Gender Equality and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

GENDER EQUALITY
AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA
Editors
LISA KOLOVICH
MONIQUE NEWIAK
©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

© 2024 International Monetary Fund
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Cataloging-in-Publication Data
IMF Library
Names: Kolovich, Lisa, editor. | Newiak, Monique, editor. | International

Monetary Fund, publisher.
Title: Gender equality and economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa /
Editors Lisa Kolovich, Monique Newiak.
Description: Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 2024. | 2024. |
Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers: ISBN:
9798400246968 (paper)
9798400247088 (ePub)
9798400246999 (WebPDF)
Subjects: LCSH: Women in development—Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Economic
development—Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Gender equality—Africa,
Sub-Saharan.
Classification: LCC HQ1240.5.A357 G4 2024
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this book are those of the

authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s
Executive Directors, its management, or any of its members. The
boundaries, colors, denominations, and any other information
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Monetary Fund, any judgment on the legal status of any territory
or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
Recommended citation: Kolovich, Lisa, and Monique Newiak, eds. 2024.

Gender Equality and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
ISBN: 9
798400246968 (paper)
9798400247088 (ePub)
9798400246999 (PDF)
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Contents
Foreword vii
Acknowledgments ix
Contributors xi
Abbreviations xxiii
Introduction: How Gender Equality Can Shape Sub-Saharan

Africa’s Development 1
Lisa Kolovich, Monique Newiak, and Catherine Pattillo
PART I: WHERE THINGS STAND: GENDER EQUALITY IN

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
1. Revisiting Trends in Gender Equality 9

Chiara Broccolini, Anna Fruttero, and Saanya Jain
2. Zooming into Women’s Financial Access 43

Kazuko Shirono, Katia Huayta-Zapata,
Hector Carcel-Villanova, and Esha Chhabra
3. Epidemics, Gender, and Human Capital in

Developing Countries 63
Stefania Fabrizio, Diego B. P. Gomes, Carine Meyimdjui, and
Marina M. Tavares
4. COVID-19 and Gender Inequality: Impact in

Southern Africa 81
Fatou Kiné Thioune, Giorgia Albertin, Romina Kazandjian, and
Tianyuan Wang
5. COVID-19 and Gender Gaps in the Labor Market:

Evidence from Nigeria and Ethiopia 97
Chie Aoyagi
PART II: SETTLING ON THE BASICS: ENDING HARMFUL PRACTICES

AND DEVELOPING THE CONTINENT
6. Eliminating Violence against Women and

Boosting the Economy 113
Rasmané Ouedraogo and David Stenzel
7. Eliminating Child Marriage and Boosting Growth 131

Pritha Mitra, Eric M. Pondi, Malika Pant, and Luiz F. Almeida
iii

iv Gender Equality and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
PART III: INVESTING WELL: EMPOWERING WOMEN AND

BOOSTING INCLUSION AND RESILIENCE
8. Closing Education Gaps and Promoting Inclusive

Development—Lessons from West Africa 147
Diego B. P. Gomes, Lisa Kolovich, Vivian Malta, Monique Newiak,
Rasmané Ouedraogo, and Sahar Priano
9. The Impact of Women’s Empowerment on Human Capital

of the Next Generation: Looking within the Household 165
Olivia Goldin
10. Gender Inequality and Electoral Violence in Africa:

Unlocking Women’s Peacemaking Potential 193
Rasmané Ouedraogo and Idrissa Ouedraogo
11. A Causal Story: Gender Equality and Economic Growth 209

Ata Can Bertay, Ljubica Dordevic, and Can Sever
PART IV: FAIR PLAY: EQUAL RIGHTS AND WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT
12. Legal Rights: Women’s Economic Empowerment 225

Katharine Christopherson, Audrey Yiadom, Juliet Johnson,
Francisca Fernando, and Lucia Gruet
13. Legal Rights: Women’s Empowerment—Case Studies 237

14. Rethinking Fiscal Law Design to Address Gender Inequality 253

Alessandro Gullo, Arthur Rossi, Lydia Sofrona, Karla Vasquez Suarez,
Christophe Waerzeggers, and Kikachukwu Alex-Okoh
PART V: THE POWER OF POLICIES: FROM FISCAL TO FINTECH
15. Tax and Expenditure Policy for Gender Equality 273

Brooks Evans, Alexander Klemm, Carolina Osorio-Buitron, and
Mauricio Soto
16. Gender Budgeting Practices in Sub-Saharan Africa 295

Lauren Keating, Laura Gores, Carolina Rentería, Vincent Tang,
and Nino Tchelishvili
17. Gender Inequality and Care Work: Valuing and

Investing in Care 315
Mehjabeen Alarakhia, Zahra Sheikh Ahmed, and Tanima Tanima
18. Fintech, Female Employment, and Gender Inequality 333

Boileau Loko and Yuanchen Yang
19. Digitalization and Gender Equality in Political Leadership
in Sub-Saharan Africa 347
Diego B. P. Gomes and Carine Meyimdjui

Contents v
PART VI: LOOKING AHEAD: NEW OPPORTUNITIES
20. Gender and the Green Economy: What Conditions for a

Gender-Transformative Transition to the Green Economy
in Africa? 363
Elena Ruiz Abril
Index 379

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Foreword
In recent decades, sub-Saharan Africa has made great progress in addressing

gender inequality. Maternal death rates have fallen, education gaps have n arrowed,
and access to health and finance has generally increased. Many countries have
reformed their legal systems, removing or altering a large share of the laws that
treat women differently than men. Countries such as Rwanda, South Africa, and
Uganda are among the pioneers that adopted gender-responsive budgeting;
several more have recently started following their path.
A lot more needs to be done, however. In many countries in the region, gender
inequality in its variety of forms is still excessively high. This is, of course, a moral
issue. But from an IMF perspective, it also has significant bearing on a country’s
economic development. For instance: fewer women than men in the formal labor
market, more women than men in vulnerable jobs, substantial earnings gaps
between men and women—all of these are visibly linked to the economy. Women
also face higher barriers to starting a business, in part because of the significant
financial and digital divide. Issues outside the labor market equally undermine
economic development. For instance, when gender inequalities lead to a high
incidence of child marriage or to gender-based violence, they put a heavy toll on
women, families, and the well-being of children. They diminish the returns from
education and lower productivity by destroying human capital that the region’s
rapidly growing and young population is counting on to build a prosperous
future.
At a time when the traditional engines of growth have weakened globally, and
as sub-Saharan Africa grapples with a shock-prone environment amid a signifi-
cant funding squeeze, promoting gender equality can help boost and sustain
inclusive growth over the medium term. It can also help to better address other
key challenges of our time, such as climate change, demographic trends, and
digitalization.
Despite the oftentimes macrocritical relevance of gender issues, macroeconomic,
structural, and financial policies often fail to take gender into account, and gender
equality is mostly treated separately from core macroeconomic issues. This is a
gap that needs to be addressed.
In 2022, the Fund adopted a gender strategy to precisely ensure that, when
macrocritical, gender issues are integrated in our core macroeconomic policy
analysis.
We are committed to supporting our 190 member countries in designing
policies with a gender lens. This includes, for instance, implementing expendi-
ture and tax policies to achieve better macroeconomic outcomes and narrow
gender gaps, incorporating gender into public financial management, and remov-
ing legal obstacles to women’s economic empowerment. By integrating gender
into core macroeconomics, we can better complement the efforts of many
vii

viii Gender Equality and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
partners that are working towards gender equality. This book showcases some of
the emerging analytical and policy work, with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa, that
can help in policymaking.
Sub-Saharan Africa’s development and sustainable growth would benefit from
women’s further empowerment. The stakes are high, but history shows that, with
sustained commitment, substantial change is possible.
Antoinette M. Sayeh
Deputy Managing Director
International Monetary Fund

Acknowledgments
As this book is released, we are looking back on more than 10 years of formal and
informal collaboration on gender with each other. It’s not always the case that
colleagues become good friends, but when they do, a world of opportunity pres-
ents itself. For us, this opened doors to being part of the institutional change that
has now brought gender to the IMF’s core work. So, first of all, high five to us!
More seriously, we are grateful to all the brilliant colleagues who were trailblaz-
ers at the IMF before the approval of the IMF’s first Gender Strategy—Kalpana
Kochhar, Daria Zakharova, Stefania Fabrizio, Sonali Jain Chandra, Rasmané
Ouedraogo, Carolina Rentería Rodriguez, Vincent Tang, Priyanka Chaturvedi, to
name only a few—and those who have elevated the case for the IMF’s role on
gender and macro, ensuring that it is enshrined and implemented institutionally—
Rishi Goyal, Ratna Sahay, Valentina Flamini, and Anna Fruttero, among many
others across the institution under the great leadership of our Managing Director
Kristalina Georgieva and Deputy Managing Director Antoinette M. Sayeh. We
thank our dedicated colleagues in the Inclusion and Gender Unit in the Strategy,
Policy and Review Department—your passion in moving the needle motivates us
every day.
We would like to thank the leadership at the African Department, in particular
David Robinson and Cathy Pattillo, for spearheading the work in the region. The
chapters in this book are evidence of the enthusiasm with which teams have
approached tackling gender gaps in sub-Saharan Africa. The chapters also show
how much more work is needed. We count on you, our readers and colleagues,
to take these lessons forward.
This book reflects the hard work of many colleagues inside and outside the IMF,
and we are grateful to each of them. We are fortunate to work with a growing cadre
of mission chiefs, desk economists, directors of IMF training and capacity develop-
ment centers, and technical experts—all of whom are dedicated to examining
gender issues. Our external partners and colleagues offer a wealth of expertise and
have warmly welcomed collaboration and innovation opportunities.
Our outstanding colleagues in the IMF Communications Department have
kept us on track and done a fantastic job supporting us throughout the process.
Many thanks in particular to Lorraine Coffey and Patricia Loo for their patience
and guidance.
Finally, we would like to thank our families and cover several generations at
once: Monique would like to thank her (great)-grandmothers for being an inspi-
ration (you know what you did). Lisa would like to tell her daughter that her
unique perspective, resilience, and, most of all, kindness are gifts to be celebrated
(and that half of those come from her dad).
Lisa Kolovich and Monique Newiak
ix


Contributors
EDITORS
Lisa Kolovich is a Senior Economist in the IMF’s Inclusion and Gender Unit and
one of the co-authors of the IMF’s Strategy Toward Mainstreaming Gender. She
has also worked in the IMF’s African and Research Departments and was the
team manager for gender research under a joint collaboration between the IMF
and the UK’s Department for International Development that focused on macro
issues in low-income countries. Her research examines gender budgeting and
fiscal policy initiatives as tools for reducing gender inequality. She is contributor
and editor of the book, Fiscal Policies and Gender Equality. She holds a PhD in
Economics from the University of Navarra, Spain, and an MA in Economics from
the University of Maryland.
Monique Newiak is the Deputy Chief of the IMF’s Inclusion and Gender Unit,
which she joined after her assignment as the IMF’s Resident Representative in Sierra
Leone (September 2019–March 2023). While working on a wide range of sub-
Saharan African countries over the past decade at the IMF, she has been a key
contributor to the IMF’s analytical and operational agenda on inclusive growth,
including as a co-editor of the books Women, Work and Economic Growth—Leveling
the Playing Field (2017) and Good Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa—Opportunities
and Lessons (2022). She holds a PhD in Economics from Ludwig-Maximilian
University of Munich. Her research has been published in such journals as European
Economic Review, Canadian Journal of Economics, Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
and Social Sciences.
AUTHORS
Mehjabeen Alarakhia is the Regional Policy Advisor on Women’s Economic
Empowerment for the East and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO) of UN
Women. She leads the regional portfolio on women’s entrepreneurship and
employment, which includes supporting women’s entrepreneurship and employ-
ment, transforming the care agenda in East and Southern Africa, and supporting
women’s economic empowerment through climate-resilient agriculture in the
region. The ESARO portfolio covers 25 countries including emerging economies,
conflict and post-conflict economies, and small island states. Mehjabeen holds a
BA in Sociology, a specialized BA in Social Work, and a master’s degree in
International Development. Her research focuses on how economic policy can
contribute to positive development outcomes.
Giorgia Albertin is Deputy Division Chief of the Eastern Africa II Division in the
IMF’s African Department, and she is IMF Mission Chief for Mauritius. She has
xi

xii Gender Equality and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
extensive experience working on emerging markets, low-income countries, and

fragile economies. Previously, she served as the Mission Chief for Namibia,
Eswatini, and Equatorial Guinea and was IMF Resident Representative for Tunisia.
She also held various positions in the IMF’s Middle East and Central Asia
Department; IMF Institute; and IMF Strategy, Policy, and Review Department.
She also worked on energy issues at the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. Her research focuses on gender inequality, fragile states, regional
integration, and energy subsidies. She holds a PhD in Economics from the London
School of Economics and Political Science.
Kikachukwu Alex-Okoh is a Research Officer in the Fiscal and Financial

Division of the IMF’s Legal Department. Before joining the Fund, Kikachukwu
worked in private practice in Lagos, Nigeria. She holds an LLM in International
Business and Economic Law from Georgetown University Law Center, and an
LLB from the University of Warwick, United Kingdom.
Luiz F. Almeida is an Economist in the Country Economics and Engagement

Unit of the International Finance Corporation, the private-sector arm of the
World Bank Group (WBG). He conducts macroeconomic surveillance of the
Caribbean region and leads the development of WBG products such as Country
Private Sector Diagnostics and Country Partnership Frameworks. Prior to the
WBG, he worked for the IMF and in the private sector with PwC Brazil. He
holds a master’s degree in Applied Economics from Johns Hopkins University.
Chie Aoyagi is an Economist in the IMF’s African Department. Before joining

the department, she worked in the Review and Strategy Division of the Statistics
Department and in the IMF’s Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific in Tokyo.
Her research focuses on gender equality and structural reforms. Chie holds a BA
in International Development Studies from the University of California, Los
Angeles, and an MA and PhD in Economics from the National Graduate
Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo.
Ata Can Bertay is an Assistant Professor at Sabanci Business School and also
serves as Director of the Sabanci University Corporate Governance Forum.
Previously, he held the position of Research Economist at the World Bank’s
Development Economics Research Group, where he led the “Global Financial
Development Report,” on financial development. His areas of expertise include
banking, financial economics, and macrofinance. He received his PhD in
Economics from Tilburg University.
Chiara Broccolini is an Economist at the Gender Group and Poverty and

Equality Global Practice of the World Bank. She works on labor markets, climate
change, and provision of childcare services, with a special focus on gender equal-
ity and women’s economic empowerment. Before joining the World Bank, she
worked on economics of education, poverty, and development finance at the

xiii
Contributors
Inter-America Development Bank and in academia. She has published in peer-

reviewed journals, and has taught undergraduate and graduate courses. She holds
a PhD in Economics from the University of Ancona, Italy.
Hector Carcel-Villanova is an Economist in the Financial Institutions Division

of the Statistics Department at the IMF. For three years he worked on the
Financial Access Survey; currently, he contributes to the Monetary and Financial
Statistics and the Financial Soundness Indicators databases. Previously, he worked
at Eurosystem, as Principal Economist at the National Bank of Lithuania, and as
a trainee during his doctoral studies at the European Central Bank. Hector holds
a PhD from the University of Navarra, Spain, and has published articles on gen-
der, fintech, monetary policy, and machine learning.
Esha Chhabra is an Economist in the IMF’s Statistics Department, where she

works on the department’s capacity development strategy, monitoring, and gov-
ernance. During her time with the department, she has also worked on the
Financial Access Survey and issues related to financial inclusion, and she has
contributed to the conceptualization and setting up of the Gender Data Hub.
Before joining the IMF, Esha worked with the South Asia Chief Economist’s
office at the World Bank. She received her MPA in International Development
from the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs.
Katharine Christopherson is Assistant General Counsel in the IMF’s Legal

Department, where she provides strategic, intellectual, and operational leadership
in support of the department’s legal advice on IMF’s governance and institutional
issues; and surveillance over member countries’ economies, exchange systems,
capital flow management measures, trade, and gender and law-related matters.
She joined the IMF in 2000 after obtaining an LLM from Yale Law School.
Before joining the IMF, she worked as an attorney in private practice and as a law
professor at the University of Lima, Peru.
Ljubica Dordevic is an Economist in the IMF’s African Department, where she

works on Chad and contributes to the completion of the first debt treatment
under the G20 Common Framework for sovereign debt restructuring. Previously,
she worked on the Seychelles and Mauritius and in the Monetary and Capital
Markets Department in the Division of Financial Supervision and Regulation.
Her research has been published in the Journal of Banking and Finance and in the
Journal of Financial Stability. Before joining the IMF, she was an Assistant
Professor/Postdoctoral Fellow of Household Finance at Goethe University
Frankfurt. She holds a PhD in Finance from Tilburg University.
Brooks Evans is a Senior Economist in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department.

Under the guidance of Mauricio Soto, he leads the Expenditure Policy Division’s
work on gender and is involved in other inclusion topics, including income
inequality. He focuses on both macro- and microeconomic analysis and policy

xiv Gender Equality and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
advice in advanced economies and developing countries. His work assesses the
distributional effects of fiscal policy; his areas of focus include social assistance,
labor market programs, pensions, subsidies, and the wage bill. Brooks previously
worked at the World Bank, where he trained officials and experts worldwide on
social protection, labor, and poverty analysis. His research has appeared in such
publications as the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor, the World Bank’s World Development
Report, and Applied Economics.
Stefania Fabrizio is Chief of the Inclusion and Gender Issues Unit in the IMF’s
Strategy, Policy, and Review Department; Alternate Chair of the IMF Gender
Working Group; and Member of the IMF Advisory Group on Inequality.
Previously, she worked in the Fiscal Affairs Department, the European Department,
the African Department, and the Statistics Department. Her research interests
include macroeconomics, gender economics, inequality, labor economics, public
finance, and fiscal institutions. Before joining the IMF, Stefania was Visiting
Professor at the University of Salamanca, Spain. She holds a PhD in Economics
from the European University Institute.
Francisca Fernando is Counsel with the Financial Integrity Group of the IMF’s Legal
Department. She has been supporting the IMF’s work on gender issues, including as
a co-author of the 2022 IMF working paper “Tackling Legal Impediments to
Women’s Economic Empowerment.” Before joining the IMF, she worked for the
World Bank Group. She holds a Master of Laws degree from the University of
Toronto and a Bachelor of Laws degree from the London School of Economics and
Political Science, and she is called to the Bar of England and Wales.
Anna Fruttero is a Senior Economist at the World Bank. In her career, she has
led operations, policy dialogue, and analytical activities in several regions and was
part of the core team drafting the World Development Report 2015. Her exper-
tise includes distributional analysis, social protection and labor, fiscal policy,
norms and aspirations, and behavioral insights. She has published articles in
peer-reviewed journals and has taught graduate courses at New York University
and Johns Hopkins University. From 2018 to 2021, she was on external service
at the IMF, where she contributed to drafting the Fund Gender Strategy and
worked on female labor force participation and fiscal policy as well as debt sus-
tainability. She holds a PhD in Economics from New York University.
Olivia Goldin is an Economic Advisor at the UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and

Development Office. She works on small island developing states. She was recent-
ly the UK Economic Advisor in Sierra Leone; previously she worked on climate
and environment, humanitarian, and trade issues. She has also worked at the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and in academic
research, where she focused on development, gender, and climate economics.

xv
Contributors
Diego B. P. Gomes is a Senior Economist in the Inclusion and Gender Issues

Unit in the IMF’s Strategy, Policy, and Review Department. Prior to joining the
IMF, he was a Professor at the Alberta School of Business, University of Alberta,
and worked in the hedge fund and management consulting industries.
Laura Gores is a Technical Assistance Advisor at the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs

Department, Public Financial Management 2 Division. She works on gender
budgeting in Asia, Francophone Africa, and Latin America. Before joining the
IMF, she assessed the performance of EU budget support to developing countries
at the European Court of Auditors and worked at the Financial Commission of
the French Parliament. She holds master’s degrees in Finance and Public
Administration from the University of Münster (Germany), Sciences Po Paris,
and the École Nationale d’Administration (France), as well as a PhD on the EU’s
trade agreement with the Caribbean countries.
Lucia Gruet works in the IMF’s Law Division of the Legal Department, primar-
ily on the legal aspects of country operations as well as issues related to IMF law
and policy. She is part of the gender policy working group. Before joining the
IMF, she was an Associate in the International Arbitration Department of Alston
& Bird in New York; she was also a Legal Consultant at the World Bank for the
Women, Business and the Law Team. Lucia worked on the Social and Institutions
Gender Index at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). She has published various articles and reports focusing on women’s
rights for the World Bank and the OECD. Dually trained in civil law and com-
mon law, Lucia holds a Master of Laws degree from Université Paris 1-Panthéon-
Sorbonne, Paris, and an LLM from Columbia Law School.
Alessandro Gullo is Assistant General Counsel in the IMF’s Legal Department.

He leads the Financial and Fiscal Law Division, in charge of advising on mone-
tary, financial, and fiscal law reforms in IMF member countries, including the
integration of gender policies into their fiscal legal frameworks. He advised a
variety of countries on the design and implementation of their legal reforms, also
in a crisis context. He served on various committees of international stan-
dards-setting bodies and has published on fiscal, banking, and financial matters.
Katia Huayta-Zapata is an Economist in the IMF’s Statistics Department, where

she works on the Financial Access Survey. Before joining the IMF, she worked at
the Center for Financial Inclusion and Peru’s Superintendency of Banks,
Insurance, and Private Pension Funds. She is a Joint Japan/World Bank Graduate
Scholarship Program scholar; she earned a master’s degree in Public Administration
in International Development from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.
She also holds a master’s degree in Economics from the Pontificia Universidad
Católica del Perú.

xvi Gender Equality and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
Saanya Jain works on global energy investments at the International Finance

Corporation (World Bank Group). Prior to this, she worked at the IMF’s Africa
Department on programs with Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Benin, particularly on
fiscal and climate policy. She has also worked at The Atlantic magazine, McKinsey
& Company, and The Rock Creek Group. She has published on climate finance in
sub-Saharan Africa and in the mining sector. She holds a BA in Economics and
International Relations with Honors from Brown University.
Juliet Johnson is the Registrar of the United Nations Appeals Tribunal. Before
joining the United Nations, she was Senior Counsel in the IMF’s Legal Department,
Administrative Law Division. She coauthored the IMF working paper “Tackling
Legal Impediments to Women’s Economic Empowerment.” She has also worked as
an Appellate Attorney at the global law firm Jones Day and as an Urban Planner
for RTI International. She holds a JD from Duke University School of Law, a
master’s degree in City Planning from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and
a BA in International Development from University of California, Berkeley.
Romina Kazandjian is an Economist (Economist Program) in the Debt Capital

Markets Division of the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department. Previously,
she was an Economist in the IMF’s African Department, working on Lesotho and
Eswatini; an International Economist in the US International Trade Commission; an
American Economic Association Dissertation Fellow at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston; and an Intern in the IMF’s Strategy, Policy, and Review Department. Her
research interests include inflation, uncertainty, public debt, development, and gender
inequality. She holds a PhD in Economics from American University.
Lauren Keating is a Visiting Scholar with the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department
(FAD), where she supports gender budgeting initiatives. She is on leave from the
Canadian Ministry of Finance, where she worked in fiscal policy leading Canada’s
gender budgeting efforts. In her current role and in a previous role as a Short-
Term Expert in FAD, she has participated in technical assistance missions to The
Gambia, Lesotho, and South Africa. She holds an MA in International Economic
Development Policy from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
and a Bachelor of Commerce degree from Carleton University.
Alexander Klemm is Division Chief of the Tax Policy 2 Division of the IMF’s
Fiscal Affairs Department. He leads analytical work on tax policy and provides
capacity development to members in the Asia-Pacific region, non-Francophone
Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. He previously worked in IMF area depart-
ments, participating in financial programs and economic surveillance, and outside
the IMF at the Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, and the European Central
Bank, Frankfurt. He holds a PhD from University College London and has pub-
lished on public finance, tax policy, investment, and the balance of payments.

xvii
Contributors
Boileau Loko is an Assistant Director in the IMF’s Strategy, Policy and Review
Department, with wide-ranging country experience including on sub-Saharan
Africa and Central America. He holds a PhD in Macroeconomics and Economic
Modeling from the University of Auvergne, France. He has worked and published
papers on various topics, including emerging issues such as natural disasters, gen-
der inequality, productivity, and fintech.
Vivian Malta is a Senior Economist at the IMF, where she works on macroeco-
nomics and gender inequality issues. Before joining the Fund, she was a
Macroeconomist in the financial industry and at the World Bank’s office in Brazil.
She holds a PhD in Economics from Brazil’s Fundação Getúlio Vargas-Escola de
Pós-Graduação em Economia and a bachelor’s degree in Industrial Engineering
from Pontifical Catholic University, Rio de Janeiro. During her graduate studies
she spent a year at Columbia University and at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York as a visiting scholar.
Carine Meyimdjui is an Economist in the IMF’s Strategy Policy and Review

Department. She has been involved in various research and analytical work on
macroeconomic policies and external shocks in low-income countries. Her most
recent work focuses on digitalization, food insecurity, and natural disasters with
an interest in gender issues.
Pritha Mitra is a Division Chief in the IMF’s Strategy, Policy, and Review
Department. Previously, she worked extensively on surveillance and program
cases across Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, including as Mission
Chief. Her wide-ranging publications cover climate change, fiscal policies, social
and equity issues, natural resources, and structural policies underlying economic
growth. She holds a PhD in Economics from Columbia University.
Carolina Osorio-Buitron is a Senior Economist in the Tax Policy 2 Division of

the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department. She holds a PhD and a master’s degree in
Economics from the University of Oxford. Her research interests include open
economy macroeconomics, labor economics, and public policy. Before joining
the IMF, she worked as an Economist in the Central Bank of Colombia.
Idrissa Ouedraogo is a retired university Professor and Chairman of the Board

of Directors of Forge-Afrique. His previous jobs include full Professor of
Economics at the University Thomas Sankara; Director of Centre d’études, de
documentation et de recherche économiques et sociales; and Director of the
Department of Economics and Management at the University Ouaga II. He also
directed the Ziga dam project and was the National Technical Coordinator of the
Program for the Strengthening of Economic Governance. He holds a PhD from
the University of Knoxville.

xviii Gender Equality and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
Rasmané Ouedraogo is the IMF’s Resident Representative for Niger. In his pre-
vious assignments in the IMF’s African Department, he worked on Côte d’Ivoire
and Central African Republic. Before joining the African Department, he worked
in the IMF’s Statistics Department (Balance of Payments Division) and the World
Bank’s Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management Global Practice. His broad
research interests relate to development economics and macroeconomics. He
received his PhD in Economics from University of Auvergne, France. He holds
master’s degrees in International Economics, Development Economics, and
Project Management from Clermont School of Economics, France.
Malika Pant joined the IMF in 2008. She is an experienced Economist with a
track record of research on the energy sector, capital flows, crisis in advanced econ-
omies and emerging markets, low-income countries, and data transparency. Before
joining the IMF, she worked as an Associate Macroeconomist at Morgan Stanley
for the Asia-Pacific region. She received her MA in Applied Economics from Johns
Hopkins University and MA in Economics from Mumbai University. She also
holds a BA in Economics and Statistics from St. Xavier’s College, Mumbai.
Catherine Pattillo is a Deputy Director in the IMF’s African Department, where

she oversees work on several countries and the Regional Economic Outlook as well
as on climate change, capacity development, gender, and research. Since joining
the Fund from a position at Oxford University, she has worked in the Fiscal Affairs
Department, where she was Chief of the division responsible for the IMF’s Fiscal
Monitor; in the Research Department; on countries in Africa and the Caribbean;
and in the Strategy, Policy, and Review Department, where she worked on low-in-
come country issues, and emerging issues such as gender, inequality, and climate
change. She has published in these areas and on the Sustainable Development
Goals, firm dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa, growth, investment, debt, monetary
and exchange rate policies, aid, and currency crises. She received her BA from
Harvard University and PhD in Economics from Yale University.
Eric M. Pondi is an Economist in the IMF’s Strategy Policy and Review

Department, which he joined in 2018. His policy work includes country reviews,
analytical contributions to the IMF agenda on emergency facilities and the 2021
Special Drawing Rights allocation, and debt sustainability analyses in the context
of the G20 Common Framework. His research focuses on climate change adap-
tation, economic crises, the economic impact of the gender gap, and asset pricing.
He holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Montreal, where he taught
economics prior to joining the IMF.
Sahar Priano is a Research Analyst in the IMF’s Strategy Policy and Review
Department, where she works on economic issues concerning gender and
inclusion. She is also a Course Facilitator for the Master of Arts in Global
Risk degree at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International
Studies (SAIS). She earned a BA in Political Economy from the University of

xix
Contributors
California, Berkeley. She also holds a master’s degree in International Political

Economy and International Economics from SAIS.
Carolina Rentería is Chief of the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department’s Public

Financial Management (PFM) I Division. She is responsible for delivering PFM
capacity development and creating a comprehensive PFM analytical agenda in
such areas as budget and treasury processes, fiscal risks management, infrastruc-
ture governance, fiscal transparency, and PFM for strategic priorities such as cli-
mate, gender, and Sustainable Development Goals. She leads the department’s
gender work, particularly gender budgeting. Before joining the IMF in 2016, she
worked at the World Bank as Executive Director of the Board and Lead
Economist for Africa. In Colombia she served as Minister of Planning, National
Budget Director, and Senior Advisor to the Fiscal Council. She holds master’s
degrees from New York University in Public Administration and from Universidad
de Los Andes in Economic Development.
Arthur Rossi is the Financial Regulation Lead in the Supervisory and Innovation
Department of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority. Prior to that role, he was
a Financial Regulation Expert in the Financial Stability Department of Banque de
France and a Research Officer in the IMF Legal Department’s Financial and
Fiscal Law Division, advising on public financial management, financial law, and
fintech issues. Before joining the IMF in 2017, he worked for the European
Central Bank. He holds a JD in Business Law from Jean Moulin University, Lyon,
and a master’s degree in Financial and Tax Law from Sorbonne University, Paris.
Elena Ruiz Abril is UN Women’s Regional Policy Advisor for Women’s Economic
Empowerment for West and Central Africa. She has more than 20 years of experi-
ence working to support women’s economic rights, advising governments, multilat-
erals, and the private sector. Before joining UN Women, she worked for the World
Bank; the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; and several UN
agencies in Africa, Latin America, Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East and
North Africa. In her current role, she works to scale up solutions to support wom-
en’s economic empowerment in West and Central Africa, with a focus on rural
women and climate-resilient agriculture, women in the transition to the green
economy, unpaid care reform, and gender-responsive economic policy.
Can Sever is an Economist in the IMF’s African Department. He previously

worked in the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department as an Economist.
He also worked as an intern at the IMF’s Asia and Pacific and Research
Departments and as a short-term consultant at the World Bank’s Development
Economics Research Group. He holds a PhD in Economics from the University
of Maryland, College Park. He completed his MA in Economics and BS in
Electrical and Electronics Engineering at Bogazici University. He conducts
research in the areas of international finance and macroeconomics as well as polit-
ical economy.

xx Gender Equality and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
Zahra Sheikh Ahmed is a Program Analyst for the Women’s Economic

Empowerment Team of the East and Southern Africa Regional Office of UN
Women. The Women’s Economic Empowerment portfolio aims to strengthen
women’s economic autonomy; this includes transforming the care agenda.
Before UN Women, she worked as a program officer for one of Sweden’s
largest civil society organizations, ForumCiv, supporting entrepreneurs to
strengthen gender equality, decent employment, and corporate social respon-
sibility in Somalia. In addition to working with civil society actors as agents
of change in more than 70 countries, she had many years of experience in the
civil society and public sectors in Sweden.
Kazuko Shirono is a Deputy Division Chief in the Financial Institutions

Division of the IMF’s Statistics Department (STA). She oversees the work related
to the Financial Access Survey, including outreach, research, and capacity devel-
opment. Kazuko is also the Lead Coordinator for STA’s gender-related work-
stream. Before joining STA, she worked in various IMF departments, including
the European Department, where she led Article IV missions. Kazuko holds a
PhD in Economics from Columbia University.
Lydia Sofrona is a Senior Tax Law Expert for the IMF, providing technical assis-
tance on all aspects of tax law reform across a range of IMF member countries,
including those in the Middle East and North Africa region, sub-Saharan Africa,
Europe, and Asia. Before this role, she worked as Senior Counsel in the Financial
and Fiscal Law Unit of the IMF’s Legal Department, as Director of Legal services
for the Greek Revenue Authority, and as Legal Counsel to the Greek Alternate
Minister of Finance. She has also worked as a Technical Assistance Expert for the
European Commission, providing tax legal design and drafting assistance to juris-
dictions across Europe and Central Asia.
Mauricio Soto is a Deputy Division Chief in the Expenditure Policy Division of

the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department. He focuses on a range of critical public
finance issues, including social spending programs, government compensation
and employment, and Sustainable Development Goals. At the IMF, he has
worked on fiscal policy issues in more than 20 countries in surveillance, lending,
and capacity development activities. Before joining the IMF, he was a researcher
on social insurance issues at Boston College’s Center for Retirement Research and
the Urban Institute.
David Stenzel is an Economist in the IMF’s Finance Department, where he

works on concessional lending. Before joining the Finance Department, he
worked on Senegal in the IMF’s African Department. Previously he was Senior
Advisor to the German Executive Director and worked at Deutsche Bundesbank
on international monetary and economic cooperation. His broad research inter-
ests encompass development, fragility, and macroeconomics. He holds a master’s
degree in Economics from Freie Universität Berlin.

xxi
Contributors
Vincent Tang is an Economist in the Fiscal Affairs Department at the IMF, where
he works on public financial management, gender budgeting, and macrofiscal policy.
He has led several initiatives on gender in the IMF, including collaborations with the
Gates Foundation and UN Women. He was Head of Fiscal Economics and Head of
Growth Economics at Her Majesty’s Treasury in the United Kingdom. He has also
worked at the UK’s Department for International Development and Department for
Education. He holds two degrees from the University of Cambridge: an MPhil in
Economics and a BA in Economics and Physics.
Tanima Tanima works with the Women’s Economic Empowerment Team of the
East and Southern Africa Regional Office of UN Women. As a feminist and
researcher, she focuses on gender, care, and labor markets in developing contexts,
and she is passionate about effectively using data for development policy. Tanima
worked as a Research Associate for two leading research centers, J-PAL South
Asia and IFMR LEAD, on projects aimed at improving women’s and children’s
health and education outcomes and at changing social norms on paternal care of
children. She holds an MPhil in Economics from the University of Oxford.
Marina M. Tavares is an Economist in the Climate Change Structural Reforms

Division of the IMF’s Research Department. Previously she led the working
group on the interconnections between macroeconomic policy and inequality
under Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office-IMF Collaboration.
Her research interests include macroeconomics, climate change, gender, and
inequality. Before joining the IMF, she worked as an Assistant Professor at the
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México. She holds a PhD in Economics from
the University of Minnesota.
Nino Tchelishvili is a Senior Economist in the Public Financial Management

(PFM) Division of the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department. Her main areas of exper-
tise include PFM reforms, budget planning and implementation aspects, gender
budgeting, and govtech. Since 2019, she has coordinated and led capacity develop-
ment in several countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and in Anglophone
sub-Saharan Africa, including in fragile states. She contributes to IMF working
papers on gender budgeting. Before joining the IMF, she worked at the World
Bank; she has also held senior-level positions in the Ministry of Finance of Georgia.
Fatou Kiné Thioune is a PhD candidate in Economics at the University of

Southern California. Her research focuses on the role of productivity in economic
growth and development in Africa. Through her research, she has studied topics
such as misallocation, trade, COVID-19 and gender inequality, and structural
transformation in various African countries. She interned at the IMF in summer
2021, conducting research on the disproportionate impact of the COVID-19
pandemic on gender inequality in Southern Africa. She is dedicated to using her
expertise to tackle critical economic challenges and contribute to evidence-based
policymaking, particularly in Africa.

xxii Gender Equality and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
Karla Vasquez Suarez is Senior Counsel in the Financial and Fiscal Division of the
IMF’s Legal Department. She has extensive experience in Asia, sub-Saharan Africa,
Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East and North Africa region,
providing legal advice on the areas of public debt management, public financial
management, fiscal rules, liability management operations, government guarantees,
fiscal risks management, budget, public investment frameworks, public-private
partnerships, and state-owned enterprises. Before her work at the IMF, she was a
partner in a law firm in La Paz, Bolivia, and served as Senior Counsel in the banking
and companies regulatory agencies in Bolivia. She received her LLM from
Georgetown University Law Center and is licensed in the New York Bar.
Christophe Waerzeggers is a Tax Lawyer and Senior Counsel in the Financial

and Fiscal Division of the Legal Department of the IMF where he coordinates the
work of the tax law function. He has extensive experience in tax law design and
drafting and has advised on tax law reforms in Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin
America, and the Caribbean. Before joining the IMF, he lectured on tax and
comparative tax law at various universities and consulted for the World Bank and
the UK’s Department for International Development. He also worked with the
Belgian firm de Bandt, van Hecke & Lagae; the UK firm Linklaters; and the US
firm Hogan & Hartson. He holds LLMs in Law and Tax Law from the Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven, Belgium.
Tianyuan Wang is a Research Analyst in the Southern II Division of the IMF’s

African Department, where she works on countries in the South Africa Countries
Union and is involved in Article IV missions for Botswana, Namibia, and South
Africa. She previously interned with the IMF’s Strategy, Policy, and Review
Department, where she worked on innovative projects using machine learning
techniques. Her research interests include fiscal policy, energy and green transi-
tion, and international trade. She holds a master’s degree from Johns Hopkins
University and a bachelor’s degree from Hong Kong Baptist University.
Yuanchen Yang is an Economist at the IMF. Before joining the Fund, she was a
Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Fellow at Harvard University. Her research interests lie
at the intersection of macroeconomics and finance, including macrofinancial linkages,
real estate, and innovation. Her work has been published in scholarly journals and
presented widely in academic conferences. She holds a PhD from Tsinghua University.
Audrey Yiadom is Senior Counsel in the IMF’s Legal Department Fund Law and
Policy Division. She is a co-coordinator of the Legal Department’s gender policy
working group and coauthored the working paper “Tackling Legal Impediments
to Women’s Economic Empowerment.” Prior to joining the IMF, she worked for
the US government as a Senior International Attorney at Millennium Challenge
Corporation, and was a Project Finance Associate at Clifford Chance US LLP. She
earned her JD and LLM degrees in International and Comparative Law from
Cornell University Law School and her BA, cum laude, in International
Development from Cornell University College of the Arts and Sciences.

Abbreviations
AE advanced economies
AFR African Department
AIDS acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
APD Asia and Pacific Department
BAZ BMI-for-age z-score
BMI body mass index
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women
CLRA Communal Law Reform Act
CRED Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DHS Demographic and Health Survey
EAP East Asia and Pacific
ECA Europe and Central Asia
ECOWAS Economic Community of West Africa States
EM-DAT Emergency Events Database
EMDC emerging markets and developing countries
EMDE emerging markets and developing economies
EME emerging market economies
EU European Union
EUR European Department
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAS Financial Access Survey
FE fixed effects
FEMNET African Women’s Development and Communications Network
G7 Group of Seven
G20 Group of Twenty
GB gender budgeting
GBI Gender Budgeting Index
GBS Gender Budget Statement
GDI Gender Development Index
GDP gross domestic product
GGI Gender Gap Index
GIA gender impact assessments
GII Gender Inequality Index
GLS generalized least squares
GMM generalized method of moments
GMO Gender Monitoring Office
GSMA Global System for Mobile Communications
HCI Human Capital Index
xxiii

xxiv Gender Equality and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
HIC high-income countries

HIV human immunodeficiency virus
IBFD International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation
ICT information and communication technology
ICU International Communication Union
IFC International Finance Corporation
ILO International Labour Organization
ILOSTAT International Labour Organization Department of Statistics
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPU Inter-Parliamentary Union
IPUMS Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IV instrumental variable
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
LFS Labor Force Survey
LIDC low-income and developing countries
LSL Lesotho Loti
MCD Middle East and Central Asia Department
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MSME micro, small, and medium enterprise
N1 Nigeria Naira
NBER National Bureau of Economic Research
NEET not in education, employment, or training
NIDS National Income Dynamics Survey
NST National Strategy for Transformation
ODI Overseas Development Institute
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS ordinary least squares
PEPUDA Promotion of Equality and Prevention of
Unfair Discrimination Act
PPP purchasing power parity
SACU South Africa Countries Union
SADC Southern African Development Community
SALDRU Southern Africa Labour and Development Research
SAS South Asia
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SIGI Social Institutions and Gender Index
SME small and medium enterprise
SSA sub-Saharan Africa
STEM science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
SWAPO South West Africa People’s Organisation
UEA CRU University of East Anglia Climate Research Unit
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

xxv
Abbreviations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization
UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VAT value-added tax
WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union
WAZ weight-for-age z-score
WBES World Bank Enterprise Survey
WBL Women, Business and the Law
WDI World Development Indicators
WEF World Economic Forum
WEO World Economic Outlook
WHD Western Hemisphere Department
WHO World Health Organization
XOF West African CFA Franc


Introduction: How Gender Equality
Can Shape Sub-Saharan Africa’s
Development
Lisa Kolovich, Monique Newiak, and Catherine Pattillo
The vast expanse of sub-Saharan Africa is filled with remarkable diversity. Ancient
cultural traditions from a multitude of ethnic groups blend with modern technol-
ogies. Hundreds of languages can be heard from the coasts of Madagascar to the
lush rainforests of the Congo Basin to the sweeping vistas of the Atlantic from
Senegal, Sierra Leone, and São Tomé and Principe. A burgeoning youth popula-
tion brimming with an entrepreneurial spirit builds on these foundations, expe-
riences, and wisdom from parents, grandparents, and ancestors, and is working
towards a prosperous future.
As this book goes to press, however, the continent is still waiting for a “light
on the horizon” (IMF 2023). Sub-Saharan African economies are emerging from
a multitude of shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic, which have been a
setback to the region’s economic development. They are still grappling with eco-
nomic scarring from the pandemic and the ongoing repercussions of several
external conflicts that have put pressure on domestic prices and exchange rates,
while fiscal and external buffers to deal with new shocks are generally low.
While economic growth for the region is set to rebound, additional policy
efforts are crucial to secure a sustainable increase in per capita incomes and make
progress towards the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).
Sub-Saharan African economies are not alone in their quest for growth—world-
wide, policy makers are looking for new sources of sustainable, inclusive, and
increasingly green growth (Sayeh, Badel, and Goyal 2023), especially since tradi-
tional sources of growth, such as trade, while still critical, may not be sufficient
to produce reliable growth and prosperity dividends going forward. In developing
economies, there is a concern whether attainment of the SDGs by 2030 is
feasible.
In this book, 20 chapters—written by staff at the IMF, the World Bank, UN
Women, and others—make the case that empowering women and girls and put-
ting a gender lens on policies to tackle the significant challenges of our times will
be critical to the region’s economic development.

2 Gender Equality and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
GENDER EQUALITY—AN ENORMOUS UNTAPPED

SOURCE OF PROSPERITY
The region’s prospects must be seen in the context of how equal—or unequal—
opportunities and outcomes have been for the main share of the population.
The good news is that sub-Saharan African economies have made tremendous
progress on the SDGs, including fostering gender equality (SDG 5), that cuts
across all other development goals. Progress has been significant in eliminating
gender inequality in legal rights, increasing education for both boys and girls,
improving health outcomes for children and mothers, and boosting financial
access and digitalization. Several sub-Saharan African countries, including
Rwanda and Uganda, have been best practice examples on how to mainstream
gender into public financial management via gender budgeting—a practice that
incorporates a gender lens into public financial management aimed at improving
gender equality—and others are increasingly claiming this field (Tanzania, Togo,
Sierra Leone).
However, long-standing gender inequality persists, and recent shocks have
exposed vulnerabilities. By many compositive measures, gender equality in sub-
Saharan Africa remains high compared to other regions (Chapter 1). Maternal
mortality rates significantly exceed global averages. Adolescent pregnancies are
frequent, with health risks for both mothers and children, and can result in higher
school dropout rates for girls. The region has the lowest expected years of school-
ing compared to other regions, with a significant gender gap in literacy, and still
substantial gaps in educational attainment in many countries. There are signifi-
cant gender gaps in financial inclusion (Chapter 2), and a substantial digital
divide, with women less likely to use mobile internet or own mobile phones
(Chapters 18 and 19). Many laws that are “on the books” discriminate on the
basis of gender (Chapters 12 and 13). The incidence of gender-based violence
remains high (Chapter 6), with one-third of ever-partnered women in the region
having experienced violence in their lifetime. Harmful practices, such as child
marriage and female genital mutilation, have yet to be eradicated (Chapter 7).
Women and girls are overrepresented in informal and vulnerable employment,
and are shouldering disproportionately the responsibilities in providing paid and
unpaid care services (Chapter 17). The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed some
of these vulnerabilities and disproportionately impacted women in many coun-
tries (Chapters 4 and 5).
The root causes of this inequality are complex, interwoven with socioeconom-
ic challenges, cultural and social norms, long-standing laws on the books, political
factors, and at times distortionary policy. More often than not, macroeconomic
and other policies remain blind to their gendered impacts.
Gender equality has enormous macroeconomic consequences—addressing
them will benefit growth, economic and financial stability, a more equal income
distribution, and other development outcomes (Kochhar, Jain-Chandra, and
Newiak 2017). A long-standing vast literature highlights that gender equality can
boost GDP per capita (Ostry and others 2018; Cuberes and Teignier 2016,
2018), benefit economic growth and productivity (IMF 2015, Chapter 11;

Introduction: How Gender Equality Can Shape Sub-Saharan Africa’s Development 3
Hakura and others 2016), lower income inequality (Gonzales and others 2015),
support economic diversification in low-income contexts (Kazandjian and others
2019), and foster financial stability (Sahay and Čihák 2018), firm profitability
(Christiansen and others 2016), and development outcomes more broadly (Duflo
2003, 2012).
This book builds on this literature to highlight specific gains from gender
equality in outcomes that are important for sub-Saharan Africa. With the inci-
dence of gender-based violence among the highest in the world, Chapter 6 argues
that a decrease in violence against women by 1 percentage point is associated with
a significant 9 percent increase in nightlights per capita, a proxy for economic
activity. Ending child marriage today would result in a more than 1 percentage
point increase in the long-term annual per capita real GDP growth in emerging
and developing countries (Chapter 7). Chapter 8 shows that closing gender gaps
in education for different income groups could yield GDP gains of 5 to 11 per-
cent in West African economies, while boosting formality and revenue mobiliza-
tion. Economically empowering women is also one of the most impactful means
for building the human capital of the next generation, with a strong association
between women’s empowerment and control of resources with children’s health,
especially in households with less resources (Chapter 9). Chapter 10 guides the
reader through the reasons why gender equality can also provide for peace in the
region, including by reducing electoral violence.
INCLUDING A GENDER LENS IN POLICYMAKING TO

BOOST REFORM IMPACT
There is a significant body of evidence on which macroeconomic and structural
policies can promote gender equality (IMF 2022). While the specifics of policies
may differ across countries, this book sheds light on the key areas in which areas
policymakers can reap quick wins to set the foundation for equality and where
they can leverage existing policies and frameworks to integrate a gender lens into
the policy design. To focus the discussion on the areas in which the IMF has built
expertise, we collect evidence and policy examples around the areas of legal
reform, public financial management, and fiscal policy, while touching more
briefly on other reform areas.
Fair Play: Equal Laws and Women’s Economic Empowerment

Creating a fair system of rules is critical. Chapters 12 and 13 call attention to how
legal frameworks can serve as potent instruments for enshrining equal opportuni-
ties, shifting societal perceptions of gender roles, and ensuring accountability for
achieving gender equality outcomes. The importance of adopting laws that pro-
mote gender equality in labor markets; access to finance and assets, including
through equal inheritance rights; and decision-making roles, and that disincen-
tivize and eliminate gender-based violence should not be underestimated. Legal
frameworks provide a binding foundation for implementation and enforcement.
Five case studies from the region—Rwanda, Namibia, South Africa, Mauritius,

and Cabo Verde—countries that have achieved some of the most gender-equal
outcomes in the region on a range of dimensions—provide examples of how legal
reforms have been implemented across the region.
Effective legal frameworks for public financial management can also play a
crucial role in facilitating gender-balanced fiscal policies (Chapter 14). Legal
reforms can introduce gender-budgeting practices, including gender-balance
principles, gender-budget statements, and gender-impact assessments, into the
budgetary system. These legal provisions can strengthen the mandate of audit
institutions in conducting gender-related audits and establish enforcement mech-
anisms. Promoting gender equality by applying a gender perspective to fiscal
policies and the budget process, a practice known as gender budgeting, can help
address gender inequality concerns in various aspects of the economy and society.
This approach ensures that laws, policies, and budgets promote the well-being
and economic participation of women.
Large Role for Fiscal Policy

There is a significant role for tax and expenditure policy to tackle gender equality
in the region (Chapter 15). Gender-responsive tax policies can support women’s
economic empowerment, and policymakers should more generally aim to pro-
mote formal employment and ensure that revenue mobilization contributes to
funding social programs that foster gender equality. There are still countries in
sub-Saharan Africa where there is explicit gender discrimination in the tax code,
mostly in labor income taxation. Such biases need to be eliminated. Personal
income tax reforms should focus on progressivity and individualization (that is,
taxing individuals’ incomes rather than families’ incomes), while capital income
taxes, which predominantly benefit men, could be raised by abolishing preferen-
tial tax treatments. A single-rate value-added tax and sales-tax system with mini-
mal exemptions can enhance revenue mobilization and fund social programs for
gender equality. Excise taxes, when set to correct for externalities, for instance, to
disincentivize the consumption of harmful goods and services, can reduce gender
inequality. They can also mitigate climate-induced income shocks on women.
The role for a gender lens in expenditure policy is also high. For instance,
policymakers aiming to enhance both access to and the quality of education
should also consider designing gender-responsive complementary policies address-
ing social assistance, infrastructure development, and school dropout rates, par-
ticularly for girls facing pregnancy-related challenges. Providing access to quality
care services, increased public investment in social care and rural infrastructure,
and a redistribution of care responsibilities can support greater equality and wom-
en’s economic empowerment.
Gender budgeting is critical in the context of limited fiscal resources, rising debt
pressures, and exacerbated gender disparities (Chapter 16). It not only showcases a
government’s dedication to promoting gender equality but also enhances the effec-
tiveness of resource allocation through improved design of responsive fiscal poli-
cies. Sub-Saharan African countries, including regional leaders like Rwanda,

Introduction: How Gender Equality Can Shape Sub-Saharan Africa’s Development 5
South Africa, and Uganda, were early adopters of gender budgeting and have
introduced many innovative practices. While lessons from advanced economies,
such as Canada, highlight that fully adopting gender budgeting takes time, incre-
mental steps towards the adoption, for instance by starting the work with pilot
ministries, is useful and can drive the reform process.
In all these efforts, working with reliable data is essential. For example, empirical
work shows that epidemics can have a disproportionate, significant, and lasting
negative impact on girls’ education (Chapter 3). This finding underscores the
importance of collecting gender-disaggregated data to monitor and tailor policies
effectively. New data collection efforts, and currently still-infrequent surveys, should
be set up with a gender lens. Moreover, collecting higher-frequency data, such as
monthly or quarterly data, can provide more nuanced insights into where gender
gaps are occurring and what are the impacts of a gender-responsive policy response.
High-frequency data, for instance collected from mobile money transactions, can
improve the understanding of gendered economic patterns.
EMPOWERING WOMEN, TACKLING MEGATRENDS

The recent experience with a global pandemic and megatrends, such as digitali-
zation and climate change, which are also closely interlinked with gender gaps
and gendered outcomes, demand a concerted and tailored effort around transfor-
mative fiscal, financial, and structural policy measures.
The COVID 19 pandemic has exposed many issues with unpaid work, which is
often undervalued and disproportionately falls on women and girls, with conse-
quences for their economic empowerment (Chapter 17). Transforming social
norms and reducing unpaid caregiving burdens on women are essential steps
toward achieving gender equality and sustainable development in the face of global
challenges like climate change and economic shocks. In this context, tackling
long-standing cultural norms and traditions is crucial for achieving a gender-equal
society, but this requires patience and persistence. Programs may focus on role
modeling and changing stereotypes, but they must engage men and boys and part-
ners on many fronts, such as traditional leaders, for these efforts to succeed.
Financial technology, or “fintech,” has had a positive impact on women’s wel-
fare, increasing both the number of female employees in the workforce and the
female-to-male employee ratio (Chapter 18). However, the positive effects of
fintech are more pronounced in countries with strong governance and institu-
tional quality so that addressing the digital divide and promoting good gover-
nance, laws, and regulations are essential steps to maximize fintech’s impact on
gender equality. One promising avenue for increasing female political representa-
tion is through boosting digital access, such as through internet access and social
media use, which is correlated with more favorable perceptions of women’s elec-
toral chances in sub-Saharan Africa (Chapter 19).
Chapter 20 shows that, under strong and timely policies, women can benefit
from the green transition in in sub-Saharan Africa. As policymakers are designing

appropriate policies to encourage a transition to the green economy, they should

apply a gender lens to so that women can benefit from emerging green jobs. The
large female entrepreneurial capacity, in turn, could be a strong force of innova-
tion, an incentive for making climate and gender concurrent, not competing,
goals. At the same time, policymakers should be attentive to unintended conse-
quences of well-intentioned policies. For instance, they should consider the dis-
tributional impact along gender and income lines of increased public transporta-
tion, carbon pricing, and taxes. When well designed, reforms can concurrently
advance gender equality and protect the vulnerable.
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Christiansen, L., H. Lin, J. Pereira, P. Topalova, and R. Turk. 2016. “Individual Choice or
Policies? Drivers of Female Employment in Europe.” IMF Working Paper 16/49, International
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Cuberes, D., and M. Teignier. 2016. “Aggregate Effects of Gender Gaps in the Labor Market:
A Quantitative Estimate.” Journal of Human Capital 10 (1): 1–32.
Cuberes, D., and M. Teignier. 2018. “Macroeconomic Costs of Gender Gaps in a Model with
Entrepreneurship and Household Production.” B.E Journal of Macroeconomics 18 (1).
Duflo, E. 2003. “Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old-Age Pensions and Intrahousehold
Allocation in South Africa.” World Bank Economic Review 17 (1): 1–25.
Duflo, E. 2012. “Women Empowerment and Economic Development.” Journal of Economic
Literature 50 (4): 1051–79.
Gonzales, C., S. Jain-Chandra, K. Kochhar, M. Newiak, and T. Zeinullayev. 2015. “Catalyst for
Change: Empowering Women and Tackling Income Inequality.” Staff Discussion Note
15/20, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Hakura, D., M. Hussain, M. Newiak, V. Thakoor, and F. Yang. 2016. “Inequality, Gender Gaps
and Economic Growth: Comparative Evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa.” IMF Working Paper
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2015. “Inequality and Economic Outcomes in Sub-
Saharan Africa” (Chapter 3). In Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa.
Washington DC, October.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2022. “Strategy Towards Mainstreaming Gender.” IMF
Policy Paper 22/037. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023. “Light on the Horizon?” (Chapter 1). In Regional
Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington DC, October.
Kazandjian, R., L. Kolovich, K. Kochhar, and M. Newiak. 2019. “Gender Equality and Economic
Diversification.” Social Sciences 8 (4): 118. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8040118.
Kochhar, K., S. Jain-Chandra, and M. Newiak. 2017. Women, Work and Economic Growth:
Leveling the Playing Field. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
Ostry, J. D., J. Alvarez, R. A. Espinoza, and C. Papageorgiou. 2018. “Economic Gains from
Gender Inclusion: New Mechanisms, New Evidence.” IMF Staff Discussion Note 18/006.
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Sahay R., and M. Čihák. 2018. “Women in Finance: A Case for Closing Gaps.” IMF Staff
Discussion Note 18/005. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Sayeh, A. M., A. Badel, and R. Goyal. 2023. “Countries That Close Gender Gaps See
Substantial Growth Returns”. IMF blog. https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/09/27/
countries-that-close-gender-gaps-see-substantial-growth-returns.

PART I
Where Things Stand:
Gender Equality in
Sub-Saharan Africa


CHAPTER 1
Revisiting Trends in
Gender Equality
Chiara Broccolini, Anna Fruttero, and Saanya Jain
Sub-Saharan Africa has significantly reduced gender inequality over the past decades.
However, the region still grapples with various dimensions of gender inequality, posing
ongoing challenges. Progress has been significant in narrowing gender gaps in
education, especially at the primary and secondary levels, and improving health
outcomes for women and girls. Nonetheless, the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the
fragility of prior gains, emphasizing the need for continued efforts. Significant chal-
lenges remain in many areas—an inclusion issue and a key detriment to achieving the
Sustainable Development Goals and better macroeconomic outcomes. This chapter sets
the stage for the remainder of the book by providing an overview of the landscape of
gender inequality in terms of opportunity, outcomes, and representation.
INTRODUCTION
This book makes the case that gender equality is a crucial development goal and
that closing gender gaps will support favorable macroeconomic outcomes and
long-term economic and social goals. Understanding the potential of closing
gender gaps in sub-Saharan Africa requires understanding the types of gaps the
region still faces.
The statistics presented in this chapter draw on rich data collected or made
available by many institutions, such as the International Labour Organization
(ILO), the World Bank (including through its World Development Indicators;
Findex; and Women, Business and the Law), and the World Health Organization,
as well as indices developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and the United Nations. Increasing availability of this
information at the country level helps provide a stocktaking of gender gaps in
sub-Saharan Africa and lays the foundation for macro-gender analysis. The find-
ings motivate the regional and country analysis in the remainder of the book and
the call for action for policies to close the gaps.
Where does sub-Saharan Africa stand overall? Looking at gender indices offers a
sense of gender inequality in sub-Saharan Africa (see Annex 1.1). The Gender
The authors would like to thank Abigail Dalton, Laura Rawlings, Abhilasha Sahay for their valuable
insights and comments on the draft.

Figure 1.1. Gender Inequality Index, 2021

(Index, scale 0–1)
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
APD EUR MCD WHD SSA
Source: United Nations Development Programme 2021b.
Note: The Gender Inequality Index measures gender disparities in health, empowerment, and the
labor market. It ranges from 0, where women and men fare equally, and 1, where one gender fares
as poorly as possible in all the measured dimensions. APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe;
MCD = Middle East and Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; WHD = Western Hemisphere.
Inequality Index for 2021—which measures inequality of opportunity through edu-

cation and health gaps, labor market outcomes, and inequality of representation—
suggests that gender inequality in sub-Saharan Africa remains substantial in absolute
terms and compared to other regions (Figure 1.1).1 In particular, women’s labor force
and political participation in sub-Saharan Africa lag behind those in other regions.
Moreover, women face challenges in achieving their full human development poten-
tial due to high levels of maternal mortality, adolescent fertility rates, and limited
access to secondary education.
The Global Gender Gap Index from the World Economic Forum—capturing
economic participation, wage equality, educational attainment, health and survival,
and political empowerment—provides a similar assessment (Annex Table 1.1.2).2
Sub-Saharan Africa bridged just 67.9 percent of its gender gap and surpassed the
Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. According to the World Economic
Forum, it would take the region 98 years to close the gender gap at the current rate
of progress.
1
A low Gender Inequality Index value indicates low inequality between women and men.
2
The Global Gender Gap Index uses a 0-to-100 scale. The scores can be interpreted as the distance
covered toward parity (this is the percentage of the gender gap that has been closed). It has four main
components: Economic Participation and Opportunity (labor force participation rate; wage equality
for similar jobs; estimated earned income; legislators, senior officers, and managers; professional and
technical workers); Educational Attainment (literacy rate, enrollment in primary education, enroll-
ment in secondary education, enrollment in tertiary education); Health and Survival (sex ratio at
birth, healthy life expectancy), and Political Empowerment (women in parliament, women in minis-
terial positions, years with female/male head of state) (World Economic Forum 2022).

Chapter 1 Revisiting Trends in Gender Equality 11
The OECD’s Social Institutions and Gender Index offers a more comprehen-
sive perspective by assessing both legal and practical forms of discrimination that
women encounter across different facets of life. It illustrates how ingrained social
structures continue to undermine women’s empowerment.3 The overall index
score in sub-Saharan African countries is higher than the global average,
indicating a higher level of gender inequality.
The remainder of this chapter explores gender inequality in the region in terms
of three dimensions: inequality of opportunity, inequality of outcomes, and
inequality of representation.
INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
Gender gaps persist in various domains, including access to opportunities, educa-
tion, health care, and finance. Violence against women and traditional practices
remain significant challenges. These gaps and barriers, influenced by legal systems,
societal norms, and sometimes discriminatory policies, are still pronounced in
sub-Saharan Africa, often surpassing those observed in other regions. Despite prog-
ress in some areas, significant disparities remain. This section provides an overview
of the gender landscape of critical opportunities.
Legal Rights
Robust legal frameworks and institutions protecting women’s economic rights are
essential for promoting economic empowerment and economic development, as
discussed in Chapters 12 and 13.4 However, the most recent data from Women,
Business and the Law (2023) reveal that globally, women possess only three-quarters
of the economic rights enjoyed by men. This gap means that a staggering 2.4 billion
3
The OECD Development Centre’s Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) measures discrim-
ination against women in social institutions in 179 countries. By considering laws, social norms,
and practices, the SIGI captures the underlying drivers of gender inequality to provide the data
necessary for transformative policy change. A value of 0 indicates no discrimination, and 100 indicates
absolute discrimination. The SIGI is also one of the official data sources for monitoring the Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs) 5.1.1: “Whether or not legal frameworks are in place to promote,
enforce and monitor gender equality and women’s empowerment.” The SIGI covers four dimensions
of discriminatory social institutions, spanning major socio-economic areas that affect women’s lives:
discrimination in the family, restricted physical integrity, restricted access to productive and financial
resources, and restricted civil liberties (OECD 2022).
4
Evidence has shown that improvements in legal equality between women and men are associ-
ated with many positive outcomes across many domains of gender equality. For example, research
has documented a link between legal equality and women’s educational attainment (see, for exam-
ple, Deininger and others 2019; Harari 2019), women’s health outcomes (Anderson 2018; Harari
2019), women’s participation in the labor force (Hyland, Djankov, and Goldberg 2020), women’s
employment in the formal sector (Hyland, Djankov, and Goldberg 2021), better jobs for women
(Islam, Muzi, and Amin 2019), strengthened women’s intra-household bargaining power and deci-
sion-making (Voena 2015; Harari 2019; Haldar and Stiglitz 2013; Heath and Tan 2020), female
entrepreneurship (Paoloni and Lombardi 2020; Strawser, Hechavarría, and Passerini 2021), and wom-
en’s political representation (Hyland, Djankov, and Goldberg 2021).

Figure 1.2. Legal Barriers (1990–2022)

(Score, scale: 1–100)
100
Global APD MCD EUR
WHD SSA HIC
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
1990 92 94 96 98 2000 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
Source: World Bank 2023.
Note: The figure reports the Women, Business and the Law Index score, which measures how laws
and regulations affect women’s economic opportunities. Overall scores are calculated by taking the
average score of each index (mobility, workplace, pay, marriage, parenthood, entrepreneurship,
assets, and pension), with 100 representing the highest possible score. APD = Asia and Pacific;
EUR = Europe; HIC = high-income countries; MCD = Middle East and Central Asia;
SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; WHD = Western Hemisphere.
working-age women lack the same legal rights as men. When analyzing the global
landscape, economies in Europe, Central Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean
exhibit scores above the global average of 77.1. In contrast, the Middle East, North
Africa, and South Asia exhibit the lowest average scores, indicating the need for
further improvement in legal frameworks and institutions to enhance women’s
economic rights in these regions.
Where does sub-Saharan Africa stand? Encouragingly, sub-Saharan Africa
accounts for more than half of all reforms in legal systems introduced in 2022.
Seven economies have enacted 18 positive legal changes. Remarkably, for the
first time in 53 years, two economies in sub-Saharan Africa have achieved
scores above 90.5 Consequently, the region’s average score now surpasses that
of the Asia and Pacific region (Figure 1.2). Despite progress in de jure-based
discrimination over time, women are granted, on average, less than three-quar-
ters of the legal rights afforded to men, as indicated by the average score of
72.6 in 2022 (Figure 1.2). In the African region, progress across the topic areas
measured has been uneven, with most reforms issued in domains that histori-
cally lagged behind. The catch-up effect has been strongest in the laws affect-
ing equal treatment in the workplace, parenthood, and pay indicators.6
5
See Elefante and others 2023.
6
Workplace score for sub-Saharan Africa increased from 17.2 percent in 1990 to 80.5 in 2022.
Similarly, parenthood and pay indicators moved respectively from 20 percent and 38 percent in 1990
to 45 and 64 percent in 2022.

Figure 1.3. Gender Parity in Figure 1.4. Gender Parity in Primary

Preprimary Education, 1990–2021 Education, 1990–2021
(Index) (Index)
1.10 1.05
1.05 1.00
1.00
0.95
0.95
0.90
0.90 Global Global
APD 0.85 APD
0.85 MCD MCD
EUR 0.80 EUR
0.80
WHD WHD
0.75 SSA 0.75 SSA
HIC HIC
0.70 0.70
1990 95 2000 05 10 15 21 1990 95 2000 05 10 15 21
Source: World Bank 2021b. Source: World Bank 2021b.
Note: Gender Parity Index for gross enrollment Note: Gender Parity Index for gross enrollment
is the ratio of girls and boys enrolled in is the ratio of girls and boys enrolled in
preprimary levels in public and private schools. preprimary levels in public and private schools.
APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe; APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe;
HIC = high-income countries; MCD = Middle HIC = high-income countries; MCD = Middle
East and Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan East and Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan
Africa; WHD = Western Hemisphere. Africa; WHD = Western Hemisphere.
Despite improvements in the past 20 years, the parenthood7 and pay8 indica-
tors still have the lowest scores in the region, revealing stubborn legal barriers
to more and better jobs for women.
Education
In the past decade, significant progress has been made in achieving gender equal-
ity in education, although global improvements conceal notable regional dispari-
ties. Access to preprimary education has reached parity (Figure 1.3). There has
been a substantial increase in the proportion of African girls receiving primary
education and improvements in the gender parity index since 1990 (Figure 1.4)
and in secondary education since 2000 (Figure 1.5). However, the primary and
secondary education gender parity indices for sub-Saharan Africa still range from
0.8 to 1.6 for primary and 0.6 to 1.3 for secondary.
Despite these gains, girls face more barriers than boys when accessing tertiary
education. While sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed rapid progress in tertiary
7
The parenthood indicator examines laws affecting a woman’s work during and after pregnancy,
including paid leave, and laws prohibiting firms from dismissing workers because they are pregnant.
8
The pay indicator examines whether laws are in place to ensure equal remuneration between men
and women for work of equal value and whether they allow a woman to work at night, in industrial
jobs, and in jobs deemed dangerous in the same way as a man.

Figure 1.5. Gender Parity in Figure 1.6. Gender Parity in Tertiary

Secondary Education, 1990–2021 Education, 1990–2021
(Index) (Index)
Global APD Global APD
1.2 MCD EUR 1.6 MCD EUR
WHD SSA WHD SSA
1.4
1.1 HIC HIC
1.2
1.0
1.0
0.9 0.8
0.6
0.8
0.4
0.7
0.2
0.6 0.0
1990 95 2000 05 10 15 21 1990 95 2000 05 10 15 21
Note: Gender Parity Index for gross enrollment Note: Gender Parity Index for gross enrollment
is the ratio of girls and boys enrolled in is the ratio of girls and boys enrolled in
preprimary levels in public and private schools. preprimary levels in public and private schools.
APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe; APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe;
education enrollments, with the gender parity index increasing from 0.40 in 1990
to 0.73 in 2021, it is the only region where women do not have an advantage over
boys (Figure 1.6). The gender parity index in tertiary education varies across
countries, ranging from 0.3 to 1.7.
Sub-Saharan Africa also has the lowest expected years of schooling compared
with other regions, with 9.2 years for women and 8.6 years for men as of
2020–21.9 Moreover, while Europe and the Western Hemisphere have almost
achieved universal and equal adult literacy, and Asia and the Pacific are making
progress in closing the gender gap, sub-Saharan Africa, along with the Middle
East and Central Asia, significantly lag at 64 percent for women and 77 percent
for men as of 2020, reporting the widest gender gaps. Again, within sub-Saharan
Africa, there is substantial variation along these two dimensions: expected years
of schooling for girls ranges from 5.7 to 12.5, and only 40 percent of countries
report an adult female literacy rate above 75 percent (Figures 1.7 and 1.8).
Additionally, sub-Saharan Africa exhibits a significantly larger proportion of
population between the ages of 15 and 24 who cannot read and write with
9
Expected years of schooling is the number of years a child entering school age is expected to spend
at school or university, including years spent on repetition (World Bank 2021b).

Figure 1.7. Adult Literacy Rate, Figure 1.8. Expected Years of

2020–21 Schooling, 2020–21
(Percent)
Global female Global male
Global female Global male
HIC female HIC male
100 20
90 18
80 16
70 14
60 12
50 10
40 8
30 6
20 4
10 2
0 0
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
APD MCD EUR WHD SSA APD MCD EUR WHD SSA
Note: Adult literacy rate is the percentage of Note: Expected years of schooling is the
people aged 15 or above who can both read number of years a child of schooling entrance
and write with understanding a short simple age is expected to spend at school or
statement on their everyday life. APD = Asia university, including years spent in repetition.
and Pacific; EUR = Europe; MCD = Middle East APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe;
and Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; HIC = high-income countries; MCD = Middle
WHD = Western Hemisphere. East and Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan
Africa; WHD = Western Hemisphere.
comprehension compared with the global average, and it demonstrates a higher

prevalence of illiteracy among women within this youth demographic (21 percent
for young men and 26 percent for young women, compared with 7 and 9 percent,
respectively, worldwide). The lower years of schooling and literacy rates contrib-
ute to the persistence of inequality between men and women, as laid out in more
detail in Chapter 8.
School closures due to COVID-19 threatened progress made in education,
with girls expected to be at risk of paying the highest toll (Chapter 3). UNESCO
2020 projected that worldwide 11.2 million girls and young women were expected
to be at risk due to the COVID-19 pandemic and UNICEF 2021 estimated that
up to 10 million more girls will be at risk of becoming child brides because of the
pandemic. Several studies also expressed concern that, in the context of developing
countries, adolescent girls’ attendance would be more negatively affected than
boys,10 and UNESCO 2021 argued that girls were expected to be more strongly
10
See, for example, Azevedo and others 2020 and Giannini and Albrectsen 2020.

affected by the increased burden of unpaid work within households while boys
were expected to participate more in income-generating activities to substitute for
pandemic-related reductions in household income.
While evidence continues to emerge, according to the World Bank (2023b),
there has not been an increase in gender gaps in education during the pandemic
in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, these gaps have narrowed. However, the findings
indicate that COVID-19 may have had extensive effects on education, affecting
factors that typically play a role in school attendance, such as parental education
and socioeconomic status. This suggests that the economic aftermath of the
pandemic could have increased vulnerability among households, making it chal-
lenging for them to provide the necessary resources to support their children’s
education.
Health
Regarding health indicators, sub-Saharan Africa faces more significant challenges
than other regions in areas such as maternal, infant, and under-5 child mortality
rates, fertility rates, and adolescent fertility rates.
Maternal mortality rates improved, declining from 792 per 100,000 live births
in 2000 to 511 in 2020.11 Nevertheless, the region still exhibits alarmingly high
levels of maternal mortality compared with the global average of 223 and it
remains five times higher than in high-income countries, where the rate is only
12 per 100,000 live births.12 The primary causes of maternal deaths are obstetric
hemorrhage, hypertensive disorders during pregnancy, non-obstetric
complications, and pregnancy-related infections. However, deaths resulting from
incidental causes may not be accurately reported in many countries in the region
(Musarandega and others 2021).
Between 1990 and 2021, infant and under-5 mortality rates have significantly
decreased for both boys and girls. However, rates remain 10 times higher than
those observed in high-income countries. In 2021, the female infant mortality
rate was 43 per 1,000 live births, while for males it was 53. These rates starkly
contrast with those in high-income countries, which stood at 3.8 and 4.5, respec-
tively (Figure 1.9). Furthermore, in 2021, the probability of a newborn not sur-
viving the age of in sub-Saharan Africa was 15 times higher than in high-income
countries, and gender disparities persisted. Boys were at a higher risk than girls,
with mortality rates of 75 and 64, respectively, compared to 5 for boys and 4 for
girls in high-income countries (Figure 1.10).
Adolescent girls who become pregnant face elevated health risks, including a
higher probability of maternal death, childbirth complications, and low birth
11
Sources: WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group and UNDESA/Population Division.
Retrieved from the World Bank Gender Data Portal.
12
In 2020, the maternal mortality rate was 74 deaths per 100,000 live births in East Asia and Pacific,
and 13 in Europe and Central Asia.

Figure 1.9. Infant Mortality Rate, Figure 1.10. Mortality Rate of

1990–2021 Children under Age 5, 1990–2020
(Number of deaths per 1,000 live (Number of deaths per 1,000 live
births) births)
120 SSA female 200 SSA female
SSA male 180 SSA male
100 HIC female HIC female
HIC male 160 HIC male
140
80
120
60 100
80
40
60
40
20
20
0 0
1990 95 2000 05 10 15 21 1990 95 2000 05 10 15 21
Note: Infant mortality rate is the number of Note: Under-5 mortality rate is the probability
infants dying before reaching one year of age per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die before
per 1,000 live births. HIC = high-income reaching age 5. HIC = high-income countries;
countries; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa. SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.
weight for their babies. They also endure social stigma and often have limited
opportunities to access higher education and employment. Furthermore, adoles-
cent pregnancies can have intergenerational effects, increasing the risks of teenage
pregnancies in future generations. In 2020, teenage fertility rates in sub-Saharan
Africa, while displaying some decline, remained the highest among all regions,
with 101.6 births per 1,000 women aged 15 to 19. This is more than twice the
global average of 42.7 births per 1,000 adolescents and nearly 10 times higher
than in high-income countries (Figure 1.11). There are some success stories:
Ghana has made significant progress in reducing these births over time, and other
countries have managed to halve their rates within 40 years. It is also worth high-
lighting the correlation between teenage pregnancy and school dropout rates. In
countries with the highest rates of adolescent fertility, girls’ expected years of
schooling are typically lower than seven.
Sub-Saharan African countries have made remarkable progress in raising life
expectancy, mainly through significant reductions in infant mortality. Such
improvements typically result in a substantial drop in fertility rates. However, as
of 2020, the region’s fertility rate was 4.7 children per woman of childbearing age,
twice the global average and three times higher than in high-income countries
(Figure 1.12).
In the 1950s, fertility rates in Asia and Latin America mirrored those in
Africa. However, with advancements in health care, living conditions, and

Figure 1.11. Adolescent Fertility Rate, 1990–2020

(Number of births per 1,000 women ages 15–19)
160 Global APD MCD EUR
WHD SSA HIC
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1990 92 94 96 98 2000 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20
Source: World Bank 2021b.
Note: APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe; HIC = high-income countries; MCD = Middle East and
Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; WHD = Western Hemisphere.
overall economic prosperity, fertility rates in these regions steadily declined,

eventually falling below replacement levels in 2020. In stark contrast, sub-Saha-
ran Africa has followed a different trajectory. High fertility rates persist, despite
a 40 percent increase in GDP per capita from 1990 to 2015. This suggests that
progress in educational attainment and income growth may not have kept pace
with those in other regions (Shapiro and Hinde 2017; Bongaarts 2017).
Figure 1.12. Fertility Rates, 1990–2020

(Births per woman)
7 Global APD MCD EUR
WHD SSA HIC
6
0
1990 92 94 96 98 2000 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20
Source: World Bank 2021b.
Note: APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe; HIC = high-income countries; MCD = Middle East and
Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; WHD = Western Hemisphere.

Figure 1.13. Accounts at Financial Institutions, 2021

(Percent)
Global female Global male HIC female HIC male
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
APD MCD EUR WHD SSA
Source: Global Findex 2021.
Note: The figure shows the percentage of respondents (ages 15+) who report having an account (by
themselves or together with someone else) at a bank or other type of financial institutions in the
previous year. APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe; HIC = high-income countries; MCD = Middle
East and Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; WHD = Western Hemisphere.
Adding to this challenge, as of 2019 modern contraceptive prevalence rates in

sub-Saharan Africa were significantly lower than the global average: 28.6 per-
cent and 55.7 percent, respectively.13
Financial Access
In 2021, globally, 78 percent of men and 74 percent of women held financial
accounts (Figure 1.13). However, while in high-income countries there were no
significant differences between men and women, a more pronounced gender gap
was evident in developing economies, where 74 percent of men and 68 percent of
women had accounts. Sub-Saharan Africa faced the most significant gender gaps
with 47 percent of women holding an account compared to 60 percent of men.
Notably, in 2021, there was hardly any gender gap among young adults (15 to
24) who exclusively used mobile money accounts. However, the take-up of mobile
13
Contraceptive prevalence, any modern method, is the percentage of married women ages 15 to 49
who are practicing, or whose sexual partners are practicing, at least one modern method of contracep-
tion. Modern methods of contraception include female and male sterilization, oral hormonal pills, the
intrauterine device, the male condom, injectables, the implant (including Norplant), vaginal barrier
methods, the female condom, and emergency contraception. Source: Household surveys, including
Demographic and Health Surveys and Multiple Indicators Cluster Surveys. Largely compiled by UN
Population Division. Retrieved from the World Bank Gender Data Portal.

money accounts is lower for older women than men in the same age group.14 A lack
of access to a mobile phone was a common reason cited by 35 percent of unbanked
adults for not having a mobile money account.
In 2021, approximately 50 percent of female and male adults in sub-Saharan
Africa borrowed money. However, only 13 percent of women and 16 percent of
men used formal channels such as obtaining loans from a financial institution.
The percentage was significantly lower compared with high-income countries,
where more than half of adults (56 percent of women and 58 percent of men) had
borrowed money formally in the previous 12 months. Conversely, in sub-Saharan
Africa, informal borrowing from family and friends continued to far outstrip
formal channels, with 39 percent of women and 43 percent of men receiving
financial assistance informally, in contrast to just 14 percent of men and women
in high-income countries.
The spread of mobile money accounts in certain regions has created new
opportunities to cater to traditionally marginalized groups, including women,
poor people, and other groups traditionally excluded from the formal financial
system. Access to finance can empower women by providing greater economic
and entrepreneurial opportunities and increasing independence within the house-
hold. Chapter 9 explores this issue in more detail.
Digital Finance
The direct receipt of payments into an account plays a crucial role in providing
individuals with access to various financial services. In developing economies, the
proportion of adults involved in digital payments as senders or recipients has
significantly increased from 35 percent in 2014 to 57 percent in 2021.15 However,
this figure is low compared to high-income countries where digital payment
adoption is almost universal, with a rate of 95 percent for both men and women.
Encouragingly, in developing economies, 83 percent of adults who received digi-
tal payments also made digital payments, a substantial increase from 66 percent
in 2014 and 70 percent in 2017.16
Worldwide inclusion in digital finance is progressing rapidly and with
smaller gender gaps than in traditional finance systems. In sub-Saharan Africa,
in 2021, 42 percent of women and 55 percent of men aged 15 or older made
or received digital payments in the previous year. While the gender gap in
digital payments remains higher than in other regions (Figure 1.14), the share
of women involved in digital payments has grown significantly since 2014,
surpassing the growth rate in account ownership during the same period
(Figure 1.15).
14
Source: Global Findex 2021.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.

Figure 1.14. Respondents, Ages Figure 1.15. Respondents, Ages

15+, Making or Receiving Digital 15+, Making or Receiving Digital
Payment in the Previous Year, 2021 Payment in the Previous Year,
(Percent) 2014–2021
Global female Global male (Percent)
HIC female HIC male 2014 2017 2021
100 100
90 90
80 80
70 70
60 60
50 50
40 40
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
Global APD MCD EUR WHD SSA HIC
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
APD MCD EUR WHD SSA

Source: Global Findex 2021. Source: Global Findex 2021.
Note: The figure shows the percentage of Note: The figure shows the percentage of
respondents (ages 15+) who report using respondents (ages 15+) who report using
mobile money, a debit or credit card, or a mobile money, a debit or credit card, or a
mobile phone to make a payment from an mobile phone to make a payment from an
account in the previous year. APD = Asia and account in the previous year. APD = Asia and
Pacific; EUR = Europe; HIC = high-income Pacific; EUR = Europe; HIC = high-income
countries; MCD = Middle East and Central Asia; countries; MCD = Middle East and Central Asia;
SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; WHD = Western WHD = Western Hemisphere; SSA =
Hemisphere. sub-Saharan Africa.
Violence against Women

Sub-Saharan Africa faces significant challenges in addressing violence against
women. On average, approximately 33 percent of ever-partnered women in the
region have experienced violence in their lifetime (Figure 1.16), and 20 percent
have experienced violence over the previous 12 months (WHO 2021).17 None of
the countries in the region fall into the group with the lowest prevalence estimates
for lifetime physical and sexual intimate partner violence among ever-married/
partnered women aged 15 to 49.
It is essential to acknowledge that these estimates may not capture the full extent
of non-partner sexual violence due to underreporting influenced by societal stigma
and measurement challenges. The true prevalence of non-partner sexual violence is
likely to be higher than the reported and estimated prevalence figures.
17
Middle East (23.7), Europe (19), Asia Pacific (31), and Western Hemisphere (25).

Figure 1.16. Women, Ages 15–49, Subjected to Physical and Sexual

Violence by an Intimate Partner as of 2018
(Percent)
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
APD EUR MCD WHD SSA
Source: The Global Health Observatory, WHO.
Note: The figure shows the share of ever-partnered women (ages 15–49) subjected to physical and
sexual violence by a current or former partner in their lifetime. APD = Asia and Pacific;
Harmful Traditional Practices

Eliminating harmful traditional practices like female genital mutilation18 and
child marriage is a target of SDG 5 (United Nations Department of Economic
and Social Affairs 2022). These practices hinder women’s economic opportunities
and economic growth. Female genital mutilation is internationally recognized as
a violation of human rights and an extreme form of gender discrimination with
immediate health consequences. While rates have decreased in sub-Saharan
Africa, with fewer girls under 14 experiencing female genital mutilation com-
pared to those aged 15 to 49, there are still countries with high prevalence.
Ending child marriage is estimated to increase long-term annual per capita real
GDP growth in emerging and developing countries by 1.05 percentage points
(Mitra and others 2020). Despite a decline over the past decade, child marriage
remains widespread, affecting approximately one in five girls globally. Ongoing
crises, such as conflicts, climate-related disasters, and the lingering effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic, threaten progress.19 Child marriage primarily stems from
gender inequality, disproportionately affecting girls. Globally, child marriage rates
for boys are only one-sixth of those among girls.
18
Female genital mutilation comprises all procedures that involve partial or total removal of the
external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for nonmedical reasons.
19
Child marriage is any formal marriage or informal union between a child under age 18 and an
adult or child (UNICEF 2023).

In 2022, an estimated 640 million girls and women were married in

childhood. Child brides face higher risk of domestic violence, reduced educa-
tion, increased pregnancy complications, and poorer economic and health
outcomes. These consequences often extend to their children. Child marriage
also isolates girls from their families and friends, resulting in significant mental
health challenges (UNICEF 2023). Generational trends estimated by UNICEF
suggest that despite recent declines, pandemic-related risks have offset previous
progress.20
Sub-Saharan Africa is a region of primary concern, with the highest global risk
of marriage before 18. The progress observed has been mainly among wealthier
women (UNICEF 2023). Bride price payments historically prevalent in Africa21
incentivize child marriage and early marriages, resulting in stifled human capital
accumulation as girls are taken out of school to be married for payment in cash
or other goods (see, for example, Corno and Voena 2015; Corno, Hildebrandt,
and Voena 2020).22
INEQUALITY OF OUTCOMES
Promoting women’s economic empowerment is crucial for achieving sustainable
development and inclusive economic growth. Yet, women continue to confront
barriers when it comes to accessing financial resources, credit facilities, and land
ownership. These barriers, in turn, stifle entrepreneurship and hinder
income-generating activities. Therefore, it is essential to give priority to bridging the
gender gap in financial inclusion and providing tailored support for female-led
businesses. These efforts are critical for fostering inclusive economic growth and
harnessing the untapped potential of women in the region.
Labor Force Participation and Employment

Over the past three decades, sub-Saharan Africa consistently maintained the
highest average female labor force participation rate among all regions. As of
2021, this rate stood at 62 percent, marking a slight decline from 65 percent in
1990. Meanwhile, the global average also witnessed a slight decline, dropping
from 51 percent in 1990 to 47 percent in 2021 (Figure 1.17). Notably, during
20
Prevalence estimates reflect child marriages that occurred at least two years and as many as six
or more years before the reported year. For this reason, the impact of recent changes, such as those
arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, is not expected to be evident yet in reporting that relies on
the standard indicator.
21
Bride prices and dowries are the most well-known types of marriage payments. Bride price pay-
ment is a cash or in-kind transfer given by or on behalf of the groom to the bride’s family upon the
marriage. Dowry payments involve a transfer from the bride to the groom’s family upon the marriage.
The Women Stat Project estimates for 2016 track bride price and dowry practices worldwide; in all
the African countries, net assets move from the groom’s family to the bride’s family.
22
This topic is explored further in Chapter 4.

Figure 1.17. Female Labor Force Figure 1.18. Gender Gap in Labor
Participation, Ages 15+, Force Participation, Ages 15+,
1990–2021 1990–2021
(Percent of population) (Percentage points)
MCD EUR MCD EUR
WHD SSA WHD SSA
70 HIC 60 HIC
65
50
60
55
40
50
45 30
40
20
35
30
10
25
20 0
1990 95 2000 05 10 15 21 1990 95 2000 05 10 15 21
Note: APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe; Note: The figure shows the difference between
HIC = high-income countries; MCD = Middle male and female labor force participation.
East and Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe;
Africa; WHD = Western Hemisphere. HIC = high-income countries; MCD = Middle
East and Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan
this period, only one other region, Asia and Pacific, experienced a decrease.
At the same time, male labor force participation declined in all regions, with the
global average decreasing by 7 percentage points. Sub-Saharan Africa saw the
smallest reduction in male labor force participation, contributing to the relatively
stable gap in labor force participation between men and women, which remained
at 11 percentage points in 2021 (see Figure 1.18).
Trends in employment outcomes mirror those in labor force participation.
Between 1990 and 2021, the global average for the female employment-to-
population ratio declined from 48 to 44 percent (Figure 1.19). In sub-Saharan
Africa, this ratio went from 61 percent to 59 percent over the same period.
The gender gap in employment has remained relatively stable, standing at
10.4 in 2021 (Figure 1.20). Sub-Saharan Africa maintains its position as the
region with the lowest gender gaps in employment. In 2021, the female
employment-to-population ratio was 58.5 percent, while the male employ-
ment-to-population ratio was 68.8 percent.
A smaller proportion of women is employed, and among those who are, a sig-
nificant percentage are in precarious positions. Globally, there is a prevailing trend

Figure 1.19. Ratio of Female Figure 1.20. Gender Gap in the

Employment to Population, Ratio of Employment to Population,
Ages 15+, 1991–2021 Ages 15+, 1990–2021
(Percent) (Percentage points)
MCD EUR MCD EUR
WHD SSA WHD SSA
70 HIC 60 HIC
60 50
50 40
40 30
30 20
20 10
10 0
1991 96 2001 06 11 16 21 1991 96 2001 06 11 16 21
Note: The figure shows the proportion of a Note: The figure shows the difference between
country’s population that is employed. male and female employment-to-population
APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe; ratio. APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe;
of higher male representation in informal employment.23 However, in sub-Saharan

Africa, women are more likely than men to find themselves in informal and vul-
nerable employment. Specifically, 64 percent of women work in the informal
sector, while the figure for men is 58 percent, 79 percent of women are in vulner-
able employment compared to 67 percent of men (Figure 1.21). The higher inci-
dence of informality can be due to various factors, including the need for flexible
work hours or reduced working hours to accommodate caregiving and household
responsibilities. Engaging in the informal sector work leads to lower earnings for
women and restricts their access to non-monetary benefits and labor law protec-
tions. Consequently, this contributes to a widening gender gap in lifetime earnings
(Sahay 2023).
23
Informal employment includes all jobs in unregistered and/or small-scale private unincorporated
enterprises that produce goods or services meant for sale or barter. Regardless of size, self-employed
street vendors, taxi drivers, and home-based workers are all considered enterprises. However, agri-
cultural and related activities, households producing goods exclusively for their use (for example,
subsistence farming, domestic housework, care work, and employment of paid domestic workers),
and volunteer services rendered to the community are excluded.

Figure 1.21. Informal Employment, Figure 1.22. Vulnerable

2015–19 Employment, 2019
(Percent) (Percent)
80 90
Global female
70 80 Global male
HIC female
60 70 HIC male
60
50
50
40
40
30
30
20 20
10 10
0 0
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Note: Informal employment is defined as a Note: Vulnerable employment is defined as
percentage of total nonagricultural employment. contributing family workers and own-account
APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe; workers as a percentage of total employment.
MCD = Middle East and Central Asia; APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe;
SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; WHD = Western HIC = high-income countries; MCD = Middle
Hemisphere. East and Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan
Across most regions in developing countries, women are more likely to be in

vulnerable employment (Figure 1.22). Although a significant portion of workers is
self-employed women, these women are more likely to be unpaid workers in family
enterprises and less likely to become own-account workers (Bue and others 2022;
Gindling and Newhouse 2014). This situation leaves them vulnerable in the labor
market, as they have a lower chance of having formal work arrangements, access to
benefits, or participation in social protection programs (ILOSTAT 2013).24 This
disparity is particularly pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa, where 79 percent of
women and 67 percent of men are engaged in vulnerable employment. In some
countries, over 95 percent of women (and 85 percent of men) work as unpaid or
own-account workers. These gender disparities in vulnerable employment under-
score the need for targeted interventions to improve women’s working conditions
and livelihoods in the region. Furthermore, in nearly all countries, women are more
likely than men to engage in part-time employment.25 While only 50 percent of
24
ILOSTAT (2010) defines vulnerable employment as the sum of contributing family workers and
own-account workers as a percentage of total employment.
25
Part-time employment refers to regular employment in which working time is substantially less than
normal. Definitions of part-time employment differ by country.

Figure 1.23. Part-Time Employment, 2021

(Percent)
HIC female HIC male
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
APD MCD EUR WHD SSA
Source: ILOSTAT 2021.
Note: Part-time employment refers to regular employment in which working time is substantially less
than normal. Definitions of part-time employment differs by country. APD = Asia and Pacific;
women are employed in high-income countries, approximately 28 percent of them

work part-time, compared to 23 percent of employed men (Figure 1.23).
Cultural norms play a significant role in shaping these patterns, as women are
often expected to shoulder a larger share of unpaid household work than men.
Across Africa, young women bear a heavier burden of unpaid domestic work,
including caregiving for family members, than young men. Consequently, they
often must opt for less formal or part-time employment opportunities closer to
home.
Comprehensive time-use surveys26 conducted in several African countries
indicate that women’s unpaid care work is, on average, 2.86 times that of men. In
contrast, in Europe and North America, women spend twice as much time as
men on such activities, while in South Asia, it is almost nine times. When
including paid work, the total workload for women in sub-Saharan Africa is
1.2 times that of men, meaning that African women bear the heaviest work bur-
den across all regions (African Development Bank 2020; Charmes 2019). The
lack of affordable childcare is a significant barrier that can impede women’s access
to formal employment opportunities. This obstacle often forces women into a
difficult dilemma where they must choose between pursuing a formal career or
26
Benin (2015), Cameroon (2014), Cabo Verde (2012), Ethiopia (2013), Ghana (2009), Madagascar
(2001), Mali (2008), Mauritius (2018), South Africa (2010), Tanzania (2018), and Uganda (2018).
See also UN Women 2021.

prioritizing their responsibilities as mothers. Without accessible and affordable

childcare options, women face challenges in striking a balance between work and
caregiving, limiting their ability to fully participate in the workforce while fulfill-
ing their roles as mothers.
Sectoral Segregation
Sectoral segregation refers to the pattern in which men and women tend to be
concentrated in different sectors or industries of the economy. This segregation
typically results in men and women having unequal access to employment oppor-
tunities, in wage disparities, and in differing levels of representation in various
sectors. Sectoral segregation is widespread across regions, with women more likely
to be engaged in the service sector than men and less likely to be involved in agri-
cultural and industrial positions (Figures 1.24 and 1.25). Occupational segregation
refers to the unequal distribution of men and women across different types of jobs
or professions. It arises from a combination of self-selection by girls and women
into gender-conventional career paths and the societal pressure that explicitly
or implicitly dissuades them from pursuing non-gender-conforming paths.
The interplay between individual choices and external influences intersects with
Figure 1.24. Share of Women Figure 1.25. Share of Men

Employed by Sectors, 2021 Employed by Sectors, 2021
(Percent) (Percent)
HIC agriculture HIC industry HIC agriculture HIC industry
HIC service HIC service
90 90
80 80
70 70
60 60
50 50
40 40
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Source: ILOSTAT 2021. Source: ILOSTAT 2021.
Note: APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe; Note: APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe;

disparities in skills or resources, such as lower levels of expertise or capital, which

further restrict the range of occupational options available to women. In Africa,
agriculture serves as a primary sector of employment. However, women are 3 per-
centage points less likely to be employed in agriculture, working on their plots or
someone else’s than are men.
Share of Youth Not in Education, Employment, and Training

Despite sub-Saharan Africa having a higher ratio of female-to-male labor force
participation rates than other regions, these seemingly positive figures conceal
underlying challenges. Specifically, girls face greater obstacles to accessing educa-
tion, employment, or training than do their male counterparts. The obstacles
faced by young women can have far-reaching consequences since the employment
of young women contributes to economic growth and enhances their voice and
agency, resulting in positive effects on the individuals, families, and society at
large (Klugman and others 2014). However, the school-to-work transition is
slower in sub-Saharan Africa than in high-income countries, and young people in
the region require assistance in entering the labor market after completing their
education (Elder and Kring 2016). In 2021, among individuals aged 15 to 24,
30 percent of girls and 19 percent of boys were not in education, employment, or
training (NEET). The gender gap in this regard has shown no improvement
between 2004 and 2021 and is significantly wider than in high-income countries
(Figure 1.26). In 2021, sub-Saharan Africa ranked second in the world for having
the highest gender gap in this aspect, following the Middle East and Central Asia
(Figure 1.27).
Between 2017 and 2021, NEET rates ranged from 77 percent to below
20 percent, with gender gaps as large as 28 percentage points. Chakravarty, Das,
and Vaillant (2017) identified several constraints that affect girls’ employment in
sub-Saharan Africa. These include lower levels of marketable skills, limited access
to financing, network constraints stemming from less exposure to the workplace
and employers, discrimination, lack of role models, and limited mobility.
Digital Divide
The rise of digital technology in sub-Saharan Africa offers both opportunities and
challenges for gender equality. While mobile technology and digital platforms have
expanded economic opportunities for women and increased access to services such
as education, health care, and information, a significant gender digital divide per-
sists. Harnessing digital technology has the potential to enhance women’s participa-
tion in the labor market and contribute to fostering inclusive societies and econom-
ic growth. Nevertheless, failure to bridge the gender digital divide would deprive
women of the full advantages and benefits of digital technology, thereby limiting
their participation in the digital economy and restricting their access to resources
and opportunities available through digital platforms.
Sub-Saharan Africa presents some of the largest gaps, with women 36 percent
less likely than men to use mobile internet, and a 13 percent gender gap in mobile

Figure 1.26. NEET Rates in SSA and Figure 1.27. NEET Rates by
High-Income Countries, 2004–21 Regions, 2021
(Percent of youth population) (Percent of firms)
45 SSA female 60 HIC female
SSA male HIC male
40 HIC female 50
35 HIC male
30 40
25
30
20
15 20
10
10
5
0 0
2004 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 21
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
APD MCD EUR WHD SSA
Note: The figure shows the share of young Note: The figure shows the share of young
people (ages 15 to 24) who are not in people (ages 15 to 24) who are not in education,
education, employment or training (NEET) in employment or training (NEET) in sub-Saharan
sub-Saharan Africa compared to those in Africa compared to various other regions.
high-income countries. HIC = high-income APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe;
countries; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa. HIC = high-income countries; MCD = Middle
East and Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan
ownership, equivalent to 95 million women not owing a mobile phone as of 2023

(GSMA 2023). These disparities in access to digital technology perpetuate
inequalities, leading to both social and economic costs.27 Social norms can restrict
women’s access to and use of digital technologies. Additionally, in several
sub-Saharan African countries, taxes imposed on mobile money withdrawals or
digital services act as barriers, especially for low-income women (Aranda-Jan and
Qasim 2023). Addressing the gender gap in digital technology through improved
access, digital literacy programs, and supportive policies is crucial for promoting
gender-inclusive economic development.
Entrepreneurship
Sub-Saharan Africa stands out for having the highest rate of women involved in
entrepreneurial activity worldwide (World Economic Forum 2022). Several
sub-Saharan African countries rank among the world’s top nations with the
27
It is estimated that excluding women from digital platforms has led to a staggering loss of $1 trillion
in GDP (Alliance for Affordable Internet 2021).

highest proportion of female entrepreneurs (Mastercard Index of Women

Entrepreneurs 2022). The region’s limited employment opportunities often
drive both men and women to entrepreneurship out of necessity. This is espe-
cially true for women, who face greater constraints in accessing alternative
employment opportunities. However, despite their significant presence, female
entrepreneurs in Africa face several challenges, including lower profits than do
their male counterparts (World Bank 2019). Female entrepreneurs make
strategic decisions that differ from those made by male entrepreneurs, including
the choice of sector, capital investment, labor utilization, business innovation,
and competitiveness. Typically, female entrepreneurs gravitate towards
female-dominated industries, such as trade, retail, textile and footwear,
pharmaceutical, and perfume products, while male-owned enterprises dominate
manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, and fishing (World Bank 2021).
Interestingly, female entrepreneurs who cross over to male-dominated sectors
tend to perform better than those in female-concentrated sectors (World Bank
2021). Women, however, face numerous obstacles when entering male-dominated
sectors, including unconscious biases, societal norms, limited exposure to these
fields, and constraints related to time and capital.
Despite their entrepreneurial efforts, female entrepreneurs consistently face sig-
nificant disparities in business capital compared to their male counterparts.28 They
also employ fewer workers and allocate fewer labor hours in their businesses.29 Male
entrepreneurs are more likely to adopt advanced business practices and innovations,
and they are more likely to engage in competitive practices. Furthermore, legal
discrimination against women remains a challenge in several sub-Saharan African
countries. While gender gaps in accessing loans from financial institutions are
smaller in Africa than in other regions of the world, a World Bank (2019) analysis
reveals persistent and substantial gender disparities in the size of outstanding loans
for various groups of entrepreneurs.
Furthermore, female farmers in sub-Saharan Africa face significant systemic
barriers, leading to substantial gender gaps in agricultural productivity. Since
agriculture is the primary employment sector on the continent, addressing these
gaps can yield substantial gains for African economies. One major driver of gen-
der inequality in agriculture is the disparity in land ownership between men and
women. According to FAO (2018), African women own significantly less agricul-
tural land than men, often due to customary norms discouraging women from
claiming ownership or possessing documented evidence of their land property
rights. Extensive evidence demonstrates a strong correlation between secure land
tenure and increased investment and productivity in agriculture (FAO 2018;
28
When analyzing data from 14 impact-evaluation data sets across 10 African countries, it is evi-
dent that male-owned firms typically have more than six times the amount of capital investment,
including equipment, inventory, and property, compared with female-owned enterprises (World
Bank 2019).
29
The existence of constraints restricting the growth of women-led firms is evidenced by the fact that
the share of businesses that are led by women decreases as the size of the firm increases (Ubfal 2023).

World Bank 2020b). Therefore, addressing gender discrimination in land owner-

ship and ensuring secure land tenure for women are critical steps toward promot-
ing their economic empowerment and improving agricultural productivity.30
INEQUALITY OF REPRESENTATION
Inequality of representation of women is a multifaceted and pressing issue that spans
both political and corporate realms. In societies around the world, women continue
to face significant disparities in their representation within these spheres. In the polit-
ical sphere, the underrepresentation of women in elected offices and decision-making
bodies raises questions about the inclusivity of democratic processes and the fair
representation of diverse perspectives. In the corporate world, women continue to
encounter barriers that limit their access to executive and managerial roles, emphasiz-
ing the broader issue of gender disparities in economic leadership.
Sub-Saharan Africa has made notable strides in promoting women’s political
participation and decision-making. Many countries in the region have imple-
mented gender quotas and affirmative action policies to increase the representation
of women in parliaments and government positions. Despite these efforts,
women’s political empowerment in the region remains below parity, and women
are underrepresented in key decision-making bodies and leadership roles.
Globally, there has been an increase in the portion of seats held by women in
national parliaments (Figure 1.28). In 2021, women held 26 percent of parlia-
mentary seats worldwide, up from 11 percent in 1997. However, as of 2020, no
region had achieved gender parity in parliamentary representation. In sub-Saharan
Africa, there has been remarkable progress, with the proportion of female parlia-
mentarians increasing from 10 percent in 1997 to 23 percent in 2020.
Throughout the continent, the representation of women in parliament varies
significantly, ranging from 7 percent to 61 percent.
Similarly, the region made substantial progress in women’s representation in
ministerial positions. Between 2005 and 2020, the share of women holding min-
isterial positions increased from 15 percent to 25 percent. This percentage is
higher than the global average (Figure 1.29), highlighting the region’s positive
advancements in gender equality in political leadership.
In terms of women’s representation in managerial positions in the private sector,
in 2021, 16 percent of firms had female top managers in sub-Saharan Africa, just
below the global average (Figure 1.30). According to the Africa Growth Initiative
(2022), women accounted for 24.3 percent of company board seats in the region in
2018, with 24.5 percent serving as board chairs. This represented the highest level
of any region and was marginally higher than average representation on executive
committees at 22 percent (McKinsey 2019). While this figure reflects significant
progress in the region, this progress has not been consistent across countries and the
region faces challenges in promoting women in middle management positions.
30
For a comprehensive review of the most promising interventions in addressing key constraints to
women entrepreneurship see Ubfal 2023.

Figure 1.28. Proportion of Seats Figure 1.29. Proportion of Women

Held by Women in National in Ministerial Positions, 2005–2020
Parliament, 1997–2020 (Percent)
(Percent)
35 Global APD 40 Global APD
MCD EUR MCD EUR
30 WHD SSA 35 WHD SSA
HIC HIC
30
25
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
5 5
0 0
05 008 010 012 014 015 016 018 019 020
19 7
20 9
20 1
20 3
20 5
20 7
20 9
20 1
20 3
20 5
20 7
20 9
21
20
9
9
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
19

Note: APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe; Note: APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe;
Figure 1.30. Firms with Female Top Managers, 2018–2020

(Percent of firms)
35
Regions Global HIC
30
25
20
15
10
0
APD MCD EUR WHD SSA
Source: Enterprise Surveys, World Bank Survey. Retrieved from the World Bank Gender Data Portal.
Note: The figure shows the percentage of firms in the private sector who have females as top
managers. APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe; HIC = high-income countries; MCD = Middle East
and Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; WHD = Western Hemisphere.

CONCLUSION
The analysis of gender inequality in sub-Saharan Africa paints a comprehensive
picture of the region’s challenges and persistent gaps across various dimensions.
While it is evident that gender disparities persist in multiple sectors, hindering
progress towards gender equality and sustainable development, it is equally
important to recognize the positive developments that have emerged.
Despite the persistence of discriminatory social institutions, societal norms,
and harmful traditional practices, sub-Saharan Africa has made strides in enacting
positive legal changes that are crucial in promoting women’s economic empower-
ment. There have been improvements in access to education, even though gender
disparities remain, particularly at the tertiary level. Efforts to combat maternal
mortality rates and adolescent fertility rates are underway, although further prog-
ress is needed. Women still face significant barriers to economic empowerment,
such as in accessing financial resources, formal employment, and entrepreneur-
ship opportunities, but there have been positive shifts towards increased political
representation and entrepreneurship rates.
Addressing gender inequality in sub-Saharan Africa requires a comprehensive
and multifaceted approach. This includes promoting legal reforms to protect
women’s rights, improving access to quality education and healthcare services, com-
bating violence against women, eradicating harmful traditional practices, fostering
financial inclusion, bridging the digital gender divide, and promoting women’s
economic empowerment. Moreover, increasing women’s representation in decision-
making positions is essential. The approach needs to confront deeply ingrained
gender biases and systemic obstacles while exploring innovative strategies to ensure
balanced and inclusive representation in both political and corporate domains.
Crucially, collaboration among governments, civil society organizations, interna-
tional institutions, and communities is pivotal in implementing and sustaining these
measures. By prioritizing gender equality as a fundamental development goal and
addressing the systemic barriers preventing women to achieve their full potential in
sub-Saharan Africa, it will be possible to foster inclusive and sustainable economic
growth, improve social well-being, and create a more equitable and just society.

ANNEX 1.1. GENDER EQUALITY INDEXES

Gender Inequality Index (GII)
The Gender Inequality Index is a composite measure of gender inequality defined
using three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment, and the labor
market. The reproductive health indicators are the maternal mortality ratio and
adolescent birth rate. The empowerment indicators include the percentage of
parliamentary seats held by women and the percentage of the population with at
least some secondary education by gender. Finally, the labor market indicator
corresponds to labor force participation by gender. A low index value suggests low
inequality between women and men and vice versa.
African countries continue to report high levels of maternal mortality and
adolescent fertility rates; moreover, women are at a disadvantage in educational
attainment (Annex Table 1.1.1).
Global Gender Gap Index (GGI)

The Global Gender Index provides an annual assessment of the status and progress of
gender inequality across four crucial dimensions: economic participation and oppor-
tunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment.
Sub-Saharan Africa has shown significant progress in women’s economic par-
ticipation and half of the countries in the region have achieved parity in estimated
earned income. However, sub-Saharan Africa ranks lowest globally in educational
attainments.
Regarding health and survival, sub-Saharan Africa has closed 97.1 percent of
its gender gap, reporting the highest regional score together with Europe and the
Western Hemisphere. Eleven African countries have reached full parity in healthy
life expectancy, and all countries in the region have achieved gender parity in sex
ratio at birth. Political empowerment remains the most significant challenge,
although it shows a substantive improvement of 3.3 percentage points from 2021
(Annex Table 1.1.2).
ANNEX TABLE 1.1.1
Regional Performance by IMF Area Department, Gender Inequality Index, 2021

Share of Population with at Least
Seats in Some Secondary Education Labor Force Participation
Maternal Parliament (25+) Rate (15+)
Mortality Adolescent Held by
Ratio1 Birth Rate2 Women Female Male Female Male
SSA 457 96 24 30 41 61 72
APD 86 28 20 61 65 51 72
EUR 8 11 31 90 93 52 65
MCD 99 30 19 66 68 32 70
WHD 82 50 29 63 64 52 73
Note: APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe; MCD = Middle East and Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; WHD = Western
Hemisphere.
1
Deaths per 100,000 live births.
2
Births per 1,000 women ages 15–19.

ANNEX TABLE 1.1.2.
Regional Performance, Global Gender Gap Index by Subindex, 2022

Economic Participation Educational Attainment Health and Survival Political Empowerment
SSA 0.68 0.88 0.97 0.22
APD 0.66 0.98 0.95 0.19
EUR 0.72 0.99 0.97 0.35
MCD 0.52 0.95 0.95 0.13
WHD 0.69 0.99 0.97 0.30
Source: World Economic Forum 2022.
Hemisphere.
Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI)

SIGI assesses gender discrimination within social institutions across 179 coun-
tries. It does so by considering the impact of laws, social norms, and practices that
limit women’s rights and hinder their access to opportunities and resources. This
comprehensive approach allows SIGI to uncover the root causes of gender
inequality. Compared to other regions, African countries experienced the highest
level of discrimination due to family-related factors and of restrictions in access-
ing productive and financial resources (Annex Table 1.1.3).
ANNEX TABLE 1.1.3.
Regional Performance, Social Institutions and Gender Index by Components, 2022

Restricted Access to
Discrimination in Restricted Physical Productive and
the Family Integrity Financial Resources Restricted civil liberties
SSA 52.4 29.6 40.9 34.6
APD 50.4 33.7 32.5 38.3
EUR 12.8 18.6 10.2 16.8
MCD 67.9 37.2 37.3 47.3
WHD 21.5 26.1 22.7 17.6
Source: SIGI 2023.
Note: 0 indicates non-discrimination, 100 absolute discrimination. APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe; MCD = Middle
East and Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; WHD = Western Hemisphere.
Human Capital Index (HCI)

The Human Capital Index calculates the contributions of health and education
to worker productivity. The final index score ranges from 0 to 1 and it measures
the productivity of a future worker of a child born today relative to the bench-
mark of full health and complete education.31
Annex Table 1.1.4 shows the disaggregation of the Human Capital Index by
its subcomponents. In the African regions, boys have a higher stunted rate and a
31
The Human Capital Index quantitatively illustrates the key stages in a child’s human trajectory and
their consequences for the productivity of the next generations of workers with three components:
(1) survival from birth to school age, measured using under-5 mortality rates; (2) expected years of
learning-adjusted school, combining information on the quantity (number of years of school) and
quality (harmonized test score) of education; and (3) health (adult survival rates from age 15 to 60
and fraction of children under 5 not stunted; World Bank 2020a).

ANNEX TABLE 1.1.4.
Regional Performance, Human Capital Index by Subcomponents, 2020

Probability of Survival to Expected Years of School Harmonized Test Scores Learning-adjusted Years of Percentage of Children Adult Survival Rate
Age 5 School under 5 Not Stunted
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
Chapter 1 Revisiting Trends in Gender Equality

SSA 0.94 0.93 8.2 8.4 362 362 4.6 4.7 0.71 0.66 0.76 0.70
APD 0.98 0.98 12.1 11.9 438 428 8.6 8.20 0.77 0.76 0.90 0.83
EUR 1.00 0.99 13.2 13.2 494 483 10.5 10.2 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.88
MCD 0.98 0.97 11.2 11.1 412 389 7.5 7.0 0.82 0.79 0.91 0.86
WHD 0.98 0.98 12.1 11.9 421 416 8.2 7.9 0.85 0.83 0.90 0.83
Source: World Bank 2020a.
Note: APD = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe; MCD = Middle East and Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; WHD = Western Hemisphere.
37
lower probability of survival to age 5. Concerning the expected school years, girls
are still disadvantaged compared with boys. The gender gap in the Human
Capital Index varies quite widely across African economies, ranging from –0.05
to 0.03.
Gender Development Index (GDI)

The Gender Development Index measures gender inequalities in three basic
dimensions of human development: longevity, education, and income per capita.32
Sub-Saharan Africa has the second-lowest gender development index (0.91), fol-
lowed by Middle East and North Africa and with scores that range from 0.77 to 1.
Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region with girls at a disadvantage compared with
boys in terms of expected years of schooling and have the largest gap in terms of
mean years of education.
ANNEX TABLE 1.1.5.
Regional Performance, Gender Development Index by Subcomponents (2020)

Life Expectancy at Expected Years of Mean Years of Estimated Gross National
Birth Schooling Schooling Income per Capita
SSA 1.08 0.95 0.74 0.68
APD 1.07 1.03 0.93 0.60
EUR 1.08 1.05 0.99 0.67
MCD 1.08 1.00 0.94 0.35
WHD 1.09 1.07 1.00 0.60
Source: UNDP 2021a.
Hemisphere.
32
The Gender Development Index is calculated as the ratio of female to male Human Devel-
opment Index values constructed based on three components: life expectancy at birth, expected
and mean years of schooling, and the estimated gross national income per capita (United
Nations Development Programme 2021).

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CHAPTER 2
Zooming into Women’s

Financial Access
Kazuko Shirono, Katia Huayta-Zapata,
Hector Carcel-Villanova, and Esha Chhabra
The developments of women’s financial access in sub-Saharan Africa—including

during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic—are depicted in annual data from the
IMF’s Financial Access Survey (FAS). The FAS results indicate a lower degree of
financial access and use via commercial banks in sub-Saharan Africa than in other
regions during the prepandemic period, with a sizable and persistent gender gap.
During the pandemic years, women in sub-Saharan Africa broadly maintained finan-
cial access with no major widening of the gender gap, albeit with a few exceptions,
likely supported by countries’ policy measures. Nevertheless, given the low and uneven
levels of financial access for both men and women in the region, efforts need to con-
tinue advancing women’s financial access—including improving the availability of
gender-disaggregated data on both traditional and digital financial services—to better
track the developments and assess policies.
INTRODUCTION
Since the onset of the global COVID-19 pandemic, much has been debated on
its potential impact on women’s financial inclusion and the need for supportive
global policy actions (Azar and Mejía 2020; Schuttenbelt 2020, IFC 2020). Sub-
Saharan Africa is no exception given that 350 million of the world’s unbanked
population live in the region (World Bank 2018). However, evidence is scarce,
partly due to a lack of well-curated data in this area. This chapter examines wom-
en’s financial access in sub-Saharan Africa during the COVID-19 pandemic—
drawing on annual supply-side data collected through the IMF’s Financial Access
Survey (FAS)1 and publicly available information on relevant gender-sensitive
policies to support women’s financial access during the pandemic.
This chapter partly draws on Shirono and others (2021), to which Yingjie Fan (Princeton University)
also contributed.
1
The FAS is available on https://data.imf.org/fas. Some FAS indicators can also be accessed through
third-party websites such as the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Databank.
43

As of March 2023, 29 African countries report gender-disaggregated data to

the FAS. While the time coverage and availability of indicators vary across coun-
tries, the FAS can offer insight into various aspects of women’s financial access in
sub-Saharan Africa—such as account adoption and financial service usage—
including comparison with other regions.
The FAS gender-disaggregated data suggest that before the pandemic, the
degree of financial access in sub-Saharan Africa was lower relative to other
regions, with significant gender gaps measured by the share of borrowers and
depositors in some cases. During the first year of the pandemic in 2020, the
number of female depositors in the region stayed broadly stable or even increased
in some countries and continued to rise in 2021, which may reflect the impact of
policy measures that countries implemented to maintain financial access. The
outstanding value of deposits and loans also stayed relatively stable in the African
countries in the sample, albeit with a few exceptions.
The gender gap in financial access remained mostly unchanged in most of
sub-Saharan Africa during the COVID-19 pandemic. The gender gap for share
of depositors improved in some cases, for example, but some of these improve-
ments were due to a larger decline in the indicators for men than for women.
These results indicate the importance of granular data in tracking developments
and assessing policy impacts.
These findings should be interpreted cautiously because of the limited sample
size and the need to control for omitted variables. As more granular financial
access data become available, improved analysis could help better tailor support-
ive policies. Nevertheless, the data clearly show that efforts need to continue
advancing financial access in sub-Saharan Africa.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: The next section discusses issues
related to gender-disaggregated data on financial access, including key features of the
FAS gender-disaggregated data series and indicators. After that is a pre-COVID-19
pandemic snapshot of women’s financial access based on FAS gender-disaggregated
data, with an emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa. Then there is an overview of policy
measures countries have taken to support financial access for women in response to
the COVID-19 pandemic. FAS outcome data are presented on women’s financial
access for sub-Saharan Africa in 2021.
FAS GENDER-DISAGGREGATED DATA

The gender gap in financial inclusion—defined as access to and use of financial
services in this chapter2—has important macroeconomic implications through
its links to higher economic growth, particularly in countries with lower overall
levels of financial inclusion (Sahay and others 2015), income inequality (Aslan
2
Financial inclusion is a multifaceted concept covering several dimensions (Espinosa-Vega and oth-
ers 2020). This chapter focuses on access to and use of financial services as these are key pillars of
financial inclusion.

Chapter 2 Zooming into Women’s Financial Access 45
TABLE 2.1.
FAS Gender-Disaggregated Series

Deposit-Taking Microfinance Non–Deposit-Taking Microfinance
Commercial Banks Institutions Institutions
Depositors and borrowers Depositors and borrowers Borrowers
Deposit and loan accounts Deposit and loan accounts Loan accounts
Outstanding loans and deposits Outstanding loans and deposits Outstanding loans
Source: IMF Financial Access Survey.
Note: The FAS collects gender-disaggregated data on 15 series. Each cell in the first two columns of the table lists two sep-
arate series for deposits and loans.
and others 2017; Sahay and others 2018), and financial stability (Sahay and
others 2018; Khera and others 2022). However, a lack of granular data often
hampers analysis. Despite progress made in recent years, addressing data issues
is often the first step toward closing the gender gap in financial inclusion
(Data2X 2019; Oula, Carey, and Kayibanda 2019; FinEquity 2020). This sec-
tion briefly discusses issues related to gender-disaggregated data on financial
access, focusing on FAS supply-side data.
Gender-disaggregated data from the FAS offers a bird’s-eye view of the
financial inclusion landscape for women before and during the COVID-19
pandemic.3 The FAS is a unique source of annual supply-side data on financial
access and use, covering 189 countries. It contains 121 time series, including
gender-disaggregated data on 15 series on access to and use of financial services
provided by different types of financial institutions (Table 2.1). Data reporting
is somewhat uneven with some data gaps—not all countries report the complete
set of time series to the FAS, and data coverage varies across countries.
Nevertheless, the increasing number of countries reporting these data to the
FAS, which more than doubled between 2018 (35 reporters) and 2022
(82 reporters as of March 2023)—including 29 countries in sub-Saharan
Africa—reflects the importance of gender-disaggregated information for policy-
making. Out of the 82 countries that report gender-disaggregated data to the
FAS, about half are low- and lower-middle income countries, some of which
report many of the gender-disaggregated data series. For example, Guinea,
Pakistan, Zimbabwe (reporting all 15 gender-disaggregated series), and
Bangladesh (reporting 10 gender-disaggregated series) were the top gender-
disaggregated data reporters in 2022.
The FAS is based on administrative data collected by central banks and
financial regulators and thus tends to be more cost-effective than demand-side
surveys. FAS data can be collected annually unlike similar statistics from
demand-side surveys. The FAS also directly measures financial access outcomes,
so the FAS series capture actual outturns, free of estimates or assumptions. The
FAS gender-disaggregated series allow for developing several cross-country
3
The FAS gender-disaggregated data have been collected annually since 2018.

comparable indicators to measure different aspects of financial inclusion (see

Annex 2.1). As shown in the next section, these indicators offer insights into
the state of play before the COVID-19 pandemic.4
FINANCIAL ACCESS GENDER GAP: A PRE-COVID-19

PANDEMIC SNAPSHOT
Adoption of Bank Accounts
The share of male or female depositors (or borrowers) in the male or female adult
population (Annex 2.1) can proxy the size of the banked population. Figure 2.1
shows the size of banked male and female populations for countries across five
regions in 2019. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the size of the banked popu-
lation and gender gaps therein varied widely across countries, with significant
gender gaps in some cases. Multiple factors drive gender gaps in financial access,
including structural inequality in income (for example, due to lower female labor
market participation) and restricted legal rights (for example, lack of a legal pro-
vision to prohibit gender-based discrimination; World Bank 2021). Overall, the
global average share of female and male depositors in the adult population in
2019 was 40 and 61 percent, respectively (a 21 percentage point gap). Among
sub-Saharan African countries, however, the banked population rate was signifi-
cantly lower for both women and men—22 and 38 percent, respectively. The
financial access gender gap within the region itself varied widely. In some coun-
tries, the share of the banked female population was less than half of the banked
male population (for example, in Chad, South Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Guinea).
Compared with the banked depositors, the gender gap for banked borrowers
tends to be smaller globally—in 2019, the average share of female and male bor-
rowers at commercial banks was 19 percent and 24 percent, respectively. For
sub-Saharan Africa, the same indicator was 3 percent and 6 percent for women
and men, respectively.
Another approach to analyzing gender inequality in financial access is to exam-
ine the proportion of women among the banked population. For gender parity,
the indicator should be close to 50 percent (see Annex 2.1 for more discussion).
The FAS data suggest that the proportion of female borrowers stayed at about
33 percent on average between 2016 and 2019 globally, even though some vari-
ation in the pace of progress existed across countries (Figure 2.2). For sub-Saharan
African countries, the proportion of female borrowers was 31 percent in 2019,
with substantial heterogeneity in the region. In countries such as Republic of
4
This chapter mainly uses the data on commercial banks and microfinance institutions when avail-
able, given that commercial banks are still the most common financial service providers in many
countries. However, some countries may have other types of financial institutions (for example, credit
unions) playing a more dominant role. In addition, a more complete analysis requires taking account
of digital financial services (see, for example, Commodore 2020, Ayadi and Shaban 2020; Agur,
Martinez Peria, and Rochon 2020; and Bazarbash and others 2020).

Figure 2.1. Male and Female Share of Banked Population, 2019

(Percent of female or male population)
Depositors Borrowers
Seychelles
Cabo Verde
Male
Mauritius
Botswana Female
Zimbabwe
Uganda
Lesotho
Madagascar
Africa Equatorial Guinea
Zambia
Cameroon
Comoros
Congo
Guinea
Chad
South Sudan
Angola
Malaysia
Maldives
Samoa
Asia and Pacific
Indonesia
Bangladesh
Thailand
Denmark
Poland
Portugal
Spain
Malta
Europe North Macedonia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Romania
Albania
Moldova
Georgia
Middle East and
United Arab Emirates
Central Asia Pakistan
Brazil
Panama
Mexico
Chile
Paraguay
Western
Costa Rica
Hemisphere Peru
Honduras
Ecuador
Haiti
Dominican Republic
150 120 90 60 30 0 30 60 90 120 150
Share of depositors and borrowers at commercial banks
Sources: IMF Financial Access Survey; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: This chart shows the share of male and female depositors and borrowers at commercial banks
as a percent of the male and female adult population in 2019. The sample was selected based on
data availability. Depositors with bank accounts in more than one bank may be counted multiple times
in some cases, and thus the indicator can exceed 100 percent of the population. Some countries also
include nonresidents and minors (Cabo Verde, Malta, Mauritius, Seychelles), resulting in a significantly
higher share of depositors, ranging from 150 to 240 percent of the female or male population.

Figure 2.2. Proportion of Female Depositors and Borrowers at Commercial

Banks, 2016 and 2019
(Percent)
2019 2016
Seychelles
Lesotho
Botswana
Madagascar
Cabo Verde
Zambia
Mauritius
Zimbabwe
Africa Comoros
Uganda
Equatorial Guinea
Cameroon
Guinea
South Sudan
Chad
Congo
Angola
Malaysia
Samoa
Indonesia
Asia and Pacific
Maldives
Bangladesh
Thailand
Poland
Portugal
Moldova
Denmark
Romania
Spain
Europe
Malta
North Macedonia
Czech Republic
Cyprus
Albania
San Marino
Georgia
Middle East and
United Arab Emirates
Brazil
Mexico
Peru
Panama
Chile
Western
Honduras
Hemisphere Costa Rica
Paraguay
Ecuador
Haiti
Dominican Republic
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Note: This chart shows the proportion of female borrowers to total borrowers at commercial banks
for 2016 and 2019. Some countries did not report 2016 data to the FAS. The sample was selected
based on data availability.

Congo, Chad, South Sudan, and Guinea, the proportion of female borrowers was
less than a quarter of the total banked population, while other countries (for
example, Lesotho, Botswana, and Madagascar) had a proportion of female bor-
rowers above 40 percent in 2019. A similar pattern holds for the average propor-
tion of female depositors. The average proportion increased only slightly—from
33 percent to 36 percent—in sub-Saharan Africa during the same period, even
though the gender gap measured by this indicator is smaller than the indicator
based on total borrowers. Overall, these limited changes over time may suggest
persistent structural factors, such as inequality in income and restricted legal
rights (Jousse 2021).
The gender gap in financial access may be smaller once microfinance institu-
tions5 are considered, as they are known to play a key role in providing credit to
women in some low- and middle-income economies (Espinosa-Vega and others
2020). For example, in Guinea, microfinance institutions provide loans to a larger
share of the population than commercial banks, accounting for close to 5 percent
of both male and female populations with a minimal gender gap. In addition,
informal access to finance—such as savings or investment clubs—also plays a role
in many developing economies, particularly in rural areas (Singer 2014). In this
regard, it is also important to note the growing significance of fintech to help
close gender gaps in financial access (Sahay and others 2020).
Financial Service Usage

Financial service usage among the banked population can be measured by the
value of outstanding deposits or loans. In 2019, the outstanding female-owned
deposits at commercial banks were significantly lower than those owned by men
in most economies in the sample (Figure 2.3).6 In sub-Saharan African countries,
the outstanding value of deposits as a share of GDP was significantly lower for
both men and women than in other regions with a large gender gap in some cases.
The gender gap is smaller for a few countries (for example, Guinea and
Zimbabwe) if it is measured by outstanding deposits per depositor. However,
these economies also tend to have a large share of the unbanked population.7
A similar pattern holds for the outstanding number of female-owned loans at
commercial banks.
5
Microfinance institutions offer small-scale loans typically to self-employed or informally employed
low-income individuals and microenterprises. Microfinance institutions can be either deposit-taking
or non–deposit-taking.
6
According to the FAS guidelines, gender-disaggregated data on outstanding deposits and loans need
to be reported excluding balances in joint accounts. In practice, however, many countries do not
exclude joint accounts when disaggregating by gender. See Annex 2.1.
7
The gender gap in outstanding deposits or loans as a share of GDP needs to be interpreted with
caution as these indicators can be low for women due to lower female income. Outstanding deposits
or loans as a share of female income may be a useful measure, but data on female income are not
readily available.

Figure 2.3. Female-Owned versus Male-Owned Deposits and Loans, 2019

(Percent of GDP)
Deposits Loans
Botswana
Seychelles
Male
Mauritius
Comoros Female
Zambia
Africa
Zimbabwe
Cameroon
Madagascar
Guinea
Equatorial Guinea
Mongolia
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Asia and Pacific
India
Bangladesh
Thailand
Malta
Iceland
Cyprus
North Macedonia
Europe
Denmark
Romania
Albania
Moldova
Georgia
Middle East and
Jordan
Chile
Peru
Western Paraguay
Hemisphere Ecuador
Panama
Colombia
60 40 20 0 20 40 60
Outstanding deposits and loans at commercial banks
Note: This chart shows the male-owned and female-owned outstanding deposits at commercial
banks as a percent of GDP in 2019 or the latest available. The sample was selected based on data
availability.
The gender gap in financial service usage seems to persist even when microfi-
nance institutions are considered. Given the relatively high degree of access by
women, women’s loans from these institutions—measured by the amount of
outstanding loans—tend to be close to the level of men’s loans (Figure 2.4).
However, overall, the gender gap in bank loans dominates in these countries in
the sample.
In sum, before the COVID-19 pandemic, the degree of financial access and
use via commercial banks was low for both men and women in many economies,
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, the gender gap in financial access
and usage was sizable and persistent. This assessment is incomplete, however, as
in many low- and middle-income countries, mobile money plays a key role in

Figure 2.4. Gender Gap for Microfinance Loans versus Bank Loans, 2019
(Percent of GDP)
4 Institution
Commercial banks
Microfinance institutions
3
0
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Guinea Madagascar Zambia Zimbabwe
Note: This chart shows the outstanding loans at microfinance institutions and commercial banks as a
percentage of GDP with gender breakdowns for select economies in 2019. The sample was selected
based on data availability.
facilitating financial inclusion, including in sub-Saharan Africa (Bazarbash and

others 2020; GSMA 2019). A more holistic assessment of financial inclusion will
require accounting for the role of digital finance in addition to traditional bank-
ing services, but options are limited as supply-side gender-disaggregated data on
digital finance are currently scarce.
With this foundational information, the next section examines policy respons-
es adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic to support women’s financial access,
providing context for understanding financial access outturns in the first year of
the pandemic in 2020.
POLICY RESPONSE TO THE PANDEMIC:

A GENDER PERSPECTIVE
Countries took a range of policy actions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, documenting information on policy measures specifically targeted to
support women’s financial access is not straightforward because such information
is qualitative in nature and often scattered across the public domain. In addition,
available sources may exclude some measures that have benefitted women but
have not necessarily been tailored for them. To bridge this information gap, this
section presents policy measures targeting or benefiting women’s financial access
in sub-Saharan Africa, drawing on the UNDP and UN Women’s COVID-19
Global Gender Response Tracker. This tracker contains information on a range of
measures announced in response to the pandemic to support women’s social and
economic security.

TABLE 2.2.
Policy Responses Benefitting or Targeting Women for Selected African Countries

Gender-Sensitive Policy Measures Countries
Financial assistance to small and medium Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea,
enterprises Lesotho, Niger, Senegal, South Africa
Income support Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, Togo
Loan assistance Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda
Tax relief Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Mali,
Niger, The Gambia
Source: IMF staff.
Note: For more details, see IMF COVID-19 Financial Access Policy Tracker, https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Topics/COVID/
FAS-tracker/stafi-2020-fas-covid-19-policy-response-tracker-smes-and-mobile-money-6896899-v22-dmsdr1s.ashx,
which contains information on gender-sensitive policies to support women’s financial access according to the classifi-
cation listed in this figure, drawing on the UNDP COVID-19 Global Gender Response Tracker.
The UN tracker classifies measures into four categories: (1) social protection,
(2) labor markets, (3) violence against women, and (4) fiscal and economic poli-
cies. The measures under each of these categories are further divided into several
types and subtypes. Policies discussed in this section focus on measures intended
to help women continue to engage in financial transactions and alleviate credit
constraints during the pandemic. These measures were largely drawn from the
fourth category of the UN tracker—fiscal and economic policies. Such measures
were identified for 69 countries, 19 of which are in sub-Saharan Africa. Some of
these measures are specifically geared toward supporting women’s financial access
(“targeting women”), while others may be for the broader population yet benefit
women (“benefitting women”).8 The results are summarized in IMF’s Financial
Access COVID-19 Policy Tracker (https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-
covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19).9 Focusing on sub-Saharan African
countries, these measures are classified in this section into four categories:
• Financial assistance for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) has been
implemented in the form of grants and subsidies, directly or indirectly sup-
porting women. In Benin, the authorities announced an XOF 74 billion
(around $124 million) stimulus package including temporary wage subsi-
dies to support formal enterprises, craftspeople, and small service providers
in the informal sector, which employs 98 percent of employed women. In
Senegal, the government provided subsidies to female entrepreneurs in the
informal sector who experienced significant operating losses during the
8
These classifications are also included in the gender component of the IMF Financial Access
COVID-19 Policy Tracker.
9
These 69 countries include 11 low-income, 38 middle-income, and 20 high-income countries.
Shirono and others (2021) provide an overview of these policies and show that the most popular
gender-sensitive measures for middle- and high-income countries were income support and financial
assistance to SMEs, while loan assistance was the most commonly used measure by low-income
countries.

pandemic. In Lesotho, the government launched a three-month disbursing

grant program of 50 million LSL (around $3.5 million) for medium, small,
and micro businesses, targeting the tourism sector. In Lesotho, women
make up about 76 percent of workers in the accommodation and food
services.
• Income support for women has been provided in the form of direct cash
transfers to individuals or wage subsidies to compensate for lost income in
certain sectors. For example, in Burkina Faso, the government announced
cash transfers for workers in the informal sector, where 98 percent of
employed women in the country work. Similarly in Togo, the government
set up an unconditional cash transfer program for all informal workers
above age 18 who could prove income loss due to the pandemic, and 65 per-
cent of the beneficiaries were women.
• Loan assistance, such as loan moratoria, reduced interest rates, and loan
guarantees, have been implemented to support sectors where women are
overrepresented. In Liberia, as part of the Market Women and Small
Informal Petty Traders Bank Loan Program, the government paid the loans
owed by women who either work in markets or are petty or small traders in
affected regions of the country. The Central Bank of Nigeria pledged N1
trillion (around $2.5 billion) in loans to boost local manufacturing and
production across critical sectors. In Nigeria, manufacturing accounts for
12 percent of women’s employment compared with 5 percent of men’s
employment.
• Tax relief includes tax exemptions or delayed filing of returns, aimed at
alleviating the financial burden of female entrepreneurs. In Mali, the gov-
ernment introduced tax advantages for sectors particularly affected by the
pandemic, including tourism, hotels, and transport. The measure supports
women’s economic security as accommodation and food service activities
employ over two times more women than men in the country.
The most popular gender-sensitive measure among these 19 sub-Saharan
African countries was financial assistance to SMEs (adopted by 47 percent of the
countries in the sample), followed by income support (42 percent), tax relief
(37 percent), and loan assistance (32 percent). Similar patterns were found for
other regions; income support and financial assistance to SMEs were the most
popular policy responses in Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia, and the
Western Hemisphere. Overall, the majority of the countries in the full sample
(62 percent) adopted a single gender-sensitive measure, with only three countries
implementing all four types.
Income support for individuals and wage subsidies for SMEs (to the extent
that they provide support for household income) are likely to help maintain the
number of depositors and borrowers as well as the level of outstanding deposits
and loans during the COVID-19 pandemic. This support is of great relevance for
the sub-Saharan Africa region, where over 90 percent of micro, small, and

medium enterprises (MSMEs) were adversely affected by the pandemic and

female-led SMEs were particularly hit hard, with many reporting revenue losses
of over 50 percent (IFC 2021). Other policy measures have likely had similar
supportive effects on corporate accounts, but such gender-disaggregated data are
not readily available. While gender-disaggregated data for households are avail-
able in the FAS, further policy analysis, including understanding the effectiveness
of these policies, will require more granular data.10
WOMEN’S FINANCIAL ACCESS DURING

THE PANDEMIC
The information on gender-sensitive policies to support financial access provides
a useful context in understanding the outcomes during the COVID-19 pandemic
based on FAS data. This section sheds light on women’s financial access in select
sub-Saharan African countries during the pandemic years (2020–21) using the
FAS data from the 2021 and 2022 rounds.11
Figure 2.5 shows how the share of depositors and borrowers by gender at
commercial banks has changed between 2019 and 2020 or 2019 and 2021,
depending on data availability. In some countries, the banked population with
deposit accounts increased for both men and women, including some cases where
the share of female depositors grew more than that of male depositors—for exam-
ple, in Angola and Lesotho, the female share increased by 10 and 3 percentage
points, respectively, which is more than double the increase for men. This positive
change is likely due to the policy measures implemented in response to the pan-
demic. Like many other countries globally, these economies have taken monetary
and fiscal measures to support the economy during the pandemic, including cash
transfers and loan assistance (IMF 2021a; IMF 2021b). For example, in Lesotho,
the government provided three-month salary subsidies and a grant program in
some sectors, including textile, health, and tourism, that mainly benefitted
women as they are the predominant workforce in these sectors. These policies are
likely to have limited the adverse effects of the pandemic on financial access or
even created the need to open bank accounts to receive these government services
in some cases.
In other countries, however, the banked female population declined, and the
degree of reduction varied widely across countries. A similar pattern exists for the
share of borrowers, but the magnitude of the change was less pronounced, with a
10
Other pandemic measures also could have affected financial access and usage indicators. For exam-
ple, mobility restrictions could have affected spending patterns (for example, lower spending and
higher savings), affecting the outstanding amounts of deposits.
11
The 2022 FAS round collects data for 2021. Newly reported annual data to the FAS are normally
disseminated on a rolling basis on the FAS portal starting in June, with an announcement of the main
findings in October or November.

Figure 2.5. Variation of Male and Female Depositors and Borrowers in

Selected African Countries, 2019–2021
(Percent of male or female population)
1. Variation in Share of Depositors 2. Variation in Share of Borrowers
Uganda Madagascar
Angola Cameroon1
Seychelles1 Guinea
Mauritius Congo
Lesotho Chad
Cabo Verde South Sudan
Botswana Lesotho
Male Comoros Male
Madagascar1
Female Botswana Female
Equatorial Guinea1 Equatorial Guinea1
Guinea Zimbabwe
Chad Mauritius
Cameroon1 Zambia
South Sudan Uganda
Comoros Seychelles1
Zimbabwe Cabo Verde
10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Note: This figure shows annual changes in the share of male and female depositors and borrowers at
commercial banks as a percentage of the male and female adult population in 2021. Positive
(negative) numbers indicate an increase (decrease) in the banked population in 2021 compared with
2019. The sample was selected based on data availability. Uganda, Angola, Cabo Verde, and
Zimbabwe have a higher variation of share of depositors, ranging from 10 to 35 percentage points of
the male or female population. Uganda’s variation of share of depositors is 17 percentage points
(female) and 34 percentage points (male).
1
Indicates the variation was calculated using 2019 and 2020 data.
broadly unchanged state in most cases, particularly for 2020. In 2021, the share
of borrowers, both men and women, had a greater decline in a few countries.
Figure 2.6 shows the evolution of the outstanding amounts of deposits and
loans between 2019 and 2020 or 2019 and 2021, depending on data availability.
Most countries in the sample had less than one percentage point change in both
deposits and loans in both directions. This outcome likely reflects the fact that
these are stock indicators and might not fully reflect the impact stemming from
the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in the 2020 data. Notable exceptions
include Mauritius, which experienced a large change in the outstanding amounts
of deposits between 2019 and 2021. For Mauritius, this is in part explained by
the decline in nominal GDP.12
Table 2.3 summarizes the evolution of the gender gap in financial access mea-
sured by the indicators used in Figures 2.5 and 2.6 for sub-Saharan African coun-
tries. Overall, the gender gap remained broadly unchanged in most countries
12
Deposits also increased by more than 10 percent for both men and women in nominal terms
between 2020 and 2021.

Figure 2.6. Variation of Male- and Female-Owned Deposits and Loans,

Selected African Countries, 2019–2021
(Percent of GDP)
1. Variation in Outstanding Deposits 2. Variation in Outstanding Loans
Mauritius Botswana
Madagascar Mauritius
Cameroon1 Madagascar1
1
Equatorial Guinea Cameroon1
Male Male
Zimbabwe Equatorial Guinea1
Female Female
Comoros Guinea
Guinea Zambia
Botswana Zimbabwe
Seychelles1 Seychelles1
10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Note: This figure shows annual changes in the male-owned and female-owned outstanding deposits
and loans at commercial banks as a percent of GDP in 2021. Positive (negative) numbers indicate an
increase (decrease) in the banked population in 2021 compared with 2019. The sample was
selected based on data availability.
1
Indicates the variation was calculated using 2019 and 2020 data.
between 2019 and 2021, except the gender gap measured by the share of depositors,
which shows some narrowing of the gender gap in several countries by varying
degrees while in a few cases the gender gap has increased significantly. In some cases,
the narrowing of the gender gap was not necessarily due to a relative increase in
women’s financial access, but rather due to a larger reduction in the level of financial
access for men compared with that of women in 2021 (for example, Cameroon for
the share of depositors and Uganda for the share of borrowers).
Financial service usage through commercial banks may not provide a complete
picture of the impact of the pandemic on vulnerable groups. A closer look at
microfinance institutions—a key financial service provider to women in develop-
ing economies—reveals that the gender gap also remained broadly unchanged for
this segment, albeit based on data for a handful of countries. However, an
unchanged gender gap may not necessarily be reassuring given the sizable gender
gap combined with low levels of financial access in many of these economies.
More substantial efforts will be needed to further advance women’s access and
narrow the gender gap. In this regard, fintech adoption may play a key role as
fintech can provide more efficient and often cheaper financial access to low-in-
come households and SMEs, including those led by women (Sahay and others
2020; Loko and Yang 2022).
Interpreting these findings requires considering several factors. First, countries
have taken various policy actions to mitigate the economic fallout from the pan-
demic, including measures to support women’s financial access (IMF 2021a). These
policy responses are likely to have limited severe disruptions to financial service

TABLE 2.3.
Evolution of The Gender Gap in Financial Access, 2021 vs 2019

(Percentage change)
(share of adult (share of adult Deposits Loans
Country population) population) (percent of GDP) (percent of GDP)
Angola −6.8
Botswana1 −0.4 −0.2 −0.7 −0.6
Cabo Verde −30.9 −4.6
Cameroon2 −1.1 0.4 −0.1 0.3
Chad 0.6 0.0
Comoros1 7.9 0.5 1.3
Equatorial Guinea2 −3.2 0.0 0.4 0.4
Guinea 0.8 0.3 1.0 0.0
Lesotho −2.0 −0.1
Madagascar1 0.2 1.4 0.2 0.1
Mauritius −1.0 −0.3 1.9 1.4
Seychelles2 −3.3 −0.2 1.1 −0.3
South Sudan −0.9 0.0
Uganda 17.7 −2.0
Zambia 3.5 −1.0
Zimbabwe 15.3 −3.0 −0.2 0.7
Note: This table shows changes in the gender gap in 2021 measured by the four indicators used in Figures 2.7 and 2.8.
Positive (negative) numbers indicate increased (decreased) gender gap, grouped into three categories depending on
the size of the changes: (1) a green triangle indicates a narrowing of the gender gap in 2021 compared with 2019 by
equal to or greater than 1 percentage point; (2) a red reversed triangle indicates an increase in the gender gap by equal
to or greater than 1 percentage point; and (3) a yellow rectangle indicates a broadly unchanged gender gap within the
range of 1 percentage point. The sample was selected based on data availability.
1
Indicates the data for 2020 were used to calculate the change in the gender gap for one or two of the indicators.
2
Indicates that the data for 2020 were used to calculate the change in the gender gap for all four indicators.
usage. Second, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic might not have been fully
evident in the 2020 data, in particular. The timing and the degree of lockdown
measures have varied across countries. Due to these timing effects, the impact of the
pandemic might have been more pronounced in the second half of 2020, thus not
clearly revealed in the annual data. The 2021 data may be subject to a similar effect
as conditions might have eased during 2021 in some countries. Similarly, some
indicators tend to evolve slowly and may not fully reflect the impact of the pandem-
ic. Finally, these observations are based on a limited set of countries, and more data
points and controls will be needed for a complete and formal assessment.
CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic has amplified the need for better-tailored policies to
support women that rely on gender-disaggregated data to track women’s financial
access. The early outcome data from the FAS presented in this chapter suggest
that during the pandemic, women’s financial access in sub-Saharan Africa
remained unchanged or improved in some countries while others experienced

reversals to varying degrees. Overall, policy measures—income transfers and wage

subsidies—undertaken in response to the pandemic seem to have helped support
financial access. Nevertheless, given the lower level of financial access compared
with other regions, efforts need to continue to further advance women’s financial
access in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, these findings are based on relatively
small samples, and a more complete analysis will require more data with better
country coverage. Other considerations, such as the role of digital financial ser-
vices, including mobile money, will also help derive a complete picture.
The FAS gender-disaggregated data series offers a good starting point for
countries that currently do not collect such data but are faced with the need to
better monitor gender gaps in financial access. For countries that already collect
some annual gender-disaggregated data, broadening series coverage (for example,
data on female-owned SMEs or digital financial service usage disaggregated by
gender) or collecting higher-frequency supply-side data (monthly or quarterly)
can provide further insights. These data can also aid in understanding the effect
of various polices implemented to support women’s financial access during the
pandemic. Nevertheless, gender-disaggregated data from the FAS highlight the
need to continue advancing women’s financial access and financial inclusion more
generally in sub-Saharan Africa, given the low level of financial service penetra-
tion in many of the economies in the region.

ANNEX 2.1. MEASURING WOMEN’S

FINANCIAL ACCESS
Financial inclusion is a multifaceted concept, and no single indicator can capture
it entirely (Espinosa-Vega and others 2020). The analysis in this chapter is based
on several indicators constructed from the FAS gender-disaggregated series to
measure the adoption and usage aspects of women’s financial inclusion. These
indicators have the following analytical features and limitations:
• Share of male and female depositors (or borrowers) at commercial
banks in the male and female adult population: The share is a proxy for
the size of the banked population among all adults. The indicator can be high-
er than 100 percent and may overestimate the level of a banked population
if account holders have multiple bank accounts and are not uniquely iden-
tified in the data reporting.
• Proportion of female depositors (or borrowers) in total depositors
(or borrowers): This indicator captures the gender gap among the banked popu-
lation. The closer to 50 percent the female share is, the smaller the gender gap.
One caveat for this indicator, however, is that while most countries have the
female share of the population at about 50 percent, there are some exceptions
where the female share is significantly lower or higher than 50 percent. In that
case, this indicator may not necessarily reflect the gender gap.13
• Outstanding value of male- or female-owned deposits (or loans) as a
percent of GDP: This indicator directly measures the relative usage in terms
of deposit or loan amounts among the banked population as a share of GDP.
However, this indicator can be low for women due to lower female income.
Using female or male income as a denominator may be more appropriate in
this case, but such data are often not readily available.
Understanding the treatment of joint accounts is important when using
these indicators. According to the FAS Guidelines and Manual, both joint
accounts and joint account holders need to be counted when disaggregating the
data by gender—based on the gender of the account holders. The following
example illustrates the treatment of joint accounts in FAS reporting (Annex
Table 2.1.1).
In this example, there are two deposit accounts—account A is owned by a
woman and account B is jointly owned by a woman and a man. In this case, the
number of depositors should be reported to the FAS as one male depositor and
two female depositors, and the sum of male and female depositors is equal to the
total number of depositors (A + B + B = 3). The number of accounts should be
reported as one male-owned account and two female-owned accounts as gender
disaggregation is based on the gender of account holders. In this case, the sum of
female- and male-owned accounts (A + B + B = 3) is greater than the total number
13
See Ritchie and Roser 2019.

ANNEX TABLE 2.1.1.
Treatment of Joint Accounts in the Financial Access Survey

Depositors Accounts Outstanding Deposits
Total 3 (A+B+B) 2 (A+B) $(A+B)
Female 2 (A+B) 2 (A+B) $(A)
Male 1 (B) 1 (B) $0
Source: IMF staff.
of accounts (A + B = 2). Finally, joint accounts are excluded when gender-disag-

gregating outstanding loans and deposits in the FAS, although in practice, some
countries include joint accounts when reporting outstanding loans and deposits
in the FAS. Deviations from the FAS guidelines are recorded in the metadata,
which can be checked to better understand the treatment of joint accounts by
each country.
ANNEX 2.2. SUB-SAHARAN COUNTRIES

SUBMITTING GENDER DATA
This annex lists countries with available FAS gender-disaggregated data (Annex
Table 2.2.1). While 29 African countries report gender-disaggregated data to the
FAS, some were not included in the analysis of this chapter due to insufficient
data coverage. Countries covered in the IMF’s COVID-19 Financial Access Policy
Tracker are indicated by an asterisk in Annex Table 2.2.1. In addition, countries
that have information on gender-sensitive policy measures to support women’s
financial access in the IMF’s Financial Access Tracker are highlighted in blue.
ANNEX TABLE 2.2.1.
Sub-Saharan Countries Submitting Gender Data to the FAS

1 Angola 9 Côte d’Ivoire1 17 Madagascar1 25 South Sudan
2 Benin 1
10 Congo, Republic of 18 Malawi1 26 Togo1
3 Botswana 1
11 Congo DRC 19 Mali 1
27 Uganda1
4 Burkina Faso1 12 Equatorial Guinea1 20 Mauritius1 28 Zambia1
5 Cabo Verde1 13 Guinea1 21 Namibia1 29 Zimbabwe1
6 Cameroon1 14 Guinea-Bissau1 22 Niger1
7 Chad1 15 Lesotho1 23 Senegal1
8 Comoros 16 Liberia 1
24 Seychelles1
Source: IMF staff.
1
Countries covered in the IMF’s COVID-19 Financial Access Policy Tracker.

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CHAPTER 3
Epidemics, Gender, and Human

Capital in Developing Countries
Stefania Fabrizio, Diego B. P. Gomes, Carine Meyimdjui,
and Marina M. Tavares
For centuries, epidemics have disrupted lives and had negative consequences on human
capital and economics. This chapter investigates the impact of epidemic episodes on
school completion in developing countries, examining 338 epidemic episodes across
countries from 1970 to 2019. The investigation yielded five key results: (1) estimates
show that epidemic episodes are associated with reductions in school completion rates
in the same year and one year later; (2) girls are affected more severely than boys;
(3) children in primary education suffer more than those in lower secondary educa-
tion; (4) viral epidemic episodes reduce completion rates more in lower secondary than
in primary education, while the opposite occurs for bacterial events; and (5) longer
epidemics are more harmful to children in lower secondary education.
INTRODUCTION
Epidemics have been a disruptive force in societies for centuries, causing loss of
life and hampering economic activities. Apart from their immediate impact, they
can have long-term consequences on growth by reducing children’s years of edu-
cation. This decline can occur directly due to school closures or indirectly due to
loss in family income that can lead parents to withdraw their children from
school. The COVID-19 pandemic is a stark example of how such events can have
global impact. Developing countries are especially vulnerable to adverse human
capital effects because children already face significant educational barriers.
Primary and secondary education completion rates in these countries still lag
behind those in developed nations.1
Despite their frequency and harmfulness, little is known about the epidem-
ics’ impact on school completion rates in developing countries. Estimating the
epidemic effect on school completion rates and identifying which students are
more vulnerable to these events are critical for accurately measuring the long-
term benefits of containing epidemics and improving government policies to
1
According to the World Development Indicators from the World Bank, the primary and secondary
education completion rates in low-income countries are 67 and 39 percent in 2020, respectively. In
high-income countries, the completion rates are 99 and 97 percent, respectively.
63

reach the most vulnerable. This chapter fills in the information gap on the
effect of epidemics on education in developing countries by answering three
critical questions: (1) What is the impact of an epidemic episode on school
completion rates? (2) Is the impact similar for boys and girls and primary and
secondary education? and (3) Does the impact depend on the epidemic type or
length?
To quantify the epidemics’ impact on school completion rates in developing
countries, data on historical epidemic episodes from the Emergency Event
Database are combined with primary and lower secondary school completion
rates from the World Development Indicators from the World Bank. Data were
selected from 57 developing countries from 1970 to 2019. Analysis is limited to
developing countries because epidemics are more common and more dangerous
to children in these countries.
The findings indicate that an epidemic episode significantly reduces comple-
tion rates, affecting primary education more than lower secondary education and
girls more than boys. Experiencing an epidemic episode is associated with a
decline of 2.5 percentage points in the primary education completion rate and a
decline of 1.8 percentage points in the lower secondary education completion rate
in the epidemic year. Investigating the impact by the children’s gender showed
that an epidemic episode is associated with a reduction in boys’ and girls’ primary
education completion rates of 1.8 percentage points and 2.8 percentage points,
respectively. In lower secondary education, the completion rate falls by 1.8 per-
centage points for boys and 2.2 percentage points for girls. These results with-
stand a range of robustness checks, including controlling for government expen-
ditures on education.
The findings also indicate that, regardless of the type of epidemic, an epidemic
episode is associated with a decrease in school completion. However, viral events
reduce completion rates in lower secondary education more than in primary
education, whereas bacterial events have the opposite effect. Finally, findings
showed that the length of the epidemic is related to a drop in school completion,
and longer epidemics are harmful to students in lower secondary education.
This chapter adds to the growing body of research on the impact of epidemics on
children’s educational outcomes, discovering that epidemics are associated with a
deterioration in years of education. The contribution is twofold: (1) a cross-country
approach allows a comparison of the impact of different epidemic types and dura-
tions on school completion rates in a way that a single-country study cannot and
(2) a study of epidemics across a broader range of countries allows an assessment of
the relationship between epidemics and school completion rates while controlling for
key factors such as country fixed effects and time fixed effects. Most papers in the
literature focus on a single epidemic episode.
The literature on the impact of epidemics on children’s outcomes is vast,
with several studies focusing on specific epidemic episodes. Archibong and
Annan (2017, 2021) examined the impact of the meningitis epidemic in Niger.
Their findings indicate that the epidemic adversely affected school attendance,

Chapter 3 Epidemics, Gender, and Human Capital in Developing Countries 65
educational outcomes, and labor market outcomes for affected individuals.

Furthermore, the impact persisted for several years after the epidemic had
ended. Bandiera and others (2019) conducted a quasi-random experiment to
estimate the impact of the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone. The study found
that younger girls tend to spend more time with men during a crisis, leading to
an increase in out-of-wedlock pregnancies and a significant drop in school
enrollment. However, the adverse effects can be reversed with interventions that
allow girls to allocate their time differently, preventing unplanned pregnancies
and enabling them to re-enroll in school after the crisis.
Other studies have focused on the impact of HIV on children’s education
outcomes. Guo, Li, and Sherr (2012) critically reviewed the global literature on
the impact of HIV/AIDS on children’s education outcomes. The study found that
children affected by HIV/AIDS face multiple educational barriers, including
stigma and discrimination, increased caregiving responsibilities, and limited
access to health care and social services. More recently, de Azevedo and others
(2021) and United Nations Children’s Fund (2021) documented the impact of
COVID-19 on children’s education outcomes. The studies found that school
closures, remote learning challenges, and economic hardships due to the pandem-
ic have significantly disrupted children’s education. These disruptions have dis-
proportionately affected disadvantaged children, exacerbating preexisting inequal-
ities in access to education.
This chapter also contributes to recent studies that examine the impact of epi-
demics on individual beliefs and attitudes. Eichengreen, Saka, and Aksoy (2022)
examined the effects of epidemic exposure during an individual’s “impressionable
years” (ages 18 to 25) on their confidence in political institutions and leaders,
while Eichengreen, Aksoy, and Saka (2021) measured the impact of such exposure
on views about science, trust in scientists, and the perceived benefits of their work.
The rest of the chapter includes the following sections: data description,
empirical strategy, effects of epidemic events, government expenditures on educa-
tion, and conclusion.
DATA DESCRIPTION
The data on epidemic events come from the Emergency Events Database. The
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) launched the
database in 1988 with the initial support of the World Health Organization
(WHO). The primary goal of the database is to support humanitarian efforts on
a national and international scale. The initiative aims to provide an objective
foundation for vulnerability assessment and priority setting and to rationalize
decision-making for disaster preparedness. It contains essential core data on the
occurrence and effects of more than 22,000 mass disasters worldwide from 1900
to the present day. The database comprises various sources, including UN agen-
cies, nongovernmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes,
and press agencies.

Among the epidemic events, the data set includes all the episodes of viral,
bacterial, parasitic, fungal, or prion diseases that the WHO declared as an
epidemic—defined as a widespread occurrence of an infectious disease in a
geographical area at a particular time. From the universe of epidemic events,
only those that happened in developing countries were selected, resulting in a
panel of 623 unique country-year observations from 1970 to 2019.
This data set is then combined with primary and lower secondary school com-
pletion rates and macroeconomic data from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI). Annex Table 3.1.1 summarizes all the data used in the chapter.
School completion rates are measured as the number of children completing the
final grade of primary or lower secondary education relative to the number of
children in the relevant age group. A limitation of this measure is that it does not
allow for the identification of whether the decline in completion rates is due to a
decline in enrollment or an increase in dropout rates that could affect completion
years after the epidemic.
The merged data set maintains only country-year observations with informa-
tion on school completion rates. Due to the irregularity of school completion
rates data in the WDI, the final sample had 338 unique country-year epidemic
events, comprising 57 developing countries from 1970 to 2019. Missing data on
school completion rates are well distributed among epidemic and nonepidemic
years, indicating that epidemics’ harm did not cause an unprecedented impact on
data collection that could bias the results (see Annex Table 3.1.3).
Table 3.1 presents the distribution of events by type of epidemics. Epidemics
are divided between bacterial, viral, and other. Viral epidemics include Ebola,
dengue, and viral meningitis, while bacterial epidemics include cholera, bacte-
rial meningitis, and typhoid. The sample has a high concentration of bacterial
(65 percent) and viral (29 percent) episodes. Other types of epidemics account
for only 6 percent of the episodes. Table 3.2 documents the distribution of
TABLE 3.1.
Distribution of Events by Type of Epidemics

Total Viral Bacterial Other
Number of Events 338 98 221 19
Share of Events 100% 29% 65% 6%
Source: Emergency Events Database.
TABLE 3.2.
Duration in Months of Epidemic Events

Mean P25 P50 P75 P90 P95
Months 3.4 1 2 4 8 11
Note: This table summarizes duration information for the 237 epidemic events for which data exist on both the start and end
dates (years and months). P25 refers to the 25th percentile, P50 refers to the 50th percentile (median), and so on.

epidemic duration in the sample. The mean and median (P50) durations equal
3.4 and 2 months, respectively, indicating that the distribution of duration is
right skewed. The 75th duration percentile (P75) equals four months, showing
that all events up to the third quartile of the distribution last less than six
months. The 95th percentile (P95) is less than 12 months, showing that epi-
demics lasting more than one year in the sample are rare, representing less than
5 percent of events.
Figure 3.1 presents the historical and cross-country view of the epidemic events
in the final sample. Panel 1 shows the number of epidemics reached an all-time
high during the 2000s, with 18 episodes recorded in 2000, 2002, and 2005.
Figure 3.1. Number of Epidemic Events

1. Time Series
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1970 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97 2000 03 06 09 12 15 18
2. Cross-Country
25
20
15
10
0
NER
TCD
MOZ
BEN
GIN
CMR
MLI
COG
COD
ETH
MWI
SEN
ZMB
BDI
TGO
KHM
HND
MDG
LAO
MRT
NPL
GMB
VNM
CAF
DJI
CIV
KEN
LSO
NIC
PNG
ZWE
SDN
BGD
SLB
COM
YEM
MMR
KIR
KGZ
LBR
GNB
TLS
STP
SLE
AFG
BTN
ERI
HTI
UZB
TZA
BFA
UGA
GHA
NGA
RWA
TJK
MDA

Note: Figure uses International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. Panel 2
encompasses data from 1970 to 2019.

Since then, the number of episodes by year has dropped, with four episodes in
2019.2 Panel 2 reveals considerable heterogeneity among countries. In the upper
tail of the distribution, Niger (NER) is the country with the highest number of
cases, 21 in total, followed by Chad (TCD) with 17 cases. In the lower tail of the
distribution, five countries have 0 epidemic events: Afghanistan (AFG), Bhutan
(BTN), Eritrea (ERI), Haiti (HTI), and Uzbekistan (UZB). Overall, the median
and the average number of events per country are 5 and 6, respectively.
Previously stated facts reveal salient patterns about the distribution of epidem-
ic events in the sample: (1) some types of epidemics are more likely than others,
(2) long-lasting epidemics are rare events, (3) different periods in history have
more events than others, and (4) certain countries suffer more from epidemics
than others. The next sections outline an empirical strategy combined with
robustness exercises that take these patterns into account.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Fixed-effects panel regression models are used to estimate the impact of epidemics
on school completion rates, allowing for the control of unobservable and unmea-
surable factors that vary across countries but not over time. The main indepen-
dent variable of interest is an epidemic indicator created from the Emergency
Events Database. This indicator is set to 1 if a country experienced at least one
epidemic event in the given year and 0 otherwise. Since epidemics can start at
different times of the year, their consequences on school completion rates might
materialize in the following year. Therefore, this analysis considers both the cur-
rent and the one-year-lagged epidemic indicators. The effects of viral and bacte-
rial events—the two most common epidemics in the sample—and the duration
of epidemics are also explored.
Countries are indexed by i and years by t. Let yi,t be the school completion rate
of interest, Ei,t the epidemic indicator, Yi,t the log of real GDP per capita, λi coun-
try fixed effects, and θi year fixed effects. Note that the completion rates variable
yi,t refers to any of the six series available from the WDI, where each series con-
cerns a combination of education level (primary or lower secondary) and gender
(girls, boys, or all). Then, for each type of completion rates series, the main
regression specification can be stated as:
yi,t = β0 + β1Ei,t + β2Ei,t−1 + β3Yi,t + λi + θt + εi,t, (3.1)
where εi,t is the error term. Because the regressions are estimated independently
for each series of an education–gender combination, the estimated coefficients
are gender and education-level specific. The coefficients β1 and β2 measure the
current and lagged average marginal effects of epidemics on school completion
2
The increasing trend until the 2000s stems from the discovery of new microorganisms, the prolif-
eration of slums resulting from urbanization, and trade openness (Lindahl and Grace 2015; Oliveira
and others 2020).

rates in the year of the epidemics. Negative and significant estimates for β1 and
β2 imply that epidemics are associated with reductions in school completion.
Possible confounding factors are controlled for through (1) λi country fixed
effects to capture unobservable factors that vary across countries but are fixed
over time, (2) θt year fixed effects to account for possible global trends that may
affect the dependent variable, and (3) Yi,t the log of real GDP per capita to
capture the country’s income level and the fact that richer countries may have
more resources to contain epidemic episodes and assist the population and
schools.3
Given the high concentration of viral and bacterial epidemic events in the
sample, the impacts of these specific types are also tested separately. Following the
same approach as the main epidemic indicator, three new specific indicators were
created to capture the incidence of viral, bacterial, and other types of epidemic
events. Let Vi,t be the indicator for viral events, Bi,t the indicator for bacterial
events, and Oi,t the indicator for other types of epidemics. Then, the specification
for a particular epidemic event is given by:
yi,t = β0 + β1Vi,t + β2Vi,t−1 + β3Bi,t + β4Bi,t−1 + β5Oi,t + β6Oi,t−1 + β7Yi,t
+ λi + θt + εi,t, (3.2)
where εi,t is again the error term. The interpretation of the coefficients β1 to β6 is
the same as before, that is, negative values mean that specific epidemic events are
associated with a drop in school completion rates. The controls are the same as in
the main specification.
A further investigation explores how the duration of epidemics is associated
with school completion rates. Two dummy variables are used to measure a short
and long epidemic. An epidemic is short when it is less than or equal to two
months (the median) and long when it is more than two months. The duration
is calculated using the start and end year or month information contained in
EM-DAT. Let Di,ts indicate a short epidemic and Di,tl indicate a long epidemic. The
specification assessing the role of duration is then given by:
yi,t = β0 + β1Di,ts + β2Di,tl + β3Yi,t + λi + θt + εi,t, (3.3)
where the controls are the same as before and εi,t is the error term. The interpre-
tation of the coefficients β1 to β2 is the same as before, that is, negative values
mean that specific epidemic events are associated with a decline in school com-
pletion rates. The controls are the same as in the main specification.
Since a high concentration of epidemic events occurs in certain countries and
years, robustness exercises were performed to ensure that no specific country or
year influenced the results. The primary model was re-estimated (equation 3.1)
excluding each country and year.
3
A robustness exercise also controls for government expenditures on education per pupil as a per-
centage of GDP per capita. Adding this control reduces the sample size by over three-fourths, making
comparisons with the previous estimates difficult.

THE EFFECTS OF EPIDEMIC EVENTS

Table 3.3 shows the results of the main regression exercises (equation 3.1) for
school completion rates both in primary and lower secondary education. The
results are presented for all children and separately by gender (boys and girls).
The estimates reveal three principal facts. First, all estimates for current and
lagged epidemic indicators are negative, showing that epidemic events are asso-
ciated with reductions in school completion rates both in the same year and one
year later. Second, girls are more severely affected than boys—that is, given the
level of education, estimates for girls are always more negative than for boys.
Third, primary education suffers more than lower secondary education—that
is, conditional on the child’s gender (the same holds for all children), estimates
for primary education are always more negative than for lower secondary
education.
A closer examination of the estimates shows that, for primary education, the
fall in completion rates for all children due to epidemic shocks (current and
lagged) is significantly greater than 2.0 percentage points on average. Girls’
rates drop 2.8 percentage points in the current year and 2.2 percentage points
a year later, while boys’ rates decrease by 1.8 and 2.0 percentage points, respec-
tively. For lower secondary education, the fall in completion rates varies
between 1.8 percentage points (current) and 1.3 percentage points (lagged) on
average when considering all children. In the current year, the rates for girls and
boys fall by an average of 2.2 and 1.8 percentage points, respectively. A year
later, the drop equals 1.9 percentage points for girls and 1.3 percentage points
for boys.
The results should be interpreted as a lower bound since only the impact of
epidemics on completion rates of the last grades of primary and secondary edu-
cation are captured. It is reasonable to believe that the adverse effects also occur
in the rest of the grades, not only in the last ones.
Many possible reasons could explain why girls may be more vulnerable to
failing to complete school during epidemics than boys. First, parents may value
boys’ education more than girls’, leading them to sacrifice a daughter’s school
TABLE 3.3.
Effects of Epidemic Events on School Completion Rates

Primary Education Lower Secondary Education
All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
Epidemics, −2.495*** −1.769* −2.789*** −1.756** −1.767** −2.232***
Current (0.825) (0.981) (0.875) (0.768) (0.876) (0.819)
Epidemics, −2.048*** −2.039*** −2.156*** −1.299 −1.295 −1.887**
Lagged (0.670) (0.731) (0.739) (0.794) (0.786) (0.901)
N 1,375 1,271 1,271 1,076 948 948
R2 0.665 0.554 0.722 0.684 0.607 0.702
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the country level. All specifications control for the log of
real GDP per capita and include country and year fixed effects.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

attendance when families suffer a negative income shock (Oster 2009; Garg and
Morduch 1998). Second, parents might also value girls’ contribution to home
production more than boys’ during crisis time, leading them to take girls out of
school or not enroll them in school (Archibong and Annan 2021; Bjorkman-
Nyqvist 2013). Third, parents may also be more likely to support girls’ marriage
during epidemics because they benefit financially through wedding gifts that are
highly valued during periods of hardship, such as during epidemics (Archibong
and Annan 2021; Corno and Voena 2016; Corno, Hildebrandt, and Voena 2020;
Ashraf and others 2020). Fourth, girls may lose access to safe spaces and become
more vulnerable to rapes and unplanned pregnancies that can lead them to drop
out of school (Bandiera and others 2019; Denney, Gordon, and Ibrahim 2015;
Elston and others 2016; Menzel 2019). Last, girls are more prone to illness during
epidemics due to their responsibilities at home, which include caring for younger
siblings and sick family members, fetching and treating water (particularly dan-
gerous in the case of cholera), and preparing food (Das 2017; Bjorkman-Nyqvist
2013; Malta and others 2019).
Table 3.4 explores the epidemics’ impact depending on the epidemic type
(equation 3.2). The disaggregated estimates confirm two of the previously men-
tioned findings, regardless of the type of epidemic event. Viral, bacterial, and
other types of epidemics are all associated with drops in school completion rates
for girls and boys in the same year and a year later. Conditional on the level of
education, all types of epidemics are more harmful to girls than to boys. The only
exception is the bacterial lagged effect for primary education. In that case, the
estimates for boys are slightly more negative than for girls.
TABLE 3.4.
The Role of Viral, Bacterial, and Other Types of Epidemic Events

Viral, Current −3.048** −2.138 −3.353** −3.474*** −2.701** −3.795***
(1.460) (1.727) (1.361) (1.032) (1.304) (1.056)
Viral, Lagged −0.938 −0.388 −1.073 −1.949** −1.778 −2.839**
(1.119) (1.239) (1.175) (0.967) (1.089) (1.215)
Bacterial, −2.152** −1.559 −2.482** −0.777 −1.203 −1.254
Current (0.926) (1.083) (0.952) (0.791) (0.835) (0.825)
Bacterial, −2.287** −2.600** −2.402** −0.791 −0.946 −1.074
Lagged (0.876) (0.995) (0.921) (0.898) (0.866) (0.905)
Other, −2.923 −1.513 −2.416 −2.156 −1.928 −2.704
Current (2.483) (2.767) (2.782) (3.293) (2.164) (3.829)
Other, −6.559*** −6.393** −6.422*** −1.789 −1.120 −2.810
Lagged (2.027) (2.444) (2.175) (2.324) (2.507) (3.106)
N 1,375 1,271 1,271 1,076 948 948
R2 0.666 0.556 0.723 0.686 0.608 0.704
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the country level. All specifications control for the log of
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

This exercise reveals that certain epidemic events are more harmful than oth-
ers, depending on the level of education. From the perspective of all children, for
instance, viral episodes reduce completion rates more in lower secondary than in
primary education. The opposite happens during bacterial events. These results
hold when looking at girls and boys separately. Other types of epidemics are more
negative in primary than in lower secondary education for all children combined.
However, this last result becomes more mixed when boys and girls are looked at
separately, depending on if the effect is in the same year or a year later.
Many possible reasons may account for the differences between the impact of
viral and bacterial epidemics on children’s completion rates, but data limitations do
not allow for the identification of these channels. Differences in the transmission
and mortality rates of these two types of epidemics by age group may help to
explain the differences in impact. On the one hand, bacterial infections, particularly
cholera, are known to be more harmful to young children (Ali and others 2012),
which can help explain why young children in primary school are more negatively
affected by bacterial epidemics than older children in secondary education. On the
other hand, viral epidemics, including dengue4 and Ebola,5 have higher transmis-
sion rates among teenagers and adults than among young children, which can help
explain why viral epidemics more negatively impact completion rates of children in
secondary education. Another possible reason is that Ebola, a viral epidemic, has an
extremely high fatality rate among adults, which can lead to an increase in the
number of orphans and loss of income due to deceased parents. This effect is more
likely to impact older children’s completion rates since these children are old
enough to work and have less access to orphanages due to their advanced age.
The importance of the epidemic length is examined next. Table 3.5 presents the
results for the regressions that quantify the effect of epidemic duration (equa-
tion 3.3).6 All estimates are negative, showing that long and short epidemics are
associated with a drop in school completion rates. Short epidemics are associated
with more significant reductions in school completion in primary education. Girls’
completion rates drop by 2.95 percentage points, and boys’ fall by 2.56 percentage
points. In lower secondary education, longer epidemics are associated with much
larger declines in completion rates than in short epidemics. A long epidemic is
associated with a drop of 3.69 percentage points in girls’ completion rates, while
boys’ completion rates drop by 2.92 percentage points.
4
Dengue is primarily spread by the bite of infected Aedes mosquitoes, including Aedes aegypti and
Aedes albopictus mosquitoes. A mosquito becomes infected when it bites a person whose blood con-
tains dengue. See Thai and others (2015) for a discussion about dengue transmission by age.
5
Ebola is spread by direct contact with blood or other body fluids (such as vomit, diarrhea, urine,
breast milk, sweat, and semen) of an infected person who has Ebola or recently died from Ebola—a
possible reason for the lower transmission of Ebola to children since they can be easily isolated from
the sick and do not participate in funerals. See Glynn (2015) and WHO (2015).
6
The sample sizes of the duration exercises are slightly smaller than those of previous exercises, as
monthly durations could be calculated for only a subset of the epidemics in the sample (237 of
338 events) due to missing information on the start month, end month, and year for all epidemics.

TABLE 3.5.
Effects of the Duration of Epidemics on School Completion Rates

Short −2.680** −2.566** −2.953** −0.435 −1.036 −0.1370
Epidemics (1.054) (1.265) (1.144) (1.053) (1.075) (1.190)
Long −2.271* −1.409 −2.622* −3.539*** −2.922** −3.690***
Epidemics (1.310) (1.448) (1.314) (1.184) (1.253) (1.156)
N 1,280 1,174 1,174 926 811 811
R2 0.668 0.558 0.723 0.670 0.585 0.688
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the country level. All specifications control for the log of
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
The robustness of the findings is assessed by considering lagged effects of more

than a year and country/year importance. To do so, the main model (equation 3.1)
was re-estimated first by including additional epidemic lags ranging from two to
four years and second by excluding each country and year. The three principal
conclusions from the main exercise are still valid. Furthermore, all extra lag esti-
mates are negative, suggesting that epidemics have a long-term negative associa-
tion with completion rates. These estimates are highly statistically significant for
girls in lower secondary education but less for the other groups.
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON EDUCATION

In this section, an additional robustness exercise explores the importance of gov-
ernment expenditures in education to reduce the epidemic’s impact on school
completion. Government expenditures on education can significantly reduce an
epidemic’s negative impact on school completion. Well-funded schools may sup-
port students during epidemics, reducing dropout rates. Also, well-funded
schools may have better sanitation and water supplies, reducing the need for
school closure during epidemics.
To assess its importance, a control was included in the main regression speci-
fication (equation 3.1) for the government expenditures on education per pupil
as a percentage of GDP. Let Gi,t denote the government expenditures variable.
Then, the specification now estimated can be stated as:
yi,t = β0 + β1Ei,t + β2Ei,t−1 + β3Yi,t + β4Gi,t + λi + θt + εi,t, (3.4)
where the rest of the notation is the same as the main regression (equation 3.1).
For primary school completion rates, government expenditures are included per
pupil in primary education only. Similarly, for lower secondary school completion
rates, only government expenditures per pupil on secondary school are
considered.
Table 3.6 summarizes the results. Note that adding this control significantly
reduces sample size by over three-fourths, making comparisons with the previous

TABLE 3.6.
Results when Including Government Expenditures on Education

Primary Education
All All Boys Boys Girls Girls
Epidemics, 0.213 0.361 0.971 1.142 −0.591 −0.501
Current (1.121) (1.023) (1.172) (1.077) (1.179) (1.085)
Epidemics, −2.857** −2.918*** −3.019** −3.098** −3.047** −3.088**
Lagged (1.118) (1.080) (1.185) (1.151) (1.289) (1.256)
Government No Yes No Yes No Yes
Expenditure
N 247 247 242 242 242 242
R2 0.740 0.745 0.640 0.65 0.771 0.771
Lower Secondary Education
All All Boys Boys Girls Girls
Epidemics, −0.015 −0.011 0.104 0.103 −0.130 −0.121
Current (0.862) (0.871) (0.943) (0.946) (0.866) (0.879)
Epidemics, −0.657 −0.657 −0.327 −0.335 −1.059 −0.991
Lagged (1.115) (1.077) (1.015) (0.992) (1.308) (1.242)
Government No Yes No Yes No Yes
Expenditure
N 155 155 155 155 155 155
R2 0.719 0.719 0.703 0.71 0.703 0.703
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the country level. All specifications control for the log of
real GDP per capita and include country and year fixed effects. For primary school completion rates, government
expenditures per pupil are used on primary education only. For lower secondary school completion rates, government
expenditures per pupil are used on secondary school only.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
estimates difficult.7 Regardless, the results still display negative estimates overall,
especially for the lagged epidemic indicator. When comparing the exercise with
and without the government expenditure controls, restricting to the sample of
episodes where government expenditure data are available, it was found that this
control does not affect the results significantly, indicating that government expen-
ditures in education may not be an important margin that affects the epidemic
impact on school completion. Due to the important reduction of the sample size,
the uncertainty around the estimates increases, especially for lower secondary
education.
CONCLUSION
This chapter offered an analysis of the impact of past epidemics on school com-
pletion rates. The results suggest that past epidemics reduced completion rates by
an average of 2.5 percentage points in primary education and 1.8 percentage
points in lower secondary education. Furthermore, girls were more severely affect-
ed than boys. In primary education, completion rates decrease by 1.8 percentage
points for boys and 2.8 percentage points for girls. In lower secondary education,
7
Annex Table 3.1.2 lists the set of countries used in this exercise.

rates fall by about 1.8 percentage points for boys and 2.2 percentage points for
girls. These findings are consistent with those in previous studies that examined
single epidemic episodes, finding that epidemics are associated with a decline in
school completion rates and that effects are more significant for girls. For exam-
ple, Archibong and Annan (2021) found a significant reduction in years of edu-
cation for school-aged girls relative to boys after a meningitis epidemic in Niger.
Bandiera and others (2019) found that young girls in highly disrupted villages
during the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone had a persistent drop in school
enrollment postcrisis. All types of epidemic events were found to reduce comple-
tion rates. However, viral epidemic episodes reduce completion rates more in
lower secondary than in primary education, while the opposite happens for bac-
terial events. In addition, longer epidemic episodes are associated with more
harmful effects in lower secondary education.
This study highlighted the urgent need for preparation and targeted policies
to address the negative impact of epidemics on education outcomes in developing
countries, particularly on the most vulnerable groups. The cost of epidemics on
school completion rates is substantial, affecting children for many years after-
ward. More research could identify effective policy interventions to reduce the
impact of outbreaks on education outcomes, particularly for girls, and to under-
stand the main channel through which epidemics reduce completion rates.

ANNEX 3.1. DATA DETAILS
ANNEX TABLE 3.1.1.
Data Sources
Data Source
Epidemics (All Epidemics, Viral, Bacterial, and Other) Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT)
School Completion Rate (All, Boys, Girls, Primary, World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)
and Secondary)
GDP per Capita World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)
Government Spending on Education per Pupil as a World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)
Share of GDP
ANNEX TABLE 3.1.2.
List of Countries in the Sample

ISO Country Name ISO Country Name
AFG Afghanistan1 MDG Madagascar1
BDI Burundi1 MLI Mali1
BEN Benin1 MMR Myanmar
BFA Burkina Faso1 MOZ Mozambique1
BGD Bangladesh1 MRT Mauritania1
BTN Bhutan1 MWI Malawi1
CAF Central African Republic1 NER Niger1
CIV Cote d’Ivoire1 NGA Nigeria
CMR Cameroon1 NIC Nicaragua1
COD Democratic Republic of the Congo1 NPL Nepal1
COG Republic of the Congo1 PNG Papua New Guinea
COM Comoros1 RWA Rwanda1
DJI Djibouti SDN Sudan
ERI Eritrea1 SEN Senegal1
ETH Ethiopia1 SLB Solomon Islands
GHA Ghana1 SLE Sierra Leone1
GIN Guinea1 STP São Tomé and Principe1
GMB The Gambia1 TCD Chad
GNB Guinea-Bissau TGO Togo1
HND Honduras1 TJK Tajikistan
HTI Haiti TLS Timor-Leste1
KEN Kenya1 TZA Tanzania1
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic UGA Uganda1
KHM Cambodia1 UZB Uzbekistan
KIR Kiribati1 VNM Vietnam1
LAO Lao PDR1 YEM Yemen
LBR Liberia ZMB Zambia1
LSO Lesotho1 ZWE Zimbabwe1
MDA Moldova1
1
Countries included in the section titled Government Expenditures on Education.
Note: ISO refers to International Organization for Standardization.

ANNEX TABLE 3.1.3.
Missing Data
Primary School Completion Low Secondary School Completion
Epidemic Year Missing 46% 60%
Nonmissing 54% 40%
Nonepidemic Year Missing 51% 61%
Nonmissing 49% 39%

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CHAPTER 4
COVID-19 and Gender Inequality:

Impact in Southern Africa
Fatou Kiné Thioune, Giorgia Albertin, Romina Kazandjian,
and Tianyuan Wang
This chapter analyzes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on gender disparities in
the southern African region. It explores the extent and channels through which the
COVID-19 pandemic has affected gender inequality. The analysis provides significant
evidence for a “she-cession”: the pandemic economically affected women disproportion-
ately relative to men. In South Africa, employment, hours worked, and incomes for
women were more negatively affected than for men. In Namibia and Eswatini,
women were less likely to be employed during the pandemic and were more likely to
have lost employment due to the pandemic. In Lesotho, women were less likely to be
formally employed than men during the pandemic. This chapter provides evidence
supporting women’s heavier unpaid work burden and occupational gender segregation
as transmission channels and that business employment acted as a countercyclical shock
absorber for women in South Africa and Lesotho.
INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has been disproportionately impacting women
worldwide, and likely even more severely in developing countries, due to heavier
unpaid care work burdens, occupational gender segregation in affected sectors,
increased gender-based violence, and possibly permanent loss of human capital.
Unlike in previous recessions, which mostly affected traditionally male occupa-
tions in construction and manufacturing, the current crisis is referred to as a
“she-cession,” having damaged the services industry, that is, retail, tourism, and
hospitality, which primarily employs females (Alon and others 2020). The
United Nations has warned that the negative effects on women are even worse
in developing countries, where 70 percent of female employment is in the infor-
mal sector, with low wages and high job insecurity (United Nations 2020).
Moreover, school and daycare closures have increased the already higher burden
of unpaid care work that women perform in the household and have led to
missed years of schooling as millions of girls worldwide were forced to perma-
nently drop out of school (United Nations 2020). As a result of restrictions on
movement due to lockdown measures, gender-based violence also “increased
exponentially” globally (United Nations 2020). Thus, the pandemic and associ-
ated lockdown measures exposed and exacerbated pre-existing macro-critical
81

gender inequalities. Addressing these gaps in the labor market, education, health,
and finance will be key to supporting the postpandemic recovery.
This chapter analyzes gender disparities and empirically quantifies the dispropor-
tionate impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on women in the southern African
region. Using macro-level data and micro-level data from surveys on individuals,
stylized facts are derived on pre-existing gender disparities in the region. Pre- and
post–COVID-19 pandemic survey data are then used to empirically estimate the
disproportionate effect of the pandemic on women’s economic outcomes, specifically
in South Africa, Eswatini, Lesotho, and Namibia. The chapter draws on an IMF
working paper (Thioune and others, forthcoming) that empirically investigates the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on gender disparities in the southern African
region and related transmission channels.1 The data show that significant gender
inequalities still exist in the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) region, espe-
cially in employment, political representation, and health, which the COVID-19
pandemic exacerbated. Evidence suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic has wid-
ened the gap between male and female economic outcomes in South Africa,
Eswatini, Lesotho, and Namibia, as it has decreased women’s employment and
income more relative to men and has disproportionately increased the unpaid work
burden on women. The data also show that businesses—mostly informal—acted as
a shock absorber. The disproportionate negative effects of the pandemic on women
are due to a heavier unpaid work burden and occupational gender segregation.
The rest of the chapter presents stylized facts about gender disparities in the
region and highlights the main results from the analyses. Some policy recommen-
dations and conclusions are then offered.
STYLIZED FACTS: GENDER DISPARITIES IN SOUTHERN

AFRICA BEFORE THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
While overall gender inequality may not seem too striking in the SACU region,
aggregate indices mask significant gender inequalities in several dimensions, such as
health, labor markets, and legal empowerment. At the aggregate level, the SACU
countries do relatively well with regard to gender parity: Gender Development
Indices2 are close to 1 for all of them and above the sub-Saharan Africa and
Emerging Markets and Developing Economies averages (see Figure 4.1). Their
1
Bluedorn and others (2021) explore gender gaps during the pandemic in South Africa but do
not empirically estimate the impact on gender disparities. Some evidence has also been provided
in Lesotho on a “she-cession,” although covering statistical evidence without empirical estimations
(Government of Lesotho 2020). Research also exists on COVID-19 and gender in other African
countries, such as Ethiopia and Nigeria (Chapter 6). Less research has been done on southern African
countries, and this chapter fills this gap in the literature.
2
The Gender Development Index is computed as the female-to-male Human Development Index
ratio; the Human Development Index captures health measured as life expectancy, education, and
gross national income.

Chapter 4 COVID-19 and Gender Inequality: Impact in Southern Africa 83
Figure 4.1. SACU Countries: An Overview of Gender Inequality

1. Gender Indicators1, 2 2. Women, Business and the Law
(Index, 2019) (2019)
BWA SWZ LSO BWA SWZ LSO
NAM ZAF Developing NAM ZAF
1.2 World SACU SSA WBL index
1.0 100
0.8 Pension 80 Mobility
60
0.6 40
0.4 Assets 20 Workplace
0
0.2
0.0 Entrepre-
Gender Gender Global Pay
neurship
Development Inequality Gender Gap
Index 2019 Index 2019 Index 2020 Parenthood Marriage
3. Gender Parity Index for School Gross 4. Health Indicators
Enrollment (Percent, to the latest available)
(Girls-to-boys ratio, to the latest available
year before 2020)
BWA SWZ LSO BWA SWZ LSO
1.6 NAM ZAF NAM ZAF 100
1.4
1.2 80
1.0 60
0.8
0.6 40
0.4 20
0.2
0 0
Primary Secondary Tertiary Adolescent Percent of HIV prevalence
births per married percent among
1,000 women women with women
ages 15–19 demand for
(2020) family planning
5. Employment in Services 6. Female Share of Total Unemployed
(Percent of female and male employment, Population Not Available for Work Due to
modeled ILO estimate, 2019) Unpaid Domestic Work
(Percent)
90 Female Male 100
80
70 80
60
50 60
40 40
30
20 20
10
0 0
BWA SWZ LSO NAM ZAF SWZ 2016 LSO 2019 NAM 2018 ZAF 2020
Sources: Eswatini CSO; Lesotho BOS; Namibia Statistics Agency; StatsSA; UNDP; UNFPA; World Bank
Gender Database; World Economic Forum; World Bank Women, Business and the Law; and World Bank
World Development Indicators.
Note: In panel 3, due to the data limitation, the latest available data varies for the following: Botswana
(2015), Eswatini (2019), Lesotho (2017), Namibia (2018), South Africa (2019). BWA = Botswana; Eswatini
CSO = Eswatini Central Statistical Office; Lesotho BOS = Lesotho Bureau of Statistics; LSO = Lesotho;
NAM = Namibia; SACU = Southern Africa Countries Union; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; StatsSA = Statistics
South Africa; SWZ = Eswatini; UNFPA = United Nations Fund for Population Activities; UNDP = United
Nations Development Programme; WBI = Women, Business and the Law; ZAF = South Africa.
1
Higher scores for the Gender Development Index and the Global Gender Gap mean better gender equality,
while for the Gender Inequality Index they represent worse gender disparities. The Global Gender Gap index
is based on Global Gender Gap Reports, which reflect values collected in the previous year (t – 1).
2
The SACU index is calculated in simple average of all five SACU countries. The Index of World, sub-Saharan
Africa, and developing countries are referred directly from the data source.

Global Gender Gap3 scores are lower but still relatively high compared to other
Emerging Markets and Developing Economies. Yet, the SACU region does worse
with regard to the Gender Inequality Index4 compared to the Emerging Markets
and Developing Economies. Education gaps at the primary, secondary, and tertiary
levels have been largely closed, with girls’ enrollment even higher than boys’ in some
countries. Although these indices suggest fairly gender-equal societies in southern
Africa, gender gaps persist in the labor market, including labor force participation,
employment, and opportunities, especially in legal rights. The gender gap in access
to finance persists in most countries and women face more difficulties in running
profitable businesses. Although women are as likely as men to have bank or mobile
money accounts overall, fewer women borrow money compared to men.
Indicators of women’s health still paint a particularly worrying picture. For all
five countries, about 60 percent or more of people over the age of 15 years who live
with HIV are women. The maternal mortality rate is also above regional and eco-
nomic peers. Gender-based violence is prevalent in all SACU countries, and as a
result of restrictions on movement, it is exponentially on the rise globally during the
pandemic (United Nations 2020). According to the United Nations Populations
Fund, in Botswana, 67 percent of women have experienced abuse (UNFPA).
The Violence Against Children Survey conducted in 2007 reveals that in Eswatini,
48 percent of women aged 13-24 have experienced sexual violence in their lifetime.
In Namibia, 33 percent of married women aged 15-49 years have experienced vio-
lence from their partner, according to the 2013 Namibia Demographic and Health
Survey. In Lesotho, 33 percent of women have been abused by an intimate partner
(UNAIDS 2019). SaferSpaces reports that in South Africa, 25 to 40 percent of
women have experienced violence from their partners.
In the labor market, gender gaps also remain prevalent. The female labor force
participation rate is lower than for males in all countries, and female unemploy-
ment is higher in all SACU countries except Namibia. Women earn less and are
more likely economically poor. Political representation and empowerment lag, in
part due to legal restrictions, except for Namibia and South Africa. Research has
shown that legal restrictions in various dimensions drive gender gaps (Gonzales
and others 2015). The services, the informal, and the contact-intensive sectors
most negatively affected by lockdown policies across the region predominantly
employ women. Women’s share of employment in services is higher than men’s in
all SACU countries and is particularly high in South Africa at 84 percent.
3
The Global Gender Gap captures national gender gaps in economic participation, educational attain-
ment, health, and political criteria.
4
The Gender Inequality Index captures gender inequality across areas of health (maternal mortality
ratios and adolescent fertility rates), empowerment (share of parliamentary seats and education attain-
ment at the secondary level for both males and females), and labor force participation (rates by sex).
While the Gender Inequality Index has drawbacks (such as a complicated functional form and a com-
bination of indicators that compare men and women with indicators that pertain only to women),
it is preferable to alternatives such as the Gender Development Index, in which one of the main
components is not observed and is imputed.

Informal employment is also significant. In all countries except South Africa, the
informal sector employs more than 50 percent of women. Most of the unpaid
domestic work burden falls on women, keeping them out of the labor force. From
micro-level data in all the sample countries except for Botswana, out of the unem-
ployed respondents whose primary reason for not working is unpaid domestic
work, the overwhelming majority—over 70 percent—are women.
The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated all of these challenges, as described
in the next section.
MAIN RESULTS
The previous section provided a short overview of gender equality in the region
and initial statistics on how the pandemic has impacted the overall picture. The
next subsections present the results on the impact of the pandemic on women
through different indicators and for each country.
South Africa
The analysis for South Africa shows that the COVID-19 pandemic affected more
women than men and those women experienced a larger loss in employment,
reduction in weekly hours worked, and loss in income (Table 4.2.1). These dis-
proportionate effects are due to sectoral and occupational gender differences and
childcare and unpaid work burdens mostly falling on women. That is, evidence
suggests a “she-cession” in South Africa. However, some evidence also suggests
that business employment, especially in informal businesses, acted as a counter-
cyclical shock absorber for women. Generally, women in low- and medium-skilled
occupations and women with children were particularly affected. However, edu-
cation reduces the disproportionate negative effect of the pandemic on women.
Two data sources—the National Income Dynamics Survey–Coronavirus
Rapid Mobile Survey and the Quarterly Labor Force Survey—were used to con-
duct the analysis and derive these results. Linear probability panel regressions
were run to empirically estimate the effect the COVID-19 pandemic had on
women and various outcome variables (Thioune and others forthcoming).
Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Women’s Employment

The analysis shows that the COVID-19 pandemic reduced employment for
women significantly more than for men. The pandemic decreased the probability
of employment by 12.7 percentage points for men and by 14.6 percentage points
for women, decreasing the probability of employment for women by 1.94 per-
centage points more than men.5 Controlling for the transmission channels shows
that the type of employment, occupation, children, and education explain the
disproportionate negative effect of the pandemic on women.
5
The analysis is based on the National Income Dynamics Survey-Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey.

Notably, the disproportionately negative effect of the pandemic on women’s

employment is largest among the self-employed.6 Women with regular jobs and
casual work and self-employed women were more negatively affected than their
male counterparts. No evidence indicates that women who were running busi-
nesses were less or more affected relative to their male counterparts. Furthermore,
women with regular jobs in low-skilled and medium-skilled occupations were
more affected than their male counterparts. Additionally, women with children
below seven years old were also more affected than men in the same situations.
Similarly, more educated women were more affected than more educated men.
Evidence indicates that the kind and sector of employment and occupation are
transmission channels. In all types of employment (except unpaid work), the
pandemic disproportionately affected women’s employment.7 The analysis sug-
gests that the pandemic disproportionately affected more women’s employment
than men’s in all sectors except mining. Women working in agriculture were most
disproportionately affected by the pandemic relative to women in manufacturing
and services. Regarding occupation type, the pandemic disproportionately
affected more women in jobs at all skill levels, with the negative effect being the
largest in low- and then in medium-skilled occupations.
Finally, the analysis indicates that the pandemic disproportionately affected
women who spend more time fetching water and wood compared to their male
counterparts. However, the disproportionate negative impact of the pandemic on
women relative to men is larger for women who do not spend time fetching water
and wood. The fact that women who spend more time fetching water and wood
are less likely to be employed even before the pandemic explains the latter result;
therefore, they are less likely to lose employment because of the pandemic.
Analysis using the National Income Dynamics Survey–Coronavirus Rapid
Mobile Survey suggests that women running businesses were not disproportion-
ately affected by COVID-19, even after controlling for different transmission
channels. These businesses are mostly informal and the associated day-to-day
activities, although vulnerable to the pandemic shock, can still be carried out
despite COVID-19 related restrictions due to their informal nature. For instance,
women selling vegetables at the market can still carry out these activities despite
the lockdown, although they might incur a decrease in hours worked or income
from these activities due to reduced mobility and economic activity.
The results obtained from the Labor Force Survey are similar to those from the
National Income Dynamics Survey as the pandemic did not affect women
6
Also included are the respondents’ different types of employment, namely regular job, casual work,
self-employment, and business employment. Regarding occupation (in the case of a regular job) and
business occupation (in the case of a business job or self-employment), the classification follows the
International Standard Classification of Occupation, and the different categories are classified based on
skill level. Managers, professionals, technicians, and associate professionals constitute the high-skilled
occupations; clerical support workers, service and sales workers, craft and related trades workers, armed
forces occupations, plant and machine operators, and assembly, and skilled agricultural, forestry and
fishing workers are medium-skilled; and elementary occupations are low-skilled occupations.
7
The analysis is based on the Labor Force Survey for South Africa.

running businesses more than men. However, the sector of business employment
and occupation are channels through which the pandemic affected women’s
businesses more relative to those owned by men. Controlling for sector and occu-
pation reveals that the pandemic disproportionately affected women running
businesses in manufacturing and other sectors and those in low-skilled occupa-
tions more than their peers in other sectors.
A more detailed analysis points to informal businesses acting as a shock absorber
for the impact of the pandemic on women’s employment. To paint a more com-
plete picture, the analysis included the disproportionate impact of the pandemic
on women running formal compared to informal businesses. The National Income
Dynamics Survey–Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey included 16 formal business-
es and 398 informal ones, while the Labor Force Survey included 1,759 formal and
7,250 informal ones. The baseline specification was run separately for informal and
formal businesses, where the binary business employment variable equals 1 if the
person runs an informal and formal business, respectively, and 0 otherwise. From
the National Income Dynamics Survey data, significant evidence indicates that the
pandemic disproportionately affected women running formal businesses relative to
men running formal businesses. However, no disproportionate impact of the pan-
demic exists for women running informal businesses.
The Labor Force Survey data do not offer significant evidence of the dispro-
portionate effects of the pandemic on either women-run formal or informal
businesses. However, results from the National Income Dynamics Survey provide
some evidence to suggest that informal businesses served as a cushion for women
against the pandemic shock.
This evidence suggests that informal (but not formal) businesses served as a
cushion for the pandemic shock, particularly for women. This finding does not
necessarily contradict recent research on Northern Africa suggesting that informal
employment did not increase and therefore was not countercyclical during the
COVID-19 pandemic (IMF 2021a). The findings are specifically on women’s
business employment relative to men’s, which did not decrease in the case of
informal businesses relative to men’s. The results support the finding of Lambert,
Pescatori, and Toscani (2020) that informality plays a key role as a shock absorber,
limiting unemployment, and demonstrating that the informality effect is stronger
for women than men in South Africa.
Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Weekly Hours Worked

and Monthly Income
An investigation of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on women’s hours
worked, which examined the intensive margin of the pandemic’s effects on
employment, found that the pandemic decreased women’s weekly hours worked
relative to men’s by 1.2 hours. Therefore, not only did the pandemic drive women
out of work to a larger extent compared to men, it also disproportionately
decreased their aggregate hours worked relative to men. Two main channels,
occupation and children, drive the disproportionate effect. Indeed, women in
low-skilled occupations were more affected than their male counterparts, and

women with children under seven years old were more affected than men in the
same circumstance. This finding suggests that the occupational gender differences
and the childcare burden that falls mostly on women explain why women worked
fewer hours due to the pandemic relative to men.
Women’s monthly net income decreased by 226.3 Rands (about $13) beyond
men’s because of the pandemic. This relative decrease might not seem sizable;
however, given that the average monthly income for women in the sample is
R3780 (about $239), this drop is equivalent to an additional decrease of 5 percent
of their income beyond that of men. The occupations drive the overall negative
effect, as women in low-skilled occupations were more affected than their male
counterparts. Similarly, women with children under seven years old lost more
income than men in a similar circumstance. The number of children in school
accentuates the disproportionate effect of the pandemic on women, as having
more children attending school increases the disproportionately negative effect of
the pandemic on women’s income.
Similarly, the Labor Force Survey provides evidence that the pandemic affected
women’s hours worked more than men’s. Data from the Labor Force Survey provide
more evidence on the channels through which the pandemic affected women’s hours
worked, with the type and sector of employment, occupation, domestic work, and
education as the significant ones. When the type of employment is considered, the
pandemic disproportionately affected women doing regular jobs. Another expected
result is that the pandemic disproportionately affected women in services more than
their male counterparts. The pandemic also affected women in medium- and
low-skilled occupations disproportionately more than men, and the disproportion-
ately negative effect on women is largest in medium-skilled occupations, which is
consistent with findings using the National Income Dynamics Survey. Consistent
with findings regarding employment, women who spent more time fetching water
and wood were more affected than men in the same situation. The pandemic dispro-
portionately affected more educated women less than women who were less
educated, as higher levels of education decrease the significant disproportionately
negative effect of the pandemic on women.
Eswatini: Women’s Unpaid Work Burden Increased

Due to the Pandemic
The analysis in Eswatini is based on probit models on binary response questions
data, and results are obtained on the probabilities that gender may have had a
differential effect on the outcome of interest. The results suggest that the
COVID-19 pandemic disproportionately affected women’s employment relative
to men in Eswatini. However, the pandemic impacted men more significantly in
terms of income loss. Specifically, the odds ratios imply that during the pandem-
ic, men were 1.1 times8 more likely to be employed, while women were 1.3 times
8
When the odds ratio is <1, the reciprocal is taken—so in this case, 1/0.915 = 1.09—and interpreted
as a lesser probability of women having the outcome in question. When the odds ratio is >1, the odds
ratio is taken as is, implying that women are more likely to have the outcome in question.

more likely to have lost their jobs. However, the pandemic caused men in
Eswatini to become 1.1 times more likely to lose income. Since women in
Eswatini are more likely to be unemployed or out of the labor force relative to
men, these findings imply that the pandemic further exacerbated these
pre-existing labor market inequalities. However, the COVID-19 pandemic may
have also had a positive mechanical effect on the pre-existing gender inequality
in incomes, whereby men were more likely negatively impacted due to the
pandemic.
Second, the effect of the pandemic on outcomes of domestic and care work is
estimated. This work is one of the main hypothesized channels of the dispropor-
tionate effect of the pandemic on women, indicating the availability of these data
is a major advantage of this survey. The dependent variables are dummies for
whether the respondent spent more time on domestic work, childcare, and adult
care due to the pandemic. As expected, the results suggest that the pandemic
resulted in women spending increased time—specifically, about 1.1 times more
time—doing domestic, childcare, and adult-care work relative to men. These
results confirm the hypothesis that one way the pandemic disproportionately
affected women in Eswatini is by increasing their unpaid care work burden,
including domestic and care work.
Lesotho: Women’s Businesses Were Resilient to the

Pandemic Shock
As with the empirical analysis conducted on the Eswatini data, simple probit
models are estimated using the 2020 Rapid Impact COVID-19 survey data for
Lesotho. The results suggest that during the pandemic, women were less likely to
be formally employed than men, more likely to run a business, and less likely to
have stopped working due to the pandemic. Specifically, men were 1.5 times
more likely to be formally employed but also 1.3 times more likely to have
stopped working due to COVID-19. On the other hand, women were 2.2 times
more likely to run a business.
Namibia: The Pandemic Drove More Women

Out of the Labor Market
Both panel and probit models are estimated for Namibia using its COVID-19
Household and Jobs Tracker survey data. The results suggest that women were
more likely to lose their employment due to the pandemic and less likely to work
during the pandemic. Specifically, women were 6.7 percentage points more likely
to lose their employment and 6.9 percentage points less likely to work. Women
were not significantly more likely than men to have stopped working or changed
jobs due to the pandemic.9
9
Probit models that were run for South Africa establish comparability among all countries in this
analysis, and the results are consistent with the previous findings from the data on Eswatini, Lesotho,
and Namibia.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The results from these analyses point toward some policy actions to reduce the gender
gap and build more economic resilience in South Africa, Eswatini, Lesotho, and
Namibia. Reducing women’s occupational segregation and unpaid work burden
would strengthen their employment and income resilience to shocks. This chapter
provides strong evidence that occupational gender segregation and unequal unpaid
work burdens are the two primary channels of the disproportionate impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic on women’s employment and income relative to men in the
southern African region. Country authorities should implement policies that tackle
the root causes of gender inequality to strengthen women’s resilience to such shocks,
catalyzing a stronger, more sustainable, and inclusive postpandemic recovery.
Encouraging girls’ education in science, technology, engineering, and mathe-
matics (STEM) fields will reduce occupational gender segregation by ensuring
that women have more access to diversified job opportunities and become more
resilient to shocks. Disparities in fields of study still exist, with girls more likely
to opt-in for non-science fields. As a result, women’s employment is more con-
centrated in the tertiary sector activities that are more vulnerable to shocks like
the COVID-19 pandemic, notably hospitality and tourism. Therefore, encourag-
ing women to pursue careers in STEM fields will support their representation in
all sectors of the economy, attenuating the disproportionately negative effects of
shocks on women due to occupational gender segregation.
Fostering the provision of care services, such as childcare and adult care, and
parental leave would give women more flexibility to pursue full-time jobs since
many women had to drop out of the labor force to stay at home and care for their
children following school closures. Research has shown significant heterogeneity
in how the pandemic affected countries’ gender gaps, with some countries being
more resilient to the shock than others. One of the main reasons the pandemic
did not worsen some countries’ gender gaps is the availability of affordable child-
care (Bluedorn and others 2021). Providing affordable and accessible care services
would thus strengthen countries’ resilience to such shocks.
In light of the evidence on the importance of business employment, country
authorities should complement their efforts to formalize the informal sector by ensur-
ing a robust social safety net. The informal sector is a large component of South
Africa’s, Eswatini’s, Lesotho’s, and Namibia’s economies. Although the informal sector
is vulnerable in terms of pay, job security, and working conditions, it has cushioned
against the pandemic shock for informal-sector employees, the majority of whom are
women. Recent IMF research (IMF 2021b) suggests that countries aiming to formal-
ize their informal sectors should set up permanent mechanisms to increase the cover-
age and adequacy of social protection systems and provide adequate incentives for
formalization. These mechanisms may include cash transfers for unemployed and
informal-sector workers through digital technologies, for instance, sustainable gov-
ernment-to-person mobile transfer programs. In addition to supportive social protec-
tion systems, tax policy and administration measures can decrease the incentives for
informality and increase the incentives to join the taxpayer registry, for instance,
adequate minimal threshold for value-added tax, simpler value-added and corporate

tax systems, low payroll taxes, and simplification of tax payment procedures. Steady
and gradual structural policy reforms, including simplifying labor market regulations,
competition policy, eliminating excessive regulations and bureaucratic requirements,
and digitalization would further support the formalization process.
One way to enhance business employment in these countries is by strengthening
financing for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). Access to more
financing would allow small business owners, the majority of whom are women, to
scale up their businesses and become more resilient to economic shocks. Support
for MSMEs could include setting up incubators and facilitating business network-
ing as well as increasing financial literacy and inclusion by providing access to for-
mal financial services and preparation of financial accounts, among others.
Digitalization and fintech could also play a catalytic role in scaling up MSMEs.
Enabling Environment for Gender Equality

Policies addressing the macro-critical gender inequalities previously discussed
require a conducive environment, with legal systems that ensure women’s equal
economic participation and social freedom. The restrictive legal system in some
southern African countries impedes women’s agency, limiting their economic par-
ticipation and contributions. For instance, in Eswatini and Lesotho, the misalign-
ment between and parallel application of civil and customary legal systems allows
for persistent discrimination against women. Even though constitutions in these
countries promote gender equality de jure, customary law remains exempted from
these provisions. As a result, women still face discrimination in accessing financial
services, such as loans, and in property ownership and inheritance rights, which
may obstruct them from owning collateral. This chapter provides strong evidence
for the importance of businesses in providing a social safety net for women in these
countries. Access to financial services and the ability to acquire assets are crucial in
giving women more agency to invest and grow their businesses, thereby enhancing
private sector-led growth. Enshrining gender equality in legal frameworks may also
contribute to combating gender-based violence and child marriage and may even-
tually make discriminatory social norms and unequal opportunities obsolete.
Gender-responsive budgeting could support the implementation of these recom-
mendations and help foster an enabling environment conducive to gender equality.
Gender-responsive budgeting allows governments to take into account gender
inequality concerns when enacting policies and implementing programs in national,
state, and local budgets. Given that women’s participation is lagging in many aspects
of the economy, including the labor market, as well as in health, education, and
political representation, gender equality goals should be incorporated into laws,
policies, and budgets that aim to promote the well-being of the population.
CONCLUSION
This chapter explores whether the COVID-19 pandemic disproportionately
affected women in southern Africa and finds significant evidence for a “she-ces-
sion” in South Africa, Eswatini, Lesotho, and Namibia. Specifically, women’s

employment, hours worked, and incomes were disproportionately more negative-

ly affected during the pandemic than those of men in South Africa. Likewise, in
Namibia, women were more likely than men to have lost employment due to the
pandemic. Furthermore, analysis of the dynamic effects of the pandemic suggests
that women’s employment, hours worked, and income also took longer to recover
after the initial shock of the COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa. Findings are
complemented with results for Eswatini, Lesotho, and Namibia. In Eswatini,
women were less likely than men to be employed and more likely to have lost
their jobs due to the pandemic. In Lesotho, women were less likely to be formally
employed than men. In Namibia, women were less likely than men to work
during the pandemic. However, the findings also suggest that men in Eswatini
were relatively more likely to have lost income due to COVID-19, while men in
Lesotho were more likely to have stopped working due to the pandemic.
These findings provide evidence supporting the role of women’s heavier unpaid
work burden and occupational gender segregation as transmission channels of the
COVID-19 pandemic shock on gender inequality. Having young children and
children in school and spending more time fetching water and wood contributed
to the disproportionately negative impact of the pandemic on women’s employ-
ment, hours worked, and income in South Africa. Furthermore, the results from
the analysis in Eswatini further suggest that the pandemic exacerbated women’s
already disproportionate unpaid domestic, childcare, and adult care work burdens.
Moreover, women employed in low- and medium-skilled occupations and certain
sectors, such as services, were particularly impacted by the pandemic with regard
to employment, hours worked, and income, while more education counterbal-
anced some of this negative effect.
The evidence also showed that business employment, especially in the infor-
mal sector, acted as a countercyclical shock absorber for women in South Africa
and Lesotho. Unlike other forms of employment, women’s relative to men’s busi-
ness employment was not disproportionately affected by the pandemic.
Specifically, women running informal (but not formal) businesses were less nega-
tively affected by the COVID-19 pandemic shock than their male counterparts.
Furthermore, women in Lesotho were more likely than men to run a business
during the pandemic. This evidence suggests that women in these countries may
have used informal business employment to cushion the negative impact of the
pandemic.
The observed trends may be operating in the broader southern and even
sub-Saharan African region. Due to limited data availability, this baseline model
cannot be applied to all countries in the region. The analysis of data from
Eswatini, Lesotho, and Namibia, albeit not as granular, confirms some of the
findings about the disproportionate impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on
women in the region. For cross-country comparability reasons, this methodology
was also applied to the data from South Africa, broadly confirming the results
from the other countries in this study. More detailed, gender-disaggregated, and
uniform-across-countries data would greatly facilitate future research aiming to
apply this empirical analysis to the broader southern and even sub-Saharan
African region.

ANNEX 4.1. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY: ASSESSING THE

IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON GENDER INEQUALITY
Empirical analysis is modeled following Alon and others (2021) as follows:
yi,t = β0 + β1Fi + β2Dt + β3Fi × Dt + β4Xit + εi,t (4.1)
for individual i at time t, where y is the outcome variable of interest, namely a binary
employment indicator, weekly hours worked, and nominal income in local
currency; F is a female dummy; D is a treatment dummy for the post-COVID time
period and equals 0 before COVID (Q1 2020) and 1 after the onset of the pan-
demic; and X is vector of controls: age, marital status, education, area of residence
(rural versus urban), province, and ethnicity. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. The female dummy equals 1 if the individual is female and 0 if a
male. The control population is the male population. The impact of the COVID-19
pandemic on any outcome variable of interest for the male population is captured
by β2. For the female population, it is captured by the sum of β2 and β3. So, β3
captures the disproportionate impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on women rela-
tive to men and is therefore the main parameter of interest. This empirical analysis
can be done only in countries with pre- and post-COVID-19 pandemic data.
Additional specifications capture the transmission channels of the

COVID-19 shock. The analysis controls for the industry in which individual i is
employed and their occupation to assess the role of occupational gender segregation
in the differential effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on women compared to men.
The industries and occupations are classified into different major categories and
include a dummy for each group of industry or occupation, holding one group
constant. The specification controlling for the employment industries is as follows:
yit = γ0 + γ1Fi + γ2Dt + γ3Fi × Dt + γ4industry1it + γ5Fi × industry1it
+ γ6industry1it × Dt + γ7Fi × Dt × industry1it + γ8industry2it
+ γ9Fi × industry2it + γ10industry2it × Dt + γ11F1 × Dt × industry2it
+ γ12Xit + 𝜇it (4.2)
where industry0 is the control industry group. Similarly, the specification for
occupation is as follows:
yit = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1Fi + 𝛿2Dt + 𝛿3Fi × Dt + 𝛿4occupation1it
+ 𝛿5Fi × occupation1it + 𝛿6occupation1it × Dt
+ 𝛿7Fi × Dt × occupation1it + 𝛿8occupation2it
+ 𝛿9Fi × occupation2it + 𝛿10occupation2it × Dt
+ 𝛿11Fi × Dt × occupation2it + 𝛿12Xit (4.3)
where occupation0 is the control occupation group. Other factors controlled for
are the kind of employment respondents have, specifically whether they are
own-account workers, working for a wage, or are employers, as follows:
yit = 𝜂0 + 𝜂1Fi + 𝜂2Dt + 𝜂3Fi × Dt + 𝜂4 jobkind1it + 𝜂5Fi × jobkind1it
+ 𝜂6 jobkind1it × Dt + 𝜂7Fi × Dt × jobkind1it + 𝜂8 jobkind2it
+ 𝜂9Fi × jobkind2it + 𝜂10 jobkind2it × Dt + 𝜂11Fi × Dt × jobkind2it
+ 𝜂12Xit + 𝜇it (4.4)

To estimate the effect that school closures and increased childcare burdens had on
the differential impact of the pandemic on women, the analysis controls for the
number of children under seven years old that the individual has and the number
of children attending school living in the household, as shown in the following
equation (these data are available only in the National Income Dynamics Survey
data set):
yit = θ0 + θ1Fi + θ2Dt + θ3childrenit + θ4Fi + Dt × θ5Fi × childrenit
+ θ6childrenit × Dt+ θ7Fi × Dt × childrenit + θ8Xit + 𝜇it (4.5)
Finally, the analysis controls for the increased household work burden by includ-
ing time spent fetching wood and water, which is available in the Labor Force
Survey data:
yit = λ0 + λ1Fi + λ2Dt + λ3timeit+ λ4Fi × Dt + λ5Fi × timeit
+ λ6timeit × Dt + λ7Fi × Dt × timeit + λ8Xit + 𝜇it (4.6)
Panel regressions are run following equation (4.1) for South Africa and Namibia,
and the analysis is complemented with probit models for Eswatini, Lesotho, and
Namibia due to data limitations. Specifically, for Eswatini, Lesotho, and Namibia,
the following specification is run:
Yi = Pr(Yi = 1|Xi) = 𝜙(Xi β) (4.7)
for each individual i, where Yi is a binary outcome variable, such as whether the
respondent is employed or not, whether they lost some income or their job, or
whether they spent more time doing unpaid work; Xi is a vector of explanatory
variables, the main one being gender, but also including controls such as age and
marital status.  measures the effects of the corresponding explanatory variables
on Yi.

ANNEX 4.2. RESULTS
ANNEX TABLE 4.2.1.
South Africa NIDS: Clustering Standard Errors at the Province Level

(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Employment All Business Monthly Income Weekly Hours
Forms Employment Worked
COVID-19 Dummy −0.127*** −0.0237*** 10.65 −5.203***
(0.0159) (0.00513) (114.4) (0.521)
Gender × COVID-19 −0.0194 0.00471 −226.3** −1.226
Dummy
(0.0115) (0.00620) (101.2) (0.704)
Education level 0.00866** −1.04e-05 −13.18 0.383
(0.00328) (0.00281) (53.89) (0.217)
Age 0.00576 0.00444*** 148.3 0.284
(0.00377) (0.00120) (96.82) (0.284)
Observations 33,076 20,110 8,766 11,772
R2 0.028 0.004 0.013 0.041
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ analysis using the National Income Dynamics Survey data set.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel regressions with individual fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
province level. Columns (1)–(4) dependent variables: employment of all forms, business employment, monthly income,
and weekly hours worked. Gender = 0 if male and 1 if female. Controls are age, age squared, education level, marital
status, and province. R2 is the within R2. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
ANNEX TABLE 4.2.2.
South Africa LFS: Clustering Standard Errors at the Province Level

(1) (2) (3)
Variables Employment All Forms Business Employment Weekly Hours Worked
COVID dummy −0.0541*** −0.0110*** −3.186***
(0.00455) (0.00239) (0.147)
Gender × COVID-19 −0.00481 0.00106 −1.029***
dummy
(0.00376) (0.00207) (0.294)
Age 1.05e-05 0.000577* 0.222*
(0.000796) (0.000256) (0.108)
Education level 0.00395*** 0.000216 −0.0309
(0.000191) (0.000408) (0.0300)
Observations 176,845 176,845 58,919
R2 0.015 0.002 0.022
Controls Yes Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes Yes
*p < 0.1; ***p< 0.01.
Source: Authors’ analysis using the labor force survey data set.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel regressions with individual fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
province level. Columns (1)–(3) dependent variables: employment of all forms, business employment, and weekly hours
worked. Gender = 0 if male and 1 if female. Controls are age, age squared, education level, marital status, and ethnicity.
R2 is the within R2. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

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one%20in,over%20double%20the%20global%20average.

CHAPTER 5
COVID-19 and Gender Gaps in

the Labor Market: Evidence
from Nigeria and Ethiopia
Chie Aoyagi
A high degree of informal self-employment in the rural agricultural sector characterizes

the labor structure in sub-Saharan Africa. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic
on female employment may not appear large because the share of informal self-employ-
ment is particularly high among women. Nevertheless, widespread income reduction
was observed in rural and urban households. This reduction could limit economic
opportunities for women as husbands’ control over the household resources is the norm.
The chapter also finds that rural children struggled to continue learning during school
closures. These countries need gender-sensitive policies to narrow the gap during and
postpandemic.
INTRODUCTION
Globally, the COVID-19 pandemic disproportionately impacted women’s
employment and income. Additional data clarifies the nuances of how women
have fared worse than men. In sub-Saharan Africa, about 80 percent of women
were considered own-account workers (that is, self-employed workers without
employees) or contributing family workers (also known as unpaid family workers)
before the pandemic. However, “self-employment” status could mask the true
economic impact of the crisis on women. Although not officially recognized as
unemployed, their economic activities were often interrupted, reduced, or
stopped. The divide between women in urban and rural settings also differentiates
the pandemic impacts on them. While women in cities may be more prone to
losing their jobs, women in rural areas are more likely self-employed and face
greater challenges in maintaining their children’s educational progress when
schools are closed.
Regardless of where a woman lives and works, the shocks to household income
are widespread. Even before the pandemic, women in sub-Saharan Africa were
more likely than men to exist under the threat of poverty. According to
International Labour Organization (ILO) statistics, 81 percent of female workers
in sub-Saharan Africa—compared with 77 percent of male workers—were either
extremely, moderately, or close to poor in 2019. The pre-existing gender
97

inequities threatened women’s lives as the public health crisis grew, reversing the
progress toward gender equality.
While the gender impact of the COVID-19 pandemic spread to multiple
dimensions in sub-Saharan Africa, this chapter focuses on gender differences in
employment, household income, and children’s education during the early stages
of the lockdowns. This study contributes to the growing literature on the house-
hold level impacts of the COVID-19 shock, focusing on two sub-Saharan African
countries—Nigeria and Ethiopia.
PREPANDEMIC EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE

IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Figure 5.1 illustrates the regional and sectoral employment distribution in sub-
Saharan Africa. As in other parts of the world, more women in sub-Saharan Africa
worked prepandemic in the services sector, which has been hit harder than agri-
culture or industry because of reduced demand caused by pandemic-related
lockdowns and social distancing. As in other regions, the share of the services
sector is higher in urban than rural areas.
However, sub-Saharan Africa stands out from the rest of the world due to the
low urbanization and high employment share in agriculture. The pre-existing divide
between women in urban and rural settings is key to understanding how the pan-
demic has affected overall female employment. The aggregate statistics hide diverse
experiences for labor market structure and inequality. The country-by-country
data in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show a strong link between income per capita and the
level of urbanization and the share of agriculture in total employment—that is,
Figure 5.1. Employment in Sub-Saharan Africa by Sector

(Percent of total employment)
Agriculture Industry Services
100
25 19
80
9
8 59
60 74
40
68 71
22
20 11
15 19
0
Female Male Female Male
Rural Urban
Sources: International Labour Organization database; and IMF staff calculations.

Chapter 5 COVID-19 and Gender Gaps in the Labor Market 99
Figure 5.2. Percentage of Rural Female Employment as a Share of Total

Female Employment
100
Share of rural employment for women
90 Low-income average
80 Middle-income average
70
60
50 48%
40
30
20 18%
10
0
GNQ
CAF
MDG
SEN
GHA
GAB
NAM
SSD
NGA
ZAF
UGA
MOZ
TCD
ZWE
RWA
GNB
MLI
GIN
BFA
SLE
AGO
BWA
MUS
ERI
KEN
ETH
ZMB
SWZ
BDI
NER
COM
CPV
TGO
CIV
BEN
LSO
LBR Low income Middle income
Note: The figure uses International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. The country
classification is from April 2021 WEO.
Figure 5.3. Percentage of Female Employment in Agriculture as a Share of

Total Female Employment
120
Share of female agriculture
Low-income average
100 Middle-income average
80
60 54%
40
25%
20
0
BDI
CAF
MOZ
TCD
SSD
GNB
ZWE
NER
ERI
GIN
MLI
KEN
MDG
ETH
COM
ZMB
SLE
LBR
TGO
BEN
SEN
LSO
AGO
GAB
GNQ
CPV
CIV
NAM
SWZ
MUS
ZAF
UGA
RWA
NGA
GHA
BFA
BWA
Low income Middle income


Figure 5.4. Employment in Sub-Saharan Africa by Employment Status

(Percent)
Employees Employers Own-account workers Contributing family workers
100 5
18 14
90
80 37
43
70
60 51
50 60 5
40 51 2
30
48
20 2
33
10 1 19
11
0
Female Male Female Male
Rural Urban
female employment in low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa is more likely

rural and agricultural compared to middle-income countries in the region.
Another feature of sub-Saharan Africa’s labor market structure is the high
share of informality—a key determinant of the pandemic’s impact on the overall
labor market. Most workers in sub-Saharan Africa are self-employed, especially
in rural areas, and often work in the informal sector. According to a paper by
the ILO (2018), about 90 percent of employment in Africa was informal. As
shown in Figure 5.4, own-account workers (mostly in the informal sector) and
contributing family workers (all in the informal sector by definition) together
accounted for 88 percent of women and 78 percent of men in rural employment
in sub-Saharan Africa. Women were twice as likely as men to be contributing
family workers.
The country-by-country outcomes depicted in Figure 5.5 show a strong link
between income per capita and the share of own-account and contributing family
workers in total female employment, suggesting that informality in employment is
particularly high among women in low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
CASE STUDIES OF THE EARLY STAGES OF LOCKDOWN

The discussion on the overall labor market structure for the region in the previous
section identified unique features of sub-Saharan Africa while also noting the
heterogeneity across the diverse set of countries. This section, however, focuses on
Nigeria and Ethiopia, using data from the first round of the World Bank Living
Standards Measurement Study–Integrated Surveys on Agriculture Program for
High-Frequency Phone Surveys on COVID-19. While these two large countries

Figure 5.5. Sum of Own-Account and Contributing Family Workers as a

Share of Total Female Employment
(Percent)
Share of female own-account plus contributing Low-income average
Middle-income average
100
90 84%
80
70
60
50
42%
40
30
20
10
0
TCD
NER
BDI
CAF
GIN
BEN
ERI
MOZ
SLE
SSD
LBR
MDG
ETH
ZMB
TGO
MLI
GNB
COM
ZWE
SEN
KEN
LSO
GNQ
AGO
SWZ
GAB
NAM
MUS
ZAF
CPV
CIV
BFA
NGA
UGA
GHA
RWA
BWA
Low income Middle income
in sub-Saharan Africa have distinct characteristics that require caution in applying

the results of this study to the rest of the region, the two countries do share
similarities with other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, namely the widespread
informal employment in the rural agricultural sector—a characteristic vital to
understanding the impact of the pandemic on employment and education in
the region.
The Nigerian survey was conducted between April 20 and May 11, 2020,
coinciding with a federally mandated lockdown initiated on March 30, 2020.
The Ethiopian survey was conducted between April 22 and May 13, 2020, coin-
ciding with a state of emergency (under Article 93 of the Constitution) declared
on April 8, 2020. This section focuses on the labor market outcomes of approxi-
mately 2,000 survey respondents in Nigeria and over 3,000 respondents in
Ethiopia who completed the relevant parts of the questionnaire.
In Nigeria, 36 percent of the relevant respondents reported that they stopped
working due to the lockdown during the surveyed period, while in Ethiopia, the
share was about 8 percent. In Nigeria and Ethiopia, the lockdown was the
dominant reason workers lost their jobs or closed their businesses during this
period. However, the severity of the work stoppage was greater in Nigeria, which
implemented stricter containment measures than Ethiopia.
Figure 5.6 shows notable differences in employment situations between
rural and urban respondents and between male and female respondents. Urban
areas had a higher share of people who stopped working due to the lockdown.

Figure 5.6. Survey Results on Employment Situation for Nigerian and

Ethiopian Adults
Currently employed Stopped working due to lockdown
Stopped working due to other reasons Not working before COVID-19
1. Nigeria 2. Ethiopia
Rural Men (911) Rural Women (299) Rural Men (720) Rural Women (258)
12% 20%
7% 26%
46% 6% 52% 44% 48%
4%
6% 64%
35% 22%
3% 5%
Urban Men (523) Urban Women (235) Urban Men (1,304) Urban Women (967)
11% 17%
7% 24%
31% 7% 34%
38%
6% 48%
9%
67% 9%
44%
39% 9%
Sources: World Bank COVID-19 phone survey; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the number of observations.
On the other hand, for rural and urban areas, the share of men who lost their
employment due to the lockdown was greater than women—meaning that rural
women were the least affected by employment losses in both countries. However,
this finding might be due to widespread informal employment in agriculture
among women, especially rural women, for which an activity loss would not
appear as lost employment. Bundervoet, Davalos, and Garcia (2021) support this
explanation as they found that an employment structure dominated by agricul-
ture and own-account work explains the lower reported job losses in low-income
countries worldwide during the early stages of the lockdowns.
Even though employment loss was less severe in rural than urban areas,
income reductions were widespread (Figure 5.7). In both Nigeria and Ethiopia,
the share of households that reported reduced total household income since the
outbreak is equally high between rural and urban areas—about 80 percent in
Nigeria and about 60 percent in Ethiopia. Among the top three most common
income sources, household farming and nonfarm family businesses are more
likely to face reduced income than wage employment, implying a vulnerability in
the informal sector and for own-account and contributing family workers.
Women may be adversely affected in particular because of their dependence on
family farming and family businesses and their initially lower income and higher
poverty rate compared to men. Furthermore, because husbands’ control over the
allocation of household resources is the norm in most parts of West and East
Africa (Verschoor and others 2019), reduced household income might further
lessen economic opportunities for women in the region.

Figure 5.7. Share of Households Reporting Income Reduction since

Mid-March by Income Source
(Percent)
1. Share of Nigerian Households Reporting 2. Share of Ethiopian Households Reporting
Income Reduction by Source Income Reduction by Source
100 Urban Rural Urban Rural 100
90
90 90
83 83 82
80 77 80 80
73
70 69 70
60 56 56 56 60
50 47
50 50
42
40 40
33
30 30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
Household farming,
livestock or fishing
Nonfarm family
business
Wage employment of
household members
Total household
income
Household farming,
livestock or fishing
Nonfarm family
business
Wage employment of
household members
Total household
income
The pandemic has also affected the education of the future work force, possi-
bly leaving long-lasting scars on the economy. The same World Bank surveys were
used to study the impact of school closures and families’ adaptation to continuous
learning for children. On March 26, 2020, Nigeria closed schools nationwide.
Likewise, on March 16, 2020, Ethiopia closed all primary and secondary schools.
The school closures for both countries continued for about six months until
Nigeria and Ethiopia reopened schools on October 12, 2020, and October 19,
2020, respectively. The surveys coincided with the school closures and asked
those with primary or secondary school children at home whether the children
engaged in any educational activities after the schools closed.
Analysis of responses from over 1,000 Nigerian households and approximately
2,000 Ethiopian households indicates that urban households are more likely than
rural households to have children engaged in learning activities at home during
school closures (Figure 5.8). Moreover, rural children in female-headed households
were the least likely to continue learning during school closures. The educational
gap between rural and urban areas had been observed even before the pandemic.
For example, according to the 2018 Demographic and Health Survey, in Nigeria,
the net school attendance ratio for primary school was 70 percent for urban chil-
dren and 50 percent for rural children. Yet these results imply that the urban–rural
educational gap was widening during the pandemic.

Figure 5.8. Share of Households with Children Engaged in Learning

Activities
(Percent)
1. Share of Nigerian Households with 2. Share of Ethiopian Households with
Children Engaged in Learning Activities Children Engaged in Learning Activities
80 80
70 70
60 60
50 50
40 40
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
Male- Female- Male- Female- Male- Female- Male- Female-
headed headed headed headed headed headed headed headed
Rural Urban Rural Urban
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES

The previous section showed employment loss due to lockdowns and learning
activities during school closures across different gender and regional groups in
Nigeria and Ethiopia. This section quantifies the differences in the employment
loss and learning probabilities across those groups using the Nigerian COVID-19
pandemic survey together with the pre-COVID baseline survey—the 2018–19
round of the Nigeria General Household Survey—to supplement household and
the respondents’ background information.
The combined surveys identified background information for close to 2,000
respondents, such as gender, age, place of residence, educational attainment, and
employment sector, to explain the individual’s probability of losing employment
due to lockdowns.
First, the regression results show that being a woman is associated with lower
probabilities of employment loss due to lockdowns. However, as discussed in the
previous section, this employment loss may reflect the fact that women are more
likely to be informal, self-employed agricultural workers and thus would not
report losing a job or closing a business even though their return to work might
be significantly reduced.
Second, the regression results confirm that living in urban areas and working in
the nonagricultural sector are both associated with higher probabilities of lockdown-
induced employment loss.

Third, and surprisingly, graduating from high-school or having a higher edu-

cational background is a characteristic of an individual with a higher probability
of employment loss—which is seemingly contradictory to the finding that global
epidemics hurt employment prospects of those with only a basic education.
However, the results show that the lockdowns, at least initially, led to higher job
losses for people with higher educational levels.
Finally, the respondent’s age has a nonlinear effect on the person’s probability
of employment loss—meaning that until a certain age (estimated around
40 years old), the probability that a person loses a job due to lockdowns increases
as the age increases by one year. For individuals older than 40 years, age would
have the opposite effect.
To illustrate the magnitude of the effect of those individual characteristics
associated with the person’s employment-loss probability, Figure 5.9 presents the
average marginal effects at age 40. The age of the individual is fixed considering
the nonlinear age effects, which are the smallest and almost zero at age 40. While
the average marginal effects shown in the chart are particular for the 40-year-old
group, the relative magnitude and the sign (positive or negative) of the marginal
effects of all other variables remain the same across all age levels. The interpreta-
tion of the average marginal effects shown in Figure 5.9 is as follows:
• On average, being a woman is associated with a reduced probability of los-
ing employment by 0.10 point at age 40.
• On the other hand, living in an urban area or having a high school or higher
educational background is associated with increased probabilities of employ-
ment loss due to lockdowns by 0.06 point and 0.08 point, respectively.
• Overall, the average marginal effects of working in the nonagricultural
sector at the onset of the pandemic are the largest and associated with
0.21 point higher probability of an employment loss due to lockdowns.
Figure 5.9. Average Marginal Effects to Employment-Loss Probabilities

0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
–0.05
–0.10
–0.15
Female Urban High school+ Nonagricultural
Source: IMF staff calculations.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES

Similarly, both surveys were used to study how children’s engagement in learning
activities during school closures differ across households. The regression results
show that children living (1) in a female-headed household, (2) in rural areas, or
(3) with an adult agricultural worker are, on average, less likely to continue learn-
ing during school closures.
Predicted lower learning probabilities of children in female-headed households
are consistent with the fact that female-headed families often face special circum-
stances. For instance, a single mother could be living alone with her children, thus
facing greater challenges in ensuring home-based learning for the children.
According to the Nigerian 2018–19 baseline survey, about 80 percent of female
heads of household surveyed were widows, 9 percent were separated, and 2 percent
were divorced. The predicted lower probabilities for children in rural areas imply
that the lack of infrastructure or support necessary to continue learning in rural
areas during school closures would widen the pre-existing urban–rural educational
gaps. The positive effects of nonagricultural employees in the household suggest
that while agricultural employment seemed more resilient against the pandemic
shock, children in the household might have to help their family on the farm when
schools are closed and face greater challenges engaging in learning activities. On the
other hand, whether the respondent has a high school or higher level of education
does not have significant effects on the overall learning probabilities of children in
the household (p  0.1), while the respondent’s education has positive and signif-
icant effects on the probabilities of parents teaching children at home during school
closures (Aoyagi 2021).
Moreover, to illustrate the magnitude of the effects those individual character-
istics have on the learning probability of children in their household, Figure 5.10
presents the average marginal effects for respondents at age 40. As in the case of
the employment-loss probability regression discussed previously, age 40 was
Figure 5.10. Average Marginal Effects to Children’s Learning Probabilities

0.10
0.05
0.00
–0.05
–0.10
–0.15
Female-head High school+ Urban Nonagricultural
Source: IMF staff calculations.

selected as the fixed point because of the nonlinear age effects, which are almost
zero at age 40. The interpretation of the average marginal effects shown in
Figure 5.10 is as follows:
• On average, having a female head of household is associated with children’s
reduced probability of engaging in learning activities during school closures
by 0.14 point.
• On the other hand, urban households and households with a nonagricul-
tural worker have on average 0.05 and 0.06 point higher probabilities for
children’s continuous learning during school closures, respectively.
• The average marginal effects of the respondent’s educational background
(high school+) on the overall learning activities for children in their house-
hold are not significant at 10 percent ( p  0.1).
Interestingly, the urban–rural gap found by this quantitative analysis of
Nigeria is close to the average of low-income and middle-income countries ana-
lyzed in Bundervoet, Davalos and Garcia (2021).
CONCLUSION
This chapter studies the initial impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on employ-
ment and children’s learning in sub-Saharan Africa by examining the regions’
prepandemic labor market structure and using the case study of two low-income
African countries—Nigeria and Ethiopia—from survey results that became avail-
able in early summer 2020. The World Bank high-frequency phone surveys
conducted in Nigeria and Ethiopia during the early stages of the nationwide
lockdowns and school closures were used to analyze the differential impacts of the
pandemic on individuals and children in their households with various character-
istics. In particular, the study focuses on the gender, place of residence, and
employment sector of nationally representative respondents to the surveys.
The study finds that a job loss or business closure due to the lockdowns in
Nigeria and Ethiopia was more common in urban than rural areas and among
male rather than female workers. One caveat to the result is that employment loss
probabilities for rural women may not appear large because the majority of these
women were informal self-employed and did not “fire themselves.” Nevertheless,
income losses were widespread and rural women were one of the most vulnerable
groups with a lack of decent work options and a high poverty rate.
The costs of the pandemic for women are not limited to lost income but also
the struggle to maintain children’s educational progress. The study finds that, in
Nigeria, rural households headed by women are far less likely than urban house-
holds to have children engaged in learning activities during school closures.
Female-headed households are vulnerable and different in many ways from the
average household, not because women head the households but because of the
circumstances that lead women to becoming heads of households. For example,
in Nigeria, women heads of households are primarily widows. The situation could
be particularly troubling in rural areas because of the pre-existing divide.

Compared to children in urban areas, children in rural areas were lagging academ-
ically even before the pandemic. Yet these results imply that the urban–rural gap
widened during the pandemic—rural children do not have the same internet
connectivity, rural schools are less equipped to offer remote learning, and children
are more likely to be expected to work to support their households.
While these main survey results are for Nigerian and Ethiopian households,
similar geographic and gender divides exist in other countries in sub-Saharan
Africa, and a targeted set of women-centered policies can blunt the negative
impacts of the crisis and improve prospects for the next generation. As of
November 2021, about 90 percent (43 out of 50 countries and territories) of
governments in the region have introduced gender-sensitive policies in response
to the crisis caused by the pandemic (UNDP-UN Women 2021). For example,
the governments of Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Senegal have introduced measures
to facilitate access to small business loans during the COVID-19 pandemic; most
beneficiaries for these loans are women. The Democratic Republic of the Congo
and South Africa initiated a range of fiscal measures to support female-dominated
sectors of the economy, such as hospitality and tourism. In Kenya and Rwanda,
some in-kind and cash transfer programs prioritize women in beneficiary house-
holds or target female-headed households.
These are encouraging signs, but room still exists for accelerating and scaling
up gender-sensitive policy measures. Sub-Saharan Africa lags behind other regions
in the average number of gender-sensitive measures per country, including those
aimed at addressing the surge in violence against women and girls, the unprece-
dented increase in unpaid care work, and the economic insecurity caused by the
large-scale loss of jobs, incomes, and livelihoods (Figure 5.11). In particular,
Figure 5.11. Average Number of Gender-Sensitive Measures by Regions

10
Violence against women
9 Women’s economic security
8 Unpaid care
Total
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Sub- Eastern Asia, Northern Europe, Latin America Central and World
Saharan South-Eastern Africa and Northern and the Southern
Africa Asia and Western America, Caribbean Asia
Oceania Asia Australia and
New Zealand
Sources: United Nations Development Programme-UN Women COVID-19 Global gender response
tracker policy measures data set, living database, version 3 (November 11, 2021); and IMF staff
calculations.

sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest number of measures to address women’s unpaid
care burdens, and the region’s gender response to the pandemic has been uneven
across countries and dimensions.
Stronger policies addressing the unequal impact of the COVID-19 pandemic
are warranted to limit widening gender inequality and the urban-rural gap. The
pandemic has taken an enormous toll on women’s lives and livelihoods, regardless
of where they live or how they are employed. Policies should reflect the significant
role women often have in their homes and communities and the impact for future
generations. Supporting women provides key short-term economic benefits and
creates vital building blocks for a more prosperous and inclusive future.
REFERENCES
Aoyagi, Chie. 2021. “Effects of COVID-19 on Regional and Gender Equality in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Evidence from Nigeria and Ethiopia.” IMF Working Paper 2021/169, International
Bundervoet, Tom, Maria E. Davalos, and Natalia Garcia. 2021. “The Short-Term Impact of
COVID-19 on Households in Developing Countries: An Overview Based on a Harmonized
Data Set of High-Frequency Surveys.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank,
Washington, DC.
International Labour Organization (ILO). 2018. Women and Men in the Informal Economy:
A Statistical Picture, Third Edition. Geneva, Switzerland: ILO.
United Nations Development Program–UN Women (UNDP-UN Women). 2021. “COVID
19 Global Gender Response Tracker, Global Factsheet.” Version 3, November 11.
Verschoor, Arjan, Bereket Kebede, Alistair Munro, and Marcela Tarazona. 2019. “Spousal Control
and Efficiency of Intra-household Decision-Making: Experiments among Married Couples in
India, Ethiopia and Nigeria.” The European Journal of Development Research 31: 1171–96.


PART II
Settling on the Basics:
Ending Harmful Practices
and Developing the
Continent


CHAPTER 6
Eliminating Violence against

Women and Boosting the Economy
Rasmané Ouedraogo and David Stenzel
The COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns led to a rise in gender-based violence. This
chapter explores the economic consequences of violence against women in sub-Saharan
Africa using demographic and health survey data collected before the pandemic. A two-
stage least square method to address endogeneity identified that a 1 percentage point
increase in the share of women subject to violence can reduce economic activity, proxied
by nightlights per capita by about 9 percent. Nightlights per capita are used as a proxy
for economic activity since traditional indicators such as GDP are not available on the
subnational level. Economic costs result from a significant drop in female employment.
Our findings also show that violence against women is more detrimental to economic
development in countries without protective laws against domestic violence, in countries
rich in natural resources, in places where women are deprived of decision-making power,
and during economic downturns. Beyond the moral imperative, these findings highlight
the economic importance of combating violence against women, particularly by reinforc-
ing laws against domestic violence and strengthening women’s decision-making power.
INTRODUCTION
One in three women has experienced physical or sexual assault in her life.1
Worldwide, no place is less safe for a woman than her home. Besides a fundamen-
tal human rights violation, a serious public health concern, and devastating for
1
“Violence against women and girls” refers to: “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or
is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats
of such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private
life” (1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, 2). “Intimate partner
violence” is one of the most common forms of violence against women and girls but is not identical
as it excludes acts of violence not perpetrated by intimate partners and includes violence against men
or those with gender-nonconforming identities. The term “gender-based violence” is broader since it
includes violence against men, boys, and sexual minorities or those with gender-nonconforming iden-
tities. “Violence” also comes in various forms, including sexual, physical, or psychological violence,
which this chapter considers violence. This chapter uses the terms “violence against women and girls,”
“intimate partner violence,” and “domestic violence” interchangeably for readability. In this chapter,
these terms refer to violence against women and girls committed by their intimate partners, including
sexual, physical, or psychological violence.
113

individual well-being, violence against women and girls also has high economic
costs. Channels through which violence against women and girls create “economic
costs” include lower labor supply, reduced productivity per hour worked, less
investment in human capital for both women and children, and possibly lower
investment due to higher demand for health and judicial services. Domestic vio-
lence adversely affects companies, which incur costs associated with higher rates of
absenteeism, staff turnover and reduced productivity at work, and the potential for
reputational damage (International Labour Organization and UN Women 2019).
The COVID-19 pandemic led to increased domestic violence against women.
Adverse economic and social conditions coupled with lockdown measures exacer-
bated existing situations of abuse and control. According to the International
Growth Centre (Young and Aref-Adib 2020), the number of reported cases of
gender-based violence in Nigeria increased from 300 to more than 700 following
the introduction of lockdowns in March 2020.
According to UN Women (Puri 2016), the cost (public, private, and social) of
violence against women worldwide amounts to $1.5 trillion. Duvvury and others
(2013) found that violence against women can cost up to 3.7 percent of GDP in
some countries. Although the sub-Saharan African region has the highest level of
domestic violence against women, empirical studies of its potential economic
impact are scarce, mainly due to data limitations.
This chapter presents a novel approach to assess the economic impact of vio-
lence against women and girls in 18 sub-Saharan countries. The data on the
prevalence of violence against women and girls stem from the Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) database compiled by the Demographic and
Health Survey Program of the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID). This database includes country surveys from the 1980s to the present.
The analysis uses several types of violence against women, including physical
(hurting, punching, and slapping, among others), emotional (attempts to embar-
rass, shame, blame, frighten, control, or isolate), and sexual violence. These data
were combined with the level of economic activity (approximated by nighttime
light data per capita) for 224 districts in sub-Saharan Africa. To address the prob-
lem that economic activity could affect the level of violence against women and
girls and vice versa (endogeneity), an instrumental variable approach was used to
examine the following questions based on cross-district variations:
• How does violence against women and girls affect the level of economic
activity in sub-Saharan Africa?
• Is there any evidence that violence against women and girls affects labor
supply?
• How do protective laws against domestic violence, natural resources, the
decision-making power of women, and the business cycle affect the impact
of violence against women and girls in economic activity?
The analysis showed that violence against women and girls has a negative
effect on economic activity. The impact is both economically and statistically
significant. The results show that an increase by 1 percentage point of women

Chapter 6 Eliminating Violence against Women and Boosting the Economy 115
subject to domestic violence is associated with a drop of per capita nightlights of

about 9 percent in a given district. More violence is associated with a significant
drop in female employment. Moreover, violence against women is more detri-
mental to economic development in countries without protective laws against
domestic violence, in countries rich in natural resources, in countries where
women are deprived of decision-making power, and during economic downturns.
The economic cost of violence against women is higher in countries where the
gender gap in education between partners is high.
The findings imply that sub-Saharan African countries should strengthen laws
to combat violence against women and reinforce women’s decision-making
power. Furthermore, promoting women’s education will be key to reducing the
gender gap in education and the influence and control of men. Sub-Saharan
African countries should also address the increased levels of domestic violence due
to the COVID-19 pandemic to bolster economic recovery.
The rest of the chapter offers a discussion of the main channels through which
violence against women and girls affects economic growth; a look at the data and
extent of global violence against women and girls with a focus on sub-Saharan
Africa; the empirical strategy and baseline results; and a discussion of the trans-
mission channels. The chapter also addresses further variables determining the
impact of domestic violence on levels of economic activity and presents conclud-
ing remarks.
TRANSMISSION CHANNELS, THE DATA, AND

STYLIZED FACTS
The main channels through which violence against women and girls potentially
affects economic growth are fewer hours worked (absenteeism), reduced produc-
tivity per hour worked (presenteeism), lower long-term labor supply (indirect
effect due to violence), less investment in human capital formation, and less
investment in physical capital due to higher consumption of health and judicial
services (see, for instance, Duvvury and others 2013). Figure 6.1 offers a stylized
visualization.
The analysis in this chapter is based on 29 integrated Demographic and
Health Surveys (DHS) from the USAID’s DHS Program from 18 sub-Saharan
African countries.2 The surveys have been taken in different years, and the
University of Minnesota Population Center harmonized them for comparability
of variables across countries and over time. The sample covers more than 440,000
women. IPUMS also includes information on current residences so that individ-
uals can be assigned to administrative units, typically districts or provinces,
according to the administrative division of each country.
2
The data have been extracted from IPUMS Global Health, hosted by the University of Minnesota
Population Center. The original data are from USAID’s DHS program, and sampling and methodol-
ogy per country can be found here: https://dhsprogram.com/.

Figure 6.1. Violence against Women and Girls and Economic Growth:
Transmission Channels
Less hours worked

Short-term economic
activity
Lower productivity per
hour worked
Violence against Lower labor supply

women and girls
Lower human capital Long-term economic

formation activity
Less public and private

investment in physical
capital due to higher
consumptions of health
and judicial services
Source: Authors, based on Duvvury and others 2013.
The extent of violence against women and girls by intimate partners is

measured by answers to the survey question: “Have you experienced mistreat-
ment by your husband or intimate partner, including punching with a fist or
something harmful, slapping, pushing, or throwing something, threatening
with harm, emotional violence, and sexual violence?” Drawing on the
responses, the share of women subjected to intimate partner violence was
calculated at the district level for each variable and construct a composite
index of domestic violence, which is the simple average of the previously
mentioned variables.
Economic development at the district level is proxied by nighttime lights data
provided by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The most com-
monly used measure for economic activity, GDP, is not available at the district
level. Recent studies have shown that nightlight satellite data are highly correlated
with economic activities, with a coefficient of correlation up to 70 percent
(Hu and Yao 2019; Pinkovskiy and Sala-i Martin 2016). The data capture cleaned
luminosity, after filtering for cloud coverage, other ephemeral lights, and back-
ground noise. In this chapter, nightlights per capita are calculated by dividing the
sum of all nighttime light pixel values within a district by the district’s population.
The population data are from the Gridded Population of the World, Version 4
database provided by the Center for International Earth Science Information
Network.
Control variables such as the size of the agriculture sector (proxied by the share
of cropland), the urbanization rate (share of respondents living in urban areas),

Figure 6.2. Domestic Violence by Income Group and Region

(Percent of husbands/partners committing physical, sexual, or emotional
violence)
1. By Income Group 2. By Region
30 31
29
28
27
26 25
23
24 21
19
22
17
20 15
Low income Lower middle Upper middle
Sub-Saharan
Africa
East Asia and
Pacific
Europe and
Central Asia
Latin America and
the Caribbean
Middle East and
North Africa
South Asia
income income
Sources: USAID’s DHS Program; and authors’ calculations.

Note: Black line indicates average.
infrastructure (time to a water source and total road lengths), education (average
number of years of schooling), conflict intensity (number of conflict-related
deaths over the population), and religious fractionalization (religious beliefs of
respondents) are from the IPUMS data set; road lengths is from the Center for
International Earth Science Information Network (2013). These variables are
usually considered strong determinants of economic development.
What do the data show about the extent of physical, sexual, and emotional violence
against women? Such violence is pervasive, according to the survey data (Figures 6.1–
6.3). Moreover, it appears to depend on the country’s level of development as the
violence is somewhat higher in low-income than middle-income countries.3
3
The sample of countries in the study includes: Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Malawi, Maldives,
Mali, Moldova, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea,
Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The classification follows
the World Bank’s classification of countries by income groups: https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/
knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups.

Figure 6.3. Domestic Violence by Country

(Percent of husbands/partners committing physical, sexual, or emotional
violence)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Papua New Guinea
Afghanistan
Liberia
Congo Democratic Republic
Cameroon
Mozambique
Uganda
Gabon
Tanzania
Timor-Leste
Sierra Leone
Mali
Angola
Ghana
Kenya
Malawi
Zimbabwe
Sâo Tomé and Príncipe
Benin
Burundi
Zambia
Nigeria
Dominican Republic
Namibia
Côte d'Ivoire
Togo
Ethiopia
Rwanda
Pakistan
India
Tajikistan
Chad
Honduras
Haiti
Moldova
Ukraine
Jordan
Kyrgyz Republic
Cambodia
Egypt
Peru
Guatemala
South Africa
Senegal
Myanmar
Philippines
Nepal
Burkina Faso
The Gambia
Azerbaijan
Maldives
Comoros
Armenia
Sources: USAID’s DHS Program; and authors’ calculations.
Note: Sub-Saharan African countries are marked in red.
The IPUMS data also show that sub-Saharan Africa has the highest rate of domestic
violence globally, with more than 30 percent of women having experienced intimate
partner violence, followed by the East Asia and Pacific regions. In Afghanistan, Papua
New Guinea, Liberia, and Democratic Republic of the Congo, nearly half of all
women experienced physical, sexual, or emotional violence committed by a husband
or partner.4
The percentage of women across sub-Saharan African countries who reported
experiencing physical, emotional, or sexual violence by their current husband or
partner ranges widely. For example, about 1 percent of women in Comoros
reported that a husband or partner punched them with a fist or something harm-
ful, compared with 18 percent of women in Gabon. Women reporting sexual
violence ranges from about 2 percent in Burkina Faso to 27 percent in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo; emotional violence ranges from about
6 percent in Comoros to 47 percent in Gabon. Slapping occurs frequently, with
more than one-third of women reporting being slapped by a husband or partner
in Gabon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, and Zambia. The
threat of harm is also common since nearly 20 percent of women reported they
have been threatened with harm in Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and Uganda (Table 6.1).
4
It is worth noting that these numbers can differ from those from more recent country surveys.

TABLE 6.1.
Type of Domestic Violence

Did she Was she Was she ever Did she Did she ever
present any ever pushed, ever experience
physical punched shaken, experience any sexual
results of with fist or Was she or had Was she ever any violence
husband’s something ever something threatened emotional from
actions? harmful? slapped? thrown at with harm? violence? partner?
Country (%) (%) (%) her? (%) (%) (%) (%)
Angola 11.8 11.1 29.4 10.6 7.2 25.0 7.8
Burkina Faso 3.6 5.8 8.7 4.2 6.5 9.8 1.5
Burundi 18.8 10.9 36.5 14.1 7.0 25.5 25.6
Cameroon 17.8 16.9 36.4 21.9 19.7 36.9 15.1
Comoros ... 1.1 4.0 3.0 0.4 5.5 1.7
DR Congo 23.4 14.3 40.6 26.0 19.3 38.3 27.1
Côte d’Ivoire 8.1 13.0 19.8 10.6 7.5 18.0 5.1
Ethiopia 6.1 6.7 15.9 11.5 7.2 22.3 7.6
Gabon ... 17.8 42.0 24.9 3.6 47.0 15.5
The Gambia ... 2.9 14.9 5.1 0.6 17.3 2.9
Ghana 8.7 5.0 16.6 9.4 9.0 33.0 6.7
Kenya 13.3 13.3 31.2 19.7 14.4 27.7 13.0
Malawi 9.1 8.7 17.9 8.1 9.0 20.7 15.8
Mali 5.0 8.6 15.5 6.2 6.2 16.1 6.5
Mozambique 6.3 10.7 26.9 9.2 5.4 34.9 7.8
Namibia 8.4 13.0 18.8 15.6 12.0 25.3 7.3
Nigeria 5.0 3.8 14.7 6.3 6.1 21.2 4.8
Rwanda 11.3 11.5 28.3 15.4 9.0 18.8 15.0
Senegal 5.8 7.9 15.2 5.5 4.9 13.4 6.3
Sierra Leone ... 8.8 37.4 21.1 1.3 40.0 6.6
South Africa 5.1 ... ... 12.8 6.2 18.7 3.5
Tanzania 25.2 16.8 31.8 15.4 8.2 31.8 12.6
Chad ... 7.7 20.6 10.3 1.3 22.4 8.9
Togo ... 9.4 19.6 10.0 0.8 21.6 8.1
Uganda 19.4 17.1 36.5 21.1 19.4 42.6 24.7
Zambia 14.6 13.0 36.8 14.6 9.3 25.0 17.0
Zimbabwe 11.8 10.5 25.1 10.6 10.4 29.1 13.3
Sources: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series database; and authors’ calculations.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND BASELINE RESULTS

The following estimating equation further investigates the impact of intimate partner
violence against women on economic activity, proxied by nightlights per capita:
Nightlightsij,t = α + βViolenceij,t + γX΄ij,t + πj + ϕt + μij,t (6.1)
where, for district i from country j at time t, Nightlightsij,t represents nighttime
lights per capita, Violenceij,t is the share of women who experienced domestic vio-
lence, Vector X΄ij,t includes control variables.5 πj and ϕt are country and time fixed
5
The approach accounts for the influence of variables on economic activity traditionally consid-
ered important determinants of economic development (Mamo, Bhattacharyya, and Moradi 2019;
Egert, Kozluk, and Sutherland 2009; Alesina and others 2003; Barro 2001; Alesina and others 1996),
including the share of the agriculture sector, the degree of urbanization, infrastructure, education,
conflict, and religious fractionalization.

effects, respectively. The inclusion of these fixed effects accounts for country-
specific and time-invariant characteristics that may affect nightlight per capita. μij,t
is the error term.
The key challenges for estimating the effect of domestic violence on night-
lights per capita are reverse causality, omitted and unobservable variables, and
measurement errors. First, the level of economic activity could affect the level of
domestic violence. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, spikes
occurred in domestic violence (UN Women 2020). Second, some variables may
be subject to measurement error. Data on the prevalence of intimate partner
violence collected through surveys could be inaccurate since, generally, victims of
domestic violence tend to underreport it, either due to fear of retaliation, privacy
concerns, or other societal factors (Felson and others 2006; Krantz 2002). Third,
many potential variables affect the level of economic activity at a given point in
time and over time. Key control variables and other unobserved variables that
could affect both economic activity and domestic violence (for instance, cultural
and social norms, and economic inequality) could be missing. Consequently,
estimating equation (6.1) could lead to biased results.
To address the first problem of endogeneity, an instrumental variable
approach—the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method—was used. The average
level of domestic violence in neighboring districts was used as the instrument for
domestic violence in a given district. “Neighboring districts” are those that share
the same borders. To use the average level of gender-based violence in bordering
countries as an instrument, two conditions should be met: (1) the instrument
needs to be relevant (meaning that gender-based violence in bordering districts
needs to correlate with the level of gender-based violence in a given district) and
(2) the instrument should be exogenous (meaning that gender-based violence in
bordering districts should be uncorrelated with nightlights per capita in a given
district or the error term in estimating equation [6.1]). Several papers have used
similar instrumental variables (Acemoglu and others 2019; Caselli and Reynaud
2019; Cherif, Hasanov, and Wang 2018).
Regarding the relevance of the instrument, it seems likely that regional cultural
closeness could lead neighboring districts to share some common values and behav-
iors. Physically close proximity naturally facilitates communication, social interac-
tion, diffusion of cultural values, and learning across different societies; therefore,
people may share common behaviors such as the acceptance of domestic violence.
It is thus plausible that the level of domestic gender-based violence in neighboring
districts is a good predictor of domestic violence in a given district. Regarding the
exogeneity of the instrument, as Cherif, Hasanov, and Wang (2018) emphasized, a
country could be affected by spillovers from its neighbors mostly, but not
exclusively, through trade and finance. To address the spillover issue that could
invalidate the exogeneity of the instrument, they controlled for the average real
GDP per capita in neighboring countries as a proxy for the spillover effect. This
chapter follows this approach and controls for the average nightlights per capita in
bordering districts in the second stage. Furthermore, as in Acemoglu and others
(2019) and Cherif, Hasanov, and Wang (2018), controlling for time and district

Figure 6.4. The Impact of Violence against Women and Girls on Economic
Activity per Violence Type: Baseline Results
(Percentage points)
0
–2
–4
–6 ***
***
–8
*** ***
–10 ***
–12
–14 ***
–16 ***
–18
***
–20
Composite index
Was she ever

threatened with
harm? (%)
Was she ever pushed,

shaken, or had something
thrown at her? (%)
Did she ever

experience any
emotional violence? (%)
Did she ever experience

any sexual violence
from partner? (%)
Was she ever punched

with fist or something
harmful? (%)
Did she present any

physical results of
husband’s actions? (%)
Was she ever

slapped? (%)
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
fixed effects that could affect nightlights per capita allows for parametrical removal
of the influence of unobserved fixed characteristics common to districts.
Based on this approach, strong evidence exists that violence against women
and girls has a substantial negative impact on economic activity in sub-Saharan
Africa. Figure 6.4 shows the estimated coefficients associated with violence
against women. The bars represent the size of the impact, and the stars represent
the level of significance of the coefficients. Using the composite index of violence
against women, the results suggest that an increase of 1 percentage point could
reduce nightlights per capita by about 9 percent. The results also indicate that the
impact depends on the type of violence. Threatening with harm, punching with
a fist or something harmful, and causing emotional violence appear most detri-
mental to economic activity.
A Transmission Channel
Violence against women and girls reduces economic activity through multiple
channels. The evidence shows that a reduced labor supply is important. Extensive
literature documents the relationship between employment and domestic vio-
lence. Previous studies found that experiencing intimate partner violence is asso-
ciated with increased absenteeism over the long term and presenteeism in the
short term through tardiness, not showing up for work, use of sick days, and

problems with concentration, job performance, and productivity (Reeves and

O’Leary-Kelly 2007; Swanberg, Logan, and Macke 2005; Brush 2002). Other
studies point out that women who are in abusive relationships tend to experience
high rates of job loss and turnover and are frequently forced to quit or be fired
(Swanberg and Logan 2005; Bell 2003). Some research papers also emphasize that
compared to nonabused women, abused women sustain two to three times more
injuries requiring surgery and tend to be socially excluded, making them less
likely to be employed (Damonti 2014; Campbell 2002).
Ideally, data on women’s annual hours worked would be needed to assess the
effects of intimate partner violence on labor supply. Since these data are unavailable,
we use data on women’s participation in the official labor markets (thus excluding
agriculture, informal jobs, and unpaid jobs), which the IPUMS data set includes. This
approach implicitly assumes that the only way domestic violence affects labor supply
is to discourage women from participating in the formal labor market. But domestic
violence also reduces labor supply through reduced hours worked per day or missed
working days while an affected woman would still be participating in the labor mar-
ket. Also, the exclusion of agriculture, informal, and unpaid jobs means that the proxy
is likely to underestimate the impact of domestic violence on labor supply.
We use the same methodological approach to estimate the impact of violence
against women and girls on economic activity. The results presented in Figure 6.5
show a highly negative impact of violence against women and girls on female
Figure 6.5. A Transmission Channel: Female Employment

(Percentage points)
0
–1
***
–2
***
*** ***
–3 ***
***
–4
***
–5
***
–6
Composite index
Was she ever

threatened with
harm? (%)
Was she ever punched

with fist or something
harmful? (%)

any emotional
violence? (%)
Was she ever pushed,

shaken, or had something
thrown at her? (%)

any sexual violence
from partner? (%)
Did she present any

physical results of
husband’s actions? (%)
Was she ever

slapped? (%)

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

employment, corroborating that women experiencing abuse are less likely to

work, which in turn reduces economic activity. However, the evidence also sug-
gests that including female employment in the baseline estimation cannot
account for the full impact of violence against women and girls on economic
activity and that further channels exist that could include, for example, lower
productivity per hour worked due to an inability to focus on work or lower edu-
cational attainment associated with violence against women and girls.
MITIGATING AND REINFORCING FACTORS

The data can also be used to shed light on whether certain factors, such as appli-
cable laws on domestic violence, natural resource endowments, economic condi-
tions, and decision-making power, can either mitigate or amplify the effect of
violence against women and girls on economic activity. Therefore, an interaction
term is included in the baseline estimation between the variable of interest and
violence against women and girls. Table 6.2 presents the results.
• Effects of laws on domestic violence: The presence of protective laws
against domestic violence has proven effective in reducing physical, psycho-
logical, and emotional abuse. Laws can not only benefit women seeking to
address domestic violence in their relationships but can also help enhance
their physical and psychological well-being. Some countries are also adopt-
ing protective provisions to help ensure that domestic violence does not
affect women’s labor force participation. Using data from the World Bank’s
Women, Business and the Law, it is possible to define a binary variable,
taking the value of 1 if the country has adopted protective laws against
domestic violence at the time of the survey, and 0 otherwise. Defining a
binary variable and adding the interaction term shows that the negative
effect of gender-based violence on nightlights per capita diminishes in coun-
tries with legal provisions against domestic violence. Legal provisions can
help reduce the occurrence of domestic violence by deterring abusive behav-
ior and providing women access to justice for violence-related cases (Dugan
2002), which could enhance their well-being and boost economic participa-
tion and contributions.
• Effects of natural resources: Previous studies provide evidence that mining
zones can be a hostile climate for women in general (International Labour
Organization 2007). Opening new mines can trigger a structural shift in
employment patterns in Africa, with women leaving the agricultural fields
for informal service jobs around the mining sites (for instance, as vendors)
or leaving the labor market (Kotsadam, Ostby, and Rustad 2017). Ross
(2008, 2012) emphasized that an increase in natural resources leads to lower
female employment since revenues tend to push out low-wage and
export-oriented factories. Drawing on this employment shift, reduced
female economic power, and women’s dependence on their partners,
Kotsadam, Ostby, and Rustad (2017) concluded that natural resources can

increase women’s risk of abuse by their intimate partners. In environments

in which women’s dependency is high, domestic violence could be elevated,
which could also lead to a high adverse economic impact. To test this
hypothesis, data on mining sites from the United States Geological Survey
(2014) was used to construct a variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a
mining site in the district and 0 otherwise. Adding this interaction term
shows that the economic costs of domestic violence are higher in resource-
rich districts.
• Economic conditions and commodity price shocks: Previous studies
underscored that a proliferation of intimate partner violence followed the
Great Depression (Liker and Elder 1983; Conger and others 1990). Sharp
economic downturns could increase abusive behavior in two ways
(Schneider, Harknett, and McLanahan 2016): First, the direct experience
of job loss and material hardship increases abusive behavior. Men who
might otherwise have kept negative behaviors in check may succumb to the
stress of challenging economic circumstances and engage in abusive behav-
ior. Second, worsening macroeconomic conditions increase abusive behav-
ior by increasing uncertainty and fear among a broad population segment.
The construction of an interaction variable between commodity prices and
violence against women and girls allows an exploration of this assumption.6
The results show that the economic costs of domestic violence are higher
during a commodity price slump, implying that the increase in domestic
violence during the pandemic could have detrimental effects on economic
development.
• Decision-making power and gender gap in education: Women’s
decision-making power and educational inequality between women and
men living in the same household are another important dimension to
consider. Many researchers have associated intimate partner violence with
unbalanced power and control, and women with limited decision-making
power were found to be subject to more physical violence (Rahman and
others 2013; Koenig and others 2003). In fact, higher decision-making
power could increase women’s ability to escape domestic violence, lessen its
intensity, or deter violent partners. In addition, education has been shown
to help safeguard against abuse (Amegbor and Rosenberg 2019; Garcia-
Moreno and others 2005). High educational attainment is negatively asso-
ciated with being both a victim and a perpetrator of abuse (Cools and
Kotsadam 2017; Pierotti 2013; Mocan and Cannonier 2012; Jewkes
2002). The results corroborate these hypotheses. Districts in which women
6
Economic conditions at a district level are proxied by a commodity price index based on the main
commodities of each district from the IPUMS data set. The commodities include gold, maize, rice,
soybean, sugarcane, wheat, sunflower, groundnut, and palm oil. We use the difference in prices
between the year prior to the survey and the survey year to build the index with price data from the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development data set.

TABLE 6.2.
Mitigating and Reinforcing Factors

Dependent variable: nighttime light per capita
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Violence against women −7.3210*** −14.9031*** −9.4469*** −31.6915*** −20.9654**
(2.604) (3.395) (1.547) (5.884) (7.863)
Violence *law 5.2341**
(2.424)
Law 0.7963*
(0.480)
Violence *natural resources −10.3803***
(3.071)
Natural resources −1.4481***
(0.497)
Violence *economic conditions 0.7044**
(0.224)
Economic conditions −0.0273
(0.087)
Violence *decision power 44.9079***
(8.812)
Decision power 7.0456***
(1.643)
Violence *education gap −21.3012*
(12.495)
Education gap −4.7622**
(1.195)
Agriculture −0.1180 0.1616 0.0417 0.0436 −0.1406
(0.209) (0.250) (0.203) (0.261) (0.239)
Urban area 0.5708* 0.3398 0.3562 0.2835 0.8105***
(0.303) (0.339) (0.311) (0.311) (0.288)
Time to water source 0.0030 0.0002 −0.0046 −0.0018 −0.0119***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Roads 0.0512*** 0.0617*** 0.0473*** 0.0028 0.0683***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017)
Education 0.6046** 0.7957*** 0.6616*** 1.2004*** 0.2835
(0.297) (0.272) (0.191) (0.315) (0.291)
Conflict −0.0728** −0.0905** −0.0693** −0.0937*** −0.1072***
(0.035) (0.041) (0.033) (0.024) (0.028)
Religious fractionalization 0.3103 0.6289 0.2173 0.2694 −0.5366*
(0.332) (0.385) (0.326) (0.342) (0.324)
Neighbors’ nighlight per capita 0.2941** 0.3057** 0.2858*** 0.3597** 0.2235**
(0.120) (0.133) (0.110) (0.147) (0.108)
Constant −0.3100 0.5240 −0.1097 2.7384*** −2.8206
(0.406) (0.537) (0.420) (0.823) (1.881)
First stage
Neighbors’ domestic violence 0.7008*** 0.4925*** 0.8093*** 0.2212*** 0.1629**
(0.128) (0.110) (0.102) (0.033) (0.070)
Observations 319 337 333 337 337
R2 0.759 0.584 0.687 0.582 0.802
F-test, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 22.03 40.04 69.84 30.70 3.89
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 18.18 18.61 41.20 29.66 9.16
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 10.82 59.21 44.28 58.92 18.29
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

have more decision-making power or where the level of education is more

equal between men and women experience a lower effect of violence
against women and girls on economic activity.7
CONCLUSION
The research shows that higher violence levels against women and girls are asso-
ciated with lower economic development. The results suggest that an increase in
violence against women by 1 percentage point can reduce nightlights per capita,
which is strongly correlated with economic activity, by around 9 percent. Strong
evidence suggests that the negative impact of violence against women and girls on
the labor supply of victims drives this adverse effect. Furthermore, the results
show that the negative economic effects of violence against women is higher in
countries without protective laws against domestic violence, countries rich in
natural resources countries where women are deprived of decision-making power,
and during economic downturns. A significant gender gap in education also
contributes to higher adverse effects of violence against women.
The findings have several potential policy implications: First, these findings
imply that adopting and reinforcing laws against domestic violence and strength-
ening women’s decision-making power could help lower violence and the eco-
nomic cost of domestic violence. As previous studies showed, strong laws are
crucial to deter violence against women, protect victims of domestic violence, and
promote women’s participation in the labor markets. Second, the results highlight
that sub-Saharan African countries should encourage girls’ education to reduce
the gender gap in education and attenuate men’s influence and control. Third,
sub-Saharan African countries should pay attention to the increased levels of
domestic violence during the COVID-19 pandemic. As the data show, the eco-
nomic cost of violence against women is higher during downturns, suggesting
that the economic recovery from the current crisis could take longer if domestic
violence is not addressed. Finally, sub-Saharan African governments should
implement targeted policies to ensure that women benefit equally from the
exploitation of natural resources.
7
The level of decision-making power is proxied by leveraging an IPUMS survey question about
women’s ability to make decisions about their health care to construct an indicator of the percentage
of women able to make their own decisions regarding health care needs. As for the gender gap in
education, the IPUMS data set allows a calculation of the difference between the education levels of
husbands and wives at the district level.

ANNEX 6.1
ANNEX TABLE 6.1.1.
List of Country Survey Years in the Sample

Country Survey year Number of districts Number of individuals
Angola 2015 14 14,379
Burundi 2016 17 17,269
Cameroon 2004 10 10,656
Cameroon 2011 11 15,426
Comoros 2012 3 3,815
Democratic Republic of Congo 2007 9 9,995
Democratic Republic of Congo 2013 9 18,827
Ethiopia 2016 11 15,683
Ghana 2008 12 4,916
Kenya 2003 11 8,195
Kenya 2008 11 8,444
Kenya 2014 11 31,079
Malawi 2010 28 23,020
Malawi 2016 27 24,562
Mali 2006 8 14,583
Mali 2012 6 10,424
Mozambique 2011 10 13,745
Namibia 2013 12 10,018
Nigeria 2008 5 33,385
Nigeria 2013 5 38,948
Senegal 2017 14 16,787
South Africa 2016 7 8,514
Zimbabwe 2005 10 8,907
Zimbabwe 2010 10 9,171
Zimbabwe 2015 10 9,955
Tanzania 2010 24 10,139
Tanzania 2015 27 13,266
Burkina Faso 2010 13 17,087
Zambia 2007 8 7,146
Zambia 2013 8 16,411
Total 224 444,752

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CHAPTER 7
Eliminating Child Marriage and

Boosting Growth
Pritha Mitra, Eric M. Pondi, Malika Pant, and
Luiz F. Almeida
This chapter quantifies the relationship between child marriage and economic growth.
It confirms that ending child marriage is critical from a human rights and develop-
ment perspective, and it also has important macroeconomic implications. The analysis
shows that eliminating child marriage would significantly improve economic
growth—ending child marriage today would result in a 1.05 percentage point increase
in the long-term annual per capita real GDP growth in emerging and developing
countries. Given the strong interdependent relationship between education and child
marriage, education policies should be prioritized when developing comprehensive
strategies to end child marriage. Key complementary policies include addressing health
care, social assistance to poor and marginalized children, and excessive school dropout
rates for girls due to pregnancy.
INTRODUCTION
Child marriage is a serious human rights issue. As of 2021, 1 out of 5 girls in
emerging and developing countries (EMDCs) was married before the age of 18,
with the highest rate in sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 7.1).1 These numbers are likely
to have grown dramatically with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, where
measures to contain the pandemic’s spread (such as lockdowns) are likely to have
undermined strategies to end child marriage—including through loss of educa-
tion, reduced access to sexual and reproductive health information and services,
and limitations on access to social support networks (United Nations Children’s
Fund [UNICEF] 2021a). UNICEF (2021b) estimates that the pandemic has put
an additional 10 million girls at risk of child marriage by 2030. Overall, the
Sustainable Development Goal of putting an end to child marriage by 2030
appears more out of reach.
1
Child marriage is defined as a marriage or union involving a child under the age of 18 (UNICEF
Global Databases 2022).
131

Figure 7.1. Child Marriages, 2016–21

(Percent)
40
30
Average
20
10
0
Sub-Saharan Africa South Asia Latin America and Eastern Europe and
the Caribbean Central Asia
Source: UNICEF Global Databases 2022.
Note: Percent of women aged 20 to 24 years who were first married or in a union before age 18.
The consequences of child marriage are wide-ranging and inextricably linked

with poverty reduction, inequality, and economic growth. The literature has
found that child marriage substantially increases fertility and population growth
and reduces educational attainment, resulting in lower earnings and productivity.
Child marriage also harms the health of mothers, increases intergenerational
poverty and inequality, is associated with increased family violence and gender
inequality, and reduces women’s decision-making power (Wodon and others
2017a). Through these and other channels, child marriage not only hurts chil-
dren and families, it also constrains economic growth and development.
Mitra and others (2020) found that if child marriage were to end today, the
long-term annual per capita growth in EMDCs would increase by more than 1
percentage point. The paper is the first to quantify the impact of child marriage
on economic growth, and this chapter elaborates on the paper’s key findings,
including insights on policies—such as education and health—that could be
most effective in ending child marriage.
BACKGROUND
Factors contributing to child marriage include social and cultural norms and low
levels of income, education, and family and community health (Lloyd 2005;
UNICEF 2005; Santhya, Haberland, and Singh 2006; Jain and Kurz 2007;
Malhotra and others 2011; United Nations Population Fund 2012; Vogelstein
2013; Klugman and others 2014; UNICEF 2014a, 2014b). For example, social
and cultural norms could bias parents’ decision making when assessing the pros
and cons of having a child wed at a young age as opposed to, for example, having

Chapter 7 Eliminating Child Marriage and Boosting Growth 133
the child complete their primary or secondary education. Limited income or low
education levels among parents or grandparents could also lead to perceiving early
marriage as a way to ensure social and economic stability.
Child marriage has substantial links to poverty and inequality. Wodon and
others (2017a) found that if child marriage were to end by 2030, a group of
106 EMDCs would save an average of about $300 billion per year between
2015 and 2030 from reduced population growth and about $75 billion per year
from improved child health. They also estimated that EMDCs would gain, by
2030, an average of 1 percent of family earnings from improved salaries and
productivity. Chaaban and Cunningham (2011) found similarly striking results
indicating that allowing girls in EMDCs to complete their education (mainly
primary and secondary school) could increase their lifetime earnings by up to
1.5 percent per year. These estimates focus on the impact of child marriage on
girls, but child marriage affects boys, too. Boys who marry early are more likely
to drop out of school and have lower earnings potential. From a broader per-
spective, the long-term impact of child marriage on growth will reflect the
trade-off between increased labor supply—owing to increased fertility rates—
against lower productivity—due to weak education and health outcomes result-
ing from child marriage.
Besides having negative effects on individuals and communities, child mar-
riage could be associated with unfavorable macroeconomic outcomes—
especially muted growth dynamics—when its occurrence is high. However,
assessing this direct or indirect impact is difficult because of the feedback loop
that exists between child marriage and various socioeconomic factors (Wodon
and others 2017a).
The literature on economic growth links per capita economic growth to various
macroeconomic variables such as initial human capital, government consumption,
public investment, or political stability (Barro 1991). Growth models have been
extended to include additional determinants such as social norms (Cole, Mailath,
and Postlewaite 1992), corruption (Mauro 1995), income inequality (Berg and
Ostry 2011), and economic diversification (Papageorgiou and Spatafora 2012).
The challenge in building a growth model where child marriage is an explan-
atory variable is addressing the feedback loop previously mentioned (the endoge-
neity bias). Although child marriage increases poverty and inequality, at the same
time, poorer communities (among other characteristics) are also likely to encour-
age early marriage, especially for girls. While it is challenging to establish the
optimal specification of a growth model, we can assume that child marriage is
likely correlated with relevant growth determinants such as health or education.
Therefore, as Mitra and others (2020) have shown, provided that the endogeneity
bias is removed, the link between child marriage and growth could be assessed
through the channels of health and education.
Key strategies to prevent or delay child marriage include empowering girls
with information, skills, and support networks; educating the community;
improving educational quality and access for girls; offering economic incentives
to parents; and removing barriers in the legal and policy frameworks (Malhotra

and others 2011; Brown 2012; Kalamar, Lee-Rife, and Hindin 2016; Wodon and
others 2018). But no single strategy is enough. For example, adopting laws
against child marriage has not ended the practice (Wodon and others 2017b).
The World Bank’s Sahel Women Empowerment and Demographic regional
project and African Union, United Nations Population Fund, and UNICEF
initiatives are beginning to drive broader policy changes.2 However, comprehen-
sive strategies, including investment in programs and policies to end child mar-
riage, are still lacking.
LINK BETWEEN CHILD MARRIAGE AND GROWTH:

A DESCRIPTIVE APPROACH
Child Marriage in Growth Models
A naïve approach to quantifying the link between child marriage and growth is to
include child marriage directly in a growth model as an explanatory (or control)
variable. Although this approach likely generates a reverse causality bias, it could
provide information on some of the interactions at play. For this exercise, we
follow the growth model by Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004),
which uses a Bayesian approach to identify the variables that matter most for
growth. The following equation is considered:3
Gt,t+T = θ0 + θ1ln(yt) + θ2CMt + γXt + εt,(7.1)
where T is the growth horizon, yt the per capita real GDP in year t, Gt,t+T the
growth rate of the per capita real GDP between years t and t + T, CMt the inci-
dence of child marriage at t, Xt the vector of the other explanatory variables at t,
and εt the error term.
Data
Child marriage is proxied by the percentage of women aged 20 to 24 years who
were first married or in a union before the age of 18. Data for this variable are
often not available as child marriage surveys are not routinely performed (or
performed on average every three to five years at the earliest in countries with
more than one survey, as shown in the UNICEF Global Database on child
marriage). However, given the stability of the distribution of child marriage
across countries and over time (Mitra and others 2020), we include all countries
with at least one data point. Table 7.1 presents the variables that we use for the
analysis. All of the variables are based on the selection process of Sala-i-Martin,
2
The World Bank’s Sahel Women’s Empowerment and Demographic Project was approved in 2014
and has granted housing and academic support to more than 100,000 girls in various sub-Saharan
African countries. UNICEF and United Nations Population Fund in 2016 launched the Global
Programme to End Child Marriage, which has provided sex education and school attendance support
to more than 14 million adolescent girls as of June 2022.
3
The model from which the final results of the study are deduced is presented later.

TABLE 7.1.
Explanatory Variables of Growth

Variable Description (Source)
Log of the per capita GDP Real GDP per capita in PPP terms (IMF)
Child marriage Percentage of women aged 20 to 24 years, married or in
union before age 18 (UNICEF Global Database 2022)
Human capital index Based on years of schooling and returns to education
(Penn World Table 9)
Life expectancy at birth Total (World Bank World Development Indicators)
East Asia dummy 1 for East Asia countries and 0 otherwise
Share of extractable commodities in Percent (Updated from Chapter 2, IMF World Economic
total exports Outlook, October 2015)
Fraction of tropical area Percent (Gallup, Mellinger, and Sachs 2010)
Trade openness Import+Export in percent of GDP (IMF)
Relative price of investment Ratio price level of capital formation - price level of
household consumption (Penn World Table 9)
Share of government consumption Percentage of per capita GDP (in PPP terms) related to
government consumption
Note: UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund); PPP (Parity Purchasing Power).
Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004), except child marriage. The final database con-
sists of 112 countries, mostly low-income countries,4 with variables observed
between 1997 and 2017.
Results
We estimate four growth models based on the additional dependent variables that
we use besides the initial income level. Model M1 includes only child marriage;
model M2 includes child marriage and its squared value (to test the nonlinearity
of the potential effects); model M3 includes only the controls from Sala-i-Martin,
Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004); and model M4 adds child marriage to M3.
Models M1 and M2 confirm that the effect of child marriage on growth is likely
negative and linear, as the square of child marriage is not significant. Given the
omission of the other macroeconomic variables affecting growth (translated into a
small R 2), the consistency of these estimates is debatable. Nonetheless, the two
models confirm the negative correlation between child marriage and growth. The
results from model M3 are consistent with the growth literature (Sala-i-Martin,
Doppelhofer, and Miller 2004 provide a summary) and have an R 2 of 0.45, indicat-
ing reasonable goodness of fit. Box 7.1 presents these results in detail. Finally,
model M4 confirms that the marginal effect of child marriage on growth is negative.
However, unlike in M1, that effect is not significant—suggesting correlations
between child marriage and the other explanatory variables need to be accounted for.
The signs, the marginal effects, and the standard errors for the other explanatory
variables are consistent with M3 (Box 7.1).
4
Due to the data attrition for some countries, the number of observations in some regressions
decreases to 76 countries.

TABLE 7.2.
Growth Models with Child Marriage

Variables M1 M2 M3 M4
Log of the per capita GDP −0.80*** −0.79*** −1.26*** −1.27***
Child marriage −0.02*** −0.03* −0.00
Child marriage (squared) 0.00
Human Capital Index 0.76*** 0.75***
Life expectancy at birth 0.02 0.02
East Asia dummy 1.04*** 1.04***
Extractable commodities in total 0.00 0.00
exports
Fraction of tropical area −0.61*** −0.61***
Trade openness −0.00 −0.00
Relative price of investment 0.01 0.01
Share of government consumption −0.02* −0.02*
Intercept 4.45*** 4.57*** 3.72*** 3.79***
P-value 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
R2 0.16 0.16 0.45 0.45
Note: M1 = Child marriage as the only control;
M2 = Child marriage and its squared value as controls;
M3 = Growth model with controls from Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004);
M4 = Child marriage and growth factors as controls.
*p < 0.10; ***p < 0.01.
Box 7.1. Results of Growth Model with Controls from Sala-i-Martin,

Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004)1
For the countries included in the sample, growth per capita between 1997 and 2017 is
(1) positively impacted by the human capital index and the East Asia dummy and (2) neg-
atively impacted by per capita GDP in 1997, the fraction of tropical areas in the country,
and the share of government consumption in GDP. Besides the extreme growth figures for
East Asian countries during 1997–2017 (due to the Asian crisis and a V-shaped recovery as
well as rapid economic diversification), these results reflect that a more educated popula-
tion supports higher productivity and growth; wealthier countries are more likely to expe-
rience lower long-run growth than poorer countries that have further to catch up; govern-
ment consumption in EMDCs often crowds out more productive private investment; and
most tropical countries are EMDCs.
Notably, the coefficient for life expectancy is not significant, which may be due to its
correlation with the human capital index (Pearson correlation of 0.64 in the database). The
coefficients for trade openness and the share of extractable commodities in exports, both
proxies for economic diversification, are also not significant. The remaining explanatory
variables are not significant but are of the correct sign.2,3
1
See results of model M3 in Table 7.2.
2
Wealthier countries are assumed to have intense commercial interactions worldwide, nat-
urally increasing their trade openness, measured in this paper as (Imports + Exports) / GDP.
3
The results are robust to the addition of the terms of trade and credit to the private sector.
See Mitra and others 2020 for more details.

Link between Child Marriage and Fundamental

Growth Factors
The channels through which child marriage could impact growth are multiple. Studies
outline five main channels: health, education, fertility, labor force participation, and
decision making.5 Given the overlap across these channels, we consolidate them into
the channels of health, education, and labor force participation, with a focus on the
first two (using labor force participation only for robustness checks). For example,
health and fertility are closely linked, as are education and labor force participation.
Moreover, Wodon and others (2017a) showed that although child marriage reduces
earnings and household welfare, its impact on women’s labor force participation is
marginal—where the latter is more related to girls’ education attainment. Also, health
affects decision making (for example, HIV/AIDS) and education.
To understand the interactions between child marriage and growth factors
(especially health and education), we regress child marriage on the growth factors
from Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004). We consider the following
equation for child marriage in a given year t (model M5):
CMt = β0 + β1Het−h + β2Edut−h + βX t2 + εt2 , (7.2)
where CMt is the proportion of child marriage at time t, Het−h and Edut−h represent
overall health and education levels, respectively, lagged by h periods relative to t,
X t2 is the vector of other explanatory variables at t, and εt2 the error term.
In this equation, child marriage is assumed to depend on lagged values of edu-
cation and health—where past improvements in the levels of education and health
of the family and the community are expected to reduce child marriage. The rest of
the explanatory variables are contemporaneous macroeconomic variables reflecting
the idea that current economic conditions affect a family’s decision to marry their
children early. Endogeneity should not be an issue in this setting, as it can be
assumed that current rates of child marriage would take several years to affect mac-
roeconomic variables. We apply a lag of five years for the education and health
variables, allowing the equation to capture the education and health levels when the
girls married (our child marriage data are collected on girls aged 20–24 years).
The results indicate that GDP per capita, the East Asia dummy, and lagged human
capital are significantly and negatively linked to child marriage, while the fraction of
tropical areas is significantly and positively correlated with child marriage (see
Table 7.3). These findings support the idea that the education of the child, the family,
and the community help reduce child marriage; poorer countries, often located in the
tropics, have higher instances of child marriage; and the rapid economic development
in East Asia during the 1990s resulted in an exceptional decline in child marriage.6
5
Note that these channels imply correlation and not necessarily causality.
6
These results are robust to changing the lags on the human capital index and life expectancy from
five to seven years. They are also robust to the addition of variables such as the terms of trade, credit
to private sector, and labor force participation. The lack of significance of life expectancy may be due
to its correlation with the human capital index. See Mitra and others (2020) for details.

TABLE 7.3.
Child Marriage Explained by Growth Factors

Variables Coeff.
Log GDP per capita −13.01*
Human Capital Index −11.27***
Life expectancy at birth 0.12
East Asia dummy −12.55***
Extractable commodities in total exports −0.01
Fraction of tropical area 10.81***
Trade openness −0.00
Relative price of investment −1.95
Share of government consumption −0.05
Intercept 85.00***
P-value 0.00
R2 0.56
Note: This model is later referred to as Model M5.
*p < 0.10; ***p < 0.01.
A MODEL FOR CHILD MARRIAGE AND GROWTH

Model
The model builds on the interdependence between child marriage, education,
and health as previously discussed. Child marriage is assumed to depend on past
levels of health and education and education to depend on past levels of health.
Therefore the following simultaneous equation model is used:
{
Gt,t+T = α0 + α1Het + α2Edut + α3CMt + α4ln(yt) + αX t1 + ε1t (7.3)
CMt = β0 + β1Het−h + β2Edut−h + βX t2 + εt2 (7.4)
Edut−h = γ0 + γ1Het−2h + γ3CMt−2h + ε3t−h (7.5)
Where Gt,t+T is the growth rate of the per capita GDP between t and t + T, CM
represents the proportion of child marriage, He and Edu represent overall health
and education levels, y the real GDP per capita, X 1 and X 2 the vectors of other
explanatory variables in equations (7.3) and (7.4), respectively, εi for i = 1,2,3 are
the error terms. h is a lag-time horizon, which is chosen to be five years.
Estimation Strategy
The simultaneous equations model represented by equations (7.3)–(7.5) are esti-
mated through three-stage least squares. This approach helps address potential
endogeneity issues created by some variables being both explanatory and depen-
dent. The three-stage least squares method is an instrumental variable (IV) method
that corrects for potential correlation in the structure of disturbances across equa-
tions. Concretely, it estimates all the model coefficients simultaneously and pro-
ceeds in three steps: (1) applying a two-by-two IV regression, (2) estimating a
consistent covariance matrix of the errors, and (3) applying a multivariate GLS-type
regression by using the covariance matrix estimated in the second step.

TABLE 7.4.
Explanatory Variables in Models (7.3) and (7.4)

Variable Model (7.3) Model (7.4)
Child marriage ü
Log of the per capita GDP ü ü
Human Capital Index ü ü
Life expectancy at birth ü ü
East Asia dummy ü ü
Share of extractable commodities in total exports ü
Fraction of tropical area ü ü
Trade openness ü
Relative price of investment ü
Share of government consumption ü
Terms of trade ü
Given the attrition in child marriage data, the stability of near-term child mar-
riage rates, and the stability of its distribution over the medium term, it is assumed
that:
CMt = CMt−2h = CM (7.6)
The controls in X 1 are the same used in model M3 previously described. In
addition to health and education, they build on the factors selected by Sala-i-
Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004). Likewise, beside health and education,
controls in X 2 are the variables that were significant in model M5 (child marriage
as left-hand variable). We control for endogeneity issues by using lagged variables
(see Mitra and others 2020). Table 7.4 summarizes the variable selection in (7.3)
and (7.4) with details.
Results
Estimation of the simultaneous equations model confirms that child marriage
has a significant and negative impact on growth (see Table 7.5). A decrease in
child marriage by 1 percentage point can increase per capita growth by 0.04
percentage point per year. This result implies that if child marriage were to end
today (proxied by the average rate of child marriage declining to 0), the long-
term annual per capita growth in EMDCs would increase by 1.05 percentage
points (given the linear relationship between child marriage and growth, as
previously highlighted).7 This result is consistent with the findings of Wodon
and others (2017a) and helps further quantify the increases in per capita growth
implied by their results.8 The findings also highlight the intergenerational effects
7
This result is obtained by assuming that end of child marriage corresponds to a decline of its inci-
dence by its average value in the sample (that is, by 26 percentage points).
8
From a sample of 106 countries, Wodon and others (2017a) estimate that the annual benefit from
ending child marriage in 2015 would have increased from $22 billion in 2015 and would be as much
as $566 billion in 2030. This increase, coupled with the leverage effect from the reduction in popu-
lation growth, would naturally lead to important increases in per capita growth.

TABLE 7.5.
Results of Model with Simultaneous Equations

Growth (t,t+T) Child marriage (t) Human Capital (t−h)
Child marriage (t) −0.04** Child marriage −0.02***
(t−2h)
Log of the per capita −1.63*** Log of the per −7.89**
GDP (t) capita GDP (t)
Human Capital Index (t) 0.07 Human Capital −26.80***
Index (t−h)
Life expectancy at 0.02 Life expectancy 0.46** Life expectancy at 0.02***
birth (t) at birth (t−h) birth (t−2h)
East Asia dummy 0.42 East Asia −5.60
dummy
Extractable commodities 0.00
in exports
Fraction of tropical area −0.36 Fraction of trop- 6.18**
ical area
Trade openness (t) −0.00
Relative price of −0.08
investment (t)
Share of government −0.02**
consumption (t)
Credit to private sector (t)
Intercept 7.30*** Intercept 73.23*** Intercept 1.14**
P-value 0.00 P-value 0.00 P-value 0.00
Note: The columns give the results of regressions (7.3), (7.4), and (7.5) of the simultaneous equation model (from left to right).
For a given variable X, X(t) is the value at t and G(t,t+T) is the PPP growth rate between t and t+T. h is the lag horizon.
**p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
of reducing child marriage. Lagged by 10 years, child marriage has an impact on

growth through its effect on education five years later. A 1 percent reduction in
10-year lagged child marriage improves the human capital index by 0.02 per-
cent.9 This result then affects child marriage after another five years and ulti-
mately improves per capita growth by 0.02 percentage point.
Education has a substantial indirect impact on growth through its effect on
child marriage. Lagged education has a significant and negative coefficient in the
estimation of child marriage. A 0.1 deviation improvement in the five-year lagged
human capital index reduces child marriage by 2.7 percentage points. This reduc-
tion, in turn, increases per capita growth by 0.1 percentage point per year.
Considering the standard deviations of both the education proxy and child mar-
riage data, this suggests that lagged education accounts for almost 80 percent of
the effect of child marriage on growth.10
The impact of health on growth is smaller than that of education and is
mainly channeled through the effect of health on education. Lagged health has
9
This result represents an average increase of about 1 percentage point, given the average value of the
human capital index in our sample.
10
The 80 percent figure is obtained by estimating the effects on growth associated with 1 standard
deviation in each variable of interest.

a significant and positive coefficient in the estimation of education. A one-year

improvement in the 10-year lagged life expectancy at birth increases the
human capital index by 0.02 percent. This increase feeds through to a reduc-
tion in child marriage by 0.6 percentage point (this channel accounts for about
40 percent of the effect of the human capital index on child marriage). The
improvement in child marriage then increases per capita growth by 0.02 per-
cent per year. Notably, the effect of the five-year lagged life expectancy on child
marriage is significant and positive. This result could be interpreted as better
survival rates of children resulting in more children being married, absent
policy changes to improve the income levels, education, and cultural
practices.
Mitra and others (2020) showed that the model is robust to changes for vari-
ous assumptions—including income inequality and governance. The following
alternative specifications also do not materially change the results: increasing the
lag-horizon h to seven years; considering child marriage by age 15 (instead of
age 18); successively adding credit to the private sector, and factoring in labor
force participation as additional controls in equation (7.3).
CONCLUSION
Child marriage is a serious human rights issue across many emerging and devel-
oping countries with wide-ranging socioeconomic consequences. Its adverse
impact on population growth, health, education, and earnings—and more
broadly, poverty reduction, and income inequality—have been thoroughly
examined.
Mitra and others (2020) is the first study to examine the overall impact of
child marriage on economic growth. In that paper, we applied a simultaneous
equations model to account for the interdependent relationships among child
marriage, education, and health and the multiple channels through which they
impact economic growth.
While ending child marriage is an important development goal in itself, Mitra
and others (2020) found that reducing child marriage could significantly improve
economic growth. For example, over the long term, a reduction in child marriage
by 1 percentage point could increase annual per capita real GDP growth by
0.04 percentage point. This result means that if child marriage were to end today,
the long-term annual per capita growth in EMDCs would increase by
1.05 percentage points.
While some margin of error always exists around these types of cross-country
econometric estimates, the results of this analysis support the existence of a strong
relationship between child marriage and economic growth. These findings further
strengthen the case for EMDC policymakers to allocate more effort and resources
toward ending child marriage.
As countries develop comprehensive strategies toward ending child mar-
riage, the results of Mitra and others (2020) can also provide insights on

policy prioritization in developing strategies to end child marriage. In

particular:
• The strong interdependent relationship between education and child mar-
riage suggests that education policies should be prioritized when developing
comprehensive strategies to end child marriage. For example, past education
accounts for almost 80 percent of the effect of child marriage on growth.
Through this channel, an improvement in the human capital index (reflect-
ing years of schooling and returns to education) by 0.1 percent could raise
per capita growth by 0.1 percentage point per year.
• Improving education, both the quality and years of schooling, will also
require stepping up complementary policies such as social assistance to poor
and marginalized children, better infrastructure building for hygiene and
transportation, and addressing excessive school dropout rates for girls due to
pregnancy—in some countries, official policies expel pregnant girls from
school.11
• Health care policies also have an important role, though indirect, in ending
child marriage as shown by the importance of better health outcomes on
increasing levels of—and returns to—education.
• Stepped-up outreach and education for governments and affected commu-
nities (especially parents) on the costs of child marriage will also be critical
to ending child marriage.
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Journal of Economics 106 (2): 407–43.
Berg, Andrew G., and Jonathan D. Ostry. 2011. “Inequality and Unsustainable Growth: Two
Sides of the Same Coin?” IMF Staff Discussion Note 11/08, International Monetary Fund,
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Brown, Gordon. 2012. “Out of Wedlock, Into School: Combating Early Marriage through
Education.” London: The Office of Gordon and Sarah Brown.
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Behavior, and Growth.” Journal of Political Economy 100 (6): 1092–125.
Chaaban, Jad, and Wendy Cunningham. 2011. “Measuring the Economic Gain of Investing in
Girls.” Policy Research Working Paper 5753, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Gallup, John L., Andrew D. Mellinger, and Jeffrey D. Sachs. 2010. “Geography Datasets.”
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doi:10.7910/DVN/SPHS5E.
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brighter-future-empowering-pregnant-girls-and-adolescent.
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students and adolescent mothers was not fully protected in 13 African countries as of November
2022. For more details, see Human Rights Watch (2022).

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Child Marriage among Young People in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A Systematic
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Santamaria. 2014. “Voice and Agency: Empowering Women and Girls for Shared Prosperity.”
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Developing Countries. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
Malhotra, Anju, Ann Warner, Allison McGonagle, and Susan Lee-Rife. 2011. “Solutions to End
Child Marriage What the Evidence Shows.” International Center for Research on Women,
Washington, DC.
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681–712.
Mitra, Pritha, Eric M. Pondi Endengle, Malika Pant, and Luiz F. Almeida. 2020. “Does Child
Marriage Matter for Growth?” IMF Working Paper 20/27, International Monetary Fund,
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Facts and Macroeconomic Implications.” IMF Staff Discussion Note 12/13, International
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Long-Term Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach.”
American Economic Review 94 (4): 813–35.
Santhya, K. G., Nicole Haberland, and Ajay Singh. 2006. She Knew Only when the Garland Was
Put Around Her Neck’: Findings from an Exploratory Study on Early Marriage in Rajasthan. New
Delhi: Population Council.
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Disruptions, Alternative Approaches, and Building Programme Resilience.” UNICEF, New York.
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Child Marriage.” https://data.unicef.org/resources/covid-19-a-threat-to-progress-against-child
-marriage/.
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https://data.unicef.org/.
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Practice, A Statistical Exploration.” UNICEF, New York.
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Prospects.” UNICEF, New York.
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Analysis of Violence Against Children.” UNICEF, New York.
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Marriage.” UNFPA, New York.
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U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives.” Council on Foreign Relations, New York.
Wodon, Quentin, Chata Male, Ada Nayihouba, Adenike Onagoruwa, Aboudrahyme Savadogo,
Ali Yedan, Jeff Edmeasdes, and others. 2017a. “Economic Impacts of Child Marriage: Global
Synthesis Report.” Economic Impact of Child Marriage Project. International Center for
Research on Women and World Bank, Washington DC.
Wodon, Quentin, Paula Tavares, Oliver Fiala, Alexis le Nestour, and Lisa Wise. 2017b. “Ending
Child Marriage: Child Marriage Laws and Their Limitations.” World Bank, Washington, DC.
Wodon, Quentin, Chata Male, Claudio Montenegro, Hoa Nguyen, and Adenike Onagoruwa.
2018. “Educating Girls and Ending Child Marriage: A Priority for Africa Report.” World
Bank, Washington, DC.


PART III
Investing Well:
Empowering Women and
Boosting Inclusion and
Resilience


CHAPTER 8
Closing Education Gaps and

Promoting Inclusive
Development—Lessons from
West Africa
Diego B. P. Gomes, Lisa Kolovich, Vivian Malta,
Monique Newiak, Rasmané Ouedraogo, and Sahar Priano
This chapter demonstrates the critical link between gender equality, education, and
macroeconomic outcomes, underscoring the profound economic and social benefits
derived from closing gender gaps in education. The chapter summarizes the quantita-
tive impact of education policies in Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. The
findings reveal a substantial potential to boost GDP and revenues, and to lower
income inequality through policies targeting gender parity in education. The chapter
outlines the theoretical framework, presents results across contexts, offers policy insights,
and concludes with a summary of findings.
INTRODUCTION
Gender equality is not just a matter of inclusion—it has far-reaching positive
implications for macroeconomic outcomes, stability, and governance. Vast theo-
retical and empirical evidence, including in this book, has consistently shown that
gender equality is associated with better macroeconomic outcomes at all levels of
development, including higher GDP, greater productivity, lower income inequal-
ity, and faster economic growth and convergence (Kochhar, Jain-Chandra, and
Newiak 2017; Gonzales and others 2015; Sever 2022).
Narrowing gender gaps in education and promoting female labor force partic-
ipation unlock a cascade of benefits. Increased educational attainment among
women leads to higher diversification of output and exports, bolstering economic
resilience (Kazandjian and others 2016). Moreover, women tend to invest more
resources in their children, fueling school expenditures and higher school enroll-
ment (Aguirre and others 2012). Increased educational attainment among
women translates into higher human capital, a key driver of economic growth and
better development outcomes (Barro 2001; Krueger and Lindahl 2001).
Conversely, unequal access to education perpetuates income disparities and stifles
progress (Galor and Zeira 1993; Gonzales and others 2015).
147

But just how substantial are the gains from closing gender gaps in education?
This chapter outlines a journey to quantify the macroeconomic impact of various
education policies in Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. The micro-founded
general equilibrium model, which features diverse agents, gauges the macroeco-
nomic and distributional effects of education policies—especially those targeting
girls. The results are astounding: in Senegal, implementing a policy ensuring a
minimum of five years of education for all children could increase GDP by 8 per-
cent (Kolovich, Malta, and Tavares Mendes 2018). In Nigeria, aligning girls’
education levels with boys’ levels across income groups could boost GDP by 5 per-
cent (Malta and Newiak 2019). In Niger, closing the gender gap in schooling
across income percentiles could ignite an impressive 11 percent long-term GDP
surge (Ouedraogo and Gomes 2023). And in Sierra Leone, the benefits of educa-
tion loom large, the result from a similar reform could amount to 8 percent of
GDP in the long run (Malta, Newiak, and Sandy 2020).
The rest of this chapter lays out the theoretical framework underpinning this
analysis, then presents the results of the framework’s application to different con-
texts in Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. A policy section synthesizes the
insights gleaned from these four case studies, and a conclusion summarizes the
results.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Gender inequality in education has wide-ranging implications for macroeconomic
performance, and a growing body of research has explored these effects. There are
various channels through which gender inequality can exert a negative impact on
macroeconomic performance. King and Hill (1993) and Knowles, Lorgelly, and
Owen (2002) use a Solow growth framework and discover that gender gaps in
education have a substantial and statistically significant negative impact on GDP
levels. In addition, Dollar and Gatti (1999), Forbes (2000), Appiah and McMahon
(2002), Klasen (2002), Yamarik and Ghosh (2003), Gonzales and others (2015),
and Kazandjian and others (2016) investigated the impact of gender disparities on
economic growth. Their findings show that gender gaps in education have a neg-
ative impact on future economic growth. Furthermore, they challenge the earlier
findings of Barro and Lee (1994) that suggested a potential negative relationship
between female education and economic growth, demonstrating that such conclu-
sions do not withstand rigorous econometric analysis.
Gendered educational gaps and growth are linked by several channels. First,
gender inequality in education translates into lower human capital stock, a key
driver of economic growth and better development outcomes (Barro 2001; Krueger
and Lindahl 2001). Also, inequality in education perpetuates income inequality
and curbs progress (Galor and Zeira 1993; Gonzales and others 2015). In nations
with large educational disparities between girls and boys, the limited development
of female human capital slows technological uptake and innovation (Barro 2001;
Krueger and Lindahl 2001). Furthermore, in cases where diminishing marginal
returns to education are observed, the decision to limit girls’ education to lower

Chapter 8 Closing Education Gaps and Promoting Inclusive Development 149
levels while providing higher levels of education to boys implies that the marginal
return on educating girls surpasses that of boys (World Bank 2001; Knowles,
Lorgelly, and Owen 2002). Klasen (2002) uses cross-country and panel regressions
to show that the costs of educational gaps in the Middle East and North Africa and
South Asia respectively amount to 0.9 and 1.8 percentage point differences in
growth when compared to East Asia.
Second, closing gender gaps in education benefits future generations. Women
tend to invest more resources in their children, resulting in higher school expen-
ditures and child enrollment (Aguirre and others 2012). Encouraging women’s
education has been established to lower fertility rates and child mortality rates,
and to foster education and thus human capital of future generations (Aguirre
and others 2012). All these factors help to boost economic growth.
A third argument contends that increased female educational attainment pro-
motes greater diversification of output and exports, thereby strengthening eco-
nomic resilience (Kazandjian and others 2016). Berge and Wood (1994) support
that a well-educated female labor force is critical to driving the growth of manu-
facturing exports. The diversification of the economy is stimulated through the
accumulation of human capital, enabling the growth of skill-intensive industries,
the emergence of new technologies, and facilitating the spread of technology
among firms. Conversely, gender disparities in education have a direct adverse
effect on diversification by limiting the available pool of human capital (Galor
and Zeira 1993; Gonzales and others 2015). The results corroborate other studies
that show a well-educated workforce is critical not only for achieving economic
diversification but also for significantly contributing to the improvement of
export quality (IMF 2014).
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The analysis in this chapter employs an IMF-developed model-based framework
known as the Dynamic General Equilibrium Life-Cycle Model with Heterogeneous
Agents to quantify key transmission channels through which gender-responsive
policies impact (1) female labor force participation, (2) earnings, (3) economic
growth, (4) income inequality and poverty, and (5) public finances. The country-
specific model allows for individuals to be different in key aspects, such as
(1) gender, (2) stage of life, (3) labor skills, and (4) access to savings. The model
also examines gender biases in both the workplace and the household, which
create barriers for women to join the labor force. To account for the fact that the
informal sector overrepresents women, particularly in low-income countries and
emerging markets, the model also allows for workers to decide between partici-
pating in formal or informal jobs.
In each life period, households (comprising a man and a woman) make deci-
sions about consumption of goods and services produced in formal and informal
sectors while making labor supply decisions separately. Men decide the number
of hours worked in formal or informal sectors, while women decide first if they
participate in the labor market and, if they do, how many hours to work in the

formal or informal sectors. Households incur a utility cost when women partic-
ipate in the labor market, which comes from the need to coordinate home pro-
duction, child or elder care, and other unpaid work, as well as to comply with
laws and social norms that create barriers for women to work outside the house-
hold. Human capital is determined by initial skills and years of education but
also evolves endogenously through on-the-job experience. Formal sector produc-
tion uses capital and labor inputs, while informal sector production uses only
labor. Women face wage discrimination, and households pay taxes on formal
sector goods and services, purchases, and earned income. Corporate revenues in
the formal sector are also taxed. The government spends revenues on public
consumption, public education, and transfers (see Malta, Martínez Leyva, and
Tavares 2019 for more details).
RESULTS FROM COUNTRY CALIBRATIONS

Niger1
Gender development in Niger stands out as one of the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa.
The United Nations Gender Development Index measures gender inequalities in
achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: (1) health, mea-
sured by female and male life expectancy at birth; (2) children’s education, measured
by female and male expected years of schooling for children; and (3) adult educa-
tion, measured by female and male mean years of schooling for adults ages 25 years
and older. The index shows that, when aggregating these categories, Niger performs
worse than the average in sub-Saharan Africa, West African Economic and
Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries, or peers in the Sahel region.
This underperformance is due to lower education attainment in Niger. The
average years of schooling is only 1.7 and 2.8 for females and males in Niger,
respectively, compared to 5.1 and 6.9 years in sub-Saharan Africa and 2.5 and
4.6 years in the WAEMU region. The disparities are also large when it comes to
the expected years of schooling, which measures the number of years of schooling
that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if the current age-specific
enrollment rates persist throughout the child’s life.
Girls’ elevated school dropout and child marriage rates significantly constrain
gender equality. Government spending on education—3.8 percent of GDP in
2020—is commendable. While slightly below the WAEMU average of about
4 percent of GDP, Niger’s education spending is above the average in sub-Saharan
Africa (3.4 percent of GDP) and the Sahel region (3.5 percent of GDP).
However, this relatively high education spending poorly translates into better
education outcomes for women due to elevated school dropout and early child
marriage rates. About 45 percent of girls drop out of primary school in Niger,
1
This section draws directly from Ouedraogo and Gomes 2023.

compared to 20 percent in the WAEMU region and 22 percent in sub-Saharan

Africa. In addition, more than 75 percent of women get married by age 18 in
Niger, compared to 35 percent for peer countries in the WAEMU region and
41 percent in sub-Saharan Africa.
These educational gender disparities undoubtedly pose significant develop-
ment challenges and have macroeconomic implications. This chapter quantifies
the impact of closing education gaps between girls and boys using the framework
described in the previous section. The model is calibrated to match key variables
of Niger’s economy in 2018, such as the formal sector’s share of GDP, government
expenditures as a percentage of GDP, government expenditures on education as a
percentage of GDP, the Gini index of household income, and female labor force
participation rate, among others. The benchmark year was considered to be 2018
due to the availability of microdata for Niger, notably from the 2018 edition of
the Enquête Harmonisée sur le Conditions de Vie des Ménages.
The model simulates a public policy that increases education spending to
include more girls in schools to equalize the number of years of education for
boys and girls within the same income percentile. This approach is used because
in Niger, despite having a low overall level of education, men have more years of
education than women at every income percentile. These differences, on average,
range from slightly more than 0.3 additional year for men at the lower end of
the distribution to approximately 1.4 additional years at the upper end. Also, the
gender gap in educational attainment grows monotonically across the income
spectrum, suggesting that gender inequality in human capital formation rises
with income.
Raising girls’ education to the same level as boys’ triggers a series of positive
effects on the economy (Figure 8.1). Women enter adulthood with more educa-
tion and thus a larger stock of human capital. As a result, they benefit from
higher labor-market returns to education and higher returns to experience if they
choose to work. Therefore, the incentives for women to enter the labor force and
work more hours increase. According to the model, the new policy will likely
increase female labor force participation by 85.6 percent. Working women begin
to supply more hours to the labor market, which, combined with their higher
level of human capital, increases mean effective hours worked by 30.1 percent.
The gender gap in mean effective hours worked, as measured by the male-to-
female ratio, falls by 59.5 percent. The same is true for the hours gender gaps in
formal and informal labor markets, which have shrunk by 62.8 and 61.7 per-
cent, respectively. Working women earn more in the labor market due to their
higher level of human capital and higher supply of work hours, which contrib-
utes to increased household income and closing of the income gap between men
and women. Household mean labor income goes up by 8.6 percent, and the
overall gender gap in mean labor income, as measured by the male-to-female
ratio, goes down by 53.3 percent. The same reductions occur individually in the
formal and informal labor markets—which have gap reductions of 62.8 and
54.9 percent, respectively.

These labor market developments have macroeconomic and fiscal implica-

tions. Total economic output, as measured by GDP, rises by 11.2 percent, owing
primarily to the increase in effective hours worked (Figure 8.1, panel 3). Higher
labor income enables households to consume more, resulting in a 3 percent
increase in aggregate private consumption. On the other hand, to implement the
new education policy, the government must increase its public education spend-
ing by 21.2 percent, raising total government spending by 3 percent. Such an
increase in education spending would imply budget reallocation and efficiency
improvement. However, increased labor income, consumption, and production
Figure 8.1. Niger: Simulation Results of Increased Education Expenditure

(Changes from benchmark, percent)
1. Labor Supply 2. Labor Income
100 85.6% 20
8.6%
80
60 0
40 30.1%
–20
20
0 –40
–20
–53.3% –54.9% –60
–40 –62.8%
–60 –80
–59.5% –62.8% –61.7%
–80
–100 –100
Female labor force
participation
Mean effective
hours worked
Gender gap in mean

effective hours worked
Gender gap in mean
effective hours worked,
formal
Gender gap in mean
effective hours worked,
informal
Household mean
labor income
Gender gap in mean

labor income
Gender gap in mean

labor income, formal
Gender gap in mean

labor income,
informal
3. Macro Aggregates 4. Fiscal Aggregates

25 25
21.2% 20
20 15.3% 16.2%
15
11.3%
15 10
11.2% 3.0% 5
10 0
–5
5 3.0% 3.0%
–9.3% –10
0 –15
GDP
Private
consumption
Government
expenditures
Public
education
expenditures
Total tax
revenues
tax revenues
Corporate
income tax
revenues
Consumption
tax revenues
Primary
deficit
Labor income
Source: Ouedraogo and Gomes 2023.

result in increased tax collection, which can be used to fund these additional fiscal
outlays. Revenues from taxes on labor income, corporate income, and consump-
tion grow by 15.3, 16.2, and 3 percent, respectively (Figure 8.1, panel 4). As a
result, total tax revenue increases by 11.3 percent, providing more than enough
resources to cover the new education expenditures, implying a 9.3 percent reduc-
tion in the primary deficit.
Nigeria2
Education outcomes in Nigeria are among the weakest worldwide and are deteri-
orating in some parts of the country. Access to education is highly unequal across
states and individuals’ income and gender. Building human capital to boost work
force productivity will be essential to reap Nigeria’s demographic dividend.
Nigeria’s population is growing by more than 2½ percent annually, and its youth
account for more than half of the population—presenting tremendous opportu-
nities. However, a larger population will also add pressure on public services and
infrastructure, which are already under considerable strain—Nigeria hosts the
largest number of out-of-school children worldwide. Experiences from other
countries suggest that declining dependency ratios (increasing the ratio of the
working-age population to those too young or too old to be in the labor market),
provide an opportunity for a demographic dividend. To reap this dividend, how-
ever, investments in human capital need to increase to allow workers to enter into
the labor market at higher wages and higher productivity employment.
Quality issues in Nigeria’s education sector impede the effective accumulation
of human capital, and educational attainment varies strongly across states. Using
numbers available as of 2018, the average Nigerian spent more than eight years
in school, but substantial issues affect in the quality of education, halving the
effective level of schooling. For instance, using Nigeria’s 2013 demographic and
health survey, only 24 and 31 percent of teachers scored at least 80 percent on a
fourth-grade test in the language and mathematics curriculum, respectively, and
4 out of 5 persons 15 to 24 years old were not able to read a full sentence (World
Bank 2018). Education can either be nearly universal in some states like Lagos or
see the majority of children out of school in others like Bauchi.
Access to education also varies widely across individuals’ incomes and gender.
A 2013 demographic and health survey revealed the following statistics: Among
the 20 percent of the poorest in Nigeria, a child’s probability of not attending
school was more than 70 percent; the probability was 2 percent for the richest
quintile, contributing to Nigeria’s high number of out-of-school children (a min-
imum of 10 million children). The probability of completing upper-secondary
education was particularly low for poor girls: 1 percent for the bottom quintile
and 6 percent for the second quintile.
As in the previous section, the micro-founded general equilibrium model
was applied with heterogenous agents to quantify the gains from narrowing
2
This section draws directly from Malta and Newiak (2019).

education gaps. The model is calibrated to match the main features of the
Nigerian economy. These features include labor market outcomes (participa-
tion, income), income distribution, education (in years of schooling), gender
inequality, and the government (see Malta and Newiak for more details).
Four scenarios give a gradual picture of possible gains from higher education
(Figure 8.2), reaching up to 12 percent of GDP (and higher levels for more ambi-
tious policies not shown here):
• Scenario 1: Equalize the number of years of education for boys and girls within the
same income percentile. With more girls educated, the female-to-male labor
force participation ratio rises from 76 percent to 87 percent, and increased
productivity raises women’s average hourly wages by more than 8 percent.
Men’s average hourly wages remain constant and the long-term level of GDP
increases by 5 percent. With productivity increasing mainly at the lower end of
the income distribution (where gender gaps are highest), income inequality—
as measured by the Gini coefficient—decreases 2 percentage points.
• Scenario 2: Increase education for both boys and girls, so that each child benefits
from at least the current median years of education for boys. This policy increases
the ratio of female-to-male labor force participation to 93 percent because
the boost in human capital disproportionately impacts girls. Without addi-
tional reforms in the tax system, government revenues increase only a little
(0.2 percent of GDP), mainly driven by the added activity of women of
middle income in the formal sector, as most women will join the informal
sector so as not to incur income or corporate tax. Earnings rise for both
women (+10.4 percent) and men (+2.7 percent). GDP increases by almost
8 percent, higher than in Scenario 1, because access to education and higher
productivity spreads to a wider range of workers. The Gini coefficient
decreases by 5 percentage points, because people in the lower half of the
income distribution no longer differ in their level of education, and gender
gaps in education close.
• Scenario 3: After increasing education as in Scenario 2, reduce barriers that pose
disincentives for women to join the formal and informal labor market. In this
scenario, in addition to increasing education levels for boys and girls, the
government addresses discrimination in the formal and informal labor sec-
tors. Examples of such policies are, for example, implementing equal pay for
equal work rights, equal access to resources (including land and credit),
policies that make it easier to balance work and household responsibilities,
and policies that address social norms and negative attitudes toward working
women. In this simulation, average education increases to 9.8 years for girls
and 10.3 years for boys. With higher returns from labor, gender gaps in
labor force participation would completely close, and women’s average
wages would increase by 18.1 percent (and by 3.2 percent for men).
Government revenues would increase marginally (¼ percent of GDP)
through higher incomes in the formal sector. GDP rises by 11.7 percent, on
the back of higher productivity, including from removing distortions from

the labor market. The Gini coefficient decreases by 6 percentage points as

lower-income households become more educated and women join the labor
market in an environment with fewer obstacles or discrimination.
• Scenario 4: Increase the efficiency of education, that is, increase the quality-
adjusted years of learning at the given years of schooling, by 16 percent (to the
level in sub-Saharan African’s lower middle-income countries). This change
boosts GDP by 3.6 percent through higher productivity for all children.
The impact on other outcomes discussed in this chapter is smaller since
relative education gaps remain the same across individuals at different levels
of income and between boys and girls.
Figure 8.2. Nigeria: Impacts from Different Education Scenarios

1. Change in Female-to-Male Labor Force 2. Change in Average Female-to-Male
Participation Ratio Earnings per Hour Ratio
(Percentage points) (Percentage points)
30 12
25 24.3 9.9 10
20 8
17.5
15 5.3 6
11.4 4.7
10 4
5 2
0.4 0.5
0 0
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
3. Change in GDP 4. Change in Gini Coefficient of Income
(Percent) Inequality
(Percentage points)
14 0
–0.1
12 11.7% –1
10 –2
–2.3
8 7.9% –3
6 5.0% –4
4 3.6% –5
–4.9
2 –6
–6.0
0 –7
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Source: Malta and Newiak 2019.

Sierra Leone3
Overall human capital outcomes, including in education and health, are challeng-
ing in Sierra Leone. In 2019, the World Bank’s Human Capital Index—capturing
several dimensions of national health and education outcomes globally—ranked
Sierra Leone among the seven countries with the largest human capital challenges
worldwide, driven by weak health indicators, including child mortality and stunt-
ing. Education outcomes remain challenging. Although children completed an
average of nine years of education, the suboptimal quality of education results in
learning outcomes on par with receiving only 4½ years of high-quality education.
These indicators highlight the challenges in a country once referred to as the
“Athens of West Africa” around independence in 1961, particularly as population
growth alone will put pressure on the educational system.
The Ebola health crisis was a significant setback for health and education out-
comes. The immediate impact of the Ebola crisis on health outcomes was dramatic
and affected other health areas as health resources shifted to Ebola-related programs
(Save the Children 2016). In addition, UNICEF (2017) reported that the direct
consequences of the Ebola outbreak on the education sector were substantial and
reversed some of the progress toward the Millennium Development Goal of achiev-
ing universal primary education. Specifically, UNICEF reported that: all schools
closed and 1.7 million primary and secondary students did not attend school for at
least nine months; the crisis left 3,300 Sierra Leonean orphans who were less likely
to attend school than their peers; the deaths of teachers increased pupil-teacher
ratios; and maintenance of school infrastructure stopped. The UNICEF report
estimated the indirect cost of lost future human capital due to the crisis at 8.8 to
9.8 percent of Sierra Leone’s GDP in 2016.
When UNICEF conducted the analysis featured in this report, Sierra Leone
faced significant challenges in closing disparities in access to and completion of
education. The final level of education and completion rates varied considerably
depending on individuals’ demographic characteristics and their household loca-
tion. While school enrollment rates increased over the past two decades, these
increased rates do not imply that all who attend school will complete schooling.
The report also indicated that the level of education varied widely across
income groups. A boy in the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution was
more than five times as likely to receive no education than a boy in the richest
family. A boy from the richest 20 percent of households was more than 10 times
more likely to complete secondary education or achieve higher education than a
boy from the poorest 40 percent of households, and large education gender gaps
existed across all income groups. The probability of a girl receiving no education
was more than 10 percentage points higher than for a boy in every income group.
Secondary or higher school attainment increased disproportionately with
income for boys, but showed a large uptick for girls only in the richest income
quintile. Hence, while enrollment levels were similar for boys and girls, girls were
3
This chapter draws directly from Malta, Newiak, and Sandy 2020.

more likely to drop out and not complete their education. The rural-urban divide
in education was also substantial. Children in rural areas were two to three times
more likely not to receive any education; girls were 16 times more likely, and boys
were five times more likely to complete secondary or higher education than boys
(girls) in rural areas.
Given the aforementioned statistics and the government’s intention to address
them, a range of scenarios were tested with the following main results (Figure 8.3):
• Scenario 1. Close gaps between boys and girls in access to education within each
income quintile. This measure assumes a substantial increase in girls’ educa-
tion levels while not addressing the educational disparities across income
groups. The additional education would boost economic activity through
higher female human capital and labor force participation, lifting women’s
purchasing power with higher wages (an increase of 30.9 percent). GDP
(composed here of both formal and informal sectors) would increase by
8.2 percent in the long term. With higher skills, more women would join
the (more competitive) formal sector, and the formal and informal sectors
would grow by 8.6 percent and 8 percent, respectively. Government reve-
nues under current tax policies would be larger by 0.6 percent of GDP in
the new steady state. Since the bottom of the income distribution has the
widest educational gender gaps, income inequality would decline (1-point
drop in the Gini coefficient), and the income ratio of the top 10 percent of
the income distribution to the bottom 10 percent would drop by 3.6 per-
cent (from an average income ratio of 9.4 to 9.0).
• Scenario 2: Ensure all children complete at least primary education. In this
scenario, education increases for all children that currently do not complete
primary education, thus raising girls’ education disproportionately. The
strong boost in human capital and the resulting increase in wages (38 per-
cent for women; 13 percent for men) increases GDP by more than 18 per-
cent in the long term (19.6 percent and 17.7 percent in the formal and
informal sectors, respectively). However, assuming the policy is not accom-
panied by anti-discrimination policies to level the playing field for men and
women in the labor market, productivity levels (output per hours worked)
in the formal sector would drop by 5.1 percent. In contrast, the informal
sector would benefit from increased education at the bottom of the income
distribution (28.9 percent increase in productivity). Under current tax pol-
icies and formal sector size, government revenues would increase by 0.8 per-
cent of GDP in the new steady state. Since the largest human capital gaps
are at the bottom of the income distribution, income inequality would drop
substantially, with the Gini coefficient falling by almost 6 points and the
income ratio of the top 10 percent of the income distribution to the bottom
10 percent declining by 35.7 percent (from an average income ratio of 9.4
to 6.0).
• Scenario 3: Ensure all children complete at least lower secondary education. This
scenario magnifies the channels discussed in Scenarios 1 and 2, increasing

158
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
–9
–8
–7
–6
–5
–4
–3
–2
–1
0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Closing gender gaps Closing gender gaps Closing gender gaps
in education in each in education in each in education in each
(Points)
income quintile income quintile
(Percent)
(Percent)
income quintile
At least primary At least primary At least primary
education for all education for all education for all
3. Change in Real GDP

At least lower At least lower At least lower
secondary education secondary education secondary education
for all for all
5. Change in Gini Coefficient

for all
At least secondary At least secondary At least secondary
Source: Malta, Newiak, and Sandy 2020.

1. Change in Average Female Earnings
Raising quality of Raising quality of Raising quality of

education by 50% education by 50% education by 50%
Closing gender gaps Closing gender gaps Closing gender gaps

in education in each in education in each in education in each
income quintile income quintile income quintile
(Percent)
(Percent)
At least primary At least primary Sector GDP At least primary

Formal sector
At least lower At least lower At least lower
Gender Equality and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
Informal sector
secondary education secondary education secondary education
(Percentage points)
for all for all for all
Figure 8.3. Sierra Leone: Impact from Reducing Gender Gaps
At least secondary At least secondary At least secondary

6. Change in Revenue-to-GDP Ratio

2. Change in Average Male Earnings
4. Change in Formal versus Informal
Raising quality of Raising quality of Raising quality of

education by 50% education by 50% education by 50%
0
0
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
10
20
30
40
50
60
GDP by 40 percent (48.4 percent and 36.9 percent for the formal and
informal sectors, respectively). Overall productivity in the formal sector
would increase by 9.0 percent, while the informal sector would see a
54.8 percent productivity gain, mainly due to increases in education at the
lower end of the income distribution where informal labor is more com-
mon. Increased consumption and wages would boost government revenues
by 1.8 percent of GDP. Income inequality would decline significantly (with
the Gini coefficient dropping by more than 7 points) as human capital
would increase, in particular for poorer individuals. The income gap
between the top and bottom 10 percent of the income distribution would
drop by more than 44 percent (from an average income ratio of 9.4 to 5.2).
• Scenario 4: Ensure all children complete upper secondary education. This highly
ambitious—and thus illustrative—scenario would result in boosting GDP
by more than 60 percent (72 percent and 56 percent in the formal and
informal sectors, respectively). Labor supply in the informal sector would
decline by 12 percent, substituted by more productive work, and productiv-
ity in the formal and informal sectors would rise by 28 percent and
77.5 percent, respectively. The revenue-to-GDP ratio could increase by
3 percentage points. The Gini coefficient would drop by more than
7 points, while the income gap between the top and bottom 10 percent of
the income distribution would drop by more than 45 percent.
• Scenario 5. Raise the quality of education by 50 percent (by increasing the number
of years of quality-adjusted schooling by 50 percent). Policies to increase the
average quality of education, even in the absence of actions to raise the num-
ber of years of schooling, could still boost GDP by 27.3 percent (32.5 percent
and 23.8 percent for the formal and informal sectors, respectively), on the
back of an increase in human capital across all income groups. Productivity in
the formal and informal sectors would increase (by 31.4 percent and 22.1 per-
cent, respectively). Income inequality, however, would remain relatively unaf-
fected as the measure does not change relative endowments of education
across the different strata of the society.
Senegal4
Senegal has taken important steps to close gender gaps. Gender gaps in both
enrollment and completion rates for primary education have closed and even
reversed (IMF 2020). According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization, from 1999 to 2016, gross enrollment rates in primary
education improved from 59 percent to 88 percent for girls, while the rates
improved from 71 percent to 78 percent for boys. Primary education completion
rates rose from 33 percent for girls and 43 percent for boys in 2000 to 64 percent
and 54 percent, respectively, in 2016. However, the average years of education in
4
This section draws directly from IMF 2020.

Senegal was only 2.8 in 2015 (according to the United Nations Development
Program), lower than the average of WAEMU (3.0 years) and sub-Saharan Africa
(5.1 years). More progress is needed as girls’ completion rates in secondary edu-
cation and enrollment in tertiary education are still substantially lower than those
of boys. The Demographic and Health Survey program reported that, in 2012,
the average female completion rate in secondary education was only 13 percent
compared to 21 percent for boys. The female completion rate for tertiary educa-
tion doubled from 4 percent in 2006 to 8 percent in 2016; however, the male
rate—which increased from 8 percent to 13 percent—is still relatively higher.
Household survey data was also used to examine gender gaps in education along
the urban–rural divide. Across sub-Saharan Africa, on average, educational attainment
in rural areas is significantly lower than in urban areas. In the case of Senegal, the 2011
household survey showed that boys and girls between the ages of 10 and 14 in rural
regions in Senegal have on average approximately 1.5 years less education than their
urban counterparts. The urban–rural divide increased for boys and girls between ages
15 and 19, with urban students completing approximately twice as many years of
education as their rural counterparts. Examining gender gaps in the number of years
of education again reveals differences between urban and rural regions. Gender gaps
are wider in urban areas than in rural areas (1.3 compared to 0.7 years of education
gaps, on average). However, in percentage terms, women in rural areas of Senegal
complete much less education than boys. Although the difference in urban areas
averages 31 percent, the difference increases to 57 percent in rural areas.
The combination of low education, gender roles, early pregnancy, and early
marriage can create a poverty trap for women and girls. Expectations play a prom-
inent role in economic outcomes, which is no different for women in poor
employment conditions. Parents expecting lower returns from their daughters in
the labor market will have fewer incentives to keep them in school. Girls with less
education and fewer professional opportunities may not prioritize improving
their skills and may choose to stay out of the labor force or have more flexible jobs
allowing them to reconcile the demands of work at home versus outside the
home. This cycle can leave them trapped in informal and lower-paying jobs.
The model was applied to Senegal, which also exhibits the characteristics of a
typical low-income country, including a sizable gender gap, high informal sector
employment, low levels of education, and predominance of the agricultural sec-
tor. In addition, as in many other low-income countries, women in Senegal face
additional penalties in the labor market, including lower returns from experience
and other “unexplained” gender pay gaps.
Closing educational gender gaps in Senegal increases female labor force partic-
ipation and results in substantial GDP gains (Figure 8.4). In the baseline scenario,
working women have 35 percent fewer years of schooling on average than men,
and this gap widens for households at the bottom 50 percent of the income dis-
tribution. The exercise envisages closing the gap so that men and women at every
income level will have the same number of years of education (differences will
remain between individuals at different income levels).
Model simulations suggest that closing education gaps boosts female labor
force participation by almost 19 percentage points, while output grows by about

Figure 8.4. Senegal: Macroeconomic and Distributional Effects from

Closing Gender Gaps in Education
1. GDP and Government Accounts 2. Household Income
(Percent) (Percent)
10 11.2% 12
8.8%
10
8
7.0% 8
6 6
4 4
2
2
0.9% 0
–0.1%
0 –2
GDP Fiscal balance Male Female Average
impact wage wage household
income
3. Wage Gap, Inequality, and Poverty 4. Change in Household Income
(Percent) (Percent change)
0 60
–5 –2.8% 50
–10 –7.7% 40
–11.6%
–15 30
–20 20
–25 10
–27.6%
–30 0
Wage gap Gini Top-10- Poverty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
to-bottom Deciles of income distribution
10-income
ratio
Source: IMF 2020.
9 percent in the long run, as a more educated female labor force increases overall
labor productivity. With higher skills, some low- and lower-middle-income
women join the labor force in the model, while young female workers continue
to work throughout their lifetimes due to the financial returns from experience.
Women with less education and experience would join the large informal sec-
tor, while middle-income and upper-middle-income women shift more of
their working time to the formal sector, which has higher wages and more
secure jobs.

Gender wage gaps, income inequality, and poverty rates fall. Because of the rise
in female education, the gender pay gap would shrink. Despite higher competition
in the labor market, the growth in aggregate demand is enough to offset pressures
on men’s wages, which decline only marginally. Closing education gaps would also
reduce poverty substantially, as poorer and less educated women would gain rela-
tively more years of education. This educational level increase would reduce
inequality, shrinking the income gap between the top 10 percent of the income
distribution and the bottom 10 percent. In the long run, this measure would bring
net fiscal revenue gains, reflecting a higher collection of consumption and labor
income tax revenues due to higher economic activity, which could be channeled to
finance social and development spending.
PUTTING THE COUNTRY CASES TOGETHER:

The model simulations presented in this chapter provide insight into the macroeco-
nomic and distributional impacts of gender-responsive education reforms. The goal
is to support policymakers in making better-informed decisions and considering the
most effective and sustainable measures to boost female school enrollment and
economic growth while reducing income inequality and poverty.
With limited fiscal space and vast challenges, implementing educational
reforms in these countries will require evidence-based prioritizing, sequencing,
and targeting of policies. Careful monitoring of education spending and its
impacts will help reassess programs and priorities. Enhancing sector governance
is vital to ensure that spending aligns well with needs at the various levels.
Strengthening systems for a multisector effort to improve education will be
critical. Such improvements involve: (1) clarifying mandates and strengthening
accountability structures across institutions, policies, and acts; (2) realistic sec-
tor planning; (3) significantly reducing discrepancies in resources transferred
from the center and those arriving at district levels; and (4) enhancing transpar-
ency and accountability in existing systems for allocating resources to schools.
Furthermore, comprehensive reform to improve educational quality and effi-
ciency of services needs to be supported by efforts to improve health outcomes,
especially for children, and access to infrastructure. Improving and institutional-
izing administrative data collection on the education system will allow for better
monitoring and evaluation of education-related reforms. Improving the quality of
teachers to raise the efficiency of education would require new recruitment
efforts, deployment, and training, along with higher salaries for teachers. School
nutrition and health programs may also encourage girls to remain in school.
In some cases, legal reforms can also address underlying factors that reduce
female school enrollment and completion. These reforms include laws to enshrine
equal opportunities and children’s rights and eliminate gender-based violence.
Enforcing civil and criminal law when customary law contradicts nondiscrimina-
tory policies is also critical.

CONCLUSION
This chapter summarizes the macroeconomic impacts of gender-responsive education
policies in four countries—Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone—to provide
solid evidence on the macroeconomic benefits and importance of gender equality in
education. Ensuring equality of opportunities for girls to attend school brings positive
implications for economic growth, productivity, and income equality.
With the Dynamic General Equilibrium Life-Cycle Model with Heterogeneous
Agents, it was estimated that GDP gains could range from 5 to 40 percent in the
long term. In addition, policies aimed at equalizing access to education support
higher female labor force participation, increased household income, and reduced
income inequality. Addressing additional barriers to female education, such as
access to infrastructure, high adolescent fertility rates, and legal hurdles could
further support equality in education. Gender-responsive education policies help
level the playing field and promote inclusive and sustainable economic
development.
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CHAPTER 9
The Impact of Women’s

Empowerment on Human Capital
of the Next Generation: Looking
within the Household
Olivia Goldin
This chapter focuses on the instrumental impact of women’s empowerment within the
household on children’s human capital, particularly health. This study and other evi-
dence indicate that women’s economic empowerment, including employment, and
women’s control of resources in the household improve children’s health. Women’s
empowerment and control of resource allocations are even more important to children’s
health in households with fewer resources to share among household members, which
is particularly pertinent when households face hard times. This work emphasizes the
benefits of women’s economic empowerment and enabling women to control resources,
including through social protection and cash transfer programs.
INTRODUCTION
Women’s empowerment has been shown to have a catalytic effect on improving
the productive capacity of the next generation (Chapters 1 and 2). This chapter
focuses on the impact of women’s empowerment within the household on chil-
dren’s health, with an empirical study in South Africa. Strong economic evidence
supported by the analysis indicates that children’s health is improved by women’s
economic empowerment, such as employment prospects, and in particular wom-
en’s control of resources in the household. More generally, women’s empower-
ment is a prerequisite to achieving all of the Sustainable Development Goals
(OECD 2021; United Nations 2023; World Bank 2011). The positive impact on
the human capital of the next generation constitutes one way that women’s
empowerment has a multiplier effect, making it “smart economics” (World Bank
2011; Revenga and Shetty 2012).
This study and economic literature additionally indicate that women’s empow-
erment is more important for children’s health when households are poor and have
few resources to share among household members. This analysis makes these
findings even more important when households face hard times. In the wake of the
COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, people worldwide have suffered
165

rising poverty and hunger, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where 132 million
people (roughly 13 percent) were estimated to be acutely food-insecure in 2022
(IMF 2023), with staple food prices in sub-Sahara Africa surging 24 percent from
2020–22, and food making up almost 40 percent of people’s consumption baskets
(Okou, Spray, and Unsal 2022; IMF 2022). As price-takers for global commodi-
ties, sub-Saharan African and other developing countries are particularly suscepti-
ble to external shocks, as Sub-Saharan Africa is a large importer of food and energy
while commodities dominate exports. Climate change threatens children’s health
through both income shocks (for instance, threatening agricultural yields) and
health shocks (for instance, disease outbreaks). In the face of these crises, optimal
allocation of scarce resources within households can improve prospects for the next
generation, with potentially minimal cost.
The evidence has policy implications in emphasizing the benefits of women’s
economic empowerment and the benefits of women’s ability to control resources,
including social protection and cash transfer programs. Duflo (2003) and numer-
ous other studies have indicated that the efficiency and effectiveness of transfers
in improving children’s human capital increases when women receive the trans-
fers. Many large-scale cash transfer and social protection programs aimed primar-
ily at improving children’s health and education outcomes are therefore directed
toward women. Examples include some advanced economies’ child benefit pro-
grams (including the UK for a long time) and large-scale cash transfer programs
such as Oportunidades/Progresa in Mexico and Bolsa Familia in Brazil. The evi-
dence that women’s empowerment improves children’s outcomes may depend on
gendered norms of women bearing most of the domestic responsibilities. Some
programs, especially conditional cash transfers, that have focused on women’s
empowerment as only instrumental for benefitting children have unintentionally
reinforced existing gender roles and increased women’s burdens of responsibilities
(Cookson 2018; Orzoco Corona and Gammage 2017; Molyneux and Thomson
2011). To improve children’s outcomes and also to truly empower women, inter-
ventions must be sensitive to gender equality and seek opportunities to transform
gendered norms.
BACKGROUND
Children’s Health Links to Economic Development
Children’s health and human capital development are critical to well-being, pro-
ductivity, and economic development. Health is a core dimension of human
capital. A child’s health is likely to impact local, national, and wider prosperity
through important economic outcomes such as the individual’s income, educa-
tional attainment, cognitive ability, behavioral problems, and health later in life
(Almond 2006; Banerjee and others 2010; Carneiro, Meghir, and Parey 2013;
Duc 2011; Mani 2012). Poor nutritional status during childhood and its lasting
negative impact on economic growth and health is well documented in the liter-
ature (Glover-Amengor and others 2016).

Chapter 9 The Impact of Women’s Empowerment 167
Within households and across society, decisions are made on how much edu-
cation or health care is provided to individual children. These decisions “have
significant implications for the intergenerational transmission of poverty and the
potential for upward mobility across generations” (Doss 2013, 10). Low invest-
ment in child health therefore has far-reaching consequences for economic
growth and welfare (Duflo 2003).
Representing Children’s Health

This study analyzes children’s health in terms of their nutritional status, specifically
anthropometric status. Anthropometric status generally reflects overall health and
represents the child health indicator used in most relevant studies (for instance,
Thomas 1990; Chen and Li 2009; Abreha and Zereyesus 2020). Nutritional intake
is a determinant of children’s health, and nutrition is a dominant health problem
for children in developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where
about 45 percent of all child deaths are linked to malnutrition (WHO 2021).
Representing Women’s Empowerment in the Household

Different household members can have different preferences and make different
decisions about allocating household resources, including supporting children’s
health. Through bargaining with each other, household members negotiate to
obtain power in making decisions over resources. Each individual’s bargaining
power determines their options if members do not agree. Norms and rules (for
instance, violence, divorce, or support networks) and economic possibilities
(through income, employment opportunities, education, and asset ownership)
determine people’s options outside of agreement. Bargaining power itself is “fun-
damentally unobservable” (Doss 2013, 11) but can be represented in practice by
decision making over resources (an outcome of bargaining) or outside opportuni-
ties (that determine bargaining power).
Doss (2013) indicated that the best representation of women’s bargaining
power is whether a woman can make decisions, including about expenditures, as
other proxies may be a means to obtaining control of resources but not a requisite
for implementing one’s preferences or doing so effectively. This study uses this
variable, focusing on decision-making power over day-to-day expenditures, to
directly identify control over inputs into children’s health.
Women’s opportunities outside the household do not necessarily translate to
increased capacity to exercise preferences within the household. In theory, outside
opportunities increase bargaining power only when they are “gainful” outside
options, that is, when a partner’s options outside the household have payoffs at
least as high as those the partner would have from remaining in the current situa-
tion. This scenario gives that partner a credible “threat point” for walking out on
a deal (Sen 1992; Handa 1996; Muthoo 1999, 2000, 2002; Browning, Chiappori,
and Weiss 2011; Doss 2013). Studies of outside opportunities include employ-
ment or earnings (Qian 2008; Duflo and Udry 2004; Lundberg and Polak 1993,
1996; Lundberg, Polak, and Wales 1997), exogenous income transfers (Duflo

2003), women’s education (Handa 1996, 1999; Currie and Moretti 2003; Chopra
2003; Wamani and others 2005; Lindelow 2008; Medrano, Rodriguez, and Villa
2008; Chen and Li 2009; Anyamele 2009; Cleland 2010; Lesiapeto and others
2010; Bain and others 2013; Essilfie, Sebu, and Annim 2020), women as a house-
hold head (Handa 1999; Gaiha and Kulkarni 2005; Luseno and others 2014), and
asset and land ownership (Allendorf 2007; Doss 2006; Beegle, Frankenberg, and
Thomas 2001; Quisumbing 1994). Indicators of such outside opportunities can
also be associated with factors that may separately impact children’s health and
confound understanding of a causal pathway. For example, household adults who
are working more can support children’s health through higher income and better
networks through one pathway. Through another pathway, however, increased
nondomestic work for men and women has been shown to compromise children’s
health and nutrition through decreasing time with children in certain settings
(Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja 2012; Johnston and others 2018) and time use pat-
terns shape nutritional outcomes (Hull 2013). This relationship could lead to an
underestimation of the effect of an individual’s employment on children’s health.
Women’s Empowerment Links to Children’s Human Capital

Strong evidence indicates that women’s empowerment in the household leads to an
improvement in children’s health and more human capital accumulation compared
to men’s (Thomas 1990; Lundberg and Polak 1993, 1996; Lundberg, Polak, and
Wales 1997; Duflo 2003; Duflo and Udry 2004; Doss 2006; Qian 2008).
Studies exploiting exogenous income shifts, such as through policy changes,
importantly indicated the causal effect of women’s empowerment on children’s
health by ruling out potential endogeneity (Duflo 2003; Duflo and Udry 2004;
Qian 2008). In South Africa, Duflo (2003) used a natural experiment showing
that young girls who live with a woman eligible for a transfer program gained 0.6
standard deviations of weight for height, but gained statistically insignificant
0.056 standard deviation when living with a man eligible for a transfer, while
there was no significant effect for boys.
Studies in developing country settings have indicated that women typically
spend a higher proportion of their income and the cash they control on food and
health care for children compared to men, while men use more of their income
for personal expenditure, and spend more conspicuously than women. Examples
of studies that illustrate this finding include in Kenya, Guatemala, Brazil, and the
Philippines (Quisumbing 1994; Quisumbing and others 1995), Brazil (Thomas
1990, 1994), and Côte D’Ivoire (Duflo and Udry 2004). The systematic litera-
ture review by Santoso and others (2019) points to how money controlled by
women is more likely to be used to purchase food and health care for children of
the household than money controlled by men, and this results in a positive influ-
ence on household-level calorie availability and health outcomes in many studies,
including in Rwanda (Von Braun and others 1991) and Mali (Castle 1995).
Borges (2007) indicated that on average worldwide, women reinvest 90 percent

of their income in their families and communities, contrasting with men who
reinvest just 30–40 percent of their income. Thomas’ seminal study in Brazil
(1990) indicated that maternal income increased family nutrition four to seven
times more than paternal income.
Numerous systematic reviews of recent studies have been conducted, although
these studies are almost all cross-sectional, leading to challenges identifying cau-
sality. Abreha and Zereyesus (2020) indicated that decision making was the most
common measure of women’s empowerment among studies reviewed, and most
studies in sub-Saharan Africa indicated that women’s higher decision-making
power is positively associated with better children’s health status. Many of these
studies examined Demographic Health Surveys (DHSs), including a study across
26 sub-Saharan African countries (Siedu and others 2021) showing that house-
holds in which women had greater decision-making power were more likely to
seek health care for children. For example, they were more likely to seek treatment
for childhood diarrhea and complete child immunizations. For eight sub-Saharan
African Demographic Health Surveys (Singh, Bloom, and Brodish 2012), wom-
en’s decision making is associated with increased likelihood that children will be
treated for respiratory illness. Essilfie, Sebu, and Annim (2020) indicated that
female decision making in Ghana is associated with improved children’s nutri-
tional status. Another systematic review (Santoso and others 2019) found an
inconclusive relationship, although all studies reviewed were observational and
cross-sectional, with suspected endogeneity issues of factors not accounted for.
Several cross-sectional studies in sub-Saharan Africa have indicated a strong asso-
ciation between women’s empowerment and positive feeding practices for infants
and young children in some African countries studied (Mali, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone, and Ghana) although results were mixed in others (Ethiopia, Nigeria,
Uganda, and Zimbabwe) (Kobina Dadzie, Amo-Adjei, and Esia-Donkoh 2021;
Na and others 2015; Malapit and Quisumbing 2015).
A mother’s education also strongly predicts children’s health, including when
considering effects such as a mother receiving health information (Handa 1996,
1999; Currie and Moretti 2003; Chopra 2003; Wamani and others 2005; Lindelow
2008; Medrano, Rodriguez, and Villa 2008; Chen and Li 2009; Anyamele 2009;
Cleland 2010; Lesiapeto and others 2010; Bain and others 2013; Essilfie, Sebu, and
Annim 2020). In Uganda, educating mothers is associated with greater adoption of
health-promoting behaviors within the household (Nyqvist and Jayachandran
2017). Abu-Ghaida and Klasen (2004) found that in Bangladesh, better educated
women are more capable of processing information, using health care facilities, and
keeping their living environment clean. A United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) study (2014) claimed that, in low-income
countries, 1.7 million (4 percent) fewer children would suffer from stunting if all
women had completed primary education. The study also showed that if all women
had completed secondary education, 12.2 million (26 percent) fewer children
would suffer from stunting, as education leads parents to improve health and
hygiene practices and improves nutrition in their children’s diet.

Women’s household headship is another proxy for women’s power in the

household. While Handa (1999) provided evidence that household heads can
win resources on behalf of their own children, using household head as a proxy
for women’s empowerment relies on the assumption that women can implement
their preferences more efficiently in female-headed households than male-head-
ed households. Mixed evidence exists on the impact of women as a household
head, including positive impacts on children’s health in India (Gaiha and
Kulkarni 2005) and no significant impact in a Malawi cash transfer study
(Luseno and others 2014). These findings could be because household headship
represents household characteristics that negatively affect children, such as that
female heads of household often bear the sole responsibility for earning income
(Richards and others 2013) and may have more limited access to resources than
the average male-headed household. For instance, in a study in Ghana,
female-headed households had lower access to agricultural inputs (Doss and
Morris 2001).
Resource allocation when resources are constrained have notably varied by
gender, with women receiving less (Sen 1992, 2003), including in cases of extreme
weather shock (Anttila-Hughes 2012; Foltz and Han 2013). When women’s bar-
gaining power and/or control of resources increased, some empirical studies indi-
cated bigger improvements in girls’ health than boys’ health in the household
(Thomas 1994; Duflo 2003; Qian 2008).
Channels of Impact of Women’s Empowerment on

Children’s Human Capital
The phenomenon of women’s intra-household empowerment leading to increased
spending on children’s health has been attributed to the tendency for women to
value children and emphasize children’s well-being more than men (Nyqvist and
Jayachandran 2017). While women may not inherently value children more than
men, there are many socioeconomic reasons that they do. Cultural and social
norms often encourage women to prioritize ensuring household members receive
sufficient food allocations, particularly in poor rural settings. In poor, rural South
Africa, mothers are considered the “most important health worker in the house-
hold” (Medrano, Rodriguez, and Villa 2008, 612). Moreover, women often have
“gendered indigenous knowledge” of the domestic sphere and matters relevant to
health, including agriculture, maintaining water supplies, and food security, facil-
itating better-informed and more productive decisions on children’s health inputs
(Terry 2009, 13). As women in these settings tend to be poorer and specialize in
nonmarket (domestic) labor, they are likely to rely more on their children for
future support, and therefore they may prioritize their children’s human capital
accumulation to a greater extent than men. Women may also care more about
children’s daily needs and well-being because they tend to spend more time with
children and thus may be more familiar with them than men, who typically spe-
cialize in market labor. Given that women tend to care and know more about
children than men do, women are expected to make decisions about daily expen-
ditures to support children’s health more than men.

Direct experimental evidence on preferences indicates that compared to men,

women prefer health outcomes (Lampietti and others 1999; Prabhu 2010) and
spending on children (Kusago and Barham 2001). Such direct experimental evi-
dence identifies preferences about outcomes such as children’s health through
asking men and women what they prefer and comparing. This valuably augments
most empirical studies of the impacts of female empowerment, including the
empirical analysis in this chapter, which infer the preferences about outcomes
through outcomes, inferring how preferences differ between men and women
through the improvement in outcomes associated with proxies for women or men
having more ability to implement their preferences.
The link between material allocations to children (for instance, food resources and
health inputs) to improvements in children’s diet and nutritional status is well estab-
lished (Santoso and others 2019; United Nations Childrens Fund [UNICEF] 2021).
Women’s decision-making power could also affect children’s health through other chan-
nels, such as women’s health and access to maternal health care. Qualitative evidence
from a study in Ghana indicated women’s lack of decision-making autonomy and wider
gender inequality undermined access to maternal health care (Ganle and others 2015).
Evidence also explores the impacts of women’s empowerment on children’s
education. Using exogenous increases in sex-specific incomes, Qian (2008) shows
that children’s education improves when female income increases but when male
income increases, girls’ educational attainment decreases and there is no effect for
boys. Wider evidence is mixed in the context of a cash program in Morocco,
targeting to mothers versus fathers made no difference to children’s educational
attainment (Benhassine 2015).
IMPORTANCE OF WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT FOR

CHILDREN’S HEALTH WHEN HEALTH INPUTS ARE
MORE SCARCE
Resource Scarcity
Health inputs are more important when households are poorer or children’s
health is more threatened (for instance, by disease). There is a higher return of
additional allocations of health inputs for children’s health status.
If women’s power over resources affects children through the allocation of resourc-
es, women’s decision making would likely improve children’s nutrition where resourc-
es are scarce and therefore contested within the household (Heckert, Olney, and Ruel
2019; Santoso and others 2019). This phenomenon amounts to diminishing margin-
al returns of health-to-health inputs. Reduced household wealth constrains health
inputs, including food, medicine, water, and shelter. Poverty is associated with
increased stress, mental health problems, reduced cognitive ability, and poor health
(Mani and others 2013; Haushofer and Fehr 2014). The effect of women’s empower-
ment in the household is therefore expected to be stronger for poorer households.
Income tends to improve children’s nutritional status. Empirical evidence has
shown reductions in children’s health and educational attainment due to negative

income shocks (Mincer 1958; Subramanian and Deaton 1996; Jacoby and
Skoufias 1997; Jensen 2000; Banerjee and Mullainathan 2010), including income
shocks from extreme weather crises (Anttila-Hughes 2012; Baez, Caruso, and Niu
2018). Real income losses tend to result in replacing more expensive but poten-
tially more nutritious foods (including meat and fish) with cheaper foods such as
cereals (Subramanian and Deaton 1996; Banerjee and Duflo 2007; Anttila-
Hughes 2012). Increased resource scarcity and resource competition in a society
also increases risk of instability and conflict, with negative impacts on human
capital and wealth accumulation.
Climate Shocks
Climate change has been called “the biggest global health threat of the 21st centu-
ry” (Costello and others 2009, 1693). Countries in sub-Saharan Africa are partic-
ularly vulnerable to changes in climate and the impacts of rainfall variability
(Niang and others 2014). Extreme weather events are becoming increasingly fre-
quent with climate change. Extreme weather has been consistently associated with
reduced children’s nutritional status in the literature (Maccini and Yang 2009;
Skoufias and Vinha 2012; Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang 2013; Andalón and others
2016), including in sub-Saharan African and South Africa (Thompson, Matamale,
and Kharidza 2012; Foltz and Han 2013; Baez, Caruso, and Niu 2018).
Weather events such as extreme rainfall tend to negatively affect children’s health
through health and income shocks. The health shocks include increased disease bur-
den brought about by jeopardizing water, hygiene, and sanitation, which increase
water-borne disease (UNICEF 2017). Children living in sub-Saharan Africa are
expected to disproportionately bear these risks (Thompson, Matamale, and Kharidza
2012). In particular, floods increase the prevalence of disease-carrying insects such as
mosquitos and worms, and extreme flooding can physically harm people, especially
children. Extreme weather events also threaten children’s health indirectly by affecting
household resources, with subsequent reduced investments in human capital. For
poor, rural households, the effect is particularly strong due to the strong impact of
extreme rainfall on agricultural production and incomes. Studies have therefore used
rainfall shocks as the exogenous instrumental variable for income shocks for poor,
rural communities (Angrist and Krueger 2001; Duflo and Udry 2004; Miguel,
Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004; Miguel 2005). Extreme flooding also directly causes
loss of physical assets (Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang 2013).
This study focuses on the impact of rainfall, as rainfall is considered “the most
important source of climate variability for livelihoods” of South Africans (Flato,
Muttarak, and Pelser 2017, 48). In accordance with the literature on climate
shocks, extreme rainfall shocks will likely negatively affect children’s health.
With the expectation that the impact of women’s empowerment in the house-
hold will be stronger when health inputs to children are more constrained, the
impact of women’s decision making in the household is likely stronger in the face
of extreme weather events. Evidence for this anticipated finding is limited, and
insufficient climate data limit potential conclusions of our study. Foltz and Han
(2013) indicated that in Mali, the number of women in the household over

childbearing age (over 45 years) improved children’s health; however, no signifi-

cant interaction exists between this effect and extreme positive rainfall shocks.
Women’s indigenous knowledge of resource management (Terry 2009) will likely
give women’s empowerment a vital role in climate adaptation (ActionAid 2007).
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Research over the past 25 years, including that in the previous sections of this chap-
ter, has established that preferences differ within households. This research has
shown that household decision making over allocation of resources is not the same
across potential decision makers, going against the previously dominant theories of
unitary preferences within the household (Samuelson 1956; Becker 1981).
We construct a theoretical framework using Besley and Ghatak’s (2001)
incomplete contracting framework for public goods. The benefits of children’s
health are public goods (nonrival and nonexcludable) for each potential decision
maker (Rasul 2000). Besley and Ghatak demonstrated that decision-making
authority should be allocated to the party that values the benefits of the public
good the most regardless of involvement in investments for the good. Involvement
in investments could be through personal contribution of money. Allocating
ownership to the party with the highest valuation improves investment incentives
for both parties and results in the highest possible level of joint surplus.
Applying Besley and Ghatak’s framework indicates that if women value chil-
dren’s health more than men do, then in order to maximize children’s health
women should be allocated decision-making power. This allocation produces
higher human capital for children (the “joint surpluses” of the investment in
children), regardless of either party’s investment involvement. Application of the
Besley and Ghatak framework assumes that contracts cannot habitually be made
on the investment levels or realized human capital of children, leading to an
incomplete contracting “holdup” problem and parties underinvesting in chil-
dren’s health compared to the “first best” optimal that would require contracts.
Achieving the second-best household investment in children requires allocating
control of resources to the party that cares more, regardless of investment involve-
ment, such as in earning the money to invest. The literature has indicated that
women tend to be the more caring party. (Annex 9.1 provides further details on
the theoretical framework.)
This study empirically tests the hypothesis that women making decisions on
daily expenditures is associated with improvements in children’s health compared
to men making these decisions.
Women’s economic opportunities outside the household (such as employ-
ment) are expected to increase their bargaining power and decision-making power
over household resources in the household, with potential to enable women to
implement their preferences more effectively. Women’s economic empowerment,
such as employment, is not the only factor determining the allocation of decision-
making power. Other factors also likely enhance women’s effectiveness in imple-
menting their preferences—for instance, gaining support and knowledge through

networks—that also affect their decision-making power. Through separate vari-

ables for decision makers’ gender and economic characteristics, this study analyzes
whether the impact of women’s decision-making power is dependent on their
economic empowerment in terms of employment status. This link could have
policy implications, adding to the reasons why women’s economic empowerment
enables economic development through supporting children’s health.
Data and Empirical Methodology

Data Origin
This study employs a panel of longitudinal household-level data—the four-wave
panel data set from the National Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS) produced by
the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU 2017a,
2017b, 2017c, 2017d). The nationally representative panel data set surveyed
28,000–38,000 individuals from roughly 10,000 households in each of the four
waves (2008, 2010–11, 2012, 2014–15). Each wave contained seven surveys, and
the 1,500 variables provided extensive data on individuals’ and households’
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, including detailed anthropomet-
ric data for children, intra-household decision making, household structure and
composition, labor market participation, education, and other economic activity.
These data facilitate controlling for—and examining the effects of—relevant
health and socioeconomic factors. Inclusion of wider factors helps to minimize
endogeneity, while the relatively large sample allows examination of restricted
samples. The study uses high-resolution global terrestrial monthly climate data
developed by the University of East Anglia Climate Research Unit (UEA CRU
2014; Harris, Jones, and Osborn 2014). For further details on data adjustments
see Annex 9.2.
South Africa
The South African context is not typical of sub-Saharan Africa, characterized by
one of the world’s most consistently unequal income distributions (World Bank
2023a) with high per capita income levels for a development context but pro-
nounced poverty (World Bank 2023b). The range of wealth in the nationally
representative sample facilitates examination of the role of resource scarcity for
the impact of climate on children’s health. Located at the southern tip of Africa,
the country also hosts a range of climatic zones with rainfall variation across dis-
tricts. The approach to the rainfall variable reflects this variation.
Sample
The sample includes children aged 2 to 15 years, in line with the NIDS definition
of children and evidence on using anthropometric measures (for example, Roemling
and Qiam 2013). The main focus and specification sample is resource-scarce house-
holds. See Annex 9.3 for details on further sample exclusions and the definition of
resource scarcity.

Key Variables
Dependent Variable—Children’s Health
There are several ways to measure children’s health, including anthropometric
measures. For this chapter, children’s health is assessed through the anthropomet-
ric z-score of BMI (body mass index)-for-age, measuring children’s nutritional
status and health, in keeping with the literature (for example, Thomas 1997).
Robustness is checked against the z-score of weight-for-age and excludes obese
children. Annex 9.4 provides further details.
Explanatory Variable—Women’s Empowerment

The variable for whether a woman makes decisions in the household uses adults’
responses to the question, “Who makes decisions about day-to-day household
expenditures? (for example, groceries).” The decision maker was used for daily
expenditure as choices and allocation of daily expenditure to determine children’s
intake of nutrition, given constraints of the household budget.
Explanatory Variable—Extreme Rainfall

Potential impacts of extremely high rainfall (potential flooding) were examined using
a dummy variable for whether rainfall in the last completed rainy season in a house-
hold’s district was in the top 5 percent of the district’s rainfall, in terms of deviations
from the district-level long-term mean for each southern African rainy season in
1901–2015. This follows the literature (including Maccini and Yang 2009;
Blankespoor and others 2010). Using precipitation relative to a long-term mean
rather than absolute precipitation improves the exogeneity of the variable, as each
district’s (long-term) usual rainfall was controlled for. Usual rainfall is likely related
to socioeconomic status and accounts for local adaptation and preparedness.
Model
The study employs an ordinary least squares (OLS) panel data model. Unobserved
heterogeneity and hence potential endogeneity were minimized by controlling for
relevant socioeconomic, environmental, proximal and inherent risk factors for
poor health as part of the control variables, in keeping with the literature. Annex
9.5 provides further detail on the empirical methodology. The full results in
Annex Table 9.6.1 describes the variables in the model.
RESULTS
Female Empowerment
The empirical analysis indicates a significant positive impact of women’s empower-
ment in the household on children’s health. A female making decisions over daily
expenditures in the household compared to a male making these decisions improves
children’s health by 0.077 standard deviation of the z-score of BMI for children of

the same age, for the average 2- to 15-year-old child in a resource-scarce household
(Table 9.1, column 1). This result is statistically significant at the 1 percent level—
meaning that for 10-year-olds with a BMI at the 25th percentile for their age,
women’s decision making is roughly associated with an increase in their BMI from
14.7 to 15.0, moving significantly toward healthy status. Annex 9.6 provides the
full table. The result is robust and significant, though, as anticipated, slightly small-
er for specifications using decision making over large, unusual expenditures, exclud-
ing obese children, or including non-resource-scarce (richer) households.
The role of wider economic empowerment

The study examines the role of women’s economic empowerment versus decision
making over household expenditures through variables for decision makers’ charac-
teristics. The variables for decision makers’ characteristics may influence each other;
for example, an individual’s employment makes them more likely to become the
decision maker. The interaction variable for whether a decision maker is both
female and employed indicates that the impact on children’s health of a female
making decisions within the household depends on her employment status; having
a female household decision maker who is employed is associated with an increase
of 0.131 standard deviation of the z-score (Table 9.1, column 2). This analysis
indicates no statistically significant impact of an unemployed female decision maker
versus an unemployed male decision maker. This finding also suggests there is no
significant effect of a male decision maker being employed versus unemployed, all
else equal. Employment status may improve female decision makers’ impact on
children’s health because they have stronger bargaining power through options
outside the household and they are more likely to have stronger control over their
own income. Adding further characteristics of the decision maker indicates male
decision makers improved children’s health to a greater degree when they were more
educated—by 0.01 standard deviation for each extra year of schooling—but school-
ing is not significant for female decision makers to have an impact, perhaps suggest-
ing the impact is captured through employment (Table 9.1, column 4).
Resource scarcity
The impact of women’s empowerment on health is generally stronger in poorer
households, as shown in Figure 9.1, which indicates a trend of higher coefficients
for poorer quintiles of income, with a coefficient of 0.088 for the poorest quintile
and 0.039 for the highest quintile. While the impact remains positive, the low
statistical significance in quintiles is likely due to the low sample size.
The rainfall shock to children’s health

Extremely high rainfall two rainy seasons before the survey year is associated with
significant decreases in children’s health of 0.194 standard deviation of the z-score
of BMI for age (full results table in Annex 9.6). This finding supports the literature
indicating the negative impact of climate shocks on children’s health, which could
occur via disease burden and compromising agricultural yields. The interaction
with women’s empowerment is insignificant, though better accounting for hydro-
logical systems is needed for the analysis of rain shocks to be credible.

TABLE 9.1.
The Impact of Women’s Decision Making and Employment Status on

Children’s Health
(2)
Interaction of (3)
Decision Maker Significant (4)
(1) Being Female and Characteristics of Decision Maker’s
Variables Main Employed Decision Maker Characteristics
Decision Maker Is 0.077*** 0.029 0.017 0.118
Female (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.091)
0.000 0.348 0.586 0.194
Decision Maker’s −0.000
Age (0.001)
0.832
Age for Female −0.001
Decision Makers (0.001)
0.265
Decision Maker’s −0.046 −0.070 −0.077
Employment (0.044) (0.044) (0.053)
Status 0.297 0.116 0.144
Decision Maker Is 0.131*** 0.139*** 0.141**
Female and (0.050) (0.051) (0.057)
Employed 0.009 0.007 0.013
Decision Maker’s 0.008*** 0.010*
Schooling (0.003) (0.006)
0.002 0.085
Schooling if (0.007)
Female 0.451
Observations 24,535 24,518 24,501 24,501
Source: Author’s own analysis using National Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS) produced by the Southern Africa Labour and
Development Research Unit (SALDRU 2017a–d) and climate data produced by the University of East Anglia Climate
Research Unit (UEA CRU 2014).
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. P-values reported below standard errors. Standard errors clustered at dis-
trict and wave level. FE = clustered at level of Districts and Waves; pid = 14,171 (column 1).
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Figure 9.1. The Coefficient for Women’s Decision Making in the Household
on Children’s Health
0.25
Coefficient 95% confidence interval
0.20
Empowerment-Health Effect
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
–0.05
–0.10
1 2 3 4 5
Income quintiles
Source: Author’s own analysis using National Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS) produced by the
Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU 2017a–d) and climate data
produced by the University of East Anglia Climate Research Unit (UEA CRU 2014).

CONCLUSION
Results and Implications
This study’s empirical analysis supports the wider evidence indicating that wom-
en’s empowerment in the household improves children’s health, particularly
through women’s employment. This link indicates the importance of women’s
economic empowerment outside of the household for household dynamics. The
study supports the literature which has shown that when women control house-
hold resources, children have better human capital outcomes.
This study also indicates that women’s empowerment generally matters more
for children’s health when households are poorer, making women’s empowerment
more important for children’s health in challenging times. The world faces rising
poverty and food insecurity in the aftermath of global shocks. Improving chil-
dren’s health is even more urgent in the face of direct health shocks, such as dis-
ease outbreaks, and shocks to household resources, such as through economic
downturns experienced worldwide following the Russian invasion into Ukraine
and the COVID-19 pandemic. Climate change is expected to accelerate the
threats to children’s health through household income and health channels.
The results suggest that a multipurpose or holistic policy focusing on chil-
dren’s health and women’s empowerment is advantageous. Policy and programs
aiming to improve children’s health can do so indirectly by increasing women’s
economic empowerment. Economic empowerment enhances women’s bargain-
ing power and control of resources in the household, which is associated with
improvements in children’s health. Policies that can increase women’s economic
empowerment include improving employment opportunities (for instance,
developing sectors that employ women), enhancing education and skills train-
ing for women, and changing rules and norms such as ease of divorce, violence
against women, and societal perceptions of women’s roles (Agarwal 1997;
Browning, Chiappori, and Wiess 2011; Muthoo 1999; Sen 1992).
Social protection and cash transfer programs can usefully target women, and
many programs already do. Making women central to cash programs can be key
to their success for children’s outcomes, as women can most often be relied upon
to fulfil responsibilities to their children and spend the money they receive in
accordance with children’s needs (Molyneux and Thomson 2011). The World
Bank and others have developed significant evidence on how to design inclusive
and impactful government-to-person transfers to women, including ensuring that
payments are deposited directly into women’s accounts.
To enable sustainable development and gender equality, policymakers must con-
sider the gains to women of increased control rights over resources. Programs that
treat women only as an instrument for benefiting children can risk exacerbating
gendered social norms, reinforcing women’s caring role, and exacerbating women’s
time poverty through additional unpaid responsibilities, particularly conditional cash
transfer schemes, such as in Peru (Cookson 2018) and in Mexico and Ecuador
(Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 2012; Orozco

Corona and Gammage 2017; Molyneux and Thomson 2011). Women already bear
most of the burden of unpaid domestic responsibilities, spending on average three
times longer on unpaid care work than men worldwide (World Bank 2023c). To
empower women, development actors can seek opportunities to transform social
norms, including on caregiving (for example, through the work of Equimundo) and
tackling issues in the care economy that this book addresses. The design, implemen-
tation, and evaluation of interventions must be sensitive to gender inequalities. Cash
transfers to women have the potential to benefit women—through greater financial
inclusion, increasing social status, and wider economic empowerment (World Food
Programme 2022). Growing evidence indicates cash transfers reduce violence against
women (Baranov and others 2020). If gender norms could transform such that the
average man invested as much in children as the typical woman, household mem-
bers’ health and well-being would improve.
With human capital of the next generation threatened by climate change and
global shocks that affect household resources, it is more critical than ever that
policymakers look within households to enable economic development. Enabling
women’s economic empowerment and women’s power to make decisions in the
household is smart economics.
Limitations and Further Research

This study augmented the literature through empirical analysis of panel data and
analyzing control rights directly and separately to female employment and income.
The evidence that women’s empowerment improves children’s outcomes may
depend on gendered norms of women bearing most domestic responsibilities,
which is the dominant culture in most contexts worldwide. Future research could
identify whether women’s control of household resources matters if gendered
norms shifted significantly such that women and men split domestic and caring
responsibilities equally.
The reliability and accuracy of the results could be improved by further
limiting potential endogeneity of household-level variables, including potential
influence of female decision making and other explanatory variables. This
improvement could be achieved using an exogenous source of variation in
resource control, such as a randomized cash transfer program.
Further research could hone the analysis of how women’s empowerment in the
household protects children from the negative impacts of extreme weather. Such
research would be strengthened by better accounting for hydrological systems,
including data for the upstream water catchment, water treatment, and the extent
of floodplains in agricultural land. The climate analysis would also be improved
by increased location precision of rainfall data through microdata with more
precise geographical units within district councils and greater time precision.
Further work would assess the interaction effect on children’s human capital of
women’s intra-household decision making with extreme weather, identifying
whether women’s empowerment protects children from the negative impacts of
extreme weather in climate crisis.

ANNEX 9.1. FURTHER DETAILS ON THE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Francesconi and Muthoo (2011) found that the theoretical conjecture holds even if
the child’s health were a slightly impure public good, that is, excludable or rivalrous
to a small extent. It seems plausible that children’s health could be slightly impure,
for example, due to the potential for sole custody by one party.
Suppose for simplicity of explanation that a woman has a higher valuation of
the good, while her partner, a man, is the sole investor. We can plausibly assume
that the highest investment level maximizes the joint surplus of their child’s
health. Therefore, both parties gain larger payoffs from a higher investment than
a low one, and the payoffs are higher for whoever cares more about the child (in
this scenario, the woman). However, since neither the investment level or health
quality is contractible, upfront payments between parties cannot guarantee the
high investment level. Following the incomplete contracting literature, we assume
the parties bargain over the surplus after the investment is sunk, and investment
choices depend upon each party’s share of the surplus.
Since resource control affects the parties’ payoffs from disagreement, it also
affects their share of the surplus and investment incentives. If the man (the party
with the lower valuation) has control rights on the determinants of a child’s health
and he chooses the high investment level, then even in the event a disagreement, he
will continue the investment since he receives a higher ex post payoff through the
child’s health. Hence, the woman (whom, for simplicity, we are assuming is the
higher valuation party) cannot be induced to contribute anything ex post if the man
has already made a high investment, and he will prefer the low investment level. If
the woman has control rights, neither party receives a disagreement payoff, as the
investment requires the man’s continued participation to generate surplus. Applying
the Nash Bargaining Solution, bargaining results in splitting the surplus equally. The
man will now choose a higher investment level than if he had the control rights due
to the higher payoff. Hence, women’s decision making yields the surplus maximiz-
ing level of investment: investment incentives increase if control rights are allocated
to the more caring party, regardless of who has the money to invest.
ANNEX 9.2. DATA ADJUSTMENTS

Merging Data Sets
The climate data was merged with the micro-data by the geographical cen-
ter-point of each district council. The district council is the ultimate geographical
level for the weather data while each precipitation reading refers to a 2,500
square-kilometer area. This relies on the assumption that rainfall deviations from
trends are homogenous within district councils. For time period, rainfall was
examined during the rainy season closest to the NIDS wave, when the rainfall
impacts are the greatest and the largest rain variation exists (Flato, Muttarak, and
Pelser 2017). The monthly climate data for South Africa for precipitation total

was used, employing the full-time series from 1901–2015 to create the baseline
reference of long-term mean and standard deviation by season and year for the
rainfall shock variables.
The rainy “southern African monsoon” season occurs in October to March for
most of South Africa (Bellprat and others 2015). The climate data were merged
with the micro-data using separate geo-mapping data from South Africa’s 2011
Census (Statistics South Africa 2017a). The geographical census data connected
each longitude–latitude pair with its corresponding geographical labels, including
district and the districts’ center-point coordinates. After adjusting these data to be
the same precision as the climate data, the data were merged by center-point
coordinates. The micro-data were then merged with the climate data based on
South Africa’s 52 District Councils’ Municipal Demarcation Board codes present
in both data sets, following the boundaries used in South Africa’s 2011 Census.
Deflation
Since NIDS collected data for each Wave over at least one year, all price or income
data were deflated including household income, household wage, and household
expenditure by month. The deflators are derived from price indices from the
national headline consumer price index published by Statistics South Africa
(2017b), as described on the NIDS website (SALDRU 2017a).
ANNEX 9.3. THE SAMPLE

Children
Anthropometric measures such as weight-for-age are less reliable for under two-
year-old children due to their different body compositions (Roemling and Qiam
2013). Children who are pregnant or lactating were excluded, as these states
would constitute undesired heterogeneity. Sample members are household resi-
dents (defined as residing in the household at least four nights a week) such that
they are impacted by household phenomena.
Household Resource Scarcity

Household resource-scarcity is defined as insufficient income to provide a mini-
mum of health-improving food to each member of the household, as specified by
the World Bank (Haughton and Khandker 2009). Resource-scarcity was there-
fore calculated using the recommended minimum monthly cost in South Africa
of sufficiently feeding one person in the base year for deflation (2015) of R1958
(equivalent to roughly $150 in 2015) (Numbeo 2015). This figure was then
multiplied by each individual’s household size to make an indicator variable for
household monthly expenditure under the resource-scarcity line. Thus, 85 per-
cent of the sample members were defined as living in resource-scarce households.
This percentage roughly matches the national poverty line (National Treasury &
Statistics South Africa 2007).

Movers
To correctly estimate the clustered standard errors using Stata, panels of individ-
uals must be nested within district clusters. Any individuals who moved districts
were therefore removed between waves for the main specification.
ANNEX 9.4. MEASURE OF CHILDREN’S HEALTH

BMI-for-age z-score (BAZ) is weighted for age (in days). Accounting for weight,
height, and age helps identify malnutrition, which is more sensitive to short-term
changes than height-only measures. For robustness, this measure is compared
with the weight-for-age z-score (WAZ). Using WAZ for our analysis significantly
reduces the sample size and results are not robust for this (p-value of 0.149). If
policy aims to avert undernutrition and hunger, overweight children provide
useful variation in this analysis. Robustness of the findings are confirmed for
excluding obese children, as obese could be considered unhealthy but may be
detected as a “health improvement” through BAZ or WAZ. The BAZ measure is
derived by the data producers, as described in the NIDS manual (Chinhema and
others 2016). The reference populations were the WHO international growth
standards (WHO 2006; de Onis and others 2007; WHO 2023).
ANNEX 9.5. FURTHER DETAILS ON EMPIRICAL

METHODOLOGY
Accounting for time and space “fixed” effects
A fixed-effects model was used with both district and year fixed effects. The dis-
trict fixed effects allow for time-invariant unobserved (otherwise omitted) differ-
ences across districts, for instance community gender norms, local public services,
local preparation, and adaptation for rainfall. The year fixed effects capture
unobserved trends, such as sample-wide technological changes in health care or
climate adaptation. Furthermore, using fixed effects allows potentially nonran-
dom attrition to be correlated with—and partially captured by—the unobserved
(fixed) effects (Wooldridge 2013), helping to diminish endogeneity.
The estimated standard errors are clustered at the level of the 52 districts,
following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). In this way, intra-district
correlation was allowed for among model errors for each individual, relaxing the
assumption of independence between observations (Cameron and Miller 2015).
Rainfall Dynamics
Two lags of rainfall by rainy season year were included, following optimal lag
selection best practices. Examining the dynamic impacts of climate shocks on
children’s health was limited as data for socioeconomic conditions are for the
“present” period. Effects may dissipate over time and be conflated with more
recent conditions and unobserved “noise.” Furthermore, wave fixed effects in time

will not apply to lags referring to years outside the waves, so rainfall trends are not
fully captured through the wave fixed effects.
The dynamic impacts (between time periods) on children’s health of floods and
droughts will likely differ. Drought may contribute incrementally to low health via
sustained water scarcity and poor crop yields that lead to undernutrition in the
medium to long term. By contrast, floods may have more of an immediate (“shock”)
effect. Floods are likely to increase infectious disease prevalence quickly; compromise
water, health care, and other infrastructure; and jeopardize the harvest during the
rainfall rather than cumulatively over the growing season. Floods are therefore expect-
ed to have a more immediate effect on health.
ANNEX 9.6. FULL RESULTS

ANNEX TABLE 9.6.1.
Full Results: Impacts on Children’s Health

(2)
Interaction of (3)
Household Decision Maker’s Characteristics
Decision Maker Is 0.077*** 0.029 0.017 0.118
Female (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.091)
0.000 0.348 0.586 0.194
Decision Maker’s Age −0.000
(0.001)
0.832
Decision Maker’s Age If −0.001
Decision Maker Is (0.001)
Female 0.265
Decision Maker Is −0.046 −0.070 −0.077
Employed (0.044) (0.044) (0.053)
0.297 0.116 0.144
Decision Maker Is 0.131*** 0.139*** 0.141**
Female and Employed (0.050) (0.051) (0.057)
0.009 0.007 0.013
Decision Maker’s 0.008*** 0.010*
Schooling (0.003) (0.006)
0.002 0.085
Schooling if Decision (0.007)
Maker Is Female 0.451
Individual Characteristics
Female Dummy 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.081** 0.080**
(Compared to Male) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
0.009 0.010 0.012 0.012
Age in Years −0.254*** −0.255*** −0.255*** −0.255***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Age Squared 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(continued)

ANNEX TABLE 9.6.1. Continued
(2)
Interaction of (3)
Race Dummy: Colored −0.410*** −0.406*** −0.409*** −0.413***
(Compared to Black) (0.069) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Race Dummy: Asian −0.739** −0.722** −0.753** −0.758**
0.027 0.034 0.026 0.025
Race Dummy: White 0.413 0.425 0.416 0.418
0.138 0.120 0.126 0.128
Household Characteristics
Log Household Income 0.060*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.057***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
Mother Is Dead Dummy −0.083** −0.078* −0.073* −0.070*
(Compared to One (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042)
Parent Being Alive) 0.047 0.068 0.085 0.100
Father Is Dead Dummy −0.028 −0.025 −0.023 −0.022
(Compared to One (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Parent Being Alive) 0.269 0.314 0.349 0.370
Number of Female −0.047*** −0.047*** −0.045*** −0.046***
Siblings (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of Male −0.020 −0.019 −0.017 −0.018
Siblings (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
0.104 0.116 0.146 0.142
Number of Female 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
Siblings if Female (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
0.339 0.326 0.335 0.332
Number of Male −0.028** −0.028** −0.027** −0.027**
Siblings if Female (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
0.015 0.015 0.020 0.020
Village Characteristics
High Rainfall in Last 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.039
Rainy Season (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060)
0.527 0.512 0.506 0.516
High Rainfall Two Rainy −0.194*** −0.191*** −0.189*** −0.190***
Seasons Ago (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
High Rainfall Three 0.068 0.072 0.073 0.073
Rainy Seasons Ago (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)
0.155 0.131 0.133 0.133
Urban Dummy 0.073* 0.066* 0.051 0.051
(Compared to Rural) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
0.063 0.087 0.188 0.187
Observations 24,535 24,518 24,501 24,501
Number of pid 14,171 14,168 14,159 14,159
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Author’s own analysis using National Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS) produced by the Southern Africa Labour and
Development Research Unit (SALDRU 2017a–d) and climate data produced by the University of East Anglia Climate
Research Unit (UEA CRU 2014).
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. P-values reported below standard errors. Standard errors clustered at dis-
trict and wave level. FE = clustered at level of Districts and Waves; pid = 14,171 (column 1).
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

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CHAPTER 10
Gender Inequality and Electoral

Violence in Africa: Unlocking
Women’s Peacemaking Potential
Rasmané Ouedraogo and Idrissa Ouedraogo
This chapter uses individual-level data from the sixth round of Afrobarometer surveys
to examine the impact of gender equality on electoral violence in Africa. The data
cover more than 40,000 individuals from 30 countries. The results highlight that
gender equality is associated with lower electoral violence. Countries with higher
levels of female labor force participation tend to be less subject to electoral violence
due to the peaceful influence of women and improved macroeconomic outcomes.
Quantitatively, the empirical estimates show that an increase in female-to-male labor
force participation ratio by 1 percentage point is correlated with a reduction of the
probability of electoral violence across the continent by around 4.2 percentage points.
This chapter’s findings support the long-standing view that female empowerment
contributes to the reduction of violence and underscore the urgency of addressing
gender inequality in Africa.
INTRODUCTION
If non-violence is the Law of our being, the future is with Women.
Who can make a more effective appeal to the heart than a woman?—
Mahatma Gandhi, “To the Women of India, Oct. 4, 1930”
Elections constitute one of the most important pillars of democracy, but in most
African countries, elections are characterized by the high possibility of election-
related violence. During elections, the stability and security of African states hang
in the balance. Electoral violence is a major problem on the continent and threat-
ens the development and consolidation of democracy. According to Buchard
(2015), around 50 percent of elections are still subject to violence, although there
has been substantial annual variation in the frequency of violent episodes in recent
years. Violence in Côte d’Ivoire following the 2010 presidential election may have
displaced as many as 1 million people and caused more than 3,000 deaths; the
Kenyan 2007–08 postelection turmoil killed 1,300 people and displaced some
250,000–600,000; and in Nigeria more than 1,000 people died over the 2011
polls (Atwood 2012).
193

Yet no study is known to have investigated the empirical impact of gender

equality on electoral violence. Electoral violence is carried out to determine, delay,
or to otherwise influence an electoral process (Fischer 2002) and take place
before, during, or after an election. To explain electoral violence in Africa, schol-
ars have posited several theories, including those related to ethnic and political
cleavages (Colombo, D’Aoust, and Sterck 2017; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner
2010), natural resources (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2008), political competi-
tion (Sterck 2017; Collier and Vicente 2012), weak governance (Gutiérrez-
Romero 2014), and fragility and past conflicts (Collier and Vicente 2012,
Brancati and Snyder 2012). None of these studies empirically explored the impact
of gender equality on electoral violence despite the recognition in the literature
that closing the gender gap is correlated with a reduction in conflict occurrence
(Demeritt, Nichols, and Kelly 2014; Melander 2016; Caprioli 2005). Existing
studies associate women with an aversion to violence and an inclination toward
peace, and they argue that including women in society (both politics and eco-
nomics) makes violent conflict less likely (Demeritt, Nichols, and Kelly 2014;
Goldstein 2001). Countries with greater gender equality and female participation
generally tend to adopt more peaceful preferences, leading to a reduced likelihood
of political violence (Goldstein 2001).
This chapter uses individual-level data from the sixth wave of the Afrobarometer
survey to explore the impact of gender equality on electoral violence in Africa.
The study estimates the effect of female labor force participation on the percep-
tion of electoral violence and controls for several covariates. The endogeneity
problem is addressed by employing an instrumental variable approach in which
the female-to-male labor force participation ratio is connected with rainfall
growth rate. Rainfall growth rate is positively associated with female labor force
participation, because it presents job opportunities for women in the agriculture
sector. According to Jayne, Yeboah, and Henry (2017), the agriculture sector
remains the single largest source of employment in Africa, and women make up
almost 50 percent of the agriculture labor force on the continent (Food and
Agriculture Organization 2011).
The results show that gender equality is associated with a reduction in elec-
toral violence in Africa. The findings imply that countries with higher levels of
female labor force participation tend to have lower levels of electoral violence.
An increase in female-to-male labor force participation ratio by 1 percentage
point is correlated with a decrease in the likelihood of electoral violence by
4.2 percent. The chapter underscores the importance of achieving gender equal-
ity and women empowerment in Africa and provides a novel contribution to
the long-standing debate about the role of gender inequality as a determinant
of civil conflicts.
The rest of the chapter discusses the mechanisms through which gender
inequality affects conflicts and violence; it then presents the data, provides some
descriptive statistics, and describes the empirical strategy. Finally, the chapter
reports and analyzes the results and offers some concluding remarks.

Chapter 10 Gender Inequality and Electoral Violence in Africa 195
MECHANISMS
Gender equality can affect electoral violence through several mechanisms; these
include a structural violence channel as well as norms and social roles.
Structural Violence
Coined by Galtung (1969), structural violence refers to a form of violence wherein
some social structure or social institution may harm people by preventing them
from meeting their basic needs. In cases of structural violence, gendered structural
hierarchies, which are maintained by norms of violence and oppression, should
result in higher levels of intrastate violence by inuring people to aggression and
by providing the framework for justifying it (United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization 1995).
Often aimed at women, structural violence is maintained through gender
socialization, gender stereotyping, and a constant threat of violence—all of which
insidiously identify women as inferior, thus influencing their actions at all levels
(Caprioli 2005). Structural violence can be expressed in higher rates of female
unemployment, unequal access to goods and services, and exploitation. Winter
and Leighton (2001) argued that structural violence is the violence of injustice
and inequity—embedded in ubiquitous social structures and normalized by sta-
ble institutions and regular experience.
Galtung (1975) identified four components of structural violence: (1) exploita-
tion, which is focused on the division of labor, with the benefits being asymmetri-
cally distributed; (2) penetration, which necessitates the control by the exploiters
over the consciousness of the exploited, thus resulting in the acquiescence of the
oppressed; (3) fragmentation, which means that the exploited are separated from
each other; and (4) marginalization, with the exploiters as a privileged class observ-
ing their own rules and forms of interaction. The third component refers, for
instance, to the exclusion of women from the labor market, which is the subject of
this study. It results from women having fewer job opportunities outside the home
that would allow for participation and create a sense of efficacy.
Structural violence creates the foundation for structural inequality and con-
flicts. The term structural inequality refers to the system of privilege and inequality
created and maintained by interlocking societal institutions. Women are subjected
to structural inequality, which results from male domination; gender stereotypes;
sexism; lack of opportunities, decision-making power, and adequate education;
barriers to accessing social or economic resources; and all other aspects resulting
from non- or under-participation of women. Caprioli (2005) argued that gender
inequality should have a substantial impact on intrastate conflict based on the
direct impact of structural inequality, with its inherent norms of discrimination
and violence and the role that it plays in facilitating ethnic rebellion and conflict.
Moreover, gender discrimination and structural violence are important aspects in
mobilizing groups and in legitimizing violence. Inequality can create grievances
between groups that, especially when exploited by politicians, deepen animosity

between them and increase the likelihood of bloodshed (Atwood 2012). In the
same vein, Midlarsky (1999) highlighted that inequality, when extreme and sys-
tematic, leads to political violence.
Norms and Social Roles

The second mechanism is about the norms and social roles of men and women.
In many societies, the tasks and responsibilities imposed on people are divided
into male and female gender roles. Under this division of labor, it is argued that
gender equality as a norm is associated with a low occurrence of violence.
In general, women are more violence averse. Hudson and others (2008–09)
argued that societies dominated and controlled by men are subject to an environ-
ment where violence and aggression are considered the norm. Thus, societies with
a very high level of male dominance in politics tend to be controlled by hyper-
masculine political cultures, which can probably fuel electoral violence. This
norm prescribes violence as a means to resolve conflict also on the highest
decision-making levels (Forsberg and Olsson 2016). This is typically the case for
electoral violence in which some groups do not accept the poll results or adhere
to the democratic process; they then resort to violence to achieve their ends.
Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) used the “subculture of violence” perspective to
emphasize that social groups exhibit high rates of violent behavior because of
group members’ adherence to values and norms that support, legitimize, and
encourage violent behavior, and these values and norms often emphasize an ideal
of masculinity.
In this regard, gender equality is associated with lower grievances and conflicts.
Societies characterized by gender equality are ingrained with norms that men and
woman treat each other with respect (Melander 2005). These norms then transfer
to other societal relations, such as between ethnic groups and political parties, and
can explain the relative peacefulness of such states. Demeritt, Nichols, and Kelly
(2014) argued that gender equality as a norm prescribes respect and resolution of
conflict without violence, and hence equality norms may prevent grievances from
escalating to violent conflict in the first place. Incorporating women in society
reflects changes in gender construction and particularly reflect the relaxation of
the norm of men-as-warriors. From this perspective, states that emphasize gender
equality and female participation in traditionally male society also tend to adopt
more generally peaceful preferences, leading to a reduced likelihood of political
violence (Demeritt, Nichols, and Kelly 2014; Goldstein 2001). Accordingly, the
inclusion of women in societal decision making could lead to them increasingly
exerting the inherent pacific influence and/or redefining traditional gender roles
in ways that privilege nonviolence—in the way constructivists anticipate.
Some authors rely on the biological and reproductive role of women to explain
these peaceful attitudes. This role leads to an inclination to give life, not take it
(Demeritt, Nichols, and Kelly 2014). With this natural preference for peace,
women would prefer to prevent societal problems from escalating to conflict and
attempt to de-escalate armed conflicts when they do occur (O’Mahoney 2012).

DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Data Sources
This chapter’s primary data source is round six of the Afrobarometer surveys. The
Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpartisan research project that measures the
social, political, and economic conditions in Africa. Afrobarometer began in 1999
with only 12 countries in the first round; surveys covered 36 countries in the sixth
round, conducted in 2014–15. Nationally representative samples of individuals
who are older than 18 years are selected both in rural and urban areas of the
participating countries. Afrobarometer uses multilevel random selection methods
to generate the samples, which constitute a representative cross-section of the
population. In the sixth wave, more than 53,000 people were surveyed, with
sample sizes ranging between 1,200 and 2,400 people depending on each coun-
try’s population size.
Measurement of Electoral Violence

The survey data was used to measure electoral violence; the main issue that arose
was the definition of the term. The United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) defines electoral violence as “acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or
physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arise in the context
of electoral competition. When perpetrated to affect an electoral process, violence
may be employed to influence the process of elections—such as efforts to delay,
disrupt, or derail a poll—and to influence the outcomes: the determining of win-
ners in competitive races for political office or to secure approval or disapproval of
referendum questions” (UNDP 2009, 4).
Similarly, Fischer (2002) defined electoral violence as any random or orga-
nized act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political
stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence an electoral
process. As such, electoral violence includes acts—such as assassination of oppo-
nents or spontaneous fisticuffs between rival groups of supporters—and threats,
coercion, and intimidation of opponents, voters, or election officials (UNDP
2009).
The measurement of electoral violence was based on question Q49 from the
sixth round of Afrobarometer surveys, which provides an assessment about the
respondent’s personal experience with or perception of political intimidation and
violence. In question Q49, the respondents are asked: “During election cam-
paigns in this country, how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of
political intimidation or violence?” Response choices include “A lot,” “Somewhat,”
“A little bit,” and “Not at all.” The three first answers were merged and coded as 1,
which indicates that the respondent feared becoming a victim of political intim-
idation or violence, and the last answer, “Not at all,” was coded as 0.1
1
The results remain consistent even if the intensity of electoral violence is considered.

Measurement of Gender Equality

In this chapter, the female-to-male labor force participation ratio is used as a
measure of gender equality; the data are available from the sixth round of
Afrobarometer surveys. The female-to-male labor force participation ratio is the
ratio between the female labor force participation rate and the male labor force
participation rate. Question Q95 asks: “Do you have a job that pays a cash
income?” The survey also includes the gender of the respondent (see question
Q101), which allows the calculation of the female labor force participation rate
and the male labor force participation rate for each administrative region; calcu-
lating the ratio between the two yields the female-to-male labor force participa-
tion ratio.
Control Variables
To alleviate the problems of confounding caused by omitted variables, several are
included:
• Sociodemographic variables: age, level of education, residence, and employ-
ment status.
• Political affiliation and election-related variables: political party membership,
interests in political affairs, views about the elections, and media coverage and
participation of political parties.
• Trust in institutions: trust in electoral commission, government, ruling
party, police, army, and courts of law.
• Media: access to radio, television, newspapers, and social media.
• Socioeconomics: access to food, water, medical care, cash income, transpor-
tation, and electricity.
Annex Table 10.1 lists the control variables.
Descriptive Statistics
The sample covers 30 countries and consists of more than 40,000 respondents.
Country sample sizes range from 630 people in Liberia to 2,395 in Malawi.
Annex Table 10.2 displays descriptive statistics. On average, 46 percent of total
respondents reported being a victim of electoral violence. Furthermore, the
female-to-male labor force participation ratio is, on average, 73 percent; thus,
around 73 women of the sample are working per every group of 100 working
men. This share differs widely among countries. Figure 10.1 presents, by coun-
try, the average values of the female-to-male labor force participation ratio and
electoral violence. It shows that electoral violence is widespread in Nigeria, Cote
d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Kenya, where more than two-thirds of respondents
reported being victims of political intimidation and violence. On the contrary,
the share of respondents who have been targeted by electoral violence is low in
Niger, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Burkina Faso. In these countries, less than
one-fourth of respondents reported being subjects of electoral violence.

Figure 10.1. Gender Equality and Electoral Violence per Country

(Percent, average values)
120
Electoral violence Female-to-male labor participation ratio
100
80
60
40
20
0
Nigeria
Côte d’Ivoire
Liberia
Kenya
Gabon
Mozambique
Zimbabwe
Zambia
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Sierra Leone
Guinea
Algeria
Malawi
Cameroon
Morocco
South Africa
Swaziland
Ghana
Benin
Mali
Namibia
Tunisia
Senegal
Burundi
Burkina
Mauritius
Madagascar
Niger
Sources: Authors’ calculations; and Afrobarometer data.
The female-to-male labor force participation ratio is high in Mozambique,

Ghana, Togo, and Madagascar (above 90 percent); it is low in Niger, Burundi,
Tunisia, Algeria, and Malawi (below 50 percent).
Empirical Strategy
The objective was to estimate the impact of gender equality on electoral violence.
The model is as follows:
Electoral Violenceij = α + βGender Equalityij + γX΄ij + πj + μij (10.1)
Where, for individual i from country j, Electoral Violenceij is a binary variable
taking the value of 1 if the respondent reports being a victim of electoral violence,
Gender Equalityij represents the female-to-male labor force participation ratio.
Vector X΄ij includes socioeconomic, demographic, political, and election-related
variables. πj are country fixed effects. The inclusion of country fixed effects will
account for observable and unobservable country-specific characteristics that may
explain electoral violence. The error term is μij.
Attempts to estimate the impact of gender equality on electoral violence will
suffer from the common error of mistaking cause for effect and vice versa—
known as endogeneity issues—due to measurement errors, the omission of vari-
ables, and reserve causality. The direction and magnitude of this bias will depend
on the relative and potentially offsetting effects of reverse causality and measure-
ment error. The most problematic issue arises from reverse causality, given that
election-related violence may affect women’s participation in the labor market.
The direction of this bias is most likely negative, given that electoral violence

might negatively affect the female-to-male labor force participation ratio. The
second bias, related to measurement error, may come from any of the control
variables, including gender equality. The omitted variables constitute another
source of endogeneity; consequently, ordinary least squares regressions are likely
to be biased.
To address this endogeneity issue, an instrumental variable probit model was
used to estimate equation (10.1). The exogenous variations in rainfalls were used
as instrument for female-to-male labor force participation ratio. The idea is that
an economic shock emerging from extreme rainfalls will lead to a loss of jobs for
women, thus affecting the female-to-male labor force participation ratio and,
consequently, triggering electoral violence. An extreme economic shock steam-
ing from a decline in rainfall may disproportionally affect women, as men could
have more coping strategies than women do. Several studies have shown that
women’s job mobility and transition tend to be low compared to those of men
(Looze 2017). Royalty (1998) found that women are more likely than men to
experience job-to-nonemployment rather than job-to-job transitions. This find-
ing, in turn, implies that the unemployment rate for women will be higher than
that of men when an adverse shock in rainfall materializes. Weather shocks are
plausible instruments for developments in the labor markets in economies that
largely rely on rainfed agriculture, as do those in Africa (Miguel, Satyanath, and
Sergenti 2004).
RESULTS
Table 10.1 reports the results. The simple probit model is used in columns 1
through 5, and the instrumental variable probit model is used in columns 6
through 10. From the outset, one can observe that the coefficient associated with
gender equality is negative and significant in all columns, suggesting that gender
equality is negatively associated with electoral violence. This analysis focuses on
the instrumental variable probit model.
Column 6 presents the results of the estimates without any control variables
except the variable of interest. Country fixed effects are included in all regres-
sions with the purpose of controlling for all co-determinants of electoral violence
and gender equality. The coefficient associated with the female-to-male labor
force participation ratio, the coefficient of interest, is negative and significant at
the 1 percent level. Thus, an increase in gender equality reduces the likelihood
of electoral violence. Quantitatively, an increase in the female-to-male labor
force participation ratio by 1 percentage point is correlated with a decrease in the
likelihood of electoral violence by 4.2 percentage points.2 The findings are con-
sistent with some previous studies that highlighted that gender equality is nega-
tively associated with the occurrence of conflicts (Demeritt, Nichols, and Kelly
2014; Caprioli 2000, 2005).
2
Marginal effect calculated at mean values.

TABLE 10.1.
Impact of Gender Equality on Electoral Violence

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES Probit IV probit
Gender Equality −0.073*** −0.075*** −0.084*** −0.077*** −0.076*** −1.313** −1.233* −1.394*** −1.470*** −1.661***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.610) (0.664) (0.511) (0.531) (0.480)
Sociodemographic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chapter 10 Gender Inequality and Electoral Violence in Africa

Political Affilitation and Trust in Institutions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Media Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socioeconomic Conditions Yes Yes
Constant 0.940*** 1.111*** 1.533*** 1.474*** 1.757***
(0.306) (0.309) (0.226) (0.230) (0.209)
First stage
Rainfall Growth Rate 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.061*** 0.057*** 0.059***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 40,034 39,588 20,880 20,634 20,500 40,034 39,588 20,880 20,634 20,500
Log Likelihood −44831 −44171 −23413 −23107 −22882 −32270 −31597 −15964 −15696 −15457
Wald chi-square 5313 5408 3967 3954 4032 5641 5602 4399 4500 4940
Wald p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wald Chi-square Test of Exogeneity 4.30 3.31 6.68 6.55 9.25
Exogeneity Test Wald p-value 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00
Wald Test of Weak Instrument 3.31* 2.97* 5.11** 5.07** 7.01***
Anderson-Rubin Test of Weak Instrument 3.71* 2.84* 5.77** 5.78** 8.32***
Note: The results in columns 6 through 10 suggest that our instrument performs very well in the first stage. Rainfall growth rate is a positive and significant predictor of female labor force participation in Africa.
Statistical tests do not invalidate the econometric method. At the bottom of the table is Wald chi(2) score of the exogeneity of the instrumented variable. The null hypothesis of no endogeneity is rejected. The
Wald test and the Anderson-Rubin test regarding the strength of the instrument are strongly significant; therefore, the hypothesis that the instrument is weak is rejected. Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
201
Column 7 includes sociodemographic variables, such as respondents’ level of

education, age, living area, and employment status. As shown by the coefficient
associated with the gender equality index, a negative correlation exists between
gender equality and electoral violence. Moreover, the coefficients associated with
education and with age are negative and strongly significant, suggesting that
older, highly educated people are less likely to report electoral violence.
Column 8 includes the political affiliation of the respondent as well as some
election-related matters. These variables capture whether respondents report
being is a member of a political party, their interests in public affairs, their partic-
ipation in the last election and judgment about it—that is, fairness of votes and
participation of opposition parties, media coverage, and the counting of votes. In
fact, the outbreak of electoral violence is often related to voters’ misjudgment of
the election process. The exclusion of opposition parties can also spur electoral
violence. The trust of respondents in the national electoral commission, local
government council, ruling party, police, army, and courts of law are also con-
trolled for. A lack of trust in the national election commission, the ruling party,
police, and army can lead to protests and electoral violence, particularly when
voters do not trust the courts of law to reconsider irregularities. Even controlling
for these important covariates, the results still show that the coefficient associated
with the variable of interest—gender equality—is negative and significant at the
1 percent level; the coefficient is higher than that of column 6. Not surprisingly,
the results show that respondents who reported that the election was fair and free,
and that the votes were counted fairly, are less likely to be involved in electoral
violence. Trust in the election commission, ruling party, and army are also asso-
ciated with lower electoral violence, suggesting that more accountable, transpar-
ent, and effective ruling parties could help prevent electoral violence in Africa. In
contrast, those respondents who think that the opposition parties were prevented
from participating in the election are more likely to report electoral violence.
Given the increasing role of the media during election periods and daily life,
the respondent’s media channel is controlled for in column 9. The media play an
important role during elections and can act as a watchdog to ensure plurality of
views, opinions, and transparent political processes as well as offer a platform for
candidates and voters to discuss important issues. However, the media can also
amplify or even incite national prejudices or tensions during contentious elec-
tions. The following media channels were included: radio, television, newspapers,
and social media. The results in column 9 show that controlling for respondents’
media channel does not change the core results. The coefficient associated with
gender equality remains negative and strongly significant at the 1 percent level.
Furthermore, the coefficients associated with some media channels are positive
and significant. This finding is in line with that of Abdi and Deane (2008), who
discovered that the media had undermined democracy during the Kenya’s
post-election violence of 2008.
Finally, respondents’ access to basic needs and assets including food, water, med-
ical care, cash income, transportation, and electricity are included in column 10.
Poverty rates are very high in Africa, and this desperate situation may lead to electoral

violence; the literature has shown that some politicians can exploit the impoverished
conditions of the populations to mobilize and lead them to rebellion (Goodhand
2001). Poverty compounds vulnerability to insurgency at the individual and com-
munity level by lowering the opportunity cost of mobilizing for violence (Humphreys
and Weinstein 2008). As column 10 shows, the impact of gender equality on elec-
toral violence remains negative and significant at the 1 percent level. The results also
indicate that respondents who have never been without food, medical care, transpor-
tation, and electricity are less likely to report electoral violence.
CONCLUSION
This chapter provided an empirical analysis of the impact of gender equality on
electoral violence in Africa. It used individual-level data from the sixth wave of
Afrobarometer surveys, which allowed an in-depth exploration of the role of gen-
der in election-related violence. The sample covers more than 40,000 individuals
from 30 African countries. The results show a strongly significant and negative
correlation between gender equality and electoral violence in Africa. Based on the
estimates, an increase in female-to-male labor force participation ratio by 1 per-
centage point is associated with a decline of election-related violence by around
4.2 percentage points.
The findings imply that promoting gender equality and equal opportunity
could help reduce the problem of recurrent electoral violence in Africa. With
many conflicts and civil wars on the continent originating from electoral violence,
the results of this chapter underscore an important way of fostering peace and
boosting democracy. African countries should promote gender equality to sup-
port women’s economic empowerment. Improving women’s participation in the
labor market should be a priority not simply for equity’s sake but also for the
positive economic impact (Chapter 2; Ostry and others 2018; IMF 2018) and the
potential to bring peace. The quest for peace in Africa must involve fighting all
forms of inequality and discrimination against women.

ANNEX 10.1.
ANNEX TABLE 10.1.1.
List and Definitions of Control Variables

The sociodemographic variables include:
• Age: continuous variable (in years)
• Education: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent has a tertiary education degree,
and 0 otherwise
• Urban: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent resides in urban area, and 0
otherwise
• Employed: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent is employed, and 0 otherwise
Political affiliation and election-related variables include:
• Political party member: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent is affiliated to a
political party, and 0 otherwise
• Public affairs interests: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent is interested in
public affairs, and 0 otherwise.
• Voted: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent voted during the last election, and 0
otherwise
• Fair election: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent thinks that the last election
was completely free and fair, and 0 otherwise.
• Voters’ views reflected: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent thinks that elections
ensure that voters’ views are reflected, and 0 otherwise
• Votes counted fairly: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent thinks that votes are
always counted fairly, and 0 otherwise
• Media fair coverage: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent thinks that the media
provides fair coverage of all candidates during the last election, and 0 otherwise
• Nonparticipation of opposition parties: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent
thinks that opposition has been prevented from running, and 0 otherwise
Trust in institutions and people involved in election organization variables include:
• Trust electoral commission: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent trusts the
national electoral commission, and 0 otherwise
• Trust government: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent trusts the elected local
government council, and 0 otherwise
• Trust ruling party: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent trusts the ruling party,
and 0 otherwise
• Trust police: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent trusts the police, and 0 otherwise
• Trust army: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent trusts the army, and 0 otherwise
• Trust courts of law: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent trusts the courts of law,
and 0 otherwise
Media-related variables include:
• Radio: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent gets news from the radio, and 0 otherwise
• TV: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent gets news from television, and 0 otherwise
• Newspapers: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent gets news from the
newspapers, and 0 otherwise
• Social media: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent gets news from the social
media, and 0 otherwise
Socioeconomic variables include:
• Access to food: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent has never been without
food, and 0 otherwise
• Access to water: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent has never been without
water, and 0 otherwise
• Access to medical care: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent has never been
without medical care, and 0 otherwise
• Access to cash income: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent has never been
without cash income, and 0 otherwise
• Access to transportation: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent has access to
transportation, and 0 otherwise
• Access to electricity: dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent has access to
electricity, and 0 otherwise
Sources: Afrobarometer surveys; and authors’ coding.

ANNEX 10.2
ANNEX TABLE 10.2.1.
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Electoral Violence 40,034 0.46 0.5 0 1
Gender Equality 40,034 0.73 0.3 0 3
Employed 39,875 0.39 0.5 0 1
Education 39,932 0.09 0.3 0 1
Age 39,830 37.31 14.3 18 105
Urban 40,034 0.39 0.5 0 1
Political Party Member 36,708 0.63 0.5 0 1
Voted 37,956 0.70 0.5 0 1
Fair Election 36,611 0.44 0.5 0 1
Voters’ Views Reflected 32,899 0.37 0.5 0 1
Votes Counted Fairly 37,377 0.35 0.5 0 1
Media Fair Coverage 36,012 0.25 0.4 0 1
Nonparticipation of Opposition Parties 36,237 0.07 0.3 0 1
Public Affairs Interests 39,763 0.56 0.5 0 1
Trust Electoral Commission 36,910 0.27 0.4 0 1
Trust Government 38,471 0.22 0.4 0 1
Trust Ruling Party 36,639 0.24 0.4 0 1
Trust Police 39,432 0.26 0.4 0 1
Trust Army 38,925 0.41 0.5 0 1
Trust Courts of Law 38,680 0.27 0.4 0 1
Radio 39,985 0.82 0.4 0 1
Television 39,963 0.60 0.5 0 1
Newspapers 39,842 0.40 0.5 0 1
Social Media 39,427 0.25 0.4 0 1
Access to Food 39,974 0.54 0.5 0 1
Access to Water 39,972 0.54 0.5 0 1
Access to Medical Care 39,915 0.50 0.5 0 1
Access to Cash Income 39,888 0.25 0.4 0 1
Access to Transportation 39,885 0.82 0.4 0 1
Access to Electricity 40,026 0.63 0.5 0 1
Rainfall Growth 40,034 0.04 0.3 –0.8 4.2
Sources: Afrobarometer surveys; and authors’ calculations.
Note: Max = maximum; Min = minimum; Obs = observations; Std. Dev. = standard deviation.

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CHAPTER 11
A Causal Story: Gender Equality

and Economic Growth
Ata Can Bertay, Ljubica Dordevic, and Can Sever
This chapter emphasizes the importance of gender equality as a development goal by

focusing on its role in economic growth. Gender equality can foster economic growth
through multiple channels; however, endogeneity concerns have made it challenging
to identify the causal link between gender equality and economic growth. This chap-
ter lays out the argument, based on Bertay, Dordevic, and Sever (2020), that higher
gender equality causes economic growth by enabling a better allocation of female
labor. In sub-Saharan Africa, a region severely hit by the COVID-19 shock and with
large gender gaps, achieving gender equality offers countries large economic develop-
ment gains.
INTRODUCTION
Gender equality has been at the forefront of the economic development agenda
for many years, and the United Nations (UN) has included it as one of the 17
Sustainable Development Goals.1 Achieving gender equality is a goal in and of
itself. In addition, as women constitute about half of the world’s population, and
their access to equal opportunities and involvement in economic activities has
significant consequences on the global economy. Against the background of slow-
ing productivity growth globally and a more shock-prone world, empowering
women is now even more important to set the stage for inclusive, resilient, sus-
tainable, and green growth. This chapter seeks to give an overview of recent trends
in gender equality that can contribute to better economic performance. It also
presents evidence of gender equality’s criticality for macroeconomic performance
more generally, with a particular focus on the sub-Saharan Africa region and the
COVID-19 crisis.
Pursuing gender equality is a complex issue with many dimensions involving
both opportunities (for instance, in the area of law, as well as access to health
services, education, and finance) and outcomes (for example, regarding labor
force participation, earnings, and women in positions of power). The last several
decades have witnessed considerable improvement toward a gender-equal world
1
The fifth Sustainable Development Goal aims to achieve gender equality and empower all women
and girls. See the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN General Assembly 2015).
209

in many of these aspects; however, progress has come at a slower pace in several
dimensions (Chapter 1). In addition, gender equality is not an issue specific to
developing countries. Many high-income countries also have room for improve-
ment, as macroeconomic measures in these countries may hide gender disparities
such as vertical and horizontal segregation and the lack of women in high-level
positions (for instance, on corporate boards or in public office).
Progress on gender equality in sub-Saharan Africa has been mixed. Compared
to other developing regions and even most high-income countries, sub-Saharan
Africa fares relatively well in terms of the gender gap in labor force participation
(Figure 11.1, panel 1). Yet, there is a considerable variation within the region, with
higher gender gaps in the north than in the south (International Labour
Organization 2022), and women are often employed in informal, lower-quality jobs.
On education—proxied by female gross secondary school enrollment rates2
(panel 2) —and reproductive health (panels 3 and 4)—proxied by adolescent fer-
tility rate and maternal mortality ratio—sub-Saharan Africa has made remarkable
progress. Yet overall, the region continues to persistently exhibit the most concern-
ing statistics. Moreover, women’s legal rights, as measured by the World Bank’s
Women, Business and the Law Index,3 have been improving in all regions
(panel 5), including in sub-Saharan Africa, which has shown significant progress
in the realm of law, while legal reforms that support gender equality are still needed
to ensure fair treatment of women in the region (see also Chapter 7). Finally,
despite steady improvements in women’s access to financial services, as measured
by female account ownership at a financial institution or with a mobile-money-
service provider, women’s access to financial institutions remains below 50 percent
in sub-Saharan Africa (panel 6)—still very far from the 96 percent rate seen in
high-income countries (see also Chapter 9).
The COVID-19 pandemic has likely widened these long-standing gender
disparities. The pandemic-induced economic contraction has been dubbed a
“she-cession” for its disproportionate impact on women worldwide (Alon and
others 2021); its effects were likely felt even worse in developing countries (as
documented, for instance, in Chapter 15 for the southern African region) due to
women’s vulnerable position at work and at home. The International Labour
Organization (ILO) reports that the pandemic affected women’s jobs dispropor-
tionally: females experienced job losses to a larger extent than did their male
counterparts (ILO 2021). The crisis hit women workers particularly hard in
sub-Saharan Africa due to their high share in contact-intensive sectors and
2
Because gross school enrollment ratios are calculated as the ratio of the number of enrolled students
(regardless of their age) to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of
education shown, the ratios can be larger than 100 percent.
3
This index focuses on the legal impediments to the economic inclusion of women starting from the
time they enter the labor force and continuing through retirement. In particular, the index includes
eight aspects regarding women’s legal rights—namely, gender-based discrimination in laws in mobil-
ity, workplace, pay, marriage, parenthood, entrepreneurship, asset ownership, and pensions. It ranges
between 0 and 100; higher values indicate a more gender-equal legal environment.

Chapter 11 A Causal Story: Gender Equality and Economic Growth 211
Figure 11.1. Aspects of Gender Inequality

1. Labor Force Participation 2. Education
EAP ECA EAP ECA
HIC LAC HIC LAC
MNA SAS MNA SAS
School enrollment, secondary,

Labor force participation rate
0.9 SSA SSA 120

0.8
100
female (percent)
(female to male)
0.7
0.6 80
0.5 60
0.4
40
0.3
0.2 20
1995 2000 05 10 15 20 1995 2000 05 10 15 20
3. Adolescent Fertility Rate 4. Maternal Mortality Ratio

EAP ECA EAP ECA
HIC LAC HIC LAC
150 MNA SAS MNA SAS 800
SSA SSA
600
100
400
50
200
0 0
1995 2000 05 10 15 20 2000 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 17
5. Women’s Legal Rights 6. Access to Finance

EAP ECA 2011
HIC LAC 2014
90 MNA SAS 2017 100
Account ownership at a
Woman, Business and
the Law index score
80 SSA 2021
financial institution
80
70
60
60
40
50
40 20
30 0
1995 2000 05 10 15 20 EAP ECA HIC LAC MNA SAS SSA
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators and Women Business and the Law Database.
Note: Panel 1 plots the mean ratio of female labor force participation rate over the male labor force
participation rate (in the corresponding population age 15 and older). Panel 2 plots gross female
school enrollment ratio, as the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the female population of
the age group that officially corresponds to secondary school education. Panel 3 plots adolescent
fertility rate (the number of births per 1,000 women ages 15 to 19). Panel 4 plots maternal mortality
ratio (per 100,000 live births). Panel 5 plots the overall index on women’s legal rights from the World
Bank’s Women, Business and the Law index (ranging between 0 and 100, higher values indicating
lower levels of legal impediments to the economic inclusion of women). Panel 6 plots account
ownership at a financial institution or with a mobile-money-service provider, the percentage of
female respondents who report having an account, or the percentage who have personally used a
mobile money service in the past 12 months (percentage of population ages 15 or older). This
chapter uses the World Bank’s definition of regions, where high-income countries are grouped
together and the geographical groups include only developing countries: ECA = Europe and Central
Asia; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; HIC = high-income countries; LAC = Latin America and the
Caribbean; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; SAS = South Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.

informal jobs (Chapter 15; Aslam, Fuje, and Rawlings 2021; Aoyagi 2021); this
led to higher increases in unemployment—which have stayed persistently higher—
for women than for men (World Economic Forum 2022). Furthermore, indirect
channels such as childcare and homeschooling responsibilities fall disproportion-
ately on women. The pandemic lockdowns also exposed them to increased
gender-based violence (Chapter 5; Ouedraogo and Stenzel 2021).
The World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report for 2021 shows
that although sub-Saharan Africa has been steadily improving its performance on
gender equality overall, the pandemic had detrimental consequences: there was a
reversal in gender gaps in three dimensions of the World Economic Forum’s
gender gap measure—economic participation and opportunity; educational
attainment; and political empowerment—and progress stalled in the aspect of
health and survival (World Economic Forum 2021). While some progress was
made in 2022 to regain the lost ground, in the Global Gender Gap Report for
2022, sub-Saharan Africa still ranked low—sixth out of eight regions globally—
and even ranked the lowest on some aspects, such as educational attainment.
With about 68 percent of the total gender gap bridged, the report estimates that,
if the current pace holds, it will take 98 years to fully close the gap.4 COVID-19
and geopolitical shocks are thus stalling progress on gender equality, and a risk of
reversal looms, especially as leaders focus on tackling the compounding crises.
Overall, according to the IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook for sub-Saharan
Africa from April 2022 (IMF 2022), the gradual economic recovery in the region
is short of the pace needed to make up for the lost output. Furthermore, with the
economic scarring from the pandemic more severe and more long-lasting in
developing economies relative to that of the developed ones (Yeyati and Filippini
2021), sub-Saharan Africa’s development gaps are likely to persist. Prolonged
school closures in the region have hurt much-needed human capital accumula-
tion and put girls at a greater risk than boys of not returning to school, despite a
greater return to education than those for men; see Kattan, Montenegro, and
Patrinos (2021) and Bah Diallo and others (2021). Such closures may lead to
permanent scarring and weigh on medium-term growth, making it harder for
sub-Saharan Africa to catch up with advanced economies. All in all, despite the
region’s significant progress in different dimensions over the last decades, pressing
ahead with closing gender gaps holds a key to invigorating growth and counter-
acting the setback caused by the pandemic and compounding shocks, especially
for those areas hit hardest.
The rest of this chapter provides a literature review regarding various channels
of the relationship between gender equality and economic growth and then dis-
cusses their causal relationship in the context of Bertay, Dordevic, and Sever
(2020).
4
The Global Gender Gap Index measures gender-based gaps in access to resources and opportunities
in a given country, regardless of that country’s development level and level of available resources. It
scores on a scale of 0 to 100, and scores can be interpreted as the distance covered toward parity (that
is, the percentage of the gender gap that has been closed).

POSSIBLE CHANNELS OF THE RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN GENDER EQUALITY AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH
The vast literature on the positive relationship between gender equality and eco-
nomic performance goes back to, at least, Boserup (1970). Other examples include
Hill and King (1995); Dollar and Gatti (1999); Tzannatos (1999); Klasen (2000,
2002); Knowles, Lorgelly, and Owen (2002); Lagerlof (2003); Abu-Ghaida and
Klasen (2004); Esteve-Volart (2004); Klasen and Lamanna (2009); Duflo (2012);
Elborgh-Woytek and others (2013); Gonzales and others (2015); Cuberes and
Teignier (2016); Hakura and others (2016); Kochhar, Jain-Chandra, and Newiak
(2017); Ostry and others (2018); Hsieh and others (2019); and Ouedraogo and
Stenzel (2021). Gender equality is found to yield favorable economic performance
through several channels, such as productivity growth, human capital accumula-
tion, higher female labor force participation, and improved labor market efficiency.
The literature attests that some of the main channels are improving women’s access
to finance, education, and health services; participation in the workforce; and a
level playing field in terms of pay and career prospects. Studies have also shown
that gender equality improves economic performance indirectly. For example,
because working women likely invest more in the education, nutrition, and health
of their children, more women in paid employment facilitates human capital accu-
mulation over time (see, for instance, Schultz 2002; World Bank 2012). Men and
women also complement each other in production with different perspectives and
skills (Ostry and others 2018).
Other studies show that women’s participation in economic activities can
improve economic outcomes by reducing income inequality, contributing to
financial stability, facilitating economic diversification, improving competitive-
ness, and mitigating the negative effects of population aging (Steinberg and
Nakane 2012; World Economic Forum 2014; Gonzales and others 2015;
Kazandjian and others 2016; Kochhar, Jain-Chandra, and Newiak 2017; Sahay
and Cihak 2018). In addition, new important interactions of gender equality and
economic growth emerged together with other macro-critical issues. For example,
women’s empowerment and participation in decision making is essential for mit-
igating climate change (Gambacorta and others 2022; Altunbas and others 2022),
and fintech is associated with more female employees in the workforce and fewer
financial constraints for female-headed firms (Chapter 10; Loko and Yang 2022).
Gender equality enhances growth through such channels.
Among the most visible obstacles to achieving gender equality are the prevalent
legal impediments to women’s economic empowerment (Chapters 12 and 13),
since gender inequality in economic outcomes is not only a result of social attitudes,
cultural norms, and economic policies, but also of discrimination in the law
(Christopherson and others 2022; Sever 2022). A growing body of literature has
shown positive associations between legal gender equality and several metrics of
women’s economic empowerment, including labor force participation, financial
inclusion, asset ownership, and starting businesses in the formal sector (Khan 1996;

Agarwal 2003; Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper, and Singer 2013; Gonzales and others
2015; Hyland, Djankov, and Goldberg 2020; Hyland and Islam 2021; Sever 2023).
Moreover, Sever (2022) has found that abolishing gender discriminatory laws cata-
lyzes the process of income convergence through which developing economies can
catch up with the richer ones, with significant implications for sub-Saharan Africa
given the still low economic development in many countries of that region.
Even though ample evidence has suggested various direct and indirect chan-
nels through which gender- and economic growth-related variables interact, the
strand of literature that tries to establish a causal link between them is scarce.
With a focus on a recent cross-country empirical study, the following subsection
addresses the causal link between gender equality and economic growth.
CAUSAL LINK FROM GENDER EQUALITY TO

ECONOMIC GROWTH
As presented, multiple theoretical frameworks associate gender equality with
better economic outcomes. Various empirical analyses have supported these chan-
nels at the micro level by focusing, for example, on firm-level or single country
studies.5 Many cross-country macro studies have also shown positive relationships
between various measures of gender equality and economic growth (Cuberes and
Teignier 2014 reviews the literature). Figure 11.2 shows the Gender Employment
Gap Index, which is calculated in Pennings (2022) and indicates mean long-run
GDP per capita gains from closing gender employment gaps at the regional level.
Indicated gains are economically large at 10 percent of long-term GDP per capita,
even for high-income countries. For sub-Saharan Africa, where the gender
employment gaps are relatively low, there are also significant benefits to closing
the gender gaps—leading to 17 percent higher GDP per capita in the long run.
There are, however, only a few studies that have tried to establish a causal effect
of gender equality on economic growth, due to embedded endogeneity concerns
typical to the empirical literature on development (for instance, reverse causality
and omitted variable bias).6 The present chapter is based on the work of Bertay,
Dordevic, and Sever (2020), which examined whether higher gender equality facil-
itates economic growth by enabling a better allocation of female labor at the indus-
try level. By focusing on the differential effect of gender inequality on economic
growth within countries between industries with varying labor compositions along
gender lines, Bertay, Dordevic, and Sever (2020) address many of the endogeneity
5
Joshi (2017) reviews the literature, methodological challenges in this literature, and channels of
relationship between gender diversity and firm performance. Single-country studies also include an
increasing number of IMF country reports.
6
Some studies used the instrumental variable method—for instance, Klasen (2002) in a cross-country
setting and Esteve-Volart (2004) at the subnational level—while others used the instrumental variable
generalized method of moments technique (IV-GMM; for example, Kazandjian and others 2016) or
the system-GMM estimations (for instance, Hakura and others 2016).

Figure 11.2. Long-Run GDP per Capita Gains from Closing Gender
Employment Gaps
East Asia and Pacific
Europe and Central Asia
High income
Latin America and the Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7

Gender Employment Gap Index
Source: Authors’ calculation from Pennings (2022).
Note: The Gender Employment Gap Index used here is the full Gender Employment Gap Index—that
is, the weighted average of a “better employment gap” and “other employment gap”—from
Pennings (2022). The World Bank’s definitions of regions are used, where high-income countries are
grouped together and the geographical groups include only developing countries.
concerns in cross-country studies and also employ various robustness checks to rule
out alternative explanations for the findings.
Using an industry-level cross-country analysis focusing on manufacturing,
Bertay, Dordevic, and Sever (2020) tested whether increased gender equality
disproportionately benefits industries with a typically higher female employee
share relative to that of other industries. The authors argue that such industries
should grow relatively more (and have higher productivity growth) related to both
extensive and intensive margins of employment,7 and the effects on both margins
would be more prevalent in high-female-share industries:8
• On the extensive margin, additional women in the labor force (due to
higher gender equality) contribute to a larger pool of talent to hire from,
and a larger share of newly hired women joins high-female-share industries.
• On the intensive margin, gender equality enables women to fully develop
their potential in the labor market by, for example, occupying higher
value-added jobs and having longer career ladders. Unlocking women’s
potential at work would in turn be beneficial for growth, this effect being
particularly pronounced for high-female-share industries.
7
Improvement on the extensive margin means employment of more women in an industry (higher labor
force participation by women), whereas intensive margin suggests women working longer hours (that
is, less part-time or temporary work and more full-time positions generally associated with better jobs).
8
The authors define industries as high-female-share in terms of having a higher share of female
workers in the industry in comparison with other industries and not necessarily having a higher share
of women than men in the industry.

Bertay, Dordevic, and Sever (2020) use a difference-in-differences approach as in

Rajan and Zingales (1998)—which studied the finance and growth nexus—and test
whether manufacturing industries’ growth rates are differentially affected by
country-level gender equality depending on the industries’ typical gender composi-
tion. The authors focus on a large sample of developing countries in the 1990s. In the
empirical model, economic growth outcome is captured by industry-level
value-added growth or value-added-based labor productivity growth. Country and
industry fixed effects are included to control for unobserved country and industry
characteristics, and possible convergence effects are captured by initial value-added
share of respective industries. Finally, to explicitly address endogeneity concerns, the
growth differentials of interest are captured by an interaction term between the gender
inequality index and the female labor share of industries coming from Sweden in the
1980s. Namely, the identification problem addressed by this approach is that the
actual industry gender compositions are generally distorted by existing gender
inequalities—due to, for instance, discrimination in the labor market or gender social
norms. In other words, observed industry gender compositions may not reflect their
underlying compositions, which would prevail in the absence of labor market fric-
tions. Thus, Bertay, Dordevic, and Sever (2020) use industry gender compositions of
1980s Sweden—a high-gender-equality country with few gender-related frictions—
and assume that some intrinsic reasons9 lead some industries more than others to
typically employ more female labor. This assumption is critical to the identification
strategy—the other assumption being that these industry differences in gender com-
position carry over to other countries. The decade lag of the benchmark period in
Sweden (1980s) with respect to the study sample of developing countries (1990s)
aims to address their technological differences that have thus affected the production
process and potentially also the nature of jobs and relative marginal productivity of
the labor of women as compared with that of men.
The measure of gender inequality used is the United Nations Development
Programme’s Gender Inequality Index (GII), which contains information on
gender disparities in empowerment (that is, education and political power),
health, and educational outcomes. The Gender Inequality Index varies between 0
and 1, and the Gender Inequality Index of a country in which women and men
fare equally would be 0, so a higher value of the index indicates higher gender
inequality. Figure 11.3 plots GDP per capita growth against the Gender
Inequality Index in the 1990s and shows that gender inequality is indeed nega-
tively correlated with the average growth of real GDP per capita.
As Figure 11.4 visualizes, this chapter is based on the empirical strategy by Bertay,
Dordevic, and Sever (2020) to identify a causal effect of gender equality on economic
growth that relies on within-country differences between industries. The baseline
result suggests that the effect of gender equality on industry value-added growth is
statistically significant and economically large. To give a sense of the economic
9
One example is the industry-specific relative marginal product of labor between men and women,
which shapes women’s comparative advantage to men and thus their relative employability in that
industry.

Figure 11.3. Gender Inequality and Real GDP per Capita Growth
0.8 Correlation: –0.269

p-value: 0.019
Gender Inequality Index in 1990
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
–2 0 2 4 6 8
Average growth in real GDP per capita over the 1990s
Source: Bertay, Dordevic, and Sever (2020).
Note: Chart plots the average growth rate of real GDP per capita (from the World Bank World
Development Indicators database) for emerging market and developing economies over the 1990s
and Gender Inequality Index (GII) in 1990 (from United Nations Development Programme). The
correlation between the two variables is about 0.3 with a p-value of 0.02.
significance of the estimated impact, the additional growth gains in an industry with
relatively high female share are compared to those in a low-female-share industry,
when they are located in countries with a high versus low gender inequality.
The result suggests that a high-female-share industry (at the 75th percentile of
female shares as estimated from Sweden, that is, the rubber and plastics products
industry) grows 1.7 percentage points faster than a low-female-share industry (at
the 25th percentile of female shares, that is, nonmetallic mineral products
industry), when it is located in a low-gender-inequality country (at the sample’s
25th percentile of Gender Inequality Index, that is, Costa Rica) rather than in
Figure 11.4. Industry-Level Growth Differentials
Country A Country B
(low gender inequality) (high gender inequality)
Industry X Industry X
Growth gap Growth gap

in country A Difference in growth gaps in country B
Industry Y Industry Y
Source: Adapted from the empirical strategy of Bertay, Dordevic, and Sever (2020).
Note: Industry X represents a high-female-share; industry Y represents a low-female-share industry.

high-gender-inequality country (at the 75th percentile of Gender Inequality

Index, that is, Cameroon). This difference in growth gaps of 1.7 percentage
points can be interpreted as the typically female-dominated rubber and plastics
products industry growing 1.7 percentage points faster per year than the typically
male-dominated nonmetallic mineral products industry in Costa Rica than in
Cameroon.
Notably, the estimated 1.7 percentage-point growth rate is how much addi-
tional growth a high-female-share industry can achieve once it is located in a more
gender-equal country, above the growth gains for a low-female-share industry.
This is not to say that low-female-share industries do not grow faster in a more
gender-equal environment. Indeed, the result suggests that gender equality can
boost growth for all industries, but high-female-share industries can gain even
more as countries move toward gender equality.
Looking at other sub-Saharan African countries below the 25th percentile of the
sample in terms of gender inequality, the implied (differential) growth effects
are even larger, as those countries make steps to reach to the 75th percentile of the
sample (that is, the level of Costa Rica). For instance, the typically female-dominated
rubber and plastics products industry could grow 2.4 percentage points faster than
the typically male-dominated nonmetallic mineral products industry in Costa Rica
than in Kenya and Central African Republic. The size of the growth effect becomes
3.0 percentage points when Niger is compared with Costa Rica.
Given that the average real annual value-added growth rate in the sample over
the period is 2.2 percent per year, estimated growth differentials are substantial.
The results thus provide valuable evidence that gender inequality has a causal
effect on real economic outcomes at the industry level. In particular, they suggest
that there is large room to boost industry growth in sub-Saharan African coun-
tries as they move toward a level playing field for women and men.
CONCLUSION
Gender equality is not only a human rights issue but also a critical development
goal. Although remarkable progress has been made toward leveling the playing
field for women over the last several decades, in various dimensions, much work
remains to be done. As countries take steps to tackle the unfair treatment of
women in all areas, gender equality would unlock a large but untapped economic
potential, yielding favorable economic outcomes. Ensuring equal access to finan-
cial, education, health services; providing equal opportunities in the labor market;
and eliminating legal impediments to women’s economic empowerment are crit-
ical to attain this goal. The literature confirms that such efforts pay off in the form
of more resilient, sustainable, and inclusive economic growth. In this regard,
Bertay, Dordevic, and Sever (2020) made a step forward in providing causal evi-
dence on the positive impact of gender equality on growth focusing on granular,
industry-level data for emerging market and developing economies. This chapter,
based on Bertay, Dordevic, and Sever (2020), discusses that gender equality dis-
proportionately affects growth in industries that rely more on female labor.

The link between gender equality and economic performance is even more
critical in the post-COVID-19 period given the scarring effects of the pandemic
on both gender imbalances and economic performance. The current moment
constitutes a window of opportunity for policymakers to not only address
long-standing issues regarding gender inequality but also mitigate the adverse
effects of the COVID-19 shock going forward. In sub-Saharan Africa—a region
severly hit by the shock and with persisting, even widening, gender gaps along
multiple dimensions—policies supportive of gender equality can help the coun-
tries leap forward in economic development.
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PART IV
Fair Play: Equal Rights and
Women's Empowerment


CHAPTER 12
Legal Rights: Women’s

Economic Empowerment
In many countries, laws often reflect and perpetuate gender norms that limit women’s
economic participation. Removal of these impediments through legal reform has been
shown to be an effective method to catalyze greater participation of women in the
economy—along with the related macroeconomic benefits. Once legal barriers are
removed and provisions for more equal treatment under the law are embedded, the
law can also be employed as a powerful tool to incentivize women to pursue equal
opportunities, change mindsets regarding the role of women, and hold institutions and
individuals accountable for achieving results. Accordingly, it is imperative for countries
to focus on eliminating existing legal impediments and designing appropriate incen-
tives to increase women’s participation in the economy.
INTRODUCTION
Empirical evidence shows that women’s economic empowerment and the closing
of gender gaps in key areas are associated with positive macroeconomic outcomes,
including higher economic growth, lower inequality, increased productivity, and
greater financial stability (Chapters 6–12). However, despite momentous strides
toward improved opportunities for women and girls, gender gaps persist, and
legal barriers remain.
It is also well established that various legal impediments in countries’
domestic laws have prevented women from achieving full economic empower-
ment and that in many countries, laws often reflect and perpetuate gender
norms that limit women’s economic participation. The removal of these
impediments through legal reform has been shown to be an effective way to
catalyze greater participation of women in the economy—along with the relat-
ed macroeconomic benefits. Once legal barriers are removed, the law can be
used as a powerful tool to incentivize women’s economic empowerment,
change mindsets regarding women’s role, and hold institutions and individuals
This chapter draws on Christopherson and others 2022.
225

accountable for achieving the intended results. Therefore, it is imperative for

countries across all regions, including sub-Saharan Africa, to focus on elimi-
nating existing legal impediments and designing appropriate incentives to
increase women’s participation in the economy.
This chapter discusses the key types of laws that impede women’s economic
empowerment; the impact of cultural norms, traditions, and belief systems on
gender equality; and ways in which the law can be used as a tool to create behav-
ioral changes and shifts in perceptions of women in the economy.
Sources of Legal Impediments to Women’s Economic

Empowerment
The categories of laws that often contain significant barriers to women’s economic
empowerment in sub-Saharan Africa include constitutional law, family law, prop-
erty law, labor law, and tax law.
Constitutional Law and Civil Rights

Legal impediments to women’s economic and political participation are often
found in constitutional law, which provides civil rights and civil liberties. In some
countries, the legal framework prevents women from voting and running for
political office. Enshrining in countries’ constitutions the right of women to equal
treatment under the law, and other key constitutional rights such as citizenship
and freedom of movement, should be the first step in addressing gender gaps and
promoting women’s economic empowerment. As the case studies in the following
chapter will show (for instance, Rwanda, Cabo Verde), legally required quotas for
women in leadership roles (in both public and private sectors) can significantly
increase the number of women in those roles. More women in these roles helps
diversify the leadership perspective and can provide a stronger support for policy
agendas aimed at initiating political processes that inform constitutional reforms
and strengthen civil rights movements.
Legal literacy and access to justice for women are also crucial to help address
gender inequality. Access to justice for women entails the ability to exercise the
same legal rights as men to sue, apply for legal aid, provide testimony, and obtain
a fair trial. However, women often experience legal restrictions in exercising their
rights because of gender-based discrimination. When women have adequate
access to justice and their rights are appropriately enforced, it discourages gender-
based discrimination.
Family Law
Family law touches on the most intimate part of people’s lives, regulating mar-
riage, divorce, adoption, child custody, and other domestic issues. For this reason,
family law often reflects gender inequality in society. In several countries, the legal
age to marry is lower for women than for men. Early marriage may lead to early
motherhood, which hinders girls’ chances of continuing their education and

Chapter 12 Legal Rights: Women’s Economic Empowerment 227
thereby limits their prospects for work. Eliminating child marriage today would
increase long-term annual per capita real GDP growth by about 1 percentage
point in emerging and developing countries (UN Women 2020; Mitra and others
2020). This economic impact is closely connected to legal norms that provide for
the husband’s power over the marriage (and the wife’s obedience, respectively). A
study found that legal discrimination against women in the form of limits on
their ability to be head of household is negatively correlated with female
labor force participation (Gonzales and others 2015). Such legal discrimination
reduces women’s bargaining power when allocating roles within the family and
their ability to pursue professional roles outside the household (Islam , Muzi, and
Amin 2019; Htun, Jensenius, and Nuñez 2019). Recognizing this relationship
between family law and women’s economic empowerment, countries like Rwanda
have enacted laws to enable women to be designated as the head of the household
and have given women rights and duties equal to those of their husbands. Such
measures have supported women’s financial stability during and after marriage
(World Bank 2021).
Property Law
Property law governs the ability to collect, own, manage, and transfer assets
and therefore is an essential component of engaging in productive economic
activities, including entrepreneurship. People need assets to sustain their live-
lihoods, provide for family members, build wealth, and provide collateral for
credit. Laws that prevent women from owning, managing, and disposing of
property and other assets can effectively hinder or significantly disincentivize
them from fully participating in the economy. Such legal impediments appear
in various forms. For example, some laws prohibit women from owning mov-
able or immovable property on their own or being granted property during a
marriage and after a divorce. Property can be distributed in discriminatory
ways that prevent women (daughters or female surviving spouses) from inher-
iting property because the relevant laws follow the cultural norm of inheritance
through male lineage. Because of such laws, some women do not have the same
access as men do to financial services, including opening bank accounts. This
in turn prevents them from building credit, borrowing and saving money, or
obtaining insurance.
Labor Law
Employment is the most common way that women can participate and contrib-
ute to the economy. When women are prevented from obtaining employment,
the economy loses a significant portion of potential for growth. Globally,
55 percent of adult women are in the labor market compared with 78 percent of
men. Moreover, women face a 37 percent wage gap (the ratio of the wage of a
woman compared with that of a man in a similar position) and a 51 percent
income gap (the ratio of the total wage and nonwage income of women compared

Figure 12.1. Wage and Salaried Workers as Percentage of Total Workforce

(Modeled ILO estimate, percent)
World, female World, male
Sub-Saharan Africa, female Sub-Saharan Africa, male
60
Low-income countries, female Low-income countries, male
50
40
30
20
10
0
1991 93 95 97 99 2001 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21
Source: International Labour Organization ILOSTAT database. Data retrieved on January 29, 2021,
from World Bank Gender Data Portal. License type: CC BY-4.0. See https://genderdata.worldbank.
org/indicators/sl-emp-work-zs?geos=WLD_SSF_LIC&view=trend.
Note: ILO = International Labour Organization.
with that of men; World Economic Forum 2021) (Figure 12.1). There are often
legal restrictions on women’s ability to work, including laws that prohibit them
from choosing a certain profession or industry according to their interests and
abilities, as well as laws that require a spouse or other male relative to provide a
work authorization. Studies show that such discrimination is a significant predic-
tor for the gender wage gap (Htun, Jensenius, and Nuñez 2019). As numerous
organizations have found, women continue to be paid less than men for work of
equal value. Data show that fewer than half of countries have a law mandating
equal pay for equal work (World Bank 2021).
The lack of protection and failure to prevent gender-based discrimination and
sexual harassment in the workplace often hinder women from obtaining jobs or
advancing their careers. This begins with discriminatory hiring practices and later
with concerns about unfavorable treatment and dismissal of women in the work-
place, especially when pregnant or after giving birth.
The lack of supportive legal and institutional frameworks providing for
parental leave, childcare benefits, and eldercare benefits means there is room for
improvement in addressing gender inequality. This is because women are the ones
who typically bear the bulk of household responsibilities. Many countries do not
yet provide for paid maternity and paternity leave; where countries do so, it is
often the employer who bears the burden of cost, thereby reducing retention of
female employees who become more costly than men (World Bank 2020). In
contrast, generous parental leave provisions are associated with smaller wage gaps
in economies with a large formal sector (Asai 2019).

Social security and pension laws affect women’s retirement conditions nega-
tively when they do not account for times of absence or part-time employment
because of childcare or eldercare. The statutory retirement age may also be differ-
ent between women and men. Shorter working lives of women have a negative
impact on their income, contributions, and pensions. The gender wage gap also
has a direct negative effect on pensions for women relative to men even when they
have equal years of contributions to the social security system because women’s
salaries are on average lower than men’s.
Tax Law
Explicit gender bias is generally easily identifiable in the relevant tax law provi-
sions. Some examples include explicitly assigning different tax rates to male and
female taxpayers; permitting tax preferences only for male or female taxpayers; or
assigning joint business, asset income, or childcare deductions or allowances only
to males (Stotsky 1996).
In the area of personal income taxation, the family-based method of determin-
ing income undermines the individual filing system and results in secondary
earners (usually women who make less money) facing a higher marginal tax rate
(Grown and Komatsu 2010; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development [OECD] Development Centre 2016). Therefore, providing
options for individual income taxation could be a necessary legal reform to
increase female labor force participation (Gonzales and others 2015). Even within
income tax systems that impose a joint income tax on the household, it is possible
to structure the income tax to reduce the higher effective tax rate on secondary
earners, in particular through tax benefits (for instance, targeted tax reliefs) to
promote the female labor supply. Other examples of implicit gender bias would
be the availability of tax deductions for work expenses predominantly borne by
men (for instance, uniforms or tools) but not for work expenses predominantly
borne by women (for instance, the cost of daycare; Stotsky 2017).
Implicit or explicit biases may also exist in tax procedural rules, such as the
inability of spouses to separately file personal income tax returns, or where the
spouse’s consent is required where a possibility of separate filing exists. These pro-
cedural requirements can impede women’s economic empowerment.
Impact of Cultural Norms, Traditions, and Belief Systems on

Gender Equality
The existing inequality between men and women under law has various root
causes, including cultural norms, traditions, and belief systems that promote
differential treatment of women. In addition, plural or inherited legal systems
often facilitate the inclusion of legal provisions that have a gender bias. Legal
reform can change attitudes and behavior and thus can be an important tool for
addressing gender inequality. This section discusses the main sources of legal
impediments to women’s economic empowerment that usually arise from coun-
tries’ broadly accepted cultural norms and belief systems.

Cultural Norms and Belief Systems

Many laws that prevent women from having the same legal status as men are
derived from deep-rooted cultural norms or other belief systems. The persistence of
those norms and systems can impede the advancement of women’s rights. Some
argue that certain beliefs are harder to change because they are considered by society
to be divinely inspired and sacred. In some African countries, for example, dowry
payment is prohibited by law but is still required by families and provided because
of religious or traditional beliefs (OECD Development Centre 2019). Others argue
that unequal treatment of women is the product of a culture of patriarchy and the
consolidation of power in men, with religion serving as justification for conservative
interpretations regarding gender roles (Cherif 2010). However, some countries have
adopted legal reforms previously considered to be infeasible in light of prevailing
norms and beliefs. For example, Côte d’Ivoire amended its marriage laws in 2019
to facilitate women’s access to credit by allowing them to use land as collateral (Law
No. 2019-570 of June 26, 2019, relating to marriage). The former marriage laws
had restricted female spouses’ rights to manage, dispose of, and inherit marital
property. Similarly, Togo reformed its family code in 2014 to enable a woman to be
the “head of household” in the same way as a man (Code of Persons and the Family,
Article 99). The Democratic Republic of Congo passed a new family code in 2016
that did not require women to obey their husbands and allowed them to sign a
contract, register a business, open a bank account, choose where to live, and get a
job in the same way as a man (Law 16/2008 of July 15, 2016).
Plural Legal Systems

Many countries have plural legal systems that recognize different sources of law
(for example, common law, customary law, and religious laws) (UN Women
2015). These plural legal systems accept that different legal systems can coexist,
and they may overlap, complement, reinforce, and even conflict with each other
at times. This can become more complex in countries where multiple legal sys-
tems exist in parallel that in practice conflict with each other.
The existence of legal pluralism affects gender equality under law in various ways.
Although in some cases it helps advance women’s rights by providing more avenues
for legal redress, it can create a barrier in other situations. For instance, because dif-
ferent belief systems can contain provisions that discriminate against women, in
some plural legal systems, reforming the legal framework to promote gender equality
requires dialogue with ethnic and religious leaders as well as women’s groups to
empower each of them to challenge discriminatory laws. It also requires education
and resources to navigate these complex systems (Chiongson and others 2012).
Inherited Legal Systems

Many countries that were former colonies inherited legal codes from colonial
powers, which included provisions that discriminate against women. Although
most European countries that were former colonial powers have phased out gen-
der discrimination in their codes, the original codes are still in force in some

former colonies (even after these countries gained independence and later adopt-
ed several international, regional, and subregional conventions promoting gender
equality). Countries that still maintain gender-biased codes inherited from the
British, French, German, and Spanish legal systems, including those from the
apartheid regime, could embark on reforms similar to those the former colonial
powers have introduced to remove these gender impediments. For example, in
Equatorial Guinea, a woman still needs her husband’s permission to sign a con-
tract because of the 1960 Spanish Civil Code. In Chad, and Niger, married
women cannot open a bank account without their husbands’ permission due to a
1954 ordinance from the former federation of French West Africa. Similarly, due
to a Spanish decree enacted in 1957, women in 12 countries in the Spanish-
speaking world are prohibited from working in mining, certain construction jobs,
and the electricity sector. In addition, women of Namibia and South Africa were
doubly burdened by gender bias and the racial discrimination embedded in laws
of the South African apartheid state.
Changing Behavior and Creating Cultural Shifts through

Legal Reform
Extensive research has shown how law and legal reform influence behavior, with
research frequently relying on economic and psychological theories and empirical
studies (Anderson and Whitman 1972). The goal of legal regulation is to exercise
control over certain behaviors (Bilz and Nadler 2014). This can happen in various
ways, including by incentivizing or disincentivizing behavior. Democratically
produced legislative outcomes are an even stronger signal to people that the values
expressed by the law are deemed desirable by society (McAdams 2000). As dis-
cussed in the next section, country-specific experiences in sub-Saharan Africa,
where constitutional and legal changes aimed at addressing gender inequality
were introduced, show the power of legal reform to modify behavior and to pro-
duce positive outcomes in supporting women’s economic empowerment.
After the independence movements prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa in the
1950s and 1960s, many countries made significant progress in removing legal
impediments to women’s economic empowerment by adopting several interna-
tional, regional, and subregional conventions that promote gender equality. The
most important treaty is the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) that has been adopted by most
countries, including 46 in sub-Saharan Africa. The Beijing Declaration and the
Platform for Action has been signed and ratified by all countries in the sub-Saha-
ran Africa’s region except Somalia. This treaty sets forth a plan for women’s
empowerment and is considered the key global policy document on gender equal-
ity. At the regional level, the Protocol to the 2003 African Charter on Human and
People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the “Maputo Protocol”) has
been signed by 43 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, but only 21 states ratified it.
This protocol was drafted by the African Union to supplement the commitments
of the 1981 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (the “Banjul
Charter”). Article 18 calls on states to eliminate discrimination against women

and to protect women’s rights in alignment with international declarations and

conventions. It also defines a multitude of women’s rights, including economic,
social, civil, political, cultural, and environmental rights. At the subregional level,
treaties and conventions also support women’s gender equality and empower-
ment. For instance, the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS)
Treaty (1975, revised in 1993) includes a dedicated article on women and devel-
opment (Article 66). Also, both the 2008 Southern African Development
Community’s (SADC) Gender Protocol and the 2016 East African Community
Gender Equality and Development Bill, which are harmonized with international
and regional agreements, aim to enhance planning, implementation, and moni-
toring of policies that support eliminating discrimination, empowering women,
and achieving gender equality in the respective subregions. In addition, the
Supplementary Act related to Equality of Rights between Women and Men for
Sustainable Development in the ECOWAS Region (2015) was adopted to
strengthen the harmonization of national legislation with international standards
on women’s rights.
Each of the countries included in the case studies in the following chapter
(South Africa, Namibia, Mauritius, Rwanda, and Cabo Verde) ratified the
CEDAW Convention and the Maputo Protocol. Rwanda is a signatory of the
East African Community Gender Equality and Development Bill. South Africa,
Namibia, and Mauritius have ratified the African Union Solemn Declaration on
Gender Equality in Africa, the African Union Gender Policy, and the SADC.
Cabo Verde is a member of the ECOWAS and ratified its treaty.
Following the adoption of the conventions mentioned earlier, many sub-Saharan
African countries continued to make progress in eliminating legal barriers to
women’s economic empowerment from 2000 to 2009. Some of this success is gen-
erally attributed to the Maputo Protocol, which entered into force in 2005 and led
to significant reforms in the region. This treaty may have particularly helped by
accelerating the adoption of gender policies in the region because many countries
amended their domestic legal frameworks to align them to the principles and stan-
dards on gender equality enshrined in the protocol (World Bank 2022). In light of
this, the principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of gender is included in every
constitution in the region. In addition, some countries went further by providing
for women to own property in their constitutions, which helped facilitate shifts in
certain social norms (for instance, the constitutions of Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Senegal Swaziland, and Zimbabwe; Hallward-Driemeier
and Hasan 2012). However, enshrining gender equality provisions in the constitu-
tion is not enough to ensure that no gender discrimination exists under law because
some African countries have plural legal systems where discrimination may still arise
from customary laws or religious laws (N’Dulo 2011; Ezer 2016). An example of
this, six sub-Saharan African countries (Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho,
Mauritius, and Sierra Leone) currently exempt customary law from the application
of constitutional provisions on the prohibition of discrimination (Klugman and
Twigg 2015; Dinokopila and Bonno 2021). In countries in sub-Saharan Africa that
have plural legal systems, it is important to ensure that laws providing for gender

equality are enforced and are given priority over conflicting customary or religious
laws. This can be addressed by explicitly establishing in the constitution that it
invalidates any law, including customary law, contradicting the constitution. This is
the case in Kenya, where gender equality prevails despite customary law because its
constitution explicitly states this (OECD Development Centre 2021).
CONCLUSION
Legal reforms to remove barriers to women’s economic empowerment can be
powerful instruments in promoting women’s economic participation and help-
ing countries achieve higher growth and a range of other macroeconomic ben-
efits. In addition, legal reforms should be adopted that incentivize women’s
economic participation, even after legal impediments have already been
removed via law reform. As noted previously, these legal reforms can entail a
broad range of measures across categories of laws, including repealing laws that
discriminate against women, providing parental leave for women and men,
making gender pay gaps illegal, implementing regulations that require appro-
priate facilities and infrastructure to allow women to benefit fully from partic-
ipating in the economy, subsidizing childcare, ensuring laws do not penalize
secondary earners, incentivizing the training and hiring of women in tradition-
ally male-dominated fields, and enabling women to exercise all their rights by
improving access to justice.
Countries that have high levels of female labor force participation have made
extensive changes to their legal frameworks over time. The case studies in the
following chapter present the experiences of several African countries—Rwanda,
Namibia, South Africa, Mauritius, and Cabo Verde—with legal reform to sup-
port women’s economic empowerment and illustrate that the pace and nature of
legal reform vary from country to country and are specific to a country’s histori-
cal, cultural, and belief systems. Despite such reforms, some barriers to women’s
economic empowerment remain. Thus, continued attention to removing legal
impediments is necessary.
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CHAPTER 13
Legal Rights: Women’s

Economic Empowerment—
Case Studies
Case studies of five countries in sub-Saharan Africa—Rwanda, Namibia, South Africa,

Mauritius, and Cabo Verde—that rank high in gender equality in their respective
regions demonstrate how legal reforms have been implemented in differing contexts to
help achieve women’s economic empowerment.
INTRODUCTION
Removing legal impediments and using the law as a tool to incentivize wom-
en’s full economic participation can encourage needed behavioral changes and
cultural shifts, particularly in countries with prevalent belief systems or tradi-
tions that discourage the inclusion of women in the workforce. Specifically,
reforming a country’s legal framework to remove discriminatory provisions
and support women’s economic empowerment has proven to result in positive
legal, social, and economic outcomes. The case studies included in this
chapter—Rwanda, Namibia, South Africa, Mauritius, and Cabo Verde—
demonstrate the power of legal reform in various areas that affect women’s
ability to work and contribute to economic growth. Also, these countries’
legal reforms have placed them in the upper rankings of reputable studies,
including the World Bank’s Women, Business and the Law (WBL) report; the
World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Gender Gap Report; and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Social
Institutions and Gender Index.
This chapter builds on the analysis and methodology in Chapter 12, which
describes the types of laws that often impede women’s economic empowerment.
Although this chapter highlights dominant belief systems and cultural norms that have contributed
to limiting women’s economic empowerment, the authors do not intend to render judgment on these
belief systems or norms. This chapter builds on Christopherson and others 2022.
237

Rwanda
Rwanda is among the top 15 countries with the lowest gender gap, according to
the 2023 Global Gender Gap Report (WEF 2023).1 It is also the second high-
est-ranking country in this index for the sub-Saharan Africa region. Rwanda’s
progress in gender equality stems in part from conscious legal reforms, which
have fostered gender equality and strengthened protection against gender-based
crimes (WEF 2022).
The Rwandan Constitution, which was adopted in 2003, and amended in
2015, replaced the 1991 Constitution, and enshrines in its preamble that the
people of Rwanda are committed to building a state based on the principle of
equality between men and women. Other key constitutional provisions include
Article 17, which provides for matrimonial equality and stipulates that no woman
can be married without her consent. The devastating effects of the 1994 genocide
fundamentally altered Rwanda’s demographic configuration, resulting in women
representing 70 percent of Rwanda’s total population (Women’s Commission for
Refugee Women and Children 1997). Therefore, it became necessary to enhance
women’s role in the public sphere. In addition to the Constitution, the Penal
Code, Civil Code, and various other laws, including property and labor laws,
establish gender rights and afford increased protection for women.
Rwanda gets high marks for women’s participation in political decision-making
processes. Most notably, the Constitution requires that women occupy at least
30 percent of positions in national legislative bodies (the Organic Law 03/2010/OL
and Law 27/2010 outline the process for such quotas). The Constitution also des-
ignates that 24 of the 80 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (lower house of
Parliament) comprise women and that at least 30 percent of elected and appointed
senators must be women. As a result, Rwanda is now among the top 10 countries
for women’s political empowerment, with over 50 percent of women holding posi-
tions as parliamentarians and ministers (Articles 10, 75, and 80 of the Constitution).
With increased female participation in politics, female parliamentarians have suc-
cessfully advocated for key legal reforms aimed at strengthening gender equality in
Rwanda. Before its civil war in the early 1990s and the genocide in 1994, Rwandan
women never held more than 18 percent of the seats in the country’s Parliament
(Powley 2006) (Figure 13.1).
A strong formal legal framework also exists for women’s property rights in
divorce and inheritance law. For example, the Matrimonial Regimes, Liberties
and Successions Law No. 22/1999 granted equal rights to male and female
children to inherit from their parents, and for men and women who have mar-
ried under a community property arrangement to have joint rights to marital
property. Rwanda updated this law in 2016 to address gaps. For example, if
1
The WEF’s Global Gender Gap Index benchmarks the evolution of gender-based gaps among four key
dimensions (Economic Participation and Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival, and
Political Empowerment) and tracks progress toward closing these gaps over time.

Chapter 13 Legal Rights: Women’s Economic Empowerment—Case Studies 239
Figure 13.1. Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliament,

1997–2020
(Percent)
100
World
Rwanda
80
60
40
20
0
1997 99 2001 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (www.ipu.org).
parents make land donations to their children (“umunami”)—a common tradi-

tional practice—they cannot give larger land parcels to their sons and must treat
sons and daughters equally. Moreover, Law No. 27/2016 Governing Matrimonial
Regimes, Donations, and Inheritance establishes, for the first time, that the
surviving spouse has the same right to inherit from her husband as other heirs
(Food and Agriculture Organizations of the United Nations Gender and Land
Rights Database [2023]; Articles 27, 28, and 75 of the Rwandan Constitution).
Law No. 43/2013 governing land in Rwanda also prohibits all forms of discrim-
ination regarding access to land and the enjoyment of real rights (Article 4 of
the Land Law 2013). Nonetheless, these laws do not protect the rights of
women in customary, informal, or polygamous marriages, and male family
members remain resistant to change given that inheritance is patrilineal in
Rwandan customary law (Parallel Report to the United Nations Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 2017). However, Article 39
of the Gender-Based Violence law stipulates that if a person in an informal
marriage decides to formally marry someone else, the belongings of the infor-
mally married couple must be divided equally (US Agency for International
Development 2016).
Rwanda has a female labor-force participation (54.8 percent) superior to the
global average of about 47 percent (International Labour Organization ILOSTAT
database 2022). As previously noted, the participation rate stems from the devas-
tation of the male population during the 1994 genocide, leaving women to fill
roles that men once occupied. Rwanda has enacted various labor laws to support
women in the workplace, including providing for equal working conditions
and equal salary for all employees irrespective of their sex (Law No. 51/2001),

maternity benefits, guaranteeing employment security for women on maternity

leave (Law No. 3/2016), and nursing breaks for mothers who return to work
(Labor Law No. 66/2018). Notwithstanding, there remain gaps that need to be
addressed. For example, gender gaps persist in labor force participation, and
occupational and industry segregation is prevalent (Labor Force Survey 2020
Gender Report). Women are also more prone to climate change shocks than men
(Annex III of IMF staff report 2023/198).
Rwanda has also taken steps to address gender-based violence, which 41.5 per-
cent of Rwandan women experience at the hands of their intimate partners during
their lifetime (UN Women Global Database on Violence Against Women [2023];
2019–2020 Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey). A national law criminalizes
and penalizes several forms of gender-based violence (Law No. 59/2008), and the
Prime Minister’s Order (No. 001/03 of 2012) sets out the modalities through which
government institutions should prevent gender-based violence. One successful gov-
ernment initiative has been the “Isange,” one-stop centers that provide medical,
legal, forensic, psychological, and safety support to victims of gender-based vio-
lence. There are now 44 operational Isange Centers across the country, funded with
assistance from the World Bank. The UN has reported that Isange centers assisted
more than 49,000 victims of gender-based violence between 2015 and 2018
(United Nations 2019).
In addition to the legal framework, Rwanda has implemented several strate-
gies and established institutional mechanisms to promote gender equality. A
National Gender Policy formulated in 2010 and revised in 2021 addresses
gender issues in various sectoral policies and programs, including in the areas of
education for girls, women in agriculture, gender-based violence, and sexual
and reproductive health (Rwanda Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion
2020). National budget considerations also factor in gender issues. For exam-
ple, the Organic Law on State Finances and Property Law No. 12/2013 made
gender balance in public financial management a fundamental principle. This
law mandates including a gender-budget statement as one of the annexes to the
national budget framework paper submitted to Parliament, and all public enti-
ties must submit activity reports to specify how plans for gender balance have
been implemented.
The combined effect of these legal reforms, strategic implementation plans,
and relevant institutional mechanisms have enabled Rwanda to put in place a
progressive framework for gender equality, resulting in notable progress.
Namibia
The experience of Namibia illustrates how tackling impediments and undertak-
ing legal reforms can incentivize women’s economic empowerment. The
Namibian Constitution—adopted in 1990 after independence from South
Africa—grants women and men equal status and expressly prohibits discrimina-
tion based on sex. Moreover, Article 23 of the Constitution explicitly recognizes
that “women in Namibia have traditionally suffered special discrimination and

that they need to be encouraged and enabled to play a full, equal and effective
role . . . in the life of the nation.” In this manner, the Constitution promotes
affirmative action to address equality for women (Constitution of the Republic of
Namibia 1990, Articles 10, 23, 95).
Over the past few years, the WEF has recognized Namibia among the
top 10 countries worldwide to close the gender gap (WEF 2023). According
to the WEF, this progress is due largely to significant increases in women’s
participation in the political arena. Leading from the top is Saara Kuugongelwa-
Amadhila, who was elected the first female prime minister in 2015 and
remains in this position as of 2023. Although no legislated quotas exist for
women in Parliament, in 2013, the leading political party (the South West
Africa People’s Organisation, or SWAPO), adopted a voluntary 50/50 policy
for forming its parliamentary lists, for example, equal representation of men
and women. Following the November 2019 elections, women held 46.8 per-
cent of the seats in the lower house of Parliament, known as the National
Assembly (Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU] Parline, Global data on
Parliaments, Namibia National Assembly data [2023]). This policy is an
important first step, but as some critics have noted, the greater number of
women among SWAPO parliamentarians has not translated into concrete leg-
islative action on gender matters (Amupanda and Thomas 2019). Moreover,
female representation in the upper house of Parliament (the National Council),
whose members are indirectly elected by the Regional Councils, is only
14 percent (IPU Parline, Global data on Parliaments, Namibia National
Council data [2023]).
Namibia has one of the narrowest gender–income gaps worldwide; the aver-
age income of a Namibian woman is about 81.6 percent of that of a Namibian
man (WEF 2022). Many elements of the formal Namibian legal framework are
conducive to women’s economic empowerment. For example, the National
Labour Act prohibits discrimination in the workplace and in employment deci-
sions on the grounds of sex, provides for equal pay for equal work, and provides
for 12 weeks of paid maternity leave and job security for new mothers (The
Labour Act, Act 11 of 2007, Sections 19, 26). In 2021, women’s labor force
participation was 54.5 percent compared with 62.2 percent for Namibian men
and the women’s world average of 46.3 percent (World Bank 2022b). Also,
women are relatively well represented in the salaried sector (56.5 percent com-
pared with 66.7 percent for men) due to high levels of educational attainment,
with 80 percent of girls completing secondary school and 17 percent of women
completing tertiary education (World Bank 2019; World Bank 2017; WEF
2022). The Married Persons Equality Act of 1996 also gives women the right to
contract, open bank accounts, register a business, and sell assets (The Married
Persons Equality Act of 1996, Articles 2, 3, and 5). Data show that approximate-
ly 80 percent of women have a bank account (although this number may include
joint accounts) or access to mobile money service (World Bank 2017). Despite
this considerable progress, legal impediments remain to women’s full financial
inclusion in the economy.

Regarding assets accumulated in marriage, the Constitution provides for uni-

versal rights to acquire, own, and dispose of property (Article 16) and grants
women equal rights during and at the dissolution of marriage (Article 14). The
Married Persons Equality Act further establishes that the default marital property
regime is “in community of property.” If the spouses divorce, the property
brought to and acquired during the marriage is divided in half. Although a posi-
tive development, the Married Persons Equality Act applies to civil marriages, not
marriages by customary law (that is, when a man and woman are married accord-
ing to the traditions of their community). Moreover, under the Native
Administration Proclamation of 1928, which still applies to the north central
sector of Namibia (above the “red line”) where historically the majority of indig-
enous people lived2 the default marital property regime for civil marriages is “out
of community property”—each spouse retains his or her own property before,
during, and after marriage—which is far less beneficial to women. This difference
dates back to the experience of “native” men in this region who entered into civil
marriages and may also have had a customary wife or wives, and who, by main-
taining separate property from the civil-law wife, could preserve their separate
property for their customary wife or wives. A Uniform Matrimonial Property bill,
which would repeal these remaining provisions of the Native Administration
Proclamation, has been pending for several years (Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW] 2022).
Regarding land ownership, Namibia has enacted gender-neutral legislation in
the Communal Law Reform Act 5 of 2002 (CLRA), which permits women to
register for communal land and to inherit land from their deceased husband
(CLRA, Chapter II, Sec. 4; Chapter IV, Sec. 26). The CLRA has also mandated
that every communal land board have at least four women, giving them slightly
more than one-third representation on a typical board. These are important
advances; however, the legacy of customary law and culture in rural communities
persists. Even if the formal legal framework enables a widow to inherit communal
land, widows may be subject to property grabbing or other threats by the
deceased husband’s family to force them off the land (Mwetulundila 2021).
Moreover, many women do not know about the CLRA’s provisions, and surveys
have shown that rural women have often internalized the conservative cultural
views that they should not own land. The CLRA also does not address the rights
of spouses to land in divorce cases, leaving local courts to apply customary law
that generally does not favor women (University of Wyoming Human Rights
Clinic 2015).
Thus, despite progressive formal legislation, the existence of customary law—
which primarily regulates marriage, divorce, and land rights—still affects control
over assets. The Constitution of Namibia expressly recognizes the validity of com-
mon law and customary law, although only to the extent that these laws do not
2
The boundary of this area was demarcated on maps by a red line, with the south and central part
of Namibia below the line known as the Police Zone, where German and South African colonial
administrators established police control over the territory and white settlements were concentrated.

conflict with the Constitution or other statutes (Article 66). In Myburgh v.

Commercial Bank of Namibia (2000), the Supreme Court of Namibia held that the
Constitution and Married Persons Equality Act overrode common law limitations
on a woman’s right to contract in civil marriages. Although this same principle
should apply to conflicts between the Constitution and customary law, it has not
yet been tested before the Supreme Court. Many experts advise that despite the
Constitution’s legislative supremacy and statutes enacted after independence, rural
communities continue to follow customary law, often with discriminatory effect on
women (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). Although the Global
Gender Gap Report indicated that women have “near equal rights” with regard to
access to finance (land and non-land assets; WEF 2022), this claim derives from
official legislation that does not fully take into account the continuing influence of
customary law and culture in rural communities.
Like the other countries discussed in this chapter, Namibia has a strong
national institutional framework for addressing remaining challenges. The
Ministry of Gender Equality, Poverty Eradication and Social Welfare targets key
issues like combating gender-based violence, and the national gender machinery
(central coordinating unit for women’s affairs within the Government) constitutes
11.3 percent of the national budget (CEDAW 2022).
South Africa
Since the end of the apartheid regime, South Africa has enacted a host of progres-
sive legislation to address gender inequality. The Constitution enshrines the
principle of nondiscrimination on the grounds of race, gender, sex, pregnancy,
and marital status, among others (Section 9). The government has promulgated
the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act No. 4 of
2000 (PEPUDA) to give effect to this provision of the Constitution by establish-
ing Equality Courts to hear cases of alleged discrimination, harassment, and hate
speech. To expand access to justice, these courts have more informal procedures
and are meant to be inexpensive. However, the Equality Courts have been
underutilized because of inadequate information to the public and insufficiently
trained court personnel (Kaersvang 2008).
Section 8 of the PEPUDA also lists specific types of discrimination that are
prohibited, such as any system that prevents women from inheriting property and
any policy or conduct that unfairly limits women’s access to land rights, finance,
and other resources. Following the landmark Constitutional Court case
Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha (2005) that declared male primogeniture unconsti-
tutional, the government enacted the Reform of Customary Law of Succession
(Act 11 of 2009), which stipulates that widows and daughters may not be subject
to inheritance discrimination. In addition, women in customary marriages are
entitled to a portion of their deceased husband’s estate. Other legislation pro-
motes women’s access to bank accounts, credit, and financial support, particularly
for previously disadvantaged black women (Broad Based Black Economic
Empowerment [Act 53 of 2000]).

Women’s labor force participation is at 54.3 percent compared with

64.9 percent for men (South Africa, Quarterly Labor Force Survey 2023). These
levels of women’s economic engagement are made possible in part by legislation
like the Employment Equity Act. Before its 2022 amendment, this Act required
designated employers—firms with more than 50 employees—to create plans to
achieve an appropriate representation of black people and women in their work-
force and submit reports detailing progress on those plans to the government.
Studies indicate that this Act restructured previously male-dominated industries
that were required to recruit female workers for legal compliance (Landman and
O’Clery 2020). In addition, the Employment Equity Act requires equal pay and
benefits for men and women performing the same role. Nonetheless, according
to the WEF, wage equality in South Africa lagged behind the rest of the world,
ranking 123 out of 148 countries (WEF 2022). Other laws that support women’s
ability to work are the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, which provides four
months of maternity leave, and the Labor Relations Act, which, as amended,
provides 10 days of gender-neutral parental leave (South Africa Department of
Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities 2020). Employers are not required
to pay for maternity leave, but women may apply for unemployment insurance
from the Unemployment Insurance Fund. However, women’s shouldering the
burden of childcare remains a significant constraint on their labor force partici-
pation. Studies have shown that women spend 2.4 to 3 times more on unpaid
domestic and care work compared with men (Kirkwood 2018).
One of the most serious issues facing South Africa today is widespread gender-
based violence. Although it is difficult to quantify, some have estimated that
gender-based violence costs South Africa approximately 1.3 percent of GDP per
year, and a woman’s lifetime experience of violence is associated with 35 percent
lower earnings (Kirkwood 2018). The UN Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) conducted a confidential
inquiry and concluded on May 17, 2021, that South Africa violated the
Convention due to its failure to take sustained measures to prevent domestic
violence. To address this critical problem, in 2021, the South African Parliament
enacted the Domestic Violence Amendment Bill and other amendments to crim-
inal laws that address sexual offenses. This legislation imposes reporting require-
ments on those who observe domestic violence and puts in place support at police
stations (“victim-friendly rooms”), creates sexual offenses courts, and provides
legal aid to victims of domestic violence (Inquiry concerning South Africa con-
ducted under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention 2021).
However, legislation alone is not enough. Research in South Africa has shown
that traditional notions of masculinity harmful to women—including that rape
strengthens a perpetrator’s masculinity—are strong. Other practices such as
forced marriage through kidnapping (“ukuthwala”) and “blessers” (older men
supporting younger women in exchange for sex) are exploitative (Kirkwood 2018;
OECD Development Centre 2019).
A need thus exists for institutional mechanisms focused on implementation and
monitoring. To address this need, in addition to a national ministry dedicated to

women, the Constitution of South Africa established the Commission for Gender
Equality. This independent statutory body is charged with “the protection, develop-
ment and attainment of gender equality” (South Africa’s Constitution of 1996,
Sections 181 and 187). The Commission for Gender Equality Act 39 of 1996
further provides for the commission’s composition, powers, and functions. This
commission is a crucial voice in assessing and monitoring the South African gov-
ernment’s progress on gender equality in a range of areas, such as the governmental
response to gender-based violence, implementation of economic empowerment
programs, and gender-responsive budgeting (Commission for Gender Equality
South Africa 2020, 2021a, 2021b). It is also active in analyzing and commenting
on legislation relating to gender equality and making legal submissions to
Constitutional Court cases involving women’s rights (Commission for Gender
Equality South Africa 2017). An independent watchdog on progress toward gender
equality is a valuable institutional mechanism.
Mauritius
Mauritius has a strong legal framework for enabling women’s access to economic
opportunities, as evidenced by the World Bank’s WBL project (which assesses and
analyzes legal barriers faced by women in various economies), affording it the high-
est rating (89.4 out of 100) of any African country (World Bank 2022). However,
other independent assessments find Mauritius lagging (98th in the Global Gender
Gap Report 2023) due to challenges in areas such as women’s labor force partici-
pation rate, earnings levels (WEF 2023), and women’s weak formal political
engagement as only 20 percent of the National Assembly members are women
(IPU Parline, Global Data on Parliaments, Mauritius National Assembly [2023]).
Recently, Mauritius has been increasingly taking steps to address discrimina-
tory labor laws. These steps include the 2019 Worker’s Rights Act mandating
equal remuneration for work of equal value—which includes male and female
workers—that increased the duration of paid maternity leave up to 14 weeks and
prohibited the dismissal of pregnant workers. In addition, the 2008 Equal
Opportunities Act prohibited gender discrimination in employment and enacted
civil remedies for sexual harassment in employment. Despite these efforts, females
represent only about 45 percent of the total labor force (World Bank, Gender
Data Portal, Labor Force Participation by Females [2023]). This statistic is also
noteworthy because unemployed women are generally more educated than their
male counterparts: 60 percent of women have a school certificate compared with
48 percent of men (Dabee 2021). Also, women tend to leave the labor force upon
marriage. Specifically, more than half of the working-age females are outside the
labor force—one of the reasons for the World Bank’s key recommendations to
reform laws affecting women’s work post childbirth (Dieterich, Huang, and
Thomas 2016).
The Civil Code establishes women’s rights in some areas of marriage and fam-
ily law. The Civil Code stems from the Napoleonic Code and had patriarchal
features, such as treating married women as “minors.” Following widespread

protests and advocacy by women’s groups, the courts amended the Code to
remove this inferior status in the early 1980s (Ramtohul 2015). Another victory
for the women’s movement concerned an immigration law that prohibited foreign
husbands of Mauritian women from residing in Mauritius (but not foreign wives
of Mauritian men), thereby threatening Mauritian women’s family stability. The
women’s front brought a sex discrimination case to the United Nation Human
Rights Committee about this provision, which was repealed in 1977. Revised in
2011, the amended Civil Code gave women equal status to men in the house-
hold, equal authority as legal guardians of their children, and the freedom to open
bank accounts without the consent of their husbands. With respect to property
rights, women and men have equal rights to own and manage property, create a
will to outline the succession of their property, and attain the same inheritance
rights. Laws are also in place to protect against gender-based violence, such as the
amended Protection from Domestic Violence Act, 2016.
In 2022, the Mauritius Law Reform Commission, in response to the attorney
general’s request, reviewed discriminatory laws against women in Mauritius. The
subsequent report outlined some key successes in legal reforms over the years,
such as the Civil Code reforms that used to require a wife’s obedience to her
husband. In addition, the report makes recommendations for the way forward
(Discriminatory Laws against Women in Mauritius Law Reform Commission
Report 2022).
Mauritius has consciously adopted policies and action plans to improve gender
equality. The government instituted a Ministry of Gender Equality and Family
Welfare with a dedicated unit working on women’s social and economic empow-
erment, including ongoing work to adopt a Gender Equality Bill. In addition, the
government adopted a new National Gender Policy for 2022–30 and a renewed
2020–24 National Strategy and Action Plan on the Elimination of Gender-Based
Violence in Mauritius.
Cabo Verde
According to the World Bank’s WBL report 2023, Cabo Verde scores 86.3 out
of 100 in terms of formal laws and regulations that affect women’s economic
opportunity, which is higher than the regional average for sub-Saharan Africa
(71.5; World Bank 2023). Nonetheless, its lower scores on women’s educational
attainment and political empowerment lower its ranking in the Global Gender
Gap Report (37th in the world) (WEF 2023).
Cabo Verde’s overarching legal framework is set forth in its Constitution,
which enshrines the principle of equality between sexes in Article 24.4 and
emphasizes that the government must remove barriers to equality between citi-
zens “especially factors of discrimination against women in the family and in the
society” (Article 7).
In addition, high-level political commitment exists to achieve gender equality,
including through a National Plan for Gender Equality (2021–2025). This plan

presents the government’s strategic vision to achieve gender equality consistent with
the latest CEDAW recommendations issued in 2019, gender-sensitive budgeting
and the establishment of gender markers in the budget system, and prioritizing
gender equality in the Strategic Plan for Sustainable Development 2017–2021.
The Constitution encourages women’s political participation (Article 55 says:
“The State shall encourage balanced participation of citizens of both sexes in
political life”), but balanced participation has been more expressly prioritized
with the new Parity Law. Adopted in 2019, this law established a mandatory
quota of 40 percent of women on the list of candidates running for Parliament,
municipalities, and other elected offices and decision-making positions in public
administration (Law Nº 56 /Vii/2010 B.O 29 I Suplemento 9 De Março 2010;
Law Nº 68/IX/2019 De 28 De Novembro 2019, Article 4). As a result, following
the municipal elections held in October 2020, women represented 42 percent of
local elected representatives in Municipal Chambers or Assemblies (National
Directorate of Planning 2021). In 2021, women held 26 of the 72 Congressional
seats (a total of 36 percent of the seats), an increase from 17 compared with the
latest legislature (US Department of State 2021).
Because access to credit is a major constraint for entrepreneurs, especially for
women, an amendment to Cabo Verde’s Penal Code in 2005 made access to
credit easier for women by prohibiting gender-based discrimination in financial
services (Penal Code, Article 161). In addition, government programs promoting
entrepreneurship also directly targeted women. Specifically, from 2015 to 2017,
the government established three entrepreneurship programs in partnership with
several nongovernmental organizations and the Agency for Entrepreneurial
Development and Innovation. One of these programs, Support to Women’s
Entrepreneurship, provided training in entrepreneurship, financing for business
plans, and the incubation process to support the establishment and growth of
women-led start-ups (Cabo Verde National Report: Beijing+25; UN Women
2019).
Despite significant progress, there is still room for improvement in certain
areas. Regarding access to justice, each citizen, female or male, has the right to
access justice and the right to obtain effective protection of rights (Article 20 of
the Constitution). However, women filled only two of the seven seats on the
Supreme Court and remain underrepresented in the judicial sector, especially in
prosecutorial positions.
Under the Constitution, female and male spouses have equal rights and duties,
and amendments to the Civil Code in 1981 allowed women to freely choose where
to live, get a job, sign a contract, register a business, open a bank account, and head
a household (OECD 2021). However, discriminatory practices and patriarchal
values regarding the role of women in family and society remain deeply rooted.
From a labor law perspective, Cabo Verde prohibits gender discrimination
in employment; however, no provision exists in the law specifically mandating
equal remuneration for work of equal value (Legislative Decree No. 5 of 2007).
Consequently, in some sectors of the formal economy, women receive lower

salaries than men for similar work. In addition, the labor market remains highly
segregated by gender, with women still overrepresented in certain sectors, such
as the informal economy where salaries are generally lower and labor protec-
tions are not necessarily enforced (US Department of State 2021). As an exam-
ple, a 2018 study on the rights of domestic workers showed that Cabo Verde
employed 6.6 percent of people as domestic workers; although 93.9 percent of
these employees were women, only 11 percent were covered by the National
Institute of Social Welfare (INPS) and therefore able to benefit from a pension
and health insurance plan (International Labour Organization 2021).
CONCLUSION
Significant progress has occurred in removing legal impediments to women’s
economic empowerment in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite these tangible advances,
the level of progress in each subregion varies, and all countries should continue
working to eliminate legal barriers to women’s economic empowerment. For
instance, countries in eastern and southern Africa tend to rank slightly better than
countries in western and central Africa. The 2023 World Bank’s Women, Business
and the Law report measuring laws and regulations restricting women’s economic
opportunities showed that the average score in eastern and southern Africa was
73.8, which is slightly above the average score of western and central Africa (68.7)
but below the global average of 76.5 (based on a total of 190 countries; World
Bank 2022a). The case studies of Rwanda, Namibia, South Africa, Mauritius, and
Cabo Verde highlighted in this chapter illustrate the positive impact of removing
such legal impediments on women’s economic, social, and political empower-
ment. As shown in the case studies, removing the existing legal barriers in
sub-Saharan African countries while using legal reform to incentivize women’s full
economic participation is essential to promote women’s economic empowerment,
facilitate economic growth, and create financial stability.
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CHAPTER 14
Rethinking Fiscal Law Design to

Address Gender Inequality
Alessandro Gullo, Arthur Rossi, Lydia Sofrona,
Karla Vasquez Suarez, Christophe Waerzeggers, and
Kikachukwu Alex-Okoh
This chapter examines the design and adoption of tax and public financial manage-
ment legislation in various countries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa, that aim
to reduce gender inequality. It highlights the legal and institutional issues that coun-
tries should consider when designing gender-related fiscal policies. Reflecting on the
COVID-19 pandemic and its disproportionate social and economic impact on
women, the chapter explores the roles that robust budgeting and tax legal frameworks
play in fiscal policies that are more sustainably rooted in gender equality. The chapter
notes that although legislative reform is not the single determining factor, it is a vital
element in ensuring positive outcomes and addressing gender inequality for an inclu-
sive recovery and beyond.
INTRODUCTION
The pandemic crisis has brought the role of fiscal policies in promoting gen-
der balance to the fore. The economic and social consequences of the pan-
demic affected women disproportionately (Christopherson Puh and others
2022)—either directly, because women are overrepresented in those economic
sectors most adversely affected by the crisis (for instance, the services sector)
or indirectly, as lockdowns forced women to leave their jobs because respon-
sibility for home schooling, childcare, and general household chores generally
fell on them.
In response, several countries, including in sub-Saharan Africa (IMF
2021a), adopted legislation that provides lifeline tax and public spending
measures—in some cases limited in scope and time and in others based on a
more permanent framework. Although transitional measures were crucial
during the most acute phase of the crisis, the COVID-19 recovery presents an
opportunity for countries to ensure that their fiscal policies are sustainably
253

rooted in gender equality—aimed at achieving both equality of opportunities

and outcomes.1
This chapter discusses the legal and institutional considerations countries should
take into account when designing gender fiscal policies toward a gender-inclusive
recovery and beyond, to create more inclusive and resilient societies. It also exam-
ines fiscal law gender-related issues in sub-Saharan African countries.
THE BROADER GENDER LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The legal framework underpinning gender considerations is multilayered. It com-
prises general foundational principles of equality and nondiscrimination embed-
ded in international conventions, countries’ constitutions, and (primary and
secondary) legislation.
International Conventions
In addition to international conventions guaranteeing equality more generally, such
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, several international conventions,
such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, specifically target gender discrimination. Although they do not specifically
target fiscal frameworks, these legal instruments create obligations applicable to all
governmental policies, including taxation and spending. The international commit-
ment to gender equality was further cemented in the 1995 Beijing Declaration,
which included a budgetary commitment for gender-impact analyses and for meet-
ing social needs. International conventions recognize that ensuring equality may
also require positive policy action (for instance, United Nations 1989). Both the
Millennium Development Goals and the subsequent 2015 Sustainable Development
Goals established gender equality and women’s empowerment as a standalone, sin-
gle goal; they also set gender-sensitive targets within other goals.
On the African continent, the 2003 Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (“The Maputo
Protocol”) outlines a range of women’s rights including economic, social, civil,
and political as well as cultural and environmental rights. Within Africa’s subre-
gions, multiple legal instruments address women’s empowerment and gender
equality, such as the Southern African Development Community’s Gender
Protocol (2008), the East African Community Gender Equality and Development
Bill (2016), the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) Treaty
(1975, revised in 1993), and the Supplementary Act relating to Equality of Rights
1
The concept of “gender equality of outcomes” is a function of the policy objective pursued and its
gender impact in a particular area. For instance, if the policy objective is to have equal representation
on boards, then gender equality of outcomes is achieved through such representation. If the policy
objective is to incentivize tax savings through the tax system, and the resulting tax benefit is found
to accrue predominantly to men, then there is no gender equality of outcomes. This does not mean
that, at an individual level, each person (whether male or female) should receive the same tax benefit,
but rather that, as a group, one gender should not be systemically disadvantaged.

Chapter 14 Rethinking Fiscal Law Design to Address Gender Inequality 255
between Women and Men for Sustainable Development in the Economic

Community of West Africa States Region (2015; Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2021b).
Constitutional Provisions on Gender and Nondiscrimination

Most countries’ constitutions prohibit discrimination, and many also specifically
prohibit discrimination based on gender (for instance, Central African Republic,
Germany, India, Italy, Tunisia) or contain provisions enshrining broad principles
of gender equality (Ghana, Liberia, Malawi). Although no specific references are
usually made to fiscal measures, constitutional obligations are generally binding
across all state actions and government policies, including tax and public financial
management frameworks. Some constitutions incorporate gender balance as a
budgetary principle (Austria, Kenya); require the government to implement pol-
icies promoting gender equality and to enact laws necessary to achieve it (Ecuador,
Morocco, Uganda); create public entities responsible for promoting or coordinat-
ing gender equality policies (for instance, the National Human Rights and
Equality Commission in Kenya). Ghana’s constitution requires the state to ensure
full integration of women in economic development.
Legislation
Countries’ laws and regulations often prohibit gender-based discrimination gen-
erally or in specific policy areas, such as in the labor market (Christopherson Puh
and others 2022; IMF 2021a). In addition, these laws and regulations promote,
enforce, and monitor measures to address gender inequality—for instance,
regarding violence against women, employment and economic benefits, marriage,
and family (see UN Sustainable Development Goals Global Indicator
Platform 5.1.12). Other legal measures that support fiscal policies to promote
gender considerations include laws that assist in the collection and maintenance
of gender-disaggregated data; these so-called equality laws encompass multiple
areas of social, political, and economic life (for instance, public contracts, quotas
for women in civil service management positions). Other laws promote access to
information. For example, in Morocco, Law 31-13 makes information systemat-
ically accessible to women and guarantees access, in a timely manner and by all
possible means, to data relating to political participation at the level of the parlia-
ment, local authorities, and political parties.
The legislation also delineates roles and responsibilities of public entities and
promotes their coordination on gender-related issues. While the executive branch
of government is generally responsible for administering and promoting gender
policies, parliamentary oversight (including through specialized committees in the
budget review and approval process) can offer independent review of such policies.
2
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals Indicators Metadata Repository, SDG Indicators
(un.org).

The judiciary, in turn, may be called on to review the application of laws and
policies to individuals and corporations and give appropriate recourse where gen-
der inequalities are identified in defiance of legal norms. Supreme audit institu-
tions may include gender issues in their audits of government policies, either as
part of regular assessments or in targeted reviews.3 The legal framework defines the
responsibilities of different actors, for example by establishing who leads the design
of gender-related policies (for instance, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Women’s
Affairs, or another specialized agency) and the role of spending ministries. Fiscal—
tax and public financial management—legal frameworks and institutions thus
support fiscal policies that aim to reduce gender inequalities. The remainder of this
chapter focuses on the role of these fiscal legal frameworks, both in the context of
the COVID-19 pandemic and toward a sustainable recovery.
LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS FOR GENDER-BASED

BUDGETING AND PUBLIC FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT TOOLS
Gender budgeting has gained prominence in the response to the pandemic
(IMF, United Nations Development Programme, and UN Women 2021). As
outlined in more detail in Chapters 11 and 12, gender budgeting is an approach
to government accounting that uses fiscal policy (tax and spending measures)
and public financial management tools to promote girls’ and women’s develop-
ment and address the negative macroeconomic outcomes caused by gender gaps
and inequalities. Its role in advancing gender considerations plays out in differ-
ent phases. First, gender budgeting can help governments understand where
inequalities lie as well as how, and to what extent, women are being affected in
different areas (for instance, in the labor market, health, and education).
Second, it can inform the design and implementation of fiscal measures aimed
at mitigating the adverse effects of the pandemic on women and girls and help
them to get back in the workforce, which in turn would give countries an eco-
nomic lift during the recovery phase. Third, gender budgeting provides tools
for regularly monitoring and evaluating the impact of gender-related policy
measures.
Gender budgeting legal frameworks can help address gender inequalities by
providing countries with the foundations for gender-related fiscal measures
(Alonso-Albarran and others 2021). Gender budgeting legal frameworks consist of
the overarching public financial management legislation; public financial manage-
ment tools and obligations related to gender budgeting implementation; and tax
and sectoral legal instruments regarding expenditure policies. Legal reform in this
area has led to provisions in constitutional frameworks, public financial manage-
ment laws, and executive decrees. Although the breadth and scope of gender
3
See, for instance, the Austrian Court of Audit’s review of the gender impact of the country’s employ-
ment tax policies (Austrian Court of Audit 2017).

b udgeting practices vary widely across countries, legal frameworks support the
implementation of an extensive toolkit that includes ex ante gender-impact assess-
ments, gender-budget statements, budget circulars, budget planning and program-
ming tools, budget execution rules, and reporting and audit requirements to
ensure greater accountability. Law can also support efforts to strengthen gen-
der-disaggregated statistics, which can allow for sound identification and assess-
ment of gender-related policies and help remove potential gender biases from
policies, regulations, and budgets.
In some countries, legal frameworks enacted before the pandemic provided for
gender budgeting tools that hardwired a gender perspective into the design of fiscal
packages during the crisis. Such legal frameworks—in some cases embedded in the
country’s constitution—have allowed for or required the incorporation of a systematic
gender perspective throughout the budgetary process. Here are several examples:
• In 2018, Canada enacted the Gender Budgeting Act, requiring that the
principle of gender equality be promoted in the federal budget and that
gender and diversity be considered in taxation and resource allocation deci-
sions, including with respect to direct spending. To enhance transparency
and accountability, the Act also requires that information on the impact of
government decisions on gender be made available to the public. In
response to COVID-19, all ministerial proposals contained a Gender-Based
Analysis Plus assessment, required by the legislation. Overall, 77 percent of
the measures taken during the crisis were gender balanced, and 18 percent
were directed specifically to women. Such measures included entrepreneur-
ship programs for women, support to shelters for women and sexual assault
centers, and increases in child benefit allowances.
• In Iceland, the 2016 Public Finance Act provides a robust framework for gen-
der budgeting. It mandates that the Minister of Finance, in consultation with
the ministry responsible for gender equality, leads the formulation of a gender
budgeting program to be incorporated in the drafting of the budget bill.
Further, the Act mandates that the budget bill clearly outline its impact on
gender-equality targets. During the pandemic, line ministries were instructed
to estimate the number of jobs and gender ratio created by their proposed
investment measures, with the Ministry of Finance providing its own estima-
tion and ensuring consistency on proposals. An overall Gender Impact
Assessment, with regard to social and labor market measures, was introduced
for the first time as part of the budget bill (Birna Baldursdottir 2020).
• In Mexico, the 2012 Federal Budget Framework Law requires that all institu-
tional budget proposals detail the measures that promote gender equality and
the eradication of violence against women or any other form of gender dis-
crimination. Further, the Federal Budget Framework Law demands that per-
formance evaluation systems incorporate specific indicators that allow an
evaluation of the gender impact of budget programs. As mandated by law,
during the COVID-19 crisis the 2021 annual budget law included an annex
detailing the resources allocated to budget programs targeted to promote

gender equality, including the responsible units for their execution.4 Another
key component of Mexico’s framework is an additional parliamentary over-
sight procedure. A working group headed by the Speaker of the Lower House
of Parliament assessed the governmental measures taken during the COVID-
19 pandemic on a weekly basis to ensure that they were designed and imple-
mented in a gender-responsive way.
• In Rwanda, the Organic Law on State Finances and Property declares “gen-
der balance” as a fundamental principle in the use of public funds. It also
requires that during the budget preparation process, the budget framework
paper, approved by cabinet and submitted to parliament, includes a gender-
budget statement. All ministries, departments, and agencies must submit
annual implementation reports. In line with this framework, the 2020/21
Gender Budget Statement identified gender priorities, including for agricul-
ture, health, infrastructure, trade, and industry.5 Rwanda’s constitution also
established the Gender Monitoring Office in 2003 to monitor the compli-
ance of gender-related commitments across public, private, and nongovern-
mental institutions.
• Uganda’s constitution requires the government to take affirmative action in
favor of marginalized groups, including women, and further provides that the
state must provide facilities and opportunities to enhance the welfare of
women, which promotes the advancement and empowerment of women, and
ensures their equal opportunity in political, economic, and social activities. The
constitution also provides for the promulgation of the Equal Opportunities Act
and the establishment of the Equal Opportunities Commission, which is man-
dated to eliminate discrimination and inequalities on the basis of gender. More
specifically, the Public Finance and Accountability Act provides that the annual
budget must specify measures taken to ensure equal opportunities for both
women and men. An analysis must be done by all government agencies—and
must be accompanied by a certificate issued by the Minister of Finance in
consultation with the Equal Opportunities Commission—on the extent to
which the budget considers gender and equity. This is a requirement at the
formulation and approval stages of the budget cycle—guided by a budget cir-
cular to government agencies and institutions that includes gender-responsive
budgeting guidelines. A national program to support women’s economic
empowerment through entrepreneurship was a source of resilience during the
pandemic (Willman, Atamanov, and Myers 2022).
• At the local level, several countries (Argentina, Austria, Germany, Italy, Liberia,
Norway and Spain) have a legal mandate for gender budgeting, which rein-
forced the adoption of gender-responsive fiscal measures during the pandemic.
Other supporting mechanisms in the legal framework are crucial to the effec-
tiveness of gender-responsive budgeting. Laws that promote strong institutional
capacity and mandate the collection of sex-disaggregated data are important in
4
See Mexico, Ministry of Finance 2021.
5
See gender mainstreaming in Rwanda’s fiscal year 2020/21 budget (Republic of Rwanda 2020).

carrying out legal and policy measures. In some countries, the statistics law was
amended to require that all data-collecting institutions analyze and publish statis-
tics by gender, for example Israel. In other countries, laws on equality set the
framework for collecting gender-disaggregated data, enabling these countries to
formulate gender–responsive policies and track progress made toward gender
balance, for example, Thailand.
The legal framework in some countries supported the scrutiny of gender-related
policy measures and promoted accountability during the pandemic, mostly through
two mechanisms:
• Parliamentary scrutiny of COVID-19 support packages. Oversight by parliament
or special committees helped to determine whether women’s and girls’ specif-
ic needs were being addressed and gender equality promoted. In most juris-
dictions, parliaments exercised this scrutiny throughout the budget process,
such as in the revisions of medium-term expenditure frameworks, in the
approval of annual and supplementary budgets, and during the review of
budget execution reports. For example, under both the Canadian Gender
Budgeting Act and the Korean National Finance Act, budgetary plans and
reports submitted during the pandemic by the executive to the legislature laid
out the impact of the budget on gender equality.6 In Austria, the Parliamentary
Budget Office analyzed gender budgeting and gender equality and gave disag-
gregated gender data to parliament, allowing its members to adequately
debate gender issues.7 Canada and Iceland established parliamentary commit-
tees to deal with COVID-19 responses and worked with ministries to review
the impact of proposed fiscal measures on gender equality.
• Gender-related audits by supreme audit institutions. Gender audits can help
determine the degree of government compliance with national legislation
related to gender equality, examine the gender impact of government pro-
grams, and make recommendations on the design and implementation of
policy measures. If broadly formulated, the legal mandate of Supreme Audit
Institutions would grant appropriate powers and tools to plan, define, and
undertake a gender audit. In Austria, guidelines for the Austrian Court of
Audit recommend that performance audits include gender considerations
such as an impact analysis or the relevance of gender objectives. In Rwanda,
all public entities are required to submit an audit report detailing how the
programs for gender equality have been implemented. Mauritius formed a
parliamentary gender caucus, through the amendment to the Standing
Orders and Rules of the National Assembly, to conduct gender audits and
ensure the promotion and attainment of gender equality by carrying out
gender assessment of government policies.8 The Office of the Auditor
6
Examples include in Canada Annex 4, titled “Gender, Diversity, and Quality of Life Statement” of
the 2021 Budget proposal. Such assessments include the COVID 19 “influence map.”
7
See official page of the gender assessments published by the Austrian Parliament in 2021 (Austrian
Parliament 2021).
8
See Mauritius’s National Gender Policy 2022–2023 (Republic of Mauritius, Ministry of Gender
Equality and Family Welfare 2022).

General of Uganda announced a performance audit of nationally agreed-

upon targets, to assess the increase of intimate partner violence against
women during the COVID-19 crisis (IMF 2021a; UN Women 2021)
Beyond the crisis, the legal framework can support the implementation of
gender budgeting tools and their enforceability. Gender measures taken during
the COVID-19 pandemic by countries with ex ante and comprehensive gender
budgeting legal frameworks will bear effects beyond the crisis. These frameworks
can help governments introduce and institutionalize gender budgeting elements
in their fiscal policymaking. Without binding legislation—and absent strong
political commitment and social movement mobilization9—governments may
easily disregard gender budgeting efforts in times of crisis (Polzer, Nolte, and
Seiwald 2021).
Female representation in decision-making public institutions is important to
ensure that decisions are made with a balanced gender perspective during the
budget process. In sub-Saharan African countries, some constitutions require a
specific quota of women representatives in legislative bodies and government
offices; these quotas are crucial in implementing policies that promote gender
equality. Kenya’s constitution provides that the State should take legislative action
and other measure to ensure that no more than two thirds of the members of
elective and appointed bodies are of the same gender.10 In Rwanda, in addition to
a general commitment to ensuring gender equality as a fundamental principle,
women must occupy at least 30 percent of the positions in decision-making bod-
ies.11 Low levels of female representation or participation in the planning process
may sometimes create a challenge for mainstreaming gender into national and
subnational budgets; these low levels of participation often mean that women’s
views and concerns are not reflected in the budgets, and so the budgets, in turn,
are not responsive to women’s issues (Kusambiza 2013).
TAX-LAW DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR

ADDRESSING GENDER EQUALITY
The following legal-design issues emerge in the design of gender-sensitive tax
measures, including in the context of the COVID-19 crisis.12
• The choice of legal instruments. Depending on the choice of measure, countries
have introduced tax measures in response to COVID-19 through primary or
9
For instance, in 2021, Argentina, while not having comprehensive gender budgeting legislation,
increased its budget dedicated to closing inequality gaps to 12.5 percent of its total budget envelope.
10
Article 27 of the Constitution.
11
Article 10(4) of the Constitution.
12
Gender-responsive measures seek to remove gender-differentiated effects and systemic barriers by
directly and explicitly targeting a particular gender. Gender-sensitive measures are not explicitly tar-
geted at a particular gender; instead, they are designed to have a positive impact on women’s economic
security, for instance, because they target sectors in which women are overrepresented.

secondary law instruments (laws or regulations), either as standalone measures

or as part of omnibus crisis bills. Some measures have also been introduced
through administrative actions (such as administrative guidelines), aiming
to achieve greater flexibility and swifter dissemination of information to tax-
payers (IMF 2021b).
• Sectoral measures or specifically targeted measures. Several countries introduced
sectoral measures to further protect households and/or small businesses.
Examples include tax benefits or incentives for sectors in which women are
overrepresented, such as health care, education and other service sectors (IMF
2021a). Other countries introduced measures designed to provide immediate
tax relief and/or assist women to remain in the workforce—for instance, giv-
ing or increasing childcare allowances (Canada) or maintaining the possibility
to offset childcare costs through tax credits even if parents had to reduce their
working hours (UK).
• Temporary or more permanent measures. Tax measures aimed at restoring fis-
cal space for crisis recovery have in some countries been temporary, while
others have taken more permanent measures (IMF 2021a). For instance,
contributions on personal or corporate income or taxes on wealth have been
introduced as one-off measures (Argentina) or as a new and more perma-
nent feature of the tax system (Bolivia). Given that these types of measures
can be targeted to those with high incomes or wealth—that is, those with
the greatest ability to pay—hence increasing the redistributive impact of tax
systems, they can be expected to have positive impacts on gender equality to
the extent that women are overrepresented in the lower income brackets.
Regardless of the type of measure, the delivery of timely, easily accessible, and
tailored taxpayer guidance is important. Providing legal certainty is even more
important in times of crisis, when taxpayers—as well as tax administrations—
must rapidly adjust to changing economic and social circumstances. The UK, for
instance, has issued various guidelines on COVID-19–related tax measures,
including working-from-home tax relief claims (linked to the increase of house-
hold expenses) and childcare allowance claims.
The economic recovery from COVID-19 offers an opportunity for countries
to ensure greater gender balance in tax-law design. Although most countries’ tax
laws are written in a gender-neutral13 way, without explicitly differentiating based
on gender,14 they may still exacerbate gender inequalities because of underlying
13
According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (2017) the term “gender neutral is anything—a
concept, an entity, a style of language—that is unassociated with either the male or the female gender.
The nature of systemic and embedded or internalized bias is such that, unfortunately often, what is
perceived to be gender neutral is in fact gender blind.”
14
According to the World Bank (2015), 16 out of 173 countries had tax systems that directly favored
men. A range of discriminatory tax laws have persisted in many countries (such as an explicit or
implicit tax deduction or a credit to the male head of household) along with legal barriers restricting
women’s ability to work.

socioeconomic differences between men and women or because of different

household structures. Faced with such implicit gender biases, countries that intro-
duce or maintain gender-neutral tax laws may not be doing enough to remove
gender-differentiated effects, and positive policy action may be required—wheth-
er in the form of gender-responsive or gender-sensitive measures. A better under-
standing of how current tax rules affect genders differently is a necessary first step
because tax-law reform is one possible response, among other policies, to address
implicit gender biases. Therefore, when (re)designing tax laws, governments
should consider the following strategies to address gender inequality:
• Identify existing gender biases in the tax system. A “gender balance in tax” legal
diagnostic of existing laws and procedures would be a useful first step in design-
ing more gender-effective reforms.15 The objective would be to identify explic-
it and implicit gender biases16 in the substantive tax laws and tax procedures of
a country, against the background of its legal, social, and cultural environment,
supported by gender-disaggregated data to the extent available. The diagnostic
can then inform the choice of appropriate policy measures—including whether
they should involve tax, spending, other structural measures, or a combination
of them—and inform their legal design in support of the country’s domestic
and international commitments to gender equality. For example, a gender
analysis of the personal income tax system could consider the following main
issues: level of tax relief for minimum basic living expenses; the impact of flat-
rate and presumptive forms of taxation; joint taxation of adult couples; and the
“tying” of social benefits to income (UN Committee of Experts on International
Cooperation in Tax Matters 2018). Other areas of focus could include corpo-
rate taxation (for instance, tax incentives in sectors that are male dominated),
property taxation (for instance, real estate or assets predominantly owned by
women subject to higher tax rates; Niesten and Hyland 2022), and inheritance
and indirect taxes. According to the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing
for Development (2018), guidelines and methodologies for medium-term
revenue strategies, tax policy assessment frameworks, and tax administration
diagnostic tools should eliminate gender biases.
• Ensure effectiveness of gender-related tax policies through tax law design. Although
the specific policy mix will vary according to countries’ circumstances and
policy objectives, anywhere tax measures are involved, law reform will likely
be required. This would generally be the case, for instance, if the objectives
were to increase tax progressivity; to move from family-unit to individual-unit
taxation, for instance to eliminate tax-induced work disincentives for second-
ary (predominantly female) earners, including social security disincentives to
spousal work; and to design a broad-based, low-rate VAT, with appropriately
targeted exemptions or reduced VAT rates.17 More generally, tax reforms can
15
See Stewart 2017.
16
See Stotsky 1996.
17
On specific tax policy considerations to address gender gaps, see Delgado Coelho and others 2022;
and IMF, United Nations Development Programme, and UN Women 2021.

help to secure additional revenues for public financing of services and infra-
structure to help address gender inequalities.18
• Address tax biases arising from other policies. Implicit and explicit biases aris-
ing from the tax system may also exacerbate gender biases arising from other
policies or circumstances. For instance, the tax system may broaden the
so-called pension gap if pension savings are tax favored, that is, if that tax
benefit mostly accrues to men earning higher salaries. The pension gap is
further widened if the country’s statutory retirement age for women is lower
than for men.19 Addressing such biases may therefore require reforms
beyond the tax system to labor legislation and/or social protection frame-
works, to encourage women’s labor force participation and pay equality,
including in retirement. A diagnostic of existing biases could involve specific
considerations and therefore examine the country’s labor force structure and
household structure. The impact of social security contributions on gender
outcomes as a priority for further work has already been highlighted
(OECD 2022). For example, South Africa noted the potential for social
security contributions (for instance, earned income tax credits) as a possible
means to improve female labor force participation. More generally, a highly
progressive personal income tax, such as in South Africa, can be seen as
correcting for gender biases in the labor market (Delgado Coelho and others
2022; OECD 2022).
• Educate taxpayers. This communication can be particularly important for
empowering women. Gender-responsive and gender-sensitive tax reforms
should be communicated clearly, with information carefully adapted to
the target audience. This includes information on tax procedural
obligations that are often noted as a disincentive for women to engage in
business activities. For example, in Rwanda it has been noted that the
understanding of tax procedures and tax liabilities is limited for some
taxpayers, including businesswomen (Rwanda Private Sector Federation
2019). The complexity of tax procedures—such as the use of multiple tax
forms, which are not always available in all official languages—may
increase tax compliance burdens, in particular on women entrepreneurs.
This is principally due to lower levels of education, resulting in some
women taxpayers having to rely on help from a third person to complete
tax obligations. Countries should also consider drafting laws and regula-
tions in gender-neutral language, to better communicate the scope and
application of tax provisions.20 Box 14.1 presents key considerations on
the use of gender-neutral language in tax laws.
18
Tax financing of specific initiatives is different from standard revenue earmarking through legisla-
tion, which usually causes excessive budgetary inflexibility and inefficiencies.
19
The term pension gap refers to women typically living on lower income in retirement than men do,
at least partly driven by the gender pay gap; see OECD 2021a.
20
UN Women (n.d.) offers examples for the English language.

Box 14.1. The Use of Gender-Neutral Language in Tax Laws

Gender-inclusive language, or gender-neutral language, is language that avoids bias
toward a particular sex or social gender and therefore is less likely to convey gender stereo-
types.
Gender discriminatory language is commonly found in tax legislations, especially in the
wording of various provisions applicable to individuals. Examples include: (a) references to
“husband” and “wife” instead of “spouse,” “married man” and “married woman” instead of
“married person,” and/or “the taxpayer and his wife” instead of “the taxpayer and their
spouse” and (b) the use of male pronouns such as “he” and “his” instead of “he/she,” “him/
her,” or “they/their.”
When drafting tax legislation, drafters should consider:
• Avoiding gender-specific nouns when making generic references and, when possi-
ble, using a gender-neutral alternative.
• Avoiding the use of masculine reference words, by (1) omitting the masculine refer-
ence word; (2) using plural forms for both nouns and reference words; (3) using “they/
their” to refer to singular nouns (that is, using the singular “they”); and (4) using the
passive voice.
• Using both feminine and masculine forms, either as separate words or via slashes.
The choice of drafting strategy should be informed by the nature of the text and the
structure as a whole; however, gender-inclusive writing should not impede the text’s
readability.
Sources: UN Women (n.d.); and authors’ compilation.

Note: The examples provided above are for drafting in the English language. See UN
Women (n.d.) for examples in French and other languages.
A high-level review of select sub-Saharan African tax laws raises the following
general observations:21
• Many tax laws do not formally discriminate by gender. In several countries,
including Ghana (Grown and Valodia 2010), Liberia, Rwanda, Uganda,
Namibia, and Lesotho, the tax law does not explicitly discriminate against
women: individuals are not identified by gender or by marital status, and they
may file taxes separately. Gender-neutral language is generally used (for
instance, the term spouse, rather than husband and wife, is used), and the per-
sonal tax system may be described as marriage neutral—that is, if the income
of an individual remains unchanged before and after marriage, the tax paid
before marriage will remain the same after the person gets married. In some
cases, single-unit taxation applies; however, sometimes the language used is
not gender neutral (for instance, in Senegal and Madagascar).
• Several countries have taken active steps toward eliminating discriminatory tax-
law provisions. In Kenya, a recent amendment to the Income Tax Act
21
For the purposes of this chapter, income tax and tax procedure legislation from selected sub-Saharan
African countries are presented through the country examples. This review focused on: (1) the use of
gender-neutral language, (2) household-unit or single-unit taxation, (3) benefit from personal or child
allowances, and (4) spouses’ joint or separate filing and assessment.

abolished a discriminatory provision on personal income tax relief for insur-

ance premiums received. Until 1995, South Africa levied higher taxes on
“married women” than “married persons,” which primarily applied to mar-
ried men—with the former taxed more and the latter less than an unmarried
person; a woman qualified for the married-person treatment only as an
exception, for example, if she was able to prove that she was the main
income earner in her household (Valodia, Smith, and Budlender 2001). A
single tax structure available to all taxpayers, regardless of their gender or
marital status, was subsequently introduced.
• However, explicit gender biases remain in tax legislation. In the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the income of a married woman living with her
husband is deemed to be the income of the husband and the tax is assessed
on him. In Kenya, an explicit provision in the Income Tax Act titled “wife’s
income” provides for assessment in the name of the husband in case of joint
filing. It also establishes joint and several liability of the wife for the payment
of her share of the tax even though the assessment is not made in her name.
A similar provision titled “income on married women (and minor chil-
dren)” is also found in the Malawi Taxation Act. In the Republic of Congo
and in Gabon, income is taxed on the household as a unit, which, according
to the tax code, comprises the head of the family, “his” spouse, and depen-
dents, with separate assessments made only in exceptional cases. This is also
the case in Comoros and Chad but with a broader range of exceptions.22 In
some cases, the term “head of the family” is expressly used to describe the
husband (for instance, in Benin and Guinea). Other discriminations exist in
the form of joint and several liability of the wife for the payment of income
tax assessed in the name of the husband. In the Central African Republic, a
woman living with her husband is jointly and severally liable for the pay-
ment of personal income tax established in his name.
• Despite formal gender equality under the tax law, structural issues may lead
to implicit discriminations. In Guinea, although a single-unit taxation
option is available, incentives encourage a household-unit taxation option,
in the form of allowances for the wife (or wives) in favor of the husband.
In addition, minor or infirm children are in principle considered depen-
dent on the husband. Personal income tax systems imposing higher tax
burdens on single-earner households may also lead to implicit discrimina-
tion where those households are predominantly headed by women (see
Valodia, Smith, and Budlender 2001, where South Africa is mentioned as
an example).
• In some cases, tax laws contain positive discrimination measures. Examples
include Equatorial Guinea, where single women with more than three depen-
dents under the age of 18 are exempt from the individual tax; Mozambique,
where municipal personal tax is levied on resident individuals between ages 18
22
See Delgado Coelho and others 2022.

and 60, but women in domestic service are exempt from it;23 and Mali, where
women who have had at least four pregnancies are exempted from the region-
al and local development tax.
• A series of other tax-relevant positive measures are identified in tax and related
legislation. Uganda recently amended the Tax Appeals Tribunal Act to pro-
vide that at least 40 percent of the members of the tribunal shall be women.
In Kenya, no more than two-thirds of the members of the National Land
Commission—which is responsible for the assessment of tax on land and
premiums on immovable property—may be of the same gender; this rule
reflects a constitutional requirement for balanced gender representation in
national committees.
CONCLUSIONS: THE ROLE OF FISCAL LAW AND

INSTITUTIONS IN ADDRESSING GENDER
INEQUALITIES
Robust public financial management legal frameworks can support the design,
implementation, and monitoring of gender-balanced fiscal policies. Law reform
can help introduce and institutionalize gender budgeting practices, possibly
through gradual implementation. Although broad differences in gender budgeting
practices occur across countries, public financial management legal frameworks
could: (1) introduce gender balance as one of the principles of the budgetary
system, (2) require the preparation of gender-budget statements and/or ex ante
gender impact assessments, (3) require the inclusion of instructions on gender
classification and tracking in budget circulars (or similar instruments) for budget
preparation, (4) require the use of gender performance–based indicators for bud-
get execution, (5) require that in-year and end-year budget execution reports
incorporate gender-related information, (6) require ex post gender-impact assess-
ments, (7) strengthen the legal mandate of Supreme Audit Institutions to con-
duct gender-related audits, and (8) strengthen enforcement mechanisms such as
sanctions—a phase of gender budgeting often overlooked.24
Legislation itself cannot ensure successful reform; however, it is an important
element for determining effective outcomes in implementation and enforceability.
If instead countries rely on high-level political commitments rather than binding
laws, the risk is that—absent a robust institutional framework and other prerequi-
sites—the gender perspective will be disregarded, particularly in times of crisis.
Legal considerations also help policymakers to address implicit gender biases
in the tax system. While explicit gender biases should generally be addressed by
removing discriminatory tax laws, addressing implicit gender biases arising from
23
See Delgado Coelho and others 2022.
24
This list is based on the common gender budgeting practices and legal provisions inventoried by
Alonso-Albarran and others (2021).

or exacerbated by the tax system may require a more calibrated policy response.
Understanding the gender impact of current tax rules is an important first step
in this respect. A gender balance in tax legal diagnostic can usefully complement
gender budgeting tools—not only in the response to a crisis but also on a per-
manent basis—to achieve equality of opportunities and outcomes. More gener-
ally, improving tax capacity to raise additional revenues can help to reduce
gender inequalities; these additional revenues can generate additional financing
for public spending on the services and infrastructure needed to address those
inequalities.
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PART V
The Power of Policies:
From Fiscal to Fintech


CHAPTER 15
Tax and Expenditure Policy for

Gender Equality
Brooks Evans, Alexander Klemm, Carolina Osorio-Buitron,
and Mauricio Soto
This chapter focuses on how tax and expenditure policies can improve the lives of
women and girls in sub-Saharan Africa. Not only are tax policies important for
generating revenue, they also interact with structural barriers women face—some of
which are unique to Africa. Eliminating tax incentives in sectors where women are
underrepresented and removing explicit biases in the tax system (and laws that
interact with it) enhance economic efficiency and gender equality. Higher carbon
prices could help mitigate the effect of climate externalities on African women and
girls. On the expenditure side, the closing of gender gaps requires using domestic and
external financing; public expenditure needs to be calibrated in terms of magnitude
and composition, as it can have a large impact in the short and long term. These
efforts include major spending items, such as health, education, social protection,
capital expenditure, and the public sector wage bill. As fiscal space tends to be more
limited in the region, many sub-Saharan African countries must be judicious in
how to allocate spending that is adequate, efficient, and sustainable to maximize
impact.
INTRODUCTION
How governments raise taxes and spend revenues has profound impacts on
gender equality. This chapter considers these interactions from the perspec-
tive of sub-Saharan Africa, ascertaining similarities and differences with other
regions. Social norms, regulatory barriers, and capacity and enforcement
constraints in sub-Saharan Africa sometimes differ from those of other devel-
oping economies. Such differences can affect the relationship between fiscal
policy and gender equality—hence, the policy implicationexps to address
gender disparities.
Research support was provided by Kardelen Cicek.
273

From the tax policy side, the key general messages on the interaction between
tax and gender, as summarized in Coelho and others (2022), are as follows:
• Gender discrimination in income tax codes and the legal environments for
property and asset ownership is declining.
• The taxation of labor income has the largest impact on gender inequality.
Progressive and individualized systems can help reduce gender employment
gaps. The unequal distribution of capital income between men and women
is exacerbated wherever the taxation of capital income is more lenient than
for labor income (dual systems).
• Excises penalize (or subsidize) women when tax rates deviate from the
social cost of consuming harmful goods, and consumption patterns differ
by gender.
• Reducing selected consumption tax rates is likely inefficient and ineffective,
while a broad-based value-added (or retail sales) tax (VAT) with minimal
exemptions can mobilize sufficient revenues to finance gender-inclusion
programs.
General insights from studies on expenditure policy are that it can economi-
cally empower women and girls via multiple channels:
• Social protection and labor programs can reduce poverty, enhance human
capital formulation, improve employability, and empower women and girls.
• Education spending not only improves learning for girls and women but also
tends to lead to higher-paying jobs and more informed decisions regarding
nutrition and health care.
• Health expenditure improves life quality and productivity of mothers and
their children.
• Wage bill policy can play an equalizing role in both labor income and
employment in the public sector.
• Capital expenditure can reduce unpaid work via improved water and sani-
tation, while digital access can boost employment.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The following two sections
cover tax policy, first focusing on explicit discrimination in the law across
regions—both with respect to the tax system and ownership rights. This compar-
ison highlights unique characteristics of the (sub-Saharan) African region—in
terms of social norms and the economic and regulatory framework—which are
essential to understanding implicit gender biases in tax systems. Second, implicit
tax biases in Africa are considered, with a description of how the different taxes
interact with underlying economic characteristics or circumstances to either rein-
force or correct gender inequality. The following sections then cover how expen-
diture polices can further improve female economic empowerment via multiple
channels. The final section concludes and formulates key policy implications for
African countries.

Chapter 15 Tax and Expenditure Policy for Gender Equality 275
Figure 15.1. Number of Countries with Explicit Discrimination Provisions in

Labor Tax Codes
10
Against women In favor of women
0
Africa Other developing economies Advanced economies
Source: IBFD.
TAX POLICY
Explicit Gender Discrimination in the Tax System
Although explicit gender biases in tax systems have receded in most parts of the
world, they remain more common in some African countries. The cases of explicit
gender differentiation have been found mostly in labor income taxation, where
there is differential treatment of husbands and wives, or where the “household
head” is legally defined as a man. In Africa, this type of explicit tax bias remains,
whereas globally tax provisions that discriminate against women often have been
replaced by tax provisions that support them (Coelho and others 2022). Eight
countries in Europe and Asia abolished tax laws explicitly biased against women,
and the number of countries that adopted income tax laws in favor of women
increased from 4 to 12. In Africa, South Africa moved toward making the system
notionally neutral.1 Other countries with tax systems that explicitly discriminate
against women have refrained from reform (Figure 15.1).
Currently, gendered laws cover tax provisions, rates, and thresholds as well as
set forth who is responsible for filing and paying taxes. In Tunisia, only the head
of the household—legally defined as a man—is entitled to a special allowance and
a child tax deduction. In multiple African countries, the responsibility for filing
taxes explicitly lies with husbands. In Kenya and in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, the reason is that a married woman’s income belongs to her husband.
In the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Comoros, and Chad, labor income is taxed at
the household level, and the law explicitly refers to the husband.
1
Until 1995, South Africa levied higher taxes on “married women.”

Figure 15.2. Gender Gaps in Ownership Rights and Property Loans in 20191
(Regional average; 1 = gender equality)
1.1 AEs Other EMDEs Sub-Saharan Africa All Africa2
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
Inheritance rights Property ownership rights Property loans
Sources: World Bank; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: AEs = advanced economies; EMDEs = emerging markets and developing economies.
1
The gap in loans represent the ratio of the percent of women with access to finance relative to the
percent of men. Property loans include borrowing to buy a dwelling or land.
2
Includes six countries from North Africa for loans and eight for rights.
Africa also has a high concentration of countries with legal frameworks that
restrict women’s property rights. As of 2020, 66 economies worldwide legally
limited women’s property rights—including asset ownership and inheritance
rights—with more than 40 percent of those countries located in Africa (see also
Chapters 12 and 13). Figure 15.2 displays (normalized) regional average indica-
tors of gender gaps in asset ownership rights—a de jure measure—as well as access
to property loans—a de facto measure. For these indicators, a value of 1 is
regarded as a benchmark of gender equality. Property rights laws are more disad-
vantageous for women in African countries than in other developing countries—
notably if north African countries are included in the calculation—and they are
associated with the wider gender gap in property loans. Legal restrictions to the
property rights of women limit their access to external finance, as banks require
collateral from those who seek financial assistance. Although in several African
countries the marriage of a daughter entails a transfer of wealth from the man’s
family, these transfers do not (necessarily) benefit the bride directly, nor do they
help to narrow gender gaps in wealth, given the myriad legal and cultural barriers
to female asset ownership. For instance, in Botswana, customary rules entail lower
inheritance entitlement shares for girls, and wives require their husbands’ autho-
rization to own property or open bank accounts, as married women are viewed as
children (Rametse and Huq 2015).
Female entrepreneurship in Africa is undermined by ownership constraints
that inhibit access to external finance (see Chapter 2). For the average African
country, less than 40 percent of firms have at least one woman among the
principal owners. While this phenomenon appears pervasive across the world

Figure 15.3. Gender Gaps in Entrepreneurship and Business Loans in 20191

(Regional average; 1 = gender equality)
1.0
AEs Other EMDEs Sub-Saharan Africa All Africa2
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Entrepreneurship Business loans
Note: AEs = advanced economies; EMDEs = emerging markets and developing economies.
1
The gap in entrepreneurship represents the share of firms with a woman among the principal
owners. The gap in loans represents the ratio of the percent of women accessing loans relative to
the percent of men. Business loans capture borrowing to start, operate, or expand a business or
farm.
2
Includes one country from North Africa for entrepreneurship and six countries for loans.
(Figure 15.3), the underlying forces in Africa are unique. Moreover, some
scholars have argued that although female entrepreneurship is opportunity
driven in developed economies, women become entrepreneurs to survive dire
economic circumstances in developing economies (Adebayo 2015). As docu-
mented previously, women in some African countries are excluded from credit
markets because they cannot own property or instruments for mortgaging.
Other loans appear more equally distributed across genders, both in absolute
terms and compared to other regions (Figure 15.3), likely reflecting new
financing alternatives among female entrepreneurs, such as crowdfunding and
peer-to-peer lending (Ojong, Simba, and Dana 2021). Notwithstanding these
positive developments, the gender bias in collateralized lending continues to
undermine female entrepreneurship, as the market for alternative financial
vehicles remains small.
Moreover, myriad social norms and institutional factors deter female entrepre-
neurship in the region. The process of starting a business in many African coun-
tries is lengthy, cumbersome, and costly, and these constraints can place additional
burdens on female entrepreneurs (Amine and Staub 2009). For example, house-
hold and childcare responsibilities mean that female entrepreneurs have less time
available than their male counterparts do to deal with bureaucratic procedures
(as in Tanzania). Many African entrepreneurs also operate in a context of perva-
sive corruption, and females may be less able than males to deal with corrupt
officials, because females cannot meet disproportionally higher bribery demands

(as in Uganda and Cameroon) without putting themselves at risk (as in Nigeria).
Poor public transportation systems primarily affect the mobility of female entre-
preneurs, as cars are most often owned by men (as in South Africa). Moreover,
cultural forces contribute to the entrepreneurship gender gap in the region, as the
legitimacy of female-owned businesses is often questioned or undermined—for
instance, because female entrepreneurship may be perceived as a threat to hus-
bands’ authority.2
Legal, institutional, and sociocultural hurdles impede the formalization and
growth of female-owned businesses. In most African countries, female entrepre-
neurs tend to be concentrated in micro, small, and medium enterprises, mostly
in the informal sector—where entry requirements are low (Vossenberg 2013).
Female-owned businesses tend to be concentrated in the retail and services sectors,
as women sometimes tend to shy away from high-tech concerns (Scarborough
2012). The high degree of informality and sociocultural headwinds do not set up
women for success. Empirical evidence for some countries suggests that, under
those conditions, businesses operated by women are more likely than those
operated by men to fail.3 This result stands in stark contrast with studies from
countries in other regions, showing that businesses are more profitable when
management includes women. A potential interpretation for this difference is that
the gender-based restrictions and barriers characteristic of sub-Saharan Africa are
preventing women from fulfilling their entrepreneurial potential.
Implicit Bias in Tax Systems

Implicit biases are more difficult to identify and address than explicit biases.
Explicit bias refers to the case where the tax code discriminates individuals on the
basis of gender, including by making reference to family roles, such as husbands
and wives. In theory, this type of bias is not difficult to identify or address, but
the resolve to address it may face political opposition in countries with gendered
social norms. When tax systems are notionally neutral, they may still entail an
implicit bias—either because they provide different incentives to men and
women or because their incidence across genders is considerably unequal, given
their economic characteristics.4
Labor income tax systems in many sub-Saharan African countries entail
implicit biases against women. As is well known, family-based tax regimes tend
to discourage (formal) employment by secondary earners, who are often
women. In individualized tax systems all agents are subject to the same tax rate
2
For a detailed discussion and review of the empirical literature, see Etim and Iwu 2019; Ojong,
Simba, and Dana 2021.
3
Muhumad (2016) and Langevang and others (2015) provide empirical evidence for Ethiopia and
Ghana, respectively.
4
Stotsky (1997, 1) defines explicit bias as “specific provisions of the law or regulations that identify and
treat men and women differently.” The line between explicit and implicit differentiation is not always
clear, though. For example, charging a tax for a product or service consumed by only one gender
comes quite close to explicit bias and could be included in broader definitions.

Figure 15.4. Implicit Bias in Labor Income Tax Systems across

Sub-Saharan Africa in 2020
(Percent)
40%
Family-based tax component
Individualized
60%
Source: IBFD.
schedule, so tax-induced work disincentives are the same for men and women.
In contrast, where income taxes are filed at the household level or the tax code
includes provisions (allowances, tax credits, deductions) to the family, secondary
earners tend to be discouraged from working. Where the tax rate schedule is
progressive, family-based components in the tax code entail a cost for secondary
earners who are considering entering the labor force or working more hours,
because the primary earner “uses up” the lower income brackets, and any tax
benefits to the family may be lost. About half of sub-Saharan African countries
require spouses to file taxes jointly, provide tax provisions at the household level,
or both (Figure 15.4).
Individualization of personal income taxes is not enough to level the playing
field for African women in the labor market. Theoretically, individualizing
personal income taxes would increase female labor force supply. While there is
scope to introduce such reforms in half of the countries in the region, their effects
may be limited. Sub-Saharan African countries collect a small share of revenues
through the personal income tax. At 2.5 percent of GDP, the average country in
the region collects significantly less than do OECD countries (8 percent of GDP)
and the average developing economy (3 percent of GDP). The low personal
income tax take in sub-Saharan Africa is partly explained by the low number of
contributors. In some cases, high exemption thresholds explain the low coverage
of the tax, with eight sub-Saharan African countries having very high exemption
thresholds that range from 1.5 to more than 4 times the average wage.5 But there
are also cases in which the tax system is too “punitive” at the low end of the
distribution—where women tend to be overrepresented6—pushing potential
5
Among these economies, only Zambia has an individual regime.
6
The female population is overrepresented at the bottom of the income distribution because they tend
to exit the labor force more frequently, work fewer hours, and work in lower-paying jobs than do men.

Figure 15.5. Regional Average Gender Gaps in Labor Markets, 2019

(Female-to-male rate; 0 = gender equality)
0
–5
–10
–15
–20
–25
–30 SSA Other EMDEs
–35
Labor force participation Formal employment
Note: SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies.
taxpayers outside of the formal work force. A regional comparison of gender

employment gaps shows that the labor force participation gap in the average devel-
oping country is 3 times wider than that in sub-Saharan Africa, where the female
labor force participation rate is just 10 percentage points lower than for males.
However, in terms of the probability of formal employment, women in Africa are
at a disadvantage relative to women in other regions, where men and women are,
on average, just as likely to be employed in the formal sector (Figure 15.5).
Making personal income taxes more progressive can reduce gender gaps in the
quantity and quality of employment. Progressive tax systems can narrow the net
income pay gap—through redistribution and by encouraging lower-income indi-
viduals to seek formal employment. Because of a weak (or lacking) social safety
net and pervasive corruption, taxpayer morale in most African countries is low,
which puts a premium on tax policies that affect the bottom of the distribution.
Several tax systems in sub-Saharan Africa seem to lack sufficient progressivity and
have very low exemption thresholds. About 20 countries require individuals who
earn less than 30 percent of the average wage to pay tax, and 4 of these countries
do not even have an exemption threshold (Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Republic
of Congo, and Eritrea). In addition, social security rates are very high in some
cases. Because these contributions are paid by all employees regardless of their
income level, high rates can severely undermine the progressivity of the tax. High
employer rates may also discourage formal employment from the demand side. In
the Republic of Congo (total) rates are as high as 44 percent.
The tax system can exacerbate gender inequality in entrepreneurship and
property rights, potentially creating trade-offs for tax policy design. As document-
ed earlier, legal frameworks that restrict women’s ownership rights, as well as the
myriad socioeconomic and cultural factors that hinder female entrepreneurship,

imply that capital income is primarily concentrated among African men. Against
this backdrop, the dual-income tax system implemented by most economies—
whereby capital income is, on average, taxed at lower rates than labor income—
exacerbates explicit gender discrimination. Moreover, the lower and differential
taxation of capital income has made overall income tax regimes less progressive
(IMF 2017, 2021), disproportionally hurting women, who are concentrated at
the low end of the income distribution. The alternatives are a comprehensive
income tax system whereby both labor and capital incomes are subject to the
same (progressive) tax rate schedule, or where this is too complex, given higher
administration costs, simply raising the capital income tax rate.
In the African context, some features of the tax regime both strengthen implicit
gender biases and make the tax system more distortionary. About 60 percent of the
countries in the region allow interest-payment deductions at the personal level.
These tax provisions result in inefficiently high levels of debt and exacerbate gen-
der disparities, because they primarily benefit men, as men have more access to
funding than do women. The gender gap is even more pronounced for collateral-
ized lending, given the legal barriers women face to own mortgageable properties.
Hence, countries with mortgage deductions (for example, Ghana, Kenya, South
Sudan, and Nigeria) are particularly biased against women. Furthermore, women
still face multiple de jure and de facto restrictions to own land and engage in cer-
tain economic activities. African women’s rights to own land remain elusive, even
as female-headed households grow (Agarwal 1994), because such rights tend to be
defined through women’s relationship with men. For example, women are unable
to inherit land where the law considers it to be the property of the husband’s lin-
eage. Studies indicate that rural women work informally in the agricultural sector
in larger shares than do men, even though women rarely own the land on which
they work (Ogunlela and Mukhtar 2009).7 Against this backdrop, countries that
provide tax incentives and provisions to the agriculture sector implicitly discrimi-
nate against women. Although some agriculture-specific policies can be justified
on economic grounds—such as the zero-rating of agricultural inputs (for instance,
Lesotho, Kenya, and Uganda) or expensing rules to encourage investment (for
instance, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, and Nigeria)—tax holidays are highly distortive.
Business owners in the agriculture sector benefit from reduced rates or exemptions
in income tax in at least 17 sub-Saharan African countries.
A single-rate VAT system without exemptions is less prone to create gender
disparities, and it can help mobilize revenues to finance programs that foster gen-
der equality. A system with VAT-rate differentiation across goods creates implicit
biases if consumption patterns differ by gender across goods subject to dfferent
rates. In contrast, the incidence of a single-rate regime would differ across genders
only to the extent men and women have different consumption shares in income.
VAT-rate reductions and exemptions have been shown to make the system more
7
For instance, in Zimbabwe only 3 percent of women hold land in the small farming sector and about
10 percent in the large-scale commercial sector. In Benin, women hold 11 percent; and in Tanzania,
25 percent (Cotula 2007).

inefficient, as they increase administration and enforcement costs (see Ebrill, Keen,
and Perry 2001). The empirical evidence of pass-through of VAT reductions on to
consumer prices is mixed, given that the effect depends very much on market
structure characteristics (Rossouw and Ross 2020; Jurga, Yates, and Bagel 2020).
Moreover, the econometric literature examining the gender incidence of sales taxes
is scarce for several reasons, including because severe data challenges prevent mea-
suring consumption at the individual level and, thus, by gender. The exception is
feminine hygiene products, the taxation of which has attracted attention in the
debate of improving their access by poor women. No African country has a
single-rate VAT system; hence, from a fairness perspective, feminine hygiene prod-
ucts should be taxed at the reduced rate applied to other necessities. All African
countries for which data are available do so, except for Egypt . Either way, a broad-
base VAT—with minimal exemptions and a statutory rate that applies to most
goods—is preferable because it is highly effective in mobilizing revenues, which
can then be used to finance programs that protect women and lower-income indi-
viduals much more effectively, including by strengthening the social safety net.
In contrast, excises can play a meaningful role in amplifying or mitigating
gender inequality. Excises are corrective taxes; they are often introduced to dis-
courage the consumption of harmful goods or services that may also entail a social
cost—a so-called externality. As explained by Coelho and others (2022), excises—
if they do not fully internalize the social cost—can implicitly create gender biases.
What is more, if the excise is too low compared with the externality, and con-
sumption patterns differ between men and women, then the gender consuming
the good more heavily is implicitly subsidized. The opposite happens when the
excise is higher than the externality. Tobacco is an example of an excise often set
below its estimated externality, which financially benefits men because, on aver-
age, they smoke more than women do (Crawfurd and Le Nestour 2019). The
implicit subsidy on male tobacco consumption is particularly large in sub-Saharan
Africa, where the excise is one of the lowest compared with the externality, and
smoking rates for men are lower than those for men (Figure 15.6).
Extreme weather events are particularly costly for women and girls in
sub-Saharan Africa (see also Chapters 9 and 20). The high concentration of vul-
nerable groups and the large population share that depends on agriculture make
weather events in Africa an important source of negative income shocks.8
Due to cultural norms, women are often expected to forgo educational and
formal employment opportunities to engage in unpaid household work, such as
caring for the sick or injured after extreme weather events and health epidemics.9
8
Agriculture, the main source of livelihoods and income for most people in Africa, is weather depen-
dent. The average share of the employment in agriculture in Africa was estimated at 51 percent
between 2011 and 2016. The agricultural sector is the primary employer in Africa, particularly in rural
areas, which host most of the population (African Development Bank Group 2018).
9
Climate change appears to spur disease environments, particularly in the tropics and where the
world’s poorest populations currently reside—Africa and Asia. See Brody, Demetriades, and Esplen
2008; World Health Organization 2014.

Figure 15.6. Tobacco Consumption by Gender and Excises

80
Taxes (percent of price)
LSO
60 ERI ZAF
GMB RWA
KEN
SEN BWA NAM
BFA ZMB
40 COG LBR UGA
NER COM
ZWE
GHA TZA MOZ Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high income)
NGA MLI Other countries
20
TGO MWI Fitted line
ETH SLE
CPV
WHO recommended tax (percent)
BEN
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Adult smoking prevalence: female relative to male (ratio)
Sources: World Bank; and World Health Organization.
Note: Figures uses International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. WHO = World
Health Organization.
In this context, women bear higher costs than do men, as households respond to
climate-driven income shocks by reallocating the time and talents of women to
smooth consumption—in ways that are detrimental to them (Dercon and
Krishnan 2000; Hoogeveen, van der Klaauw, and van Lomwel 2011; Corno and
Voena 2016). Recent studies present evidence that poorer (liquidity-constrained)
households in sub-Saharan Africa even marry their daughters at earlier ages when
faced with income shocks caused by an epidemic (Archibong and Annan 2020a),
floods, and droughts (Corno and Voena 2016), and that following such shocks,
educational attainment of school-aged girls falls relative to that of boys (Archibong
and Annan 2020b). In many African countries, marriage involves a transfer
of wealth from the groom’s family to the bride’s—the so-called bride price
(Rajaraman 1983; Wendo 2004). Countries with bride-price payments include
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.
There is evidence that, in some African countries, a lower age at first marriage for
girls is associated with lower years of schooling and higher fertility rates (Corno,
Hildebrandt, and Voena 2017; Corno and Voena 2016; Archibong and Annan
2020a; Mbaye 2020). The female-to-male ratios of school enrollment and of age
at first marriage (normalized to zero as the equality benchmark) are, on average,
lower in sub-Saharan Africa than in other developing countries (Figure 15.7).
Meanwhile, adolescent fertility rates are much higher—99 per 1,000 habitants in
sub-Saharan Africa compared with 28 in the rest of the developing world.
Therefore, a more ambitious agenda for carbon taxes, notably among large
emitters, could help empower women in (sub-Saharan) Africa. The region con-
tributes the least to global fossil fuel emissions—the average country in sub-
Saharan Africa produces 0.8 ton of CO2 per person per year, compared with a

Figure 15.7. Regional Average Gender Gaps in Education and Marriage

Age, 2019
–5
–10
–15
–20
SSA Other EMDEs
–25
Education parity Age at first marriage
Note: SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; EMDEs = emerging markets and developing economies.
global average of 4.8 tons.10 However, the continent experiences some of the most
extreme weather events in terms of drought, flooding, heat waves, and viable land
use. Climate-change mitigation measures, including carbon taxes, are being
adopted globally. Although more than 30 carbon tax programs have been adopted
across the world, as of 2020 only the European Union and 5 Nordic countries
have managed to raise carbon prices (mostly through higher taxes) to their recom-
mended level (World Bank 2021). Though it is widely recognized that a more
ambitious climate agenda is necessary, the discussion has failed to internalize the
costs of climate-related shocks on women and girls in sub-Saharan Africa in terms
of forgone education and formal employment opportunities. Supporting women
and girls is macro-critical because they represent a significant share of the conti-
nent with the fastest-growing population. Policy options require swifter actions
by the largest emitters—especially the United States, China, and India—which
are key to global success. Moreover, consideration should be given to raising the
recommended level of carbon prices. Carbon taxes primarily curb pollution and
emissions but should also aim to reduce mortality rates from environment-related
occupational risks (OECD 2020) as well as the economic costs that extreme
weather events impose on the African population—and, in particular, women.
10
The exceptions are South Africa, which is highly developed and coal dependent, as well as the
low-population and oil-rich countries Libya and Equatorial Guinea. These countries produce 5 to
10 times more per capita CO2 than the regional average. In contrast, the country with the largest
population, Nigeria, has below-regional average emissions (0.7 CO2 ton per capita), and most other
countries in the region have negligible emissions, regardless of their economy and population size.

Expenditure Policies to Economically Empower Females

Expenditure policy can economically empower women and girls via multiple
channels. Public spending can have direct and indirect effects on women and
girls, which can in turn improve their social welfare and economic output.
Spending on health and education can improve human capital; social protection
and labor policies can mitigate economic shocks; government employment and
compensation policies can close gender gaps; and capital spending on water, san-
itation, and digitalization can reduce unpaid work and improve knowledge of job
opportunities. Although not all spending areas can be examined in detail, the
following section presents the findings in an actionable way. The authors note
main issues that affect women and girls, such as gender gaps, and various spend-
ing measures that have a direct and indirect impact are presented.
Social Protection and Labor

Social Assistance/Social Safety Net and Labor Market Programs
Given the prevalence of poverty and that a large share of women in the region
work in the informal sector, social assistance and labor market programs can play
an important role in enhancing social outcomes, including those for women. The
region has the highest poverty rate, with 40 percent of the population below the
extreme poverty line in 2018. Further, women typically work under precarious
conditions. An estimated 89 percent of women in sub-Saharan Africa are
employed in the informal sector (UN Women 2015). Less than 10 percent of the
region’s population is covered by social insurance.
Social safety nets and labor market programs can foster gender equality
through several channels.11 The primary objective of social safety net programs is
to reduce current and future poverty. These programs can affect a broad range of
household- and individual-level outcomes differently, depending on individuals’
characteristics. Men and women respond differently to social safety nets and labor
market programs and can benefit from these programs in different ways, depend-
ing on the general context as well as on the program’s design and implementation.
Social safety nets and labor market programs can foster gender equality by
reducing female poverty, increasing human capital accumulation, improving
female labor market participation and employment opportunities, and contribut-
ing to female empowerment.
• Poverty reduction. Women and girls are more likely to live in poor households
and therefore may disproportionately benefit from the poverty-reduction
effects of social safety nets. Even when social safety nets do not include
gender-specific elements, programs may benefit women relatively more than
do other forms of social protection because women are typically not tied to
11
Note that the terms social assistance and social safety nets are used interchangeably.

formal employment, and their participation in formal labor markets tends to

be lower than that of men.
• Human capital accumulation. Social transfers can foster investments in chil-
dren’s health and education—both of which are key determinants of human
capital accumulation. Conditional cash transfer programs increase school
enrollment and attendance rates and reduce dropout rates, but these effects are
not consistently higher for girls or boys across countries. Household charac-
teristics and national contexts—which lead to differences in the perceived
opportunity costs of and returns to schooling across genders—can bring about
different effects of social safety nets on girls and boys and help to increase
education relatively more for the gender that is more disadvantaged in a par-
ticular context (UNICEF 2021). Cash transfer programs in many countries
condition benefits on the practices that mothers adopt during pregnancy, at
delivery, and postpartum. The evidence suggests that these conditionalities are
associated with increased prenatal visits, skilled attendance at birth, and deliv-
ery at a health facility, and reduced incidence of low birth weight and maternal
mortality. Conditional cash transfer programs also tend to have a positive
impact on children’s growth, but this effect tends to be similar across genders.
• Employment opportunities. Labor market programs can help close gender gaps
by increasing women’s employability and access to paid jobs. Women are
generally overrepresented in the under- and unemployed, and therefore
active labor market policies may disproportionately benefit them; however,
the empirical evidence is not conclusive on differences across genders in
terms of the effects of active labor market policies. Public works programs
can create temporary employment opportunities for women who may other-
wise be out of the labor market, increasing female labor force participation
especially among young women (UNICEF 2021). Many public work pro-
grams include female quotas and women-friendly working conditions, but
the transition to more stable employment can be difficult (World Bank 2014).
• Female Empowerment. Although the concept of empowerment is broad and
hard to measure, the available evidence suggests that cash transfers can
increase female empowerment by improving women’s decision-making
power, including for marriage and family planning. Many social safety nets
target benefits to women, thus increasing their control over resources and
improving their say within the household. Social safety nets also reduce
domestic partner violence against women.
Social safety nets can affect gender relationships within the family and the
community, regardless of whether program designs include gender-specific ele-
ments. Social safety net interventions provide resources to the household—not
only cash but also employment opportunities and information—and can affect
bargaining power within the family as well as household and individual consump-
tion, production, and investment decisions. Even when they do not target women
explicitly, social safety nets may offer important resources and opportunities to
women. If not properly designed, such programs may reinforce existing gender

inequalities. Many social safety net programs deliver benefits to women because
they are perceived to be more likely to spend resources on children’s food, educa-
tion, and health. Indeed, paying cash transfers directly to women has been shown
in some contexts to lead to greater spending on children’s needs, strengthening
the impact of social safety nets on future poverty reduction (UNICEF 2021).
However, this will not be the case everywhere and depends on gender norms and
the roles assigned to women by society. In some cases, cash transfers that target
women, especially those transfers conditional on children’s school attendance or
health checkups, can add to the burdens of poor mothers and reinforce traditional
gender roles. Social safety nets can be more effective at achieving gender-relevant
impacts if they are thoughtfully designed with this aim.
Pensions
Public pension schemes protect women from old-age poverty. Given that women’s
life expectancy is higher than that of men, pension income into old age is partic-
ularly important. With high informality and low pension coverage in most
sub-Saharan African countries, noncontributory social pensions can be consid-
ered as fiscal space permits, as well as ensuring elderly women can access social
safety net programs. There can be positive knock-on effects of pension spending,
as women receiving a pension are more likely than men to invest in their grand-
children and support their daughters’ job-seeking (Kabeer 2012).
Education
Gender gaps in education remain relatively high in sub-Saharan Africa. The gross
enrollment ratio of girls and boys has narrowed over time but persists, particularly
at the tertiary level. Completion rates in many countries in the region still have
gender gaps (Figure 15.8). Various measures, such as lowering school distance and
cost, can improve access and learning outcomes while enhancing health condi-
tions at schools (Evans and Yuan 2022). Public spending on education offers
various indirect benefits, such as higher earnings and better health outcomes.
Government spending on education can substantially improve the social welfare
of females now and intergenerationally.
Health
Although, in general, health outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa have improved,
women and girls tend to fare worse there than in other parts of the world. The
maternal mortality rate has declined since 2000, but it remains, on average,
above that of other regions and is nearly seven times higher than that of
advanced economies (Figure 15.9). Adolescent fertility, which places girls and
their potential offspring at greater risk, has been declining, though it is nearly
six times higher than that of advanced economies and consistently above the
low-income country average. Further, health care expenditure, per capita, is the
lowest of all comparators; therefore, this spending area likely needs both
increases and better efficiency.

Figure 15.8. Secondary Education Completion Rates

(Percent)
140 Female lower-secondary Male lower-secondary
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Central African Republic
Chad
South Sudan
Niger
Malawi
Equatorial Guinea
Mozambique
Uganda
Mali
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Ethiopia
Tanzania
Congo, Democratic Republic of the
Madagascar
Senegal
Liberia
Nigeria
Rwanda
Comoros
Togo
Cameroon
Congo, Republic of
Zambia
Eritrea
Syria
Lesotho
Gabon
Zimbabwe
Gambia, The
Eswatini
Cabo Verde
Sierra Leone
Ghana
Kenya
Namibia
São Tomé and Príncipe
South Africa
Botswana
Seychelles
Mauritius
Source: Britt and Egerer 2023.
Multiple spending measures can support female health—and human capital

formation more generally. Prenatal care has been shown to improve the health of
mothers as well as the cognitive ability of their offspring. Further, conditional
cash transfers contingent on mothers and daughters visiting a health clinic deliver
health benefits. Spending on the health of women and girls can support their
economic situation considerably—for instance, via improved productivity—and
can save lives and boost quality of life. Moreover, health care must begin before
birth, as maternal health affects health at birth, and in utero deprivations can
compromise postnatal health care.
Capital Expenditure
In developing countries, women spend considerable time on unpaid work for
tasks such as collecting water and finding fuel, and a lack of digital access can
decrease knowledge of employment opportunities. About two billion people lack
access to adequate sanitation; one billion, to drinking water. The situation in
sub-Saharan Africa is severe: the region has 2.5 times the world average of hospi-
tals without sanitation (Djantchiemo and White 2022a, 2022b). In addition to
creating poor health outcomes, these infrastructure gaps disproportionality bur-
den women and girls, who are most likely to engage in unpaid work such as water

Figure 15.9. Selected Health Indicators

Maternal mortality/fertility rate (percent) 100 Maternal mortality $5,000
Health care expenditure per capita US$

90 Adolescent fertility rate $4,500
Health care expenditure
80 $4,000
70 $3,500
60 $3,000
50 $2,500
40 $2,000
30 $1,500
20 $1,000
10 $500
0 $0
Advanced
economies
Emerging and
developing Europe
Caucasus and
Central Asia
Middle East,
North Africa,
Afghanistan,
and Pakistan
Latin America and

the Caribbean
Emerging and
developing Asia
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Source: Britt and Egerer 2023.
and fuel collection. Women also tend to have less access to the internet than men
do, which can negatively affect learning and job searching.
Public investment spending can play a strong role in female economic empow-
erment in sub-Saharan Africa by reducing unpaid work, improving health, and
increasing employment opportunities. Such spending includes that on water
access and portability, sanitation, energy, and digitization. These investments
directly affect women and girls in many ways, giving them a higher chance of
engaging in paid work, attaining better educational outcomes, realizing more
future earnings, and knowing about available jobs.
Public Sector Employment

Women tend to be paid less and represent a smaller share of paid employment rel-
ative to men. Research covering more than 30 countries worldwide showed that, on
average, women in the public sector earned less than men did, although employ-
ment shares were more equal (Evans, Le, and Soto, forthcoming). Because the
public sector is the largest formal sector employer in many sub-Saharan Africa
countries, public sector employment can play an important role in closing gender
gaps. In the private sector, women are paid about 70 percent of what men make,
but the pay gap in the public sector is much lower, controlling for skills and other
factors. A more explicit focus on gender-inclusive wage bill spending may narrow
gaps. Countries with gender-disaggregated data, such as Costa Rica, the Dominican
Republic, and Honduras, have smaller gender gaps for pay and seniority, and other
governments require gender-disaggregated public sector employment data in their

budgets. Improved public sector employment policies could have positive knock-on
effects for the economy. Over time, if women in the public sector have more posi-
tions of power and higher pay, then the pay gap in the formal private sector may
also improve.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has reviewed the multiple interactions between tax and spending
policy and gender in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Of course, the optimal
policy choices must be tailored to each country’s circumstances, but some general
conclusions can be drawn that might serve as a first inspiration for potential reforms
that would improve gender equality.
The key tax policy implications for sub-Saharan Africa are as follows:
• Explicit biases in the tax system are still more common in sub-Saharan
Africa than elsewhere and should be removed. In some cases, the biases are
in other laws (for example, on ownership or inheritance) that interact with
the tax system and should be addressed directly there.
• There is scope to individualizing the personal income tax in about half of
the countries in the region; however, as long as labor market informality
remains high and tax bases narrow, such a reform is unlikely to have mean-
ingful effects, since the tax is paid by very few people. Personal income tax
should therefore be combined with other reforms, such as those aimed at
bringing more people into the tax, notably by encouraging formal employ-
ment. Apart from tax administration measures, policy options include
making the tax and social security system more progressive; if absent, intro-
ducing a simple small businesses regime may also encourage (female) entre-
preneurs to formalize.
• Low capital income taxes that disproportionally benefit men could be raised.
Given severe enforcement constraints, this change can be most easily achieved
by abolishing preferential tax treatments. Policy options include abolishing
mortgage and other interest deductibility under personal income taxes as well
as limiting interest deductibility under the corporate income tax.
• The economic justification for differential rates in the VAT/sales tax regime
is weak. A single-rate regime with minimal exemptions is a powerful revenue
mobilization tool; hence, preserving the integrity of the tax is important. Its
higher revenue yield can provide the necessary resources to fund social pro-
grams that foster gender equality, such as by strengthening the social safety
net, which may also encourage formal employment.
• Excises can help correct and mitigate gender biases in many ways. If set at a
level that internalizes harmful externalities, excises are gender neutral. They
can also soften the disproportionate adverse effects of climate-induced
income shocks on African women and girls (higher carbon taxes, especially
by large emitters).

On the spending side, key considerations are as follows:

• Social protection and labor programs are critical to overcoming the high
levels of informal employment and poverty. These spending programs can
(in)directly target females, thereby reducing poverty, boosting human capi-
tal, improving employment, and furthering empowerment (for example, by
enhancing women’s decision-making role in the household).
• Education spending can narrow or close enrollment and completion gaps,
which, in turn, can improve future earnings and health.
• Health expenditure saves lives, including those of mothers and children,
while enhancing their well-being and productivity.
• Capital spending on water, sanitation, energy, and closing the digital divide
improves female welfare, reduces unpaid work, and increases employment access.
• Gender-sensitive wage bill policies can narrow wage, employment, and seniority
gaps—while also possibly having a positive impact on the private sector.
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CHAPTER 16
Gender Budgeting Practices in

Sub-Saharan Africa
Lauren Keating, Laura Gores, Carolina Rentería,
Vincent Tang, and Nino Tchelishvili
In the context of constrained fiscal space and exacerbated gender inequalities resulting
from the COVID-19 pandemic, gender budgeting remains important for governments
worldwide. Gender budgeting not only signals a government’s commitment to advanc-
ing gender equality, but it prompts more efficient resource use through the improved
design of responsive fiscal policies. Countries in sub-Saharan Africa were some of the
first adopters of gender budgeting, with Rwanda and Uganda continuing to demon-
strate regional leadership. This chapter uses country self-assessment data from an IMF
Gender Budgeting Survey to analyze the current state of gender budgeting practices in
34 sub-Saharan African countries. It examines strong practices across the regions and
highlights areas for advancing practices.
INTRODUCTION
As the other chapters in this book illustrate, the COVID-19 pandemic intensified
gender inequalities in sub-Saharan Africa, much as it did in the rest of the world,
and it continues to hamper the region’s growth potential (IMF 2021). The pan-
demic threatens progress toward addressing these inequalities. Although many
governments provided immediate fiscal policy responses to support health sector
spending needs and stabilize economies, the crisis hit the world’s vulnerable pop-
ulation, especially women, particularly hard. In addition to women shouldering
additional unpaid care work, sub-Saharan African women are more likely to work
in the informal sector and outside of the reach of COVID-19 response measures.
Meanwhile, many girls have left the school system permanently, and violence
against women has increased (OECD 2020).
Well-structured fiscal policies supported by sound public financial management
tools can potentially improve the conditions for women and men and advance
government efforts toward greater gender equality—a practice known as gender
budgeting. As defined in Alonso-Albarran and others (2021, 5) “gender budgeting
incorporates a gender lens into the budget process to ensure that governments are
aware of the impact of their choices on gender outcomes. Gender budgeting is not
just about funding explicit gender equality initiatives. It also entails analyzing fiscal
policies and budgetary decisions to understand their impact—intended and unin-
tended—on gender equality and using this information to design and implement
295

more effective policies.” Originating in Australia in the 1980s, more than 100
countries now practice some elements of gender budgeting. Certain sub-Saharan
African countries were early architects in developing gender budgeting (South
Africa), while others have emerged over the years as regional leaders (Rwanda,
Uganda). Some countries are recent adopters (Togo), and some have embarked on
their first efforts (Sierra Leone).
This chapter provides an overview of gender budgeting practices in 34 sub-
Saharan African countries using data obtained from an IMF survey completed by
national officials.1 This chapter focuses on the existence of gender budgeting
practices in the region and not on their quality or effectiveness. It presents the
status of gender budgeting in sub-Saharan African countries, as self-reported by
government officials, and compares sub-Saharan African gender budgeting prac-
tices with countries in other regions. An examination of the challenges and key
success factors sub-Saharan African countries have faced when implementing
gender budgeting follows this analysis. The chapter concludes with a short sum-
mary and discusses next steps for the region.
STATUS OF GENDER BUDGETING IN

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Since the 1990s, gender budgeting initiatives have taken hold across sub-Saharan
Africa. In 1995, South Africa launched its first Women’s Budget Initiative, becoming
one of the earliest adopters of gender budgeting internationally and inspiring the
introduction of gender budgeting in countries across the region (Kolovich 2018). For
some countries in the region, however, gender budgeting momentum has waxed and
waned, including South Africa’s. Many factors account for this waning, including
changes in political support and limited capacity (Polzer, Nolte, and Seiwald 2021).
Today, some sub-Saharan African countries have more advanced gender bud-
geting practices, while others are just starting out. For example, Rwanda and
Uganda have successfully embedded gender budgeting tools into existing budget-
ing procedures, and, as a result, gender budgeting has reputedly influenced
changes in fiscal policies (Stotsky, Kolovich, and Kebhaj 2016). At the same time,
many countries in the region, such as Togo, are making a strong start. Each of the
34 sub-Saharan African countries that responded to the IMF’s survey have intro-
duced at least one gender budgeting practice or tool. The IMF created the survey
in 2018 and collected answers over 2019–21, with some additions and updates in
2023. Following the IMF’s gender budgeting framework described in Box 16.1
and the concepts presented in the IMF’s gender budgeting in the G20 working
paper by Alonso-Albarran and others (2021), the 12 public financial management
instruments covered by the IMF survey and their associated 23 questions used in
this analysis examine and compare gender budgeting tools and practices across
1
Government officials from 34 sub-Saharan African countries participated in the online self-assessment
multiple-choice survey. Survey results are based on country declarations and are static in that they cap-
ture the existence of a practice or tool at a specific point in time (https://cvent.me/m950my).

Chapter 16 Gender Budgeting Practices in Sub-Saharan Africa 297
Box 16.1. IMF Gender Budgeting Framework and Survey

The IMF applies a holistic approach to gender budgeting in which each phase of the
budget cycle incorporates a gender perspective. Gender budgeting tools and practices
support the integration of gender into the four phases, from budget planning and prepa-
ration to auditing and evaluation, as illustrated in Figure 16.1.1. This approach has evolved
over time, beginning with a conceptual framework outlined in the IMF’s assessment of
gender-budgeting practices in G7 countries (IMF 2017) and further adapted in the gender
budgeting in G20 Countries working paper (Alonso-Albarran and others 2021).
Figure 16.1.1. A Holistic Approach to Gender Budgeting throughout

the Budget Cycle
• Gender statement
• Legal framework • Ex ante gender impact
• Institutional framework assessment
• Gender-disaggregated • Budget circulars with a
statistics gender lens
• Links to national plans, • Linking goals and
SDGs 2. GB performance indicators
• Embedded within 1. GB to gender
preparation
medium-term framework • Classification and
and approval
budget framework tagging of budget
allocations
3. GB
4. GB audit
execution,
and external
reporting, and
oversight • Gender lens on budget
monitoring
• Gender-related audits execution reports
• Parliamentary • Ex post gender impact
oversight and scrutiny assessment
• Performance reporting
Source: Alonso-Albarran and others 2021.

Note: GB = gender budgeting; SDGs = Sustainable Development Goals.
The IMF developed a gender budgeting survey based on this framework. The survey
captures information on gender budgeting practices from countries globally and is the
basis for this analysis. The survey was issued in 2018 with answers collected over 2019–23
and includes information on fiscal policies related to gender equality, the existence of
gender budgeting practices and tools, and challenges as well as success factors.
Government officials from 34 sub-Saharan African countries participated in the online
self-assessment multiple-choice survey. Survey results are based on country declarations and
are static in that they capture the existence of a practice or tool at a specific point in time.
However, it is worth noting that gender budgeting practices can vary over time, and what
countries report one year may not necessarily be practiced to the same extent in the next.
Additionally, although IMF staff have conducted a general validation process, actual practices
may differ. Responses at the central government level provide the basis for this chapter.

TABLE 16.1.
Count of Gender Budgeting Practices in Sub-Saharan Africa

1–8 Tools and Practices 9–15 Tools and Practices 16+ Tools and Practices
Botswana Benin Rwanda
Burundi Burkina Faso Tanzania
Central African Republic Cameroon Togo
Chad Congo (Republic) Zimbabwe
Comoros Cote d’Ivoire
Congo (Democratic Republic) Ethiopia
Gabon The Gambia
Lesotho Kenya
Malawi Liberia
Namibia Madagascar
São Tomé and Principe Mauritius
Seychelles Mozambique
Swaziland Niger
Senegal
South Africa
Uganda
Zambia
Source: IMF Gender Budgeting Survey.
Note: Country tools and practices are based on country declarations in the IMF gender budgeting survey and this figure
reflects the existence of tools at a point in time and not their quality or effectiveness. The IMF created the survey in
2018, and answers were collected over 2019–21, with some updates in 2022.
sub-Saharan African countries. Annex 16.1 outlines the 12 instruments and cor-
responding questions about tools and practices (23 total).
The number of gender budgeting practices and tools applied across the region
is considerable. Table 16.1 highlights the number of gender budgeting practices
and tools that each sub-Saharan African country has declared to have adopted.
Half of the countries surveyed reported they have 9 to 15 tools or practices, while
four countries have 16 or more tools or practices. The latter are Rwanda,
Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Togo. Countries with the lowest tool count or practices
are those with policies to promote gender equality but no additional gender bud-
geting practices, including Gabon and Comoros.
Sub-Saharan African countries have adopted a higher number of gender budget-
ing tools and practices in the first two phases or pillars of the budget cycle than in
the last two. Table 16.2 outlines the 12 instruments under each of the four pillars
of the IMF’s gender budgeting framework and identifies which country has at least
one tool or practice in place for each. Across the four pillars, sub-Saharan African
countries are more likely to have gender budgeting practices in legal and institution-
al frameworks and budget preparation. Although sub-Saharan African countries
have fewer practices in the downstream pillars, most countries have started to inte-
grate gender budgeting considerations into parliamentary oversight.
The Legal and Institutional Framework for Gender Budgeting

Almost half of sub-Saharan African countries surveyed have laws or regulations
that enshrine a gender perspective into the budget process. While many countries
have included gender budgeting requirements in their regulations, only seven
include requirements in an organic or a public finance law. For example, Uganda

has included this requirement in the 2015 Public Financial Management Act.
Enshrining gender budgeting into law is considered a good practice because it
improves the likelihood that gender budgeting will continue over time and across
political cycles (see also Chapter 14).
Nearly 80 percent of countries surveyed have some form of institutional
framework in place for gender budgeting. Gender equality is an important issue
for all ministries and departments. While the central budgetary authority leads
and coordinates gender budgeting efforts, line departments and the ministry or
agency for gender equality have play essential roles in developing sector strategies
for gender equality and implementing programs. An institutional framework that
outlines roles and responsibilities for gender budgeting is critical. For example,
South Africa introduced in 2019–20 a Gender Responsive Planning, Budgeting,
Monitoring, Evaluation and Auditing framework detailing how the government
will incorporate gender mainstreaming into public finances. Similarly, Ethiopia’s
2012 National Gender Responsive Budgeting Guidelines provide information on
the national legal, policy, and institutional framework for gender equality and
describe key steps for mainstreaming gender into the national budget cycle.
In most sub-Saharan African countries, the primary institution responsible for
gender budgeting is the ministry of finance or the ministry or agency for gender
equality. For example, the responsibility for gender budgeting reform in The
Gambia is shared between the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs and the
Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare, while in Ethiopia, the Ministry
of Finance is the central entity in charge of steering gender budgeting reform;
however, a Gender Affairs Directorate supports the gender responsiveness review
of budget submissions during budget hearings. Some countries have taken a dif-
ferent approach. Senegal distributes the responsibility for gender budgeting more
widely to include units within departments or agencies as well as an independent
agency. For gender budgeting to be most effective, there must be strong leader-
ship from the ministry of finance with support from a ministry or agency respon-
sible for gender equality (Downes and Nicol 2020).
The majority of sub-Saharan African countries collect gender-disaggregated
data. These data are necessary for understanding a country’s gender inequalities and
provide the foundation for many gender budgeting tools, for example, ex ante and
ex post gender impact assessments. Applying gender-disaggregated data in the bud-
get process varies widely. Some countries reported using the data occasionally or
frequently to develop gender-related performance indicators and targets, to inform
decision making on policies and new legislation, and to inform analyses on gender
issues. Only half of the governments collecting these data publish the statistics.
A Gender Perspective in Budget Preparation

Each surveyed sub-Saharan African country has gender equality policies in place
to respond to country-specific challenges. National or sectoral gender equality
policies can help ensure adequate consideration of equality goals during budget
planning and prioritization. In sub-Saharan Africa, a national development plan
or individual sectorial or ministerial plans often integrate these policies, providing
a foundation for gender budgeting practices. For example, Zimbabwe officially

adopted gender budgeting in 2007 with the objective of achieving gender equality
and inclusive growth in line with national commitments (Zimbabwe Ministry of
Finance and Economic Development 2023). Translating policies into specific
goals with measurable indicators is a good practice for measuring a country’s
progress toward closing gender equality gaps.
Nine sub-Saharan African countries have government-wide gender equality per-
formance targets, while seven have sector-specific targets. Setting performance targets
for gender equality goals and policies improves monitoring and tracking of a country’s
progress in key areas. For example, Rwanda has performance measures and targets in
its National Strategy for Transformation I (NST I 2017–24). Scaling up Early
Childhood Development Center services at the village level is one of these targets.
Over two-thirds of countries surveyed link gender equality goals to programs.
Half of these countries also cost goals on an annual or medium-term basis. Linking
gender equality goals with program objectives allows governments to track imple-
mentation of programs expected to advance gender equality and identify areas
where more attention is needed. Simultaneously, costing programs linked to gender
equality goals can help ensure proposals are prioritized within allocated expenditure
ceilings. For example, Rwanda links costed subprograms, whenever applicable, to
the achievement of the National Gender Policy and NST 1 (2017–24).
Only one-quarter of sub-Saharan African countries produce an annual gender
budget statement; nevertheless, the countries that produce these statements are
likely to publish them. A gender budget statement is a gender-specific policy and
accountability document that a government crafts to show how the annual bud-
get aims to improve gender equality. The statement takes stock of where a country
stands with reaching gender equality goals, describes new budget proposals and
previous actions expected to advance progress toward equality goals, and can
include an analysis of aggregate spending on gender equality or beneficiaries.
Publishing a gender budget statement is a good practice for improving account-
ability and receiving feedback on gender budgeting practices from civil society.
Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Finance and Economic Development leads gender bud-
geting and has recorded progress to date in published National Gender Budget
Statements since 2022. This statement outlines gender-specific expenditures that
the government will track along with budget implementation. Similarly, Togo has
made considerable efforts toward implementing gender budgeting in recent years,
including introducing gender budget statements (Box 16.2).
Just under half of surveyed sub-Saharan African countries issue guidelines for
gender budgeting procedures in budget call circulars. Issuing detailed instructions
in the budget circular not only signals that the government takes gender budget-
ing seriously but it also ensures that gender equality perspectives adequately
inform budget submissions. These guidelines allow for a coordinated and com-
prehensive approach that improves efficiency during budget preparation and
negotiation. Uganda has refined its budget circular instructions over time and
adjusts them after each budget cycle. For example, after learning that sectors were
providing blanket plans for addressing gender inequalities in their Budget
Framework Papers, the Ministry of Finance made its budget circular instructions

Box 16.2. Case Study of a Recent Gender Budgeting Adopter: Togo

Togo has undertaken ambitious budget reforms in recent years. The government of Togo
undertook flagship reform by transitioning from line-item to program budgeting in 2020,
setting the stage to introduce gender budgeting. In 2023, the Togolese prepared their third
Gender Budget Statement (GBS).
The process of introducing gender budgeting in Togo started in 2018. The government
achieved results through a collaborative approach. A small group of gender focal points in
line ministries reports to the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Finance, Women, and
Planning. The authorities intend to formalize this structure by creating a gender budgeting
unit within the Ministry of Finance, spearheading gender budgeting across government.
Regular communication with the public has been key to gathering stakeholder support for
the process and improving accountability for gender reforms.
A 2020 decree on the publication of budgetary documents paved the way for a GBS.
Later that year, the authorities created a roadmap for gender budgeting, defining method-
ological, legal, and organizational aspects and gender budgeting tools. Key milestones in
the roadmap included: (1) integrating the process in the budget calendar, (2) providing
gender budgeting instructions and templates in the budget circular, (3) formulating bud-
get allocations based on a gender impact assessment, and (4) publishing a GBS. Togo
published its first GBS with the 2022 budget law, covering an initial group of six pilot min-
istries that had analyzed their budget programs using the OECD Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) gender marking methodology. The GBS shows the results of this analysis
and highlights how the budget contributes to the national gender equality policy.
At the outset of the 2022 budget process, the Prime Minister’s budget call circular gave
instructions to the ministries, with templates to assist them in identifying gender sensitive
budget allocations. Budget negotiations and the discussions in Parliament involved the gen-
der focal points in the ministries. Training for government officials and members of Parliament
and a media campaign to inform the public preceded the presentation of the 2022 GBS. To
monitor the budget execution of gender-related spending, disaggregated gender-related
spending information will supplement quarterly and annual performance reports.
Togo is now rolling out gender budgeting to a wider group of line ministries.
Challenges that lie ahead include the introduction of quality management processes, to
ensure that the expanding number of line ministries consistently apply the gender mark-
ing method, and of in-depth ex ante gender impact assessments. These measures will help
increase the budget impact in operationalizing the government’s gender equality agenda.
Source: Togolese Republic, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Gender Responsive Budget
Document (DBSG) 2022; DBSG 2023.
more specific the following year, requiring sectors to outline detailed actions in an
annexed template (Stotsky, Kolovich, and Kebhaj 2016).
Eight sub-Saharan African countries conduct ex ante gender impact assessments
on some or all new government policy initiatives. In some countries, individual
spending ministries or departments (Mauritius and Tanzania) conduct these assess-
ments, while in others, the ministry or agency responsible for gender equality con-
ducts the assessments (Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, and Kenya). It is a good
practice for the government official in the line ministry responsible for the program
or policy to conduct the assessment early in the program or policy design. Of these
countries, only four have a common gender impact assessment methodology—which

is a good practice because it enables consistency and comparability across ministries

and allows for streamlined quality checks. In some countries, the ministry or agency
for gender equality has the sole responsibility for quality control of these assessments
(Republic of Congo and Cote d’Ivoire), while other countries share responsibility with
the ministry or agency for gender equality, ministry of finance, and gender units in
line ministries (Tanzania and Zimbabwe). For these assessments to inform budget
decisions, it is a good practice for the ministry of finance to conduct quality controls
and integrate the assessment into budget negotiations or briefings.
Many sub-Saharan African countries report they classify their budgets accord-
ing to programs, although their definition, usage, and effectiveness of program-
matic classification can vary widely. In general, a programmatic budget structure
could make it easier to integrate gender equality issues into budget decisions and
allow for more effective tracking of expenditures that likely advance gender equal-
ity. In nearly all countries reporting they classify their budgets according to pro-
grams, the countries incorporate gender into either stand-alone gender programs
(16 percent), other individual programs (37 percent), or both (47 percent).
Gender in Budget Execution and Monitoring

A third of sub-Saharan African countries report on the execution of gender-related
expenditures. Monitoring and evaluating the implementation of gender-related
programs or policies sheds light on whether funds achieve gender equality objectives
while improving accountability and transparency. For an example of Rwanda’s
effective monitoring approach, see Box 16.3. Eight of the surveyed countries report
on gender-related expenditures, while six compare approved with actual gender-
related expenditures.
Only five sub-Saharan African countries perform ex post gender impact assess-
ments of budget expenditures. Ex post gender impact assessments are a key tool for
evaluating the effects of revenue and expenditure initiatives on gender equality. These
assessment findings inform and improve the design of existing and new policies and
programs. For example, the South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry’s ex
post analysis of expenditures to small, medium, and micro-enterprises observed that
spending on these enterprises was a small percentage of the Department’s budget
despite women’s overrepresentation as owners. This assessment resulted in the
Department increasing allocations to support and promote women business owners
(Stotsky, Kolovich, and Kebhaj 2016). Ex post gender impact assessments can also
be used in reporting—for example, Burkina Faso uses these assessments in an annual
report on the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals.
Audit and Parliamentary Oversight of Gender Budgeting

Parliamentary and legislative oversight of gender equality initiatives is a robust
practice across sub-Saharan African countries. Over two thirds of sub-Saharan
African countries’ legislatures and parliaments are involved in gender equality
issues—likely a result of nearly 60 percent of countries having established a desig-
nated committee for gender issues. For example, Namibia’s Standing Committee on
Gender Equality, Social Development and Family Affairs addresses gender issues

Box 16.3. Sub-Saharan African Success Story: Rwanda’s Gender

Monitoring Office
Rwanda has some of the most prominent gender budgeting practices in the region. In addi-
tion to a solid legal framework, clear focus on gender-disaggregated data collection, and
extensive use of gender budget statements as a tool for integrating gender in the budget
preparation, Rwanda has built a strong system of monitoring and evaluating results.
Rwanda established a Gender Monitoring Office (GMO) in 2007 with a mandate to
ensure compliance and effective implementation of various national, regional, and interna-
tional commitments, including on gender responsive budgeting. The GMO conducts field
visits to monitor quality and conformity with gender budget statements and audits results
that line ministries achieve. The GMO then produces an Annual Report that identifies
achievements and existing challenges and supports planning for the next fiscal year
(Gender Monitoring Office 2020).
For example, in its Annual Report 2019–2020, the GMO’s assessment of FY2018/19
gender budget statements found positive results, including increased retention and per-
formance of boys in school, improved health care for women, and increased access to clean
water. The latter not only saved women quality time and households money, but women
were also actively involved in water management committees. The report also highlighted
areas for improvement, including that a wide gap in the gender distribution of employ-
ment, especially in leadership positions, remains in all districts audited. The GMO called for
increased efforts from all levels to address this gap.
To further facilitate monitoring, Rwanda developed a gender management information
system, which is a database for national gender targets and indicators that is expected to
provide sex-disaggregated data wherever it is needed for gender responsive decision
making, planning, and budgeting.
Source: Gender Monitoring Office, Government of Rwanda 2021. https://www.gmo.gov.rw.
across party lines and promotes gender equality to improve the status of women.
Establishing a gender committee ensures that the legislature remains involved and
can reinforce accountability on gender budgeting reforms. Across sub-Saharan
Africa, the role of the legislature varies, with 32 percent discussing the budget
impact on gender equality or conducting hearings on gender equality issues. Far
fewer discuss the tax policy impact on gender equality (9 percent). For example,
Ethiopia’s Standing Committee for Women, Youth and Children of the Parliament
makes recommendations to reinforce the effectiveness of the budget in the attain-
ment of gender equality goals before legislative approval. Additionally, Uganda’s
Parliament has played a critical role in promoting and enforcing gender and equity
budgeting. At the budget approval level, Parliament receives a Certificate of Gender
and Equity Compliance when various budget products are satisfied. In this process,
champions from the Uganda Women Parliamentary Association call on colleagues
to critically vet Budget Framework Papers for gender and equity responsiveness.
National audit institutions are less involved in reviewing or assessing gender
equality policies. Only five sub-Saharan African countries stated that the national
auditor produced a report on the performance of gender programs or activities.
Independent evaluations of gender programs and activities are essential for transpar-
ency and accountability, identifying implementation challenges, and incorporating

TABLE 16.2.
Sub-Saharan Africa Countries’ Gender Budget Practices

1. Legal and Institutional Framework 2. Budget Preparation 3. Budget Execution and 4. Audit and Parliamentary
Monitoring Oversight
Budget Circular Linking Budget
Containing Gender Goals Budget Execution
Specific to Programs Classification Reports
Fiscal Data Ex ante Guidelines on and Incorporates a Incorporate Ex post
Legal Framework on Institutional Disaggregated Gender Gender Impact Gender Performance Gender Gender Gender Impact Gender Parliamentary
Gender Budgeting Framework by Gender Statements Assessments Objectives Indicators Perspective Perspective Assessments Related Audits Oversight
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African
Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
(Democratic
Republic)
Congo
(Republic)
Cote d’Ivoire
Ethiopia
Gabon
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi

Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Rwanda
São Tomé and
Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
South Africa
Swaziland
Tanzania
The Gambia
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
At least one
No Gender
Gender
Budgeting Tool
Budgeting Tool
or Practice
or Practice
Note: This table outlines the 12 instruments under each of the four pillars of the IMF’s gender budgeting framework and identifies which country has at least one tool or practice in place for each; see Annex 16.1 for a list of
associated questions behind each instrument. If a country answered yes to any one of the associated questions, then the square was colored green. Note that for the indicator on “linking gender goals to programs and
performance indicators,” the green marking indicates countries that reported “yes” to questions 14 and/or 19 only (If gender equality goals are set, are they linked to programs? Are there performance targets related to
gender equality?). This does not necessarily entail program-based budgeting. As a reminder, country tools and practices are based on country declarations in the IMF gender budgeting survey, and this figure reflects the
self-reported existence of tools at a point in time, not their quality or effectiveness.

lessons learned to strengthen future policy designs. For example, Uganda’s Supreme
Audit Institution, with support from the International Organization of Supreme
Audit Institutions’ Development Initiative, conducts an audit of government efforts
toward the elimination of intimate partner violence against women.
COMPARISON OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA’S GENDER

BUDGETING PRACTICES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
The level of gender budgeting practices of low-income and developing countries
(LIDC) and emerging market economies (EME) within sub-Saharan Africa is
similar to those outside the region. Beyond sub-Saharan Africa, the survey
collected data on gender budgeting practices from 71 other countries worldwide,
including 10 LIDCs and 49 EMEs. Figure 16.1 compares the average results for
sub-Saharan African countries with other LIDCs and EMEs. The average Gender
Budgeting Index2 for sub-Saharan African countries is slightly above other LIDCs
and EMEs, but both fall under the “basic” gender budgeting practice category.
Consistent with the finding from Alonso-Albarran and others (2021), no country
has reached an overall “advanced” practice level.
Observers note that LIDC and EMEs within and outside sub-Saharan African
countries demonstrate good practices regarding institutional frameworks, disaggre-
gated fiscal data collection, budget circular, linking goals and programs, and parlia-
mentary oversight. Sub-Saharan African countries slightly outperform other LIDC
and EMEs in select practices in budget preparation (gender statements, ex ante
gender impact assessments, budget circular) and in budget execution reports and
gender audits. Consistent with the findings of the G20 paper, the greatest weaknesses
are in ex post and ex ante gender impact assessments and gender audits.
Sub-Saharan Africa is comparable with other regions in implementing gender
budgeting. Figure 16.3 shows that most regions slightly outcompete the others in
one or two areas but, broadly, all regions follow a similar pattern. For example,
sub-Saharan African countries slightly outperform other regions regarding gender
audits, budget execution reports, and linking goals and programs, although the
first two are still at the basic practice level.
While advanced economies fare better in certain gender budgeting practices,
they face similar challenges as LIDC and EME in many areas. Figure 16.2 shows
that advanced economies outperform LIDC and EMEs in disaggregated fiscal
data, gender statements, and ex ante gender impact assessments. However, these
countries face similar challenges as LIDCs and EMEs regarding gender audits,
and they score similarly or lower than LIDCs and EMEs in certain practices,
specifically budget execution reports.
2
The Gender Budgeting Index was introduced in the IMF’s Gender Budgeting Practices in G20
Countries Working Paper by Alonso-Albarran and others (2021) and is an index calculated by assign-
ing a score (from zero to three) to 23 key questions within the survey that relate to the 12 public
financial management instruments used in a budget cycle. These are the same questions that were used
to count practices in Table 16.2. For a list of the questions see Annex 16.1. The unweighted average
of the 23 questions is equal to the overall country Gender Budgeting Index.

Figure 16.1. Public Financial Management Tools Used to Support Gender

Budgeting Using the Average Scores of the Gender Budgeting Index
EMEs and LIDCs SSA countries
excluding SSA (n = 59) (n = 34)
Legal framework
1. Framework Institutional framework
Disaggregated fiscal data
Gender statements
Ex ante GIA
2. Preparation Budget circular
Link goals and programs
Budget classification
Budget execution reports
3. Execution
Ex post GIA
Gender audits
4. Oversight
Parliamentary oversight
Average GBI score
Basic Good Advanced

Sources: IMF Gender Budgeting Survey; and IMF staff.
Note: EMEs = emerging market economies; GBI = Gender Budgeting Index; GIA = gender impact
assessments; LIDCs = low-income developing countries; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa. The bars are
the average scores of the GBI of each country group. For a description of this index, see footnote 2.
Figure 16.2. Gender Budgeting Index Scores by Region and Income Group
1. Gender Budgeting Index Scores by Region 2. Gender Budgeting Index Scores by
Income Group
AFR (n = 34) APD (n = 15) AFR (n = 34) LIDC (n = 10)
EUR (n = 20) MCD (n = 16) EME (n = 49) AE (n = 12)
WHD (n = 20)
Legal framework Legal framework
Parliamentary on GRB Institutional Parliamentary on GRB Institutional
oversight 2 framework oversight 2 framework
Gender Disaggregated Gender Disaggregated
audits 1 fiscal data audits 1 fiscal data
Ex post Gender Ex post Gender

GIA
0 statements GIA
0 statements
Budget Budget
execution Ex ante GIA execution Ex ante GIA
reports reports
Budget Budget circular Budget Budget circular
classification Life goals classification Life goals
and programs and programs
Sources: IMF Gender Budgeting Survey; and IMF staff.
Note: Since the publication of the IMF’s Gender Budgeting Practices in G20 Countries by
Alonso-Albarran and others (2021), additional countries have been added to the IMF Gender
Budgeting Database; specifically, eight countries have been added to the Western Hemisphere
Department region and four to the African Department region. AE = advanced economy;
AFR = Africa; APD = Asia and Pacific; EME = emerging market economies; EUR = Europe;
GIA = gender impact assessments; GRB = gender-responsive budgeting; LIDC = low-income
developing countries; MCD = Middle East and Central Asia; WHD = Western Hemisphere.

Development partner support is likely a key factor in the increase in gender bud-
geting practices across sub-Saharan Africa. The survey results for sub-Saharan African
countries align with the literature highlighting that international organizations and
financial and technical support by development partners to LIDCs culminated in
greater gender budgeting adoption in these countries. Indeed, IMF technical assis-
tance and supporting organizations’ capacity initiatives to sub-Saharan African coun-
tries in this public financial management reform have increased over recent years.
IMPLEMENTATION OF GENDER BUDGETING IN

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA—CHALLENGES AND
SUCCESS FACTORS
Sub-Saharan African countries cite lack of clear guidance as the most pressing chal-
lenge when implementing gender budgeting. As outlined in Figure 16.3, 71 percent
of sub-Saharan African countries’ survey responses identified a lack of clear guid-
ance on incorporating gender considerations into the annual budget as one of four
major challenges when implementing gender budgeting. This factor is considerably
higher than responses from all other countries. A cause of this challenge may be
related to a lack of guidance provided in budget circulars. Indeed, less than half of
surveyed sub-Saharan African countries include details on applying gender budget-
ing in a budget circular. Where these guidelines exist, they sometimes come from
individual spending ministries to subordinate departments and, therefore, could be
inconsistently applied or not enforced, compounding this challenge.
Other primary challenges identified in the region include insufficient gender-
disaggregated statistics and coordination problems among departments. Despite
nearly 70 percent of governments in the region collecting some disaggregated data,
Figure 16.3. Major Challenges Encountered when Successfully

Implementing Gender Budgeting
(As a percentage of the sample)
44%
Lack of clear guidance 68%
Insufficient gender- 32%
disaggregated statistics 56%
42%
Lack of specialized staff 50%
Coordination problems 38%
between departments 47%
Poor quality of gender 48%
assessments 38%
21%
Insufficient political support 35%
Other countries (n = 71)
Resistance of managers 24% SSA (n = 34)
in charge 15%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

sub-Saharan African countries have noted that insufficient gender-disaggregated

statistical information inhibits them from adequately costing new gender initiatives.
Additionally, challenges for roughly half of sub-Saharan African countries include a
lack of specialized staff and coordination with departments with competencies in
gender policies during budget preparation. Some countries have dedicated coordi-
nation units to overcome these challenges. For example, Uganda’s Ministry of
Gender established a national coordination mechanism to ensure systematic inte-
gration of gender equality and women’s empowerment issues in development plans,
policies, programs, and the budget. In Togo, a coordination mechanism between
the budget directorate, the ministry of women, and gender focal points in line
ministries ensures a consistent application of gender budgeting across public sector
entities.
The top three success factors for implementing gender budgeting in sub-
Saharan African countries align with the rest of survey respondents’ answers—
political support, binding legislative requirements, and support from the ministry
of finance (Figure 16.4). A general understanding is that for gender budgeting
to be successful, change needs to come alongside a high-level commitment.
This finding is consistent with the literature highlighting that strong political
Figure 16.4. Most Important Factors for the Successful Implementation of

Gender Budgeting
Political support to improve 65%
gender equality 46%
Implementing gender budgeting 59%
is a legal requirement 41%
The support of the 47%
Ministry of Finance 38%
Gender units in the line 21%
ministries or other 17%
The support of management of 21%
the line ministries 30%
Gender-disaggregated statistical 21%
information available 14%
Technical capacity at 18%
the ministry level 14%
Increased funding to the relevant 15%
gender equality programs 13%
Support from international 12%
community 13%
Pressure from the public and 12% SSA (n = 34)
stakeholders 7% Other countries (n = 71)
Clear gender equality goals 6%
which are linked to programs 27%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

leadership, solid legal foundations, and clear direction from the ministry of
finance add the necessary weight for gender budgeting reforms to take hold (for
instance, OECD 2020; IMF 2017; Kolovich 2018).
THE IMPACT OF GENDER BUDGETING ON

GENDER EQUALITY
Across sub-Saharan African countries, gender budgeting has primarily increased the
number of programs that have gender-related goals, increased resources allocated to
gender activities, and provided a better understanding of the budget impact on gender
equality (Figure 16.5). The direct impact of implementing gender budgeting on gen-
der equality is not easily measured. An increased awareness of gender equality goals
may have brought to light key equality gaps and could have resulted in a redistribu-
tion of resources to address challenges. Additionally, gender budgeting has increased
the understanding of the intended and unintended impact of the budget on either
improving or undermining gender equality in sub-Saharan African countries, which
could have led to modifying programs and projects during their development. Of
note, rules or regulations seem to have been altered in other countries more frequently
in response to gender budgeting than in sub-Saharan African countries.
The introduction of gender-related fiscal policies has accompanied progress in
gender budgeting implementation. Figure 16.6 shows that nearly all sub-Saharan
African countries surveyed have introduced paid parental leave for mothers, a key
Figure 16.5. Impact of Gender Budgeting on Gender Equality

Do not have sufficient 35%
information to assess 32%
More programs incorporating 29%
gender related goals 27%
Better understanding of the impact 29%
of the budget on gender equality 25%
More resources are allocated 26%
to specific gender activities 21%
A greater focus on 26%
gender equality goals 25%
Programs/projects 21%
have been altered 14%
More analysis has been 18%
conducted on gender 18%
There has been no impact 12%
on gender equality goals 8%
Policies have been changed based 9% SSA (n = 34)
on gender budgeting analysis 10% Other countries (n = 71)
Rules or regulations 6%
have been altered 15%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Figure 16.6. Gender-Related Fiscal Policies Introduced by Sub-Saharan

African Countries
(As a percent of the sample)
1. Tax Policies
Gender targeted in-work tax credits or benefits 3%
Tax relief for single parents 6%

Tax based on individuals or incentives for the second
earner (as opposed to tax based on family or 29%
joint taxation)
2. Expenditure and Regulatory Policies
Private sector gender quotas in managerial/
9%
board positions
Gender-related pension reforms (e.g. pensions increasing
with the number of children or non-contributed years 15%
related to childcare are considered)
Policies to promote part-time work (women and men) 18%
Policies against stereotypes (i.e. STEM [science,
technology, engineering, mathematics]; 26%
managerial positions)
Public sector gender quotas in managerial/
29%
board positions
Paid parental leave (father) 50%
Equal pay legislation 56%
Policies to encourage female labor participation 56%
Policies to provide financial support for

56%
low-income women
Childcare support 59%
Gender-responsive foreign aid and cooperation 65%
Policies to promote women’s education 76%
Policies to promote women’s specific health needs 76%
Policies to counter domestic violence 82%
Paid parental leave (mother) 91%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Note: This illustration is based on a list of common fiscal policies that intend to promote gender
equality, and it is not intended to be an exhaustive list.

determinant for women’s continued labor force participation. Additionally, poli-

cies to counter domestic violence, promote women’s specific health needs, and
increase access to education for girls are among the top fiscal policies in place
across the region. While over 50 percent of countries in sub-Saharan Africa have
introduced at least 10 specific gender-related expenditure or regulatory policies,
tax policies have been less widely adopted. The tax policy lag is consistent with
findings that gender budgeting has typically focused on expenditures and over-
looked taxes (Kolovich 2018).
CONCLUSION
The budget is a core policy instrument of the government; integrating gender
equality objectives will ultimately result in better budgetary decisions. Although
gender budgeting reforms require significant effort, consistent incremental steps
to implementation over the medium term with feedback loops for learning and
improvement can help ensure this reform’s success. That is, countries should not
be afraid to get started.
Sub-Saharan African countries have made substantial progress in adopting and
implementing gender budgeting practices over the past decades. Good practices
involve gender budgeting frameworks, linking gender equality goals with programs,
and parliamentary oversight. Given the status of gender budgeting in sub-Saharan
Africa, developing and publishing gender budget statements and improving guid-
ance in budget call circulars is a suggested way forward. Only one quarter of sub-
Saharan African countries surveyed produce an annual gender budget statement. As
a strategic document, a gender budget statement tracks progress made toward
gender equality objectives and identifies the programs or policies in place to close
equality gaps. These statements, therefore, not only increase accountability, they
also improve annual budget prioritization and planning. Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries are readily able to develop these statements since the information to formulate
a statement has already been collected in many cases. That is, each country surveyed
has gender equality policies in place and over two thirds of surveyed countries stated
that they link gender equality goals to programs.
Sub-Saharan African countries should ensure their budget call circular is
specific to overcome the lack of clear guidance on incorporating gender consid-
erations into the annual budget. A budget call circular should explain to line
departments and agencies what is required of them during the budget cycle,
provide details on meeting the requirements, and include any gender budgeting
templates to submit with their budget submissions. To complement these
instructions, training on requirements for government officials regarding gen-
der budgeting should be incorporated into broader budget training. Less than
half of sub-Saharan African countries surveyed issued guidelines for gender
budgeting procedures in a budget call circular. Issuing guidelines can begin with
the ministry of finance having a clear plan for gender budgeting, which, if
improved, could result in a more efficient budget process.

ANNEX 16.1
ANNEX TABLE 16.1.1
Instruments and Corresponding IMF Gender Budgeting Survey Questions

12 “Instruments” or “Pillars” 23 Questions
1 Legal framework on GRB Q9 Is there a legal provision for gender budgeting? (select all
that apply)
2 Institutional framework Q7 Does the government have a gender budgeting framework?
Q10 Is there a specific institution with primary responsibility for
gender budgeting reform? (select up to two responses)
Q13 Is there a specific organization that coordinates discussions
on gender issues during budget preparation?
3 Gender statements Q15 Does the government produce and publish a gender bud-
geting statement?
4 Ex ante gender impact Q17a Does the government conduct ex ante gender impact
assessment to assess the assessments on new government policy initiatives?
impact of proposed poli- Q17c Is there a common methodology for ex ante gender impact
cies on gender equality assessments?
Q17d How are gender impact assessments used in the budget
preparation? (Example of response option: It is used to iden-
tify the budget lines with gender impact (quantitative or
qualitative)
5 Budget circular contain- Q16a Does the budget circular or guidelines include details on
ing specific guidelines on the application of gender budgeting? (select all that
gender objectives apply)
6 Linking gender goals to Q2 Does the government have policies to promote gender
programs and perfor- equality? (select all that apply—response example: Yes, gen-
mance indicators der equality policies are part of the national development /
strategic plan)
Q14 If gender equality goals are set are they linked to programs?
Q19 Are there performance targets related to gender equality?
7 Budget classification Q21b If yes, how is gender incorporated into the program classifi-
incorporates a gender cation? (21a: Is the budget classified according to programs?)
perspective Q22 Are budgetary allocations tagged with any type of budget
classifiers to identify their linkage to gender objectives?
8 Fiscal data disaggregated Q25a Does the government collect data disaggregated by gender?
by gender Q25b Is this data published?
Q25c Indicate how often the data is used in decision making (mul-
tiple responses “inform budget decision making,”“inform
decision making on policies,”“inform decision making on
new legislation,” and then options from Very Frequently,
Frequently, Occasionally, Rarely, Never)
9 Budget execution reports Q26 Do budget execution reports issued by the government
incorporate gender per- in-year include information on gender related expenditures?
spective Q27 Does the government’s end of year annual financial state-
ment include information on the following?
10 Ex post gender impact Q28 Does the government conduct ex post gender impact
assessments to assess the assessments of budget expenditures?
impact of policies on Q29 Indicate how often the gender impact assessments (ex ante
gender goals *adjusted and ex post) have influenced decision making in the follow-
to 28 ing areas (list of areas such as informed annual budget
decision making, and options from Very Frequently,
Frequently, Occasionally, Rarely, Never)
11 Gender-related audits Q32 Has the National/Supreme audit institution in the past three
years produced gender-related audit reports?
12 Parliamentary oversight Q31 Has the legislature/Parliament in the last three years under-
taken any of the following activities in relation to gender
equality?
Source: Alonso-Albarran and others 2021.

REFERENCES
Alonso-Albarran, Virginia, Teresa Curristine, Gemma Preston, Alberto Soler, Nino Tchelishvili,
and Sureni Weerathunga. 2021. “Gender Budgeting in G20 countries.” IMF Working Paper
De Henau, Jerome. 2018. “Social Security and Women.” 2018 UK Women’s Budget Group
Briefing, London.
Downes, Ronnie, and Scherie Nicol. 2020. Designing and Implementing Gender Budgeting:
A Path to Action. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Gender Monitoring Office. 2020. Gender Monitoring Office Annual Report 2019–2022. Republic
of Rwanda.
Gender Monitoring Office. 2021. Government of Rwanda. https://www.gmo.gov.rw.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2017. “Gender Budgeting in G7 Countries.” IMF Policy
Paper, Washington DC.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2021. “Gender Equality and COVID-19: Policies and
Institutions to Mitigate the Crisis.” IMF COVID-19 Special Series Note, Washington, DC.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2022. “IMF Strategy toward Mainstreaming Gender.”
IMF Policy Paper 22/037, Washington DC.
Kolovich, Lisa L. (editor). 2018. Fiscal Policies and Gender Equality. Washington DC: International
Monetary Fund.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2020. “Women at the
Core of the Fight against COVID-19 Crisis.” OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus
(COVID-19). Last modified April 1, 2020. https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-
responses/women-at-the-core-of-the-fight-against-covid-19-crisis-553a8269/.
Polzer, Tobias, Isabella M. Nolte, and Johann Seiwald. 2021. “Gender Budgeting in Public
Financial Management: A Literature Review and Research Agenda.” International Review of
Administrative Sciences 89 (2): 450–66.
Stotsky, Janet G., Lisa Kolovich, and Suhaib Kebhaj. 2016. “Sub-Saharan Africa: A Survey of
Gender Budgeting Efforts.” IMF Working Paper 16/152, International Monetary Fund,
Washington, DC.
Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. 2023. 2023 National Gender
Responsive Budget Statement. Verotas.

CHAPTER 17
Gender Inequality and Care Work:

Valuing and Investing in Care
Mehjabeen Alarakhia, Zahra Sheikh Ahmed, and
Tanima Tanima
This chapter explores the extent of and trends in care work in sub-Saharan Africa and
makes a case for gender-responsive care policies. Care work, which encompasses both
unpaid and paid care, is often undervalued and disproportionately falls on women and
girls. Available time-use data show that caring responsibilities vary substantially with
women’s personal and labor market characteristics, and employed women—if their paid
and unpaid work activities are added together—have much longer workdays. The
unequal distribution of care work hinders women’s empowerment, perpetuates gender
stereotypes, and contributes to economic and social inequalities. Care work should be a
critical component of the development agenda; there is a substantial need for better data,
analysis, and research to inform gender-responsive care policies and measure progress. The
authors outline the current state of care services and infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa
and present a framework for transformative care policies in the region. The chapter
concludes by underscoring the significance of prioritizing care policies and infrastructure
to achieve gender equality, inclusive development, and resilience in the face of crises.
INTRODUCTION
Care work—essential for sustainable economic development, social well-being,
and the future of decent employment—involves the activities and social relations
required to satisfy the productive and reproductive needs of all human beings.
This includes direct care for children, the elderly, people living with disabilities,
and people facing illnesses, as well as indirect care or domestic work, such as
providing food and other necessities for a household. Care work encompasses two
spheres of work—unpaid care work, including both direct and indirect, that is
provided by individuals for the household or community, and paid care work that
is usually direct care performed for pay or profit.
Care is a universal right and an essential public good. Despite its importance
to society and the economy, care work is often not recognized as skilled work or
The views expressed in this document are of the authors only and do not necessarily represent the views
of UN Women, the United Nations, or any of its affiliated organizations. UN Women is the United
Nations entity dedicated to gender equality and the empowerment of women. A global champion for
women and girls, UN Women was established to accelerate progress on meeting their needs worldwide.
315

a public issue. Households, governments, the private sector, and the community
should share the responsibility for providing care work. Yet, most of the care work
worldwide is undertaken by unpaid carers at a household level, and women and
girls shoulder a disproportionate responsibility for it. Although unpaid care work
can be rewarding, it is often drudgery, and its unequal distribution by gender
forms a major barrier to women’s empowerment in economic, political, and social
spheres, and it hampers the overall well-being of women and girls. Compared
with their prevalence in the labor market, women are also overrepresented in paid
care jobs, especially domestic work jobs. Complex socioeconomic norms precipi-
tate the disproportionate distribution of unpaid care work by gender and the
feminization of care work. Care work is viewed as an extension of women’s
“natural” role as caregivers and thus perceived as a women’s issue.
Despite data limitations, a few trends in sub-Saharan Africa are clear. First,
women and girls make up most of the unpaid care workforce. According to esti-
mates from the International Labour Organization (ILO), Addati and others
(2018), and Charmes (2019), women and girls spend as much as 3 to 3.4 times
more on unpaid care work than do men and boys. Second, responsibilities of
women to provide unpaid care work hinders their economic, social, learning, and
leadership opportunities. Women in sub-Saharan Africa cite unpaid care work
duties as the top reason for not participating in the labor force (Addati and others
2018). In addition, women in households with dependents (children or elderly
people) work fewer hours in paid employment than do women in households
with no dependents. Third, on average, women’s workdays—when both paid and
unpaid work hours are added together—are much longer than men’s. Time pov-
erty among employed women is significant and can lead to or exacerbate income
poverty when women and households are unable to outsource care services
(Zacharias, Antonopoulos, and Masterson 2012). Fourth, when women engage
in paid work, their unpaid care responsibilities do not decrease proportionately.
This affects their overall well-being, the quality of care enjoyed by caregivers and
care recipients, and women’s overall productivity both in paid and unpaid work.
Finally, paid care work is a very important source of employment for women, and
most women in paid care jobs are domestic workers with informal working
arrangements, low pay, and poor working conditions.
Why do we need better care policies and investment in care

infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa?
For better social, economic, and political growth of women and girls. Considerable
research has identified unequal gender distribution of care work as a key barrier
to women’s social, economic, and political empowerment. Socially prescribing
women and girls as caregivers undermines their basic human rights and limits
their opportunities and capabilities. Better care policies and infrastructure are key
for alleviating gendered inequalities and increasing women’s quality of life.
For poverty reduction, which includes better health and education outcomes for all.
Care work is systematically linked with economic inequality, poverty, and

Chapter 17 Gender Inequality and Care Work: Valuing and Investing in Care 317
precarity. Care work is largely performed by women and girls within the home in
an unpaid manner; thus, it affects marginalized households the most. Marginalized
households lack essential infrastructure, such as clean water and fuel, so women
spend more time on indirect care work. Moreover, low-income households are
unable to afford quality childcare services or domestic care services. This con-
strains women from doing paid work or from working for more hours in paid
jobs. Thus, evidence shows that better care systems, especially public childcare
provisions, are fundamental to overcoming poverty and reducing inequalities
(Halim, Perova, and Reynolds 2023). Further, better quality care services enhance
quality of life as well as health care and education outcomes for care recipients,
especially children (Staab 2015).
For supporting inclusive economic growth and development. Investment in care sys-
tems linked to labor market policies can create jobs, increase women’s productiv-
ity in both paid and unpaid work, facilitate women’s participation in the labor
market, and remove inequalities in the labor force and at the household level.
Women’s entry into the labor market and increased productivity lead to large
economic dividends; this is linked to the fact that paid care work is an important
source of employment for women, and it is poorly remunerated, undervalued,
and frequently carried out in precarious conditions. Quality employment also
generates more economic activity and higher tax revenues for the government.
Overall, better care systems support inclusive economic growth and
development.
For creating a resilient society and economy. The COVID-19 pandemic made even
more evident the deficiency in how care systems are set up. Sub-Saharan Africa is
vulnerable to crises, including but not limited to internal and external conflicts,
environmental degradation, and climate change. Crises tend to increase care
needs, make care work more arduous, and compound the injustices related to its
unequal distribution. Such effects are felt most by those pursuing subsistence
livelihoods. Robust care infrastructure and care systems help families, communi-
ties, and societies weather these crises.
In light of these factors, development practitioners and policymakers are
increasingly recognising the need for better care policies and care infrastructure.
This chapter discusses the state of care work and care policies in sub-Saharan
Africa and highlights the need for more data and analysis to further the care
agenda. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: The second section uses
available data in sub-Saharan Africa to measure trends and determinants of care
work, both paid and unpaid, and discuss the importance of data and time-use
surveys (TUSs); this section constitutes the core of the chapter. The third section,
“Transformative Care Policies,” discusses what transformative care policies look
like and presents an overview of the state of the care economy in the region. The
fourth section, “From Better Data to Better Measures of Progress,” makes the case
for better data, statistics, and research on care for informing gender-responsive
care policies and measuring progress. The final section contains a summary and
considers avenues forward.

MEASURING CARE WORK IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:

PAID AND UNPAID
All over the world—and sub-Saharan Africa is no exception—the family or house-
hold provides most unpaid care work. Surveys on time use and the labor force are
complementary sources of data for understanding the extent, trends, and determi-
nants of unpaid care work. Although the paid care sector in sub-Saharan Africa is
small, it is essential to the functioning of society. This section mainly draws on
estimates from the ILO (Addati and others 2018), compiled using the latest TUSs
and labor force surveys in all sub-Saharan African countries where data were avail-
able. First, the authors measure the magnitude and determinants of unpaid care
work, composed of own-use production work of services1 and volunteer work in
households producing services according to the 19th International Conference of
Labour Statisticians Resolution I concerning work, employment, and labor
underutilization. Second, the authors assess labor market characteristics of unpaid
carers. Third, they examine care jobs and care workers. Fourth, they discuss data
gaps and TUSs.
Extent of and Trends in Unpaid Care Work

The average woman in sub-Saharan Africa2 spends 249 minutes per day on
unpaid care work; figure 17.1 presents average time spent by women on unpaid
care work by country and category (Charmes 2019). In comparison, the average
man spends 87 minutes per day on unpaid care work, which is about 40 percent
of the time spent by women on the same activities. Figure 17.2 presents ILO
estimates of time spent on unpaid care work by men, by country and category.
Both men and women spend most of their time on domestic services for own
final use within households (for example, indirect care work, housework), indi-
cating such services’ importance for all adults. Caregiving services to household
members (that is, direct care work) make up the next largest category of unpaid
care work and community services. Help to other households (for example, vol-
unteer work, a mixture of direct and indirect care work) makes up the smallest
category of unpaid care work.
The average time spent on unpaid care work varies considerably across coun-
tries. Men in Mali spend the least time (21 minutes) and men in Cabo Verde
spend the most time (246 minutes). It is worth noting that Cabo Verde is
characterized by a difference in data collection methodology, so the authors
1
The ILO refers to own-use production work as “activities performed to produce goods or provide
services intended for final use by the producer, their household and/or family” (ILO 2023).
2
In this subsection the authors calculate the regional averages for time use by using weights according
to country population; however, readers should be careful with these estimates because the authors
use data from only 10 countries in the region: Ethiopia, Mauritius, Mali, Tanzania, South Africa,
Madagascar, Cabo Verde, Benin, Ghana, and Cameroon.

Figure 17.1. Women’s Time Spent in Unpaid Care Work, by Country and
Categories
(Minutes per day)
Domestic services for own final use within household
Caregiving services to household members
Community services and help to other households
Ethiopia
Mauritius
Mali
Tanzania
South Africa
Madagascar
Cabo Verde
Benin
Ghana
Cameroon
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Source: Charmes 2019.
Note: Refer to Annex 17.1 for survey year and characteristics.
Figure 17.2. Men’s Time Spent in Unpaid Care Work, by Country and
Categories
(Minutes per day)
Domestic services for own final use within household
Caregiving services to household members
Community services and help to other households
Cabo Verde
Ethiopia
South Africa
Cameroon
Mauritius
Ghana
Tanzania
Madagascar
Benin
Mali
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

urge caution about comparing Cabo Verde with other countries.3 Women’s
unpaid care work ranges from 212 minutes in Cameroon to 291 minutes in
Ethiopia. Mali has the largest gender divide, with women performing 92 per-
cent of total unpaid care work. Even in Cabo Verde, which has the smallest
gender divide in time allocation, women do 66.6 percent of the total unpaid
care work.
The large gender gap in time spent on unpaid care work has two main and
direct effects. One, women participate much less in paid work. In sub-Saharan
Africa, women work only 0.66 hour for every 1 hour spent by men in paid work.
Second, the total working hours spent by women per day is more than that spent
by men. If the total time spent working, both paid and unpaid, is added together,
women spend 432 minutes per day working, while men spend only 361 minutes,
on average, which means that women have less time available for other activities
such as education, participating in civic activities, or leisure. This outcome—
referred to as time poverty4—can lead to or exacerbate income poverty for women
and households. It can also lead to poor-quality care for recipients and affects the
health and well-being of the unpaid carers. Research confirms that women’s labor
force participation shrinks the gender gap in unpaid care work, but the decrease
in time spent by women in unpaid care work does not lessen in proportion. Rost,
Bates, and Dellepiane (2015) conducted a study in Ethiopia, Philippines,
Uganda, and Zimbabwe; the researchers found that women spend 10 to 44 fewer
minutes on primary unpaid care work per 60 minutes of paid work; however,
women’s participation in paid work has no effect on secondary care work or
supervision of dependents.
Gender gaps in time use are not uniform; they vary based on numerous socio-
economic factors and individual characteristics, which highlights that intersec-
tionality matters. Overall unpaid care work done by women and girls is higher in
rural areas, for less educated women, for married women, and for women living
in households with children. Men in rural residence and men living with children
spend more time on unpaid care work, similar to women. However, the addition
of a child to the household increases women’s care duties more than men’s care
duties. Interestingly, more educated men spend more time on unpaid care work,
indicating that education may influence social norms. In Ethiopia, Ghana, and
Tanzania, young women spend as much or more time on unpaid care work as do
adult women. Children are also significant providers of unpaid care work in
Africa, and girls perform more work than do boys.
3
The survey in Cabo Verde was conducted by asking respondents stylized questions about their
activities, not including paid work. Thus, one cannot reconstitute the complete schedule of an
individual’s day.
4
Although several understandings and definitions of the term time poverty exist, the authors here
conceptually use it to mean “the potential failure of individuals to fulfill their labor commitments
while simultaneously meeting some minimum needs of personal maintenance” (Zacharias 2023).

Unpaid Care Workers and the Labor Force

The authors now compare people living with care recipients at home (children
under 15 years or elderly people), a proxy for people with high unpaid care work
responsibilities, with people living without care recipients. This assessment con-
tinues to use ILO estimates (Addati and others 2018), based on data from
national labor force surveys and household survey microdata, which covers
24 countries and approximately 70 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s population. As
shown in Figure 17.3, approximately 36.4 percent of women with direct care
responsibilities are outside the labor force, compared with 19.8 percent of men
living with care recipients. Conversely, 24.3 percent of men living without depen-
dents are outside the labor force, which is much more than men with care respon-
sibilities. In this way, men living with care recipients experience a labor force
premium, which provides evidence for the “male as breadwinner” model.
Labor force and household surveys from 21 African countries covering
61 percent of the region’s population show that the most important reasons
cited by women for being out of the labor force was unpaid care work
(34.4 percent), followed by personal reasons—that is, being in education or
being sick or disabled (33.8 percent). Sub-Saharan Africa’s share of people ages
15 to 24 is also substantial (20 percent), and a large proportion of these young
people are not in employment, education, or training (NEET). Based on data
Figure 17.3. Unpaid Carers and Persons Not Living with Dependents, by
Gender and Labor Force Status
(Percentage)
Outside the labor force Employed Unemployed
1. Women 2. Men
100 100
4.4 5.9 4.2 6.7
90 90
80 80
70 70
59.2 56.8
60 76 69 60
50 50
40 40
30 30
20 36.4 37.4 20
10 19.8 24.3 10
0 0
Unpaid carers Persons living Unpaid carers Persons living
without care without care
recipients recipients
Source: Addati and others 2018.

from nine5 countries in east and southern Africa, Perry (2022) found that
women are more likely to be NEET than men. Importantly, care work increases
the probability of NEET status for women, especially for women 20 to 24 years
old. Taken together, these findings suggest that women’s labor force participa-
tion is hurt by caring responsibilities.
Income and residence also affect labor force participation decisions. Women
living without care recipients are less likely than women living with care recipients
to participate in the labor force. This is most likely explained by the fact that in
resource-poor environments, women must search for paid work when there are
dependents to look after. Further, households in sub-Saharan Africa often consist
of extended family members—an arrangement that allows for care responsibilities
to be shared. Unpaid carers are also less economically disadvantaged in rural areas,
where 34.7 percent of women with care recipients at home are outside the labor
force, compared with 41.6 percent of their urban counterparts.
In sub-Saharan Africa, whether a woman resides in a household with depen-
dents alters the intensity and quality of her employment. In households with
dependents, especially with young children who are less than six years old, women
work fewer hours in paid employment; men see no such trend. Using data from
23 countries, which constitute 72 percent of the total employed population in
sub-Saharan Africa, the authors find that the gender gap in working hours per week
was 5.2 hours for employed men and women living in households with no chil-
dren. This gap rises to 6.8 hours for employed men and women living in house-
holds with one child and increases further to 7.2 hours for employed men and
women in households with two children. It is a well-documented fact that women’s
wage employment is low in sub-Saharan Africa, but it dips even lower for employed
women carers (13.8 percent). Most employed women living with dependents work
in the informal sector (92.2 percent), mostly in own-account and contributing
family work, which is slightly higher than employed women who live with no
dependents (88.6 percent). Informal jobs come with significant downsides, but one
reason women prefer them is for the flexibility they allow for juggling unpaid care
work and paid work (Ceita 1999 cited in González and Grinspun 2001; Marcucci
2001; Verceles and Beltran 2004; Ramirez and Roses 2005).
Care Jobs and Care Workers

A serious deficit exists in care service provisions in the region. Sub-Saharan Africa
has the lowest proportion of paid care jobs among all regions in the world,
although there is considerable variation across countries. The care workforce
generally includes (1) workers in education, health, social work, and domestic
work; (2) care workers in other sectors (such as nurses in factories); and (3) non-
care workers in care sectors (such as cooks and cleaners in a hospital or school).
In sub-Saharan Africa, about 10.7 percent of employed women, compared with
only 5.4 percent of employed men, are employed in care jobs. Duffy (2021)
5
Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, and Uganda.

estimates that the care employment constitutes as much as 18 percent of total

employment in South Africa and as little as 3.5 percent of total employment in
Mozambique.
Such feminization of care work holds true across the world, and care work is
often an entry point into the labor force for women in low-income countries. In
sub-Saharan Africa, only about half of the care workers in care sectors are women,
although this statistic hides significant vertical and horizontal segregation: the
majority of the high-status care jobs are held by men. Agriculture is the largest
sector in most sub-Saharan countries and women are overrepresented in agricultural
jobs. For instance, about three out of every four people in Mozambique work in
agriculture and 58 percent of agriculture workers are women (Duffy 2021).
On average, care work is underpaid, unprotected, and undervalued. These
characteristics are related to its perception as an extension of women’s care roles,
which lends it low status and low social recognition. However, not all care work-
ers earn low wages. Hierarchies and differences exist among care workers in terms
of remuneration, working conditions, and status. Some care professions are
legally and socially regulated, which makes them high status and better paying.
For example, medical doctors earn 55 percent more than nurses and 89 percent
more than midwives in South Africa.
Domestic work is an important sector of care work in the region. About a third
of sub-Saharan Africa’s care workforce, 2.3 million people, are domestic workers.
This is a strongly feminized sector: 80 percent of all domestic workers are women.
Informal working arrangements, low remuneration, and long working hours are
common characteristics of domestic work in the region. Domestic work happens
behind closed doors and comes with much higher risk of sexual harassment and
physical violence. These workers are isolated and unable to organize, aspects that
affect their bargaining position and contribute to their lower pay and long work-
ing hours. The pay penalty is particularly prevalent in this sector, for example, as
found in South Africa (Budlender 2011). Given the relational nature of care
work, it is also difficult to threaten to withdraw services or go on strike.
Data Gaps and TUSs

Unfortunately, much is left to be understood, especially about unpaid care work.
For example, men’s and women’s contribution to unpaid care work has fallen
slightly across the globe from 1997 to 2012; however, overall gendered distribu-
tion of unpaid care work remains largely the same. This global estimate is based
on 23 countries with time series data, which include only 3 African countries
(Benin, South Africa, and Tanzania). Thus, the authors cannot generalize this
trend to sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, income and time poverty move together
and have an inverse-U relationship across the globe, but it’s unclear whether this
holds true in sub-Saharan Africa. Also, links between time poverty and inequality,
agricultural productivity, income poverty, and labor force participation are not yet
understood.
Lack of nationally representative and comparable time-use data remains a big
part of the challenge. The authors use data from 10 countries in sub-Saharan

Africa, where comparable data from TUSs were available between 1998 and
2019. Since then, a few more countries in the region have conducted TUSs, some
of which are still forthcoming. Yet most countries in the region have not
conducted such surveys. To a great extent, this is because these surveys are costly
and complex to conduct and require literate respondents. Time-use data are most
reliably collected based on time diaries—that is, through an inventory of all activ-
ities conducted in the previous 24 hours. However, this effort requires literacy and
numeracy. Asking stylized questions on a one-week reference period is still com-
mon practice in some TUSs. This approach avoids the problem of literacy and
numeracy but often results in imprecise estimates. Further, there are problems
with harmonizing definitions across countries and surveys and with adequately
capturing activities that are simultaneously undertaken—for example, watching
television while caring for a child.
TRANSFORMATIVE CARE POLICIES

This section discusses the ILO’s 5R framework, a policy approach to care work,
applied to sub-Saharan Africa. The authors also introduce the African Care
Economy Index (ACEI), which measures social recognition and state support for
care work in African countries and reveals significant deficits in care policies
across the region.
The 5R Framework
The care diamond expresses the social division of care in a society among four key
institutional actors: families and household, markets, the state, and the commu-
nity and other civil society organizations (Figure 17.4; Razavi 2007). Although
most unpaid care work is concentrated at the household level, paid care work
Figure 17.4. The Care Diamond

The state
Community/
The market
civil society
The Care
Diamond
Domestic
employment
Households
Source: UN Women Training Center. https://portal.trainingcentre.unwomen.org/product/introduction-
to-care-work-and-care-economy/.
Note: Reproduced with permission from UN Women.

forms the other three points of the diamond. Governments are primary duty
bearers for the provision of care services and care infrastructure. Care is both a
right to which people should have access and a function that some people per-
form. From a rights-based perspective, care policies ensure that everyone has the
right to receive and provide quality care.
The ILO’s 5R framework is a human rights–based and gender-responsive
approach to public policy for care work. The framework recommends that policy
should recognize, reduce, and redistribute unpaid care work; reward paid care work;
and guarantee representation for care workers through social dialogue and collec-
tive bargaining. It aims to build a virtuous cycle to mitigate inequalities in care
work, improve the socioeconomic lives of unpaid carers and paid care workers,
and address barriers that keep women from entering the labor force. By extension,
it works to improve quality of care for care recipients.
As a first step, more widespread recognition of the importance of care work at
both the international and national level is required. Care work is necessary for
all; requires time, energy, and skills; and comes with an opportunity cost in terms
of time not spent on other activities. There was a landmark resolution in 2013 by
the 19th International Conference of Labour Statisticians for inclusion of unpaid
work and household production in System of National Accounts. However,
national-level legislation and policy efforts across all countries in sub-Saharan
Africa are far from including unpaid care work in national statistics. Foremost,
there is a need for robust data at a national level, especially time-use data. Further
research is required to measure all forms of care; understand links with GDP,
poverty, and labor force participation and mitigating factors; and track progress
in building care policies, care infrastructure, and care services.
Reducing unpaid care work requires public investment in both (1) social care
services infrastructure and (2) physical rural infrastructure that is of high qual-
ity and affordable and accessible to all. Social care infrastructure—physical,
human, and financial—supports universal social care services for children and
people living with disabilities as well as universal health care. It transforms a
substantial amount of unpaid domestic care work to paid social care work. In
the absence of state involvement, such care services are expensive and quality
services are available only to the high-income minority. This situation enhances
gender, class, and intergenerational inequalities and leads to increased reliance
on informal labor and migrant domestic workers. Building better physical rural
infrastructure lessens unpaid care work by reducing the time required to deliver
indirect care work. This includes but is not limited to building roads and pro-
viding access to clean water, sanitation facilities, electricity, digital technology,
and the internet. Protection of natural resources such as land and water is
equally important in ensuring adequate and inclusive care infrastructure for all.
The formal private sector also has a role to play in protecting workers and pro-
viding decent working conditions so these employees are not overworked,
undervalued, or underpaid.
Redistributing care work calls on two types of redistribution: between women
and men and between all actors in the care diamond—households, the state, the

private sector, and the community. Given the gender-based division of care
labor, all relevant actors must aim to eliminate discriminatory social norms and
gender stereotypes that assign care work to women by promoting positive mas-
culinities to encourage men’s increased participation in care work. Such trans-
formation of mindsets cannot happen in isolation and requires changes across
society. Efforts must be culturally sensitive and emphasize strengthening the
family unit and community bonds in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the
state must actively take up responsibility for providing care as a universal right,
in terms of both access to and quality of care services. Households usually bear
the ultimate responsibility for filling care deficits and assume care responsibili-
ties when public provisions are lacking. Important areas of intervention include
labor market regulation and provisions of public care services. The state also has
an active role to play in encouraging and incentivizing the private sector to offer
gender-inclusive family-friendly employment policies to maintain work–life
balance and maternity and paternity leave; they must support carers at the
workplace. The last point of the care diamond, the community, can also
support care work in various ways, from formalized entities to unofficial
community-based networks.
Paid care work is systematically undervalued and underpaid. Policy efforts
should seek to adequately reward paid care work, recognizing that it requires
skills and resources. This includes regulating formal employment terms and
conditions so that they reflect the principles of equal pay for equal work and
decent working conditions. It is crucial to recognize that most of the labor force
in sub-Saharan Africa, especially care workers, is concentrated in the informal
sector. Thus, the state must focus its efforts on formalizing care systems and
ensuring that social protection schemes include informal workers and migrant
workers. Laws and policy measures must also ensure safe working conditions for
paid care workers. Promoting representation of workers through collective bar-
gaining and social dialogue is an equally important focus area. Decades of
privatization and austerity have eroded collective bargaining power (Montague-
Nelson 2022), but collective action remains an important forum in which paid
care workers, especially women, can engage with employers and governments to
discuss and negotiate working conditions and participate in decision-making
processes.
Although not officially a part of the 5R framework, there is an emerging need
to recognize the significance of resilience as an important characteristic of care
systems. The COVID-19 pandemic shed light on the importance of care in the
face of crisis. Sub-Saharan Africa is prone to various crises, including conflicts,
climate change, and public health emergencies. Essential care services are needed
more than ever in crisis situations, which often exacerbate the gendered distribu-
tion of care work. Thus, policy efforts need to promote resilient care systems in
the face of spiraling care needs and demands on women and girls, and such
efforts must address how crises affect food and energy shortages as well as forced
migration.

The State of Care Services in Sub-Saharan Africa and the ACEI

There are large deficits in the coverage of care policies across sub-Saharan Africa,
and all countries are far from realizing universal care provisions. Legislation for
maternity leave, ranging from 8 to 17 weeks, exists in 23 African states.6 A few
countries offer paid paternity leaves, but they are considerably shorter and range
from 1 day to 10 days. There is a distinct lack of socialized childcare, elder care,
and care for people living with disability; only a few countries regulate private
provision of care in these areas. Socialized health care is also generally lacking and
inadequate in size and accessibility. Notably, Kenya has recently set precedence by
being the first country in the region to start work on a comprehensive care policy,
though many countries do have legislation that addresses specific aspects of care.
ACEI is a tool developed by the African Women’s Development and
Communication Network (FEMNET) to measure social recognition and state
support for care work in Africa. The index is composed of 10 basic metrics
related to legislation, policy, and government expenditure. They are maternity
and paternity leave, socialized childcare, socialized care for the elderly, social-
ized care for people living with disability, socialized health care, socialized food
production, COVID care measures, domestic worker protection, care grants
and subsidies, and family care leave. The index assigns a score out of 30, and a
score of 18 and above is considered a passing grade. FEMNET analyzed and
assigned a measure of the index in 54 African countries (Valiani 2022). All
54 countries scored less than 8, much below the passing grade. Burkina Faso
(7.2), Ethiopia (6.3), Zimbabwe (6.0), South Africa (5.7), Kenya (5.7), and
Ghana (5.5) were the top-scoring countries, with index values higher than 5.
The Gambia (0.9), Nigeria (0.9), and Eritrea (0.3) were the lowest-scoring
countries, with index values less than 5.
FROM BETTER DATA TO BETTER MEASURES

OF PROGRESS
Care work should be understood contextually because it is deeply influenced by
social norms, cultural practices, and historical factors specific to a given society or
region. In this section, the authors emphasize the importance of a pan-African
feminist framing of care and consider the role of TUSs and qualitative data. This
section also discusses the exclusion of care work from GDP and income estimates
and the need for reliable and sex-disaggregated data to inform gender-sensitive
policies and programs in the region.
6
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire,
Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, and Ghana.

A Context-Specific Understanding of Care Work

Economists, feminists, and feminist economists have been discussing care since the
1960s, as highlighted in Ossome and Naidu (2021). Care work is central to human
societies and essential for the functioning of families, societies, and economies. Care
is defined by interdependence and interconnectedness, given the care needs of a
person over a lifetime, from childhood to old age, and given the prevalence of sick-
ness and disabilities. This interconnectedness is similar to the South African ethos
of “Ubuntu,” or “togetherness.” Ubuntu highlights that “an authentic individual
human being is part of a larger and more significant relational, communal, societal,
environmental, and spiritual world” (Mugumbate and Chereni 2020).
Precisely due to this nature of care, it is heavily influenced by social norms that
define what is good care, who is the caregiver, and who is the care recipient. Thus, a
discussion and understanding of care must acknowledge how culture, religion, and
history have contributed to the formation of these norms in the African context.
Conceptual understandings of care, especially at a policy level, do not include a
pan-African feminist framing, which is unsurprising given that care has not been a
policy priority in the region. A growing body of thought and research on care work
and the care economy in Africa is highlighting the need to define care for the region
that considers more than just childcare, domestic work, and health care. The
extended values of Ubuntu that embrace care for informal networks within the com-
munity, including extended families and friends and humanitarian work, should be
considered. Furthermore, care work could extend to traditions of well-being, such as
Indigenous healing practices, environmental protection, and spiritual care.
TUSs constitute a key source of quantitative data on unpaid care work.
Although difficulties in implementing TUSs have been briefly discussed, their effec-
tiveness in the African context must be further interrogated. For instance, what
qualifies as a “household”? The answer is important because this unit is used to link
the number of dependents and amount of care work needed. These contextual
considerations must be balanced with concerns for international comparability.
Much can be gained by conducting TUSs that are at least regionally harmonized—
something that has not been achieved among the few such surveys that have been
conducted so far. Furthermore, while TUSs give a quantitative estimate of time
invested in unpaid care work, they are insufficient to understand the consequences
and patterns that emerge from the observed time-use trends. Documenting real
stories of people’s, especially women’s and girls’, lived experience is required to
deeply understand the extent of care labor and its value to the household and com-
munity. Detailed community studies can also provide a better understanding of the
local environments in which unpaid care work takes place (Folbre 2018).
Incorporating Data in National Statistics and Measures of

Economic Progress
Unpaid care work generally compensates for a lack of public expenditure on care
infrastructure and services. Despite its substantial magnitude and contribution to
the economy, unpaid care work is excluded from the measurement of GDP, the

Figure 17.5. Value of Unpaid Care Work as a Percentage of GDP, US Dollar

PPP 2011, by Gender and Country
(Percent of GDP)
12
Women Men
10.5
10
9 8.8
7.6 7.9
8 7.2
5.9 6
6
3.8
4
0
Benin Cameroon Ethiopia Ghana Madagascar Mali Mauritius South Tanzania
Africa
Source: Addati and others 2018.
Note: Refer to Annex 17.1 for survey year and characteristics. PPP = purchasing power parity.
main indicator of national income. Although GDP is often used as an indicator

of development, it underestimates overall economic activity and undervalues
social well-being. Figure 17.5 presents ILO estimates (Addati and others 2018)
for the value of unpaid care work as a percentage of GDP for nine sub-Saharan
African countries. These estimates are calculated by assigning a monetary value to
time spent on unpaid care work by costing time based on minimum wages in the
country, known as the opportunity cost approach. Women’s unpaid care work
ranges from 8.6 percent in Madagascar to 3 percent in Mauritius, and men’s
contribution ranges from 2.5 percent in South Africa to 0.6 percent in Mali.
Although there are concerns that such estimates may be imprecise, they provide
at least a lower bound to the economic value of unpaid care work. These concerns
also overlook the reality that despite its considerable contribution, unpaid care
work is currently valued at zero.
Another important consideration that has received less attention is valuation
at the household level. Unpaid care work is not accounted for in household
income or consumption estimates (Folbre 2015). Market-centric discussions
about women’s labor supply and labor market participation fail to recognize that
unpaid care work is an essential complement to market income. Thus,
market-based income measures ignore the opportunity cost of reduced time for
unpaid care. Investment in time-saving devices and basic infrastructure could
significantly improve women’s productivity, increase their participation in paid
work, and enhance household living standards. Such payoffs to public invest-
ments are understated when nonmarket work is not valued.
Lack of reliable and sex-disaggregated data on unpaid care work is a major
barrier to gender-sensitive policy and programming. Efforts across the world and

especially in sub-Saharan Africa still have a long way to go. Although there are
some general trends in unpaid care work, there is considerable heterogeneity in
the state of the care economy across nations. Thus, a more localized and contex-
tual understanding of unpaid care work and care needs is needed. Such efforts are
also important for tracking overall progress toward the care agenda at the national
and regional levels and for sharing learnings across the region.
CONCLUSION
Women and girls play a significant role in providing care services across sub-
Saharan Africa, in both an unpaid and a paid capacity. Care responsibilities have
a negative impact on the ability of women to participate in the economy; form a
barrier to their social, learning, and leadership opportunities; and affect their
well-being and social status.
Most care services are provided by the family or household in an unpaid capac-
ity, while paid care workers deliver a smaller, but important, proportion of care
services. Women in sub-Saharan Africa spend more time on unpaid care work
than do men, which leads to time poverty for employed women as well as gender
gaps in labor force participation and time spent on paid work. Even as women
enter the labor force, their unpaid care work responsibilities do not reduce pro-
portionately. Thus, employed women work a “double shift”—one at work and
one at home. Women from varied socioeconomic backgrounds have varying
responsibilities for care work, and gender gaps in time use are not uniform.
Hence, policymakers must employ an intersectional approach when devising care
policies and care infrastructure. Unfortunately, any understanding of unpaid care
work in sub-Saharan Africa is severely limited by data unavailability. TUSs are the
most important source of data on unpaid care work, and few countries in the
region have conducted a TUS in the past three decades.
Care jobs, especially paid domestic work, are a big source of employment for
women. The paid care workforce is very small in sub-Saharan Africa and suggests
deficiencies in care service provisions. Women’s care jobs, on average, are charac-
terized by low pay, informal contracts, and difficult and unsafe working condi-
tions. Most of these jobs are domestic work. The role of social norms in observed
gender gaps cannot be overstated. Gender stereotypes of unpaid care work and
the social association of women’s “natural” inclination toward caring explain to a
great extent the high level of feminization prevalent in paid care employment.
Policymakers first need to recognize the care agenda as an important policy
priority. Universal provision of quality and accessible care services is still far from
reality on the continent. Public investment in social care and physical rural infra-
structure is required to reduce time spent on unpaid care work. Redistributing
care work between men and women and between social actors—households,
markets, the state, and the community—is also an important part of the care
agenda. Policies must focus on adequately rewarding paid care work and promot-
ing representation of paid care workers through collective bargaining and social
dialogue.

Care work must be understood in a context-specific manner—one that con-

siders social norms and the extended values of Ubuntu. Because unpaid care work
is excluded from the measurement of GDP, as such, GDP underestimates overall
economic activity and undervalues social well-being. Efforts to collect reliable and
sex-disaggregated data on care work, as well as including such data in national
statistics, are necessary for tracking progress at the national and regional levels.
TUSs are a key source of quantitative data on unpaid care work, but their imple-
mentation in sub-Saharan Africa must be carefully examined to balance contex-
tual considerations with concerns for international comparability. A key priority
for the care agenda is to strengthen the production and dissemination of data and
statistics on care work and care-related policies.
ANNEX 17.1
ANNEX TABLE 17.1.1.
Time-Use Survey Characteristics, by Country

Survey Mode of Data
Country Year Period Type of Survey Sample Size Instrument Collection
Benin 2015 1 month Module of household 13,026 individuals One diary Interview
survey
Cameroon 2014 1 month Module of household 4,988 households One diary Interview
survey
Cabo Verde 2012 3 months Module of household 3,390 households One diary Interview
survey
Ethiopia 2013 1 month Stand-alone 52,262 individuals One diary Interview
Ghana 2009 2 months Stand-alone 9,297 individuals One diary Interview
Madagascar 2001 2 months Stand-alone, sub 7,749 individuals One diary Interview
sample of household
survey
Mali 208 2 months Stand-alone 2,249 individuals One diary Interview
Mauritius 2003 2 months Module of household 6,480 households One diary Interview
survey
South Africa 2010 3 months Stand-alone 30,897 individuals One diary Interview
Tanzania 2014 4 quarters Module of household 10,553 individuals One diary Interview
survey

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CHAPTER 18
Fintech, Female Employment, and

Gender Inequality
Boileau Loko and Yuanchen Yang
Fintech—new technology in finance that delivers financial services digitally—promises

to promote financial inclusion and close the gender gap. Using a novel fintech data set,
this study shows that fintech adoption significantly improves female employment and
reduces gender inequality. The effect is more pronounced in firms without traditional
financial access. Fintech not only increases the number and ratio of female employees in
the workforce but also mitigates the financial constraints of female-headed firms.
However, poor institutions and governance weaken such benefits.
INTRODUCTION
Gender equality lays the foundation for a peaceful, prosperous, and sustainable
world (United Nations Development Programme 2020). Despite progress made
over the past decades, as highlighted in Chapters 1 and 2, many challenges
remain—women experience higher poverty levels, unemployment, and other
economic hardships (IMF 2021). In the global financial system, women continue
to be underrepresented at all levels, from depositors and borrowers to managers
and regulators (Sahay and Cihak 2018).
Much hope exists that new technology in finance (fintech), which has spread
quickly worldwide, will unlock vast potential for stimulating economic growth and
increasing social welfare. Fintech could also help reduce gender inequality and pro-
mote female employment, particularly in the current context, where the COVID-
19 pandemic has exacerbated the existing gender gap in employment (Figure 18.1).
According to the World Bank, the current global employment rate is less than
46 percent for women but 71 percent for men. Boosting female employment could
generate substantial growth benefits (IMF 2021; International Labour Organization
2022) and lay the foundation for other forms of gender equality, such as income
and social status, while boosting macroeconomic outcomes.
Loko and Yang’s study (2022) was among the first to shed light on the link
between fintech and gender inequality measured by female employment. Previous
research had focused on specific case studies; however, Loko and Yang used a
cross-country data set covering 114 economies and a range of gender inequality
indicators at the micro level. They showed that women—traditionally marginalized
by the formal financial system—can be included and experience improved welfare
in the new fintech ecosystem.
333

Figure 18.1. Employment Rate by Gender

(Percent)
80 Female Male
75
75.4 75.1 74.8 74.5 74.3
70 74.0 73.7 73.4 73.3
71.3
65
60
55
48.5 48.2 48.0 47.9 47.9 47.8 47.7 47.6 47.8
50 45.9
45
40
2011 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Sources: International Labour Organization; and author calculations.
Note: Female (male) employment represents the labor force participation rate of female (male)
population ages 15+ based on modeled International Labour Organization estimate.
Using a novel fintech indicator and firm-level employment data, this study1
shows that fintech adoption significantly improves female employment and reduces
gender inequality worldwide and in the sub-Saharan African region. Specifically, a
1 percent increase in the scale of fintech usage is associated with a 1.4 percent
increase in the number of female workers and a 0.4 percent increase in the ratio of
female to total employees in the sample firms. The economic significance is pro-
nounced, given that female employees represent only 32 percent of employees in
the sample. Fintech not only increases the number and ratio of female employees in
the workforce but also mitigates the financial constraints of female-headed firms.
The effects are more pronounced in firms without traditional financial access.
However, the digital divide and poor institutions weaken such benefits.
Admittedly, a significant gender divide exists in accessing fintech services that can
be ascribed largely to differences in attitudes toward privacy and technology (Chen
and others 2021) and technological and institutional factors. This study identifies
technological, legal, and regulatory barriers that have constrained fintech usage and
proposes pathways to build a more gender-inclusive financial ecosystem.
BACKGROUND
Using digital platforms, fintech could easily cross physical barriers and expand
financial services to geographically marginalized communities. With these digital
platforms making big data available, fintech firms can process borrower information
more efficiently and overcome information asymmetry. Unlike their traditional
1
This chapter draws upon Loko and Yang 2022.

Chapter 18 Fintech, Female Employment, and Gender Inequality 335
counterparts with heavier compliance and capital requirements, fintech firms have
lighter regulations, enabling them to operate nimbly in certain market segments,
lend with less collateral, and better support the economy. When viewed through a
gender lens, the benefits from fintech could therefore be significant.
First, fintech can leverage digital financial tools to increase access to and use of
financial services, benefiting populations disproportionately excluded from the
traditional financial system (Sahay and others 2020). According to the World Bank
Group’s 2017 Global Findex report, more than 25 percent of women still do not
use or have access to the financial system, and more than 70 percent of female-
owned small and medium enterprises have inadequate or no access to financial
services (World Bank 2017; Demirgüç-Kunt and others 2018). Developing
fintech-enabled services will likely lead to greater convenience, privacy, and security
for the traditionally unbanked or underbanked female population.
Second, fintech can better evaluate the creditworthiness of individuals whom
the traditional financial system may have previously marginalized due to no or
minimal credit history. Using alternative data—for example, information gener-
ated by and about consumers on digital platforms—fintech helps loan providers
make lending decisions without relying on credit reports or scores. Many loan
applicants, including female applicants with no credit reports or credit scores,
would benefit from these innovative measures to assess credit risk and model
creditworthiness.
Third, fintech can facilitate access to financing, especially for female-headed
households and businesses. Worldwide, an estimated $300 billion financing gap
exists for formal, female-owned small businesses (International Finance
Corporation [IFC] 2017). Without such access, women face difficulties collecting
and saving income, growing their own businesses (Sahay and others 2015), and
pulling their families out of poverty. Many fintech-based platforms operating on
“big data, small credit” propositions can contribute to women’s economic
empowerment and entrepreneurship by targeting small and medium enterprises,
lowering interest rates, and relaxing collateral requirements.
Most studies analyzing the nexus between fintech and inequality have focused
on income inequality (Suri and Jack 2016; Asongu and Nwachukwu 2018; Demir
and others 2020; Zhang and others 2020; Chinoda, Mashamba, and Vivian
2021). Several studies have pointed to either finance or technology as a positive
force for improving female employment. Based on a sample of 48 African coun-
tries, Ngoa and Song (2021) concluded that information and communications
technology (ICT) significantly stimulates female labor market participation, and
financial development enhances the effect. Focusing also on Africa, Asongu and
Odhiambo (2019) showed that promoting ICT beyond certain thresholds is nec-
essary for ICT to mitigate inequality and increase female participation in the
economy. Studies focused on Europe and Asia also found a positive impact of
finance and technology on female employment (Nassani, Aldakhil, and Moinuddin
2019; Chen and others 2021). However, few, if any, studies have examined the
intersection of female employment with fintech. This gap derives partly from the
lack of data and partly because of the difficulty in establishing causality.

Identifying the causal effects of fintech development on female employ-

ment is challenging because of well-known endogeneity concerns, namely the
potential correlation between explanatory variables and the error term that
arises from omitted variable and simultaneity (Yang 2021). Building on the
seminal work of Rajan and Zingales (1998), this study makes progress on
establishing causality by including an array of controls and interacted fixed
effects (country-industry and year) that allow accounting for a range of omit-
ted variables.
As fintech expands access to financial services and credit, its adoption should
disproportionately help firms with financial constraints, high-tech firms facing
greater information asymmetry and thus higher borrowing costs, and firms with-
out existing financial access. The study provides detailed evidence on economic
mechanisms through which fintech development affects female employment by
including several interaction terms between fintech and firm characteristics such
as financial constraint, high-tech intensiveness, and loan access. In this way, the
model specification captures the rich dynamics between fintech and firm vari-
ables, allowing for more reliable statistical inferences.
LINK BETWEEN GENDER INEQUALITY AND FINTECH

Empirical Strategy
To estimate the relation between fintech and gender inequality, Loko and Yang
(2022) constructed the following baseline model, as shown in equations (18.1)
and (18.2):
Genderi,j,t = β0 + β1Fintechi,t−1 + β2 Xi,t−1 + β3Ii,j,t−1 + ηi,k + μt + εi,j,t (18.1)
Genderi,j,t = β΄0 + β΄1Lendingi,t−1 + β΄2Capital Raisingi,t−1 + β΄3 Xi,t−1

+ β΄4Ii,j,t−1 + ηi,k + μt + εi,j,t (18.2)
where Genderi,j,t refers to the level of gender inequality of country i, firm j, in
year t, measured by the number of female employees and the ratio of female
employees over female and male employees in the sampling firms. Fintechi,t cap-
tures the fintech development of country i in year t, measured by the volume of
alternative finance, which can be further classified into digital Lending and digital
Capital Raising. Xi,t−1 is a vector of country-level controls, including the natural
logarithm of per capita GDP, GDP growth rate, and trade openness. Ii,t−1 is a
vector of firm-level controls, comprising firm size, firm age, export dependence,
foreign ownership, and sector specialization. All explanatory variables are lagged
by one year to mitigate endogeneity concerns.
Variable ηi,k accounts for country–industry fixed effect that absorbs variations
in the financial environment between countries and industries, such as systematic
differences in economic development, government policies, and industry-specific
reforms. The μt denotes year fixed effect that picks up any variation in the

outcome that happens over time and is not attributable to other explanatory
variables. Standard errors are clustered at the country and industry levels to
account for heteroskedasticity.
The coefficients of interest are β1, β΄1, and β΄2, which are associated with fintech
variables. If they are positive and significant, it suggests that a higher level of
fintech development is associated with higher female representation in the work-
force, hence a lower degree of gender inequality. If they are negative and signifi-
cant, a negative correlation between fintech development and gender equality can
be inferred.
As discussed earlier, identifying the causal effects is a challenge because of the
potential correlation between right-side variables and the error term arising most
notably from omitted variables and reverse causality. On the one hand, omitted
variables could bias the estimation that results from traditional cross-country
regressions. Unobservable country or industry characteristics related to both fin-
tech and female employment are left in the error term, making statistical infer-
ences hard to draw. On the other hand, a higher female employment rate could
increase the use of fintech.
In their pioneering work, Rajan and Zingales (1998) proposed a fixed-effect
identification strategy with interaction terms. They showed that better-developed
financial markets lead to higher economic growth in industries heavily dependent
on external finance. Loko and Yang (2022) built on this work and established the
following model that extends their empirical framework to the fintech setting. By
estimating various forms of the model, this study examines the effects of fintech
on gender inequality, as shown in equation (18.3):
Genderi,j,t = α + β(Fintechi,t−1 × Firmj) + γFintechi,t−1 + ρFirmj + δIi,j,t−1
+ ηi,k + μt + εi,j,t (18.3)
where Firmj is firm-level financial constraint, loan access, digital infrastructure,
and other variables that capture economic mechanisms and help with identifica-
tion. Note that only additional explanatory variables that vary both with country
and firm need to be included. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year to
mitigate simultaneity concerns.
One key virtue of the model is that it allows using interacted fixed effects
(country–industry and year) to control for a range of omitted variables. Thus, the
model treats country and firm characteristics in ways that previous cross-country
empirical studies could not correct and will be less subject to criticism about the
model’s specifications. When interpreting the results, the focus is on the signs and
economic significance of β. A positive (negative) and significant coefficient indi-
cates that fintech exerts a disproportionately positive (negative) effect on firms
with financial constraints, high-tech intensiveness, loan access, and internet
access. In addition, including various interaction terms clearly illustrates the spe-
cific mechanisms through which fintech affects female employment. These mech-
anisms are firmly grounded in economic theories, thus effectively addressing
concerns of reverse causality.

Data
The data on fintech adoption derive from the Cambridge Alternative Finance
Benchmark, which contains the volume of finance through digital platforms from
the world’s 191 jurisdictions spanning 2011–20.2 The benchmark is based on an
online survey hosted by the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance Judge
Business School in partnership with the University of Agder (for the EU report),
the University of Chicago Booth School of Business (for the Americas study), the
University of Sydney Business School, the University of Tsinghua Graduate
School at Shenzhen, Shanghai Jiaotong University Law School (for the Asia-
Pacific regional study), and Nesta (for the UK report).
Data on female employment come from the World Bank Enterprise Survey
(WBES). Since the 1990s, this renowned firm-level survey has covered a rep-
resentative sample of firms in the world’s major economies. The WBES is a
standard establishment-level survey representative of the nonagricultural, non-
extractive private sector, covering registered establishments with five or more
employees. The database covers various business environment topics, includ-
ing access to finance, corruption, infrastructure, crime, competition, and
performance measures. However, given the incidence of agriculture in female
employment, the WBES database that only includes manufacturing and ser-
vice industries has certain limitations.
In addition to the main variables of interest, the country-level control vari-
ables derive from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. To
estimate mediating effects, the study merges the existing data set with the
Worldwide Governance Indicators proposed by Kaufmann and Kraay in 1999.
The indicators report on six broad dimensions of governance—voice and
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality,
rule of law, and control of corruption—for more than 200 countries and terri-
tories over the period 1996–2020. The Women, Business and Law Index
derives from the World Bank’s annual report under the same title that analyzes
laws and regulations affecting women’s economic opportunity in 190
economies.
The sample period is 2011–20, the overlapping years of all previously refer-
enced databases.
2
Loko and Yang (2022) chose the current fintech indicator over other fintech-related indexes, includ-
ing Global FINDEX compiled by WB and FAS compiled by IMF for the following reasons: (1) They
are published in waves and the only available years are 2011, 2014, and 2017, making it difficult to
perform reliable panel-based analysis; (2) the fintech landscape has been changing rapidly since 2017,
making it preferable to use the latest data available to reflect the most recent developments; (3) Global
FINDEX and FAS do not make the distinction between lending and equity financing, which is eco-
nomically important given the vastly different natures of, and incentives offered by, debt and equity
financing. The final index on alternative finance includes financial channels and instruments that
emerge outside the traditional financial system. Mobile money and internet banking that are often
operated by traditional banks are thus not included.

Results
Table 18.1 provides the baseline regression results. In column (1), equation (18.1)
is estimated using the number of female employees as the dependent variable and
the level of overall fintech finance as the independent variable. Dropping missing
values leads to a sample of 22,631 firms. The fintech coefficient is positive and
significant at the 1 percent level. The result appears consistent with the hypothesis
that fintech development is associated with a significant increase in female
employment. Specifically, a 1 percent increase in the volume of transactions
through fintech platforms is associated with a 1.4 percent increase in the number
of female full-time employees in sample firms.
A likely explanation is that with easier financial access enabled by fintech,
firms have more financial resources to expand their businesses, make investments,
and boost production. Since capital and labor are complements in the production
TABLE 18.1.
Fintech Development and Female Employment

(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Female Employees Female Ratio Female Employees Female Ratio
Fintech 1.363*** 0.375***
(0.456) (0.112)
Lending −0.143* −0.047***
(0.083) (0.011)
Capital Raising 0.776*** 0.152***
(0.112) (0.019)
GDP 2.931** 0.642* −1.344*** −0.334***
(1.318) (0.330) (0.114) (0.020)
GDP Growth −0.627* −0.094 0.098** 0.060***
(0.329) (0.084) (0.046) (0.006)
Openness 6.764** 1.543** −0.023 0.595***
(2.774) (0.702) (0.826) (0.110)
Sales 0.354*** −0.003*** 0.366*** −0.006***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
Age 0.081*** −0.003 0.086*** −0.002
(0.010) (0.002) (0.012) (0.003)
Export Share 0.109*** −0.014* 0.027 −0.021**
(0.041) (0.007) (0.050) (0.009)
Foreign Ownership 0.306*** 0.025*** 0.311*** 0.027***
(0.033) (0.006) (0.043) (0.008)
Sector Specialization 0.068 −0.056 0.020 −0.056
(0.448) (0.076) (0.434) (0.077)
Constant −29.434*** −6.675*** −3.488*** 0.228
(8.811) (2.161) (0.945) (0.155)
Country–industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22631 26447 14631 17021
R2 0.390 0.263 0.393 0.270
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook database; Loko and Yang 2022; World Bank Enterprise Survey; and author calculations
based on data from Cambridge Alternative Finance Benchmark.
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.

process (Allen 1968), increased investments create more demand for laborers,
including female laborers (Benmelech, Bergman, and Seru 2011).
In column (2), the dependent variable Female Employees was replaced with
the ratio of female employees over total employees and we found a significantly
positive correlation between fintech development and female ratio. The results
indicate that fintech adoption not only leads to more jobs for women but also
raises the ratio of female to male workers.
Next, the fintech indicator was disaggregated into fintech lending and fintech
capital raising instruments. Interestingly, opposite signs were observed on the
estimated coefficients. Despite the overall positive influence of fintech on female
employment, the correlation between fintech lending and female employment is
negative and significant. In contrast, the coefficient on capital raising is positive
and significant at the 1 percent level, consistent with the hypothesis that equity-
like instruments are more effective tools to mitigate financial distress than debt-
like instruments. The results highlight the importance of distinguishing between
different fintech tools in estimating the economic impact.
GENDER INEQUALITY, FINTECH, AND

FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
How does fintech disproportionately increase the number of female employees?
First, fintech reduces firms’ financial constraints. With more financial resources
made available through fintech, employers might be able to hire female workers
who require on-job trainings, maternity leave, flexible hours, and other benefits
(Liu and others 2017; Lim and Zabek 2021; Kalev and Dobbin 2022). If this
hypothesis is true, a more pronounced effect should occur in firms with finan-
cial constraints. This study tests this hypothesis by interacting the fintech indi-
cator with a firm’s financial constraint; Table 18.2 presents the results.
Consistent with the hypothesis, the coefficient on the interaction term is posi-
tive and significant (column 1), suggesting a stronger effect for financially
constrained firms. Thus, fintech promotes female employment by providing
firms with more financial resources to hire more employees, especially female
employees.
Fintech adoption could disproportionately benefit female-led firms, which are
more likely to hire female workers (West and Sundaramurthy 2019). Numerous
studies have documented a gender divide in financial access (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2016). Women are less
likely than men to obtain the financing needed to start a business because of a
lack of collateral guarantees, a lack of credit history, or the bank’s practice of
gender discrimination. With a lower collateral requirement and alternative ways
to establish credit worthiness, fintech is expected to provide more convenient
access to finance for female borrowers. The results, reported in Model 2 of
Table 18.2, confirmed the conjecture. The effect of fintech is positive and signif-
icant in female-led firms, suggesting that fintech can contribute to a more equal
distribution of financial resources between genders.

TABLE 18.2.
Gender Inequality, Fintech, and Firm Characteristics

(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Female Employees
Fintech 0.444* 0.406* 0.555** 0.727**
(0.238) (0.236) (0.282) (0.291)
Fintech × Financial Obstacle 0.016***
(0.006)
Fintech × Female–Led 0.014**
(0.006)
Fintech × Small Business 0.017***
(0.005)
Fintech × Service Sector 0.044**
(0.018)
Financial Obstacle −0.272***
(0.088)
Female-Led –0.173*
(0.093)
Small Business 0.175**
(0.075)
Service Sector –0.424*
(0.255)
Age 0.186*** 0.186*** 0.174*** 0.189***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Export Share 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign Ownership 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant –5.524 –4.981 21.222* 16.140
(3.601) (3.580) (12.399) (12.873)
Country–industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,120 25,120 25,120 25,142
R2 0.150 0.150 0.173 0.096
A stronger effect of fintech on small businesses should also be expected. Small

firms are often unable to pledge collateral due to the lack of collateral assets
(Nguyen and Qian 2012). In the meantime, small firms tend to hire more women
than larger firms do, as the latter prefer more educated workers (Paik 2008). This
study tests this hypothesis by interacting the fintech indicator with a dummy that
indicates small business. The positive and significant sign on the interaction term
in Model (3) of Table 18.2 confirms the stronger impact on small businesses.
In addition, more women cluster in the service industry because of their com-
parative advantages, for example in interactive tasks (Georgieva and others 2020).
In contrast to manufacturing sector firms, service sector firms have more intangible
assets such as goodwill and trademarks. The limited collateral value of intangible
assets restricts the use of traditional financial instruments such as bank loans (Hsu,
Tian, and Xu 2014). The traditional financial system often discriminates and mar-
ginalizes service sector firms, which are thus more likely to face financial constraints.

Consistent with this hypothesis, the coefficient on the interaction term in Model
(4) of Table 18.2 is positive and significant, suggesting that fintech adoption brings
additional benefits to firms in service sectors.
In summary, fintech promotes female employment mainly through a favorable
allocation of financial resources to firms that are more female-labor intensive, and
more likely to have financial constraints, such as female-led and small firms and
firms in service sectors.
GENDER INEQUALITY, FINTECH, AND

COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS
The impact of fintech development on female employment could vary with the
heterogeneity in countries’ institutional quality. To test this hypothesis, sample
firms were divided based on the institutional quality of the country that hosts
their headquarters. The study examines four governance dimensions—female
business law, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law.
Table 18.3 displays the results and shows that women living in countries with
better legal protection are likely to benefit more from fintech.
TABLE 18.3.
Gender Inequality, Fintech, and Country Characteristics

Stronger Law Protection Weaker Law Protection
(1) (2)
Variables Female Employees
Fintech 1.441*** 0.027
(0.452) (0.025)
GDP 3.238** 0.391***
(1.312) (0.091)
GDP Growth −0.714** 0.064***
(0.327) (0.005)
Openness 7.533*** 1.873**
(2.766) (0.753)
Sales 0.393*** 0.269***
(0.006) (0.008)
Age 0.083*** 0.069***
(0.011) (0.018)
Export Share 0.095** 0.090
(0.047) (0.077)
Foreign Ownership 0.285*** 0.291***
(0.037) (0.074)
Sector Specialization 0.001 0.607**
(0.458) (0.251)
Constant −31.661*** −7.905***
(8.754) (1.017)
Country–industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 15,849 6,782
R2 0.406 0.370

In untabulated results, the details of which can be found in the original paper,
countries with greater government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the rule
of law experience greater welfare improvement via fintech. To some extent, insti-
tutional quality could increase the risk aversion of the country’s investors, dis-
couraging the development of fintech innovations and thus limiting its impact on
gender inequality.
The sample countries are also examined in regional groups, based on the geo-
graphical classification in WBES. The results, summarized in Table 18.4, point to
a greater effect of fintech on female employee ratio in sub-Saharan Africa than in
other regions, as suggested by the larger magnitude of the coefficient in the
sub-Saharan Africa subsample. Fintech positively affects female employment in
Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and Central Asia whereas it negatively affects female
employment in Middle Eastern and northern African countries.
Interestingly, a positive association exists between fintech and female employ-
ment in sub-Saharan Africa. With less developed financial markets, sub-Saharan
African countries are home to fewer entrenched players than advanced economies.
As a result, they may offer more opportunities for innovation, as disrupting the
equilibrium faces less resistance.
TABLE 18.4.
Gender Inequality and Fintech in Different Regions

Sub-Saharan Asia and Europe and Middle East and Latin America
Africa Pacific Central Asia North Africa and Caribbean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Female Ratio
Fintech 0.142*** 0.041*** 0.104*** −0.032*** −0.012
(0.041) (0.006) (0.016) (0.004) (0.012)
GDP −9.370*** −0.068*** 0.043 0.032 0.006
(2.664) (0.015) (0.096) (0.023) (0.026)
GDP Growth 0.966*** 0.004 −0.037 0.000 0.008
(0.276) (0.017) (0.063) (0.002) (0.011)
Openness −0.607*** 0.066* 0.661* 0.063* −0.091
(0.171) (0.036) (0.373) (0.033) (0.197)
Sales −0.001 0.001 −0.007*** −0.003 −0.005**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Age −0.008** −0.012** 0.000 0.010** 0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
Export Share −0.026* 0.006 −0.034*** 0.061** 0.030
(0.014) (0.020) (0.011) (0.024) (0.028)
Foreign Ownership −0.014 0.055* 0.049*** 0.058* 0.028*
(0.010) (0.033) (0.009) (0.031) (0.016)
Sector −0.059 0.135** −0.293*** −0.114 0.261***
(0.068) (0.064) (0.024) (0.101) (0.062)
Constant −1.451*** −0.170 −0.379 0.547*** 0.328
(0.416) (0.365) (0.327) (0.143) (0.312)
Country–industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,614 3,765 10,766 2,629 2,673
R2 0.136 0.283 0.296 0.084 0.087

Taken together, the findings not only confirm the previous estimates about the
association between fintech and female employment but also show that prevailing
governance ineffectiveness, poor regulatory quality, and weak rule of law associated
with less developed countries constitute major obstacles to fintech adoption in these
economies.
CONCLUSION
Fintech development leads to significant welfare improvements for women. It not
only increases the number of female employees in the workforce but also raises
the ratio of female relative to male employees. This study also sheds light on the
economic mechanisms—fintech provides easier financial access to firms with
financial constraints, especially female-led firms, small firms, and firms in service
sectors that traditionally hire more female workers.
Weak institutions reduce the positive effect of fintech. Fintech can significant-
ly increase female employment in countries with good governance, law, and reg-
ulations, while it has weaker benefits in countries whose institutional quality is
below the median. At the regional level, the effect of fintech is positive in sub-
Saharan African, Asian and Pacific, and European countries.
These results provide important policy implications. First, closing gender gaps
in digitalization is critical to fully reap fintech benefits on gender equality. In most
countries, unequal access to mobile phones and other electronic devices creates
financial inclusion gaps. For example, according to the OECD (2018), worldwide,
327 million fewer women than men have a smartphone and can access the mobile
internet. The findings indicate that the inequality-reducing effects of fintech are
significantly weaker in firms without access to the internet compared to firms with
such access. Thus, the digital divide must be addressed, for example, by investing
in technological innovation and increasing the supply of digital infrastructure, to
fully leverage fintech benefits. Second, policymakers need to promote good gover-
nance, laws, and regulations to ensure that fintech effectively reduces gender
inequality.
Valuable avenues of research exist that are worth exploring: Does fintech help
reduce firms’ earning inequality in addition to the gender employment gap? What
are the fintech-related distributional effects and welfare implications on female-
led households and female entrepreneurs who start businesses? If banks and fin-
tech lenders compete on credit provision, how will that affect consumers and
investors? Do the new forms of financing introduced by fintech demand new
forms of regulation? Answering these questions allows a comprehensive approach
to building more gender-inclusive economies.
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CHAPTER 19
Digitalization and Gender

Equality in Political Leadership in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Diego B. P. Gomes and Carine Meyimdjui
This chapter examines the impact of digitalization on people’s perceptions of women as

political leaders in 34 sub-Saharan African countries. We find that being a social media
or internet user is linked to a higher likelihood of supporting gender equality in political
leadership; however, the intensive margin of usage does not appear to be significant.
Furthermore, women’s perceptions of gender equality in political leadership are more
sensitive than men’s to internet and social media use. The chapter recommends policies
for improving information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure and
investing in technological education.
INTRODUCTION
Increasing gender diversity in political leadership is critical not only for fairness
and inclusion but also for potential economic benefits.1 First, diverse political
leadership can bring a variety of perspectives and experiences to policy- and
decision-making, resulting in more innovative and effective solutions to prob-
lems. This is especially important when dealing with economic issues because
different leaders may have dissimilar ideas about how to promote economic
growth and development. For example, Perkins, Phillips, and Pearce (2013)
found that in more ethnically diverse nations, a female national leader is
associated with higher GDP growth. Second, diverse political leadership can
improve a political system’s credibility and legitimacy, which can be important
for fostering economic confidence and attracting investment. A diverse group of
leaders perceived to represent the population’s interests can help to build trust
and support for the government and its policies. Third, diverse political leader-
ship can contribute to the creation of a more inclusive and equitable society,
which in turn can aid economic development. More people, regardless of their
background, participating in the political process and having access to leadership
roles can lead to greater prosperity and opportunity for all members of society.
1
For further reading on the subject and empirical evidence, see Hessami and da Fonseca (2020),
Anderson (2022), and the references therein.
347

This is especially important for marginalized groups, particularly women, who

may face economic barriers and would benefit from having representatives who
understand and advocate for their needs.2
Nonetheless, despite the importance of gender diversity in political leadership,
gender disparities in political participation are widespread around the world.
Perkins, Phillips, and Pearce (2013), for example, show that from 1950 to 2013,
less than 5 percent of national leaders in 188 countries were female. According to
the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report, the largest gender gap
today is in political participation; this report monitors progress toward gender
equality in four areas: economic participation and opportunity, educational
attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment. In the 2022 edition,
the political empowerment gap was found to be the largest of the four, with a
score of just 22 on a scale of 0 to 100 (where 100 represents total parity). The
gender gap in political participation is especially pronounced in Africa. According
to the World Economic Forum data, the average score for sub-Saharan Africa on
the political empowerment index is just 21.3, the lowest of any region in the
world, although heterogeneity exists between countries within the region.3 This
means that women in sub-Saharan Africa are even less likely than the global aver-
age to hold positions of political influence. This finding highlights the need for
increased efforts to promote gender equality in the political sphere and to ensure
that women, particularly in Africa, have equal opportunities to participate in
decision-making and leadership. Even though women have historically been suc-
cessful leaders, stereotypes and traditional barriers persist.4
Changes in perceptions of women as leaders constitute one likely mechanism
for increasing female political participation. Gender stereotypes and biases can
influence how women are perceived and treated in positions of leadership, pre-
venting them from achieving important roles in the political sphere. For instance,
society may judge women in political leadership positions more harshly than
2
According to Cowper-Coles (2020), more women in politics seem to be associated with lower levels
of corruption. Hence, having more women in political leadership in Africa could be an asset as the
region seeks to lower corruption.
3
According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, a significant disparity exists among
African countries in terms of the proportion of parliamentary seats held by women as of 2020. Despite
efforts in Rwanda (63.8 percent of parliamentary seats), Senegal (43 percent of parliamentary seats),
and South Africa (42 percent of parliamentary seats), countries such as Nigeria (less than 4 percent
of parliamentary seats) and Benin (less than 8 percent of parliamentary seats) continue to lag signifi-
cantly. More recently, the August 2022 elections in Kenya highlighted persistent threats to women,
with around a dozen of them being seriously and physically assaulted as they considered running for
political office (Akwiri and Miriri 2022).
4
Women have led as chiefs, monarchs, and politicians for centuries. Nefertiti (-1370 to -1330) and
Cleopatra (-51 to -30) reigned as pharaohs in ancient Egypt, and the Candaces of Meroe (-170 to
314) reigned as queens in Ethiopia. More recent examples include queen mother Yaa Asantewaa (1840
to 1921) of Ghana, who led the war against the British colonial authority; Aba, who organized a suc-
cessful revolution against the British tax regime in Ghana; Queen Nzinga of Angola (1624 to 1663),
who led an army of women against the Portuguese colonialists; and Zewditu, who ruled as Empress
of Ethiopia from 1916 to 1930 (Loiseau and Nowacka 2015; Deloitte 2019).

Chapter 19 Digitalization and Gender Equality in Political Leadership in Sub-Saharan Africa 349
men, and voters may perceive female candidates as less competent or likable.
Changing these perceptions and challenging gender stereotypes may help to
increase the number of women in positions of leadership in government and
parliament. Efforts could include raising awareness of existing biases as well as
initiatives to promote more positive images of women as leaders—for example,
by exposing society to real-life examples of successful female leaders and high-
lighting their accomplishments or providing training and support to women
seeking leadership roles.
Digitalization, through increased internet and social media usage, may be able
to help change perceptions of women as political leaders. The internet and social
media platforms offer myriad ways for people to access information locally and
worldwide, connect with others, and participate in public discourse. These tools
can help women showcase their ideas, experiences, and leadership skills as well as
challenge traditional gender stereotypes and biases. Social media platforms, for
example, can be used to amplify the voices of female politicians and leaders—and
to promote their work and accomplishments. This promotion can help increase
their visibility and credibility, and it can challenge the notion that women are
incapable of holding positions of leadership.
Furthermore, the internet and social media can provide a platform for women
to network and share resources and support.5 This is especially important for
women who may face barriers to entering or advancing in leadership roles, and
online channels can help to foster a sense of community and solidarity among
women in positions of leadership. Online channels can also expose users to the
positive work experiences of women in leadership roles—not only locally but also
globally—helping to show that when women are in positions of political leader-
ship, they can deliver exceptional results.
To shed light on the interplay between internet and social media usage and
perceptions of women as political leaders in Africa, the authors conducted an
empirical analysis using survey microdata from the Round 7 vintage of the
Afrobarometer covering 34 sub-Saharan African countries. The authors took
advantage of specific questions that asked people about their views on female
political leadership and their use of the internet and social media. The authors
then created indicator variables for gender equality in political leadership and for
internet and social media usage, as well as categorical variables that measure the
5
Individuals have been able to spread information about social movements around the world via
social media and the internet since the early 2000s. Some of these social movements include #Bring-
BackOurGirls in 2013, which spread the heartbreaking news of girls kidnapped from school by
Nigerian rebels, and #HeForShe in 2014, which invited men and others to stand in solidarity for
women, garnering the attention of more than a billion social media users. Other critical movements
include the 2012 #DelhiGangRape, the 2015 #sendeanlat (#tellyourstory in English), and the 2017
#MeToo (first used in 2006). In March 2020, a young female African journalist launched one of the
most successful African activism movements with #vraiefemmeafricaine (“genuine African woman” in
English), which ironically refers to the perception that African women should continue to be bound
by traditional laws to reflect their “Africanity.” The hashtag was used by millions of users, both male
and female, from other continents.

intensity of their use. Regressions were estimated with the indicator that measures
gender equality in political leadership as the outcome variable and the internet
and social media usage as the main independent variables. These regressions esti-
mate how much use of the internet and social media, and their intensity,
are related to the likelihood of people agreeing that women should have the same
chance as men to be elected political leaders. The regressions control for a wide
range of explanatory factors, including gender, age, education, religion, geograph-
ical region, and exposure to other media.
The results show that being a social media or internet user is associated with a
higher likelihood of agreeing that women should have equal chances as men to be
elected political leaders. According to the authors’ estimates, more people using
the internet is associated with a 3.2 percentage point increase in the proportion
of people who support that women should have equal opportunities in political
leadership as do men; for social media usage, the figure is 3.5 percentage points.
The findings also support the notion that women are more likely than men to
support gender equality in political leadership. Having a female identity is linked
to an increase in the likelihood of supporting women having equal opportunities
as men in political leadership positions by slightly more than 12.5 percentage
points. The results also support that women’s perceptions of gender equality in
political leadership are more sensitive than men’s to internet and social media use.
Finally, the authors find no compelling evidence to support the idea that the more
people who use the internet and social media, the more likely they are to support
women having equal opportunities as leaders as do men—that is, the intensive
margin of usage does not appear to be significant.
These results are closely related to those of Shamaileh (2016), who found evi-
dence that internet access improves women’s, but not men’s, perceptions of female
political leadership ability in the Arab world. The authors contribute to the discus-
sion by broadening the analysis to a wide range of sub-Saharan African countries,
investigating the impact not only of internet but also of social media usage, and by
considering the effects of the intensity of internet and social media use. This
research also speaks to that of Yang and others (2024), who investigated the role and
the impact of digitalization on gender employment and job loss in Latin American
countries. Their findings suggested that higher levels of digitalization are associated
with higher female employment and lower job loss for both men and women. The
current chapter contributes to the discussion by demonstrating another nontrivial
benefit of digitalization that has the potential to help close gender gaps in political
participation, which is currently the largest gender gap.
This chapter also adds to a growing body of literature on the effects of the internet
and social media on women’s empowerment (Crittenden, Crittenden, and Ajjan
2019). The internet and social media offer a larger platform for women to find and
follow role models; increase and create entrepreneurial activities, including marketing
and advertisement (Bailur and Masiero 2017; Delacroix, Parguel, and Benoit-Moreau
2019; Camacho and Barrios 2022); and network (Suseno and Abbott 2021). More
precisely, women could also be able to connect with others who share the same con-
cerns and stories, making it easier for them to stand together and claim their rights. It
has also been found that through social media, women have more opportunities to

boost their self-esteem and receive informal training for self-development and career
advancement (Delacroix, Parguel, and Benoit-Moreau 2019). The authors’ contribu-
tion to this literature is to shed light on the potential impact of social media and the
internet on gender diversity in political leadership.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The second section summarizes
the data and gives an overview of the relationship between internet and social
media usage and perceptions of female political leadership in sub-Saharan Africa.
The third section technically describes the regression analyses; the fourth presents
the main findings. The fifth section validates the main conclusions via robustness
tests, and the sixth offers concluding comments.
DATA AND FACTS

The authors use survey microdata from the Afrobarometer’s Round 7, completed in
2019.6 The Afrobarometer is a nonprofit organization that collects and analyzes
high-quality survey data on African attitudes, experiences, and aspirations. Its data
measure the social, political, and economic atmosphere in more than 30 countries
in Africa. The data collection process involves face-to-face interviews with a ran-
domly selected, nationally representative sample of 1,200 to 2,400 adult citizens in
each country. Annex Table 19.1.1 lists the countries included in the Round 7 sam-
ple and the number of individuals surveyed in each country.
The main outcome variable is based on a question about whether people agree
with men only as leaders or women as leaders as well (Question Q16). The ques-
tion is phrased exactly as follows:
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or
Statement 2.
Statement 1: Men make better political leaders than women, and should be
elected rather than women.
Statement 2: Women should have the same chance of being elected to political
office as men.
Respondents were asked to state whether they (1) Agree very strongly with
Statement 1, (2) Agree with Statement 1, (3) Agree with Statement 2, (4) Agree very
strongly with Statement 2, or (5) Agree with neither. The authors of this chapter
developed an indicator for agreement with women as leaders that has a value of 1 if
respondents agree or agree very strongly with Statement 2 (option 3 or 4) and a value
of 0 otherwise. In these regressions, this indicator is used as the dependent variable.
The first treatment variable of interest is based on a question about how often
people use the internet (Question Q91B). Respondents must select one of the fol-
lowing alternatives: (0) Never, (1) Less than once a month, (2) A few times a
month, (3) A few times a week, or (4) Every day. The authors then created an
indicator for internet usage that has a value of 1 if individuals reported some inter-
net access (options 1–4) and a value of 0 if they never use it. The second treatment
6
Visit http://www.afrobarometer.org for detailed information about the data.

TABLE 19.1.
Fractions Agreeing with Gender Equality in Political Leadership

All Women Men
Internet Usage
Never 0.687 0.737 0.628
Some Usage 0.754 0.830 0.697
Less Than Once a Month 0.713 0.770 0.666
A Few Times a Month 0.738 0.810 0.688
A Few Times a Week 0.765 0.848 0.702
Every Day 0.759 0.833 0.700
Social Media News
Never 0.691 0.741 0.634
Some Usage 0.759 0.839 0.698
Less Than Once a Month 0.707 0.768 0.659
A Few Times a Month 0.750 0.838 0.686
A Few Times a Week 0.761 0.844 0.698
Every Day 0.767 0.846 0.706
Sources: Afrobarometer; and authors’ calculations.
Note: All figures were calculated using the individual sample weights provided by the survey.
variable under consideration is based on a question about how often people get
news from social media such as Facebook or Twitter (Question Q12E). The alter-
natives are the same as in the previous question. Similar to the previous indicator,
the authors created one for social media news access and investigated the results
further for both treatment variables by taking the intensity of usage into account.7
The authors begin by getting a bird’s-eye view of how use of the internet and
social media influences people’s perceptions of women having an equal chance as
men to be elected political leaders, using the variables described previously.
Table 19.1 documents the fractions of individuals in the sample that agree with
gender equality in political leadership; these figures are calculated for the entire sam-
ple and separately for men and women. The authors also do it for both the extensive
and intensive margins of internet and social media usage. Five facts stand out:
1. Most people in this sample believe that women should have the same oppor-
tunity as men to lead. This is true not only for the entire sample but also for
men and women separately. All figures are greater than 50 percent, regardless
of frequency of internet and social media use.
2. Being a social media or internet user increases the likelihood of agreeing that
women should have the same chance as men to lead. Around 75 percent of
7
According to the data, not all internet users also use social media. For instance, among women,
34.6 percent are internet users, but only 29.7 percent use social media. For men, the figures are
45 percent (internet) and 39 percent (social media). Therefore, assuming that both groups are the
same may be misleading, which is why the authors have considered both. Remarkably, the data also
show that across all age and education groups, women are less likely than men to use the internet
and social media. This confirms the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) findings that
the digital gender gap persists in low-income countries (https://www.itu.int/itu-d/reports/statistics
/2021/11/15/the-gender-digital-divide/). Finally, the authors observe that use of the internet and
social media increases with education level and decreases with age.

users support gender equality in political leadership; this drops to 69 percent

among those who do not use it.
3. Women are more likely than men to agree on female leadership. For both the
internet and social media, and regardless of intensity of use, the proportion of
women who are positive about female–male equality in political leadership is
always greater than the proportion of men.
4. Women’s perceptions of female–male equality in political leadership are more
sensitive than men’s to the use of the internet and social media. Using the
internet increases the proportion of women by approximately 9 percentage
points while increasing the proportion of men by only 7 percentage points. In
terms of social media, these figures are 10 and 6 percentage points for women
and men, respectively.
5. The more frequently people use the internet and social media, the more likely
they are to agree that women should have the same chance as men in political
leadership. This is true across the board as well as for men and women separately.
When compared with using them less than once a month, using the internet and
social media every day adds about 5 to 6 percentage points to the fraction.
The authors recognize that numerous factors could play an important part in
shaping perceptions of female–male equality in political leadership (for instance,
age, education, religion, geographical region, and exposure to other media). The
following section describes regression exercises that systematically control the
estimates for many of these key features, providing more accurate figures to vali-
date the documented facts.
REGRESSIONS
The authors used the entire Round 7 sample, which includes respondents from
the 34 African countries covered by the survey, to estimate the marginal effects
of internet and social media usage on people’s perceptions of women having the
same chance as men to be elected to positions of political leadership in
sub-Saharan Africa. Linear probability models were estimated using ordinary
least squares with standard errors clustered at the regional level.8 The regressions
have been controlled for a rich set of variables that includes age (six groups),
education (four levels), religion (three kinds), an employment indicator, urban/
rural area, and dummies for geographical regions.9 To control for wealth levels,
the authors included a lived poverty index provided by the Afrobarometer that
is an average index of five poverty items. To control for the influence of other
8
The Afrobarometer data include information on the region within each country where people live.
The authors therefore take advantage of this more granular level of aggregation when controlling the
regressions and estimating the standard errors.
9
The age groups are 18–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, and age 65 and over. The education levels
consist of no formal education, primary, secondary, and post-secondary. Religions include Christian,
Muslim, and others.

kinds of media, the authors added three more indicators of news access through
radio, television, and newspaper.10 Finally, two new categorical indexes were
added: one that measures satisfaction with democracy and another that assesses
an individual’s perception of how the government handles promoting equal
rights and opportunities for women.
To formalize the regressions, the authors indexed individuals by i and let yi be
the indicator for agreement with women having the same chance as men to be
elected political leaders, Ii the indicator for internet or social media usage, Fi a
female dummy variable, and Xi the vector of controls described previously. Then,
the first regression specification estimated can be stated as
yi = α + βIi + γFi + θ'Xi + εi (19.1)
where εi is the error term. Positive estimates for β imply that being a social media
or internet user increases the likelihood of agreeing that women should have the
same chances as men of being elected as political leaders (fact 2). Positive esti-
mates for γ imply that women are more likely than men to agree on gender
equality in political leadership (fact 3). The authors ran a second specification
that interacts the internet or social media indicator with the female dummy,
which can be formalized as
yi = α + βIi + γFi + δ(Ii × Fi) + θ'Xi + εi (19.2)
Positive estimates for δ indicate that women’s perceptions about gender
equality in political leadership are more sensitive than men’s to the use of the
internet and social media (fact 4). Finally, the authors estimated a third speci-
fication that explores the intensity of internet or social media usage, letting Ii,k
be the usage indicator associated to the intensity k. Then, the third regression
is given by
yi = α + ∑ βkIi,k + γFi + θ'Xi + εi (19.3)
k
Higher values for βk, with k’s associated with higher usage intensities, indicate
that the more frequently people use the internet and social media, the more likely
they are to agree that women should have equal chances to be elected as political
leaders (fact 5).
MAIN RESULTS
Table 19.2 summarizes all the regression results. The column labels corre-
spond to the regression specification numbering from the previous section. To
conserve space, only the estimates for the independent variables of interest are
presented—internet or social media usage indicators, the female dummy, the
interaction between the usage indicator and the female dummy, and the
10
These three indicators were developed in the same manner as the social media news indicator
described in the previous section.

TABLE 19.2.
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results

Internet Social Media
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Usage Indicator, Ii 0.032*** 0.026*** 0.035*** 0.024***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009)
Female Dummy, Fi 0.127*** 0.121*** 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.118*** 0.126***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Interaction, Ii × Fi 0.013 0.023**
(0.011) (0.010)
Intensity of Use, Ii,k
Never base base
Less Than Once a Month 0.020 0.009
(0.016) (0.017)
A Few Times a Month 0.027** 0.034***
(0.012) (0.013)
A Few Times a Week 0.039*** 0.034***
(0.009) (0.009)
Every Day 0.032*** 0.041***
(0.009) (0.009)
Observations 40,042 40,042 40,042 40,044 40,044 40,044
R2 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Note: Estimates are weighted using the individual sample weights provided by the survey. Standard errors in parentheses
are robust and clustered at the regional level.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
intensity of usage categories. Estimates have been weighted using the individ-
ual sample weights provided by the survey, and standard errors are robust and
clustered at the regional level.11
The results of the internet and social media exercises all point in the same
direction and confirm three facts documented earlier. The estimates for the usage
indicators are positive and significant, validating the fact that being a social media
or internet user increases the likelihood of agreeing that women should have the
same chances as men of being elected as political leaders (fact 2). According to
regression specification (19.1), using the internet increases the share of people
who agree that women should have equal chances of being elected to political
leadership positions by 3.2 percentage points, while using social media increases
the share by 3.5 percentage points. The female dummy coefficient estimates are
positive and significant across all regression specifications, corroborating the fact
that women are more likely than men to agree on gender equality in political
leadership (fact 3). Overall, having a female identity is linked to an increase of
slightly more than 12.5 percentage points in the proportion of people who agree
that women should have the same chances as men of being elected to political
leadership positions. The estimates for the interaction terms are also positive
11
The authors used variance inflation factor tests to assess multicollinearity in the regression models.
All the independent variables of interest had variance inflation factors less than 3, indicating that
multicollinearity for those variables is not severe enough to warrant corrective measures.

TABLE 19.3.
Wald Test Results for Intensity of Use (Ordinary Least Squares Regressions)
Internet Social Media
Test F-statistic Significance Level F-statistic Significance Level
Less Than Once a Month 0.14 0.7092 2.13 0.1448
Equals to
A Few Times a Month
A Few Times a Month 0.91 0.3420 0.00 0.9481
Equals to
A Few Times a Week
A Few Times a Week 0.99 0.3195 0.69 0.4081
equals to
Every Day
All Equalities Above 0.66 0.5757 1.29 0.2773
Simultaneously
Note: Wald tests results on the equality of all subsequent usage intensity categories.
despite being more uncertain in the case of the internet. This finding supports the
fact that women’s perceptions about gender equality in political leadership are
more sensitive than men’s to internet and social media use (fact 4).
All the estimates for usage intensity categories are positive and increasing, in
general, with intensity level; however, to determine whether there is an increasing
relationship between the intensity of use and the likelihood to support women
having equal chances as men of being elected as political leaders, the authors first
had to determine whether the usage intensity categories are statistically distinct
from one another, so Wald tests of simple and composite linear hypotheses about
the intensity of use categories were performed (Table 19.3). Every two subsequent
categories were tested to see if they are equal. For instance, the first row displays
the results of the test to see if the coefficients of “Less than once a month” and “A
few times a month” are equal. The authors also tested for all equality conditions
simultaneously (last row). All tests have significance levels greater than 10 per-
cent, implying that the equality hypotheses at reasonable significance levels can-
not be rejected. These results do not support the notion that the more people use
the internet and social media, the more likely they are to support women having
equal chances as men to be elected as political leaders (fact 5). In other words,
these findings support that the extensive margin of usage, rather than the inten-
sive, is important.
ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
The authors further performed a series of robustness tests to assess if the estima-
tion method or specific countries influenced the main results; Gomes and
Meyimdjui (2023) provided the detailed results of these tests. The authors began
by re-estimating the models with logistic regression rather than ordinary least
squares. The results confirmed the findings of the last section: (1) the estimates
for the usage indicators are positive and significant; (2) the female dummy

estimates are positive and significant; (3) the estimates for the interaction terms
between usage indicators and female dummy are positive and significant; and (4)
the estimates for usage intensity categories are positive and increasing, in general,
with intensity level, and all Wald tests for the equality of subsequent categories
have significance levels greater than 10 percent. Though the interpretation of the
point estimates from logistic regressions differs from that of ordinary least
squares, the logistic regressions’ average marginal effects have the same sign as
their point estimates.
The next set of robustness tests involves re-estimating the models while
excluding each country individually. The goal is to demonstrate that the main
results are not influenced by any particular country. In practice, the authors esti-
mated 204 additional regressions, as there are 2 treatments of interest, 3 regres-
sion specifications, and 34 countries in the sample. Overall, regardless of which
country the authors excluded from the sample, the results confirmed the findings
of the previous section. These outcomes provide confidence in the reliability of
these findings.
CONCLUSION
Increasing gender diversity in political leadership is critical for promoting equity,
inclusion, and economic benefits. Despite the importance of gender diversity in
political leadership, gender disparities in political participation exist globally, par-
ticularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Changing perceptions about female leadership
abilities and challenging gender stereotypes may aid in increasing the number of
women in leadership positions in government, parliament, and other spheres of
society. This chapter shows that digitalization, as measured by internet access and
social media use, is associated with increased perceptions of sub-Saharan African
women having equal chances as men to be elected as political leaders. Because of
this significant positive spillover from digitalization, as well as its other well-
known benefits, this paper recommends policy measures to improve information
and communications technology infrastructure, with a focus on the lowest cost of
energy. It does not go without encouraging measures to improve people’s educa-
tion, which gives them solid prerequisites to learn and benefit from modern
technologies such as the internet and social media.

ANNEX 19.1. DATA DETAILS
ANNEX TABLE 19.1.1.
Sample Description
Country Name Number of Individuals Percent Distribution
Benin 1,200 2.62
Botswana 1,198 2.61
Burkina Faso 1,200 2.62
Cabo Verde 1,200 2.62
Cameroon 1,202 2.62
Côte d’Ivoire 1,200 2.62
Eswatini 1,200 2.62
Gabon 1,199 2.62
The Gambia 1,200 2.62
Ghana 2,400 5.24
Guinea 1,194 2.61
Kenya 1,599 3.49
Lesotho 1,200 2.62
Liberia 1,200 2.62
Madagascar 1,200 2.62
Malawi 1,200 2.62
Mali 1,200 2.62
Mauritius 1,200 2.62
Morocco 1,200 2.62
Mozambique 2,392 5.22
Namibia 1,200 2.62
Niger 1,200 2.62
Nigeria 1,600 3.49
São Tomé and Príncipe 1,200 2.62
Senegal 1,200 2.62
Sierra Leone 1,200 2.62
South Africa 1,840 4.02
Sudan 1,200 2.62
Tanzania 2,400 5.24
Togo 1,200 2.62
Tunisia 1,199 2.62
Uganda 1,200 2.62
Zambia 1,200 2.62
Zimbabwe 1,200 2.62
Total 45,823 100

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Pandemic: Evidence from Latin America.” IMF Working Paper 2024/012. International


PART VI
Looking Ahead:
New Opportunities


CHAPTER 20
Gender and the Green Economy:

What Conditions for a
Gender-Transformative Transition
to the Green Economy in Africa?1
Elena Ruiz Abril
This chapter intends to inform current discussions about what constitutes, and most
importantly, how to realize gender-transformative green transition paths in sub-Saharan
countries. The transition to a green economy will create many new jobs around the
world, including in sub-Saharan Africa, but there is a risk that women and girls will
not share its benefits. This chapter concludes that women can benefit from the green
transition in the region if countries adopt strong policies and programs to make it
happen. Strategies should aim at facilitating a transition in which women and girls
leapfrog to high-productivity green jobs. This chapter offers a menu of policy interven-
tions to make that happen, with a focus on getting women ready for the transition,
leveling the playing field to remove structural obstacles that women face to access green
jobs, and accelerating their participation in the green economy while leveraging green
finance and green economic instruments. Action on both short- and long-term strategies
needs to start now to prevent the green transition from leaving women and girls behind.
INTRODUCTION
The transition to a green economy will create many new jobs around the world,
including in sub-Saharan Africa. But will women share in these new jobs, and will
the economic transformation help them move into higher-paid, more stable jobs
that require more education and skills? The short answer is “yes”—provided that
countries adopt strong policies and programs to make it happen.
The transition to the green economy will be a major trend shaping socio-
economic outcomes worldwide over the next 50 years. This transition will
create new economic opportunities, spawn new jobs, and spur the adaptation
1
This chapter is based on the findings of the 2021 joint report “Green Jobs for Women in Africa”
by UN Women and the African Development Bank Group. The chapter incorporates findings from
other research by UN Women in sub-Saharan Africa on different aspects of women’s participation
in agriculture, as well as recent research and policy work supporting countries in integrating gender
considerations in green transition policies.
363

of existing jobs. One projection is that 24 million new jobs will be created
worldwide just to accommodate the changes that are necessary to contain
global warming to 2° C (International Labour Organization 2018a).
Like in any transition, there will be winners and losers. Some economic sectors
will expand, others will shrink, and there will be associated employment redistri-
bution. The gender impact of this transition could take different forms depending
on whether women are over- or underrepresented in sectors that will grow or
reduce their weight in the economy.
A focus of feminist analysis of climate change over the years has been on iden-
tifying how climate change affects men and women differently and the conse-
quences of climate change with regard to gender inequalities. Much less attention
has been paid to how the transition to the green economy, mitigation, and
low-carbon paths could create opportunities for women’s empowerment. This
chapter strives to shed some light on this topic for sub-Saharan Africa.
This chapter examines what needs to happen so that women and girls do not
miss out on the opportunities to be created by the transition to the green
economy in Africa. It will look at what policies and programs need to be put in
place now so that women and girls can access the green jobs that will be generated
in the region in the coming decades and for the accessed jobs to be high quality,
high productivity, and decent. The answers to those questions intend to inform
current discussions about what constitutes and, more importantly, how to realize
gender-transformative green transition paths in sub-Saharan countries.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN IN THE GREEN

ECONOMY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The International Labour Organization (2018b) projected that the greening of
the world economy (to hold global warming to 2° C) would create 24 million new
jobs and that job growth would take place across nearly all sectors of the economy.
Globally, the shift to a green economy to combat global warming would create
4 percent more jobs in agriculture than if business continued as usual, 20 percent
more jobs in forestry, and 10 percent more jobs in transport. A range of sectors
will create green jobs in sub-Saharan Africa, with energy, construction, and agri-
culture accounting for the largest numbers.
Across sub-Saharan Africa, employment data show that women are well posi-
tioned in some of the sectors where green jobs will be created but are underrep-
resented in others that will create the higher-quality jobs. The agricultural sector
in sub-Saharan Africa employed 53 percent of working women in 2023. Most
women’s work in agriculture is via self-employment.
Sub-Saharan Africa has the world’s highest rate of women involved in entrepre-
neurial activity at 26 percent; women entrepreneurs contribute as much as 13 per-
cent of the continent’s GDP (Dushime 2022). Forestry and tourism, where the
growth of green jobs is also expected in the region, are also important areas of
female employment. However, women are underrepresented in key sectors of the
green economy that will offer the best jobs. Those sectors most likely to create

Chapter 20 Gender and the Green Economy 365
higher-end green jobs include energy (especially wind and solar), transportation,
construction, and some niche areas of services (for instance, green advisory).
Women are overrepresented in agriculture, waste management, and certain areas of
renewable energy (biomass), which are likely to create mostly lower-end jobs. The
energy mix will depend to a certain degree on country policies. A positive develop-
ment, however, is that even in sectors where women are not well represented, they
are finding niches, often as small women-led businesses in indirect jobs in green
construction, renovation, or energy efficiency (see examples in Box 20.1).
Box 20.1. Women Greenpreneurs in Sub-Saharan Africa

Across sub-Saharan Africa, women entrepreneurs and women-led businesses are entering the
green economy. These are some examples of leading women “greenpreneurs” in the region.
Solar Sister is a nonprofit organization that recruits, trains, and supports women
entrepreneurs and supplies them with durable, affordable solar-powered products and
clean stoves, thus leading to the development of clean energy businesses and markets in
last-mile rural African communities. Through this model, implemented in Tanzania,
Uganda, and Nigeria, the Solar Sister women entrepreneurs earn income by selling the
clean energy products directly to people without access to power in their communities,
which helps eradicate energy poverty. The business model of Solar Sister is to eradicate
extreme energy poverty while empowering African women. Solar Sister invests in local
women entrepreneurs to start, grow, and sustain successful clean energy businesses by
providing them with a comprehensive training package and ongoing mentoring in the
business, technology, and leadership skills necessary to kickstart a sustainable clean ener-
gy business. As of 2023, more than 8,500 Solar Sister Entrepreneurs have reached
3.9 million people in Africa with clean energy.
Solar Mamas is a women-led business that has installed solar panels in rural coastal
communities in several countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including Tanzania, where less
than 4 percent of the population has access to the electricity grid. As of 2016, the group of
13 women with low literacy trained in a six-month course to become solar engineers at
India’s Barefoot College (including building, installing, and maintaining solar panels and
batteries) and had installed more than 800 solar units. Recipients pay a monthly fee set to
be less than the average monthly cost of kerosene, the most common source of light. The
panel installer receives half of the fee, and the other half goes to community projects. With
support from UN Women, the Solar Mamas model has also been developed in Liberia
where, as of 2017, the Solar Mamas have electrified over 425 homes and structures in their
hometowns. According to the India-based nongovernmental organization, every woman
trained by the program electrifies an average of 50 homes in her village.
In Senegal, E-Cover is a woman-led business that recycles used tires into rubber aggre-
gates, tiles, shoe soles, and flooring for businesses, households, sports complexes, schools,
and town halls. In 2020, the company collected more than 834 tons of tires and employed
25 people. They have recently secured funding to expand through WIC Capital, an invest-
ment fund for women-led micro, small, and medium enterprises in West Africa.
In Kenya, Pine Kazi, a women-led fashion design business, uses pineapple waste pro-
duced after harvest to craft ecofriendly shoes. Their model encourages pineapple farming
communities to move from a linear model of plant-harvest-dispose to a circular model of
plant-harvest-reuse. They connect waste managers with product designers to use
pineapple-leaf waste as clothing material and create green jobs for unemployed youth.
Pine Kazi was a winner in the African Development Bank’s Fashionomics Africa Initiative
(https://fashionomicsafrica.org), which supports producers of sustainable fashion.

Focus on Agriculture
In the short term, given the high share of women in the sector’s workforce in
sub-Saharan Africa, most green job opportunities for women in the region will be
in agriculture. The agriculture, forestry, and fisheries sector, as well as the entire
system of food production, is both the highest greenhouse gas–emitting sector in
sub-Saharan Africa and the most vulnerable to climate change.
The agriculture sector will need to shift fundamentally to more sustainable
practices to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to enhance resilience to climate
change. Whether this is done by promoting a more efficient use of resources in
conventional agriculture or via a shift toward conservation and organic farming,
such changes will require financial investments, research, and capacity building,
and will demand new skills and create new jobs. In the short term, the shift to
conservation agriculture may even cost jobs because it requires less labor. In
the medium term, on the other hand, it may produce better-paying jobs for more
skilled workers. Evidence shows that green practices in agriculture help increase
workers’ incomes by lowering input needs, increasing yields, and fetching higher
prices or a combination of these factors. Returns on economic activities in green
agriculture can be high where jobs are linked to green certification and labeling,
which can help ensure sustained access to profitable global markets.
The combination of a transition toward green agriculture and the process of
digitalization currently underway in the region, which has accelerated during
and in the post–COVID-19 period, can also bring new opportunities for high-
end green jobs in the sector. Recent research in East Africa shows that develop-
ing innovations and digital technologies that support agroecological practices,
such as blockchain technologies for quality assurance and supply management
and digitized certification of standards in organic farming, can create new jobs.
However, the same study shows that most of the job opportunities in high-value
products and services are taken by educated youth and youth who reside near
towns (UN Women 2021a).
Climate-resilient agriculture, conservation agriculture, and organic farming may
offer quick-win opportunities for female smallholder farmers to move into green jobs
because the transition to green jobs can be realized in a short time with relatively
small investments for training and other skills-enhancement strategies. Access to
higher-end jobs linked to digitalization and innovation trends in agriculture will
require longer-term strategies that emphasize investment in education among other
things.
However, even to realize short-term opportunities for women in green jobs
in agriculture, several structural obstacles to their participation in rural value
chains need to be addressed. Despite women’s prominent role in agriculture,
they tend to be employed mostly in informal, vulnerable jobs at the early,
low-productivity stages of agricultural value chains: 89.7 percent of employed
women in Africa are in informal employment when agriculture is excluded,
and 92.3 percent of employed women in Africa are in informal employment
when agriculture is included (International Labour Organization 2018b).
Research shows that the gender gap in agricultural productivity does not arise

because women are less efficient farmers but because they experience inequita-
ble access to agricultural inputs, including family labor, high-yield crops,
pesticides, fertilizer, and land (UN Women 2019). Unequal access to male
family labor is one of the most important factors in Ethiopia, Malawi, and
Tanzania. In Tanzania, lack of male family labor explains virtually the entire
gap in agricultural productivity, whereas in Ethiopia and Malawi, it accounts
for about 45 percent of the agricultural productivity gap (UN Women 2019).
One of the primary explanations for these gaps is women’s household care
responsibilities, along with lower access to cash income related to heavy
demands on their time performing unpaid farm labor for their husbands.
Women may also be unable to scale up to the level required for high-value
crops if they are constrained by plot size. UN Women’s research in East Africa
shows that women, as well as youth with disabilities and youth who reside in
rural and remote areas, are excluded from opportunities in agriculture because
of problems with accessing land, lack of access to finance, lack of capacity
development efforts near their area, lack of access to digital technologies, and
low digital literacy (UN Women 2021a).
Social norms are an important constraint to women’s access to high-produc-
tivity jobs in agriculture. In Malawi, Uganda, and Tanzania, women’s high bur-
dens of unpaid care and domestic work leave them less able than men to invest
their time in agricultural work. UN Women’s research (2023) shows that, in
northern Senegal, as many as 45 percent of rural women are responsible for caring
for a family member with a disability or chronic illness; female farmers spend up
to 12 hours per day on direct and indirect care work, which substantially limits
the time that they can spend farming. Women are also less able to work on their
own self-managed plots of land because of social norms that create the expecta-
tion that they will work on plots that are controlled by or jointly with their hus-
bands before working on their own, particularly in polygamous households.
These norms reduce the amount of time that women have available for their own
plots and their likelihood of investing in higher-value, higher-maintenance crops
(UN Women 2019).
Overall, user- and women-centric, multifaceted interventions that address
these constraints and facilitate women-led business development in agribusiness
and entrepreneurship can enable them to realize the gains associated with the
green transition in the agriculture sector in the region.
Focus on Entrepreneurship and Green Finance

In the short and medium term, most opportunities for women’s participation in
the green economy in the region will arise via self-employment and entrepreneur-
ship. Women make up 58 percent of Africa’s self-employed population and are
more likely to become entrepreneurs than men. Sub-Saharan Africa has the
world’s highest rate of women involved in entrepreneurial activity at 26 percent
(Mastercard 2022). In the short term, most opportunities for green jobs will arise
through entrepreneurship and women-led businesses in agriculture, forestry,
waste management, circular economy, or renewable energy. Although women are

already claiming green jobs in these areas as entrepreneurs and owners of small
and medium enterprises (see Box 20.1 for examples), lack of adapted finance
remains an important constraint to take their economic activities to scale.
The gender gap in access to finance in the continent is estimated at $42 billion
(African Development Bank Group 2023). This gap has widened in recent years.
Despite high rates of women entrepreneurs, women find it particularly difficult
to secure financing for their businesses. Today, in the region, only 37 percent of
women have a bank account, compared with 48 percent of men. This gap is
strongly linked with social and cultural norms as well as access to land, which is
especially important as collateral for loans to small businesses owned by women
(Chapter 15).
Despite the tremendous growth of green finance in the past decade, women
entrepreneurs and women-led businesses continue to be excluded from this
source of financing. In 2021, green finance exceeded $720 billion, including
green bonds, green loans, venture capital and private equity funding for green
tech, green initial public offerings, and green acquisitions, which use funds to
buy companies that bring environmental benefits (Barry 2022). Lack of
sex-disaggregated data makes it difficult to fully assess the extent of the gender
gap in access to green finance or the actual share of green finance that trickles
down to women-led businesses, but the use of standard financial products and
conventional mechanisms to deliver green finance points to the same barriers
that women-led businesses face to access commercial finance. Most of the of
green finance is channeled via commercial banks and investment vehicles that
are not well adapted to small businesses, where a large proportion of women-led
entrepreneurial activity lies. A recent report by the United Nations Secretary-
General’s Special Advocate for Financial Inclusive Finance for Development
(2023) claims that green finance has focused primarily on opportunities for
traditional players (for instance, banks and institutional investors), with less
attention on tools and pathways for microsegments, including households and
micro, small, and medium enterprises.
Only a fraction of green finance is gender-responsive, and just a small per-
centage reaches organizations for women in the Global South. Taking public
finance as an example, and using the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (2016) meth-
odology to assess gender-responsiveness of official development assistance,2
2
The Development Assistance Committee gender equality policy marker is based on a three-point scor-
ing system to qualitatively track the financial flows that target gender equality. Not targeted (score: 0)
means that the project or program has been screened against the marker but has not been found to
target gender equality. Significant (score: 1) means that gender equality is an important and deliberate
objective but not the principal reason for undertaking the project or program. Principal (score: 2) means
that gender equality is the main objective of the project or program and is fundamental in its design
and expected results; that is, the project or program would not have been undertaken without this
gender equality objective. This allows the OECD to identify gaps between the Development Assistance
Committee’s donor policy commitments and financial commitments. For more information, see the
Development Assistance Committee gender equality policy marker (OECD 2019).

about 31 percent of total climate aid was gender-responsive; just 3 percent had
gender equality as a principal objective, whereas 28 percent integrated gender
equality as a secondary objective. Across regions, the gender focus of climate aid
in Africa seems to be higher than in other regions with six African countries
among the top 10 recipients of gender-responsive climate aid (Ethiopia, Kenya,
Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda). Overall, however, the proportion of
gender-responsive aid that went to southern civil society organizations amount-
ed to just 2 percent (OECD DAC Network on Gender Equality 2016). The role
that women’s organizations can play in climate change adaptation and mitigation
is restricted because of limited green finance flows to women’s organizations.
Women’s access to green finance has been a priority in the advocacy of the global
women’s movement over recent years. The Women’s Environment and
Development Organization (2019) identifies women’s access to green finance as
an essential element of gender-just climate action to achieve systemic change in
addressing climate issues.
Gender-responsive finance concentrates on adaptation rather than mitiga-
tion and focuses on the primary and secondary sectors. According to the
OECD, adaptation and projects with cobenefits appear to offer the most
potential for integrating gender considerations, currently reporting 27 percent
and 43 percent of finances as gender-responsive, respectively. On the other
hand, only 7 percent of tracked mitigation finance was gender-responsive. This
is consistent with the emphasis of feminist analysis and climate action on the
impact of climate change on women and gender equality and less so on how
transition to the green economy and mitigation paths could generate
opportunities for women. By sectors, agriculture, forestry, and other land use
and industry had the highest gender-responsiveness rates: 35 percent and
28 percent, respectively. Almost none of the aid to energy and transport, crit-
ical sectors in the generation of green jobs in the future, was reported as
targeting gender equality as a principal objective (Women’s Environment and
Development Organization 2019).
WOMEN’S OBSTACLES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE

GREEN ECONOMY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Women face several barriers that may limit their full access to green jobs in the
coming years. Many of the obstacles mentioned regarding agriculture or entrepre-
neurship also apply to green jobs in other sectors. These include barriers to
women’s and women-led businesses’ access to land, finance, and technology. In
addition, skills deficits are barriers for women to access green jobs in the short
term. Addressing this, via access to key assets and investments in skills, will be
important in the short term and will realize some quick wins. However, address-
ing skills deficits will not be enough to ensure that men and women enjoy equal
access to green jobs. Skills-oriented interventions might be sufficient to facilitate
access to green jobs for men and boys. However, for women and girls, structural
barriers from social norms will need to be addressed in parallel.

Discriminatory social norms underlie many of the obstacles that women face in
accessing green jobs—and jobs generally—including barriers to land access,
finance, and skills-building opportunities. They also constrain women’s participa-
tion in certain sectors by dictating which ones are considered male-oriented areas
of employment and which are perceived as offering acceptable jobs for women.
More critically, the unequal distribution of unpaid care work between men and
women is a significant barrier to labor market access for women. In sub-Saharan
Africa, women living alone have a higher labor force participation rate (92 percent)
than women who are married (77 percent) and women with children (80 percent).
Women are still responsible for the vast majority of sub-Saharan Africa’s unpaid
domestic and care work and spend more than twice the time on household chores
and care responsibilities as men. Indicatively, in Tanzania and South Africa, wom-
en’s share of unpaid care work is 79 and 70 percent, respectively (Charmes 2019).
In Senegal, women spend an average of four hours per day on housework and
childcare compared to less than 30 minutes for men (Agence Nationale de la
Statistique et de la Démographie, Agence Francaise de Developement, and UN
Women 2022). In Benin, women spend, on average, three hours and 41 minutes
per day on unpaid care work compared to 42 minutes for men (Charmes 2019).
In Mali, women spend an average of 21.6 hours per week on unpaid work com-
pared to 5.7 hours for men (Observatoire National du Dividende démographique
Mali and UN Women 2022).
In rural areas particularly, water and wood collection are time-consuming tasks
done largely by women and girls, which limit their opportunities to earn money.
Women’s disproportionate care work burden limits their ability to participate in the
labor market overall, and it has been shown to affect women’s ability to enter green
areas of employment. For example, a study on skills required for green sectors across
32 countries concluded that without policy interventions, the energy transition is
expected to promote more employment opportunities for men than for women
(International Labour Organization 2019). According to the International Renewable
Energy Agency (2019), lack of adequate work-life balance, care solutions, and flexi-
ble working measures is a critical impediment to retaining women in the wind
energy industry.
GENDER IN GREEN TRANSITION POLICIES IN

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Integrating gender equality into mitigation and adaptation policies helps accelerate
sustainable, inclusive, and equitable country-driven climate action. Nationally
Determined Contributions, which are at the heart of the Paris Agreement, are
policy documents that state efforts by each country to reduce national emissions
and to adapt to the impacts of climate change. Integrating gender considerations
in Nationally Determined Contributions is an iterative process to meet gender
equality goals through climate action, including by allocating budget for gender
activities. According to the International Union for Conservation of Nature
(2021), countries have altogether increased their attention to gender, but still a

quarter of Nationally Determined Contributions is gender blind at the global

level. About 94 percent of sub-Saharan Africa Nationally Determined Contributions
mentioned gender or women—they consider the impact of climate events on
women’s livelihoods, acknowledge women’s contributions to climate adaptation,
and commit to women’s participation in decision-making roles.
Similarly, the National Adaptation Plans, from the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (2021), identify medium- and long-term adap-
tation needs and develop and implement strategies to address those needs. This
is an iterative process implemented in a country-driven, gender-sensitive, par-
ticipatory approach. As of April 2022, of 44 countries that had submitted
National Adaptation Plans, 17 are from sub-Saharan Africa (UNFCCC 2023).
All National Adaptation Plans integrate gender considerations to varying
degrees. This helps ensure that adaptation planning processes address persistent
gender inequalities by recognizing gender differences in adaptation needs and
capacities, promoting gender-equitable participation and influence in adapta-
tion decision-making, and ensuring gender-equitable access to financial resourc-
es and other benefits because of climate adaptation investments. The greatest
increase has happened since 2020, which coincides with the establishment of
the enhanced Gender Action Plan. Most National Adaptation Plans recognize
women as a vulnerable group, whereas fewer identify women as a key stakehold-
er group in the adaptation planning processes.
Finally, Long-Term, Low-Emissions Development Strategies are policy instru-
ments, in line with the Paris Agreement, that identify long-term, low-emissions
paths of economic development and propose changes to the economic develop-
ment model of a country. Because of their long-term outlook, these policies are
ideal for identifying opportunities for women to participate in the green economy
(in the new low-emissions scenarios identified by the strategy) while there is still
time to address some of the structural barriers that women face to access those
jobs. In Africa, Ethiopia and Burkina Faso have implemented Long-Term, Low-
Emissions Development Strategies that have integrated gender analysis
(see Box 20.2 for more on the strategy in Burkina Faso).
Beyond the Paris Agreement–related instruments, countries are developing
policies to inform their transition to a green economy, both sectoral and nonsec-
toral, which offer opportunities to integrate gender considerations. At the sectoral
level, sustainable energy and energy reform, together with agriculture, forestry,
waste, or sustainable transport policies, are important instruments. Other policies
with a nonsectoral focus include national green jobs strategies, such as the ones
in Senegal or Ghana, and green finance strategies. Most policies lack analysis of
gender co-benefits associated with those economic reforms, and gender consider-
ations are lacking from the policy formulation process. Data constraints are an
important limitation in this process because limited sex-disaggregated employ-
ment data at the subsector and position level in many countries in sub-Saharan
Africa make it difficult to quantify specific gender-differentiated employment
impacts associated with the transition. A narrow approach to gender analysis,
focused on skills and access to finance without understanding the role that social

Box 20.2. Gender in the Burkina Faso Long-Term, Low-Emissions

Development Strategy
The Government of Burkina Faso led the process of forming a Long-Term, Low-Emissions
Development Strategy. With technical support from the Global Green Growth Institute and
UN Women for the gender analysis, two workshops were held in 2022 to identify gender
co-benefits, negative impacts, and mitigating actions associated with the strategy and to
assess employment effects arising from the low-emissions scenarios. The workshops
included participants from all sectoral and nonsectoral ministries concerned with the strat-
egy as well as representatives from civil society and women’s groups. Despite a lack of data
to identify quantitative distributional employment impacts among men and women,
workshop participants discussed in depth the challenges and opportunities for women’s
participation in green jobs associated with the low-emissions scenarios—particularly in
agriculture, forestry, waste management and energy. As a result, the workshop participants
adopted a recommendation to establish a national Program on Green Jobs for Women and
Youth, and gender targets were included in the Long-Term, Low-Emissions Development
Strategy performance indicators.
Source: UN Women and Global Green Growth Institute. Forthcoming. “Guidance Note to
Integrate Gender in LT-LEDS: The Case of Burkina Faso.”
norms play in influencing women’s access to assets and the labor market, also
limits the reach and effectiveness of recommendations in some of these policies.
Although integrating gender in green transition policies is important, the
impact of such policies will also depend on the extent to which they are aligned
with and integrated into governments’ medium- and long-term priorities and
expenditure frameworks. Gender-responsive budgeting, which is applied to dif-
ferent degrees in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, can help establish the link
between gender policy priorities in relation to the green economy and public
expenditure (Chapters 11 and 12); gender-responsive budgeting can also help
prioritize public resource allocations for operationalizing and implementing
many of the gender commitments in sectoral and non-sectoral green economy
national policies. However, effectiveness will largely depend on the countries’
capacity to fully implement gender-responsive budgeting. UN Women (2021b)
researched government compliance with the 10 percent allocation of agriculture
budget as part of the Maputo declaration3 in seven countries in eastern and southern
Africa; the study showed that, although all of the countries except Burundi had
produced guidelines on gender-responsive budgeting, the governments’ nonadop-
tion of those guidelines was a barrier that prevented women from fully benefiting
from the 10 percent budget allocation.
3
The Maputo Declaration is a declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa that was signed
by African Heads of State and Government in Maputo, Mozambique in July 2003. The declaration
called for a pan-African flagship program to enhance agriculture production and bring about food
security on the continent. The declaration also called for a re-investment of at least 10 percent of
national budgets to improve food security, reduce poverty, and spur rural development.

Recommendations for policies to leverage women’s green job opportunities fall
into three categories. First, policies need to get women and girls ready for the
green economy through education, skills development, capacity building, and
institutional support of women-led businesses. However, a major conclusion is
that policies on skills development, which are the focus of most policy interven-
tions to promote green jobs, will not be enough for women and girls to benefit
from green economy opportunities and to access a fair share of the jobs to be
created. Thus, policies need to level the playing field by addressing structural
barriers that women face in accessing green jobs. Finally, policies should accelerate
action to promote a gender-responsive green economy so that change can happen
within a reasonable time frame.
Recommendations to Get Women Ready for the

Green Economy
Reducing horizontal segregation in the labor market to allow women access to all
green jobs on equal terms with men will require a combination of education
policies, strong female role models, and support mechanisms for women in
male-dominated sectors. Initiatives should focus on:
• Addressing gender segregation in education and promoting women’s participation
in science, technology, engineering, and math. If women are to reap the benefits
of the green transition in sub-Saharan Africa, strong leadership and invest-
ment are needed to improve their access to education in science, technology,
engineering, and math and to careers at all levels of the education system,
from primary to tertiary, including vocational education and training.
• Reskilling and upskilling. Retooling the labor force for the future of work is,
according to the African Development Bank, a priority for Africa in the
strategy for recovery from economic shocks associated with COVID-19.
The report recommends that governments scale up efforts to retrain and
reskill the labor force as quickly and as broadly as possible to facilitate work-
ers’ transition from low-productivity, obsolete sectors and jobs to new and
emerging ones. This recommendation is particularly important in the con-
text of women’s access to green jobs in the region. Reskilling and upskilling
strategies will be needed to ensure that women can access new green job
opportunities in sectors where they are already well positioned, but the
greening of jobs will require new skills—for example, in agriculture and
services. Training offers should reflect the current and future needs of the
labor market, economy, and environment.
• Developing women’s networks in male-dominated sectors. Establishing profes-
sional women’s networks and business associations in key sectors of the
green economy with higher barriers to entry by women (for instance, con-
struction, energy, and transportation) are a mechanism to support existing
female professionals and to encourage others to join. Such networks can

nurture female role models and enhance women’s ability to participate in

those sectors. These networks can also be instrumental in advocating for
corporate policies adapted to women’s needs, facilitate investments in
women-owned businesses and start-ups in these sectors, and be a source for
mentoring and coaching of women.
• Supporting the transition toward the formal economy, which can facilitate
women’s movement into better-paying green jobs with better working con-
ditions. This will be particularly critical in sectors such as agriculture,
forestry, or waste and, to a lesser extent, tourism.
Recommendations to Level the Playing Field for a

Gender-Responsive Green Economy
Addressing social norms and improving the social environment to enable women’s
participation in the green economy is crucial. This change requires both overcom-
ing biases and expectations around the distribution of unpaid care work and
overturning laws that limit women’s access to the resources and means to under-
take economic activities. To this end, specific recommendations include:
• Removing legal barriers and addressing gender discrimination in legislation.
Key areas for reform include (1) amending legislation to ensure women and
men have equal rights to ownership of immovable property (land) and
equalizing the inheritance rights of sons and daughters; (2) introducing
legislation (and enforcement mechanisms) to address sexual harassment in
the workplace, particularly in male-dominated areas of the green economy
(energy, construction, transport, and others); (3) amending legal provisions
that do not allow women to open bank accounts or to move freely in the
same way as men, which is required for doing business and for holding jobs
on an equal basis with men; and (4) removing legal restrictions on women’s
access to specific jobs and tasks. Additional policy and legal provisions to
incentivize the development of corporate policies for female employees can
also play a critical role in certain sectors.
• Balancing men’s and women’s responsibilities for care. Addressing inequalities in
the distribution of unpaid care can have an important impact on enabling
women to take paid jobs, including in the green economy. Governments
should invest in expanding care services, investing in infrastructure, and
implementing policies to recognize, reduce, and redistribute unpaid care.
Recognizing women’s unpaid care work is particularly important in
sub-Saharan Africa, where a large part of care work is informal. Changing
social norms through education and communication and involving men and
boys are important means to effect change in this area in the medium term.
• Investing in role modeling and focusing on youth to change stereotypes about
acceptable jobs for men and women. Many of the jobs in the green economy
will be in new occupations, not yet socially assigned to men or women.
Thus, opportunities exist for women to claim new jobs as engineers, archi-

tects, energy-efficiency advisers, drivers of green buses, or green innovators

across many different fields. The many women-led small and medium
enterprises installing solar panels across the region illustrate how to pierce
the “glass walls” and enter male-dominated sectors such as construction.
Perceptions evolve slowly, but governments, civil society, and community
leaders can take the lead through education, social communication, and
advocacy by leveraging positive role models of women working in
male-dominated sectors and by addressing young men and women from an
early age. In the past, involving men and boys, including traditional leaders,
in efforts to change social norms has proven effective in other domains such
as gender-based violence prevention.
Recommendations to Accelerate Action for a

Gender-Responsive Green Economy
Affirmative action to integrate gender targets and objectives into existing and new
economic policy instruments can accelerate women’s access to green jobs. Through
regulation, governments can expand opportunities for women in areas of the green
economy that have the potential to generate many green jobs but have high entry
barriers for women; these regulations can thus increase the speed with which change
takes place. New economic instruments can also open new ways to assign economic
value to women’s unpaid work on behalf of the environment—thus contributing to
a truly transformative green transition from a gender point of view. Specific recom-
mendations include:
• Leveraging green economy instruments for women’s employment. As countries
explore and identify the appropriate combination of taxes, subsidies, incen-
tives, and other economic instruments to encourage a transition to the green
economy, these measures can be designed in a way that supports women’s
employment objectives. Specific provisions can be incorporated into the
design of these instruments to carve out employment targets for women-led
businesses, or for women directly, particularly in sectors of the economy
with high employment generation potential and in which women’s share is
low (energy and transport).
• Prioritizing women’s access to green finance and redressing gender biases in the
green finance architecture. The growth of green finance offers a unique
opportunity to accelerate climate action. But women’s limited access to
green finance restricts not only their contribution to climate change mitiga-
tion and adaptation but also their access to jobs in the green economy. For
example, although carbon credits are designed to compensate for mitigation
activity, across Africa, grassroots women, who are at the forefront of climate
change mitigation through their (unpaid) work preserving ecosystems with
important carbon sequestration functions, do not access carbon credit mar-
kets (see Box 20.3 for examples). There is a need to address the gender gap
in green finance and to rethink the green finance architecture to make it

Box 20.3. Women’s Contribution to Climate Change Mitigation and

Climate Finance: The Missing Link
Across sub-Saharan Africa, women-led initiatives in forestry and other ecosystems play a key
role in carbon sequestration. This box provides a few examples. Despite promising experiences
such as the Mikoko Pamoja project described here, only a small fraction of women are access-
ing the economic rewards derived from carbon credit markets.
In Casamance, Senegal, the association Poumoulindiana, a women’s economic inter-
est group, seeks to reforest more than 50 hectares of mangrove trees per year. Mangrove
forests are powerful tools for reducing greenhouse gas emissions; they store 50 times
more carbon in their soils than tropical forests and 10 times more carbon than temper-
ate forests.
In Mali, UN Women’s Climat et Energie Mali (Mali Climate and Energy) project project
supports women’s participation in the biomass value chain through training in the produc-
tion of improved stoves and sustainable fuels (500 women trained; 150,000 improved
stoves and 119 tons of sustainable charcoal briquettes manufactured). Other initiatives
include reforestation; management of tree nurseries; improved and efficient carbonization
techniques; and establishment of women-led forest management mechanisms. The proj-
ect has led to the generation of carbon credits linked to the activities to reduce biomass
consumption (estimated to be 23,689 tons of reduced emissions of CO2 equivalent per
year or 165,822 tons of CO2 equivalent over seven years).
The Mikoko Pamoja project in Kenya is an example of a mechanism to reward commu-
nities financially for sustainable forestry activities. As the world’s first project to fund man-
grove conservation through the sale of carbon credits, it uses certification to compensate
the community for reducing greenhouse gas emissions through the conservation and
expansion of mangrove forests. Since 2017, the project has protected 117 hectares of
natural mangrove forest and has planted 10 hectares of mangroves. The plan is to plant
2,000 trees annually over 20 years. The carbon benefits of the Mikoko Pamoja project are
conservatively estimated at 2,500 tons of CO2 per year. In return, in a two-year period, the
community received a total of $24,000 in income that has been reinvested in local projects
determined through community consultation.
more inclusive and gender-responsive. Steps in the right direction include

improving women’s participation in decision-making spaces; developing
specific facilities to support grassroots women’s access to carbon credit mar-
kets and other green finance mechanisms; improving women’s information,
knowledge, and capacity to access complex processes around green finance;
and collecting sex-disaggregated data to track green finance flows along
gender lines. In the meantime, leveraging current momentum around
impact investments and gender lens investment to stipulate gender and
women employment targets in green bonds and other private finance instru-
ments represents more immediate opportunities.
CONCLUSION
The transition to the green economy in sub-Saharan Africa can be harnessed by coun-
tries to promote gender-transformative development paths. Strategies should aim at
facilitating a transition in which women and girls leapfrog to high-productivity green

jobs and skip the slow climb from one low-productive job to one that is slightly better.
The extent to which these promising paths will be realized will depend on the com-
bination of policies and the level of ambition. But whatever the policy combination,
action needs to start now—on both short- and long-term strategies—while there is
still time to prevent the green transition from being severely biased against women
and girls.
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Index
A in Senegal, 160
Abdi, Jamal, 202 tax policy on, 281, 281n7, 282
Abreha, Solomon Kibret, 169 violence and, 116, 122, 123, 125t
Abu-Ghaida, Dina, 169, 213 AIDS. See Acquired immunodeficiency
care work in, 318n2 syndrome
ACEI. See African Care Economy Index Algeria, electoral violence in, 199f
Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome Alonso-Albarran, Virginia, 295, 296
(AIDS), 84 Angola
child marriage and, 137 bank accounts in, 54
education and, 65 FAS from, 60t
Adolescent pregnancies, 2, 16–17, 18f political leadership, 348n4
child marriage and, 142 violence in, 117n3, 119t, 127
education and, 163 Annan, Francis, 64–65
in epidemics, 71 Annim, Samuel Kobina, 169
gender equality and, 211f Appiah, Elizabeth N., 148
in GII, 35, 35t Archibong, Belinda, 64–65
Human Rights Watch on, 142n11 Argentina
African Care Economy Index (ACEI), GB in, 258
324, 327 tax law in, 261
African Charter on Human and People’s Asongu, Simplice, 335
Rights (Banjul Charter), 231–32 Australia, GB from, 296
African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights on the Rights of Women in B
Africa (Maputo Protocol), 231, 254 Bacarreza, Gustavo, 350
African Union Gender Policy, 232 Bah Diallo, H. E., 212
African Union Solemn Declaration on Bandiera, Oriana, 65
Gender Equality, 232 Banjul Charter (African Charter on
African Women’s Development and Human and People’s Rights), 231–32
Communication Network Bank accounts, 46–49, 47f, 48f
(FEMNET), 327 in Angola, 54
Afrobarometer in Cabo Verde, 247
on electoral violence, 194, 197, 198, 203 family law on, 230
on political leadership, 351–53, 352t, legal rights to, 231
353n8 in Lesotho, 49, 54
Agency for Entrepreneurial Development in Mauritius, 246
and Innovation, in Cabo Verde, 247 measurement of, 59–60, 60t
Agriculture/agricultural employment in Namibia, 241
care work and, 323 in South Africa, 243
climate change and, 172, 194, 200, Bargaining power
282, 282n8 family law and, 227
in COVID-19 pandemic, 104, 106 legal equality and, 11n4
entrepreneurship in, 31–32 social safety nets and, 286
in Ethiopia, 104, 106 women’s empowerment and, 167, 173,
in Nigeria, 104, 106 176
379

Barro, Robert J., 148 C

Basic Conditions of Employment Act, in Cabo Verde
South Africa, 244 care work in, 318n2, 319f, 320, 320n3,
Bates, Katie, 320 331t
BAZ. See BMI-for-age z-score CEDAW and, 232
Beijing Declaration, 231, 254 ECOWAS and, 232
Benin employment in, 247–48
care work in, 318n2, 319f, 331t FAS from, 60t
electoral violence in, 199f financial access in, 247
FAS from, 60t income inequality in, 247
GB in, 298t legal rights in, 246–48
political leadership in, 348n3, 358t policymaking in, 4
tax law in, 265 political leadership in, 358t
tax policy in, 281n7 Cameroon
Berge, Kersti, 149 care work in, 318n2, 319f, 320, 331t
Bertay, Ata Can, 209, 212, 214–17 electoral violence in, 199f
Besley, Timothy, 173 entrepreneurship in, 278
Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha, 243 FAS from, 60t
Bluedorn, John, 82n1 GB in, 298t
BMI-for-age z-score (BAZ), 175–76 GDP per capita in, 218
Bolivia, 261 political leadership in, 358t
Borges, Phil, 168–69 tax policy in, 280
Boserup, Ester, 213 violence in, 117n3, 118, 119t, 127
Botswana Canada
bank accounts in, 49 Gender Budgeting Act in, 259, 357
customary law in, 232 tax law in, 261
FAS from, 60t Candaces of Meroe, 348n4
GB in, 298t Caprioli, Mary, 195
political leadership in, 358t Carbon tax, 283–84
violence in, 84 Care work, 244
Bride price, 23, 23n21, 283 ACEI and, 324, 327
#BringBackOurGirls, 349n5 context-specific understanding of, 328
Buchard, Stephanie, 193 in COVID-19 pandemic, 81, 89, 92,
Budget Framework Papers, in Uganda, 317, 326
300–301, 303 employment and, 321–22, 321f
Bundervoet, Tom, 102, 107 extent and trends in, 318–20, 319f
Burkina Faso GDP per capita and, 328–29, 329f
care work in, 327 gender equality and, 315–31
electoral violence in, 198, 199f income equality/inequality and, 322
FAS from, 60t increase in, 108
GB in, 298t measurement of, 318–24, 319f, 321f
income support in, 53 policymaking for, 316–17, 330
political leadership in, 358t poverty and, 316–17
violence in, 117n3, 118, 119t, 127 resilience in, 326
Burundi TUSs for, 27
GB in, 298t TUSs on, 317, 318, 323–24, 328,
violence in, 117n3, 119t, 127 330–31, 331t

Index 381
women’s empowerment and, 179 in COVID-19 pandemic, 15, 22–23,

See also Domestic work; Informal 23n20, 131
employment defined, 22n19, 131n1
Cash transfers drop-outs and, 142
in COVID-19 pandemic, 53, 54, 90 economic growth and, 131–42, 132t,
for informal employment, 53, 90 135t, 136t, 138t–40t
violence and, 178, 179 education and, 133, 137, 138, 140,
for women’s empowerment, 166, 179 142
CEDAW. See Convention on the in EMDCs, 131, 132, 133, 136, 139,
Elimination of All Forms of 141
Discrimination against Women in epidemics, 71, 283
Center for International Earth Science fertility rate and, 132, 133, 283
Information Network, 116, 117 GDP per capita and, 3, 22
Central African Republic governance and, 141
GB in, 298t HCI and, 137n6, 138t, 140, 140n9, 140t
GDP per capita in, 218 health and, 137, 138, 140–41, 142
tax law in, 265 HIV/AIDS and, 137
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology income inequality and, 133, 141
of Disasters (CRED), EM-DAT of, laws on, 134
65, 68, 69 life expectancy and, 137n6, 140t, 141
Chaaban, Jad, 133 mental health and, 23
Chad policymaking on, 133
bank accounts in, 49, 231 population growth and, 132, 139n8, 141
education in epidemics in, 67 prevalence of, 131, 132t
FAS from, 60t regional gaps in, 284f
financial access in, 46 violence and, 132
GB in, 298t Child mortality rates, 16, 17f
tax law in, 265 education and, 149
tax policy in, 275 in HCI, 36–38, 36n31, 37t
violence in, 119t Cholera, 71
Chakravarty, Shubha, 29 Civil Code
Chamber of Deputies, in Rwanda, 238 in Cabo Verde, 247
Cherif, Reda, 120–21 in Mauritius, 245–46
Childcare in Rwanda, 238
in COVID-19 pandemic, 81, 88, 89, Civil rights, 226
212 Cleopatra, 348n4
in epidemics, 71 Climate change
in Eswatini, 89 agriculture and, 200, 282, 282n8
pensions and, 229 carbon tax for, 283–84
in South Africa, 244 electoral violence and, 200
tax law on, 260 epidemics from, 282, 282n9
tax policy and, 277 health and, 166, 172–73, 176,
unpaid employment and, 27–28 180–81
Child marriage, 2 in South Africa, 180–81
adolescent pregnancies and, 142 tax policy and, 282–83
of boys, 133 women’s empowerment and, 172–73,
contributing factors to, 132–34 175, 176, 180–81

CLRA. See Communal Law Reform Act Democratic Republic of the Congo
Coelho, Maria, 274, 282 in, 108
Commission for Gender Equality, in education in, 15–16, 81, 83f, 85,
South Africa, 245 90–91, 103, 104f, 105, 106–7, 106f,
Commodity price shocks 212
human capital and, 166 employment in, 81, 83f, 84–94, 86n6,
violence and, 124, 124n6 95t, 98–105, 98f–103f, 105f
Communal Law Reform Act (CLRA), in in Eswatini, 82, 88–89, 90, 91–92, 94
Namibia, 242 in Ethiopia, 97–109, 98f–106f
Comoros Ethiopia in, 82n1
FAS from, 60t financial access in, 43–44, 51–57,
GB in, 298, 298t 52nn8–9, 52t, 54n10, 55f, 56f, 57t
tax law in, 265 financial inclusion in, 45–46
tax policy in, 275 fintech in, 333
violence in, 117n3, 118, 119t, 127 fiscal policy in, 253–54, 256
Concentration of, 69 GB in, 91, 256, 257–60, 295
Congo DRC, FAS from, 60t GDP per capita in, 209
Constitutional law, 226 gender equality in, 210–11, 219
Contraceptives, 19, 19n13 health in, 83f
Convention on the Elimination of All human capital in, 165, 178
Forms of Discrimination against income inequality in, 87–88, 102,
Women (CEDAW), 231, 232 103f
fiscal policy and, 254 informal employment in, 90, 92, 102,
on legal rights in Cabo Verde, 247 104
Namibia and, 242 in Lesotho, 82, 89, 90, 91–92, 94
on violence in South Africa, 244 in Namibia, 89, 90, 91–92, 94
Corruption in Nigeria, 82n1, 97–109, 98f–106f
economic growth and, 133 occupational segregation in, 92
entrepreneurship and, 277–88 self-employment in, 86, 86n6, 97,
fintech and, 338 104
political leadership and, 348n2 in South Africa, 82, 85–88, 90, 91–92,
Côte d’Ivoire 94, 95t
in COVID-19 pandemic, 108 tax policy/law in, 90–91, 260–62
electoral violence in, 193, 198, 199f unpaid work in, 5, 15–16, 81, 83f,
family law in, 230 88–89, 92, 108f
FAS from, 60t violence in, 81, 84, 108f, 114, 115,
GB in, 298t, 301–2 120, 126
political leadership in, 358t women’s empowerment in, 165, 178
tax policy in, 281 Cowper-Coles, Minna, 348n2
violence in, 119t CRED. See Centre for Research on the
women’s empowerment in, 168 Epidemiology of Disasters
COVID-19 pandemic, 1, 2, 9, 82n1, Cuberes, David, 213
97–109 Cunningham, Wendy, 133
agriculture employment in, 104, 106 Customary law, 232, 239, 242, 243
care work in, 81, 89, 92, 317
cash transfers in, 53, 54, 90 D
childcare in, 81, 88, 89, 212 Davalos, Maria E., 102, 107
child marriage in, 22–23, 23n20, 131 Deane, James, 202
Côte d’Ivoire in, 108 Deflation, 181

Index 383
Dellepiane, Luca, 320 Drop-outs, 2

Demeritt, Jacqueline, 196 child marriage and, 142
Democratic Republic of the Congo in COVID-19 pandemic, 81
in COVID-19 pandemic, 108 in Niger, 150
family law in, 230 Duffy, Mignon, 322–23
GB in, 298t Duflo, Esther, 166, 168, 213
tax law in, 265 Duvvury, Nata, 114
tax policy in, 275 Dynamic General Equilibrium Life-Cycle
violence in, 117, 117n3, 119t, 127 Model with Heterogeneous Agents,
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), of IMF, 149, 163
of USAID, 103
on Senegal education, 160 E
on violence, 114, 115, 115n1 East African Community Gender
on women’s empowerment, 169 Equality and Development Bill, 232
Dengue, 72, 72n4 Ebola
Department of Trade and Industry, in in Sierra Leone, 65, 156
South Africa, 302 transmission of, 72, 72n4
DHS. See Demographic and Health Economic Community of West Africa
Survey States (ECOWAS), 232
Digital divide, 2, 29–30 fiscal policy and, 254
in financial access, 20, 21f Economic growth
GDP per capita and, 30n27 child marriage and, 131–42, 132t,
Digitalization 135t, 136t, 138t–40t
economic growth and, 347 digitalization and, 347
for MSMEs, 91 education and, 147, 148, 149, 162,
political leadership and, 347–57, 352t, 163
355t, 356t, 358t fintech and, 337
See also Financial technology gender equality and, 209–19, 217f
Divorce health and, 166–67
family law and, 226 legal rights and, 225, 237, 248
in Namibia, 242 women’s empowerment and, 225, 237,
in Nigeria, 106 248
property law and, 227 See also GDP per capita
in Rwanda, 238 ECOWAS. See Economic Community of
women’s empowerment and, 167, 178 West Africa States
Dollar, David, 148, 213 Education, 2, 13–16, 13f–15f, 63–64,
Domestic violence. See Violence 63n1
Domestic Violence Amendment Bill, in adolescent pregnancies and, 163
South Africa, 244 child marriage and, 133, 137, 138,
Domestic work 140, 142
in Cabo Verde, 248 child mortality rates and, 149
care work and, 323 in COVID-19 pandemic, 15–16, 81,
in Eswatini, 89 83f, 85, 90–91, 103, 104f, 105,
in South Africa, 244 106–7, 106f, 212
women’s empowerment and, 170 economic growth and, 147, 148, 149,
Doppelhofer, Gernot, 133–34, 137 162, 163
Dordevic, Ljubica, 209, 212, 214–17 employment and, 105, 149–52, 160
Doss, Cheryl, 167 in epidemics, 63–75, 66t, 67f, 70t, 71t,
Dowries, 23n21 73t, 74t, 283

Education (continued ) EM-DAT. See Emergency Event Database

expenditure policy on, 287, 288f EMDCs. See Emerging and developing
fertility rate and, 18, 149 countries
in GDI, 38, 38n32, 38t EME. See Emerging market economies
gender equality and, 211f Emergency Event Database (EM-DAT),
in GGI, 35, 36t 64, 65, 68, 69
governance for, 147, 162 Emerging and developing countries
in HCI, 36–38, 36n31, 37t (EMDCs), child marriage in, 131,
health and, 169 132, 133, 136, 139, 141
HIV/AIDS and, 65 Emerging market economies (EME),
human capital and, 147, 149, 151, 157 306–8, 307f
income inequality and, 149, 151, Emerging Markets and Developing
160–62, 171–72 Economies, on COVID-19
informal employment and, 149–50, pandemic, 84
151, 154–55, 157 Employment, 23–28, 24f–28f, 30f
NEET and, 29, 30f care work and, 321–22, 321f
policymaking for, 151, 162 in COVID-19 pandemic, 81, 83f,
political leadership and, 353, 353n9 84–94, 86n6, 95t, 98–102,
tax law and, 261 98f–100f, 101f–3f, 104–5, 105f
teacher recruitment for, 162 education and, 105, 149–50, 151–52,
urbanization and, 160 160
violence and, 115, 124–25, 125t, 162 electoral violence and, 199–200
in West Africa, 147–63, 152f, 155f, expenditure policy and, 289–90
158f, 161f fintech and, 330–44, 334f, 339t,
women’s empowerment and, 167, 168, 341t–43t
171 GDP per capita and, 213, 215, 215f
See also specific types and topics in GII, 35, 35t
Egypt intensive and extensive margins of,
political leadership in, 348n4 215, 215f
VAT and, 282 labor law on, 227–28
violence in, 117n3 in Nigeria, 53
Eichengreen, Barry, 65 political leadership and, 353
Elborgh-Woytek, Katrin, 213 pregnancy and, 13n7
Electoral violence, 193–203 in public sector, 289–90
climate change and, 200 sectoral segregation in, 28–29, 28f
control variables for, 198, 204t social safety nets for, 286
data sources for, 196 structural violence and, 195
descriptive statistics for, 198–99, 199f, tax policy and, 274, 275f, 279–81
205t violence and, 122, 123–24
empirical strategy for, 199–200 women’s empowerment and, 167, 168,
employment and, 199–200 176, 177t
governance and, 194 See also specific types
income inequality and, 202–3 Employment Equity Act, in South Africa,
measurement of, 197 244
mechanisms of, 195–96 Employment in, 92, 199
norms and social roles and, 196 Endogeneity bias, 133
results for, 200–203, 201t Enquête Harmonisée sur le Conditions de
structural violence and, 195–96 Vie des Ménages, 151

Index 385
Entrepreneurship, 30–32 Eswatini

in agriculture, 31–32 COVID-19 pandemic in, 82, 88–89,
in Cabo Verde, 247 90, 91–92, 94
financial access for, 20, 31, 31nn28–29 employment in, 88–89, 92
GDP per capita and, 213 informal employment in, 90
legal barriers to, 11n6, 12f political leadership in, 358t
tax policy and, 276–78, 277f, 280–81 unpaid work in, 88–89, 92
in Women, Business and the Law Ethiopia
Index, 210n3 agriculture employment in, 106
Epidemics care work in, 318n2, 319f, 320, 327, 331t
adolescent pregnancies in, 71 COVID-19 pandemic in, 82n1, 97–109,
childcare in, 71 98f–106f
child marriage in, 71, 283 education in, 103, 104f, 105, 106–7,
classification of, 66 106f
from climate change, 282, 282n9 employment in, 101–2, 101f–3f,
concentration of, 69 104–5, 105f
countries in sample for, 76t GB in, 298t, 299, 303
data sources for, 76t income inequality in, 102, 103f
distribution of, 66, 66t, 72n4 informal employment in, 102, 104
duration of, 66–67, 66t, 69, 72, 73t lockdowns in, 100–102, 101f–3f, 104
education in, 63–75, 66t, 67f, 70t, 71t, political leadership in, 348n4
73t, 74t, 283 self-employment in, 104
effects of, 70–73, 70t, 71t, 73t violence in, 117n3, 119t, 127
empirical strategy for, 68–69 Expenditure policy
GDP per capita and, 69, 69n3 on education, 287, 288f
historical view of, 67–68, 67f, 68n2 employment and, 289–90
human capital in, 63–75, 66t, 67f, 70t, on health, 287–88, 289f
71t, 73t, 74t social safety nets in, 285–87
missing data on, 77t taxes/tax policy, 273–91, 275f–77f,
primary education in, 63–64, 63n1, 279f, 280f, 283f, 284f, 288f, 289f
70–72, 70t, 71t unpaid work and, 288–99
secondary education in, 63–64, 63n1, Explicit bias, in tax policy, 279n4
70–71, 70t, 71t Extreme weather. See Climate change
See also COVID-19 pandemic
Equality of Rights between Women and F
Men for Sustainable Development, Family law, 226–27, 230
232 Family planning, 83f
Equal Opportunities Act, in Mauritius, 245 FAO. See Food and Agriculture
Equal Opportunities Commission, in Organization
Uganda, 258 FAS. See Financial Access Survey
Equatorial Guinea FE. See Fixed effects
FAS from, 60t Federal Budget Framework, in Mexico,
tax law in, 265 257–58
Eritrea Female genital mutilation, 2, 22n18
care work in, 327 SDG on, 22
tax policy in, 280 FEMNET. See African Women’s
Essilfie, Gloria, 169 Development and Communication
Esteve-Volart, Berta, 213, 214n6 Network

Ferracuti, Franco, 196 Fiscal policy, 253–67

Fertility rate constitutional provisions for, 255
child marriage and, 132, 133, 283 in COVID-19 pandemic, 253–54, 256
education and, 149 for gender equality, 4–5
gender equality and, 211f laws on, 255–56
in region, 17–18, 18f See also Expenditure policy; Gender
See also Adolescent pregnancies budgeting; Tax policy/law
Financial Access Survey (FAS), 43–44, Fischer, Jeff, 197
43n1, 49n6 5R framework (recognize, reduce,
country submissions of, 60, 60t redistribute, reward, and leadership),
financial access measurement in, 324–26
59–60, 60t Fixed effects (FE), 182–83
on financial inclusion, 44–46, 45n3 for economic growth, 216
on fintech, 338n2 for education, 74t
Financial inclusion, 44–46, 44n2, 45t for electoral violence, 199, 200
in COVID-19 pandemic, 45–46 for epidemics, 64, 68–69
GDP per capita and, 213 for fintech, 337, 339t, 343t
measurement of, 59 for gender equality, 95t
in Namibia, 241 for violence, 120–21, 125t
Financial services access, 19–20, 21f, Foltz, Jeremy, 172–73
43–60, 46n4, 49nn6–7, 50f, 51f Food and Agriculture Organization
in Cabo Verde, 247 (FAO), 31
in COVID-19 pandemic, 43–44, Forbes, Kristin, 148
51–57, 52nn8–9, 52t, 54n10, 55f, Fragmentation, in structural violence, 195
56f, 57t Francesconi, Marco, 180
for entrepreneurship, 31, 31nn28–29
gender equality and, 211f G
in Mauritius, 55 Gabon
measurement of, 59–60, 60t electoral violence in, 199f
SIGI on, 36, 36t GB in, 298, 298t
in South Africa, 243 political leadership in, 358t
in Uganda, 56 tax law in, 265
See also Bank accounts tax policy in, 275
Financial technology (fintech), 5 violence in, 118, 119t
background of, 334–36 Galtung, Johan, 195
country characteristics of, 342–43, The Gambia
342t, 343t care work in, 327
in COVID-19 pandemic, 333 customary law in, 232
data on, 338 GB in, 298t, 299
economic growth and, 337 political leadership in, 358t
employment and, 330–44, 334f, 339t, violence in, 119t
341t–43t Gandhi, Mahatma, 193
firm characteristics for, 340–42, Garcia, Natalia, 102, 107
341t Gatti, Roberta, 148, 213
GDP per capita and, 342t, 343t GB. See Gender budgeting
for MSMEs, 91 GDP per capita
results for, 339–40, 339t care work and, 328–29, 329f
FINDEX, 9, 335, 338n2 child marriage and, 3, 22, 131–42,
Fintech. See Financial technology 132t, 135t, 136t, 138t–40t

Index 387
in COVID-19 pandemic, 209 Gender equality/inequality

digital divide and, 30n27 aspects of, 211f
education and, 147, 148, 151, 154, care work, 315–31
157, 159 in COVID-19 pandemic, 210–11, 219
employment and, 215, 215f cultural norms, traditions, and beliefs
epidemics and, 69, 69n3 and, 229–31
fertility rate and, 18 for development, 1–6
fintech and, 342t, 343t economic growth and, 209–19, 217f
in GDI, 38, 38n32, 38t fiscal policy for, 4–5
gender equality and, 2, 209–19, 217f GB and, 310–12, 310f, 311f
health and, 166–71 GDP per capita from, 2
legal rights for, 226–29 IMF for, 3
political leadership and, 347 legal rights and, 230–31
population growth and, 139n8 measurement of, 198
violence and, 113–26, 116f–18f, 119t, megatrends in, 5–6
121f, 122f, 125t, 127t, 244 policymaking for, 3–5
women’s empowerment and, 213, in Rwanda, 240
225–33, 228f trends in, 9–38, 10f, 12f–15f, 17f–19f,
Gender Affairs Directorate, in Ethiopia, 21f, 22f, 24f–28f, 30f, 33f, 35t–38t
299 as untapped source of prosperity, 2–
Gender-based Violence law, in Rwanda, See also specific topics
239 Gender equality of outcomes, 254n 1
Gender budgeting (GB), 4–5, 295–313 Gender Inequality Index (GII), 9–10, 10f,
audit and parliamentary oversight of, 35, 35t
302–6 on COVID-19 pandemic, 84n3
comparison with countries outside sub- of UNDP, 216
Saharan Africa, 306–8, 307f Gender neutral
in COVID-19 pandemic, 91, 256–60, parental leave, 244
295 property rights, 242
execution and monitoring of, 302 tax law, 261, 261n13, 262, 263, 264,
gender equality and, 310–12, 310f, 264n21
311f Gender Protocol, of SADC, 232
implementation challenges of, 308–10, Gender Responsive Planning, Budgeting,
309f Monitoring, Evaluation and
legal and institutional framework for, Auditing, in South Africa, 299
298–99 Genocide, in Rwanda, 238, 239
legal rights and, 256–60 GGI. See Global Gender Gap Index
in Mauritius, 259 Ghana
Parliamentary scrutiny of, 259 adolescent pregnancy decline in, 17
status of, 296–306, 297f, 298t, 304t–5t bride price in, 283
supreme audit institutions for, 259–60 care work in, 318n2, 319f, 327, 331t
Gender Budgeting Act, in Canada, 259, customary law in, 232
357 electoral violence in, 199f
Gender Budgeting Index, 306n2, 307f employment in, 199
Gender Development Index (GDI), 38, political leadership in, 348n4, 358t
38n32, 38t tax law in, 264
on COVID-19 pandemic, 82, 82n2 violence in, 117n3, 119t, 127
for Niger, 150 women’s empowerment in, 169, 170,
Gender Employment Gap Index, 214, 215f 171

Ghatak, Maitreesh, 173 economic growth and, 166–67

Ghosh, Sucharita, 148 education and, 169
GII. See Gender Inequality Index expenditure policy on, 287–88, 289f
Gini coefficient, for education, 151, 154, GDP per capita and, 166–71
157, 159 in GGI, 35, 36t
Global Database, of UNICEF, 133 income inequality and, 171–72
Global Gender Gap Index (GGI), 10, tax policy and, 274
10nn1–2, 35, 36t women’s empowerment and, 167–76,
on COVID-19 pandemic, 84, 84n3, 212 177f, 180
description of, 212n4 Henry, Carla, 194
on legal rights, 237, 238 Hill, M. Anne, 148, 213
on legal rights in Cabo Verde, 246 HIV/AIDS, 84
on legal rights in Mauritius, 245 child marriage and, 137
on legal rights in Namibia, 243 education and, 65
on political leadership, 348 Hsieh, Chang-Tai, 213
Global Programme to End Child Human capital
Marriage, of UNICEF, 134n2 in COVID-19 pandemic, 165, 178
Gomes, Diego B. P., 356 education and, 147, 149–51, 157
Gonzales, Christian, 148, 213 in epidemics, 63–75, 66t, 67f, 70t, 71t,
Governance 73t, 74t
child marriage and, 141 resource scarcity and, 174, 176, 181
for education, 147, 162 social safety nets for, 286
electoral violence and, 194 in South Africa, 165, 168
for fintech, 5 women’s empowerment and, 165–84,
Gridded Population of the World, 116 177f, 177t, 183t–84t
Guinea Human Capital Index (HCI), 36–38,
bank accounts in, 49 36n31, 37t
electoral violence in, 199f child marriage and, 137n6, 138t, 140,
FAS from, 60t 140n9, 140t
financial access in, 46 for Sierra Leone, 156
political leadership in, 358t Human Development Index, on
tax law in, 265 COVID-19 pandemic, 82n2
Guinea-Bissau Human Rights Watch, on adolescent
FAS from, 60t pregnancies, 142n11
tax policy in, 280
Guo, Yan, 65 I
Iceland, Public Finance Act in, 257
H ICT. See Information and
Hakura, Dalia, 213, 214n6 communications technology
Han, Peter, 172–73 ICU. See International Communications
Handa, Sudhanshu, 170 Union
Hasanov, Faud, 120–21 ILO. See International Labour
HCI. See Human Capital Index Organization
Health, 16–19, 17f–19f IMF. See International Monetary Fund
child marriage and, 137, 138, 140–41, Implicit bias, in tax policy, 278–84, 279f,
142 279n4, 280f, 283f, 284f
climate change and, 166, 172–73, 176, Income equality/inequality, 3, 13n7
180–81 in Cabo Verde, 247
in COVID-19 pandemic, 83f care work and, 322

Index 389
child marriage and, 133, 141 Integrated Public Use of Microdata Series
in COVID-19 pandemic, 87–88, 102, (IPUMS), 114, 115, 115n1, 117,
103f 118, 122, 124n6
economic growth and, 133 Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing
education and, 149, 151, 160–62, and Development, of UN, 262
171–72 International Communications Union
electoral violence and, 202–3 (ICU), 352n7
in Ethiopia, 102, 103f International Conference of Labour
health and, 171–72 Statisticians, 325
labor law and, 227–28 International Growth Centre, on violence,
in Namibia, 241 114
in Nigeria, 102, 103f International Labour Organization (ILO),
parental leave and, 228 9
pension gap and, 263, 263n19 on care work, 316, 318, 318n1, 324–26,
pensions and, 229, 263, 263n19 329
in South Africa, 174 on COVID-19 pandemic, 97–98, 100,
violence and, 117f 210
women’s empowerment and, 167, 5R framework of, 324–26
168 International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Income Tax Act, in Kenya, 264–65 Dynamic General Equilibrium Life-
Infant mortality, 16, 17f Cycle Model with Heterogeneous
Informal employment, 25, 25n23, 26f Agents of, 149, 163
cash transfers for, 53, 90 on GB, 296–97, 297f, 313t
in COVID-19 pandemic, 85, 86, 90, for gender equality, 3
92, 102, 104 Regional Economic Outlook of, 212
education and, 149–50, 151, 154–55, WEO of, 338
157 See also Financial Access Survey
in Eswatini, 90 Intimate partner violence. See Violence
in Ethiopia, 102, 104 IPUMS. See Integrated Public Use of
in Lesotho, 90 Microdata Series
in Namibia, 90 Isange Centers, in Rwanda, 240
in Nigeria, 102, 104 IV. See Instrumental variable
prevalence of, 285 IV-GMM. See Instrumental variable
in South Africa, 90 generalized method of moments
violence and, 122, 123
Information and communications J
technology (ICT), 335, 347 Jayne, Thomas, 194
See also Digitalization Joshi, Ruchika, 214n5
Inheritance law, 3, 91
in Mauritius, 246 K
in Rwanda, 238–39 Kattan, Raja Bentaouet, 212
in South Africa, 243 Kaufmann, Daniel, 338
Instrumental variable (IV) Kazandjian, Romina, 148, 214n6
for child marriage, 138 Kelly, Eliza G., 196
for climate change, 172 Kenya
for COVID-19 pandemic, 114, 120 bride price in, 283
for electoral violence, 194, 200 care work in, 327
Instrumental variable generalized method electoral violence in, 193, 198, 199f,
of moments (IV-GMM), 214n6 202

Kenya (continued) political leadership in, 358t

GB in, 260, 298t, 301 tax law in, 264
GDP per capita in, 218 tax policy in, 281
political leadership in, 348n3, 358t violence in, 84
property law in, 266 LFS. See Labor Force Survey
tax law in, 264–65, 266 Liberia
tax policy in, 275, 281 electoral violence in, 198, 199f
violence in, 117n3, 119t, 127 FAS from, 60t
women’s empowerment in, 168 GB in, 298t
King, M. Elizabeth, 148, 213 Market Women and Small Informal
Klasen, Stephan, 149, 169, 213 Petty Traders Bank Loan Program
Knowles, Stephen, 148 in, 53
Kochhar, Kalpana, 213 political leadership in, 358t
Kotsadam, Andreas, 123–24 tax law in, 264
Kraay, Aart, 338 violence in, 117
LIDC. See Low-income and developing
L countries
Labor force participation. See Life expectancy, 17
Employment child marriage and, 137n6, 140t, 141
Labor Force Survey (LFS), 86–87, 88, 94 in GDI, 38, 38n32, 38t
Labor law, 227–28 in HCI, 36–38, 36n31, 37t
Lamanna, Francesca, 213 Literacy, 2, 14–15, 15f
Lambert, Frederic, 87 Loko, Boileau, 333, 336, 337, 338n2
Lee, Jong-Wha, 148 Lorgelly, Paula, 148
Legal rights, 11–13, 11n4, 12f, 46 Low birth weight, 16–17
in Cabo Verde, 246–48 Low-income and developing countries
economic growth and, 225, 237, 248 (LIDC), 306–8, 307f
GB and, 256–60, 298–99
for GDP per capita, 226–29 M
gender equality and, 211f, 230–31 Madagascar
in marriage, 227 bank accounts in, 49
in Mauritius, 245–46 care work in, 318n2, 319f, 329,
in Namibia, 240–43 331t
pluralism in, 230 electoral violence in, 198, 199f
in Rwanda, 238–40, 239f FAS from, 60t
in South Africa, 243–45 GB in, 298t
women’s empowerment in, 237–48, political leadership in, 358t
238f tax law in, 264
Leighton, Dana C., 195 Malawi
Lesotho electoral violence in, 198, 199f
bank accounts in, 49, 54 employment in, 199
COVID-19 pandemic in, 82, 89, 90, FAS from, 60t
91–92, 94 GB in, 298t
customary law in, 232 political leadership in, 358t
employment in, 89, 92 tax law in, 265
FAS from, 60t tax policy in, 281
GB in, 298t violence in, 117n3, 119t, 127
informal employment in, 90 women’s empowerment in, 170

Index 391
Mali policymaking in, 3–4

care work in, 318n2, 319f, 320, 329, political leadership in, 358t
331t McMahon, Walter, 148
electoral violence in, 199f Megatrends, in gender equality, 5–6
FAS from, 60t Meningitis, in Niger, 64–65
political leadership in, 358t Mental health, child marriage and, 23
tax law in, 266 #MeToo, 349n5
tax relief in, 53 Mexico
violence in, 117n3, 119t, 127 bank accounts in, 48f
women’s empowerment in, 168, 169, cash transfers in, 178
172–73 Federal Budget Framework in, 257–58
Maputo Protocol (African Charter on Meyimdjui, Carine, 356
Human and People’s Rights on the Micro, small, and medium enterprise
Rights of Women in Africa), 231, 254 (MSME)
Marginalization in COVID-19 pandemic, 91
in care work, 317 financial assistance for, 54
fintech and, 333 Microfinance, 49n5
in structural violence, 195 Midlarsky, Manus I., 196
Market Women and Small Informal Petty Millennium Development Goals
Traders Bank Loan Program, in on fiscal policy, 254
Liberia, 53 for Sierra Leone, 156
Marriage Miller, Ronald I., 133–34, 137
family law and, 226 Ministry of Gender Equality, Poverty
family planning in, 83f Eradication and Social Welfare, in
legal rights in, 227 Namibia, 243
in Rwanda, 238–39 Ministry of Gender Equality and Family
in South Africa, 243 Welfare, in Mauritius, 246
violence in, 84 Mitra, Pritha, 132, 133, 141–42
in Women, Business and the Law Mobile phones, 2, 30
Index, 210n3 Montenegro, Claudio E., 212
See also Child marriage; Divorce Morocco
Married Persons Equality Act, in education in, 171
Namibia, 241, 242, 243 electoral violence in, 199f
Maternal mortality rates, 2, 16 fiscal policy in, 255
gender equality and, 211f political leadership in, 358t
in GII, 35, 35t Mozambique
Mauritius care work in, 323
African Union Solemn Declaration on electoral violence in, 199f
Gender Equality and, 232 employment in, 199
care work in, 318n2, 319f, 329, 331t GB in, 298t
CEDAW and, 232 political leadership in, 358t
customary law in, 232 tax law in, 265–66
electoral violence in, 198, 199f violence in, 117n3, 119t, 127
employment in, 245 MSMEs. See Micro, small, and medium
FAS from, 60t enterprise
financial service usage, 55 Muthoo, Abhinay, 180
GB in, 259, 298t, 301 Myburgh v. Commercial Bank of Namibia,
legal rights in, 245–46 243

N Niger
Naidu, Sirisha, 328 bank accounts in, 231
Namibia care work in, 327
African Union Solemn Declaration on education in, 150–53, 152f
Gender Equality and, 232 education in epidemics in, 64–65, 67
CEDAW and, 232 electoral violence in, 198, 199f
COVID-19 pandemic in, 82, 89, 90, FAS from, 60t
91–92, 94 GB in, 298t
customary law in, 242 GDP per capita in, 218
electoral violence in, 199f meningitis in, 64–65
employment in, 92, 241 political leadership in, 348n3, 358t
FAS from, 60t Nigeria
GB in, 298t agriculture employment in, 104,
informal employment in, 90 106
legal rights in, 231, 240–43 bride price in, 283
National Labour Act in, 241 #BringBackOurGirls in, 349n5
policymaking in, 3–4 in COVID-19 pandemic, 82n1,
political leadership in, 358t 97–109, 98f–106f
tax law in, 264 divorce in, 106
violence in, 84, 117n3, 119t, 127 education in, 103, 104f, 105, 106–7,
National Assembly, in Namibia, 241 106f, 155f
National Gender Budget, in Zimbabwe, electoral violence in, 193, 198, 199f
300 employment in, 53, 101–2, 101f–3f,
National Gender Policy 104–5, 105f
in Mauritius, 246 entrepreneurship in, 278
in Rwanda, 240, 300 income inequality in, 102, 103f
National Income Dynamics Survey informal employment in, 102, 104
(NIDS) lockdowns in, 100–102, 101f–3f,
for COVID-19 pandemic, 85, 86–87, 104
88 political leadership in, 358t
for women’s empowerment, 174, 180, self-employment in, 104
181 tax policy in, 281
National Labour Act, in Namibia, 241 violence in, 114, 117n3, 119t, 127
National Land Commission, in Kenya, 266 Nighttime lights, violence and, 116,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric 119–20, 125t, 126
Administration, 116 Not in education, employment, or
National Plan for Gender Equality, in training (NEET), 29, 30f, 321–22
Cabo Verde, 246–47 Nzinga, 348n4
Native Administration Proclomation, in
Namibia, 242, 242n2 O
Natural resources, violence and, 123–24, Occupational segregation, 28
125t in Cabo Verde, 248
NEET. See Not in education, in COVID-19 pandemic, 92
employment, or training in Rwanda, 240
Nefertiti, 348n4 Odhiambo, Nicholas, 335
Ngoa, Gaston, 335 OECD. See Organisation for Economic
Nichols, Angela D., 196 Co-operation and Development
NIDS. See National Income Dynamics Office of the Auditor General, in Uganda,
Survey 259–60

Index 393
Ordinary least squares (OLS) Policymaking

on political leadership, 353–54, for care work, 316–17, 330
355t on child marriage, 133
for women’s empowerment, 175 for COVID-19 pandemic, 90–91
Organic Law on State Finances and for education, 151, 162
Property, in Rwanda, 258 for financial access in COVID-19
Organisation for Economic Co-operation pandemic, 51–54, 52t
and Development (OECD), 9 for gender equality, 3–5
on fintech, 344 Political leadership, 32–33, 33f
on legal rights, 237 corruption and, 348n2
SIGI of, 11, 11n3 data and facts on, 351–53, 352t,
on tax law, 229 353nn8–9
on tax policy, 279 digitization and, 347–57, 352t, 355t,
Orphans, in epidemics, 72 356t, 358t
Ossome, Lyn, 328 GDP per capita and, 347
Ostby, Gudrun, 123–24 in GGI, 35, 36t
Ostry, Jonathan, 213 in GII, 35, 35t
Ouedraogo, Rasmane, 213 main results on, 354–56, 356t, 358t
Owen, Dorian, 148 OLS on, 353–54, 355t
poverty and, 353–54
P robustness analysis for, 356–57
Parental leave, 90 in Rwanda, 238–39, 239
gender neutral, 244 social media and, 349–57, 349n5,
income inequality and, 228 352n7, 356t
laws for, 233 Population growth
in Namibia, 241 child marriage and, 132, 139n8, 141
in Rwanda, 240 GDP per capita and, 139n8
Parity Law, in Cabo Verde, 247 in Sierra Leone, 141
Part-time employment, 26–27, 27f Poverty, 102, 107
defined, 26n25 care work and, 316–17
Patrinos, Harry A., 212 child marriage and, 132, 133, 141
Pearce, Nicholas A., 347, 348 education and, 149, 162
Penal Code, in Rwanda, 238 political leadership and, 353
Penetration, in structural violence, social safety nets for, 285–86
195 See also Income equality/inequality
Pennings, Steven Michael, 214, 215f PPP. See Purchasing power parity
Pensions, 83f, 287 Pregnancy
childcare and, 229 in adolescence, 2, 16–17
income equality/inequality and, 229, employment and, 13n7
263, 263n19 See also Maternal mortality rates
tax policy/law and, 263, 263n19 Primary education, 13, 13n
in Women, Business and the Law child marriage and, 133
Index, 210n3 in epidemics, 63–64, 63n1, 70–72,
PEPUDA. See Promotion of Equality and 70t, 71t
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination political leadership and, 353n9
Act in Senegal, 159
Perkins, Susan E., 347, 348 Promotion of Equality and Prevention
Phillips, Katherine W., 347, 348 of Unfair Discrimination Act
Platform for Action, 231 (PEPUDA), in South Africa, 243

Property rights/law, 227 customary law in, 239

gender neutral in, 242 Equality of Rights between Women
in Kenya, 266 and Men for Sustainable
in Mauritius, 246 Development and, 232
in Namibia, 242 family law in, 227
tax policy and, 275–76, 276f, 280–81 GB in, 4–5, 258, 259, 260, 296, 298,
Protection from Domestic Violence Act, 298t, 300, 303
in Mauritius, 246 gender equality in, 240
Public Finance Act, in Iceland, 257 genocide in, 238, 239
Public Finance and Accountability Act, in legal rights in, 238–40, 239f
Uganda, 258 policymaking in, 3–4
Public sector, employment in, 289–90 political leadership in, 238–39, 239,
Purchasing power parity (PPP), 329f 348n3
SDGs in, 2
Q tax law in, 263, 264
Qian, Nancy, 171 violence in, 119t, 239, 240
Quarterly Labor Force Survey, 85 women’s empowerment in, 168, 169
R S
Rainfall. See Climate change SACU. See South Africa Customs Union
Rajan, Raghuram, 216, 336, 337 SADC. See Southern African
Rapid Impact COVID-19 survey, 89 Development Community
Recognize, reduce, redistribute, reward, and SaferSpaces, 84
leadership (5R framework), 324–26 Sahel Women Empowerment and
Reform of Customary Law of Succession, Demographic Project, 133, 134n2
in South Africa, 243 Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 133–34, 137
Regional Economic Outlook, of IMF, 212 SALDRU. See Southern Africa Labour
Religion and Development Research Unit
gender equality and, 232 Santoso, Marianne V., 168
political leadership and, 353, 353n9 Sao Tome and Principe, 1
violence and, 125t GB in, 298t
Republic of Congo political leadership in, 358t
bank accounts in, 46–49 Science, technology, engineering, and
FAS from, 60t mathematics (STEM), 90
GB in, 298t, 301–2 SDGs. See Sustainable Development
tax law in, 265 Goals
tax policy in, 280 Sebu, Joshua, 169
violence in, 118 Secondary education, 13, 14f
Resilience child marriage and, 133
in care work, 326 completion rates for, 288f
in COVID-19 pandemic, 90, 258 in epidemics, 63–64, 63n1, 70–72,
from education, 147, 149 70t, 71t
Resource scarcity, 174, 176, 181 in GII, 35, 35t
Rost, Lucia, 320 in Namibia, 241
Royalty, Anne Beeson, 200 political leadership and, 353n9
Rustad, Siri A., 123–24 in Senegal, 160
Rwanda in Sierra Leone, 156, 157–59
bride price in, 283 Sectoral segregation, in employment,
CEDAW and, 232 28–29, 28f

Index 395
Self-employment Song, Jacques Simon, 335

in COVID-19 pandemic, 86, 86n6, South Africa
97, 104 African Union Solemn Declaration on
in Ethiopia, 104 Gender Equality and, 232
in Nigeria, 104 bride price in, 283
See also Entrepreneurship care work in, 318n2, 319f, 323, 327,
#Sendenlar, 349n5 331t
Senegal CEDAW and, 232
bride price in, 283 climate change in, 180–81
education in, 159–62, 161f COVID-19 pandemic in, 82, 85–88,
electoral violence in, 199f 90, 91–92, 94, 95t
FAS from, 60t customary law in, 243
GB in, 298t education in, 85
political leadership in, 348n3, 358t electoral violence in, 199f
tax law in, 264 employment in, 84, 85–88, 95t, 244
violence in, 117n3, 119t, 127 entrepreneurship in, 278
Sever, Can, 209, 212, 214–17 GB in, 5, 296, 298t, 299, 302
Sex education, by Global Programme to human capital in, 165, 168
End Child Marriage, 134n2 income inequality in, 174
Seychelles informal employment in, 90
FAS from, 60t legal rights in, 231, 243–45
GB in, 298t policymaking in, 3–4
Shamaileh, Ammar, 350 political leadership in, 348n3, 358t
Sierra Leone tax policy in, 275n1
customary law in, 232 violence in, 84, 117n3, 119t, 127, 244
Ebola in, 65, 156 South Africa Customs Union (SACU),
education in, 156–59, 158f 82–83, 84
education in epidemics in, 65 Southern Africa Labour and Development
electoral violence in, 199f Research Unit (SALDRU), 174
GB in, 296 Southern African Development
political leadership in, 358t Community (SADC), 232
population growth in, 141 South Sudan
violence in, 118, 119t bank accounts in, 49
women’s empowerment in, 169 FAS from, 60t
SIGI. See Social Institutions and Gender financial access in, 46
Index Standing Committee for Women, Youth
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and Children of the Parliament, in
financial assistance for, 52–54, 52n9 Ethiopia, 303
Social Institutions and Gender Index Standing Orders and Rules of the National
(SIGI), 36, 36t Assembly, in Mauritius, 259
on legal rights, 237 STEM. See Science, technology,
of OECD, 11, 11n3 engineering, and mathematics
Social media, 5 Stenzel, M. David, 213
political leadership and, 349–57, Strategic Plan for Sustainable
349n5, 352n7, 356t Development, in Cabo Verde, 247
violence and, 198 Structural inequality, 195
See also Digitalization Structural violence, 195–96
Social safety nets, 285–87 Sub-Saharan Africa. See specific countries
Somalia, 231 and topics

Sudan in Eritrea, 280

electoral violence in, 199f expenditure policy, 273–91, 275f–77f,
political leadership in, 358t 279f, 280f, 283f, 284f, 288f, 289f
Support to Women’s Entrepreneurship, in explicit bias in, 279n4
Cabo Verde, 247 externalities with, 282
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in Gabon, 265, 275
1, 2 in Ghana, 264
on child marriage, 131 in Guinea, 265
on female genital mutilation, 22 in Guinea-Bissau, 280
on fiscal policy, 254 health and, 274
on gender equality, 209, 209n1 implicit bias in, 278–84, 279f, 279n4,
on human capital, 165 280f, 283f, 284f
SIGI and, 11n3 in Kenya, 264–65, 266, 275, 281
Swaziland in Lesotho, 264, 281
electoral violence in, 199f in Liberia, 264
GB in, 298t in Madagascar, 264
in Malawi, 265, 281
T in Mali, 53, 266
Tanzania in Mozambique, 265–66
bride price in, 283 in Namibia, 264
care work in, 318n2, 319f, 331t in Niger, 153
electoral violence in, 199f in Nigeria, 281
GB in, 298t, 301 pensions and, 263, 263n19
political leadership in, 358t property law/rights and, 275–76, 276f,
tax policy in, 281n7 280–81
violence in, 117n3, 119t, 127 in Republic of Congo, 265, 280
Tax Appeals Tribunal Act, in Uganda, 266 in Rwanda, 263, 264
Tax law, gender neutral in, 261, 261n13, in Senegal, 264
262, 263, 264, 264n21 in South Africa, 275n1
Tax policy/law, 229, 260–66 in Tanzania, 281n7
on agriculture, 281, 281n7, 282 in Uganda, 264, 266, 281
in Benin, 265, 281n7 VAT, 4, 90–91, 262, 274
in Cameroon, 280 in Zimbabwe, 281n7
in Canada, 261 Teacher recruitment, 162
carbon tax, 283–84 Teignier, Marc, 213
in Central African Republic, 265 #Tellyourstory, 349n5
in Chad, 265, 275 Tertiary education, 13–14, 14f
childcare and, 277 in Namibia, 241
climate change and, 282–83 in Senegal, 160
in Comoros, 265, 275 Time poverty, 320, 320n4
in Côte d’Ivoire, 281 Time-use surveys (TUSs), for care work,
in COVID-19 pandemic, 90–91, 260–62 27, 317, 318, 323–24, 328, 330–31,
in Democratic Republic of the Congo, 331t
265, 275 Togetherness (Ubuntu), 328
education and, 153 Togo
employment and, 274, 275f, 279–81 electoral violence in, 199f
entrepreneurship and, 276–78, 277f, employment in, 199
280–81 family law in, 230
in Equatorial Guinea, 265 FAS from, 60t

Index 397
GB in, 296, 298, 298t, 301 on education in Sierra Leone, 156

political leadership in, 358t on gender neutral, 261n13
violence in, 119t Global Database of, 133
Tunisia Global Programme to End Child
electoral violence in, 199f Marriage of, 134n2
political leadership in, 358t on HIV/AIDS and education, 65
TUSs. See Time-use surveys on women’s empowerment, 171
Two-stage least squares (2SLS), for United Nations Development Program
violence, 120 (UNDP)
Tzannatos, Zafiris, 213 on electoral violence, 197
See also Gender Development Index
U United Nations Educational, Scientific
Ubuntu (togetherness), 328 and Cultural Organization
Uganda (UNESCO)
bride price in, 283 on Senegal education, 159
care work in, 320 on unpaid work, 15–16
entrepreneurship in, 278 on women’s empowerment, 169
FAS from, 60t United Nations Populations Fund, 84
financial service usage in, 56 United States Agency for International
GB in, 5, 258, 259–60, 296, 298–301, Development (USAID). See
298t, 303, 309 Demographic and Health Survey
political leadership in, 358t United States Geological Survey, 124
SDGs in, 2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
tax law in, 266 254
tax policy in, 281 Unpaid work, 27–28
violence in, 118, 119t in COVID-19 pandemic, 5, 15–16,
women’s empowerment in, 169 81, 83f, 88–89, 92, 108f
UN. See United Nations in Eswatini, 88–89, 92
UN Declaration on the Elimination of expenditure policy and, 288–99
Violence against Women, 113n1 in South Africa, 244
UNDP. See United Nations Development violence and, 122
Program See also Care work
UNESCO. See United Nations UN Women, 114
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Urbanization
Organization care work and, 322
UNICEF. See United Nations Children’s COVID-19 pandemic and, 98
Fund education and, 160
Uniform Matrimonial Property Bill, in epidemics from, 68n2
Namibia, 242 violence and, 116, 125t
United Nations (UN)
FAO of, 31 V
Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing Value-added tax (VAT), 4, 90–91, 262,
and Development of, 262 274
See also Millennium Development Goals; Violence, 2, 21, 22f
Sustainable Development Goals agriculture and, 116
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) agriculture employment and, 122, 123,
on child marriage, 133, 134n2 125t
on child marriage in COVID-19 cash transfers and, 178, 179
pandemic, 15, 23, 131 challenges in estimation of, 120

Violence (continued ) W
child marriage and, 132 WAEMU. See West African Economic
commodity price shocks and, 124, and Monetary Union
124n6 Wang, Lichen, 120–21
in COVID-19 pandemic, 81, 84, 108f, Water fetching
114, 115, 120, 126 in COVID-19 pandemic, 86, 88, 92,
defined, 113n1 94
education and, 115, 124–25, 125t, 162 in epidemics, 71
elimination of, 113–26, 116f–18f, WB. See World Bank
119t, 121f, 122f, 125t, 127t WBES. See World Bank Enterprise Survey
empirical strategy and baseline results WBL. See Women, Business and the Law
for, 119–23, 119n5, 121f, 122f WDI. See World Development Indicators
employment and, 122, 123–24 WEF. See World Economic Forum
GDP per capita and, 113–26, WEO. See World Economic Outlook
116f–18f, 119t, 121f, 122f, 125t, West Africa
127t, 244 education in, 147–63, 152f, 155f,
income inequality and, 117f 158f, 161f
increase in, 108 See also specific countries
informal employment and, 122, 123 West African Economic and Monetary
laws on, 123, 125t Union (WAEMU), 150–51
in lockdowns, 212 WHO. See World Health Organization
in Mauritius, 246 Winter, Deborah Du Nann, 195
mitigating and reinforcing factors in, Wodon, Quentin, 133, 137, 139, 139n8
123–26, 125t Wolfgang, Marvin, 196
natural resources and, 123–24, 125t Women, Business and the Law (WBL), 9
nighttime lights and, 116, 119–20, on fintech, 338
125t, 126 on gender equality, 210, 210n3, 211f
percentage of women experiencing, on legal rights, 237, 248
118 on legal rights in Cabo Verde, 246
pervasiveness of, 117–18 on legal rights in Mauritius, 245
religion and, 125t on violence, 123
in Rwanda, 239, 240 Women Parliamentary Association, in
in South Africa, 244 Uganda, 303
structural, 195–96 Women’s empowerment
study sample countries on, 117n3, cash transfers for, 166, 179
127 climate change and, 175, 176, 180–81
transmission channels of, 115–16, in COVID-19 pandemic, 165, 178
116f, 121–23, 122d data adjustments for, 180–81
types of, 119t, 121 economic growth and, 225, 237, 248
unpaid work and, 122 education and, 171
urbanization and, 116, 125t employment and, 176, 177t
women’s empowerment and, 167 GDP per capita and, 213, 225–33, 228f
See also Electoral violence health and, 168–73, 175, 176, 177f,
Violence Against Children Survey, on 180
COVID-19 pandemic, 84 in household, 167–68
#Vraiefemmeafricaine, 349n5 human capital and, 165–84, 177f,
Vulnerable employment, 2, 26, 26f 177t, 183t–84t
defined, 26n24 key variables for, 175

Index 399
in legal rights, 237–48, 238f in South Africa, 244

limitations and further research on, 179 See also Global Gender Gap Index
megatrends and, 5–6 World Economic Outlook (WEO), of
resource scarcity and, 174, 176, 181 IMF, 338
results on, 175–76, 177f, 177t, World Health Organization (WHO), 9
183t–84t EM-DAT and, 65
sample for, 181–82 on epidemics, 66
social safety nets for, 286
theoretical framework for, 173–75, 180 Y
Wood, Adrian, 149 Yamarik, Steven, 148
World Bank (WB) Yang, Yuanchen, 333, 336, 337, 338n2
on education COVID-19 pandemic, Yeboah, Felix Kwame, 194
16, 103, 107
on entrepreneurship, 31 Z
FINDEX of, 9, 335, 338n2 Zambia
in Rwanda, 240 electoral violence in, 199f
Sahel Women Empowerment and FAS from, 60t
Demographic Project of, 133, 134n2 GB in, 298t
on tax law, 261n14 political leadership in, 358t
on women’s empowerment, 178, 181 violence in, 117n3, 118, 119t, 127
See also Human Capital Index; Women, Zereyesus, Yacob, 169
Business and the Law; World Zewditu, 348n4
Development Indicators Zimbabwe
World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES), care work in, 320, 327
338, 343 electoral violence in, 199f
World Development Indicators (WDI), 9 FAS from, 60t
on education in epidemics, 2, 63n1, financial access in, 46
64, 66, 68 GB in, 298, 298t, 299–300
on political leadership, 348n3 political leadership in, 358t
World Economic Forum (WEF), on legal tax policy in, 281n7
rights, 237 violence in, 117n3, 119t, 127
in Namibia, 241 women’s empowerment in, 169
in Rwanda, 238n1 Zingales, Luigi, 216, 336, 337


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GENDER EQUALITY

©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

Names: Kolovich, Lisa, editor. | Newiak, Monique, editor. | International

DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this book are those of the

Recommended citation: Kolovich, Lisa, and Monique Newiak, eds. 2024.

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©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

Introduction: How Gender Equality Can Shape Sub-Saharan

PART I: WHERE THINGS STAND: GENDER EQUALITY IN

1. Revisiting Trends in Gender Equality 9

2. Zooming into Women’s Financial Access 43

3. Epidemics, Gender, and Human Capital in

4. COVID-19 and Gender Inequality: Impact in

5. COVID-19 and Gender Gaps in the Labor Market:

PART II: SETTLING ON THE BASICS: ENDING HARMFUL PRACTICES

6. Eliminating Violence against Women and

7. Eliminating Child Marriage and Boosting Growth 131

©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

PART III: INVESTING WELL: EMPOWERING WOMEN AND

8. Closing Education Gaps and Promoting Inclusive

9. The Impact of Women’s Empowerment on Human Capital

10. Gender Inequality and Electoral Violence in Africa:

11. A Causal Story: Gender Equality and Economic Growth 209

PART IV: FAIR PLAY: EQUAL RIGHTS AND WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT

12. Legal Rights: Women’s Economic Empowerment 225

13. Legal Rights: Women’s Empowerment—Case Studies 237

14. Rethinking Fiscal Law Design to Address Gender Inequality 253

PART V: THE POWER OF POLICIES: FROM FISCAL TO FINTECH

15. Tax and Expenditure Policy for Gender Equality 273

16. Gender Budgeting Practices in Sub-Saharan Africa 295

17. Gender Inequality and Care Work: Valuing and

18. Fintech, Female Employment, and Gender Inequality 333

©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

PART VI: LOOKING AHEAD: NEW OPPORTUNITIES

20. Gender and the Green Economy: What Conditions for a

©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

In recent decades, sub-Saharan Africa has made great progress in addressing

©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

Lisa Kolovich and Monique Newiak

©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

extensive experience working on emerging markets, low-income countries, and

Kikachukwu Alex-Okoh is a Research Officer in the Fiscal and Financial

Luiz F. Almeida is an Economist in the Country Economics and Engagement

Chie Aoyagi is an Economist in the IMF’s African Department. Before joining

Chiara Broccolini is an Economist at the Gender Group and Poverty and

©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

Inter-America Development Bank and in academia. She has published in peer-­

Hector Carcel-Villanova is an Economist in the Financial Institutions Division

Esha Chhabra is an Economist in the IMF’s Statistics Department, where she

Katharine Christopherson is Assistant General Counsel in the IMF’s Legal

Ljubica Dordevic is an Economist in the IMF’s African Department, where she

Brooks Evans is a Senior Economist in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department.

©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

Olivia Goldin is an Economic Advisor at the UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and

©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution

Inter-America Development Bank and in academia. She has published in peer-