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Developmental Authoritarianism in Africa: The cases of Ethiopia, Rwanda,

and Uganda
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Developmental Authoritarianism in Africa
The cases of Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda
Lumanyano Ngcayisa1
Abstract: Keywords:
Development;
Post-independence Africa saw a rise in authoritarianism; however, this
authoritarianism;
political system was led by malevolent autocrats who ruled with an iron
Ethiopia; Rwanda;
fist, accumulating absolute power, redirecting wealth to small coalitions, Uganda.
and passing policies favouring only a few. However, these ideals and
principles have evolved over the past decade, noticeably in countries like
Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda, introducing a different variant of
authoritarianism, known as “developmental authoritarianism.” Ostensibly
inspired by the Chinese authoritarian developmentalism model, Ethiopia,
Rwanda, and Uganda should be studied to comprehend the objectives and
functionality of this school of thought. In these East African cases, this
article scrutinises whether the culture ostensibly cultivates the sacrifice of
individual liberties for common objectives, countering liberal principles
while promoting economic prosperity and development. The political
leadership of these political systems is pivotal in achieving socioeconomic
development in Africa. Benevolent autocrats like Prime Minister Abiy
Ahmed, President Paul Kagame, and President Yoweri Museveni, among
others in Africa, are critical in bolstering economic growth and ensuring
state development for their countries. However, achieving rapid
economic growth and robust state development comes at the cost of
forgone civil liberties, as human rights violations persist in these countries.
Notably, the culture within these countries fosters severed liberties for
the common good. This article investigates this fairly new political system
in Africa, how it is used by these East African regions, and the ostensible
African culture which subdues many into accepting illiberal practices for
ostensible broad-based economic prosperity and state development.
1Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State.
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7961-0295.
JCEEAS – Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies – ISSN 2786-1902 93
94 L. Ngcayisa
Introduction
After independence, authoritarianism in Africa was characterised by malevolent autocrats
that reigned over their countries, resulting in the underdevelopment of their people while
enriching small coalitions. According to Kodero (2020), authoritarian systems can emerge
from the state's economic foundations, as states with wealthy natural resources can distribute
their wealth to secure patronage for political elites. However, when those resources are
depleted, coalitions become smaller and political elites become more authoritarian in their
pursuit to maintain power. Schoppert (2020) highlights those examples of malevolent African
autocrats who reigned over their people, ranging from Idi Amin of Uganda (1971–1974), Omar
Al-Bashir of Sudan (1989–2019), to Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (1987–2017). Historically,
authoritarianism has been detrimental to Africa, while the legacy of colonialism left inherent
challenges ranging from public services to policing. Many African states pursued
authoritarianism to enforce policing and regulate public services in light of these challenges.
However, authoritarianism did not necessarily result in development but rather regress. Since
then, many African states have not successfully implemented sustainable development and
economic growth due to incapacity, weak institutions, and corruption (Cheeseman and Fisher,
2019).
However, recently, some African states have innovated authoritarian ideals and principles,
leading to a rise in developmental authoritarianism. It is a political system where the state
produces substantial public works and services while exercising power over most facets of
society, enabling governments to prioritise the development of national interests and
cultivate economic prosperity to achieve state development (Matfess, 2015: 182-188).
Arguably, developmental authoritarianism in Africa is inspired by the Chinese model of
authoritarian developmentalism. Yang (2016: 49) suggests that it is the strategy employed by
the ruling elite to establish economic growth, generate employment, and sustainable growth
for the state while exercising centralised state power.
In Africa, authoritarianism's evolution has seen a rise over the past decade of progress
regarding free and fair elections in 33 out of 55 African states (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019).
However, this has not resulted in a guarantee of significant inclusivity and accessibility to
electoral processes. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2019) argues that progress in democratic
elections is not parallel to significant citizen participation, as African political participation
decreased by 0.6 points between 2013–2017. The political participation of African citizens is
under threat in the region, as civil participation (playing an active part in political processes or
affiliating with a political party) declined by 72.9%. As a result, less civil participation combined
with African personhood ideals creates a vacuum that developmental authoritarian political
systems can monopolise. African personhood encourages African societies and cultures to
embrace collective empowerment and growth over individualism (Molefe, 2019: 313-316).
In contributing to the analysis and nexus between non-democratic states and economic
development, this article investigates the impact of developmental authoritarianism in Africa.
94 JCEEAS – Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies – ISSN 2786-1902
Developmental Authoritarianism in Africa 95
It focuses on three East African countries, namely Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda. Although
authoritarianism in Africa is no new topic, its variant, developmental authoritarianism, is a
relatively recent occurrence in Africa and in these cases. The article analyses the contributions
and limitations of developmental authoritarianism in Africa as a political system while noting
the Chinese model's influence and inquiring whether developmental authoritarianism
capacitates robust state policies for development in Africa while establishing economic
relations internationally without compromising their political, economic, or social structures.
The article will use constructivist qualitative methods to explore and interpret
developmental authoritarianism as a political system. On the other hand, qualitative methods
in the social sciences work well with inductive research design. A qualitative and inductive
approach allows new theories/systems to emerge rather than limiting research to previously
defined classifications (McKibben et al., 2020: 2). The article analyses and critiques
developmental authoritarianism derived from the Chinese model, mainly using Hilary Matfess
and Dali Yang to clarify the theoretical framework. The article also briefly highlights the
concept of African personhood by Motsamai Molefe. It critically analyses applied
developmental authoritarianism in the cases of Ethiopia's, Rwanda, and Uganda, providing
positive and negative indicators. Lastly, the study provides its findings with recommendations.
Developmental Authoritarianism: A conceptualisation

According to Puddington (2017), developmental authoritarianism (DA) has thrived where
totalitarianism failed because of nuanced and readjusted repression strategies, redefined
exploitative measures on civil societies, and disseminating illiberal principles. Modern
autocrats in these systems devote themselves to debilitating opposition instead of
annihilating them while disregarding the rule of law and projecting ostensible legitimacy,
order, and prosperity. The resurgence of authoritarian rule came rebranded, as autocrats
ensured a growing number of dependents on state handouts for greater control over the
populace. Modern autocrats sometimes ostensibly provide aspects of liberal democracy (e.g.,
substantial service delivery) as a mechanism to disguise their illiberal traits (e.g., extended
terms of office). These autocrats provide basic services for centralised state power. Guriev and
Treisman (2019, p. 102) identify these leaders as 'informational autocrats,' seeking to distance
the populace from their opposition through covert efforts that censor them, while populists
publicly criticise the opposition. Essentially, propaganda is their instrument of choice.
Inglis (2019) highlights several checklist points to identify authoritarianism; however, these
also apply to developmental authoritarianism. First, elongated executive power, where
autocrats simultaneously accumulate power while weakening state institutions, judiciaries,
media, and civil activists that provide checks and balances. Second, centralised repressive
state power, lack of accountability, and elite patronage for financial backing leads to citizens'
inability to hold those responsible to account. Third, autocrats use populism and nationalism
to capitalise on existing social tensions to solidify their support while weaponizing media and
96 L. Ngcayisa
new technologies to regulate domestic news and misinform the international community.
Finally, autocrats institute the 'emergency card,' using traditional tactics such as declaring a
state of emergency to facilitate repression and elongated executive state power.
Furthermore, Gebrekidan (2020) suggested that the covid-19 pandemic is a catalyst for
invoking illiberal principles and practices even in democracies worldwide. Governments are
exploiting the health crisis to accumulate power, with little regard for preventing the abuse of
their newly acclaimed authority. These invasive illiberal measures range from Uganda closing
schools, banning large gatherings, and vehicle movement (Biryabarema, 2020) to South Africa
enforcing a lockdown alert level 5, suggesting a high covid-19 outbreak and insufficient health
system preparedness (South African Government, 2021). Moreover, norms have changed as
developmental authoritarian measures pursue invasive surveillance systems previously
criticised for abandoning liberal principles and practices.
In the African context, the resurgence of authoritarian rule in the contemporary era has
provided a platform for establishing developmental authoritarianism, particularly in Ethiopia,
Rwanda, and Uganda. According to Matfess (2015, pp. 181-204), developmental
authoritarianism is described in five fundamental components. First, the domestic ascension
into power after civil dissolution unifies citizens and creates accessible political mobilisation.
Second, this political system imposes statutory restrictions on identity, speech, and
association, influencing the possibility of civil dissolution and conflict, justifying restrictions.
Third, Matfess (2015, pp. 181-204) suggests that these political systems use a significant
proportion of the economy, promoting economic and civil development, committed to
mercantile capitalism (state development and economic growth that is based on trade, and
more significant exports than imports, while the middle-class is dependent on the state).
Furthermore, they exhibit party mobilisation and militaristic association concerning the
development of the populace. They caution regional and domestic instability to encourage
mandatory participation in political initiatives and development strategies. Lastly, these
systems create relationships with the West for the interest of regional security, in exchange
for aid, and to foster foreign direct investment. In contrast, they dismiss civil/human rights
and democratic legitimacy. Ironically, the United States (liberal democratic state) and Ethiopia
(illiberal/non-democratic state) have had diplomatic relations since the early twentieth
century and have maintained such relations throughout the changing forms of government.
The U.S. recognises that today the country is officially known as the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia and is founded on "developmental democracy". The United States defines
Ethiopia’s political system as a model that prioritises economic growth over civil rights (US.
Department of State, 2020).
According to Del Sordi (2018, p. 218), modern autocratic repression occurs primarily in two
forms, high and low intensity. High-intensity repression involves outright violence towards
prominent opposition, be it an organisation or individual. Low-intensity repression is more
covert and subtle, characterised by reduced violence. Thus, developmental authoritarianism
seemingly takes a soft approach, arguably extends its low-intensity repression beyond
opposition, and targets the populace, hindering dissenting opinions.Human Rights Watch
(2018) suggests that the Chinese government used high-intensity repression against 13 million
Turkic Muslims in the Xinjiang region, implementing arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, and
torment. At the same time, one million were detained and forced to participate in communist
political education and learn Mandarin. This relentless violation of human rights conditions
the Turkic Muslims to praise the Chinese Communist Party and its government, also noticeable
in Hong Kong with the new security laws protecting national security over local/provincial
objectives. Although this example is drawn from Asia, modern African autocrats ostensibly
derive their system from China.
The People's Republic of China uses the authoritarian development model in conjunction
with the high and low-intensity repression approach. Noticeably, in the events which unfolded
in Xinjiang, China used high-intensity repression. According to Li (2015, pp. 130-131), the
authoritarian development model is an evolved political system categorised as a political
meritocracy, which differs from traditional socialism due to its use of the market system and
its redefined Chinese democratic commitment and party leadership. As a result, China's
economy has done remarkably well, placing it among the world's fastest-growing economies.
The World Bank (2020b) records China's average GDP growth around 10% annually, lifting 850
million people out of poverty in the past three decades. However, it is noteworthy to recognise
that the Chinese state is capable, having the skills and professionalism to enforce a state-led
development role, unlike African states that seek to emulate the Chinese in this regard. Since
the late 1970s, Chinese reforms have been the catalyst for significant socioeconomic
transformation, increasing foreign direct investment, industrialisation, and marketisation
resulting in economic growth. The Chinese model protects the state-owned economy outside
of the Western democratic principles, giving rise to "state capitalism" while strategically
monitoring specific sectors of the economy without political competition and implementing
restrictions on civil freedoms to achieve national objectives (Li, 2015, pp. 130-131).
Furthermore, in the African context, the notion of ubuntu (meaning I am because we are)
plays a significant role in African Personhood, encouraging African societies and cultures to
embrace collective empowerment and growth over individualism and self-enrichment,
making them susceptible to exploitation by developmental authoritarianism. Motsamai
Molefe (2019, pp. 313-316) suggests a distinction between being human as a biological truth
and being a person having moral awareness. Therefore, personhood develops an accepted
character, where a person's life is shaped by moral virtue. In contrast, African scholars note
that personhood is achieved in social relationships, allowing one to achieve moral perfection
and personhood through a community. The best method to realise one's humanity is by
empowering and contributing to other human beings. The act of ubuntu promotes others'
good while promoting one's good, intertwining the individual and communitarian facets,
establishing African personhood.
98 L. Ngcayisa
Developmental authoritarianism capitalises on African personhood and ubuntu because it

encourages African communities to accept development at the cost of authoritarianism for
communal growth and prosperity (Motsamai Molefe, 2019: 313-316). Essentially, this leads to
neglecting civil and human rights for collective economic prosperity and state development.
Modern autocrats using developmental authoritarianism seemingly latch on to the ideals of
African personhood to promote the political system used and subdue the citizenry to
compromise liberal principles in the hope of achieving ostensible economic prosperity and
state development.
Developmental Authoritarianism: Contributions and Limitations

Developmental authoritarianism enables significant state intervention and control of the
societal and economic facets to achieve state development. Raising the question, does it
facilitate economic growth? On the other hand, according to Magnus (2018), there are no
grounds to suggest that democracy outperforms authoritarianism from an economic
argument, and empirically, records illustrate that authoritarian states can reach high economic
growth rates, e.g., Singapore and South Korea. Developmental authoritarian systems can
organise and distribute labour and capital to achieve economic growth; however, this is
generally favourable only in the early phases of economic development. Kroenig (2020, pp. 39-
41) notes that autocrats can impose decisions on the system, allowing them to redistribute
resources for crucial state objectives while side-lining political opposition in the name of state
development.
Additionally, benevolent autocrats in these systems can facilitate economic growth through
property rights reform by redistribution of land across marginalised communities (Riley, 2018,
pp. 7-8). The facilitation of higher and faster economic growth can be achieved, establishing a
potential transition into democracy. Developmental authoritarian systems arguably facilitate
economic growth easier than democracies, as they can implement policies and practices
efficiently to achieve their objective because no one can oppose such decisions. For example,
anti-rights authoritarian states such as the Chinese government promote state development
and economic prosperity over human rights. These systems hold centralised and coercive
power to be deployed purposively and systemically to establish capitalist transformation in
their societies while establishing a class system that draws in higher wage employees
(Harrison, 2019, pp. 281). An added advantage used by modern autocrats in these political
systems is that they do not necessarily implement the maximum tax rate permissible in their
states; thus, curbing the norm of taxing citizens the maximum rate until productivity
decreases, providing these states with a competitive edge regionally, e.g., China, the United
Arab Emirates, and Kenya (Fuller, 2017, p. 73).
Furthermore, according to Rough (2020), developmental authoritarian systems are more

likely to impose draconian laws with relentless efficiency and suppress information that
triggers mass panic or dissenting opinions. The covid-19 outbreak of 2020 became a catalyst
for draconian practices even in democracies, normalising illiberal principles for the common
good. Modern autocrats in these systems have the competitive edge of immediately
addressing an issue like the Covid-19 crisis, implementing nationwide lockdowns or a state of
emergency, as fewer veto participants need to consent. Ailoaiei (2020) suggests that a state of
emergency encompasses reducing civil liberties instituted during war or national security
threats to the state, entrusting more power to the state to protect its citizenry from imminent
threats. During this public health crisis, lockdowns and travel bans have ensued to curb the
spread of Covid-19; draconian regulations are seemingly the opted tactic by democratic and
non-democratic countries.
Developmental authoritarian political systems can efficiently enforce decisions, achieving

this through delineating authority and politicking behind closed doors. Simultaneously, they
portray a unified, stable, and reliable image to the nation (Kroenig, 2020, pp. 39-41). For
example, the Chinese government built two hospitals within days to combat Covid-19,
presenting a high level of control and outbreak response, which the World Health Organisation
commended. Kavanagh (2020, p. 135) notes that a strategic component to curb the pandemic
is reliable information and acting swiftly to hinder the continued spread of Covid-19 before
introducing emergency measures, which developmental authoritarian systems can use.
On the contrary, according to Riley (2018, p. 7), the lack of economic growth in
developmental authoritarian states can be caused by power struggles. The lack of succession
planning provokes political rivalry for that position, like Rwanda's case, where the political
system is closely identified with the President, Paul Kagame. However, in a capacitated state
like China, leaders use precise succession planning interchangeably, allowing the political party
to govern and be associated with the political system, not an individual.
As a result, economic growth weakens due to autocrats reallocating funds to preserve their
position of power while losing legitimacy with weak succession planning. Autocrats cannot
govern alone, and a focal point of research on authoritarianism suggests that controlling most
of the populace while excluding them from power is challenging (Brosché et al., 2020, p. 113).
Across the range of political systems, political leaders rely on maintaining ruling coalitions,
whose patronage is crucial to their longevity. In developmental authoritarian systems, ruling
coalitions are greatly dependent on the discretion of the elite. In Africa, developmental
authoritarian systems establishing prominent coalitions require stabilising the need for ethnic
inclusion to ensure cooperation, otherwise risking violent protests from excluded groups, e.g.,
identity politics between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groupings during the Rwandan genocide.
Furthermore, the lack of property rights is a catalyst for lack of investment, as banks directly
contribute to economic development. Bastiaens (2016, pp. 142-144) suggests that feeble
government infrastructures, significant intervention in business operations, expropriations or
nationalisations, and lack of property rights in developmental authoritarian systems classify
political risks. Waning institutions reduce the credibility of the state for foreign direct
investment. Also, autocrats may use these policies for personal interest, as they hold little
100 L. Ngcayisa
accountability to the public, thus benefiting themselves the most and providing them with
direct access to state resources and revenue. According to Bellinger and Son (2019),
international markets find civil unrest distasteful, especially when the government violently
constrains its populace. Foreign direct investments tend to depart, primarily when little
opposition exists to check the government on economic growth and property laws.
In contrast, history associates authoritarian systems with inadequate provision for social
goods and services, which can occur in developmental authoritarian systems too, reallocating
their budget meant for social welfare (e.g., education and health) to purchase weapons and
fund their military sectors (Khan et al., 2016, pp. 657-659). Autocrats do this because they do
not need support from the public, resulting in lower economic growth. Bove and Brauner
(2016, p. 610) suggest that developmental authoritarian systems lack popular legitimacy and
rely on the military to support their power. These systems tend to be more susceptible to
violent insurgency, making them more likely to use mass-scale force, causing dependency on
the military and increased military expenditure. Notably, this occurs in the absence of
economic growth and state development, which is in the ‘social contract’ between the state
and its people.
Moreover, high censorship in developmental authoritarian systems places them at a

disadvantage during world crises like the covid-19 pandemic. Censorship hinders the media
from broadcasting and promptly conveying essential information to the public (Kavanagh,
2020, p. 135). Arguably, developmental authoritarian political systems are susceptible to falling
victim to their propaganda and censorship. These systems use what is called 'digital
authoritarianism' (networked cyber tracking to spy on citizens) for surveillance, censorship,
and suppression of their people. Sherman (2019) mentions that these systems start by
introducing artificial intelligence into their surveillance systems to enhance authoritarian
governance. Rather than provide an open approach to internet governance and online
content, these systems insist on 'cyber sovereignty' (state control of the internet as a facet of
state sovereignty and self-governance) in the name of police control, responsiveness, and
crime prevention, e.g., China, Singapore, and Russia (globally). Nevertheless, these
developmental authoritarian systems use artificial intelligence technology to enforce mass
censorship, filter and influence online content, and ban virtual private networks within their
borders while instituting internet shutdowns when necessary.
Lastly, developmental authoritarian systems fail to protect fundamental civil rights; thus,
malevolent autocrats are not held accountable for their arbitrary actions. These political
systems cripple civil society organisations and restrict civil activists from criticising them,
particularly African governments (Smidt, 2018, pp. 1-3). They constrain international
donations to civil society organisations in their countries, as foreign donors tend to advocate
enhanced civil rights for the populace. These restrictions prevent the further establishment of
independent civil society organisations prone to critique the system's policies, making them
susceptible to supporting the system's political opposition. In 2009, the Ethiopian government
implemented a regulation that hinders civil society organisations from accepting more than
10% of their total funding from foreign donors. As a result, out of the 2 275 civil organisations
in Ethiopia (in 2009), only 1 701 were still operational by 2011. Although these organisations
can engage in human and civil rights programmes, their capacity to radically foster
transformation is constrained through limited funding (Include, 2018).
Ethiopia: Positive and Negative Indicators

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who started
his tenure in 2018, introducing a wave of reforms in his first year in office. According to the
committee for The Nobel Prize (2019), Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed received a Nobel Peace
Prize for his efforts to establish peace and international cooperation, especially for his efforts
to resolve the border conflict with Eritrea. Moreover, Ahmed's wave of reforms granted him
international praise as he released tens of thousands of political prisoners his predecessor had
detained. He also instituted civil rights reforms while publicly acknowledging past grievances
and allowing previously banned opposition groups to return home (Bader, 2019). In contrast,
Ahmed's peace agreement with Eritrea remains moot, as the Eritrea border is still closed,
while his government faces regional tension over the Nile with Egypt.
These unresolved tensions are fuelled by a lack of reciprocity from the respective heads of
state. Noticeably, in July 2021, Ethiopia increased tensions on its nearly decade-long
diplomatic standoff with Egypt and Sudan over the Nile river, allegedly making a unilateral
decision to fill the Renaissance Dam (Aljazeera, 2021). Since Ethiopia is landlocked, Ahmed's
economic-led model (striving for development) requires neighbouring ports, like Somaliland's
Berbera and Port of Djibouti on the country's southern shore, to increase exports for economic
growth. As a result, peace and regional cooperation are essential in increasing international
trade for Ethiopia, making matters increasingly difficult for the Prime Minister.
On the other hand, in 2020, the outburst of violence after the murder of HachaluHundessa
(Ethiopian singer, songwriter, and activist) resulted in at least 239 deaths, leading Ahmed to
shut down the internet and insinuate that Egyptian security agents carried out Hundessa's
murder to instigate unrest, under the command of Cairo. Some claim that Ahmed uses the
tension with Egypt to unite Ethiopians against a common enemy and divert citizens, as he
postponed the national elections and continues to shut down the internet (Hairsine, 2020).
Although Prime Minister Ahmed seems amiable, his senior military and intelligence
background, coupled with the lessons learned from the Rwandan genocide, make him
ferocious at suppressing dissenting voices (Aga and Plaut, 2018). As a result, he implements
internet shutdowns, media censorship and elongates his executive power in the name of
avoiding civil unrest, which is closely associated with the common traits of developmental
authoritarianism.
In comparison to Ethiopia's social ills, Jeffrey (2019) highlights that rapid economic growth
(defined by Agarwal (2020) as a brisk increase in the value of goods and services produced in
102 L. Ngcayisa
an economy over time) has not meant much for Ethiopia's unemployed youth over the past
decade. Although this political system seemingly follows the Chinese authoritarian
developmentalism model, whereby civil rights are forgone for economic growth and poverty
reduction, many are yet to benefit. At the same time, the country's Tigray conflict risks
deterring foreign investment and impedes domestic production, thus reducing the capacity to
create employment. In Addis Ababa, over 23.5% of households have an unemployed adult (in
2017), while underemployment, low income, unemployment, and inadequate working
conditions are high among youth, especially in rural areas (World Bank, 2017).
However, the World Bank (2019a) also recorded positive trends in poverty reduction in
Ethiopia's urban and rural areas in recent years. Citizens living under the national poverty line
decreased from 30% in 2011 to 24% by 2016. Although this growth happened before Ahmed's
administration, Ethiopia exhibited high-intensity developmental authoritarianism as the
government explicitly violated human rights, detained dissenting voices while it drove state-
led economic development. The Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), later implemented
by the Ahmed administration, increased infrastructural development through public
investments and converted the country into a manufacturing centre.
The GTP aims to average 11% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth annually, bringing
about a 20% expansion in the industrial sector and resulting in more job creation. According
to Green Growth Knowledge (2020), the GTP aims to stimulate economic structural
transformation and sustainable fast growth towards lower-middle-income status by 2025. The
GTP (second phase) focuses on establishing expedited, sustainable, and broad-based growth
through strengthening the productivity of the agricultural and manufacturing industries,
enhancing production and the market. The GTP focuses on state development and exhibits
aspects of African personhood, as it fosters communal prosperity over individual growth.
Additionally, the World Bank (2019a) highlighted Ethiopia's economic performance in the
2016/17 financial year as robust, establishing the path to rapid economic growth and reducing
poverty among the Ethiopian society. Economic growth has affected the country's stable
inflation rate, although it is still in double digits. Ethiopian reforms support growth, aiming to
achieve an average of 8% annually, and these economic reforms encompass the private
sector's support for faster growth, resulting in private-led and export-oriented economic
policies for Ethiopia's Agenda 2025. The World Bank (2020a) notes that Ethiopia's reform
agenda has fostered more significant investment in the economy, receiving a US$312.2 million
grant and US$187.8 million credit from the International Development Association. Ethiopia
also implemented energy sector reforms to advance efficiency while protecting the indigent.
These enable the private sector to provide value-added services like exports, imports, and
logistics, thus stimulating the economy. Although these reforms would be possible in a
democracy, developmental authoritarianism expedites them by suppressing dissidents,
whereas democracy requires parliamentary and popular support.
However, developmental authoritarian systems have their woes, and even potentially
prosperous systems like Ethiopia face many challenges in achieving their goals. According to
the World Bank (2019b), Ethiopia faces several developmental challenges, particularly
sustaining its positive economic growth and continued poverty reduction, which requires
significant job creation (such as the additional 14 million jobs target by 2025) and improved
governance. Additionally, the government faces challenges related to limited competitiveness
(which is detrimental to manufacturing, job creation, and exports), an underdeveloped private
sector (limiting foreign investment and industry growth), and finally, political instability (social
unrest, lowering economic growth, tourism, and exports), among other challenges.
DuPée (2017) suggests that Ethiopia's Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) Agenda 2025
is set back by an ongoing surge of civil unrest and instability in the East-African region. For
instance, in 2017, the government instituted a six-month-long state of emergency and later
added four months more due to domestic instability. Although Ethiopia has a potential mining
sector, the economic vision is undermined if the government does not ensure infrastructure
maintenance or build a new transportation and mineral-processing site; the GTP Agenda 2025
will be in vain. Although the transportation project between Addis Ababa and Djibouti is
complete, landlocked Ethiopia is at a disadvantage. The country relies heavily on neighbouring
states' ports to ensure international trade (imports and exports).
Furthermore, Ethiopia's economic strides are arguably not sustainable, and if the expected
government spending is reportedly fruitless, it will merely grow the economy without
improving productivity. The Ethiopian government is at risk of not increasing tax revenues,
although receiving significant investments resulting from fruitless spending and a lack of good
governance (Kopf, 2020). At the start of the twenty-first century, Ethiopia ranked as the third-
poorest country globally, and by 2011 averaged a GDP per capita of US$620. According to the
World Bank (2020a), Ethiopia moved from third-poorest ranked country to twenty-fourth
globally, and the GDP increased from US$620 to US$857.5 per capita. Although the country
has made great strides to improve, productivity has been chiefly replaced with capital
investment, particularly by government and state-owned enterprises.
Negative Ethiopian indicators also include undermining democratic principles through civil
rights violations and the postponement of general elections, scheduled for the end of August
2020, then later to July 2021 (due to the 2020 state of emergency against Covid-19).
Developmental authoritarianism and its modern autocrats have readjusted their repressive
methods, and this recently enforced state of emergency in Ethiopia proves as an example of
low-intensity measures. According to Human Rights Watch (2019), the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front holds all the seats in parliament, which results in little to no
regard for the opposition, causing a higher number of violent protests within the country.
Although the general elections have taken place, the International Crisis Group fears that the
ruling party's recent victory and blatant disregard for the opposition will lead to more violent
protests and boycotts. National politicking between elites fuels the current land dispute in
northern Ethiopia's Amhara and Tigray regions. The dispute has escalated into conflict. The
104 L. Ngcayisa
confrontation led to military intervention and exposed the ethnic tension within the Ethiopian
army (International Crisis Group, 2020).
Rwanda: Positive and Negative Indicators

According to Cascais (2020), Rwanda's benevolent dictator Paul Kagame marks over twenty
years of his tenure. Kagame's rise to power is accredited to his contributions to economic
recovery and peace in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide (between the Tutsis and Hutus), paving
the path to his presidency in 2000. Some have commended Kagame for his contributions to
women's rights and environmentalism in the country and many Rwandans admire Kagame's
contributions to progress in the country over the past two decades. However, he does not go
without criticism, as some suggest that he runs the country with an iron fist. He has been
criticised for suppressing dissenting voices across Rwanda, earning him the title 'benevolent
dictator,' as some perceive him as a leader who "pursues unselfish objectives for the state's
development". A benevolent dictator is an autocrat who rules with absolute power, deciding
on the objectives and executing them (often quicker than in a democracy) while being
perceived to be civic-minded (Mkhondo, 2019).
Kagame once commanded the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a Tutsi militia group based in
Uganda, which ended the Hutu's slaughter campaign against the Tutsi. As such, Kagame
became socialised in war, and his militance is evident in leading Rwanda, as bodies like the
Human Rights Watch (2020) suggest that he is aggressive, violent, very emotive, and
prosecutes dissidents. The Rwandan president can suppress opposition because of
developmental authoritarianism. He is suggested to have been involved in many murders,
arrests, and the disappearance of dissenting voices. Developmental authoritarianism fosters
the notion that freedoms and democratic practices should be subdued by the intention to
achieve collective economic growth, development, and prosperity. Kagame encourages
Rwandans to embrace communal empowerment and economic growth, but he also violates
many human rights, typical of any developmental authoritarian system.
The Rwandan capital, Kigali, is home to the Kigali International Financial Centre (KIFC)
headquarters, an initiative of the Kagame administration. According to Mwai (2020a), KIFC is
a government initiative established in 2019 that intends to position Rwanda as a business and
financial hub in Africa while reforming financial services. Although the surge of Covid-19 has
slowed the initiative, attracting investment into the country is crucial during this time. The
government agency Rwanda Finance Limited, managing KIFC, has readjusted its delivery
approach to attract more investment, leveraging technology to render services. Moreover,
the Rwandan government's response to Covid-19 and Kagame's leadership reputation gives
foreign investors’ confidence during this time of uncertainty.
Certainty established by the Rwandan government is admired in the country and across the
continent. The KIFC and many other businesses use this to attract investment, as investors
look at stable markets to manage their capital. In 2019, foreign private capital increased by
2.4%, from US$463 million in 2018, driven by investment in electricity, gas, ICT,
manufacturing, and finance sectors, among others in Rwanda's economy (National Bank of
Rwanda, 2019: 16). Providing such certainty and mobilising funds to bolster initiatives like the
KIFC would be difficult for Kagame without developmental authoritarianism; unlike
democracies, he does not have to consider various opinions that would sway him to mobilise
funds for other initiatives. Moreover, foreign direct investment means that he can fulfil
objectives like economic growth, development, and job creation, resulting in improved
socioeconomic conditions for many Rwandans, especially the youth in rural areas.
Another positive economic indicator is the project to process Coltan ore costing RWF1.3
billion (US$1.4 million), providing a professional wash plant that processes 25 metric tons of
minerals every hour. Mining investments in Rwanda include collaborating with the Mining
Board on over 5 500 hectares and another in exploration. Rwanda aims to generate US$800
million annually from mineral exports by the end of this year, raising the figure to US$1.5
billion by 2024. Thus, the Rwandan Mining Board is tasked with conducting exploration
projects across the country, obtaining geological data, and using that to attract more private
investment to stimulate economic growth (Kingsland, 2019). Kagame's leadership and
developmental authoritarianism enable him to provide stability and speedily implement
drastic policies in the country, subsequently attracting foreign and private investment.
Moreover, projects in the Western Province have an immense socioeconomic benefit, creating
jobs, fostering economic growth, and establishing development zones that bolster business
activity in the community highlighting the notion of African personhood.
According to Mwai (2020b), Rwanda's National Strategy for Transformation (NST) received
support from the World Bank Country Partnership Framework (CPF), providing a six-year
support plan on its strategic priorities while also supporting Rwanda's recovery from the
impact of Covid-19. The framework is based on the CPF's analysis of opportunities to achieve
poverty reduction and collective prosperity in Rwanda. In light of such, it suggests that the
World Bank acknowledges Rwanda's developmental authoritarian system. The World Bank
seemingly supports the notion of collective prosperity and poverty reduction outlined in the
system; however, it does not address the subversion of democratic principles, particularly
civil/human rights.
The programme focuses on five strategic objectives. They are enhancing human capital,
improving conditions for private sector development, broadening access to the digital
economy and infrastructure, increasing agricultural productivity and commercialisation while
intensifying urban agglomeration (World Bank, 2020c). These five strategic priorities are
imperative in accomplishing Rwanda's middle-income status by 2035. The World Bank has
eighteen projects, four regional operations worth US$1.9 billion in Rwanda, ranging from
providing access to basic infrastructure to electricity for rural households. The partnership
enables the government to address numerous socioeconomic issues in the country that
resonate with the critical objectives of a developmental authoritarian political system.
106 L. Ngcayisa
Although Rwanda's developmental authoritarianism shows promise for economic growth

and state development, many criticise the system's tactics for addressing socioeconomic
challenges. According to Kendunga (2020), skills development through higher education and
work experience does not align with labour market needs, as the students' quality is low
because of a weak secondary education. Since these institutions are ineffective, only 50-65%
of graduates are employed after their tertiary studies. Only a limited number of high-level
skills are developed through direct work placement programmes, while no high-skilled sub-
sector accounts for more than 5% of employment; this showcases Rwanda's low quality of
skills.
The World Bank (2015: 9) suggests that low-income Rwanda has a high unemployment rate,
with a 19% unemployed working-age population. In 2020, Rwanda's unemployment rate
fluctuated between 16% and 20.3%, primarily due to the impact of Covid-19 (National Institute
of Statistics of Rwanda, 2021). The rise in inactivity from 2011 caused by a larger proportion
of youth that remains in the schooling system and unemployment indicate Rwanda's low-
income status and significant dependence on the agricultural sector. Although the official
unemployment rate is low, underemployment and low-quality employment are prevalent. In
2015, almost 70% of employed Rwandans worked less than 35 hours a week, and a substantial
number of youth and women are unpaid employees on farms or small enterprises. Also, when
considering the 19th Conference on Labour Statisticians, the working-age population
unemployment in Rwanda rises to 42%.
The Rwandan government realised its shortcomings in achieving vision 2020, so it extended
the development deadline to 2035. However, the pandemic's impact, although partial to the
shortcomings of vision 2020, is two-fold. Firstly, Rwanda's economic regress is expected to
cause a revenue shortfall of 4% of the GDP, while Rwanda's Economic Recovery Plan argues
the shortfall to be only 3.3% of GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2020). Secondly, the
pandemic allows for an easier transition into draconian policies in the name of fighting the
invisible enemy. Thus, Rwanda's unsustainable development and economic growth strategy,
coupled with other invasive draconian practices, are to the detriment of ordinary citizens of
Rwanda. In this regard, African personhood is subverted as elites and capitalists absorb most
of the economic growth and development, leading to the opposite intent of the concept,
individual prosperity, and selective benefit, among others, instead of communal.
The African Development Bank (2020) also notes Rwanda's concessional loan of US$97.675
million to strengthen the state budget and cushion the impact of Covid-19, commending the
country on its swift, decisive response and countermeasures. However, like any other
developmental authoritarian system, funding and policies at play have a centralised agenda,
as Rwanda calls for bolstering surveillance and contact tracing of infected persons in the
country. Subsequently, Rwanda will equip itself with surveillance and monitoring abilities in
the name of combating the siege of the pandemic. Unfortunately, these capabilities will not
disappear at the end of this troubling time but instead continue and be used to enforce
despotism.
Uganda: Positive and Negative Indicators

Over three decades, Uganda has been defined by Museveni's leadership. Noticeably, his
tertiary education depicts much of his leadership today. In university, Museveni studied
economics and political science, focusing on the ideas of Franz Fanon and violence as the most
efficient form of political mobilisation (The New Humanitarian, 2006). Known as a Marxist and
pan-Africanist, Museveni also received military training in Mozambique during his youth.
Today, he continues to reign over Ugandans on the notion of economic development and
security, winning him support over the decades. According to Kwesiga (2020), Museveni's rise
to power was obtained through the gun and is maintained by the gun. He commanded 55 000
troops in his youth after Idi Amin fell from power, leading them through the Ugandan Bush
War. The National Resistance Army, led by Museveni, was lauded for overthrowing the
previous government without looting citizens' property. Since his presidency, the military
continues to actively participate in Uganda's political and institutional affairs, producing the
Ugandan constitution of 1995 and holding parliamentary seats.
However, Freedom House's global freedom scores Uganda 34 out of 100, meaning it is "not
free" (Freedom House, 2021); this is primarily attributed to election violence, limited political
rights, and constrained civil liberties. According to the International Crisis Group (2017),
Uganda's security sector, especially the police, functions beyond preserving law and order,
but instead acts as the presidential defence against opposition and dissidents. Along with
disrupting the opposition's activities, the police are allegedly involved in criminal activities,
from officers turning a blind eye to racketeering to participating in organised crime. Police
failure to effectively fulfil their duties increased violent crimes and murders. Furthermore,
informal security groups like Crime Preventers (un-uniformed militia) mobilise pro-Museveni
voters while intimidating opposition during elections. The Museveni administration governs
with decayed accountability and pro-government police while weakening the security sector
by reducing well-trained and disciplined officers from the police force. Typical of
developmental authoritarian systems, their modern autocrats debilitate opposition while
disregarding the law and project ostensible legitimacy, order, and prosperity.
In contrast, Ahluwalia (2021, pp. 121-122) suggests that elections in Uganda are merely a
legitimising mechanism for the political system and reaffirms its grip on state power.
Museveni received 58.6% of votes, although predictable, much protestation by the Wine
supporters caused unrest. Wine's campaign was stun by shootings and intimidation, alongside
mass detentions and over 50 murdered during the campaign. After the reinstated president,
Wine was placed under house arrest due to the violence during his campaign. Before Wine's
arrest, Museveni shut down the internet a day before the elections to limit opposition and
election observers. Although the United States and the European Union condemned the act,
nothing was done. Arguably, international donors to the Museveni administration are
concerned with the security of their interests which take precedence over values instilled in
their societies like democracy and human rights. Furthermore, Wine alleged fraud against
Museveni, encouraging voters to disregard the election results. 5.85 million voters reinstated
108 L. Ngcayisa
Museveni, and although Wine was defeated, he received 3.48 million votes, 34.8% votes
(France 24, 2021). Although Wine suggested he had proof of his allegations, the internet was
still shut down, and a blackout occurred in certain areas. In developmental authoritarian
systems, elections are not free or fair, and small coalitions or individuals exercise state power.
In comparison, Tripp (2021) notices that throughout Museveni's three-decades-long

presidency, women representation became critical, as Vice President Jessica Alupo, and Prime
Minister, Robinah Nabbania, are among other leading women in Uganda. Recently,
Museveni's cabinet increased women representation from 27% to 43%, while Alupo serves as
the second woman vice-president. Former Vice President, Specioza Kazibwe, served from
1994 to 2003. Women representation in government invoked much debate regarding
women's rights in a developmental authoritarian political system. Women's movements have
made noteworthy gains in the country over the years. Today, 33% of parliamentarians are
women, 43% are cabinet members, and over 46% hold local government posts. Wang and
Yoon (2018, pp. 300-301) highlight that Uganda has reserved legislative seats for women
representation over the years, which led to rising women representation in parliament.
Although these seats are not permanent, Uganda reserves parliamentary seats for women to
promote growth, experience, and an opportunity for women to contest for seats against men
and prove themselves to their constituency.
In contrast, the Republic of Uganda, in partnership with the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), embarks on the construction of strategic roads to improve trade and commerce among
the two countries (Xinhua, 2021). The roads will connect the Mpondwe border in Uganda's
Western Region and the DRC's Kalindi in the North-Kivu province. Uganda's Yoweri Museveni
and the DRC's Felix Tshisekedi believe these roads will bring rapid socioeconomic
development for the two countries through the export zone. The construction and upgrading
of 223 kilometres in eastern DRC will bolster trade and reduce insecurity amid the security
situation in the region. Woof (2021) notes that the new road and trade link will cost over
Ush1.187 trillion (U$334.5 million), boosting trade between the two countries. The project's
funding will be split between the two countries, surfacing and maintaining 89 kilometres of
road in linking Bunagana, Rutshuru, and Goma, while 54 kilometres from Beni to Butembo,
and another 80 kilometres between Kasindi and Beni. Not only will ordinary citizens benefit
from this development, but the two countries will achieve state development. Seemingly,
foreign policy and diplomacy can be positively impacted by the notion of African personhood
existing within developmental authoritarian systems.
Comparative to other developmental authoritarian systems, Uganda hosts regular

elections; however, their creditability becomes increasingly questionable since autocrats like
Museveni rule for over three decades. Today, the ruling National Resistance Movement
continues its grip on power by manipulating national resources, politicising the prosecution of
opposition, and intimidation orchestrated by state security forces. It is no surprise that
Uganda scored 34 out of 100 in 2019 for its global freedom score (Freedom House, 2021). In
2020, the freedom score increased to 36 out of 100 (still ranking "not free"), while its internet
freedom score is 56 out of 100 (ranking "partially free"). Political rights were scored 11 out of
40, and civil liberties scored 23 out of 60. Uganda's civil society and media sectors remain
active, albeit challenged with state violence and legal harassment. Opposition rallies and
protests are disrupted by police, detaining opposition leaders. In contrast, the media
regulators suspended dozens of journalists, albeit courts blocked the directives later.
Noticeably, even social media accounts with a large following are mandated to register and
submit to state monitoring.
In contrast, one of the significant setbacks of developmental authoritarianism is that laws

can be readjusted to favour only a few, and Uganda is no exception; this comes with
ramifications, especially regarding property laws. Matovu (2021) suggests that land
acquisition in Uganda is dreadful, navigating the uncertainty of the rules before and after
purchasing a property. In Uganda, land tenure refers to the systems that govern land
ownership; however, the ownership of property may differ in some regions of the country.
Ownership may speak to a vested interest in property rather than owning it. Uganda's 1995
constitution and the Land Act provides four terms of land ownership; freehold, leasehold,
Mailo, and customary tenure. Unfortunately, questionable property rights in developmental
authoritarianism are a catalyst for low investment, as banks directly contribute to economic
development.
Additionally, the International Crisis Group (2017) argues that Uganda's governance system
is deteriorating, hindering infrastructure and agriculture, among others, that have increased
demand amid a rapidly growing population. Ramifications include the delay of the start of oil
production and stagnant foreign investment. Government initiatives, masked as economic
stimulus, come in the form of handouts to secure political support. The strategy used by
Museveni's government is not isolated. Typically, developmental authoritarian systems
ensure increased state dependency to foster larger voter support and leverage for
campaigning against the opposition. Furthermore, Museveni's administration established new
administrative districts. However, their efforts have not amounted to many improvements for
local service delivery, instead causing communal tensions over mineral resources and land.
According to the World Bank (2021), in the 2020 financial year, Uganda's real GDP grew at
2.9%, significantly less than the 6.8% growth of the 2019 financial year, albeit mainly caused
by the Covid-19 pandemic. Not much is expected to change in 2021, as the country still battles
the ramifications of its lockdown regulations, closing borders that disrupted the Ugandan
economy. Public investment was reduced while private consumption followed, leading to
catastrophic ramifications for informal, industrial, and service sectors. Additionally, Uganda's
GDP per capita also shrunk by 4.5%. Even if the GDP spikes from 2022 onwards, the GDP per
capita will probably retain its low trajectory. Over the past five years, before Covid-19, even
higher productivity jobs and real GDP per capita growth declined to 1.3% from 2.2%, while the
population grew by 3.7% annually. As such, the poor remain significantly vulnerable to
economic shocks (e.g., the 2016 drought, which temporarily increased poverty). The economic
shocks caused by Covid-19 left households with less income, coupled with the high
110 L. Ngcayisa
vulnerability of poverty and limited social security. Uganda needs to create 700 000 jobs
annually to balance the labour force growth and the economy. Unfortunately, the country
currently averages 75 000 jobs annually.
In comparison, Uganda is seemingly regressive and exclusionary in the socio-political realm.

In 2014, the Ugandan parliament passed the Sexual Offences Bill that prevents and punishes
sexual violence, also criminalising homosexuality and sex work within the country. The Sexual
Offences Bill penalises homosexuality by up to 10 years imprisonment while also
discriminating against people living with HIV/AIDS and sex workers (Akullo and Kagumire,
2021). Although Museveni signed this bill, enacting it to penalise even Ugandans residing
outside of the country and permitting a death penalty for specific sexual offences, the
constitutional court repealed the bill due to irregular legal procedure and subverted human
rights. The bill would result in security, economic, and health challenges for the LGBTQI
community.
Conclusion: Findings and Recommendations

Arguably, authoritarianism has not been explored thoroughly in Africa, which has left room
for establishing developmental authoritarianism. Matfess (2015, p. 182) describes it as a
government model that instils certain democratic practices, such as public goods and services,
while also exercising central control over many societal facets. Authoritarianism in Africa has
been detrimental to its states and people. Consequently, African states have been unable to
establish sustainable development and economic growth due to their incapable governments,
weak institutions, and corruption. African systems have benchmarked other regions without
comprehensive insight into their internal functionalities, flaws, and accolades. Although this
article urges African states to review East Asian systems' achievements regarding
developmental authoritarianism, they must establish capable states through technocracy,
meritocracy, and benevolent leadership. Many African states find the Chinese model
appealing in two aspects; establishing the greater influence of the state on the citizenry
through the military and police, and for the ruling party's survival.
African states must be wary of China's emphasis on its party-army model, as it reaffirms
the ideological relations between China and Africa, which date back to China's support for
liberation movements on the continent. Although China and developmental authoritarian
systems in Africa align ideologically, China is a capable state and an emerging superpower;
thus, African states will need to ensure bilateral relations without exploitation or at least avoid
China’s debt trap diplomacy.
Democratic values are undermined within developmental authoritarianism; however, the

state must fulfil its social contract duties if citizens succumb to that. These systems in Africa
must establish themselves as capable states, ensuring solid institutions and a responsive
government. Although they are less open and competitive than Western democracies, these
hybrid political systems must ensure prosperity for the livelihoods of their people. In
addressing the unsustainability of development and economic growth, developmental
authoritarian systems must diversify their economies, invest in emerging sectors,
manufacturing, and move away from their dependency on the low-productivity agricultural
sectors. Developmental authoritarianism does capacitate states with robust development
policies; however, this political system is doomed to end in catastrophic tyranny without
benevolent leadership and precisely planned succession.
Ethiopia presents positive economic indicators, but much is still flawed and needs to be
addressed. Ironically, Ethiopia has strong ties with the United States government (a traditional
Western democracy) through foreign direct investments, and although Ethiopia exhibits much
repression, the United States mentions little about subverted democracy and human rights.
Instead, the United States lauds Ethiopia for its state-led economic development. Ahmed,
unlike his predecessor, exhibits low-intensity repression, silencing dissidents. Mainly, Ahmed's
economic-led governance model aims to achieve economic growth and development, peace,
and cooperation in the region and allows him to focus on his reform policies and increased
international trade. His efforts led to the establishment of the Growth and Transformation
Plan (GTP). The World Bank (2019) highlights that the GTP increased infrastructure
development through public investments and converted the country into a manufacturing
centre.
The sustainability of Ethiopia's system, like many developmental authoritarian systems, is

questionable. Ethiopia faces several developmental challenges, sustaining its positive
economic growth and continued poverty reduction, requiring significant job creation and
improved governance. The country also relies heavily on neighbouring states' ports to ensure
international trade. If Ethiopia fails to foster peacebuilding and cooperation in the East African
region, detrimental consequences will emerge. Ahmed's leadership within developmental
authoritarianism achieves rapid economic growth and state development; prosperity is broad-
based; however, low-intensity repression is quite evident. The sustainability of this system in
Ethiopia is unlikely; although the system is seemingly supported by the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front, there are insufficient succession planning and volatile
fluctuations of intensity repression with each Prime Minister.
In Rwanda's case, mining projects (particularly Coltan ore) provide positive economic
prospects for the country. With his developmental authoritarian system, Kagame's leadership
allows him to provide stability and speedily implement drastic policies, attracting foreign and
private investment. Projects in the Western Province have an immense socioeconomic
benefit, creating jobs, fostering economic growth, and establishing development zones that
bolster business activity in the community. It is crucial to note that although Rwanda is a
development-led authoritarian system, institutions such as the World Bank acknowledge its
political system, seemingly supporting the notion of collective prosperity and poverty
reduction. However, these international institutions and, at times, democratic states, do not
address the issue of subverted democratic values and human rights violations under Kagame's
112 L. Ngcayisa
leadership, noting that the World Bank established eighteen projects, four regional operations
worth US$1.9 billion in Rwanda (World Bank, 2020). As Rwanda aims towards middle-income
status by 2035, patronage from the World Bank in Rwanda increases the likelihood of
Kagame's vision.
Rwanda has made great strides towards attracting private and foreign investment to
achieve its 2035 middle-income status by providing fiscal incentives like preferential corporate
tax rates, tax holidays, or exemption of capital gains tax, among others. Typical of these
political systems, they intend to maintain support amidst neglected democratic principles.
Moreover, Rwanda is an emerging technology hub within central and east Africa, and the
pandemic fosters greater integration of technology for many Rwandans. Consequently,
surveillance and monitoring will become more prominent. Like any developmental
authoritarian system, funding and policies are a centralised agenda, as the Rwandan
government calls for bolstering surveillance and contact tracing of infected persons in the
country. These capabilities, however, will not disappear after these troubling times but instead
continue being used to enforce despotism. Although Kagame's leadership within
developmental authoritarianism achieves rapid economic growth and state development,
prosperity is not broad-based, favouring bureaucratic elites, foreign and private investors. The
sustainability of developmental authoritarianism in Rwanda is unlikely, as the system is solely
driven by the autocrat, with insufficient succession planning.
In Uganda's case, Museveni's leadership defined the country with his military training and
role during the Ugandan Bush War, making him a relentless autocrat and entrenched his
existence in the history of Uganda. Notably, Museveni's rise to power through the gun results
in his elongated presidency through the gun Kwesiga (2020), causing significant military
involvement in the state and a high cost to Ugandans. Sadly, Ugandans encounter election
violence, limited political rights, and constrained human liberties, among other social ills and
foregone liberties. According to the International Crisis Group (2017), Uganda's security
sector, especially the police, functions beyond preserving law and order as the presidential
defence against opposition and dissidents. As such, increased violent crimes and murders
occur concerning mobilising pro-Museveni voters while intimidating the opposition.
Over the three decades of Museveni's rule, women representation has become critical, as
his cabinet increased women representation from 27% to 43% (Tripp, 2021). However, women
representation in government invoked much debate regarding women's rights in a
developmental authoritarian political system. Some Western democracies believe that
increasing women representation in government is merely a ruse to ensure elongated state
power, typical of developmental authoritarian systems. Although Uganda's efforts to
empower women have resulted in some women representation in the legislature, this aids
the prolonged autocratic rule and maintains the legitimacy of Museveni's grip on state power
and ordinary Ugandans. Seemingly, African personhood ostensibly subdues citizens to accept
Museveni's rule since it fosters women empowerment more than ever before in Uganda.
Furthermore, the International Crisis Group (2017) argues that Uganda's governance
system is deteriorating, hindering infrastructure and agriculture, among others, that have
increased demand amid a rapidly growing population. Ramifications include the delay of the
start of oil production and stagnant foreign investment. Some government initiatives, masked
as economic stimulus, come in the form of handouts to secure political support. Noticeably,
supportive Western democracies and international financial institutions have failed to fully
democratise Uganda, with some noting women representation as a reason for non-
interventionist relations. In contrast, the government's response to the public health crisis is
questionable, as reports suggest that billions went to irregular spending. Although much of
Uganda's stagnant economic growth is due to the Covid-19 pandemic, low agricultural
productivity negatively impacts the livelihoods of many Ugandans. Therefore, Uganda must
solve environmental and governance challenges while broadening economic prosperity to
achieve a successful macroeconomic recovery.
Conflict of interest
The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.
Notes on contributor
Lumanyano Ngcayisa is a political science master’s student and an Academic Facilitator in the Department of
Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State (UFS) in Bloemfontein, South Africa. He holds
a bachelor’s degree in governance (2019) and an honours degree in political science obtained with Cum Luade
(2020). His master’s research focuses on non-democratic political systems and economic development in East
Africa. Apart from his journal publications, he regularly publishes newspaper articles, providing political analysis
on current affairs. He also works with the Academy of Multilingualism at the UFS, translating and facilitating
academic learning in indigenous languages for political science students and is part of the editorial team of
Politikon, the International Association for Political Science Students Journal of Political Science.
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Developmental Authoritarianism in Africa: The cases of Ethiopia, Rwanda,

Article · January 2022

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Developmental Authoritarianism: A conceptualisation

Developmental authoritarianism capitalises on African personhood and ubuntu because it

Developmental Authoritarianism: Contributions and Limitations

Furthermore, according to Rough (2020), developmental authoritarian systems are more

Developmental authoritarian political systems can efficiently enforce decisions, achieving

Moreover, high censorship in developmental authoritarian systems places them at a

Ethiopia: Positive and Negative Indicators

Rwanda: Positive and Negative Indicators

Although Rwanda's developmental authoritarianism shows promise for economic growth

Uganda: Positive and Negative Indicators

In comparison, Tripp (2021) notices that throughout Museveni's three-decades-long

Comparative to other developmental authoritarian systems, Uganda hosts regular

In contrast, one of the significant setbacks of developmental authoritarianism is that laws

In comparison, Uganda is seemingly regressive and exclusionary in the socio-political realm.

Conclusion: Findings and Recommendations

Democratic values are undermined within developmental authoritarianism; however, the

The sustainability of Ethiopia's system, like many developmental authoritarian systems, is

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