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Political Science Q&A 2023

Topical Test - 17

POLITICAL SCIENCE
Time Allowed: 1:30 Hrs. Max. Marks: 100

1. Do you think that Bhutan’s foreign policy has evolved from being India centric to the country
becoming fulcrum between India and China? Give reasons for your answer.

2. SAARC is an organization with past and no future. Analyze.

3. Non-Aligned Movement was more realist than it looked and less idealist than it was thought
off. Evaluate the statement.

4. Does economic interdependence lead to better political accommodation amongst nations? Answer
the above question taking into consideration India’s relations with its South Asian neighbors.

5. Evaluate the role of WTO in making Covid Vaccine available in the third world countries.

6. India's relationship with Africa is often looked into from the prism of how the former has been
and will be beneficial for the later. Examine how Africa would cater to the needs of India in
different spheres.

7. Identify the drivers of India's interest in Latin America.

8. The advent of Taliban in Afghanistan must be a cause for India engaging more with that
country than before. Critically Evaluate.

9. Explain the role played by energy as an instrument of India’s foreign policy in South Asia.

10. Has military coup in Myanmar halted the progress made the two countries in India-Myanmar
relations during the regime of National League for Democracy? Analyse the future of relations
between the two countries.

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Remarks
 Political Science Q&A 2023
Topical Test - 17

POLITICAL SCIENCE
Ans
Answwer Hints
1. Do you think that Bhutan’s foreign policy has evolved from being India centric to the
country becoming fulcrum between India and China? Give reasons for your answer.
Approach:
• Introduction: Bhutan’s relations with India and China and Bhutan as a buffer state.
• Body: Traditionally Bhutan follows an Indo centric policy but changing dynamics is forcing it
to expand its reach to resolve order issue and balance the two Asian powers.
• Conclusion: India must deliver on its promises to keep Bhutan in its exclusive sphere of influence.
Hints:
Bhutan is a small landlocked country located between two of Asia’s biggest economies—India and
China. Bhutan has maintained a special relationship with India since the signing of the Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation in 1949. India views Bhutan as a “buffer” state against China’s aggression
and military adventures. With China it maintains a neutral relationship with no diplomatic ties.
India centric:
• The basis for bilateral relations between India and Bhutan was formed by the Indo-Bhutan Treaty
of Peace and Friendship of 1949. In 2007 the treaty was re-negotiated, and provisions were
included to encourage Bhutan’s sovereignty, abolishing the need to take India’s guidance on
foreign policy. Bhutan can import arms as long as Indian interests are not harmed.
• According to C. Raja Mohan: The new treaty put the relationship on a footing of mutual respect
and equality.
• Bhutan has been very sensitive to the interests of India and is seen to be in the hegemonic hold
of India.
• In 2013, India, in an unambiguous signal, abruptly cut subsidies on gas and kerosene sales right
before general elections. This was seen by Bhutan as a gesture by India for its overtures to China.
This has caused resentment within the government and also the people.
Changing dynamics and the role of China:
• From the 1990s, China came up with a “package deal”, where in return for the smaller disputed
Doklam area (close to the Chicken neck corridor in India) it was willing to give bigger territorial
concessions in other disputed areas. The Doklam standoff in 2017 is seen as China’s way to force
Bhutan to establish diplomatic ties and move away from India’s embrace.
• China had begun exporting farming and telecommunications equipment to Bhutan. Tourism
from China generates lot of income.
• There is a growing demand within Bhutan to establish diplomatic ties to solve the border issue
with China and move away from over dependence on India.
Views of Scholars:
• According to C. Raja Mohan has the democratic transition in Bhutan and its search for a larger
international profile and the intensifying overtures from Beijing make the warming of Sino-
Bhutanese ties inevitable.
• However, Harsh V Pant argues that Bhutan happens to be one of the few countries questioning
China’s regional ambitions by not establishing diplomatic ties and demarcating territorial borders
with the former.
Conclusion:
Bhutan still remains closely linked to India. India has consistently assisted Bhutan by funding its
hydroelectric power and major infrastructure projects, and providing it with subsidies, grants and
currency swaps. India also accounts for 90 percent of Bhutan’s imports and 77 percent of its exports,
following the Free Trade Agreement between the two countries. India also reassured Bhutan by
standing up to the 2017 Chinese aggression in Doklam. Bhutan has reciprocated by being sensitive to
the security needs of India by staying away from China. India must deliver on the pending hydroelectric
projects and ensure that the trade deficit is minimal so that Bhutan can justify continuing its India-
centric policy.
2. SAARC is an organization with past and no future. Analyze.
Approach:
• Introduction: SAARC and its mandate.
• Body: Issues that plague the progress: lack of mutual trust between India and Pak being the

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main. Views of scholar’s analysis the role of SAARC.
• Conclusion: Remains relevant as a political organization to defuse political tensions, may
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eventually help in bringing about regional intergartion.
Hints:
SAARC, South Asia’s prime regional forum, was established in 1985 with many expectations with
the idea to promote peace, harmony, and economic growth through the cooperation of South Asian
states, by sharing the available resources and to build trust among parties and also by facilitating
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collaboration and regular contact between leaders.

Issues plaguing the progress:
South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world with intra-regional trade teetering at
barely 5% of total South Asian trade, compared to 25% of intra-regional trade in the ASEAN region
despite the signing of the SAFTA in 2004. Many reckon the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) is dead and there is no point in flogging a dead horse. The issues plaguing the
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progress:
• One of the major hurdles in the way of cooperation among the SAARC members is the mistrust,
mutual security perceptions and hostility especially between India and Pakistan.
• The charter of SAARC itself has some self-imposed anomalies as its charter has the provision of
not discussing the contentious and bilateral disputes but asks for increased cooperation and
exchanges. The need for unanimity in decision making further exacerbates the situation because
of hostility between India and Pakistan.
• Cheque book diplomacy by China and concessional export terms offered by west to some SAARC
countries disincentivise regional integration.
• Power asymmetry between India and the SAARC countries prevents productive engagement.
Views of Scholars:
• SD Muni: Argues that SAARC can claim considerable success in conceptual evolution and laying
down of theoretical ground work, where a number of creative ideas to address the South Asia
challenges have been formulated. For example, The Group of the Eminent Persons’ Report; SAARC
Social Charter; two reports of the Plan of Action on Poverty Alleviation; the SAARC Regional
Convention on Suppression of Terrorism may be recalled here. However, he argues that SAARC’s
record however is still very unimpressive when it comes to translating the creative ideas and
energies so unleashed.

[2] Hints: Political Science

• Prabash Ranjan: India started investing in other regional instruments, such as BIMSTEC and
BBIN, both without Pakistan, as an alternative to SAARC. However, BIMSTEC cannot replace
SAARC for reasons such as lack of a common identity and history among all BIMSTEC members.
• C. Raja Mohan, a dysfunctional SAARC can hurt the idea of emergence of a cohesive South
Asian region.
• Suman Sharma in “India and SAARC” writes that most of the disputes in South Asia are Indo-
centric so India should adopt a low profile to get the confidence of its smaller neighbours. Deeper
regional economic integration will create greater interdependence with India acquiring the central
role, which, in turn, would serve India’s strategic interests too.
The Future of SAARC:
India’s drive to showcase its regional leadership, Pakistan’s compulsion to revive its diplomatic
standing, and other SAARC member states’ continued commitment to the grouping keep the possibility
of SAARC’s resurrection alive. The Indo-Pak rivalry has existed since the creation of the organization
and despite delays and stalemates, the two countries have kept coming back to SAARC to achieve
specific national interests. Despite its limitations in achieving economic integration and collective
security interest, SAARC served as a key political platform to melt the ice between Pakistan and
India in the past and bring all the South Asian countries on one platform. The fourth summit that

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brought an Indian leader to Pakistan after 28 years or the 18th summit that began with India-Pakistan
tensions but ended with the leaders of the two countries publicly shaking hands at the closing
ceremony. It remains to be seen whether the upcoming 20th summit turns into an opportunity for an
India-Pakistan dialogue but what is clear is that pronouncing the grouping dead is premature.
3. Non-Aligned Movement was more realist than it looked and less idealist than it was thought
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off. Evaluate the statement.
Approach:
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• Introduction: NAM as solution to avoid the power politics after WW-II.

• Body: Despite having idealist leanings, it served as a realist policy.
• Conclusion: Despite its limitations, it was a practical step during that era.
Hints:
India attained its Independence at a critical juncture in World History when the world was divided
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into two major, ideologically contrasting, power blocks-US and the Soviet Union after the culmination
of the Second World War in 1945. Rejecting reductionist Cold War binaries and prioritizing India’s
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strategic independence, nonalignment was the centrepiece of India’s foreign policy. Nonalignment
was not equivalent to ‘no alignment’ or simply staying equidistant from both power blocs, rather it
involved taking an active interest in international affairs and was clearly differentiated from passive
Swiss-style neutralism. According to Nehru, nonalignment involved “combining idealism with national
interest”; idealism is the realism of tomorrow. Realist scholar Stephen Krasner termed this modified
structuralism—the pursuit of both national and universal interests.
Alan Cassel’s asserts in his book Ideology and International Relations, “The non-alignment movement
as a whole did not live up to the moralistic precepts with which Nehru had tried to invest it. From
the start, some of its subscribers were unmistakably aligned with either the communist or eastern
bloc. Furthermore, the non-aligned movement always contained a faction less interested in reducing
international tension than in mobilizing the Third World against neocolonialism.”
NAM as a realist proposition:
Nonalignment is regularly viewed in postcolonial and normative terms connoting to a sense of Indian
‘civilizational exceptionalism.’ While one can certainly view the American and Soviet spheres of
influence as neocolonial structures, a more convincing reading of nonalignment would be as a rational,
realist reaction to a charged global order, especially given India’s limited economic and military capacity.
• In 1955, India went for increased economic ties with the USSR, to encourage “a little competition”
with the West and alter the perception of Indian dependence on Anglo-American economic

Hints: Political Science [3]

 schemes. This is a perfect reflection of the Indian policy mindset at the time—Nehru’s “soft
idealism” was as much about realpolitik as moralpolitik, enabling India to gain leverage with the
superpowers.
• The objective that Nehru had sought - an international voice for India, had borne out, but the
idealistic appeals that underpinned the non-alignment initiative remained rooted firmly in the
desire to ensure an international environment conducive to India’s own domestic interests.
• The Asian Zone of peace: Nehru’s ambition for an Asian “zone of peace” was essentially an
extension of nonalignment aimed at limiting the Cold War’s spread within the continent—once
again, not only for idealist reasons but also to protect Indian security.
• In facilitating India’s access to military aid, non-alignment was convenient; it allowed her to
freely source for military supplies from the Soviet Union and her allies in Eastern Europe (notably
from the Czechs). The additional obligations Pakistan had to bear, i.e., the Southeast Asian Treaty
Organization, and the CENTO in return for more US largesse made India’s selective and
conditional relationships permitted by non-alignment’s flexibility look far more sensible in
comparison.
• Besides military requirements, non-alignment helped India in its quest to procure the economic

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and technical aid to modernize India. Lacking a large pool of technical experts in this field, India
turned to foreign construction firms to build these dams. These massive projects: Rourkela in
Orissa (German), Durgapur in West Bengal (British) and Bhilai in Madhya Pradesh (Soviet),
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“temples of modern India”, were possible through collaboration. The United States too provided
India with agricultural aid in the form of drought-resistant, high yield seeds and chemical
fertilizers which raised Indian agricultural production.
Limitations of NAM:
• The Chinese aggression in 1962 and the inability of NAM to counter it either militarily or
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diplomatically exposed its limitations. As a result, India sought military aid from the US.
• The need for security at its land borders and the IOR led India to pursue a policy of selective
alignment with the great powers, balancing one against another to ensure its regional aims were
unhindered. For instance, India welcomed the simultaneous increase in American and Soviet
involvement in the IOR following the British navy’s withdrawal in 1968.
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• Peace, Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the USSR before the 1971 India-Pakistan War is
widely seen as a breach of nonalignment but given USAs of commitment to Pakistan, India was
arguably maintaining the subcontinental balance of power. The redefining of nonalignment was
taken one step further by readily recognizing the limits of NAM.
• While the most vigorous phase of Indian non-alignment diplomacy ended with Nehru, it continued
in a nuanced form ever since. India avoided taking sides and evolved to stance of non-alignment
2.0 which shows not only the growing confidence but also its deep desires for a peaceful world
devoid of power politics.
Conclusion:
Even though Nehruvian Non-Alignment was envisioned or was seen to be an idealist forum, it was
in reality an amalgamation of realism and idealism. India’s foreign policy stand on various events
that took place across the globe in a way reflect that non-Alignment was an opportunistic policy
wherein India acted according to the situation and in turn took the stand that satisfied its own vital
interest.
India’s policy of non-alignment was a stance adopted primarily in response to the pragmatic concerns
of the Indian leadership in a period of considerable international and domestic uncertainty. While
idealism undoubtedly had a role to play, it served India’s foreign policy interests while also
accommodating neatly the domestic requirements of a new state struggling to provide economic and
social development for its people.

[4] Hints: Political Science

4. Does economic interdependence lead to better political accommodation amongst nations?
Answer the above question taking into consideration India’s relations with its South Asian
neighbors.
Approach:
• Introduction: Status of trade in South Asia as compared to other regional blocs; despite existence
of framework, it is unable to realise the potential.
• Body: How economic interdependence benefits the region and also can help in political
accommodation.
• Conclusion: Fundamental issues need to addressed along with economic interdependence.
Hints:
South Asia comprises Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Afghanistan is the newest member of the regional bloc, having joined the SAARC in 2005. Despite
geographical proximity and the existence of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements (FTAs),
South Asia is one of the least economically integrated regions in the world. Owing to protectionist
policies, high logistics cost, lack of political will and a broader trust deficit, intra-regional trade in
South Asia remains well below its potential at 5% of the region’s global trade. The regional trade in

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South Asia is dismally low at 4 percent as compared with the regional trade of the European Union
at 67 percent, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) at 62 percent, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at 26%.
Several agreements are in place to facilitate trade in the region. The SAARC Preferential Trading
Arrangement (SAPTA) was signed in 1994, followed by the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA)
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agreement a decade later in 2004 (which came into force in 2006). India’s bilateral trade with Myanmar
is conducted under the 1994 Indo-Myanmar Border Trade Agreement as well as the 2009 ASEAN–
India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITGA). Additionally, India and Sri Lanka signed the Indo-Sri
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Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA) in 1998. The agreement came into force in 2000. Despite these
agreements, trade in the neighbourhood has remained far below its potential. This is exemplary of
the fact that agreements by themselves are not enough to facilitate trade unless the barriers to trade
are removed.
Incentives for increasing regional integration
• Increased bargaining power: With globalization, increasing insignificance of national boundaries
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and consequent increase in global governance regimes evolving through multilateral negotiations,
smaller states recognize that regional cooperation and integration will give them a greater voice
than isolated negotiations. EU, NAFTA are a case in point.
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• Trade Complementarities: Due to reliance on theory of self sufficiency, trade complementarities

never developed in the region. Vertical specialization would allow countries to reap economies
of scale by concentrating on a specific production process in the value addition chain. For instance,
one country can specialize in production of yarn while the other focuses on production of finished
garments. In the South Asian context, Bangladesh having a booming jute industry can concentrate
on production, while West Bengal (India) having processing mills could focus on production of
fabric. This would be an effective way to benefit from economies of scale and expand the
production base.
• Reduction of costs and benefits to consumers: Regional cooperation and integration will allow
the SAARC states to benefit from international investment, technology and trading opportunities.
All nations will gain from more efficient use of capital and labour, distribution of goods and
services across borders and increased FDI. There will be reduced prices for consumers due to
reduction in overhead costs such as transportation costs.
• Poverty Reduction: South Asia is home to 40% of the world’s poor, with 29.5% of its population
living on less than $1 a day. While almost a quarter of the world’s population lives in the region,
South Asia accounts for only 3% of global gross domestic product (GDP), 1.9% of world exports,
and 1.7% of world foreign direct investment (FDI). Increasing regional trade will contribute

Hints: Political Science [5]

 towards creating opportunities in these countries. Increased growth rate would reduce poverty
and improve standard of living.
Economics and Politics:
• Economic factors are increasingly determining political relationships. The EU, ASEAN and other
trading blocs are examples of how conflicts and national boundaries are being dispelled in favour
of increased economic benefits and opportunities.
• Robust economic interdependence makes countries to cooperate even if they have other differences.
The US and China despite their difference accommodate each other as they are economically
interlinked.
• Peace Dividend: A serious commitment to integration, even if encouraged by economic incentives,
is more likely to create a forum for peaceful resolutions of disputes than any of the isolated
efforts have so far. In the context of India and Pakistan, SAARC Summits have been the most
critical forums to deliberate bilateral issues and achieve the limited progress so far. The 1986
SAARC Summit also helped improve the relationship between India and Sri Lanka. This is in
fact the reason why member states have always protected the SAARC institution, despite its
overall ineffectiveness.

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• Former PM Manmohan Singh believed that increase in trade with Pakistan will help in improving
the political situation. But this approach did not give optimum results. With other countries like
Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka economic integration has to some extent allowed for political
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accommodation from both sides. But South Asia is yet to see the gains achieved by other regional
bodies like EU and ASEAN.
Conclusion:
While economic interdependence can lead to political accommodation, the fundamental issues of
lack of trust, asymmetry in power and size of economy, and perceived gains from trade with extra-
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regional powers like US, China hamper the prospects for effective integration. The BIMSTEC forum,
the BBIN, the SASEC seek to leverage the benefits of economic interdependence by avoiding the
potentially contentious issues. Rajiv Bhatia, former ambassador says that: South Asian nations have
to realise the importance of promoting regional cooperation in South Asia and the need to give
primacy to economic development, growth, poverty reduction and push political issues and problems
to the background. It realizes that holding on to historic differences could cost it a place in the global
economy given the increased competition, the current world economic environment and protectionist
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tendencies of other regions.

Supplementary Information:
Barriers for greater economic interdependence:
• South Asia is perennially plagued with multiple intra region and intra state conflicts either on
basis of geographic boundaries or narrow considerations of religion, caste, language or ethnicity.
• In the late 1940s, trade between both nations as part of one political entity (i.e. British India) was
sizeable. Even in 1947, when Pakistan (Pakistan then included Bangladesh) and India became
independent, more than half of Pakistan’s imports came from India and nearly two-thirds of its
exports went to India. However, with growing disputes over security and territory, the trade
between them declined. As the two largest nations in South Asia, the relationship between these
two nations impacts the entire region.
• The economic policy of South Asian nations was based on the goal of self-sufficiency through
import substitution. Increased trade within the region has been perceived as increasing dominance
and dependence on India rather than as access to the large markets of India and Pakistan.
Smaller states like Nepal and Bangladesh chose to import from suppliers outside of the region
even at higher costs and showed considerable reluctance to accept Indian investments. Despite
Nepal’s potential hydropower capacity being greater than [70,000] MW and a continuing increase
in India’s demands, only 1% of this capacity has been developed by the two nations. Sri Lanka
imports railway coaches from Romania when better-quality coaches are available at a much

[6] Hints: Political Science

 cheaper price in India (in the state of Tamil Nadu). Similarly, in cement and ship building, Sri
Lanka can stand to gain by trading with Pakistan and India rather than South Korea. Pakistan
in particular always aimed at diminishing its historical links with India and reducing any form
of interdependence13. Over the years, increasing trade links with India has been subject to tough
resistance from industry members and other hardliners. As discussed later in this paper, this
position is slowly changing.
• Lack of comparative advantage South Asian countries trade little with each other but trade
much with other nations of the world particularly with North America and Europe. The
composition of each South Asian country’s exports to these regions is almost similar. Textile,
readymade garments, leather, agricultural products constitute a chunk of the export items while
petroleum and capital-intensive goods are mostly imported. Consequently, trade between South
Asian countries is likely to be more competitive rather than complementary. All the countries are
rich is labor but strapped for cash. No one country has a significant comparative advantage over
the other for specific items. India’s economic prevalence and comparative advantage in a wide
range of products has resulted in asymmetric trade relations with her neighbors. Further, until a
few years back all countries were pursuing import substitution policies, which never allowed
development of a particular area of expertise in the production chains.
• There is extreme asymmetry of power balance among the South Asian countries. While India

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accounts for 75% of SAARC ‘s population and about 80% of GDP, the second and third largest
member states account for only about 10% and 7% respectively16 . India also has tremendous
military power compared to all other SAARC members. This power asymmetry forms the basis
of all apprehensions regarding increased integration of other (than India) South Asian countries.
Another related factor is the geographical dependency of member states on India. India shares
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borders with all member states (except Afghanistan and the Maldives). Except Pakistan, no other
member state shares a border with any country other than India. Nepal and Bhutan are land-
locked and depend on India for transit to the outside world. Bangladesh has direct access to
international seas from one side but is surrounded by India on all other sides. Bangladesh which
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was formerly part of eastern colonial India continues to remain dependant on the western Bengal
which continues to be part of India.
Views of C Raja Mohan:
South Asian nations have wallowed in poverty for so long and marketed it abroad for aid that they
find it hard to conceive of shared prosperity through greater economic integration. Breaking out of
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this cycle is possible if South Asian states move to depoliticise issues of economic co-operation and
build habits of collective security.
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Promoting regional integration in South Asia entails efforts in key areas such as infrastructure, trade
facilitation, investment, governance and implementation. The most critical element of the integration
process in South Asia is building confidence and filling the huge trust deficit between the countries.
Economic interests (i.e. the potential of increasing trade and investment) and strategic interests (i.e.
better positioning to have a say in global governance) have the potential of uniting South Asian
countries, side-lining political differences to pursue regional integration. With increased political will
and commitment towards integration, greater efforts will have to be made towards integration. In
this respect, India will have to take on disproportionately greater responsibility while the other South
Asian countries will have to commit to cooperation and openness. SAARC needs to be reinforced
and be a professionally staffed institution. Like the ASEAN, SAARC needs to assume a central role in
creating conditions for deeper integration by promoting investment, trade, transparency, harmonizing
standards and simplifying procedures through a multilateral process. Additionally, measures of soft
diplomacy should be adequately utilized to mould public opinion, bring South Asians closer and
create an understanding of the value of increasing regional integration and cooperation. Agreements
such as the SAFTA need to be made more meaningful with appropriate emphasis on non-tariff barriers
and strict timelines for tariff reduction. Ideas such as focusing on priority industries to build
complementarities need to be explored. The changing dynamics in region and the world economic
order make this an opportune time for South Asian countries to change their approaches and strategies
towards each other.

Hints: Political Science [7]

5. Evaluate the role of WTO in making Covid Vaccine available in the third world countries.
Approach:
• Introduction: TRIPS as the mechanism of WTO which governs IP rights.
• Body: The deterrents to Waiver and the two-year protracted discussions that led to WTO waiver.
• Conclusion: Need for reforms to WTO to prevent IP blocking access to medical products during
unprecedented situations in future.
Hints:
The TRIPS (trade related intellectual property rights) of the WTO governs the intellectual property
rights in trade and applies to the Covid vaccines that have been developed mostly by the developed
countries. While the developed countries have vaccine supply in abundance many developing countries
don’t have access to the Covid vaccine. In this regard, in October 2020, India and South Africa had
asked the WTO to waive certain conditions of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement that could impede timely access to affordable vaccines and medical products
to the developing countries to combat Covid-19.
Deterrents for Waiver:

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• Big Pharma like Pfizer and AstraZeneca had opposed the proposed waiver — saying eliminating
IP protections would undermine public confidence in vaccine safety and create a barrier to
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information sharing.
• Bill Gates of Bill and Melinda Gates foundation: His justification for not sharing vaccine tech
with developing countries is “that it would not be feasible for a company to move vaccines to a
developing nation”.
• Both these arguments are unsubstantiated and were severely condemned.
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Patent Waiver:
Nearly two years after it was initiated by India and South Africa, a proposal to waive patents on
Covid-19 vaccines has been approved by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) at the 12th Ministerial
in June 2022.
Analysis:
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• The current agreement is a watered-down version of the original proposal made by India and
South Africa in 2020. They had wanted broader intellectual property waivers on vaccines,
treatments and tests.
• The question, however, is: Will patent waiver, at the current stage of the pandemic, make a
meaningful impact in the battle against the virus?
• Despite the delay of two years, the WTO waiver is seen as a “progressive” step. The vaccines
currently in use provide protection against the more severe forms of Covid. But it’s also clear
that these shots do not always guard against infection. The virus continues to pose new questions
— the lingering after-effects of the disease in large numbers of Covid patients, for instance —
even though it appears to have become less virulent.
• Information flows must, therefore, be geared towards developing second-generation preventives
and therapeutics. Easing intellectual property restrictions should be seen as the first step in this
endeavour.
• WTO negotiations are Text-based negotiations involve negotiators exchanging texts with their
preferred wording and then thrashing out a consensus on the working — a fairly long-drawn
affair.
• As decisions in WTO are taken by consensus (a single member can veto the proposal) the waiver
came two years late.

[8] Hints: Political Science

Conclusion:
Waiver of IP rights will not amount to anything substantial if pharma companies in the Third World
do not have the know-how to produce medicines and vaccines. One hopes that the revised proposal
can build on the positives with regards to the waiver of patents, and that there is a consensus among
all WTO states on vaccine equity. The global community needs to understand that in an interdependent
world order, the actions of one country can create a ripple effect, negative or positive, on others. The
virus will eventually be defeated but done collectively, the victory can come about faster, be long-
lasting and help save millions of lives. The WTO must play a proactive role and develop protocols so
that there is no delay in giving the waivers when pandemics of unprecedented nature like Covid
happens.
6. India's relationship with Africa is often looked into from the prism of how the former has
been and will be beneficial for the later. Examine how Africa would cater to the needs of
India in different spheres.
Approach:
• Introduction: The evolution of India-Africa relations as equal and collaborative partners.
• Body: How India was beneficial to Africa and how Africa is equally important for India in
spheres of trade, security, energy and global diplomacy.

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• Conclusion: India needs to deliver on its promise to truly exploit the potential of this relationship.
Hints:
From the days of common struggle against colonialism to an evolving and multifaceted 21st century
partnership under the framework of South-South Cooperation, the Africa-India partnership has come
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a long way. The story of India and Africa’s partnership embodies an equal, consultative, and
collaborative relationship. The COVID-19 pandemic also strengthened the existing developmental
partnership, guided by the ‘Kampala Principles’—a set of 10 principles enunciated by Prime Minister
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Narendra Modi in 2019 during his address to the Ugandan Parliament.

How India has been beneficial to Africa:
• In 1964, India launched the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme to
provide technical assistance through human resource development, with African countries the
greatest beneficiaries of it.
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• India’s economic engagement with Africa began intensifying in the early 2000s. India’s total
trade with Africa grew from US$ 6.8 billion in 2003 to US$ 76.9 billion in 2018, and India is
now Africa’s third-largest trade partner. Indian is currently the seventh-largest investor in Africa.
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• 80 percent of India’s peacekeepers are presently serving in Africa and 70 percent of all casualties
have been sustained there. Clearly, UN missions serve as the bedrock of India’s military engagement
and assistance to Africa.
• So far, India has sanctioned 182 LoC (Lines of Credit) projects in Africa through the Export
Import (EXIM) Bank of India, with a total credit commitment of about US$ 10.5 billion. Indian
LoCs have significant development impacts in Africa. For instance, India’s irrigation project in
Senegal led to a six-fold increase in rice production.
• the Pan African e-Network (PAeN) project on tele-education and tele-medicine, operational in
48 African countries, Indian universities and specialist hospitals are connected to educational
and hospital centres in African countries through seamless and integrated satellite and fibre
optics network.
• India has already earmarked concessional LOCs worth US$2 billion for solar projects under the
International Solar Alliance.
• At the third India-Africa Forum Summit in 2015, India pledged to provide 50,000 scholarships
to African students over a five-year period and set up institutions of higher learning in Africa.
Over 42,000 scholarship slots have already been utilised in the last five years.

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• Under the ‘Vaccine Maitri’ initiative, we have supplied 24.7 million doses of Made in India
COVID vaccines as grants, and commercial and COVAX supplies to 42 countries in Africa.
• Harsh Pant: Unlike China’s efforts, Indian project construction and financing in Africa is aimed
at facilitating community participation and development. Indian firms rely more on African
talent, and India being a democracy has a clear edge.
How Africa caters to India in various spheres:
• According to former ambassador, Rajiv Bhatia, the significance of Africa’s rich mineral resources,
geo-strategic locations of significant regions such as the Horn of Africa or southern Africa makes
it very important to India.
• India considers African countries, especially those with coasts on the Indian Ocean, to be a
critical part of its Indo-Pacific strategy. India’s decision to ‘jointly develop’ naval facilities in
Assumption and Agalega Island, off the coast of Seychelles and Mauritius respectively, has helped
to increase the Indian Navy’s presence in the Indian Ocean.
• To ensure energy security, India has invested in oil-rich states such as Sudan, Nigeria and Angola.
• Africa’s support is crucial for India to get a permanent seat at the UNSC.

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• India and Africa have often held common positions in global platforms and worked together to
guard the interests of other developing countries. The Agricultural Framework Proposal and
Protection of Geographical Indications, at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and World
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Intellectual Property Organisation, and have worked towards protecting the food and livelihood
concerns of farmers at the Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations are examples of this.
• Countries in Africa have taken major strides towards economic integration through initiatives
such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). When in force, AfCFTA will raise
intra-Africa trade levels by 52% and create one of the largest and most ambitious economic
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spaces in the world. India wants to be a part of that exciting space. (Former Foreign Secretary
Harsh Shringla)
Conclusion:
According to Rani D Mullen, New Delhi will need to start delivering on the ground if the India-
Africa partnership has to move beyond high level visits. The declaration of the Ten Guiding Principles
for India-Africa engagement is a welcome step in creating a concrete framework for India’s relations
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with Africa. India should set out to develop an Action Plan for each of the principles. Along with
that India must also address the academic and living experience of African students in India to truly
exploit the synergies of Indo-African friendship.
7. Identify the drivers of India's interest in Latin America.
Approach:
• Introduction: Despite the geographical distance both have a shared post-colonial history and
bourgeoning trade.
• Body: The focus areas for India: Energy, Minerals and export of vehicles; challenges for India.
• Conclusion: Latin America is open to engaging with India for strategic and business interests
and India must capitalize it.
Hints:
Latin America remains to be the last frontier of India’s foreign policy for India for the last several
decades. Absent strong ties in geography, what India and South America have instead is a shared
post-colonial history. Traditionally, India’s engagement with Latin American countries has been guided
by its role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) apart from being facilitated by the ‘Global South’,
which still has some resonance in Latin America. Today, it is not only economics that creates the
rationale for strong bilateral ties between India and South America; there is also India’s desire to
diversify energy sources, and a growing Chinese influence in the region. According to Harsh Pant,

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despite a highly energetic outreach to the rest of the world, and even under PM Modi—whose foreign-
relations strategies are widely regarded as driven and ambitious—India still relegates Latin America
to the backwater of diplomacy.
Drivers of India’s interests in Latin America:
The main drivers of the relationship have been official patronage and private enterprise.
• Official patronage has promoted a strategic partnership with Brazil (BRICS, IBSA); a privileged
partnership with Mexico; trade negotiations with MERCOSUR, Chile, Peru; observer status in
the Pacific Alliance; investments in energy (ONGC in Mexico), mainly hydrocarbons; and a variety
of agreements for collaboration in agriculture, science and technology, commerce, etc.
• Latin America remains an important part of emerging markets globally, with a steady and rising
middle class. As a result, the region is the preferred export destination for India’s value-added,
consumer products and inputs such as cars, motorcycles, pharmaceuticals, and chemical products.
• Many Indian companies in these sectors hold considerable market share in Latin America, and
depend on the region for a healthy share of their global revenue. For instance, United Phosphorus
Limited (UPL), an Indian agrochemical company, gets more revenue from Brazil than it does
from India, while Bajaj is the market leader in Colombia and most of Central America.

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• Latin America contributes to India’s strategic energy and food security by supplying 12% of
India’s global imports of $117 billion dollars of crude and 22% of India’s vegetable oil. Apart
from minerals like copper, silver and gold.
• The region has abundant reserves and the potential to meet India’s needs of lithium (for electric
vehicles) and pulses in the long term.
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• Ambassador (retired) R. Viswanathan, a Latin America expert: Even with longer shipping times
and more expensive freight costs, Indian exports to Latin America outstrip what we ship to
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South East Asia and the Central Asian Republics.

Challenges
• India’s lack of uniform approach towards the region is one of the major challenges. India has
good relations with countries like Brazil, Mexico, Chile but other countries lag behind.
• Rivalries between countries like Brazil and Argentina for regional dominance is also affecting
India’s relations with the region. For instance, while India and Brazil are part of the G4 seeking
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the UNSC membership, Argentina is part of the coffee club (Uniting for consensus movement in
opposition to the possible expansion of Security Council).
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• India’s presence in Latin America is dwarfed by China’s. India’s annual trade of US$30 billion
to US$50 billion with Latin America is a mere shadow of China’s US$400 billion. Chinese
investments in the region, estimated to be roughly US$159 billion, and their loans of US$136
billion (India gave less than $300 mn as lines of credit)
• One major difference separates New Delhi’s and Beijing’s approach to Latin America: China has
for two decades formulated and updated its Latin America policy through official white papers
and special envoys, while India has no official policy for Latin America, a region resigned to the
last of India’s three concentric circles of foreign policy.
Conclusion:
While India’s interest in Latin America is relatively new, the relationship has been on an upward
trajectory. Latin American countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Panama, and Argentina are seeking
cooperation with India in new sectors such as space, science and technology, and defence—this
represents a positive dynamic from New Delhi’s viewpoint. Disenchanted with the protectionist US
and Europe, and determined to reduce its over dependence on China, Latin Americans see India as
a large and growing market as well as a benign economic partner for win-win in the long term. A
dedicated foreign policy vision towards Latin America is expected from the new government, apart
from marshalling more resources towards expanding its diplomatic footprint in the region.

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8. The advent of Taliban in Afghanistan must be a cause for India engaging more with that
country than before. Critically Evaluate.
Approach:
• Introduction: India and Afghan share civilizational relations; India has immense good will.
• Body: Bilateral relations impacted by Taliban regimes; need for Indian to recalibrate.
• Conclusion: Realpolitik and pragmatism should guide India’s engagement with Taliban led
Afghan.
Hints:
India and Afghanistan share a historical and civilisational relationship. The ties go back to 1950,
when a ‘Treaty of Friendship’ gave a concrete political shape to their civilizational relationship. India
views Afghanistan as vital to its security and as a link to Central Asia. Our longstanding links with
Afghan society and our development partnership including humanitarian assistance for the people
of Afghanistan form the bedrock of relationship.
India-Afghan relations 2001-2021:
During the last two decades which followed the ouster of the Taliban from power by the US forces at

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the end of 2001 India focused on strengthening bilateral ties with Afghanistan. India has been one of
the biggest contributors towards global efforts at reconstructing Afghanistan. About $3bn has been
spent by India in Afghanistan. Over the last two decades, India’s development partnership with
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Afghanistan has had four fundamental elements: a) humanitarian assistance; b) infrastructural projects;
c) small and community-based development projects; and d) capacity-building programmes.
• The Parliament building, the Salma Dam, the Zarang-Delarum highway, Gandhi Children’s
Hospital in Kabul, the Habibia High School are but a few examples where Indian assistance
produced substantive results for the Afghan people on the ground.
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• India’s assistance to Afghanistan has been mainly non-interventionist, unlike its western
counterparts and not playing overtly political role. Over the last two decades, India’s stakes in
Afghanistan have gone up.
Relations after Taliban takeover:
In 2021 the Taliban took over Afghanistan as the U.S. completed its botched withdrawal from the
country ending a 20-year occupation. This new geopolitical reality raises questions on how India
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should deal with the Taliban, while arguments both for and against Taliban rapprochement. On one
side, some foreign policy experts have argued that Taliban rapprochement will destroy a central
pillar of India’s foreign and security policy, the dismantling of the region’s “terrorist infrastructure”,
voicing the concerns over Afghanistan becoming a hot spot for terrorist and extremist groups. On the
other hand, realists argue that India needs to engage with the Taliban, otherwise this geopolitical
vacuum will create space for counties like China to increase their footprint and influence.
Views of scholars:
Former Ambassador to Afghanistan, Rakesh Sood It is imperative for India to pivot away from its
policy of calculated indifference, and embrace strategic engagement. It is in India’s, and the region’s
interests at large, to have a seat at the table over Afghanistan’s future. None of this, however, should
require India to commit to ideologically entrenched and anachronistic positions that jeopardise its
own interests.
Sushant Sareen of ORF: Taking advantage of its goodwill established over the years with key
stakeholders in the Middle East – e.g. Iran and Russia, India can step up to a greater role. It is equally
vital that India places Afghan interests as paramount and more substantial than these competing
stakeholders’ – if not out of moralistic commitments, then out of the realpolitik considerations that an
autonomous Afghanistan is a prerequisite for peace in Indian neighborhood.
Present:
• India, which has long assumed an anti-Taliban posture, was a supporter of the Northern Alliance,
the leading resistance group during the previous Taliban regime. With the Taliban showing interest

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 in engaging with India, New Delhi has deployed its diplomatic team in Kabul to review and
restart basic consular diplomacy and revive people-to-people ties.
• India also supplied wheat, medicines, winter clothing and Covid-19 vaccines to Afghanistan.
Delivery of humanitarian assistance made India one of the most visible actors in Afghanistan
having the good will among the people.
Conclusion:
The Taliban, for its part, is also recognising that there is no getting away from India’s regional and
global clout. This creates opportunity for India to reset the terms of engagement with the Taliban on
its own terms. History tells us that here are never any full stops in Afghanistan and, therefore, there
is no reason why India should put any full stops in the path of its policy in Afghanistan. Pragmatism
combined with some hard-nosed moves is the way to not just get back in the game, but also guide its
course to the extent possible.
Supplementary Information:
Views of Sushant Sareen of Observer Research Foundation: The Indian policy should incorporate all
three options: Engage, Isolate and Oppose- with some differences. While there is a case for India to
engage with the Taliban, India must simultaneously reach out to its old friends, most of who are in
exile. As a country that is rooting for stability in Afghanistan and is pushing for an inclusive

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government, India can use its contacts with the exiles to push for reconciliation.
Even as India engages the Taliban, it must simultaneously isolate the Taliban, and not break ranks
with the rest of the international community. Keeping the Taliban isolated and under the pressure of
international sanctions is something India should support.
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The last prong of India’s approach has to be to oppose the Taliban, not just diplomatically and
politically, but also by covertly supporting anti-Taliban forces. After all, the Taliban are doing the
same by fraternising with organisations like Jaish-e-Mohammed and al-Qaeda. If anything, this can
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be India’s carrot-and-stick approach with the Taliban.

After all, the incongruity of taking a hard stance against Islamist terror groups operating against
India and at the same time doing business with the Taliban was quite glaring. However, then
diplomacy is often about holding your nose and dealing with people you despise.
9. Explain the role played by energy as an instrument of India’s foreign policy in South Asia.
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Approach:
• Introduction: South Asia is energy deficient; Nepal and Bhutan have huge hydropower potential.
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• Body: Analysis of energy co-operation between India and its neighbors.

• Conclusion: Energy is a crucial concept which can lead to collective prosperity and also pave
way for regional integration.
Hints:
South Asia as region with strong economic growth has led to increase in the consumption of energy
and thus increase in the demand for energy. Recent studies on energy requirements in South Asia
reveal that India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan have energy demand surpassing
their domestic supply, while Bhutan and Nepal have energy resources, hydropower in particular, far
in excess of their domestic needs that can be traded within the region.
Energy has become an important instrument in India’s foreign policy tool kit is based on recognition
that regional energy cooperation is crucial for mutually beneficial relations rather than one way
trade of energy that India experiences with west Asian countries.
Bhutan
• India and Bhutan signed one of the first hydropower cooperation pacts, in 1961, to harness
electricity from the transboundary Jaldhaka river. Since then, energy cooperation has been growing
strong with consequent, Chukha hydropower project.

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• EAM Jaishankar has remarked that the hydro power sector has been the most visible symbol of
the mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation between India and Bhutan
• Besides helping Bhutan in generation of hydroelectricity, India is also its largest importer of
electricity but one of the concerns is growing hydropower debt.
• India and Bhutan took a major step forward for the construction of the 600 MW Kholongchhu
project, their first hydropower joint venture project, it is the first time an India-Bhutan hydropower
project will be constructed as a 50:50 joint venture, not as a government-to-government
agreement.
Nepal
• India Nepal energy relations are based on a long-term approach in joint development of
hydropower. Arun-III hydro power project is one.
• The two countries trade power under the Nepal-India Agreement on Electric Power Trade, which
was finalised in 2014
Sri Lanka
• India and Sri Lanka signed an MoU to set up hybrid solar and wind farm in the three islands off

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Jaffna.
Bangladesh
•
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Deepening of cooperation in the area of power and energy connectivity includes projects such as
India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline, and Maitree Super Thermal Power Project.
• Former Foreign Secretary Shringla said the IBFPP is a “very unique and significant pipeline that
enable us to integrate our energy requirements”.
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• India and Bangladesh have also inked the Framework of Understanding (FOU) on Cooperation
in the Hydrocarbon Sector. This is expected to further enhance energy linkages by streamlining
investments, promoting hydrocarbon connectivity, technology transfer, joint studies, and training.
Pakistan
The two proposed pipelines under discussion are the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline and the
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Turkmenistan-Afghanistan- Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline. However, both projects face a number of

issues because of hostile relations between Pakistan and India.
Maldives: India and Maldives plan to set up a transmission interconnection for transfer of renewable
power between the two countries as part of One Sun, One World & One Grid initiative.
Conclusion:
Recently, there is talk about multilateral cooperation in power sector, which talks about expanding
cooperation in power sector to include partner countries like BBIN. Energy connectivity and trade
will form the basic pillar of regional economic integration which will pave the way for shared economic
prosperity and development.
10. Has military coup in Myanmar halted the progress made the two countries in India-
Myanmar relations during the regime of National League for Democracy? Analyse the
future of relations between the two countries.
Approach:
• Introduction: India-Myanmar have shared values and Myanmar is critical for security and
connectivity.
• Body: The progress made before the coup and the implications for India after the coup.
• Conclusion: India must adopt a pragmatic strategy which suits its national interest.

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Hints:
The friendship between India and Myanmar is age-old as they share strong historical, cultural, religious
and trade ties. Myanmar is one of the strategic neighbours of India and shares a 1,640-km border
with a number of north-eastern states. It is key pillar of India’s act east and neighbourhood first
policy. Myanmar’s importance lies in its geo-strategic location at the tri-junction of east, South-east
and South Asia. It is said that India-Myanmar relations have blossomed with the five Bs – Buddhism,
Business, Bollywood, Bharatnatyam and Burma teak.
The transition away from full military rule starting in 2011 spurred hopes of democratic reforms
after long fought battle for democracy. But the military-maintained control over much of the
government by retaining seats in the parliament and the executive. The ruling government which
won a landslide victory again in 2020 was overthrown in 2021 by a military coup. This coup in
Myanmar ended a decade-long experiment with hybrid democracy. Prior to the military coup India
supported democratic reforms in Myanmar, but it has never been in the business of exporting
democracy.
Progress made during NLD
• India under its MoU signed in 2012, India grants $5 million every year. India has been building
roads and bridges, schools, and healthcare centres in Myanmar under the India-Myanmar Border

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Area Development Programme.
• India, Myanmar conduct joint operation to destroy militant camps in Northeast such as
“Operation Sunrise” along the Indo-Myanmar border.
• Various regional connectivity projects such as India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway and
Kaladan Project has picked up pace.
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• Moreover, India has decided to provide debt service relief under the G-20 Debt Service Suspension
Initiative to help Myanmar lower the negative impacts of Covid-19.
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• Myanmar was gifted a submarine by India in 2020.

• Many Indian companies made significant economic and trade agreements in infrastructure and
other areas. such as Essar, GAIL, and ONGC Videsh Ltd. have invested in Myanmar’s energy
sector.
Since military coup
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India’s Stand:
• Myanmar coup has left India in a tight spot.
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• India in support of “the restoration of democracy in Myanmar” and condemning “any use of
violence” in the country and at the same time taken several actions to foster friendly relations
with the new military junta.
• Rajiv Bhatia commented that for India, the well-established two-track policy of supporting
democracy and maintaining cordial relations with the Government is guided by realism and
pragmatism. This policy has to discourage a mass influx of refugees; cut the capability of insurgent
groups to endanger security in the Northeast from Myanmar soil; safeguard the ongoing projects
and investments; and, above all, counter China’s growing influence.
• This stand by India is reflected in short visit to Myanmar (December 2021) by India’s Foreign
Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla clearly-etched mandate: to deepen cooperation and followed
India’s calibrated middle-path position as described by Rajiv Bhatia
• On the other hand, Harsh V Pant has argued that India as the only major democratic country
bordering Myanmar, should insist on demonstrable progress on the road to democratic transition.
At the same time, he argued that marginalising the army will only push it into China’s arms.
Ever since the coup, China’s economic grip over Myanmar has only become tighter with a special
focus on projects critical for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.

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Conclusion:
India has economic interests in maintaining cordial relations with Myanmar’s military. Myanmar has
natural resources, including natural gas, petroleum, and rare earth metals, that would be useful for
India’s high-tech industry. The restoration of a stable central government in Myanmar is also vital for
the completion of India’s Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project (which runs through the
Myanmar states of Chin and Rakhine) and the Trilateral Highway Project. In international relations,
black and white binaries never really work. The complexity of India’s regional security and
neighbourhood demands that India adopt a more nuanced position on Myanmar.

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