G.R. No. 207786. January 30, 2017.

SPOUSES MARCELIAN TAPAYAN and ALICE TAPAYAN,

petitioners, vs. PONCEDA M. MARTINEZ, respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court (Petition), seeking the reversal of the Decision dated
May 30, 2013 (assailed Decision) rendered by the Court of
Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City Twenty-First Division (CA). The
assailed Decision stems from a complaint filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Ozamiz City (RTC), by respondent Ponceda
Martinez (Respondent) against petitioners, spouses Marcelian and
Alice Tapayan (Petitioners), for Specific Performance with
Damages.
The Facts
The parties herein are relatives by affinity. Petitioner Alice
Tapayan is the sister of Clark Martinez's (Clark) wife. Clark is
Respondent's son.
Respondent is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated
along Pingol Street, Ozamiz City, covered by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. P-1223 (Pingol Property). Based on the records,
it appears that two (2) mortgages were constituted over this
property the first in favor of Philippine National Bank (PNB
Mortgage), and the second in favor of Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP Mortgage). The particulars of these mortgages
are summarized as follows:
Mortgage Parties Purpose
PNB Mortgage Respondent as To secure a One
mortgagor and Hundred Thousand
 Philippine National Peso (P100,000.00)
Bank, Ozamiz Branch loan in the name of
(PNB) as mortgagee Respondent
DBP Mortgage Respondent as To secure a One
mortgagor and Million Peso
Development Bank of (P1,000,000.00)
the Philippines, Ozamiz renewable credit line
Branch (DBP) as in the name of
mortgagee Petitioners (DBP
Loan)

The records further show that Respondent agreed to constitute the

DBP Mortgage upon Clark's request, and that, in order to release
the Pingol Property from the PNB Mortgage, the Petitioners and
Respondent agreed to utilize a portion of the proceeds of the DBP
Loan to settle the remaining balance of Respondent's PNB Loan,
then amounting to Sixty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Twenty
Pesos and 55/100 (P65,320.55).
Subsequently, the parties herein executed a Deed of Undertaking
dated August 29, 1998 (Deed of Undertaking) in reference to the
DBP Mortgage. The Deed of Undertaking bears the following
stipulations, to wit:
1. that the "Second Party Respondent has no liability whatsoever
insofar as the aforesaid loan contracted by the First Party
Petitioners concerned;" CAIHTE
2. that "to secure the aforesaid amount, the First Party Petitioners
shall execute a second mortgage in favor of the Second Party
Respondent over his House and Lot covered by TCT No. T-10143,
situated at Carangan, Ozamiz City x x x"
3. x x x
4. that in the event the First Party Petitioners could not pay the loan
and consequently, the property of the Second Party Respondent is
foreclosed and is not redeemed by the First Party Petitioners within
the one (1) year redemption period; or in case the loan shall be paid
by the Second Party Respondent just to save the property from
being foreclosed, the First Party Petitioners shall acknowledge as
his indebtedness the amount due to the Development Bank of the
Philippines upon foreclosure or the amount paid by the Second
Party Respondent in paying the loan, but in either case shall be
deducted therefrom the amount of P65,320.55 plus interests and
fees paid by the First Party Petitioners to PNB, Ozamiz City.
(Emphasis and underscoring omitted)
The DBP Loan was not paid when it fell due.
Proceedings before the RTC
On September 14, 1999, Respondent filed a complaint for Specific
Performance with Damages (Complaint) against Petitioners before
the RTC. The Complaint sought to compel Petitioners to constitute
a mortgage over their house and lot situated in Carangan, Ozamiz
City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-10143
(Carangan Property), in accordance with the provisions of the Deed
of Undertaking.
Respondent averred that Petitioners used the proceeds of the DBP
Loan exclusively for their own purposes, and that since Petitioners
failed to pay the DBP Loan, she and her children were constrained
to pay DBP the sum of One Million One Hundred Eighty Thousand
Two Hundred Pesos and 10/100 (P1,180,200.10) to save the Pingol
Property from foreclosure. Notwithstanding this, Petitioners have
neither paid their indebtedness nor executed a mortgage over the
Carangan Property to secure the same.
The Petitioners denied Respondent's allegations and claimed that
the Deed of Undertaking "is a falsity."
Petitioners argued that the proceeds of the DBP Loan were
primarily used as capital for the construction business that
petitioner Marcelian put up with Clark, Mario Delos Reyes, and
Richard Sevilla (collectively, Joint Venturers). Petitioners
supposedly applied for the DBP Loan in furtherance of the verbal
agreement among the Joint Venturers, while Respondent freely
agreed to constitute the DBP Mortgage to secure said loan upon
Clark's request. Petitioners further emphasized that a portion of the
proceeds of the DBP Loan was used to pay off the balance of
Respondent's PNB Loan. Moreover, while the DBP Loan was in
the nature of a renewable credit line, it was not renewed since
Respondent refused to give her written consent for this purpose.
On the procedural aspect, Petitioners argued that Respondent's
Complaint was premature and should have been be dismissed
outright, since she failed to resort to barangay conciliation
proceedings before filing her Complaint with the RTC.
To support their allegations, Petitioners presented a Joint Affidavit
executed by Mario Delos Reyes and Richard Sevilla, attesting to
the formation of the joint venture and the conclusion of the verbal
agreement to apply for the DBP Loan in the interest of the Joint
Venturers.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dated September 28, 2009
in favor of Respondent (RTC Decision), the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering defendant spouses Atty. Marcelian and Alice Tapayan to
execute the second mortgage of (sic) their lot and house covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10143 located at Carangan,
Ozamiz City in favor of plaintiff Mrs. Ponceda Martinez, unless
they reimburse the latter of the total amount of P1,180,200.10 paid
by her to the Development Bank of the Philippines, Ozamiz Branch
for the redemption of the mortgage, and requiring defendants to
pay to plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 for attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC noted that the Deed of Undertaking was
acknowledged before Atty. Emmanuel V. Chiong, a notary public,
and reasoned that since the latter enjoys the presumption of having
performed his duties regularly, Petitioners' claim that the Deed of
Undertaking was a falsity must be rejected. On such basis, the RTC
held that the Deed of Undertaking constitutes a valid and binding
contract, which Petitioners are bound to respect.
Proceedings before the CA
Aggrieved, Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In their appeal,
Petitioners prayed that the CA determine (i) whether the RTC
validly acquired jurisdiction over the Complaint notwithstanding
Respondent's failure to comply with the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, (ii) whether Respondent is an accommodation
mortgagor, and (iii) whether the Petitioners may be compelled to
constitute a mortgage over the Carangan Property in Respondent's
favor.
On May 30, 2013, the CA rendered the assailed Decision denying
the Petitioners' appeal. The dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DENIED. The Decision of the RTC dated 28 September 2009 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Defendants-appellants are ordered to execute
the Second Mortgage on their house and lot covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-10143 in favor of plaintiff-
appellee. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Contrary to the Petitioners' claim, the CA found that the
requirements of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law were
complied with, as evidenced by the Certificate to File Action filed
by the Lupon Tagapamayapa before the RTC on August 16, 2000.
Moreover, the CA held that the Deed of Undertaking merits
consideration, since Petitioners failed to overcome the presumption
of regularity ascribed to it as a public document. Thus, on the basis
of the stipulations in the Deed of Undertaking, the CA concluded
that Respondent indeed stood as Petitioners' accommodation
mortgagor. Hence, Respondent possesses the right to enforce the
Deed of Undertaking and compel Petitioners to comply with its
stipulations. DETACa
Petitioners received a copy of the assailed Decision on June 13,
2013.
On June 27, 2013, Petitioners filed a motion praying for an
additional period of thirty (30) days within which to file a petition
for review on certiorari before this Court. Thereafter, on July 26,
2013, Petitioners filed this Petition, ascribing multiple errors to the
CA.
Respondent filed her Comment to the Petition on May 30, 2014.
Petitioners filed their Reply on October 17, 2014.
On February 26, 2015, the Court received a notice from
Respondent's counsel of record, informing the Court of
Respondent's death. The notice identified the Respondent's eight
(8) children as her legal representatives, namely: Clark, Jeff
Martinez, Rock Martinez, Gary Martinez, Patricia Martinez Olson,
Eleanor Martinez Fassnacht, Treccie Martinez Kappes, and Sheila
Martinez Sachs.
Issue
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether the CA erred
in affirming the RTC Decision directing Petitioners to execute a
mortgage over the Carangan Property in favor of Respondent.
The Court's Ruling
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in petitions filed
under Rule 45, subject only to recognized exceptions, namely:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion. x x x (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
The Petition invokes the fourth exception above, and calls on this
Court to review the factual findings of the RTC, which were later
affirmed by the CA.
In sum, Petitioners pose that the CA erred when it affirmed the
following factual findings of the RTC:
1. The Deed of Undertaking presented by Respondent is genuine,
and constitutes a valid and binding contract enforceable against
Petitioners;
2. Petitioners applied for the DBP Loan for their own interest and
sole account;
3. Petitioners are bound to reimburse Respondent One Million One
Hundred Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Pesos and 10/100
(P1,180,200.10) representing the amount she and her daughters
paid to avert the foreclosure of the DBP Mortgage; and
4. To secure the full amount due Respondent, Petitioners are bound
to constitute a mortgage over the Carangan Property, pursuant to
the provisions of the Deed of Undertaking.
The Court holds that no misapprehension of facts was committed
by both the RTC and the CA so as to justify deviation from their
findings, except only as to the RTC's finding regarding the amount
that Petitioners are bound to reimburse to Respondent.
Petitioners waived their right to object
to the admission of the Deed of
Undertaking on the basis of the best
evidence rule.
In this Petition, Petitioners assert that the RTC and CA erred in
ruling that the plain copy of the Deed of Undertaking was
admissible as proof of its contents, in violation of the best evidence
rule under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners' assertion is erroneous.
The best evidence rule requires that the original document be
produced whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, except
in certain limited cases laid down in Section 3 of Rule 130.
However, to set this rule in motion, a proper and timely objection
is necessary. The Court's ruling in Lorenzana v. Lelina is
instructive:
The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is
(sic) the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other
than the original document itself except in the instances mentioned
in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. As such, mere
photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best
evidence rule. Nevertheless, evidence not objected to is deemed
admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at
its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a mere
photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it
was formally offered.
In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of
evidence must be made at the proper time, and the grounds
specified. Objection to evidence must be made at the time it is
formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made
after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified,
specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It
is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the
documentary evidence may be made. And when a party failed to
interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were
offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.
This is true even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and
would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the
proper time. Moreover, grounds for objection must be specified in
any case. Grounds for objections not raised at the proper time shall
be considered waived, even if the evidence was objected to on
some other ground. Thus, even on appeal, the appellate court may
not consider any other ground of objection, except those that were
raised at the proper time. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted) aDSIHc
The Court notes that Petitioners failed to object to the admission of
the plain copy of the Deed of Undertaking at the time it was
formally offered in evidence before the RTC. In fact, in their Reply,
Petitioners admit that they only raised this objection for the first
time before the CA. The relevant portions of said Reply state:
Instead of arguing against the truth of this established fact, the
respondent made an implied admission of the truth thereof when
she shifted instead to raise the argument that petitioner cannot raise
this issue for the first time in this petition. Respondent said:
"I That petitioners have raised issues of facts before this Honorable
Court not otherwise raised in the court a quo."
...
NOTHING CAN BE MORE WRONG!
Petitioner certainly raised the issue covered by Ground I of this
Petition in the lower court. Unfortunately, with utmost due respect,
it inadvertently escaped the attention of the Honorable Court of
Appeals. It was only very unfortunate that petitioner failed to give
it a superlative emphasis adequate enough so as not to be ignored
by the lower court. It can also be reasonably surmised that the new
counsel of respondent may not have perused in detail the
appellant's brief in the Court of Appeals, of which brief brought
this issue under the Issue No.:
"E.1 THERE WERE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT
THE DEED OF UNDERTAKING WAS FALSIFIED."
For easy reference, the averments on pages 31 to 33 of the
Appellant's Brief in the Court of Appeals are hereby repleaded and
reiterated as follows:
...
"Aside from the obtaining circumstances earlier discussed herein
that the Deed of Undertaking (Exh. "K") is a falsified document,
the records will show that plaintiff caused only a temporary
marking of a machine copy of the same, placed as an annex to the
Complaint and in a review of the records, defendants could not find
that plaintiff caused a substitution of the temporarily marked
machine copy with an original thereof, then subsequently marked
after being identified by plaintiff witness Ponceda Martinez. x x x
..."
Verily, it is crystal clear that Ground I is not raised for the first time
in this petition. It is admitted, however, that there was no highest
emphasis given to the same as it was placed in the last pages of the
discussion in the appellant's brief. Albeit the inadvertence, it is now
given the greatest emphasis and significance by placing it under
Ground I of this Petition because petitioners rationally and
realistically believe that it goes into the heart of this Petition.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Having failed to timely raise their objection when the Formal Offer
of Evidence was filed in the RTC, Petitioners are deemed to have
waived the same. Hence, they are precluded from assailing the
probative value of the plain copy of the Deed of Undertaking.
Petitioners failed to rebut the
presumption of regularity ascribed to
the Deed of Undertaking as a notarized
public document.
Notwithstanding the findings of the RTC and CA, Petitioners still
assail the genuineness and due execution of the Deed of
Undertaking before this Court. Petitioners insist that the Deed of
Undertaking is a falsity and should not be given credence.
The Court disagrees.
As correctly held by the RTC and CA, the Deed of Undertaking
became a public document by virtue of its acknowledgment before
a notary public. Hence, it enjoys the presumption of regularity,
which can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence.
Thus, in Spouses Santos v. Spouses Lumbao, this Court upheld the
presumption of regularity, finding the bare denial of petitioners
therein insufficient to overcome the same:
Furthermore, both "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August
1979 and 9 January 1981 were duly notarized before a notary
public. It is well-settled that a document acknowledged before a
notary public is a public document that enjoys the presumption of
regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due
execution. To overcome this presumption, there must be presented
evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such evidence, the
presumption must be upheld. In addition, one who denies the due
execution of a deed where one's signature appears has the burden
of proving that contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never
appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the deed to
be a voluntary act. Nonetheless, in the present case petitioners'
denials without clear and convincing evidence to support their
claim of fraud and falsity were not sufficient to overthrow the
above-mentioned presumption; hence, the authenticity, due
execution and the truth of the facts stated in the aforesaid "Bilihan
ng Lupa" are upheld. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
While Petitioners vehemently deny participation in the execution
of the Deed of Undertaking, they did not present any evidence to
support their claim that their signatures thereon were forged.
Hence, consistent with the ruling of the RTC and CA, the Court
upholds the presumption of regularity ascribed to the Deed of
Undertaking.
Petitioners' claim that they are mere
accommodation borrowers is not
supported by sufficient evidence.
Petitioners claim that they are mere accommodation borrowers
who applied for the DBP Loan for and on behalf of the Joint
Venturers, in furtherance of the verbal agreement between and
among petitioner Marcelian and the Joint Venturers. Thus,
Petitioners aver that the liability arising from the non-payment of
the DBP Loan should be assumed not by Petitioners Marcelian and
Alice, but by Petitioner Marcelian and the rest of the Joint
Venturers Clark, Mario Delos Reyes and Richard Sevilla.
To support this claim, Petitioners rely on the Joint Affidavit
executed by two (2) of the alleged Joint Venturers Mario Delos
Reyes and Richard Sevilla, the pertinent portions of which read:
1. That we entered into a business venture with Atty. Marcelian C.
Tapayan and Clark Martinez, engaging in the construction
business;
2. That the loan obtained by Atty. Marcelian Tapayan and Mr.
Clark Martinez for P1 Million from DBP, Ozamiz City, was used
partly to liquidate the loan of Mrs. Ponceda Martinez for about P65
thousand and the balance was used to finance as additional capital
in the construction business. ETHIDa
Curiously, however, only Mario Delos Reyes testified before the
RTC to affirm the statements in the Joint Affidavit, as Richard
Sevilla had allegedly fled to the United States as an undocumented
alien.
Hence, apart from the statements in the Joint Affidavit affirmed
solely by the testimony of Mario Delos Reyes, which is in turn
corroborated only by petitioner Marcelian's self-serving
declarations, the Court finds no other evidence on record to support
the existence of the alleged joint venture, and the verbal agreement
of the Joint Venturers in respect of the DBP Loan.
In fact, the theory that Petitioners acted as mere accommodation
borrowers is belied by their own allegations respecting the payment
of fees relating to the DBP Loan, which the Court quotes
hereunder:
Petitioner Marcelian Tapayan endeavored in good faith to fully pay
the interests and fees of the P1 Million loan with the DBP, Ozamiz
City. The loan is in the nature of a one-year credit line drawable
against 60 to 150-day promissory notes, and is renewable yearly as
long as the interests were paid. The first release of the loan was on
December 27, 1996 via a promissory note 96/109 for P400,000.00
for 150 days (Exhibit "6") which was extended for another 150
days via an Addendum to Promissory Note (Exh "7"). The second
release was on February 4, 1997 via Promissory Note No. 97-010
for P600,000.00 (Exh "8") for a term of 150 days extended for
another 150 days via an Addendum to Promissory Note (Exh "9").
The admitted documentary exhibits of petitioners evidently show
that the interests and other fees (doc. stamps) were fully paid by
petitioners covering the period from the date of the first loan
release on December 27, 1996 and until the date of the extensions
and even beyond the one-year term of the credit line as interests
were paid up to February 28, 1998 as per Exhibits "10" to "27".
Further, petitioners also paid the premium on the insurance
coverage of the mortgaged property from May 15, 1997 to May 15,
1998, and in anticipation of the renewal of the credit line,
petitioners also paid the insurance premium covering the period
from May 15, 1998 to May 15, 1999, as can be gleaned from
Exhibits "28" to "31". The foregoing facts sufficiently indicated
that amid the hard times, petitioners were up-to-date in the
payments of interests and fees covering the promissory notes and
extensions (Exhs. "6" to "9"), which is a basic requirement in the
consideration of the renewal of the credit line. In sum, petitioners
exercised utmost good faith in complying with the terms and
conditions of the credit line. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners' payment of the interest on the DBP Loan, the insurance
premiums corresponding to the Pingol Property, and other
incidental fees solely on their account, without seeking
reimbursement from the alleged Joint Venturers, establishes
Petitioners' direct interest in the DBP Loan, and negates the claim
that they are mere accommodation borrowers. Since the proceeds
of the DBP Loan redounded to Petitioners' benefit, they must bear
the liability arising from its non-payment, and comply with the
obligations imposed by the Deed of Undertaking executed in
connection therewith.
The amount paid to PNB must be
deducted from Petitioners' total liability
in accordance with the provisions of the
Deed.
Petitioners aver that the RTC's determination respecting the
amount due Respondent is erroneous, since it failed to consider the
deductions stipulated in the Deed of Undertaking. Hence,
Petitioners submit that should the Court order the execution of a
mortgage over the Carangan Property, such mortgage should only
be made to secure the amount of One Million One Hundred
Fourteen Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-Nine Pesos and 55/100
(P1,114,879.55), which represents the amount paid by Respondent
to DBP to avert the foreclosure of the DBP Mortgage, net of the
deductions stipulated in the Deed of Undertaking.
The Court agrees.
The RTC Decision directed Petitioners to execute a mortgage in
favor of Respondent to secure the amount of One Million One
Hundred Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Pesos and 10/100
(P1,180,200.10), unless Petitioners reimburse Respondent said
amount in full.
In so ruling, the RTC completely disregarded the fourth paragraph
of the Deed of Undertaking, which specifically requires
Respondent to deduct all prior payments made in favor of PNB
from Petitioners' total liability, thus:
That in the event the First Party could not pay the loan and
consequently, the property of the Second Party is foreclosed and is
not redeemed by the First Party within the one (1) year redemption
period; or in case the loan shall be paid by the Second Party just to
save the property from being foreclosed, the First Party shall
acknowledge as his indebtedness the amount due to the
Development Bank of the Philippines upon foreclosure or the
amount paid by the Second Party in paying the loan, but in either
case shall be deducted therefrom the amount of P65,320.55 plus
interests and fees paid by the First Party to PNB, Ozamiz City.
(Emphasis supplied)
This oversight was adopted by the CA when it affirmed the RTC
Decision in toto. The Court now corrects this error.
Respondent anchors her cause of action on the Deed of
Undertaking in its entirety. To allow Respondent to selectively
invoke the validity and enforceability of the provisions that support
her cause, and disregard those that operate against her interests
would promote injustice at the expense of Petitioners.
Notably, Respondent does not deny that a portion of the DBP Loan
was in fact utilized to settle part of her PNB Loan. Respondent
merely avers that such payment was necessary to clear the title of
the Pingol Property, and that the resolution of such issue would be
inconsequential to the ultimate disposition of the assailed Decision:
Grounds 2 and 3 relied upon by Petitioners raise questions of fact
so insubstantial that they do not affect the ultimate disposition of
the action that Petitioners execute a mortgage on their property in
favor of Respondent. It is an admitted fact x x x that Respondent
obtained a One Million Peso bank loan as capital for Petitioners'
construction business. If Petitioners needed to clear Respondent's
title of an existing minor lien to be able to use it for their purpose,
expenses incurred for the process were par for the course.
This argument is specious, as the actual amount Petitioners are
bound to reimburse constitutes the very same obligation
Respondent seeks to secure through the execution of the mortgage
subject of this dispute.
Thus, the Court modifies the assailed Decision, and rules that
Sixty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Pesos and 55/100
(P65,320.55) should be deducted from Petitioners' total liability,
representing the reimbursement to be paid by the latter to PNB.
Consequently, the amount Petitioners should reimburse to
Respondent is One Million One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Eight
Hundred Seventy-Nine Pesos and 55/100 (P1,114,879.55).
cSEDTC
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is
GRANTED IN PART. The Decision dated May 30, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02081-MIN is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Petitioners Marcelian and
Alice Tapayan are directed to execute a mortgage on their house
and lot covered by TCT No. T-10143 located at Carangan, Ozamiz
City in favor of Respondent Ponceda Martinez, unless they
reimburse the latter the amount of One Million One Hundred
Fourteen Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-Nine Pesos and 55/100
(P1,114,879.55). Petitioners are likewise directed to pay
Respondent attorney's fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00), in accordance with the Decision dated
September 28, 2009 rendered by the Regional Trial Court in Civil
Case No. OZC-99-38.
SO ORDERED.