a survival plan. East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/
2021/11/19/the-cptpp-isnt-just-a-trade-deal-for-taiwan-its-a-survival-plan/.
Heath, T. (2017, February 2). Strategic consequences of US withdrawal
from TPP. RAND. https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/03/strategic-conseq
uences-of-us-withdrawal-from-tpp.html. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Higgins, A. (2022, February 21). In an uneven fight with China, a tiny country’s
brand becomes toxic. New York Times (Online). https://www.nytimes.com/
2022/02/21/world/europe/china-lithuania-taiwan-trade.html. Accessed 31
Oct 2022.
Hille, K., & White, E. (2021, September 22). Taiwan follows China with bid to
join transpacific trade pact. Financial Times (Online). https://www.ft.com/
content/cc1e4e0a-803d-43be-9f4d-ba9980a5c203. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Hirschman, A.O. (1945). National power and the structure of foreign trade.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Hsieh, P.L. (2005). Facing China: Taiwan’s status as a separate customs territory
in the World Trade Organization. Journal of World Trade, 39(6), 1195–1221.
Hufbauer, G.C., & Jung, E. (2020, December 14). China plays the sanc-
tions game, anticipating a bad US habit. Peterson Institute for Inter-
national Economics. https://www.piie.com/blogs/china-economic-watch/
china-plays-sanctions-game-anticipating-bad-us-habit. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Ikenberry, G.J. (2022, March–April). A rival of America’s making? The debate
over Washington’s China strategy. Foreign Affairs, 101(2), 172–175.
Kaeding, M.P. (2015). Resisting Chinese influence: Social movements in Hong
Kong and Taiwan. Current History, 114(773), 210–216.
Kanno-Youngs, Z., & Baker, P. (2022, May 23). Biden pledges to defend Taiwan
if it faces a Chinese attack. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/
2022/05/23/world/asia/biden-taiwan-china.html. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Kearsley, J. (2020, November 18). China shows official list of reasons for anger
with Australia. 9News. https://www.9news.com.au/national/china-austra
lia-tensions-beijing-government-grievance-list-with-canberra/adc10554-e4e9-
4a19-970e-81949501a1ad. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Khalid, A. (2021, October 4). Biden is keeping key parts of Trump’s China
trade policy. Here’s why. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2021/10/04/104302
7789/biden-is-keeping-key-parts-of-trumps-china-trade-policy-heres-why?t=
1653892387445. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
King, A., & Armstrong, S. (2013, August 18). Did China really ban rare
earth metals exports to Japan? East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.
org/2013/08/18/did-china-really-ban-rare-earth-metals-exports-to-japan/.
Koka, A., & Mastro, O.S. (2021, January 15). The Soft War that America is
losing. Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. https://
fsi.stanford.edu/news/soft-war-america-losing. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Lan (2020). The poison pill in the USMCA: The erosion of WTO princi-
ples and its implications under a US-China trade war. Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law, 53(3), 1265–1326.
Lawder, D. (2022, June 3). US-Taiwan trade talks could outpace Indo-Pacific
effort, USTR official says. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/
us-taiwan-trade-talks-could-outpace-indo-pacific-effort-ustr-official-2022-
06-03/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Lester, S., & Zhu, H. (2021, September 21). China formally applies to join
CPTPP: Issues, reactions, and prospects. China Trade Monitor. https://
www.chinatrademonitor.com/china-formally-applies-to-join-cptpp-issues-rea
ctions-and-prospects/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Liang, Y. (2020, January 6). US poison pill clause harmful to free trade.
China Daily. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202001/06/WS5e127b7
4a310cf3e35582919.html. Accessed 11 Jan 2023.
Lin, B., Funaiole, M.P., Hart, B., & Price, H. (2021, September 30). China
is exploiting the pandemic to advance its interests, with mixed results.
CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-exploiting-pandemic-advance-its-
interests-mixed-results. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Lin, J.Y., & Wang, X. (2022). Dual circulation: A new structural economics
view of development. Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 20(4),
303–322.
Lin, Y., & Shieh, J.F. (2017). Change and continuity in Taiwan’s public opinion
on the cross-strait economic interactions. Journal of Asian and African
Studies, 52(8), 1103–1116.
Marukawa, T. (2021). Dependence and Competition: Trade Relationship
Between Asian Countries and China. Journal of Contemporary East Asian
Studies, 10(2), 246–261.
Matsuda, Y. (2015). Cross-strait relations under the Ma Ying-jeou administra-
tion: From economic to political dependence?. Journal of Contemporary East
Asia Studies, 4(2), 3–35.
208 J. DELISLE
Mayger, J., & Li, J. (2021, September 29). Taiwan joining WTO is not
precedent of CPTPP, China says. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2021-09-29/taiwan-joining-wto-is-not-a-precedent-for-cptpp-
china-says. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
McGee, R.W., & Yoon, Y. (2015, October 30). China reluctant to join the
“anyone but China” club. China Daily. https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/
201510/30/WS5a3090f5a3108bc8c672c620.html. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Meltzer, J.P., & Shenai, N. (2019, February 28). The US-China economic
relationship: A comprehensive approach. Brookings. https://www.brooki
ngs.edu/research/the-us-china-economic-relationship-a-comprehensive-app
roach/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Menendez, R., Risch, J.E., Cardin, B.L., Blackburn, M., Carper, T.R., Crapo,
M., Duckworth, T., Cramer, K., Hassan, M.W., Grassley, C.E., Kaine, T.,
Hyde-Smith, C., Manchin, J., Fischer, D., Murray, P., Capito, S.M., Padilla,
A., Boozman, J., Peters, G.C., Marshall, R., Rosen, J., Tillis, T., Shaheen,
J., Blunt, R., Sinema, K., Hagerty, B., Wyden, R., Young, T., Blumenthal,
R., Sasse, B., Sullivan, D., Rubio, M., Lankford, J., Rounds, M.M., Barrasso,
J., Braun, M., Portman, R., Collins, S.M., Hoeven, J., Moran, J., Lummis,
C.M., Graham, L.O., Wicker, R.F., Thune, J., Cornyn, J., Ernst, J.K.,
Toomey, P., Daines, S., Murkowski, L., Scott, R., Johnson, R., & Scott,
T. (2022, May 18). Letter to President Biden. https://www.foreign.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/220518%20-%20TO%20POTUS%20-%20Taiwan%20I
PEF%20Letter.pdf. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China. (2022). China FTA
Network. http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/fta_qianshu.shtml. Accessed 31
Oct 2022.
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China. (2022). FTAs signed with
trading partners. Bureau of Foreign Trade. https://www.trade.gov.tw/eng
lish/Pages/List.aspx?nodeID=672. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China. (2014, January 22).
Li Keqiang: Reshaping the world economy through reform, opening up
and cooperation. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_6
65391/201401/t20140122_678131.html. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China. (2021a, September
23). Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Confer-
ence. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/
2511_665403/202109/t20210923_9580315.html. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China. (2021b, November 21).
Statement by Ministry of foreign Affairs. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_
eng/wjbxw/202111/t20211121_10451002.html. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China. (2022a, February

21). Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Confer-
ence. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United
States. http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/lcbt/wjbfyrbt/202202/t20220
221_10644075.htm. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China. (2022b, July
22). Transcript of Ambassador Qin Gang’s fireside chat at the Aspen
Security Forum. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_
665342/zwbd_665378/202207/t20220722_10726091.html. Accessed 11
Jan 2022.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan). (2021a, June 1). MOFA
Thanks the International Community for Unprecedented Support of Taiwan’s
Participation in the WHA. https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=
1328&s=95949. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan). (2021b, September 23).
Regarding the matter of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressing its
opposition to Taiwan’s application to join the CPTPP, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs responded as follows. https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?
n=95&sms=73&s=96510. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan). (2022a). The Path to
comprehensive and progressive integration in Asia-Pacific region. https://ws.
mofa.gov.tw/Download.ashx?u=LzAwMS9VcGxvYWQvNDAyL3JlbGZpbG
UvMjAvNDg1L2EyOWFmNDhmLTJlMzMtNDJiNS1iZTFjLWM1NmEwY
zAxNTY2Yi5wZGY%3D&n=MTA5MDYzMOaUv%2BetluaWh%2BS7tkNQV
FBQX%2BiLseaWhy5wZGY%3D. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan). (2022b). Taiwan’s
Meaningful Participation in the ICAO Assembly. https://subsite.mofa.gov.
tw/igo/News_Content.aspx?n=CD0EC8D01432D27B&sms=B6999C101
1992A87&s=56791DB35EF036A9. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan). (2022c, May 22).
Response to US White House National Security Advisor Sullivan’s disclosure
in an interview that Taiwan was not included in the first round of participating
countries in the “Indo-Pacific economic framework.” https://www.mofa.gov.
tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&s=97882. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Niewenhuis, L. (2021, October 28). China warns that Taiwan’s push for
international space presents “seismic risks.” SupChina. https://supchina.
com/2021/10/28/china-warns-that-taiwans-push-for-international-space-
presents-seismic-risks/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Noland, M. (2018). US trade policy in the Trump administration. Asian
Economic Policy Review, 13(2), 262–278.
NY Times. (2000, March 9). Full text of Clinton’s speech on China
Trade Bill. https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/
asia/030900clinton-china-text.html. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
210 J. DELISLE
Nye, J.S., Jr. (2004, May/June). The decline of America’s soft power.
Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2004-05-01/dec
line-americas-soft-power. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Obama White House. (n.d.). The Trans-Pacific Partnership: What you need to
know about President Obama’s trade agreement. https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/issues/economy/trade. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Obama, B. (2016, May 2). The TPP would let America, not China, lead the
way on global trade. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opi
nions/president-obama-the-tpp-would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-
on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-0fd0-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_
story.html. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). (2021, March). Global
trends 2040: A more contested world. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2
040-home. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Office of the President. (2022, November 9). President Tsai meets UK Minister
of State for Trade Policy Greg Hands. https://english.president.gov.tw/
NEWS/6384. Accessed 10 Jan 2023.
Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). (2021a, June 30).
United States and Taiwan hold dialogue on trade and investment priorities.
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/
june/united-states-and-taiwan-hold-dialogue-trade-and-investment-priorities.
Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). (2021b). Remarks
as prepared for delivery of Ambassador Katherine Tai outlining the Biden-
Harris administration’s “new approach to the US-China Trade relationship”.
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/speeches-and-rem
arks/2021/october/remarks-prepared-delivery-ambassador-katherine-tai-out
lining-biden-harris-administrations-new. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Okonjo-Iweala, N. (2021, June 22). Remarks by DG Okonjo-Iweala,
100th session of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements.
World Trade Organization. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spno_e/
spno10_e.htm. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Pearson, M.M. (2001). The case of China’s accession to GATT/WTO. In D.M.
Lampton (Ed.), The making of Chinese foreign and security policy in the era of
reform, 1978–2000 (pp. 337–370). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
People’s Republic of China. (2001, December 12). Permanent mission of the
People’s Republic of China to the UN, China’s position on issues related to
its accession to the World Trade Organization. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/
ceun/eng/zt/wto/t28923.htm. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Petri, P.A., & Plummer, M.G. (2020), Should China join the new trans-pacific
partnership? China and World Economy, 28(2), 18–36.
Pollard, M.Q. (2022, April 7). China warns US against Speaker Pelosi visit
to Taiwan. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-warns-
strong-measures-if-us-speaker-pelosi-visits-taiwan-2022-04-07/. Accessed 31
Oct 2022.
Qin, J.Y. (2003). “WTO-plus” obligations and their implications for the WTO
legal system: An appraisal of the China accession protocol. Journal of World
Trade, 37(3), 483–522.
Renshaw, J., Shalal, A., & Martina, M. (2021, March 25). Biden says China
won’t surpass US as global leader on his watch. Reuters. https://www.reu
ters.com/article/us-usa-biden-china/biden-says-china-wont-surpass-u-s-as-
global-leader-on-his-watch-idUSKBN2BH2ZE. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Repnikova, M. (2022). Chinese soft power. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Reuters (2020, December 11). Timeline: Tension between China and Australia
over commodities trade. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-trade-
china-commodities-tim-idUSKBN28L0D8. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Reuters. (2021, January 7). Factbox: Recent Taiwan visits by top US offi-
cials. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-usa-diplomacy-factbox/fac
tbox-recent-taiwan-visits-by-top-u-s-officials-idUSKBN29C16B. Accessed 31
Oct 2022.
Rowen, I. (2015). Inside Taiwan’s sunflower movement. Journal of Asian
Studies, 74(1), 5–21.
Sacks, D. & Hillman, J. (2021, June 14). The time is now for a trade deal with
Taiwan. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/time-now-
trade-deal-taiwan. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Sampson, M. (2021). The evolution of China’s regional trade agreements: Power
dynamics and the future of the Asia-Pacific. Pacific Review, 34(2), 259–289.
Schott, J.J. (2022, January 3). Which countries are in the CPTPP and
RCEP trade agreements and which want in? Peterson Institute for Inter-
national Economics. https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/which-cou
ntries-are-cptpp-and-rcep-trade-agreements-and-which-want. Accessed 31 Oct
2022.
Schott, J.J., Cimino-Isaacs, C., Lu, Z., & Miner, S. (2016, September).
Prospects for Taiwan’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. PIIE
Briefing 16–7. https://www.piie.com/publications/piie-briefings/prospects-
taiwans-participation-trans-pacific-partnership. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Seppanen, S. (2018). Chinese legal development assistance: Which rule of law?
Whose pragmatism? Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 51(1), 101–
158.
212 J. DELISLE
Shapiro, D. (2013, March 11). Taiwan economy: Near-term uptick, longer-

term challenges. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/taiwan-
economy-near-term-uptick-longer-term-challenges/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Shattuck, T.J. (2020). The race to Zero?: China’s poaching of Taiwan’s
diplomatic allies. Orbis, 64(2), 334–352.
Shinn, D.H., & Eisenman, J. (2020). Evolving principles and guiding concepts:
How China gains African support for its core national interests. Orbis, 64(2),
271–288.
Solis, M. (2017, March 24). Trump withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2017/03/
24/trump-withdrawing-from-the-trans-pacific-partnership/. Accessed 31 Oct
2022.
Solis, M. (2021, September 23). China moves to join the CPTPP, but don’t
expect a fast pass. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2021/09/23/china-moves-to-join-the-cptpp-but-dont-expect-a-fast-
pass/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Stephens, H., & Kucharski, J. (2022, November 15). The CPTPP bids of
China and Taiwan: Issues and implications. Asia Pacific Foundation of
Canada Policy Briefs. https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/cptpp-bids-of-
china-and-taiwan-issues-and-implications. Accessed 11 Jan 2023
Stromseth, J. (2019, October). Don’t Make Us Choose: Southeast Asia in the
Throes of US-China Rivalry. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/res
earch/dont-make-us-choose-southeast-asia-in-the-throes-of-us-china-rivalry/.
Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative. (TAIPEI) Act
of 2019 (2020). Public Law 116–135, 134 Stat. 278, 116th Congress.
Taiwan Travel Act. (2018). HR 535, Public Law 115–135, 115th Congress.
Tan, C.K. (2021, November 5). Xi says open to discussion on state-owned
companies in CPTPP talks. Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/
Trade/Xi-says-open-to-discussion-on-state-owned-companies-in-CPTPP-
talks. Accessed 11 Jan 2022.
Thibaut, K., Kargar, S., & Pérez, D.S. (2022, April). China’s discourse power
operations in the global south. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcoun
cil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Chinas_Discourse_Power_in_the_
Global_South.pdf. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Tiezzi, S. (2021, October 25). Wendy Cutler on China, Taiwan, and the CPTPP.
The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/wendy-cutler-on-china-
taiwan-and-the-cptpp/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Truman, E. (2018, September 4). China, the United States, and damage to the
IMF. Peterson Institute for International Economics. https://www.piie.com/
blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/china-united-states-and-damage-imf.
Trump White House. (2017). Security Strategy of the United States. https:/
/trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-
12-18-2017-0905.pdf. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Tsai, T., & Liu, T.T. (2017). Cross-strait relations and regional integration: A
review of the Ma Ying-jeou Era (2008–2016). Journal of Current Chinese
Affairs, 46(1), 11–35
Tucker, N.B. (2000, July 1). The Taiwan factor in the vote on PNTR for China
and its WTO accession. NBR Analysis, 11(2). https://www.nbr.org/public
ation/the-taiwan-factor-in-the-vote-on-pntr-for-china-and-its-wto-accession/.
US Trade Representative (USTR). (2022a, February). 2021 report to congress
on China’s WTO compliance. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/
Press/Reports/2021USTR%20ReportCongressChinaWTO.pdf. Accessed 31
Oct 2022.
US Trade Representative (USTR). (2022b, August 17). United States and
Taiwan commence formal negotiations on US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st
Century Trade. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2022/august/united-states-and-taiwan-commence-formal-negotiati
ons-us-taiwan-initiative-21st-century-trade. Accessed 11 Jan 2023.
US Department of State. (2021, January 23). PRC military pressure against
Taiwan threatens regional peace and stability. https://www.state.gov/prc-mil
itary-pressure-against-taiwan-threatens-regional-peace-and-stability/. Accessed
31 Oct 2022.
US Department of State. (2022). US Relations with Taiwan. Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/.
Wang, A.B. (2022, February 28). Biden sending delegation to Taiwan
to reaffirm commitment amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Washington
Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/28/biden-delega
tion-taiwan-commitment-russia-invasion-ukraine/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Wang, J. (2004). China’s regional trade agreement approach. Singapore Yearbook
of International Law, 8, 119–147.
Wang, Y. (2022, May 23). Jointly building an Asia-Pacific Community
with a shared future. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of
China. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202205/t20220
523_10691371.html. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Webster, T. (2014). Paper compliance: How China implements WTO decisions.
Michigan Journal of International Law, 35(3), 525–578.
Wei, K. (2021, November 23). Taiwan, US hold second economic partnership
dialogue. Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/taiwan-
us-hold-second-economic-partnership-dialogue. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
214 J. DELISLE
White House. (2021a, February 4). Remarks by President Biden on America’s

place in the world. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-
remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-
world/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
White House. (2021b, April 16). US-Japan joint leaders’ statement: US-Japan
global partnership for a new era. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2021/04/16/u-s-japan-joint-leaders-statement-u-
s-japan-global-partnership-for-a-new-era/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
White House. (2021c, May 21). US-ROK leaders’ joint statement. https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-
rok-leaders-joint-statement/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
White House. (2021d, Sept. 16). Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/09/16/
press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-september-16-2021/. Accessed 31
Oct 2022.
White House. (2021e, June 8). Statement of President Joe Biden on Senate
passage of the US Innovation and Competition Act. https://www.whiteh
ouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/08/statement-of-pre
sident-joe-biden-on-senate-passage-of-the-u-s-innovation-and-competition-
act/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
White House. (2021f, December 23). Summit for Democracy summary
of proceedings. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/12/23/summit-for-democracy-summary-of-proceedings/.
White House. (2021g, March 25). Remarks by President Biden in press
conference. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/
2021/03/25/remarks-by-president-biden-in-press-conference/. Accessed 31
Oct 2022.
White House. (2021h, March). Interim national security strategic guidance.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
White House. (2022a, May 23). Japan-US joint leaders’ statement: Strength-
ening the free and open international order. https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/japan-u-s-joint-leaders-sta
tement-strengthening-the-free-and-open-international-order/. Accessed 31
Oct 2022.
White House. (2022b, May 21). United States-Republic of Korea leaders’
joint statement. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-rel
eases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/.
White House. (2022c, May 23). Fact sheet: In Asia, President Biden and a
dozen Indo-Pacific partners launch the Indo-Pacific economic framework for
prosperity. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/
2022/05/23/fact-sheet-in-asia-president-biden-and-a-dozen-indo-pacific-par
tners-launch-the-indo-pacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity/. Accessed
31 Oct 2022.
White House. (2022d, May 23). On-the-record press call on the launch of the
Indo-Pacific economic framework. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/press-briefings/2022/05/23/on-the-record-press-call-on-the-launch-
of-the-indo-pacific-economic-framework/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
White House. (2022e), May 23). Remarks by President Biden and Prime
Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan in joint press conference. https://www.whi
tehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/05/23/remarks-by-pre
sident-biden-and-prime-minister-fumio-kishida-of-japan-in-joint-press-confer
ence/. Accessed 11 Jan 2023.
White House. (2022f, February 11). Background press call by senior adminis-
tration officials previewing the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy. https://www.whi
tehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/11/background-
press-call-by-senior-administration-officials-previewing-the-u-s-s-indo-pacific-
strategy/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Wolff, L.-C. (2020). Legal responses to China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Neces-
sary, possible or pointless exercise? Transnational Law and Contemporary
Problems, 29(2), 249–326.
World Bank. (2022a). GDP (current US$), United States, Global. https:/
/data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US; https://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
World Bank. (2022b). GDP (current US$), China. https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
World Economic Forum. (2017, January 17). China’s Xi Jinping defends global-
ization from the Davos stage. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/
chinas-xi-jinping-defends-globalization-from-the-davos-stage/. Accessed 31
Oct 2022.
World Trade Organization (WTO). (2001, March). China’s accession to the
WTO and its Relationship to the Chinese Taipei accession and Hong Kong
and Macau, China. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/chinab
knot_feb01.doc. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
World Trade Organization (WTO). (2022a). Chinese Taipei. https://www.
wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/daily_update_e/trade_profiles/TW_e.pdf.
World Trade Organization (WTO). (2022b, January 31). EU Initiates
WTO Dispute Complaint Regarding Chinese Restrictions on Trade
with Lithuania. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/ds610rfc_
31jan22_e.htm. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
216 J. DELISLE
Wu, M. (2016). The “China, Inc.” challenge to global trade governance.

Harvard International Law Journal, 57(2), 261–324.
Xinhua. (2020, November 20). Full text of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s
remarks at the 27th APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting. http://www.xinhua
net.com/english/2020-11/20/c_139531308.htm. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Ye, M. (2015, May 15). China liked TPP—Until US Officials opened their
mouths. Foreign Policy. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/15/china-liked-
trans-pacific-partnership-until-u-s-officials-opened-their-mouths-trade-agreem
ent-rhetoric-fail/. Accessed 31 Oct 2022.
Zhang, X., & Li, X. (2014). The politics of compliance with adverse WTO
dispute settlement rulings in China. Journal of Contemporary China, 23(85),
143–160.
Zhang, Z. (2021, October 13). Joining the CPTPP: What China needs to do
and comparison with the RCEP. China Briefing. https://www.china-briefing.
com/news/chinas-bid-to-join-the-cptpp-challenges-comparison-with-rcep/.
Index
A 125, 128, 129, 131, 133, 150,

Acquis communautaire, 143 153, 155, 156, 175, 191
Act East Policy, 146 Australia-UK FTA, 124
Albanese, Anthony, 132, 136
Alliance shoring, 149
B
Anti-currency manipulation, 149
Beijing, 20, 49, 53, 60, 61, 96,
ASEAN+3, 144
98–101, 104, 127, 148, 166,
ASEAN+6, 144
170, 173, 182, 183, 185–194,
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 196, 199, 200
(AIIB), 58, 125 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 11,
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 58, 125, 189, 191
(APEC), 5, 16, 20, 32, 35, 79, Biden, Joe, 10, 16, 31, 57, 58, 69,
93, 97, 105, 119, 123, 125, 129, 102, 149, 153, 175, 176, 191,
148, 151, 159 196–200
Association of South East Asian Boa Forum, 148
Nations (ASEAN), 3, 27, 31, 32, ‘Build back better’, 196
57, 144, 145, 153, 159 Bush, George W., 2
AUKUS Agreement
(Australia–UK–US), 12, 48, 60,
97, 149 C
Australia, 5, 7, 12, 13, 15, 16, 33, 34, Canada, 4, 5, 7, 12, 23, 35, 39, 48,
36, 37, 39, 48, 53, 54, 57, 58, 53, 58, 60–62, 72, 73, 79, 96,
60–62, 64, 69, 71–73, 78–80, 97, 119, 120, 126, 128, 134,
93, 96–99, 104, 117–119, 123, 155
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive 217
license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd 2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3197-2
218 INDEX
China, 2–16, 20, 23, 25, 26, 31–33, D

35, 36, 38, 39, 47–64, 73, Data security, 77
95–101, 103–106, 120, Decoupling, 72, 149, 157
122–126, 129, 132, 133, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),
142–146, 148–157, 159, 167, 6, 150, 169
168, 170, 172, 175, 182, 184, Diet (Japanese), 176
186–194, 196, 198, 199, 201 Digital economic partnership
China–Australia FTA (2015), 125 agreement (DEPA), 52
China (PRC), 23 Digital governance, 51, 53, 78, 79
China (Republic of), 166, 181 Digital localization standards, 146
China’s accession to the CPTPP, 100, Digital trade, 20, 51, 68, 71, 78, 80,
102 82, 94, 95, 100
Clinton, Hillary, 196 Digital trade regime, 95
Closer Economic Relations (Australia Doha Round, 2, 89, 184
- NZ), 118
Codex Alimentarius Commission
(Codex), 29 E
Competitiveness and Resilience EAS, 144
Partnership (CoRe), 176 East Asia Free Trade Agreement
Comprehensive and Progressive (EAFTA), 144
Agreement for Trans-Pacific E-commerce, 50, 78, 120, 129, 146,
Partnership (CPTPP), 2–9, 152, 154
11–15, 19–24, 26, 27, 29–39, Economic Co-operation Framework
47–61, 63, 64, 67–70, 72–75, Agreement (ECFA), 6, 105, 183,
77–83, 90, 93–97, 99–106, 117, 184
121–123, 128–134, 142, 143, Economic impact, 68, 70, 71, 152
146, 148, 151–157, 166–169, Economic security, 33, 142, 152–154,
171, 173, 174, 176, 177, 157
181–195, 197–201 Economic Security Council, 154
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Environment, 32, 48, 72, 75–77, 81,
for East Asia (CEPEA), 144, 145 82, 93, 99, 120, 146, 148
COVID-19, 14, 15, 62, 72, 98, 122, European Commission, 3, 31
124, 126, 149, 151, 171, 172, European Single Market, 2
191, 197 European Union (EU), 2, 3, 5–10,
Covid pandemic, 14, 15, 124, 149 50, 61, 68–72, 75, 76, 79–83,
CPTPP Accession Process, 34, 35, 75, 93–95, 106, 120, 121, 124, 132,
95, 98, 118, 130, 155, 156 133, 143, 156, 173, 176, 187,
CPTPP Commission, 35, 36, 155, 194, 200
156 Canada trade agreement (CETA),
Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement 120
(CSSTA), 183, 184 Export bans, 149
INDEX 219
F International Civil Aviation

Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Organization (ICAO), 187
(of USA), 168 International institutions, 143
Food safety regulatory practices, 27 Internet, 113, 135
Foods standard and safety, 68, 80, 82 Investor protection through ISDS,
Freedom of Navigation Operations, 149
14 IPR, 149
Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
coverage rate, 22, 23
Friend shoring, 149 J
Fukushima, 13, 30, 99, 102, 103, Japan, 2, 5–7, 13, 14, 23, 25, 27, 30,
130, 150, 170, 171, 175 36, 39, 48, 53, 58, 60–63, 72,
Fumio, Kishida, 62, 176 73, 78, 79, 94, 96, 97, 99, 103,
119, 120, 124, 128, 134, 141,
142, 145, 149, 152–154, 156,
G 157, 166, 167, 170, 171,
G7, 124 175–177, 191, 195, 196
Gatekeeper, 13, 142, 143 Joint Standing Committee (of
General Agreement on Tariffs and Australian Parliament), 33, 130
Trade (GATT), 118, 119, 195
Geoeconomics, 94, 104, 143
‘Global Britain’, 2, 5, 68–71, 82, 93 K
Global supply chains, 31, 33, 75, 103 Kajiyama, Hiroshi, 151
Global value chains, 31, 32, 72, 119, Kono, Taro, 151, 173
183 Kuomintang (KMT), 6, 102, 169
H L
High-standard rules, 144, 146, 156, Labor regulations, 149
157 Labour, 48, 50–52, 55, 64, 120, 129
Huawei, 12, 62, 96, 126, 191 Lee, Hsien Loong, 36
Lee, Teng-hui
southbound policy of, 184
I Legislative Yuan, 42, 169
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Liberal Democratic Party, 151, 154
(IPEF), 4, 15, 59, 102, 153, Liberal International Economic Order
154, 159, 168, 174, 175, 184, (LIEO), 150
197, 198 Li, Keqiang, 125, 148
Indo-Pacific tilt, 68–70, 82 Lithuania, 53, 62, 187
Information Technology Agreement Liz, Truss, 2
(ITA), 8, 22, 26, 119, 133, 174 ‘lock-in’ economic reforms, 148
Institutional discourse power, 149 Look East Policy, 146
220 INDEX
M Politics of membership, 59
Malaysia, 23–25, 31–33, 59, 79, 96, Pork, imports of, 29, 130, 150, 168,
101, 119, 128, 144, 146, 153 169
Market access, 11, 20, 32, 37, 48, 55,
56, 94, 102, 120, 128, 131, 132,
Q
142, 154, 155
Quad members, 153
Market-driven economy, 50
Ma, Ying-jeou, 6, 32, 187
Member country considerations, 80 R
Mexico, 24, 35, 58, 60, 62, 72, 97, Ractopamine, 13, 29, 30, 130, 150,
105, 119, 120, 128, 155, 194, 169
195 Rare earths, 61, 190
Mimura, Akio, 152 Reform, 9, 20, 27, 30, 31, 35, 38,
Ministers’ Declaration on India’s 48, 50, 55, 56, 63, 98–101, 106,
RCEP, 146 118, 123, 145, 148
Modi, Narendra, 146 Regional Comprehensive Economic
Morrison, Scott, 122, 124–129, 132 Partnership Agreement (RCEP),
Movement of natural persons, 146 3, 4, 9, 23, 25, 27, 33, 47, 54,
68, 90, 96, 97, 120, 129, 133,
146, 148, 152, 174, 183,
N 187–189, 200
National Security Secretariat, 154 Regional Economic Integration (REI),
New Southbound Policy, 11, 150, 21, 22, 27, 32, 33, 100, 150
184 Regional institutions, 143
New Zealand, 8, 23, 32, 34, 35, 52, Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs),
60, 69, 71–73, 78–80, 94, 96, 2, 3, 183, 188
99, 103, 118, 119, 128, 129, Regulatory constraints, 75, 82
144, 145, 153, 155 Reshoring, 72, 149, 153
Non-zero-sum, 148 Rule-of-origin, 146
Rules-based trade regime, 98
Rule-setting, 142, 145, 154
O
Obama, Barack, 2, 15, 145, 196
Okonjo-Iweala (Director General, S
World Trade Organisation), 181 Sanctions, 14, 57, 58, 61, 62, 64, 149
One China policy, 104, 168, 175 Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS), 27, 29, 37, 80, 81, 150
Securitization of national economy,
P 154
Pelosi, Nancy, 96, 194 Semiconductors, 8, 14, 24, 57, 168,
People’s Bank of China, 148 171–174, 176, 177
Plurilateral agreements, 73, 119, 133 Semiconductor sector, 149
Political economy, 10, 53, 97 Shinzo, Abe, 6, 119, 166
INDEX 221
Singapore, 6, 8, 13, 23, 32, 36, 37, The Abe administration, 102, 154
52, 59, 72, 73, 78, 96, 99, 119, The Bush administration, 144, 145
121, 128, 129, 144, 146, 150, The Obama administration, 11, 75,
153, 155 144, 145
Societal implications, 68, 75 Tokura, Masakazu, 151
Soft power, 195 Tokyo, 102, 166, 168, 170, 175
South China Sea, 14, 61, 125 TPP Promotion Strategies Action
South Korea, 2, 3, 5–7, 25, 47, 54, Plan, 27
57, 61, 67, 144–146, 149, 153, Trade creation effect, 93, 94, 103,
170, 171, 174 106
Special and Differential Treatment, Transatlantic Trade and Investment
146 Partnership (TTIP), 11, 76
Special safeguard duties, 146 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
State enterprises, 48, 50, 51, 56 (TPP), 4, 7, 9–11, 19, 27, 33,
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 9, 50, 57, 63, 68, 75, 93, 99, 101,
90, 96, 120, 129, 145, 147, 152 102, 119–121, 141–145, 147,
Sunflower Movement, 184 148, 150, 152, 153
Supply chains, 20, 51, 54, 58, 59, 62, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),
142, 153 166–168, 182–184, 188, 194,
196, 197, 199, 200
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
T Partnership (P-4), 144
Taipei, 13, 102, 127, 128, 137, Trump, Donald J., 2, 10, 12, 16, 57,
166–171, 173–177 96, 117, 119, 125, 126, 145,
TAIPEI Act, 198 188, 191, 196, 199
Taiwan, 2, 3, 5–9, 11, 13–16, 19–27, Tsai, Ing-wen, 6, 11, 29, 150, 169,
29–33, 35–39, 48, 60–62, 90, 184, 187
93, 97, 102–106, 123, 127, 129,
130, 142, 150, 151, 154,
166–172, 174, 175, 177, U
182–187, 190, 191, 194, 195, Ukraine, 48, 49, 53, 56, 60, 62, 72,
197, 199, 201 96, 99, 194
agricultural imports, 37, 186 United Kingdom (UK), 2, 7, 8, 10,
Council of Agriculture, 38 12, 13, 48, 60, 63, 67–72, 74,
food imports from Japan, 130 76, 78, 80, 82, 93, 94, 96, 97,
National Referendums, 29, 30 123, 124, 128, 132, 156, 182
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing United Nations, 171
Company (TSMC), 172–175 United States interests, 16, 80, 145
Taiwan Travel Act, 198 USA, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10–16, 117, 119,
Tariff structures, 23–25 127, 170
Thailand, 2, 3, 31, 32, 47, 58, 153 ban on pork imports from, 175
Thatcher, Margaret, 2 Interim National Security Strategic
The 3-11 disaster, 149 Guidance, 31
222 INDEX
‘securitization’ of foreign economic Wong, Penny, 127

policy, 196 World Health Assembly, 187
US-China-Taiwan relations, 182 World Health Organization, 14, 98,
(US) CHIPS and Science Act, 57, 126, 171
197 World Trade Organization (WTO), 3,
(US) Congress, 5, 154, 196 5, 8–10, 12, 14, 16, 22, 27,
(US) Inflation Reduction Act, 197 30–33, 35, 39, 48, 49, 53, 55,
US Innovation and Competition Act 56, 81, 97, 98, 100, 104, 105,
(USICA), 197 118–120, 126, 133, 144, 155,
US-Mexico-Canada Agreement 182–190, 192–198, 200, 201
(USMCA), 58, 149, 194, 195 dispute resolution procedure of,
US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st century 185
trade, 114, 197 Most Favoured Nation
US Trade Representative, 155 commitments, 23
WTO-extra, 90, 100
WTO-plus, 90
V
Vietnam, 9, 13, 23–27, 36, 37, 55,
59, 72, 79, 96, 101, 119, 128,
X
146, 153, 155, 186
Xi, Jinping, 6, 9–11, 49–51, 55, 56,
63, 97, 99, 100, 125, 147, 148,
W 189
Washington, 57, 96, 101, 102, 166,
168–170, 173–175, 182, 185,
186, 188, 190, 191, 194, 195, Z
198, 199 Zhou, Xiaochuan, 148
Win-win, 148 Zhu, Rongji, 192

China, Taiwan, The UK and The CPTPP: Global Partnership or Regional Stand-Off?

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

China, Taiwan, The UK and The CPTPP: Global Partnership or Regional Stand-Off?

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

China, Taiwan, The UK and The CPTPP: Global Partnership or Regional Stand-Off?

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

TAIWAN AND WORLD AFFAIRS

China, Taiwan, the UK

ISSN 2731-9334 ISSN 2731-9342 (electronic)

Cover credit: Andrew Haimerl from Pexels/Canva

8 Divergent Interests for Taiwan’s CPTPP Bid

Peter C. Y. Chow is a professor of economics at the City Univer-

Ing-wen (2021), To Get Rich is Glorious: Challenges Facing China’s

Fellow of the UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO). She is an inter-

Fig. 2.1 The two-step accession process of CPTPP (Source Author

Fig. 4.3 Top concerns on the CPTPP selected by different

Table 2.1 Bilateral trade between Taiwan and CPTPP members

Michael Reilly and Chun-yi Lee

‘Sometimes international diplomacy is so inept that it becomes genuinely

M. Reilly (B) · C. Lee

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

First, by lifting or removing tariff barriers they aggregate the gains

advantage broader multilateral agreements and vice versa. Trade, in other

campaign was more than just a memorable strapline. Furthermore, former

If we consider the case of China, by contrast, it already enjoys close

in the country’s government of the importance of adhering to interna-

If a consensus is emerging from these contributions therefore, it is that

CPTPP Membership for Taiwan: Rationales,

Roy Chun Lee

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 19

and protection and providing better market access opportunities. Consid-

The Rationales of CPTPP Membership for Taiwan

CPTPP Bilateral Export value Import value Share of Taiwan’s total

Japan 85,315 29,209 56,106 10.30

Unit US$ Million

Moreover, Taiwan’s outbound investment in the CPTPP area has grown

the CPTPP membership.3 Even the Taiwan government’s own simula-

Countries FTA Coverage rate in 2020 (%) FTA relationships with

Singapore (SGP) 95.01 ROKa , JPNb , PRCa ,

of exports that enjoy preferential tariff treatment under a country’s

Table 2.3 Tariff structure of Taiwan’s Exports to CPTPP countries

CPTPP Zero tariff Non-zero tariff

Australia 2467 47.41 2737 52.59 4.72

Source WTO IDB database

Table 2.4 Tariff structure for selected sectors

Sectors Average Import % of export Subject Distribution of

Electrical machinery 56,245,833 2.70 19.29 34.88 45.83

To further highlight the impact of discriminatory tariff treatment faced

Table 2.5 Examples of discriminatory tariff treatment in selected CPTPP

Importing Products Main exporting Tariff rates

Vietnam Electrical devices for connection Japan (1) 6 (to 0a )

The Impetus for Regulatory Reform

Relevant Key amendments Related CPTPP Year of

Statute for Distant Preventing overfishing and limiting Environment 2016

Source Executive Yuan

asked Taiwan to remove the total ban on agricultural products from

safety issues. Unfortunately, food safety concerns were again manipu-

higher level of predictability and consistency, as well as less regulatory

Global Supply Chain Reform and the Value of CPTPP

Participation Taiwan S. Japan China Regional average

Total 60.8 53.5 42.7 36.3 44.4 48.8 37.8 36.5

Unit % share of total gross export

China to ASEAN, with Vietnam and Malaysia already a member or a

Unique Opportunity Rationale

common development of the cross-strait economy with the process of