Insitutional Thresholds To African Economic Development
Insitutional Thresholds To African Economic Development
Insitutional Thresholds To African Economic Development
An Economist article in 2000 titled Africa as the Hopeless Continent1, referring to failed development aid projects, failed states, the poor economic and political situation and the general Western assessment of the African continent. How could one of the leading economist journals come to such a conclusion? Apart from the discussion about the generalisation, legitimacy and quality of this evaluation one has to state, that many African countries seems to have a problem in their institutional structure. Failing development efforts are mostly rooted in an insufficient institutional framework. In theory, there should be three institutional actors aiming at development: Government, Civil Society and external institutions. Whether or not the division of labor of these three actors is best met in a democratic framework, like it is broadly assumed by academics all around the world, development needs a government of the people, for the people, by the people2. The prevailing failure of attempts to democratize African countries let pose the question, how the first enthusiasticely strived goal of democratization could loose so much attraction throughout the roughly 50 years of post-colonialism and how close African governments came to democratic rule at all3. Especially after it was expected to have reached an end of history with the fall of the Berlin Wall, when there was only one major political ideology, democracy, left. Fully developed democracies should serve as stencils for backward nation states, following a predetermined path towards democracy and happiness. These, by initially external, but also internal forces imposed political structures would, combined with financial and personal support, guarantee the development of democracy, and thus general development in terms of economics and civic participation. Lasting authoritarian rule and state disintegration demonstrated the outrageous naivety especially Western
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governments approached the issues of underdevelopment. Exemplary for their mistaken development business one has to mention the perpetuatedly weak influence of the civil society in many states, represented by many NGOs operating remote from the centres of power4.
Development and Democracy - combination or prioritization? One of the most discussed issues of African development is the question, how to balance development and democracy. Unfortunately, too often the discourses neglected to consider alternative political solutions. On the other hand, democracy in its ideal is not necessarily Western-stamped even though democracies like the United States claim for themselves to be the owner of the trademark. While Mugyenyi asks in one of his article, whether development or democracy should come first, one has to question whether you can separate it and if there should be an individual, African approach towards this ideal. And while Mugyenyi is stating, [...] that development can occur in the absence of democracy, but democracy cannot operate in the absence of development5, we have to contrast this assessment with the reality in African states. Referring the example of Uganda, where Museveni slowly transformed the country from a authoritarian no-party system through a movement democracy towards a multiparty democracy6 with a vivid civil society and dedicated regional accountability in e.g. the African Union. To quote Mugyenyi again, democracy, like any other political style, must be adjusted to the conditions of the countries that choose to practice it7, and it is conditioned in a reciprocal manner by social and economic development. As solution he presents a minimal democracy, which would not compete with the requirements for the more important economic development. In this approach he agrees with Goran Hyden and Perer Meyns in that he assumes development democracies require a transitional, semidemocratic period. For Hyden and Meyns, this transitional period is mainly shaped by the Big Man rule, which is characterized by patronage, clientelism and self-enrichement8. The first goal in development is hence to be seen in stabilisation of the country, which, in turn, is to be, achieved by foremost a growing economy9 and a stable political, not fully arbitrary leadership. Big Man rule as transitory system would meet the requirements of African politics best, since in Africa, politics and power are central, not local, and the process of democratisation can only start from there.10. Like in other parts of the world democratisation is, first and foremost, a domestic political battle to which outsiders can only make a minor contribution.11 Mugyenyi presents Kenya as example for these theories: whereas the suddenly, mainly by external intitiative imposed democratic system in Tanzania failed, Kenya developed smoothly, practicing Big Man rule within a, like he calls it, minimalist democracy.
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cf. (Ottaway, 1997) (Mugyenyi, 1987, p. 187) 6 cf. (Kasfir, 2002; Mugaju, 2002) 7 (Mugyenyi, 1987, p. 189) 8 cf. (Meyns, 2006; Hyden, Big Man Rule, 2006) 9 cf. (Sachs, 2008) 10 (Ottaway, 1997, p. 13) 11 (Ottaway, 1997, p. 15)
So, is development more important than democracy? Should a developing state first build up its capacities, like again Mugyenyi refers to the outputs of development, and which would these capacities be? Dont we also understand social and political structures as capacities of a country? Can we really consider democracy as a gimmick12 in development?
The risks of an own path to democracy Answering these questions one has to bear in mind to also assess how successful such minimalist transformed into full democracies and how many such experiments ended in humanitarian disasters. It is a short way from a enlightened monarchy to authoritarian dictatorship. And it is a high risk to directly link a states destiny to its leader ones. Development can also mean the extraction of resources, which simulates national growth and prosperity, of which in turn only the elites profit. Without shared growth there wont be a path to a maximalist democracy. For ecample, elections alone do not guarantee fairness or legitimate rule or democracy. Post-colonial history demonstrated how African states faked democratic rule to get a slice of the cake of international development aid flows. Others even implemented wonderful democracies, forgetting their citiziens on the way. In order to impress the West and thereby also profit economically they were just concentrating on the theoretical, not reviewing their actions. They neglected one of the basic principles of democratic rule: you have to root your system in the society13, which means, you dont only need complex, but also straight answers to ordinary questions. Too often it was thought there wouldnt be the societal capacities in a development society to answer both, the straight and the complex questions. Is it more important to regulate international, financial flows or to control traffic? Basically, a government needs to establish basic services to gain the support of its population. But what, if citizens and political leaders realize, there is no need for a full democracy? Can we really consider democracy as pure fallback system for the achievements of development?
The importance of Civil Society To make it short, we cannot consider democracy as replacable framework for developmental achievements same as one should rightly ask again wheter these achievements or capacities are not contributing a crucial part to development. Todays development approaches always comprise sociopolitical discourse, most of the time they are even seen as the key to economic development. We cannot see it as an either ... or decision, but have to combine it with democracy, or however youd like to call
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political rule based on government of the people, for the people and by the people14. Democracy is a habit good habits can be learned slower or faster depending on the example set by the leaders of society15, the influential African, ideological leader Julius Nyerere once cherished, dwells the interdependence of good governance and peoples representation. Governance of, for, and by the people cannot be achieved without empowering them politically, socially, and economically. Most development strategies today hence consider the Civil Society as their crucial element. Academics like Gyimah-Boadi claim to be able to determine the development and democratization progress of a country based on the quality of its Civil Society16. Not until an emancipated civil society emerged in most African countries throughout the 1990s, triggered by new media and communication technologies as well as the political change on a global scale, African democracies really set off. Only the civil society is able to catalyse the transformation towards a maximalist democracy by contributing and sharing knowledge, participating, monitoring the leaders, reviewing the situation, representing minorities, decentralizing poltitics and economics, and consolidating the general processes of democratization17. At the same time, NGOs and other civic institutions, are the required link to the global society, connecting unions, associations, poltical and social interest groups as well as media, Think Thanks and empowerment initiatives with the developed and developing world.
Conclusion The institutional failure of many African states originated in external naivety and internal crudity. External organisations tried to apply their own political patterns without adaption to African countries. Ethnical conflicts and diverging identities constrained nation building and constructive, consentual and non-violent negotiations, the basis for democracy. Not until the rise of the civil society and the emergence of an own, African path to democracy there is hope for general stability and peace in Africa. It is not inevitable yet, but, supported by new media, revisioned strategies of the international community and a closer integration of the African civil society into global networks, there is justified hope.
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cf. (Wiseman, 1990, S. 4) (Hope Sr., 2002, S. 84) 16 cf. (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004) 17 cf. (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004)
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