CHAPTER NO.

SOUTH ASIA

1. PEACE-MAKING AND PEACE-BUILDING BETWEEN INDIA AND

PAKISTAN
A peace process consists of all the meetings, agreements, and negotiations in which people
such as politicians are involved when they are trying to arrange peace between countries or
groups that are fighting with each other.

India was partitioned into two independent and sovereign countries—India and Pakistan—in
1947. After partition several issues remained unsolved between India and Pakistan. Issues like
Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, and Tulbul Navigation etc. became so contentious that both
countries fought several wars with each other. Unresolved issues not only resulted in war
between these two countries but created several other issues like terrorism, drug trafficking
which further escalated the tension between these two countries. To de-escalate the tension
between these two countries steps like initiating dialogue, starting the peace process and
confidence building measures were taken from time to time by the leaders, non-governmental
organisations, diplomats of these two countries. This book under review dwells on the history of
the peace process since its inception in 1997 and analyses the achievements made on eight
issues, namely, Peace and Security CBMs; Jammu and Kashmir; Siachen; Sir Creek; Tulbul
Navigation Project; Terrorism and Drug Trafficking; Economic and Commercial Cooperation;
and Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in Various Fields. The book is divided into four chapters
followed by a conclusion.

Key Points

 There is a need to embrace an overarching strategic stability regime and to shun aggressive
security doctrines to reduce the possibility of a nuclear conflict.
 The problems of terrorism and Non-State Actors need to be addressed jointly through
institutionalized mechanisms.
 Water issues should be resolved through the mechanisms provided by the Indus Basin
Treaty and should not be allowed to degenerate into a serious source of conflict.
 Confidence-building measures should be pursued to alleviate the “trust deficit” but should
not be used as a substitute for the resolution of disputes.
 Economic co-operation and trade should be facilitated to develop mutuality of interest.
 India and Pakistan need to understand each other’s legitimate interests in Afghanistan and
pursue them without coming into conflict with each other.

CAUSES OF CONFLICT

The tensions between India and Pakistan are deeply rooted in their common history. The
following are the major causes
1. The Nuclear Dimension

Some commentators hoped in 1998 that the overt possession of nuclear weapons by both India
and Pakistan would bring about the realisation that any conflict between them would have
catastrophic consequences for both countries and would, therefore, result in strategic stability.
Unfortunately, that expected peace dividend is yet to be attained. Instead, a steady nuclear
weapon and missile competition continues, in the absence of an overarching restraint regime.
India has been propounding and war-gaming its provocative “Cold Start” and “pro-active
Operations” doctrines since 2004. Pakistan has responded by introducing battlefield nuclear
weapons.

2. Afghanistan

The conflict in Afghanistan has also had spill-over effects on Indo-Pakistani relations. The
strategic partnership agreement between India and Afghanistan and the growing Indian
presence in that country, have only added to Pakistan’s concerns that India is attempting to
squeeze it from both the east and west. With uncertainties surrounding the internal dynamics of
a post-NATO Afghanistan, it also could become an arena for India-Pakistan hostility to play out.
That would have serious consequences, not only for the peace and stability of Afghanistan, but
also for the region as a whole.

3. Role of Non-State Actors

The problem of Non-State Actors (NSAs) and their trans-frontier activities has been one of the
most vexing issues between the two South Asian neighbours in recent years. In the past
decade, it has brought the two countries to the verge of war in 2001-02 and again in 2008; it
also derailed the Composite Dialogue process between them, which appeared to be regaining
some traction after a hiatus of three years. Hopes were further raised by the election of Nawaz
Sharif to the office of Prime Minister. Sharif has made no secret of his wish for peace and
warmer relations between India and Pakistan, despite the fact that he has not received
reciprocation from India. The recent eruption of violence across the Line of Control in Kashmir,
which in normal times would be a routine affair, has been blown out of proportion by the Indian
media and some political parties with an eye on the forthcoming national elections in India.
Incidents such as the attack on the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi by political activists
can only add to the acrimony. Such incidents have compounded the already acute trust deficit
between the two countries. India has accused Pakistan of sponsoring “cross-border terrorism”
against it and, after the recent cross-LOC incident, blamed the Pakistani Army for fomenting
trouble. Pakistan complains that India has provided material support, through Afghanistan, to
the insurgents in Baluchistan and parts of the Federally Administered Tribal areas in the north-
west and is now unhappy that instead of a responding to peace overtures, India is ratcheting up
the anti-Pakistan rhetoric. If the proposed meeting between the two Prime Ministers on the
sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York in September takes
place as planned, it will hopefully help in improving the atmospherics of India-Pakistan relations.

4. Areas of Common Interest

Peace and stability are pre-requisites for economic development, trade and politico-socio-
cultural relations. This has assumed added urgency since South Asia has obtained nuclear
capability, as there is now little margin for error. It is imperative that the security situation in
South Asia is stabilised and made as resistant as possible to the periodic shocks caused by the
actions of NSAs. Avoidance of crises, prevention of conflicts and the building of mutual
confidence should therefore be common objectives for the two countries.

There is a huge potential for the expansion of bilateral trade between India and Pakistan,
especially now that the long-standing issue of Pakistan granting Most Favoured Nation status to
India seems closer than ever to being resolved. But other issues, such as non-tariff barriers to
trade, will have to be addressed before any positive move can be made towards increasing
trade. There is also a long list of items on the negative list which have to be looked at before
significant improvement can be achieved. The promotion of official trade will discourage
smuggling and other means of illegal trade that at present cost the two countries substantial lost
revenue.

The serious energy shortages faced by both countries are hampering their economic
development. India cannot maintain a healthy economic growth rate if its energy resources
remain inadequate, as was made apparent by the total blackout of northern India in July 2012.
In Pakistan, normal public life has been badly disrupted by chronic electricity outages for many
years and the scarcity of energy has also adversely affected industrial output.

KASHMIR IS A MAJOR POINT OF CONTENTION

Kashmir is on fire again, after militants killed 18 Indian soldiers in an early morning raid on Sept.
18 2016. These five facts explain why the conflict over this long-disputed region between India
and Pakistan is such a deep-seated problem, and why it’s likely to get worse before it gets
better.

1. Clashes Over Kashmir

A large part of the India-Pakistan rivalry centers on competing claims over the Kashmir region.
This relatively small piece of land in the Himalayas has been disputed since 1947, the year the
modern state of Pakistan was created. Pakistan claims the land because it’s majority Muslim
like itself; India claims the land because Kashmir’s Maharajah once pledged loyalty to India
(albeit under duress). India doesn’t want to give the region up for fear of setting a dangerous
precedent for India’s other regions that are agitating for independence. While both countries
claim all of Kashmir, each of them controls only part of it.

Two of the three wars fought by India and Pakistan have been over Kashmir (1947 and 1965).
It’s bad when a collective population of 1.5 billion goes to war repeatedly over a sliver of land; it
would be worse today, since both sides now have nuclear weapons. More than 47,000 people
have been killed in Kashmir flare-ups to date—and there are human rights groups who argue
the real figure is twice that amount.
2. Bloody Weekend

Besides the 18 soldiers who died in the Sept. 18 raid, four of the militants were killed in the
subsequent shootout. While Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi refrained from pointing the
finger directly at Pakistan, other senior Indian military officials weren’t nearly as diplomatic,
accusing a Pakistan-backed group of the mayhem.

But the violence in Indian-administered Kashmir doesn’t always originate from Pakistan. That’s
because there are plenty of locals with grievances against India’s stewardship. While the Hindu
Jammu section of Kashmir seems to be content with remaining a part of India, the Muslim-
majority Kashmir Valley favors independence from anywhere between 75 to 95 percent,
according to a 2010 study. A prominent Kashmiri militant was killed by Indian forces in July,
touching off mass protests and a wave of violence that left nearly 90 people dead. But Indian
officials seem fixated on Pakistan for the moment.

3. Stalling Reforms

That makes sense from a political perspective. Modi rose to power as a pragmatic business
reformer—he still enjoys a Putin-like 81 percent favorability rating, and 65 percent of Indians
believe the country is headed in the right direction. Just 29 percent said that in 2013. But it
getting harder to buoy those numbers as the low-hanging reform fruit gets picked off the tree.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Modi began his term in 2014
with an ambitious list of at least 30 major, much-needed reforms in the areas of taxation,
government regulation, and foreign investment among others. Of those 30, seven have been
completed and 14 are in progress or partially successful; nine remain outstanding. The reforms
that have been implemented are a big reason why India is now the fastest-growing major
economy in the world.

But Modi doesn’t have the leverage in parliament to deliver any more significant reforms as the
country gears up for regional elections. And he can’t look weak when Indian soldiers are killed—
particularly after winning an election with charges that the previous government was soft on
terrorism and weak on Pakistan. His government needs to adopt a tougher line to keep core
supporters on board ahead of coming provincial elections and the next national elections in a
couple of years.

4. Fragile Pakistan

Pakistan, meanwhile, continues to deny involvement in the weekend’s violence. Pakistan knows
that it’s in a weakened position compared to India. Pakistan may have the 11th-strongest
military in the world, according to an analysis conducted by Credit Suisse, but that same ranking
has the Indian military in 5th place. 66-year old Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is in poor
health, and the country ranks as the 14th most “fragile” country (an aggregate measure of
political, social and economic stability) for 2015. India ranks 70th.
Sharif has spent UN General Assembly week trying to rally world leaders to Pakistan’s side and
internationalize the conflict, reaching out to the U.S., U.K., Japan and Turkey, but early returns
have not been promising. In Ban Ki Moon’s farewell address, Kashmir didn’t even get a mention
among the world’s largest geopolitical challenges. Pakistan cannot afford to take on India over
Kashmir, and it knows it.

5. China’s Shadow

Which is why Pakistan is angling itself toward China, the only country on the continent with a
population, economy, and military that top India’s. China has agreed to spend $46 billion in
investment in Pakistan, which is also the world’s largest recipient of weapons from China. China
also builds Pakistan’s nuclear reactors. These are ties that bind.

China remains an important trade partner to India, too. But Indians are wary of China and
seeking partners to balance China’s growing clout. Some 48 percent of Indians say that China’s
relationship with Pakistan is a very serious problem; another 21 percent of Indians say it’s
somewhat serious. China’s growing military power elicits roughly the same response from
Indians, as well. Wariness of China has led India to strengthen ties with the U.S. and other
Asian countries.

The bottom-line: Until recent weeks, relations between India and Pakistan seemed to be
warming. Recent events in Kashmir, and the search for new allies, reveal that they’re as chilly
as ever.

LESSONS FROM THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

a. Marginalized role of people in the peace process. In case of the Middle East, the peace
process had the blessings of the power elite but the non-conformist and other groups having
reservations about the normalization process were not taken into confidence by the
governments concerned. India and Pakistan need to make sure that any agreement reached to
settle their outstanding disputes should have substantial support from the majority of public
opinion. The absence of the participation of people in a peace process will promote hard - liners
and cause an irreparable damage to the agreements reached.

b. Dismissal of war as an option is another lesson which India and Pakistan can learn from
the Arab-Israeli peace process. Israel and Arab countries have not gone to war in the last 25
years and India and Pakistan have also not been to war in the last 27 years. However, the
absence of war in the two regions doesn't mean the existence of peace. Despite having a peace
treaty, Egypt and Israel and Jordan and Israel are in a state of cold peace. It is true with India
and Pakistan because the absence of war between the two countries has not ensured peace.
One can see the role of proxy wars in the two countries as a major impediment for peace in
South Asia.

c. The role of third party mediation is the third lesson which India and Pakistan can learn from
the Arab-Israeli peace process. For years, the European and American mediation between
Israel and its Arab neighbours continued ultimately leading to the signing of the Camp David.
This is not the case with India and Pakistan because except the Soviet mediation in the post-
1965 Indo-Pak War leading to the signing of Tashkent declaration, we don't see any substantial
role of third party mediation for the management and resolution of conflicts. Third party
mediation is not termed as a forthcoming possibility in the Indo-Pak normalization process
because of New Delhi's insistence on following the bilateral track. But the present stalemate in
their relations could be broken if there is some credible regional or extra-regional initiative
having the support of both New Delhi and Islamabad.

d. Non-implementation of agreements signed between the PLO and Israel is the fourth lesson
for India and Pakistan from the Middle East. Even if the parties concerned reach an agreement,
the non- implementation can discredit the peace process. So intentions and political will of the
parties concerned for the normalization process cannot be ruled out as important requirement
for peace in South Asia.

e. The feeling of superiority and compulsion present in the PLO-Israeli relations is the fifth
lesson for India and Pakistan. The fact that the Palestinians resent the manner in which Israel
has used its superior position to minimize gains for them in the September 1993 PLO - Israeli
accord and the subsequent violation of that accord by Israel should provide enough idea to New
Delhi and Islamabad about the disaster if any party tried to impose things on the other party.
There has to be a fair deal.

f. Persistence and commitment to negotiate despite difficulties is another lesson which India
and Pakistan can learn from the Arab - Israeli peace process. Given the complicated nature of
the Kashmir dispute and other conflicts between India and Pakistan it is not easy to seek
favorable results in a short span of time.

g. Discussion on less contentious issues than the most difficult or the core issue could be
another lesson for India and Pakistan from the Middle East. Egypt and Israel, PLO and Israel,
and Jordan and Israel began their peace dialogue by focusing on resolving less intricate issues.

Lastly, the need for urgency and the hope of incentive is the sixth lesson for India and Pakistan
from the Arab-Israeli peace process. Because of strategic reasons, South Asia enjoys marginal
attraction for the extra - regional powers to engage themselves in a peace process. In case of
the Middle East, events like the wars of 1967 and 1973 , the Iran-Iraq war, the Israeli attack over
Lebanon, the Palestinian Intifada, the Gulf war and the Soviet disintegration justified urgency
and also incentive in the PLO - Israeli and Jordanian -Israeli agreements. We don't see the
feeling of urgency in New Delhi and Islamabad for resolving their conflicts and because of that
reason, there is no question of incentive.

There is an urgent need for a dialogue leading to a peace-process between India and Pakistan.
There has been confrontation and strife in South Asia for the past 50 years and now the people
of the region desire peace and economic development.
The present government of Pakistan is committed to improving relations with India and resolving
all outstanding issues including Kashmir by peaceful means without resort to arms. The new
government in India has responded positively to Pakistan's offer of a dialogue.

ANALYSIS

These and many other such questions can be raised by any concerned observer of the South
Asian region, where the disharmony between the two major players has adversely affected the
ability of the region as a whole to attain its true potential, unlike, for instance, the advancements
made in the ASEAN region. The continued conflict and tension in the relationship between the
two countries, whose rivalry has a nuclear dimension as well, cannot be to anyone’s benefit. For
the past decade or so, their differences have transcended their common borders and have also
played out in Afghanistan. The biggest beneficiaries of this prolonged conflict have been the
extremist elements in both countries and, more recently, the non-state actors (NSAs). The
NSAs seemingly have the capability to disrupt and derail any effort towards resolving the
outstanding issues between India and Pakistan at will, by perpetrating a violent incident. Major
world powers have also promoted their geo-political interests by playing one country off against
the other from time to time.

2.0 INDUS WATER TREATY

Key Points
 The Indus Waters Treaty was signed on September 19, 1960 by the then Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan's President Ayub Khan.
 It was brokered by the World Bank.
 The treaty administers how river Indus and its tributaries that flow in both the countries
will be utilised.
 According to the treaty, Beas, Ravi and Sutlej are to be governed by India, while, Indus,
Chenab and Jhelum are to be taken care by Pakistan.
 However, since Indus flows from India, the country is allowed to use 20 per cent of its
water for irrigation, power generation and transport purposes.
 A Permanent Indus Commission was set up as a bilateral commission to implement and
manage the Treaty. The Commission solves disputes arising over water sharing.
 The Treaty also provides arbitration mechanism to solve disputes amicably.
 Though Indus originates from Tibet, China has been kept out of the Treaty. If China
decides to stop or change the flow of the river, it will affect both India and Pakistan.
 Climate change is causing melting of ice in Tibetan plateau, which scientists believe will
affect the river in future.
 It maybe noted that both India and Pakistan are still at loggerheads over various issues
since Partition, but there has been no fight over water after the Treaty was ratified.

What is the Indus Waters Treaty?

The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-sharing arrangement signed by then Indian Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru and then President of Pakistan Ayub Khan on September 19, 1960, in
Karachi. It covers the water distribution and sharing rights of six rivers -- Beas, Ravi, Sutlej,
Indus, Chenab and Jhelum. The agreement was brokered by the World Bank.

Why was the agreement signed?

The agreement was signed because the source of all the rivers of the Indus basin were in India
(Indus and Sutlej, though, originate in China). It allowed India to use them for irrigation,
transport and power generation, while laying down precise do's and don'ts for India on building
projects along the way. Pakistan feared that India could potentially create droughts in case of a
war between the two countries. A Permanent Indus Commission set up in this connection has
gone through three wars between the two countries without disruption and provides a bilateral
mechanism for consultation and conflict-resolution through inspections, exchange of data and
visits.
What does the treaty grant India and Pakistan?

Under the treaty, India has exclusive rights on the eastern rivers and their tributaries while
Pakistan has exclusive rights on the western rivers. Pakistan also received a one-time financial
compensation for the loss of water from the eastern rivers and to build a new canal system.

The waters of the Indus basin begin in the Himalayan mountains in the region under China. The
river flows from the hills through the arid and dry states of Punjab and Sindh, converging in
Pakistan, and empties out in the Arabian Sea, south of Karachi.

What is the Indus Waters Treaty and can India abrogate it?
The treaty gave the three "eastern rivers" of Beas, Ravi and Sutlej to India for use of water
without restriction. The three "western rivers" of Indus, Chenab and Jhelum were allocated to
Pakistan. India can construct storage facilities on "western rivers" of up to 3.6 million acre feet,
which it has not done so far. India is also allowed agriculture use of 7 lakh acres above the
irrigated cropped area as on April 1, 1960.
Is there a dispute?
Although the two countries have been managing to share the waters without major dispute,
experts say that the agreement is one of the most lop-sided with India being allowed to use only
20 percent of the six-river Indus water system. Pakistan itself in July this year sought an
international arbitration if India sought to build hydro power projects on the Jhelum and Chenab
rivers. Though the agreement has been seen as one of the most successful water-sharing
pacts, the current tension between the two South Asian neighbours might well lead to a
flashpoint. Strategic affairs and security experts say that future wars could well be fought over
water.
Can the treaty be revised or modified?
There is a provision for mediation and arbitration by a neutral umpire in case of any
disagreement. The IWT has, so far, been implemented by both the countries faithfully. It has not
gone for any modification till date, even though Article-XII of the IWT allows for any kind of
modification when both parties agree. The current tensions between the two sides might,
however, lead to a flashpoint.

How does it affect Jammu and Kashmir?

Jammu and Kashmir too has not been able to harness the full potential of the treaty. In 2007,
the Union Water Ministry had estimated Jammu and Kashmir can increase its Irrigated Cropped
Area (ICA) by 4,25,000 acres. But today, Out of 6,00,000 Hectares of cultivated land in Jammu
and Kashmir only 1,50,000 Hectares is under irrigation. This has also affected hydropower
generation. Current estimates suggests there is a possibility of harnessing more than 20,000
MW but today there is only an estimated 2,500 MV being harnessed.

It is revealed from the above analysis that the actual power potential of Jhelum, Chenab, Indus
and Ravi are 3,560 MW, 10,360 MW, 2,060 MW and 50 MW respectively. Currently, the
harnessed potential of these river basins are 750.1 MWs, 1563.8 MWs, 13.3 MWs, and 129
MWs respectively.

Power potential of Indus

One of the greatest rivers of the world, the Indus's estimated annual flow stands at around 207
cubic kms. Zanskar is its left bank tributary in Ladakh as the Shyok, Shigar and Gilgit rivers
carry glacial waters into the main river. Just a few small and micro hydropower projects have
been set up, part of the reason being that the potential spots were far away. The NHPC has
commissioned two power projects Nimoo-Bazgoo and Chutak in Leh and Kargil with a
cumulative installed capacity of 90.26 MW.

Fast Forward to 2016

More recently, just during the past couple of days, India has been reviewing the Indus Water
Treaty to see if there’s any way it could block Pakistani rivers to dry out Pakistan in totality.

This move was triggered by Mr. Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India, who is looking for
options to attack Pakistan; either through a conventional war or in any way possible.

Prime Minister Modi was briefed about the treaty and was told that India cannot scrap or even
violate the treaty as it will result in negative consequences for the country.

Here are some of the reasons why violating the Indus Waters treaty is ill-advised:

 It is almost impossible for India to block all rivers and consume water before it enters
Pakistan,
 Violating a bilateral treaty — with World Bank as a guarantor — will only bring India on
back foot,
 In retaliation, China could block water supplies to India from rivers that originate from
Chinese soils.

What are India’s Options?

 Violate Treaty and Block Water at once

  Build Dams and Consume the water (up to a certain scale)

The treaty prevents India from doing anything which could hurt Pakistan’s river system (with
respect to the three rivers owned by Pakistan). However, over the years India has been keen to
develop dams. It has done so over its own rivers and it has tried to construct dams on Pakistani
rivers for power generation purposes.

At the moment, India has 45 large and small scale power generation projects underway. India
has developed Salal hydroelectric project over Chenab, after its acceptance from Pakistan.

However, projects like Indian projects like Baglihar, Wullar and Kishenganga are disputed by
Pakistan. India has been developing these projects for many years now and it was in 2010 that
Pakistan managed to stop the Kishanganga project after appealing to the Hague’s Permanent
Court of Arbitration.

Can India Violate Indus Water Treaty?

Technically, India has the upper hand. They have built some dams but with the current setup,
they cannot completely stop the river flow towards Pakistan.

However, if India wants to only block the water, it has all the power to do so by using means
other than dams to block the flow of water. Doing so could still be treated as a violation of the
treaty.

As per the agreement, however, India is allowed to build dams only to consume the water,
which they are currently not doing. Which means that only option left for India is to build dams
and restrain or slow-down the flow of waters. In such a scenario, it will take India at least 12-15
years to build the required number of dams to put Pakistan in trouble.

For immediate blockade, it will have to violate the treaty. In this case, the matter can also
escalate and may lead to a full-blown war between both the countries, which again is something
India wouldn’t want.

Not to mention, in case of any violations, India could face international reaction especially from
its neighbors like Nepal and Bangladesh. India has water treaties with these countries as well. It
would also tarnish India’s name in the world.

This is unlikely since the treaty has survived three wars between the two countries. Although on
Thursday India raised the issue, saying that for a treaty to work there had to be "mutual
cooperation and trust" between the two sides, this seems to be more pressure tactics than any
real threat to review the bilateral agreement. And the idea that India can intimidate Pakistan by
threatening to cut off river waters is nothing new. It has arisen before every major conflict. A
unilateral abrogation would also attract criticism from world powers, as this is one arrangement
which has stood the test of time.
Some experts have said that if India starts making provision for storage facility involving the
"western rivers", which it is allowed under the treaty of up to 3.6 million acre feet, this may send
a strong message to its neighbor. Pakistan has often sought arbitration proceedings just on
mere impression that India may do so, seeking to dissuade its larger neighbor from tinkering
with the status quo.

3.0 COMPOSITE DIALOGUE BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA

The roots of the Composite Dialogue Process date back to May 1997, when at Male, the capital
of Maldives, the then Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral and his Pakistani counterpart
Nawaz Sharif mooted the idea of a structured dialogue or the Composite Dialogue Process
(CDP). Based on a compromise approach, the peace process enabled the two countries to
discuss all issues including Jammu and Kashmir, simultaneously. Since its inception, the
dialogue process has gone through numerous highs and lows in bilateral relations. It has
remained susceptible to unforeseen incidents which have derailed the process several times in
the past. However, since April 2003 it has progressed steadily till the November 26, 2008
Mumbai terror attacks when the dialogue process was suspended for a long time. This paper
dwells upon the history of the peace process since its inception in 1997 and examines the
progress made in the eight baskets of issues namely, Peace and Security including confidence
building measures(CBMs); Jammu and Kashmir (J&K); Siachen; Wullar Barrage/Tulbul
Navigation Project; Sir Creek; Economic and Commercial Cooperation; Terrorism and Drug
Trafficking; and, Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in various fields. The analysis of the peace
process in this paper hinges on three key questions. First, has any positive change in the
mindset of both sides came about over the years due to the peace process? Second, what were
the main achievements of CDP? And third, what are the prospects of resolving the pending
bilateral issues in future talks?

Pakistan and India relations have witnessed a serious deadlock over the collapse of peace talks
even before they have started. The decision to pull out was taken by Pakistan after India’s
ultimatum to stick to terrorism related agenda. Last year in August, foreign secretary level
meeting was cancelled in pretext of Pakistan’s High Commissioner meeting with Kashmiri
Leaders at New Delhi. According to media reports, around 91 ceasefire violations had taken
place since Sharif and Modi Ufa meeting.
Historically, the composite dialogue between Pakistan and India started when President Zia-ul-
Haq’s visit to India in December 1985, on his way back from SAARC Summit at Malay. At that
time, Indian PM Rajeev Gandhi and President Zia decided to start a dialogue process between
the two countries. They agreed upon four-pronged dialogue process to discuss four subjects in
the dialogue process which were: 1) Siachin; 2) Sir Creek; 3) Commercial relations; 4) Issues
related to terrorism/ immigration and people to people contact. Four committees were
established to work on these issues. Thesecommittees were headed by different secretaries to
deal with the relevant issues. During foreign secretary meetings, gradual progress was made in
these areas.
The Siachin and Sir Creek were settled and only there implementation was left at that time.
Similarly, commercial relations had improved and trade had expanded. The people to people
contact had increased. However, nothing was done on Kashmir issue. So later in 1990’s, at
Foreign Secretary meeting when the Kashmir issue was highlighted India was adamant to state
that there was nothing to discuss about Kashmir except about the illegal occupation of Indian
territory by Pakistan. This resulted in frostiness of relations between the two states and the
dialogue process skeptically stopped.

In 1997, at Male SAARC Summit, Indian PM I.K. Gujral and Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif decided
to restart the dialogue process. This time eight issues were mentioned to be discussed under
the composite dialogue process which included: 1) Peace and Security including confidence
building measures (CBMs); 2) Jammu and Kashmir (J&K); 3) Siachen; 4) Wullar Barrage/Tulbul
Navigation Project; 5) Sir Creek; 6) Economic and Commercial Cooperation; 7) Terrorism and
Drug Trafficking; and, 8) Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in various fields. However, the
dialogue process could not make progress due to 1998 nuclear tests and the Kargil conflict. The
Lahore declaration and Agra Summit could not achieve the desired results. Both initiatives failed
to resolve the contentious issues and improve the bilateral relations between the two countries.
In 2003, Musharraf took bold initiative and there was a famous Vajpayee-Musharraf golden
handshake. This ultimately led to a bilateral meeting at the sideline of SAARC Summit, held at
Islamabad in 2004. In that meeting, a declaration was made that Pakistan territory would not be
used by any terrorist in the light of India’s concern of cross border terrorism emanating from
Pakistan. Therefore, in 2004, the dialogue process between India and Pakistan resumed in the
form of the compositedialogue. The discussions also started on the Kashmir issue at the foreign
secretary level. There was normalization of relations, development in peace and security and
several CBM’s were made that included starting of bus services from Sri Nagar-Muzaffarabad
and facilitation in cross border permits, etc.
In order to resolve the Kashmir issue, Musharraf proposed a new format to discuss the Kashmir
issue. He gave a four pointagenda that included;

1) softening of LoC;

2) self-governance/autonomy but not total independence of Kashmir;

3) demilitarization of borders; and

4) joint management and supervision by both the states.

This proposal was discussed through the back channel and the subjects were kept away from
the media and the public until a final agreement could be reached. But nothing substantial could
be achieved. Finally, the whole peace process came to a standstill owing to Samjhuta Express
Bombings of 2007 and Mumbai attacks of 2008.

Similarly, the committee on peace and security could not achieve much progress except the
development of few CBM’s like prior notifications of exercises, regular hot talk between DGMO’s
and military manouevers, etc. Therefore, the committee on peace and security had not achieved
much under the composite dialogue because India had its own trajectory and Pakistan had its
own defence and security concerns. People to people contact did not proceed well after Mumbai
attacks as the visa issues could not be resolved. Similarly in trade sector, Pakistan-India did not
progress due to tariffs and strict trade policies. In fact, India has higher trade volumes with other
regional countries like China, Nepal, Sri-Lanka and Bangladesh as compared to Pakistan. The
water issues particularly building of dams by India, an open violation of Indus Waters Treaty
(IWT) in Jammu and Kashmir, is another threat to Pakistan’s economy and survival. The
menace of terrorism, Indian false allegations against Pakistan regarding safety of its nuclear
assets and accusing Pakistan behind militancy in Kashmir and for providing safe havens to
terrorists have increased the trust deficit between the two states.
Pakistan and India have agreed to restart the dialogue process, Indian External Affairs Minister
Sushma Swaraj disclosed at a joint press conference yesterday with her Pakistani counterpart
Sartaj Aziz. The new process has been named ‘comprehensive dialogue’ as against the
previous ‘composite dialogue’ which terminated after the 2008 terrorist attacks on Mumbai by
suicide attackers reportedly trained and sent from Pakistan by and anti-India militant
group. “Instead of composite dialogues now comprehensive dialogues will be held in which all
outstanding issues will be discussed,” Ms Sushma told the press conference.

All the pillars of the composite dialogue would be part of the comprehensive bilateral dialogue
and more things could be added to it, she explained. She said that foreign secretaries of both
the countries will finalise a schedule for the talks. India’s decision to agree to a new talks
process marks a U-turn in policy by its Hindu nationalist prime minister Narendra Modi, who
swept to power in 2014 promising a harder line in dealings with Islamabad. This change of heart
emerged last week when Moodi met with PM Nawaz Sharif in Paris on the sidelines of Climate
Change conference, and it yielded a more concrete result yesterday after Sushma arrived in
Islamabad for the Heart of Asia conference.

Her Islamabad visit was agreed following a meeting between Pakistan and India’s National
Security Advisers in Bangkok on Sunday. Yesterday she set out India’s desire for a new trade
corridor to be opened into Central Asia through Afghanistan which would also allow Afghan
goods to be transported through Pakistan and sold duty-free in India. Her agreement of a new
dialogue with Pakistan reflected an acceptance that the dream of regional trade will never be
realised without a better relationship with Islamabad.

Under the terms of the agreement the new comprehensive dialogue will include discussions on
peace and security, Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, confidence building measures,
the Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project, economic and commercial cooperation,
counterterrorism, narcotics control and humanitarian issues. They will also address people to
people exchanges and religious tourism, according to a joint statement issued after the meeting
between the two sides.

Since November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, in which 164 people were killed and over 300 injured,
the relations between Pakistan and India have been dominated by New Delhi’s demands that
the perpetrators be brought to justice and that the Islamabad gives assurance that it will prevent
any such attacks in future. The two countries agreed to resume the peace process in 2011 but
tensions spiked over the past two years, with cross-border shelling over the disputed border in
Kashmir claiming dozens of lives since 2014.

At the press conference, both Ms Sushma and Pakistan’s foreign affairs adviser Sartaj Aziz
condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and resolved to cooperate in order to
eliminate the menace. Significantly, Pakistan assured the Indian minister it would expedite the
early conclusion of the Mumbai terror attack trial. Referring to the successful negotiations
between the NSAs of both the countries in Bangkok it was decided that both sides would
continue to address all issues connected to terrorism.

Sushma Swaraj has also met Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on the sidelines of the conference to
discuss the new dialogue process. The news of a new engagement between the two enemies
raised hopes of a broader reconciliation but the hopes of cricket fans in both countries for a new
series of test matches were dashed. Cricket diplomacy did not appear on the agenda, a PM
House official said.

Both Nawaz and Sushma agreed on increased contacts at all level and resolving all the
outstanding issues between the two nuclear neighbours through dialogue, during the meeting
which lasted for almost an hour. Premier Nawaz Sharif said that Pakistan wanted good relations
with all its neighbours including India which was reciprocated by Indian minister. Shushma
confirmed that Prime Minister Narendra Modi will visit Pakistan next year for the Saarc summit
expected to be held in September 2016.

Summary

So the overall analysis of composite dialogue shows that it was a zero sum game and both
sides have not achieved desired goals and political objectives under the composite dialogue.
There are no future prospects of composite dialogue with India. India’s adamant policies
towards Pakistan, perpetual violation of working boundary and cross-border, strong opposition
to CPEC, involvement in Balochistan insurgency and irregular hawkish statements from political
leadership have spoiled the overall peace process. The RSS anti-Muslims ideology, propagation
of Hindutva mindset have closed windows for further dialogue or peace talks with India in the
near future.

4. SIR CREEK DISPUTE

Sir Creek is a disputed water stream between the Sindh province of Pakistan and Gujarat state
of India in the Rann of Kutch. Pakistan claims the whole water stream till India's land borders
whereas India contends that the issue should be solved as per international standards for
riverine systems and hence claims half of the channel with division at the centre. The issue is
complicated as it has historic elements attached to it like the Treaty of 1925 regarding its being
treated as part of the Sindh province but the maps of the Bombay government demarcating
territory in the middle.
The issue remains unsolved even after many rounds of talks as none is ready to concede their
position. Furthermore, the issue has gained significance with the possibility of high quantities of
oil and gas in the area which can give a big boost to the energy security of the country which
controls it. This makes negotiations further impossible.

But, both countries need to understand that it is in their best interest to mutually solve the issue
as only after the dispute is solved, they can mark their EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) and
continental shelves, and exploit the rich energy resources. Also, local fishermen from both the
sides are often caught because of the uncertainty will get a huge relief. At the same time,
amicable solution of the issue can act as a big Confidence Building Measure (CBM) for both the
countries in resolving other issues at hand.

A macro-level problem persists

 A large part of Pakistan’s coastline is adjacent to that of India’s Gujarat coast
 But there are no bilateral agreements defining maritime boundaries.
 Adding to that there is a complete absence of clear fishing laws
 Maritime Zone Acts of both India and Pak are not corresponding to the UN
Convention of Law of Sea UNCLOS and Agreement on Part XI
Importance of Sir Creek
 Strategic or military importance very little
 Dispute mainly because of the fishing resources as it’s considered to be one of
the largest fishing grounds in Asia
 Said to be rich in hydrocarbons and shale gas – immense economic potential
Origins of the Dispute
 These marshlands became first disputed between the Rao of princely state of Katch and
the Chief Commissioner of Sindh Province of British India due to different perceptions of
the boundaries.
 The case was taken up by then Government of Bombay, which conducted a survey
and mandated its verdict in 1914. This verdict has two contradictory paragraphs,
which make the India and Pakistan contenders on the same issue. Paragraph 9 of
this verdict says that the boundary between Kutch and Sindh lies 'to the east of the
Creek,' which effectively implied that the creek belonged to Sindh and, therefore, to
Pakistan.
 On the other hand, Paragraph 10 says Sir Creek is navigable most of the year and
quotes the chief commissioner of Sindh to buttress the point. According to
international law, a boundary can only be fixed in the middle of the navigable
channel, which meant that it has be divided between Sindh and Kutch, and thereby
India and Pakistan. India has used this para to consistently argue that the boundary
needs to be fixed in the middle of the creek.
Is it a ‘map’ issue?
The map of the region was chalked out in 1925 and in this map, it showed a green riband to the
east of the Creek'. Pakistan says that this Green Line is the marked boundary between Sindh
and Kutch, and argued that the Creek belonged to Sindh.
  India countered, saying the depiction was part of 'normal cartographic practice' and
should not be used to make any territorial claims. Thus we can say that Sir Creek
dispute is a classic example of cartographic dilemma.
Till 1954, the borders around Sir Creek were virtually open and there was a free movement of
people and material from both sides. After 1954, the countries started rigid stances on borders
and a controversy evolved around Sir Creek.
Stands of Pakistan and India at the tribunal
 In arguments made at the UN tribunal, India claimed that Kutch was a well-defined
entity. India says that the Raos of Kutch only paid tribute to imperial powers, first
Mughals, then British.
 Pakistan uses different colonial sources to say the Kutch never had an existence of
its own, that the rulers of Sindh had invaded and occupied parts of the Rann in the
18th century, and that the whole breadth of the Rann was the boundary between
Kutch and Sindh
 In spite of this historical nebulosity, the tribunal supported India's claim to 90 per
cent of the Rann, fixed the land border up to a point called the Western Terminus,
but left the westernmost part of the border fluid. This includes the stretch of water

5. SIACHEN BORDER

The Siachen Conflict, sometimes referred to as the Siachen War, is a military conflict between
India and Pakistan over the disputed Siachen Glacier region in Kashmir. A cease-fire went into
effect in 2003. The conflict began in 1984 with India’s successful Operation Meghdoot during
which it wrested control of the Siachen Glacier from Pakistan and forced the Pakistanis to
retreat west of the Saltoro Ridge. India has established control over all of the 70 kilometres (43
mi) long Siachen Glacier and all of its tributary glaciers, as well as the three main passes of the
Saltoro Ridge immediately west of the glacier—Sia La, Bilafond La, and Gyong La. Pakistan
controls the glacial valleys immediately west of the Saltoro Ridge. According to TIME magazine,
India gained more than 1,000 square miles (3,000 km2) of territory because of its military
operations in Siachen.

Conflict

The Siachen glacier is the highest battleground on earth, where India and Pakistan have fought
intermittently since April 13, 1984. Both countries maintain permanent military presence in the
region at a height of over 6,000 metres (20,000 ft). More than 2000 people have died in this
inhospitable terrain, mostly due to weather extremes and the natural hazards of mountain
warfare. The conflict in Siachen stems from the incompletely demarcated territory on the map
beyond the map coordinate known as NJ9842. The 1972 Simla Agreement did not clearly
mention who controlled the glacier, merely stating that from the NJ9842 location the boundary
would proceed “thence north to the glaciers.” UN officials presumed there would be no dispute
between India and Pakistan over such a cold and barren region.
Oropolitics

In 1957 Pakistan permitted a British expedition under Eric Shipton to approach the Siachen
through the Bilafond La, and recce Saltoro Kangri. Five years later a Japanese-Pakistani
expedition put two Japanese and a Pakistani Army climber on top of Saltoro Kangri. These were
early moves in this particular game of oropolitics. The United States Defense Mapping Agency
(now National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) began in about 1967 to show, with no legal or
historical justification or any boundary documentation, an international boundary on their
Tactical Pilotage Charts available to the public and pilots as proceeding from NJ9842 east-
northeast to the Karakoram Pass at 5,534 m (18,136 ft) on the China border. Numerous
governmental and private cartographers and atlas producers followed suit. This resulted in the
US cartographically “awarding” the entire 5,000 square kilometers (1,900 sq mi) of the Siachen-
Saltoro area to Pakistan.

In the 1970s and early 1980s several mountaineering expeditions applied to Pakistan to climb
high peaks in the Siachen area due in part to U.S Defense Mapping Agency and most other
maps and atlases showing it on the Pakistani side of the line. Pakistan granted a number of
permits. This in turn reinforced the Pakistani claim on the area, as these expeditions arrived on
the glacier with a permit obtained from the Government of Pakistan. Teram Kangri I (7,465
m/24,491 ft) and Teram Kangri II (7,406 m/24,298 ft) were climbed in 1975 by a Japanese
expedition led by H. Katayama, which approached through Pakistan via the Bilafond La.[12]

The Indian government and military took notice, and protested the cartography. Prior to 1984
neither India nor Pakistan had any permanent presence in the area. Having become aware of
the errant US military maps and the permit incidents, Colonel Narendra “Bull” Kumar, then
commanding officer of the Indian Army’s High-Altitude Warfare School, mounted an Army
expedition to the Siachen area as a counter-exercise. In 1978 this expedition climbed Teram
Kangri II, claiming it as a first ascent in a typical ‘oropolitical’ riposte. Unusually for the normally
secretive Indian Army, the news and photographs of this expedition were published in ‘The
Illustrated Weekly of India’, a widely-circulated popular magazine. The first public
acknowledgment of the maneuvers and the developing conflict situation in the Siachen was an
abbreviated article titled “High Politics in the Karakoram” by Joydeep Sircar in The Telegraph
newspaper of Calcutta in 1982. The full text was re-printed as “Oropolitics” in the Alpine Journal,
London, in 1984.

Skirmish

At army headquarters in Rawalpindi, Pakistani generals decided they had better stake a claim to
Siachen before India did. Islamabad then committed an intelligence blunder, according to a now
retired Pakistani army colonel. “They ordered Arctic-weather gear from a London outfitters who
also supplied the Indians,” says the colonel. “Once the Indians got wind of it, they ordered 300
outfits—twice as many as we had—and rushed their men up to Siachen.”
Reportedly with specific intelligence of a possible Pakistani operation, India launched Operation
Meghdoot (named after the divine cloud messenger in a Sanskrit play by Kalidasa) on 13 April
1984 when the Kumaon Regiment of the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force went into the
glacier region. India was soon in control of the area, beating Pakistan to the Saltoro Ridge high
ground by about a week. The two northern passes – Sia La and Bilafond La – were quickly
secured by India. When the Pakistanis arrived at the region in 1984, they found a 300-man
Indian battalion dug into the highest mountaintops. The contentious area is about 900 square
miles (2,300 km2) to nearly 1,000 square miles (2,600 km2) of territory. After 1984 Pakistan
launched several attempts to displace the Indian forces, but with little success. The most well
known was in 1987, when an attempt was made by Pakistan to dislodge India from the area.
The attack was masterminded by Pervez Musharraf (later President of Pakistan) heading a
newly raised elite SSG commando unit raised with United States Special Operations Forces
help in the area. A special garrison with eight thousand troops was built at Khapalu. The
immediate aim was to capture Bilafond La but after bitter fighting that included hand to hand
combat, the Pakistanis were thrown back and the positions remained the same. The only Param
Vir Chakra – India’s highest gallantry award – to be awarded for combat in the Siachen area
went to Naib Subedar Bana Singh (retired as Subedar Major/Honorary Captain), who in a daring
daylight raid assaulted and captured a Pakistani post atop a 22,000 foot (6,700 m) peak, now
named Bana Post, after climbing a 457 m (1500 feet) ice cliff face.

Ground situation

In his memoirs, former Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf states that Pakistan lost
almost 900 square miles (2,300 km2) of territory that it claimed. TIME states that the Indian
advance captured nearly 1,000 square miles (2,600 km2) of territory claimed by Pakistan.

Further attempts to reclaim positions were launched by Pakistan in 1990, 1995, 1996 and even
in early 1999, just prior to the Lahore Summit. The 1995 attack by Pakistan SSG was significant
as it resulted in 40 casualties for Pakistan troops without any changes in the positions. An
Indian IAF MI-17 helicopter was shot down in 1996. The Indian army controls all of the 70
kilometres (43 mi) long Siachen Glacier and all of its tributary glaciers, as well as the three main
passes of the Saltoro Ridge immediately west of the glacier Sia La, Bilafond La, and Gyong La
thus.

The Pakistanis control the glacial valley just five kilometers southwest of Gyong La. The
Pakistanis have been unable get up to the crest of the Saltoro Ridge, while the Indians cannot
come down and abandon their strategic high posts. The line between where Indian and
Pakistani troops are presently holding onto their respective posts is being increasingly referred
to as the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL).

Severe conditions
A cease-fire went into effect in 2003. Even before then, every year more soldiers were killed
because of severe weather than enemy firing. The two sides by 2003 had lost an estimated
2,000 personnel primarily due to frostbite, avalanches and other complications. Together, the
nations have about 150 manned outposts along the glacier, with some 3,000 troops each.
Official figures for maintaining these outposts are put at ~$300 and ~$200 million for India and
Pakistan respectively. India built the world’s highest helipad on the glacier at Point Sonam,
21,000 feet (6,400 m) above the sea level, to supply its troops. The problems of reinforcing or
evacuating the high-altitude ridgeline have led to India’s development of the Dhruv Mk III
helicopter, powered by the Shakti engine, which was flight-tested to lift and land personnel and
stores from the Sonam post, the highest permanently manned post in the world. India also
installed the world’s highest telephone booth on the glacier.

6. VISA AND PEOPLE TO PEOPLE CONTACT

In recognition of the crucial role of people-to-people contact through friendly exchanges and
cultural relations for the promotion of peace and normalisation, Pakistan and India agreed to
include these aspects as one of the eight subjects for the Composite Dialogue and Peace
Process initiated in 2004. Since then, the two countries have been able to make impressive
progress in this area, leading to an expansion in people-to people contacts through the
exchange of visits by performing artists, poets, lawyers, students, journalists, parliamentarians,
jurists, businessmen and writers. The enhanced level of people-to-people contact has also
made important contribution to the relaxation in the visa regime, strengthening of peace
constituencies in both the countries, the promotion of physical connectivity and enhancement of
bilateral trade. However, much more can and should be done in this direction, as progress in
this area directly contributes to the narrowing down of the trust deficit and removal of
misperceptions in the psyche of the people of Pakistan and India. These objectives are not only
essential for the achievement of durable peace through result-oriented and productive talks to
which both countries are committed under the peace process, but will serve the long term
national security interests of Pakistan, as friendly exchanges and cultural relations directly
contribute to the promotion of stability and prosperity in the South Asian region. This paper,
while taking stock of the gains already made by Pakistan and India during the last ten years of
bilateral talks under the peace process, discusses the obstacles that impede further progress in
this area, and makes an attempt to identify further areas for cooperation. The paper concludes
that friendly exchanges cannot be fully developed without simultaneously trying to resolve the
core issues.

Pakistan-India Cultural Agreement 1988

The cultural agreement signed on December 31, 1988 is the main framework for cultural
cooperation and friendly exchanges and for the promotion of people-to-people contact.
According to Article 1 of the Agreement, the governments of Pakistan and India pledged to
facilitate and encourage cooperation in the fields of art, culture, archaeology, education, mass
media, and information and sport in order to contribute towards a better knowledge of their
respective cultures and activities in these fields. The agreement also provided for the
establishment of Cultural Centers in each country, the details of which were to be worked out
later. The agreement called for the reciprocal visits of academicians, education administrators,
professors and experts for delivering lectures, as well as conducting study tours and special
courses. Under this agreement, the two governments also allowed reciprocal visits of
representatives of educational, library, artistic, sports, and journalists‟ associations, as well as
their participation in conferences, symposia and seminars.

The agreement encouraged exchanges in the fields of art and culture; mass media such as
radio and television and documentaries; education, sports and archaeology; and books,
periodicals, and educational, cultural and sports publications. There were also provisions for
exchanges between artists, poets, writers and musicians, art exhibitions, and participation in
international film festivals. Under this agreement, the governments of Pakistan and India also
pledged to encourage visits of sports teams between the two countries. The 1988 cultural
agreement provided for all possible measures for ensuring that textbooks prescribed for their
educational institutions, particularly those relating to history and geography, did not contain any
misrepresentation of facts about each other. The agreement also provided for an India-Pakistan
Joint Commission that would formulate cultural and educational exchange programmes
proposed in line with the agreement.

Cultural and Friendly Exchanges, People-to-People Contact and Peace Process (2004-
2008)

The former prime minister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Islamabad to attend the 12th
SAARC Summit in January 2004. A meeting between him and Pakistan‟s former president
Pervez Musharraf was held on the sidelines of the Summit. This resulted in a Joint Statement
issued on January 6, 2004, under which the two leaders announced the resumption of bilateral
talks in order to find solutions to disputes and promote normalisation of relations through friendly
exchanges and people to-people contact under the Composite Dialogue and Peace Process.
Subsequently, the structured talks covered eight subjects or baskets, which included these two
subjects.

The talks on friendly exchanges and people-to-people contacts were held in New Delhi on 3-4
August 2004. The representatives of the two ministries of culture discussed wide-ranging
proposals for cooperation in the fields of art, culture, archaeology, education, science and
technology, youth affairs and sports, the media and tourism. Although these discussions did not
produce dramatic results, the interaction between the two sides on this subject was
encouraging. The participants, for instance, were able to reach an agreement on addressing
humanitarian issues concerning civilian prisoners and fishermen on the two sides. There was
also an agreement to increase the number of pilgrims and places of religious importance for the
citizens of both countries. The two sides agreed that the decisions made during the talks would
be implemented through mutual coordination.

New Rail/Road Connections

Before the start of the Composite Dialogue and Peace Process between Pakistan and India in
2004, the two countries were connected through air, one rail link and one road route. Lahore
and Karachi were connected to New Delhi and Bombay (now Mumbai), while Samjhota Express
ran a train between Lahore and Amritsar. In 1999, a bus service between Lahore and New Delhi
was inaugurated. Fortunately, the four years of peace talks (2004-2008) between Pakistan and
India witnessed the opening of more land routes - two across the international border between
the two Punjabs, Lahore-Amritsar, and Amritsar-Nankana Sahib.

In April 2005, a bus service between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar was inaugurated to enable the
members of divided families living across the Line of Control (LoC) to visit one another. Another
land route opened between Rawalakot and Poonch across the LoC in 2008 for trade between
the two parts of Kashmir Valley. There were also proposals to open a Skardu-Kargil land route
and a Sialkot-Jammu road link. There was great demand from the people living across the
border for both these facilities. In 2006, Pakistan and India agreed to revive the old rail link
between Sindh and Rajasthan, also known as the Munnabao-Khokrapar Express. Before the
partition of India in 1947, it was known as the Sindh Mail and ran between Hyderabad (Sindh)
and Ahmadabad (Gujrat). It was destroyed during the 1965 War, but was reopened later on
February 16, 2006, after fervent demands and appeals from the people of Karachi.

Relaxation of Visa Regime

Over the years, strained relations marked by wars and border tensions have made the visa
regime pursued by Pakistan and India highly restrictive. However, an increased flow of people
across the international border has increased pressure on the two governments to move
towards a liberalisation of the visa system. On September 8, 2012 when the Indian foreign
minister S. M. Krishna visited Pakistan, Islamabad and New Delhi inked a landmark agreement,
approving a relaxed visa regime between the two countries. The agreement made a significant
departure from the past practices of highly restrictive visa regimes. Under the agreement,
Pakistan and India decided, for the first time, to issue tourist visas to the nationals of the other
country, opening up their rich history to the people of the two countries across the Radcliffe
Line. Apart from diplomatic, nondiplomatic and official visas, the agreement enabled hassle-free
issuance of a visa to a national visiting the other country to meet relatives or friends, or for any
other legitimate purpose.

The agreement also increased the duration of the visa to a maximum of three months at one
geographical location, while the number of specified locations was increased to five. Under the
agreement, a visitor visa could be issued for up to two years with multiple entries to a senior
citizen (above 65 years of age). The agreement provided for the issuance of group tourist visas
for individual applicants intending to travel in a group of 10 to 50 members, organised by
approved tour operators or travel agents. Such a visa, valid for 30 days, would not be
extendable. The students of the two countries could enjoy this facility, but they would not be
able to seek admission in educational institutions of the other country.

Businessmen with an income of Rs. 500, 000 or an equivalent of this per annum, or a turnover
or gross sale of Rs. 3 million were entitled to a one-year, multiple entry visa (up to four entries)
for five cities. Those with a yearly income of at least Rs. 5 million or a turnover of Rs. 30 million
were to be given multiple entry business visas for up to 10 places with an exemption from police
reporting. The agreement also provided that senior citizens of Pakistan above the age of 65
years would be granted Indian visa on their arrival at the Wagha border check point.
The agreement signed in September 2012 relaxing visa rules applies to travel across
international borders, but no initiative has been taken to ease travel restrictions on cross-LoC
movement. The Muzaffarabad-Srinagar bus service facility is available only to the members of
the divided families living in the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Despite calls for extending
this facility to other sections of the Kashmiri population, no agreement has been reached yet.

7. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

A prominent feature of the process under which friendly exchanges and people-to-people
contact between Pakistan and India have achieved rapid growth is the active role played by the
civil society, particularly independent think-tanks in the private sector, and professional
organisations of journalists and lawyers. Besides, through Track-II Diplomacy, retired military
officers, former diplomats and distinguished members of the academia have been taking part in
different forums and using various platforms to create space for people-to-people contact.

On the parliamentary track, the Islamabad-based Parliamentary Institute for Development and
Transparency (PILDAT) has initiated a number of dialogues between the Pakistani and Indian
parliamentarians to discuss and make recommendations on ways to promote the normalisation
of relations. The fifth dialogue in this series was held in Islamabad in September 2013, in which
prominent parliamentarians from the two countries participated and made important
suggestions. One such suggestion was to reopen the Indian Consulate in Karachi and the
Pakistani diplomatic mission in Mumbai. Panellists also called for strengthening air and shipping
routes between Karachi and Mumbai.

Pakistan-India Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy (PIPFPD) is an NGO that has long
been working for the promotion of amity by holding seminars, conferences, discussions, and
dialogues in both Pakistan and India. One such activity was a three-day convention organised
by PIPFPD in the Indian city of Allahabad (UP) in January 2012. The convention ended on a
positive note, with the issuance of the Allahabad Declaration, in which serious concern was
expressed about the deteriorating relations between Pakistan and India. The convention called
on the leadership of the two countries to work for the promotion of peace and democracy in the
region.

In July 2013, civil society representatives from Pakistan and India gathered in Islamabad to hold
the third round of Islamabad Dialogue, organised by the Jinnah Institute (JI) in collaboration with
the New Delhi‟s Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation (CDR). Participants from the academia
and intelligentsia, comprising defence and strategic experts, former military officials, diplomats,
and representatives from different segments of civil society discussed the issues that divide
Pakistan and India, and explored the possibilities of an improved relationship. They advocated
enhanced diplomatic, economic, cultural, government-togovernment and people-to-people
contact at all levels; and suggested cross-cultural visits and initiation of formalised student
exchange programmes.

Conclusion
There are substantial imperatives for increased people-to-people contact and friendly
exchanges between Pakistan and India. These stem from their common history and
geographical proximity, as well as the growing need for inter-regional and intra-regional
connectivity, among others, through SAARC and SAFTA. The process of friendly exchanges
and people-to-people contact, however, continues to remain heavily strained. The constraints
reflect the deep mistrust and suspicion with which the nationals of the two countries view each
other. There is no doubt that there has been considerable expansion of people-to-people
contact and friendly exchanges between Pakistan and India following the commencement of the
Composite Dialogue and Peace Process in 2004. However, frequent disruptions of the peace
process have caused a serious setback to the process of people-topeople contact and friendly
exchanges. As per conventional wisdom, people-to-people contacts will not really take off until
the core issues between the two countries are resolved, or at least until serious efforts are made
through dialogue and negotiations to resolve them

8. AFGHANISTAN: COLD WAR THEATRE

SOVIET INVASION AND MUJAHEDEEN
Key Points

 The soviet war in Afghanistan was a war in the cold war involving the soviets
 The Russians deiced to invade Afghanistan
 The war lasted for 10 years
 The Mujahideen revived unofficial aid from country's like the united states, united
kingdom, china and etc.
 The soviets expected to prop up the afghan communist and quickly withdraw
 The USA had armed rebels because they considered the soviets invasion as a threat to
mid-west oil supply.
 In the 1950s soviet influence in the country began to increase
 President Jimmy Carter warned the soviets against any attempt to gain control of
the Persian gulf.
 Soviet troops rolled into afghan to conquer the country.
 Due to the nature of the war its sometimes refereed as the "Soviets Union's Vietnam
War
AFGHANISTAN: COLD WAR THEATRE
Nearly twenty-five years ago, the Soviet Union pulled its last troops out of Afghanistan, ending
more than nine years of direct involvement and occupation. The USSR entered neighboring
Afghanistan in 1979, attempting to shore up the newly-established pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.
In short order, nearly 100,000 Soviet soldiers took control of major cities and highways.
Rebellion was swift and broad, and the Soviets dealt harshly with the Mujahideen rebels and
those who supported them, leveling entire villages to deny safe havens to their enemy. Foreign
support propped up the diverse group of rebels, pouring in from Iran, Pakistan, China, and the
United States. In the brutal nine-year conflict, an estimated one million civilians were killed, as
well as 90,000 Mujahideen fighters, 18,000 Afghan troops, and 14,500 Soviet soldiers. Civil war
raged after the withdrawal, setting the stage for the Taliban's takeover of the country in 1996. As
NATO troops move toward their final withdrawal this year, Afghans worry about what will come
next, and Russian involvement in neighboring Ukraine's rebellion has the world's attention, it is
worth looking back at the Soviet-Afghan conflict that ended a quarter-century ago. Today's entry
is part of the ongoing series here on Afghanistan.

A low-flying Afghan helicopter gunship in snow-capped valley along Salang highway provides
cover for a Soviet convoy sending food and fuel to Kabul, Afghanistan, on January 30, 1989.
The convoy was attacked by Mujahideen guerrillas with rockets further up the highway, with
Afghan government troops returning fire with artillery.

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 by troops from
the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union intervened in support of the Afghan communist government
in its conflict with anticommunist Muslim guerrillas during the Afghan War (1978–92) and
remained in Afghanistan until mid-February 1989.

In April 1978 Afghanistan’s centrist government, headed by Pres. Mohammad Daud Khan, was
overthrown by left-wing military officers led by Nur Mohammad Taraki. Power was thereafter
shared by two Marxist-Leninist political groups, the People’s (Khalq) Party and the Banner
(Parcham) Party which had earlier emerged from a single organization, the People’s Democratic
Party of Afghanistan and had reunited in an uneasy coalition shortly before the coup. The new
government, which had little popular support, forged close ties with the Soviet Union, launched
ruthless purges of all domestic opposition, and began extensive land and social reforms that
were bitterly resented by the devoutly Muslim and largely anticommunist population.
Insurgencies arose against the government among both tribal and urban groups, and all of
these—known collectively as the mujahideen (Arabic mujāhidūn, “those who engage in jihad”)
were Islamic in orientation.

These uprisings, along with internal fighting and coups within the government between the
People’s and Banner factions, prompted the Soviets to invade the country on the night of Dec.
24, 1979, sending in some 30,000 troops and toppling the short-lived presidency of People’s
leader Hafizullah Amin. The aim of the Soviet operation was to prop up their new but faltering
client state, now headed by Banner leader Babrak Karmal, but Karmal was unable to attain
significant popular support. Backed by the United States, the mujahideen rebellion grew,
spreading to all parts of the country. The Soviets initially left the suppression of the rebellion to
the Afghan army, but the latter was beset by mass desertions and remained largely ineffective
throughout the war.

The Afghan War quickly settled down into a stalemate, with more than 100,000 Soviet troops
controlling the cities, larger towns, and major garrisons and the mujahideen moving with relative
freedom throughout the countryside. Soviet troops tried to crush the insurgency by various
tactics, but the guerrillas generally eluded their attacks. The Soviets then attempted to eliminate
the mujahideen’s civilian support by bombing and depopulating the rural areas. These tactics
sparked a massive flight from the countryside; by 1982 some 2.8 million Afghans had sought
asylum in Pakistan, and another 1.5 million had fled to Iran. The mujahideen were eventually
able to neutralize Soviet air power through the use of shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles
supplied by the Soviet Union’s Cold War adversary, the United States.
The mujahideen were fragmented politically into a handful of independent groups, and their
military efforts remained uncoordinated throughout the war. The quality of their arms and
combat organization gradually improved, however, owing to experience and to the large quantity
of arms and other war matériel shipped to the rebels, via Pakistan, by the United States and
other countries and by sympathetic Muslims from throughout the world. In addition, an
indeterminate number of Muslim volunteers popularly termed “Afghan-Arabs,” regardless of their
ethnicity traveled from all parts of the world to join the opposition.

The war in Afghanistan became a quagmire for what by the late 1980s was a disintegrating
Soviet Union. (The Soviets suffered some 15,000 dead and many more injured.) Despite having
failed to implement a sympathetic regime in Afghanistan, in 1988 the Soviet Union signed an
accord with the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and agreed to withdraw its troops. The
Soviet withdrawal was completed on Feb. 15, 1989, and Afghanistan returned to nonaligned
status.

How the US provoked the Soviet Union into invading Afghanistan.

The deception necessary for the Carter Administration to weave the whole unprovoked Soviet
Invasion narrative, with the bogus threats to the oil fields, was staggering. The falsehood was
presented to the American people, and more generally, the people of US allies whose
governments parroted the same line. The January 1980 State of the Union Address by
President Carter was mostly a Brzezinski fabrication. It can be found online for anyone to read.
The height of arrogance, when the US got itself into Vietnam, continued to spread the conflict
into neighbouring states, and Brzezinski's support of Pol Pot in Cambodia, then to say that 'Now
we can give the Soviets their Vietnam'? One may conjecture, that the level of immorality,
deception and bad faith behind any enterprise tends to magnify the blowback, unintended
consequences and human suffering long after any perceived gain. Brzezinski's plan, which he
remains proud to have implemented, was a callous, calculating and ideologically driven,
intentional destruction of a nation and its people, to damage the Soviet Union. To this day, he
believes the Afghan War was a major contributor to the collapse of communism in Europe. No
historian in Russia believes this. The Soviet Union was already falling apart, due to its inefficient
command economy, and active work by the Soviet people to change the system from within.

It is also sad, perhaps because of proximity to 9/11, that the Gates and Brzezinski revelations
remain almost unknown to the American people. Professional historians write books on the
Afghan War, still follow the outdated narrative. I have yet to find any evidence that the US or any
other Western education system teaches the updated story.

9. GENEVA ACCORDS
The Geneva Accords, known formally as the agreements on the settlement of the situation
relating to the Afghanistan, were signed on 14 April 1988 United Nations, between Afghanistan
and Pakistan, with the United States and the Soviet Union serving as guarantors.

The accords consisted of several instruments: a bilateral agreement between the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of Afghanistan on the principles of mutual relations, in
particular on non-interference and non-intervention; a declaration on international guarantees,
signed by the USSR and the United States; a bilateral agreement between Pakistan and
Afghanistan on the voluntary return of Afghan refugees; and an agreement on the
interrelationships for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan, signed by Pakistan
and Afghanistan and witnessed by the Soviet Union and the United States.
The agreements also contained provisions for the timetable of the withdrawal of Soviet troops
from Afghanistan. It officially began on 15 May 1988 and ended by 15 February 1989, thus
putting an end to a nine-year-long Soviet occupation and Soviet war in Afghanistan.
The Afghan resistance, or Mujahideen, were neither party to the negotiations nor to the Geneva
accords and, consequently, refused to accept the terms of the agreement. As a result, the civil
war continued after the completion of the Soviet withdrawal. The Soviet-backed regime
of Najibullah, though failing to win popular support, territory, or international recognition, was
able to remain in power until 1992, when it collapsed and was overrun by the mujahideen.
Instruments of Accord

The Accord consisted of several instruments:

1. Agreement on the interrelationships for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan
signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan, witnessed by the USA and the USSR;

2. Bilateral agreement between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan on the principles of mutual relations, in particular on noninterference and non-
intervention;

3. Declaration on international guarantees, signed by the USSR and the USA;

4. Bilateral agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the voluntary return of Afghan
refugees.

Explanation

The year 1988 was a turning point in the world politics. In this year a disastrous decade came to
an end that caused much bloodshed and destruction in Afghanistan and threatened the security
of Pakistan. Geneva Accord has a very significant role in changing the political scenario of the
world. It is obvious that Pakistan’s international credibility boosted due to the Geneva accord
and became an important mediator in the world affairs. Pakistan, Soviet Union, Afghanistan and
USA were the participants of the Geneva accord in which Pakistan played a key role in settling
the terms to resolve the Afghan issue. After the accord many changes took place in the relations
of Pakistan with other participants.

In 1979, Soviet’s military intervened in its very neighbor Afghanistan in order to annex and make
it a part of communist regime. After a short span, the task became very difficult for Soviet Union.
The Afghan Mujahedeen with the support of Pakistan and international community gave a
severe blow to Soviet cause. Soviet leadership realized the failure of expedition and
deteriorated socio-economic conditions at domestic level compelled Soviet leadership to come
out from the catastrophic situation. Thus a process of negotiation for settlement started in early
1981, under the UN auspicious. After the long-time negotiations and discussions the final
agreement was signed at Geneva on April 14, 1988. In the Accord, a bilateral agreement was
signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan for voluntarily returning of refuges under the
guarantees signed by USA and Soviet Union. Timeframe was set up for withdrawal of soviet
forces from Afghanistan that was nine month in which 50 percent forces had to withdraw within
three months. Afghan resistance groups neither participate nor accepted the accord that exerted
dire impact on Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

The Accord witnessed a hallmark of Pakistan’s diplomacy and military strategy. It boosted
Pakistan’s diplomatic standards in the world but it had obvious impact on Pakistan’s external
and internal sphere. There was already friction between the Prime Minister Muhammad Khan
Jonejo and President Zia-ul-Haq. But the signing of the Accord by the then foreign minister
widened the friction because Zia took a hard position on establishing a pro-Pakistan
government in Afghanistan based on resistance groups that was out of question for soviets.
Finally making it pretext Zia dismissed an elected legitimate government that caused severe
setback to new established democratic set up.

The spirit Geneva Accord was in an agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan in which
Soviet Union and USA were the guarantor of non-interference and non-intervention of each
other’s internal affairs. After the soviet withdrew incompetent Najibullah could not handle the
deteriorated situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan repeatedly asked for the establishment of
legitimate and representative of people’s government. A process of civil war had been started
between different ethnic groups and finally Najibullah government was ousted and new interim
pro-Pakistani government was setup in Kabul. Pakistan stood and supported the mujahidin that
caused the friction in Iran-Pakistan relations, because Iran did not want the power in the hands
of Sunni mujahidin.

The Geneva Accord also solved the issue of security threats to Pakistan by the soviets,
because during the Afghan war Soviet Union threatened Pakistan several times and warned
that Pakistan was playing with fire due to its support to mujahidin. After a few months of Geneva
Accord the accident of Zia’s plane is also considered a conspiracy of soviet’s that can be taken
as or might be a part of US plan to get rid of Zia. Moreover, US stopped all the assistance that
was promised and given during the Afghan crisis for settlement of refugees. US sanctions made
it difficult for Pakistan to bear the burden of refugees, although it is included in Geneva accord
that 1.5 million refugees would return to Afghanistan. The chaos and civil war in Afghanistan did
not provide the safe way of returning the refugees. The refugees created a lot of problem in
Pakistan.

In 1991 the mighty Soviet empire suddenly disintegrated and as result six Muslim states
emerged in Central Asia. Pakistan established friendly relations with these states, while Russia
wanted to establish pro-Russian government in newly emerged states. On the other hand Iran
also wanted to inject her influence in the new states that caused hostility and antagonism
between Iran and Pakistan.
To sum up, although the Geneva Accord was a victory of heroic Afghans along with a high
watermark of Pakistan’s diplomacy and military strategy, but it left various repercussions to
issue in the region. Aftermath of the Accord many vicissitudes took place in the relations of
Pakistan with other countries. Diplomatically it was a successful effort in which for first time in
the history of Soviet Union withdrew her forces from a country. Socially and economically the
aftermath of Geneva Accord proved very hard and difficult for Pakistan.

POST COLD WAR SITUATIO

10. RISE OF TALIBAN

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. In 1989, the last year for which such
statistics exist, the average income per person was only $200/year. Since then it has surely
dropped further due to the constant civil war. It has the fourth highest infant mortality rate in the
world. Life expectancy for both men and women is 43-44 years old.
A London Times correspondent who has extensively traveled the country commented “… much
of Afghanistan is like a scene from Mad Max or some futurist (post-holocaust) movie.
Everywhere is the debris of war; Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers with their turrets
torn off; the wrecks of former clinics, schools and shops; razed walls, cratered and mined
roads.”
In 1996 the Taliban took control of Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul. They banned all opposition
groups, political parties and trade unions. They introduced a brutally repressive form
of sharia law. Music, movies, TV, card playing, singing, dancing, boxing, and even kite flying are
outlawed. Homosexuals are buried alive. Women are virtually enslaved.
One of the Taliban’s major financiers is Osama bin Laden. He calls for a war of the “believers”
against the “non-believers.” “Non-believers” includes non-Muslims and Muslims who do not
subscribe to his particular form of “pure Islam,” Wahabism. It’s a puritanical trend of Sunni Islam
imported from Saudi Arabia.
Islamic fundamentalism is a completely reactionary ideology that seeks to turn the wheel of
history backward to establish theocratic dictatorships. The Taliban’s sharia law has nothing in
common with Afghan culture. Most Afghan Muslims belong to the Hanafi school of thought, the
most tolerant denomination of Sunni Islam. The Taliban fighters were recruited and educated
at madrisas, Islamic religious schools in Pakistan.

The Taliban have also threatened to destabilise Pakistan, where they have controlled areas in
the north-west in recent years. Despite a major military offensive against them since 2014, they
continue to mount frequent suicide bombings and other attacks across the country. Many
observers now believe that future peace in Afghanistan can only come if the government in
Kabul negotiates with the Taliban. The announcement of Taliban plans to open an office in
Qatar in June 2013 was seen as a positive step in those negotiations, but mistrust on both sides
remains high.
Despite this, talks between the Taliban and Afghan government officials took place for the first
time in July 2015. Those talks came a month after a group of Afghan women met Taliban
representatives in Oslo. Further contacts with the group have failed to make progress. In
September 2015, the Afghan Taliban said they had put aside weeks of infighting and rallied
around a new leader in the form of Mullah Mansour, who had been the deputy of longstanding
leader Mullah Omar. The previous month the Taliban admitted they had covered up Mullah
Omar's death for more than two years. Mullah Mansour was killed in a US drone strike in May
2016 and replaced by his deputy Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada, a hardline religious scholar.

Austere rule

The Taliban emerged in the early 1990s in northern Pakistan following the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan. A predominantly Pashtun movement, the Taliban came to prominence
in Afghanistan in the autumn of 1994. It is commonly believed that they first appeared in
religious seminaries - mostly paid for by money from Saudi Arabia - which preached a hard line
form of Sunni Islam. The Taliban's promise - in Pashtun areas straddling Pakistan and
Afghanistan - was to restore peace and security and enforce their own austere version of
Sharia, or Islamic law, once in power. In both countries they introduced or supported Islamic
punishments - such as public executions of convicted murderers and adulterers and
amputations of those found guilty of theft.

Men were required to grow beards and women had to wear the all-covering burka. The Taliban
banned television, music and cinema and disapproved of girls aged 10 and over from going to
school. Pakistan was also the last country to break diplomatic ties with the Taliban. Although
Pakistan has in recent years adopted a harder line against Taliban militants carrying out attacks
on its soil, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif - who was elected in May 2013 - has said talking to the
militants is one of his priorities. At least three key leaders of the Pakistani Taliban were killed in
US drone strikes in 2013. Mullah Nazir was killed in January and Waliur Rehman was killed in
May.

In November 2013, the group's leader in Pakistan, Hakimullah Mehsud, was killed in a drone
strike. But despite these setbacks for the militants, there is evidence that their influence in
Karachi has significantly increased. What is arguably one of the most internationally criticised of
all Pakistani Taliban attacks took place in October 2012, when schoolgirl Malala Yousafzai was
attacked on her way home in the town of Mingora.

Al-Qaeda 'sanctuary'

The attention of the world was drawn to the Taliban in Afghanistan following the attacks on the
World Trade Centre in September 2001. The Taliban in Afghanistan were accused of providing
a sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda movement who were blamed for the attacks.
Soon after 9/11 the Taliban were driven from power in Afghanistan by a US-led coalition,
although their leader Mullah Mohammad Omar was not captured.
In recent years the Taliban re-emerged in Afghanistan and grew far stronger in Pakistan, where
observers say there is loose co-ordination between different Taliban factions and militant
groups. The main Pakistani faction was led by Hakimullah Mehsud until his death. His Tehrik-e
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is blamed for dozens of suicide bombings and other attacks. Observers
warn against over-stating the existence of one unified insurgency against the Pakistani state,
however.

For years the Taliban in Afghanistan were led by Mullah Omar, a village clergyman who lost his
right eye fighting the occupying forces of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Afghans, weary of the
mujahideen's excesses and infighting after the Soviets were driven out, generally welcomed the
Taliban when they first appeared on the scene. Their early popularity was largely due to their
success in stamping out corruption, curbing lawlessness and making the roads and the areas
under their control safe for commerce to flourish.

US onslaught

From south-western Afghanistan, the Taliban quickly extended their influence. They captured
the province of Herat, bordering Iran, in September 1995. Exactly one year later, they captured
the Afghan capital, Kabul, after overthrowing the regime of President Burhanuddin Rabbani and
his defence minister, Ahmed Shah Masood. By 1998, they were in control of almost 90% of
Afghanistan. They were accused of various human rights and cultural abuses. One notorious
example was in 2001, when the Taliban went ahead with the destruction of the famous Bamiyan
Buddha statues in central Afghanistan, despite international outrage. On October 7, 2001, a US-
led military coalition invaded Afghanistan and by the first week of December the Taliban regime
had collapsed. Mullah Omar and his comrades evaded capture despite one of the largest
manhunts in the world.

Many senior Taliban leaders take refuge in the Pakistani city of Quetta, from where they guide
the Taliban, analysts say. But the existence of what is dubbed the "Quetta Shura" is denied by
Islamabad, even though there is much evidence to the contrary. Despite ever higher numbers of
foreign troops, the Taliban have steadily extended their influence, rendering vast tracts of
Afghanistan insecure, and violence in the country has returned to levels not seen since 2001.
Their retreat in the years after 2001 enabled them to limit their human and material losses and
return with a vengeance.
There have been numerous Taliban attacks on Kabul in recent years and, in September 2012,
the group carried out a high-profile raid on Nato's Camp Bastion base. In the same month the
US military handed control of the controversial Bagram prison - housing more than 3,000
Taliban fighters and terrorism suspects - to the Afghan authorities. In September 2015 the
Taliban seized control of a provincial capital for the first time since their defeat in 2001, taking
control of the strategically important city of Kunduz. The US is keeping close to 10,000 troops in
Afghanistan, but the Taliban finds itself an increasingly splintered organisation - that is also
threatened by the rise of the so-called Islamic State militant group in Afghanistan.

12. AL-QEADA & 9/11

AL-Qaeda is obsessed with remembering the Manhattan Raid, as it calls the terrorist attacks of
Sept. 11, 2001. To mark 10 years after 9/11, Osama bin Laden was hard at work planning an
anniversary attack on the United States, according to information found in his compound in
Abbottabad, Pakistan, and his organization has tried several times to stage mass-casualty
attacks on the anniversaries of its most important operation.

The U.S. intelligence community reportedly found evidence in computers and other material
captured in the Abbottabad raid showing that in the weeks before his death, bin Laden was
weighing how to stage a 10th-anniversary attack on America with other senior al Qaeda
operatives, including Attiyah Abu Rahman, one of al Qaeda’s most senior operations planners.
The intercepted communications focused on selecting operatives for an attack, but the target
was apparently not clear in the information found in his hideout.

Al Qaeda has every reason to be obsessed with 9/11. The plot that toppled the World Trade
Center towers and damaged the Pentagon cost al Qaeda less than half a million dollars to pull
off, according the 9/11 Commission report. The property damage alone cost about $100 billion,
and estimates of the total economic damage inflicted by the attack range up to $2 trillion. The
cost of the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that flowed out of the 9/11 tragedy has been
estimated recently by Brown University scholars at about $4 trillion. Al Qaeda pulled off the
world’s cheapest global game changer ever on Sept. 11, 2001, and we are still living with the
consequences and costs.

Every year since then al Qaeda has at least issued a lengthy statement remembering its 19
hijackers and encouraging its followers to keep fighting America on battlefields around the
world. Sometimes these missives have included pre-taped video messages from one of the 9/11
terrorists. They always include a roundup of al Qaeda’s view of recent events in the global
struggle with America; in effect, a state of the global jihad. Inevitably al Qaeda claims it is
bleeding America economically and wearing down our will. This year it is sure to claim victory is
close at hand in Iraq, with American forces scheduled to depart by year’s end, and that victory is
coming in Afghanistan, with the first withdrawal of American and other NATO troops starting.

Al Qaeda also has tried to mark the anniversary in the past with spectacular terror attacks.
Twice it has come very close. For the fifth anniversary, in 2006, al Qaeda planned simultaneous
explosions on as many as 10 jumbo jets flying from the United Kingdom to the U.S. and
Canada, with liquid explosives brought on board by 20 or so suicide bombers. The terrorists had
already been selected, some had done their martyrdom videos, and the explosives were
prepared when British intelligence disrupted the plot in August 2006. Several of the terrorists
have been convicted of the conspiracy. Their bombs would have worked, according to experts
who examined the evidence, and all forensic evidence of the crime would have settled to the
bottom of the Atlantic. Trans-Atlantic air traffic would have come to an end; no one in their right
mind would insure flights. The targets chosen for the attacks included flights to Chicago, New
York, San Francisco, Montreal, and Toronto. Such an attack would have been a second global
game changer.

The key mastermind in the 2006 plot was a British citizen of Pakistani origin named Rashid
Rauf. Born in Birmingham, he shuttled between the terrorists in the U.K and al Qaeda’s senior
leadership in Pakistan, putting the plan together. Other evidence found in Abbottabad shows
that bin Laden was involved in the planning in 2006. Rauf was arrested by the Pakistani
intelligence service, the ISI, when the plot was rolled up in England, but escaped less than a
year later, probably with inside help.

Rauf, as well as bin Laden, was involved in al Qaeda’s next big anniversary plot, in 2009. This
time he had taught an Afghan American named Najibullah Zazi in Pakistan how to make bombs
to be used on the New York City subway system. Zazi and two other Americans planned to blow
themselves up on the first Monday after 9/11 at 9 a.m., the peak of rush hour, and attack
commuters on trains at Times Square, Grand Central, and the Port Authority stations. The
attack would have been a North American repeat of al Qaeda’s attacks in Madrid and London
that killed or wounded thousands of Spanish and British civilians in 2003 and 2005. The FBI
arrested the three on the eve of the attack, and Zazi later confessed. Rauf may have died in a
drone strike since, but that is uncertain.

So al Qaeda has motive and intent. Its new leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has been involved in all
the past plots and has been a regular performer in the annual state of the jihad video messages.
No doubt he is trying to put together another attack.

13. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

Overview

In response to the attacks of 11 September, the early combat operations that took place on 7
October 2001 to include a mix of strikes from land-based B-1 Lancer, B-2 Spirit and B-52 Stra to
fortress bombers, carrier-based F-14 Tomcat and F/A-18 Hornet fighters, and Tomahawk cruise
missiles launched from both U.S. and British ships and submarines signaled the start of
Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF-A).
The initial military objectives of OEF-A, as articulated by President George W. Bush in his 20
September Address to a Joint Session of Congress and his 7 October address to the country,
included the destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, the
capture of al-Qaeda leaders, and the cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan.[18][19][20]
In January 2002, over 1,200 soldiers from the United States Special Operations Command
Pacific (SOCPAC) deployed to the Philippines to support the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) in their push to uproot terrorist forces on the island of Basilan. Of those
groups included are Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. The operation
consisted of training the AFP in counter-terrorist operations as well as supporting the local
people with humanitarian aid in Operation Smiles.
In October 2002, the Combined Task Force 150 and United States military Special Forces
established themselves in Djibouti at Camp Lemonnier. The stated goals of the operation were
to provide humanitarian aid and patrol the Horn of Africa to reduce the abilities of terrorist
organizations in the region. Similar to OEF-P, the goal of humanitarian aid was emphasised,
ostensibly to prevent militant organizations from being able to take hold amongst the population
as well as reemerge after being removed.
The military aspect involves coalition forces searching and boarding ships entering the region
for illegal cargo as well as providing training and equipment to the armed forces in the region.
The humanitarian aspect involves building schools, clinics and water wells to enforce the
confidence of the local people. Since 2001, the cumulative expenditure by the U.S. government
on Operation Enduring Freedom has exceeded $150 billion. The operation continues, with
military direction mostly coming from United States Central Command.
The Taliban
Seizing upon a power vacuum after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan after their invasion,
the Taliban assumed the role of government from 1996–2001. Their extreme interpretation of
Islamic law prompted them to ban music, television, sports, and dancing, and enforce harsh
judicial penalties (See Human rights in Afghanistan). Amputation was an accepted form of
punishment for stealing, and public executions could often be seen at the Kabul football
stadium. Women's rights groups around the world were frequently critical as the Taliban banned
women from appearing in public or holding many jobs outside the home. They drew further
criticism when they destroyed the Buddhas of Bamyan, historical statues nearly 1500 years old,
because the Buddhas were considered idols.
In 1996, Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden moved to Afghanistan upon the invitation of
the Northern Alliance leader Abdur Rabb ur Rasool Sayyaf. When the Taliban came to power,
bin Laden was able to forge an alliance between the Taliban and his al-Qaeda organization. It is
understood that al-Qaeda-trained fighters known as the 055 Brigade were integrated with the
Taliban army between 1997 and 2001. It has been suggested that the Taliban and bin Laden
had very close connections
US-led coalition action
On 20 September 2001, the U.S. stated that Osama bin Laden was behind the 11 September
attacks in 2001. The US made a five-point ultimatum to the Taliban:

 Deliver to the U.S. all of the leaders of al-Qaeda

 Release all imprisoned foreign nationals
 Close immediately every terrorist training camp
 Hand over every terrorist and their supporters to appropriate authorities
 Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps for inspection
On 21 September 2001, the Taliban rejected this ultimatum, stating there was no evidence
in their possession linking bin Laden to the 11 September attacks.
On 22 September 2001 the United Arab Emirates and later Saudi Arabia withdrew their
recognition of the Taliban as the legal government of Afghanistan, leaving neighboring
Pakistan as the only remaining country with diplomatic ties.
On 4 October 2001, it was reported that the Taliban covertly offered to turn bin Laden over
to Pakistan for trial in an international tribunal that operated according to Islamic shar'ia
law.] On 7 October 2001, the Taliban proposed to try bin Laden in Afghanistan in an Islamic
court. This proposition was immediately rejected by the US. Later on the same day, United
States and British forces initiated military action against the Taliban, bombing Taliban forces
and al-Qaeda terrorist training camps.
 On 14 October 2001, the Taliban proposed to hand bin Laden over to a third country for
trial, but only if they were given evidence of bin Laden's involvement in the events of 11
September 2001. The US rejected this proposal and military operations ensued.
The UN Security Council, on 16 January 2002, unanimously established an arms embargo
and the freezing of identifiable assets belonging to bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the remaining
Taliban.
Combat operations start
On Sunday 7 October 2001, American and British forces began an aerial bombing campaign
targeting Taliban forces and al-Qaeda.
The Northern Alliance, aided by Joint Special Operations teams consisting of Green Berets from
the 5th Special Forces Group, aircrew members from the 160th Special Operations Aviation
Regiment (SOAR), and Air Force Combat Controllers, fought against the Taliban. Aided by U.S.
bombing and massive defections, they captured Mazari Sharif on 9 November. They then
rapidly gained control of most of northern Afghanistan, and took control of Kabul on 13
November after the Taliban unexpectedly fled the city. The Taliban were restricted to a smaller
and smaller region, with Kunduz, the last Taliban-held city in the north, captured on 26
November. Most of the Taliban fled to Pakistan.
The war continued in the south of the country, where the Taliban retreated to Kandahar. After
Kandahar fell in December, remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda continued to mount
resistance. Meanwhile, in November 2001 the U.S. military and its allied forces established their
first ground base in Afghanistan to the south west of Kandahar, known as FOB Rhino.
The Battle of Tora Bora, involving U.S., British and Northern Alliance forces took place in
December 2001 to further destroy the Taliban and suspected al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. In early
March 2002 the United States military, along with allied Afghan military forces, conducted a
large operation to destroy al-Qaeda in an operation code-named Operation Anaconda.
The operation was carried out by elements of the United States 10th Mountain Division, 101st
Airborne Division, the U.S. special forces groups TF 11, and elements of the Australian Special
Air Service Regiment and of the New Zealand Special Air Service and the Afghan National
Army. After managing to evade U.S. forces throughout the summer of 2002, the remnants of the
Taliban gradually began to regain their confidence. A U.S. and Canadian led operation
(supported by British and Dutch forces), Operation Mountain Thrust was launched in May 2006
to counter renewed Taliban insurgency.
Since January 2006, the NATO International Security Assistance Force undertook combat
duties from Operation Enduring Freedom in southern Afghanistan, the NATO force chiefly made
up of British, Canadian and Dutch forces (and some smaller contributions from Denmark,
Romania and Estonia and air support from Norway as well as air and artillery support from the
U.S.). The United States military also conducts military operations separate from NATO as part
of Operation Enduring Freedom in other parts of Afghanistan, in areas such as Kandahar,
Bagram, and Kabul (including Camp Eggers and Camp Phoenix.)
International support
The United States was supported by several nations during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
in Afghanistan in 2001–2003 and in subsequent coalition operations directly or indirectly in
support of OEF. See the article Afghanistan War order of battle for the current disposition of
coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Result
The U.S.-led coalition initially removed the Taliban from power and seriously crippled al-
Qaeda and associated militants in Afghanistan. However, success in quelling the Taliban
insurgency since the 2001 invasion has been mixed. Many believe] the Taliban cannot be
defeated as long as it has sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan and that Operation Enduring
Freedom has transformed into a continuing full-fledged war with no end in sight.
On 9 October 2004, Afghanistan elected Hamid Karzai president in its first direct elections. The
following year, Afghans conducted the Afghan parliamentary election, 2005 on 18 September.
Since the invasion, hundreds of schools and mosques have been constructed, millions of dollars
in aid have been distributed, and the occurrence of violence has been reduced.
While military forces interdict insurgents and assure security, Provincial reconstruction
teams are tasked with infrastructure building, such as constructing roads and bridges, assisting
during floods, and providing food and water to refugees. Many warlords have participated in an
allegiance program, recognizing the legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan, and
surrendering their soldiers and weapons; however, subsequent actions have led to questions
about their true loyalties.
The Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and Afghan Border Police are being trained
to assume the task of securing their nation.
On 31 December 2014, Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan concluded, and was
succeeded by Operation Freedom's Sentinel on 1 January 2015.

14. THE BONN PROCESS- WITHDRAWAL

The Bonn Agreement (officially the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan
Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions) was the initial series of
agreements passed on December 5, 2001 and intended to re-create the State
of Afghanistan following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in response to the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks. Since no nationally agreed-upon government had existed in Afghanistan
since 1979, it was felt necessary to have a transition period before a permanent government
was established. A nationally agreed-upon government would require at least one loya jirga to
be convened; however, in the absence of law and order in the wake of the rapid victory
of American and Afghan Northern Alliance forces, immediate steps were felt to be required.

Overview

In December 2001, 25 prominent Afghans met under UN auspices in Bonn, Germany, to decide
on a plan for governing the country (see list of signatories at International Conference on
Afghanistan, Bonn (2001)). By inviting warlords capable enough to disrupt the state building
process, a "big tent" strategy was enacted in order to incorporate, rather than alienate, these
non-state actors in Afghan state centralization. As a result, the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) -
made up of 30 members, headed by a chairman - was inaugurated on 22 December 2001 with
a six-month mandate to be followed by a two-year Transitional Authority' (TA), after which
elections are to be held.
One of the sections of the Bonn Agreement envisaged the establishment of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Resolution 1386 of the United Nations Security
Council subsequently established ISAF.
State building in Afghanistan

Following the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the Bonn Agreement laid the foundation for U.S. and
NATO-backed state-building efforts in Afghanistan. The agreement sought to establish a new
constitution, an independent judiciary, free and fair elections, a centralized security sector, and
the protection of rights of minorities, including women and religious and ethnic groups. This
model for state-building in Afghanistan was based on a ‘maximalist model of post-conflict
reconstruction’ that surfaced in the 1990s, following international interventions in the Balkans,
sub-Saharan Africa and East Timor.
The Bonn Agreement provided a framework for the later constitution that was established in
2004 and the presidential and parliamentary elections that followed. It emphasized the need for
strong, centralized government institutions and failed to account for the state’s cultural and
political history, as the country had previously relied on informal, regional power structures to
deliver security and services.
The state-building roadmap that was created by the Bonn Agreement was an inappropriate
model for the Afghan case, and later led to a range of issues, including government corruption
and incompetency. The subsequent failures of the Afghan state, including the inability to provide
basic security and social services, stemmed from the ‘overambitious reconstruction model’ that
was created by the Bonn Agreement, as well as practical challenges on the ground
Constitution of Afghanistan

Under the Bonn Agreement the Afghan Constitution Commission was established to draft a new
constitution in consultation with the public. The Bonn Agreement called for a loya jirga to be
convened within 18 months of the establishment of the Transitional Authority and for the use of
the 1964 constitution as the basis for a new constitution. The constitution had been adopted by
the loya Jirga on January 4, 2004.

The Bonn Agreement calls for a judicial commission to rebuild the justice system in accordance
with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law, and Afghan legal traditions.