The Epistemic Value of Understanding

Author(s): Henk W. de Regt

Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 76, No. 5 (December 2009), pp. 585-597
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science
Association
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 The Epistemic Value of Understanding
Henk W. de Regt†‡

This article analyzes the epistemic value of understanding and offers an account of
the role of understanding in science. First, I discuss the objectivist view of the relation
between explanation and understanding, defended by Carl Hempel and J. D. Trout. I
challenge this view by arguing that pragmatic aspects of explanation are crucial for
achieving the epistemic aims of science. Subsequently, I present an analysis of these
pragmatic aspects in terms of ‘intelligibility’ and a contextual account of scientific
understanding based on this notion.

1. Introduction. Traditionally, philosophers of science have denied that

understanding is among the epistemic aims of science, or that it is epi-
stemically relevant is some other way. In this article I will argue against
this view and defend the epistemic value of understanding. In Section 2,
I discuss the traditional objectivist view of the relation between expla-
nation and understanding, as defended by Carl Hempel and J. D. Trout.
In Section 3, I challenge this view by arguing that pragmatic aspects of
explanation (in particular the role of skills and judgment) are crucial for
achieving the epistemic aims of science. Section 4 presents an analysis of
these pragmatic aspects in terms of ‘intelligibility’ and a contextual ac-
count of scientific understanding based on this notion.

2. Explanation and Understanding: The Objectivist View. It is often sug-

gested that scientific explanations provide us with understanding of the
world. However, while scientific explanation has been a legitimate topic
for philosophers of science since the publication of Hempel and Oppen-
heim’s 1948 article on deductive-nomological explanation, the notion of
understanding has remained outside the focus of philosophical attention
until recently. The reason was that logical empiricists drew a sharp dis-
tinction between explanation and understanding, emphasizing that only

†To contact the author, please write to: Faculty of Philosophy, VU University Amsterdam,
De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands; e-mail: [email protected].
‡I thank Hans Radder for comments on an earlier version of this article.
Philosophy of Science, 76 (December 2009) pp. 585–597. 0031-8248/2009/7605-0008$10.00
Copyright 2009 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

585

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586 HENK W. DE REGT

the former is of philosophical interest. Hempel (1965, 425–426) presented

the following argument for this thesis. Notions such as understanding
and intelligibility are pragmatic because “their use requires reference to
the persons involved in the process of explaining,” and, consequently, they
are relative: an explanation may be intelligible to one person and unin-
telligible to another. By contrast, the hallmark of scientific knowledge is
(at least on Hempel’s view) its objective nature, and philosophers of sci-
ence should therefore try to give an objectivist account of science, and of
scientific explanation in particular. Accordingly, they should ignore prag-
matic aspects such as understanding and intelligibility. Such aspects may
be of interest to those who study the phenomenon of science empirically
(e.g., historians, sociologists, psychologists), but they are irrelevant to the
philosophy of science, or so Hempel argued. To be sure, Hempel was right
that the notion of understanding is pragmatic in the sense that it is con-
cerned with a three-term relation between the explanation, the phenom-
enon, and the person who uses the explanation to achieve understanding
of the phenomenon. One can use the term ‘understanding’ only with—
implicit or explicit—reference to human agents: scientist S understands
phenomenon P by means of explanation E. That understanding is prag-
matic in this sense implies that scientist S1 may understand P while S2
does not, even if they both possess E (the difference in understanding
being due to individual differences between S1 and S2 or between the
respective contexts in which they operate). However, as I will argue below,
Hempel was wrong when he concluded that for this reason understanding
is a philosophically irrelevant notion.
Today, the Hempelian view that understanding should be banned from
philosophical discourse is defended by J. D. Trout (2002, 2007). According
to Trout (2002, 217), philosophical analyses of scientific explanation
should be objectivist for the following reason: “What makes an expla-
nation good concerns a property that it has independent of the psychology
of the explainers; it concerns features of external objects, independent of
particular minds.” Therefore, Trout claims, philosophers of science should
eschew allegedly subjective notions such as intelligibility and understand-
ing. The latter are epistemically irrelevant if not dangerous (because ex-
perimental research in cognitive psychology shows that feelings of un-
derstanding are subject to the overconfidence bias and the hindsight bias
and are therefore typically misguided; see Trout 2002, 223–229). Trout
criticizes philosophers such as Michael Friedman and Wesley Salmon for
(unwittingly) relating explanatory power to a subjective sense of under-
standing. According to Trout, we should not try to justify our theories
of explanation by referring to alleged understanding-providing features.
The fact that a particular explanation of a phenomenon gives us a feeling
of understanding is not a reliable cue to its being a correct or accurate

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 EPISTEMIC VALUE OF UNDERSTANDING 587

explanation. On the contrary, says Trout: the feeling of understanding

will induce us to stop looking for better explanations, but wrongly so
because it is a product of the aforementioned biases. In sum, Trout con-
ceives of understanding as a subjective experience that may be induced
by explanations and concludes that it should not be regarded as episte-
mically relevant.
Insofar as objectivists are willing to discuss scientific understanding,
they identify it with explanation, thereby making it redundant. Thus,
according to Hempel (1965, 488), explanations provide scientific under-
standing only in the sense that they show how the phenomena “fit into
a nomic nexus.” And Trout (2007, 585–586) states that “scientific under-
standing is the state produced, and only produced, by grasping a true
explanation,” where one “might, for example, treat grasping as a kind of
knowing.” (However, Trout does not say of what scientific understanding
is a state nor what kind of knowing ‘grasping’ exactly is.)
In the next section I will argue that there is more to understanding than
either purely objective explanations or purely subjective feelings, as ob-
jectivists such as Hempel and Trout suggest. Between these extremes there
exists a nonobjectivist (yet not arbitrary) kind of understanding that has
a crucial epistemic function, and that needs to be taken into account in
a philosophical analysis of scientific explanation.

3. Challenging the Objectivist View: The Epistemic Relevance of Skills. Let

me first make it clear that I agree with Trout that the psychological sense
of understanding has no epistemic function: a subjective feeling of un-
derstanding is neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific understanding
of a phenomenon. Furthermore, I agree with the basic Hempelian idea
that explanations are arguments which attempt to fit a phenomenon into
a broader theoretical framework. In scientific practice explanation may
sometimes conform to Hempel’s deductive-nomological model of expla-
nation, but more often it takes the form of model-based explanation. In
the present section, I will argue that actual scientific explanation—be it
deductive-nomological or model-based—involves a kind of understanding
that is pragmatic and hence not purely objective. This type of under-
standing is based on skills and judgments of scientists and cannot be
captured in objective algorithmic procedures. It is therefore incompatible
with the objectivist conception of explanation and understanding favored
by Hempel and Trout.
The pragmatic kind of understanding that I claim is crucial for scientific
explanation is not a product of explanation. Before I substantiate this
claim, let us first make a clear distinction between three different ways in
which the term understanding can be used in connection with scientific
explanation:

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588 HENK W. DE REGT

FU: feeling of understanding p the subjective psychological experiences

accompanying an explanation.
UT: understanding a theory p being able to use the theory (pragmatic
understanding).
UP: understanding a phenomenon p having an appropriate explanation
of the phenomenon.
UP is generally regarded as an essential epistemic aim of science. It is
not at odds with the Hempelian view; as we have seen above, it corre-
sponds to what Hempel calls scientific understanding. UP can be accom-
panied by FU: explanations may, but do not necessarily, produce a sense
of understanding. Accordingly, as Trout has rightly claimed, it is episte-
mically irrelevant whether or not UP is accompanied by FU. So far I
agree with Hempel and Trout. However, contra their objectivist view, I
argue that pragmatic understanding UT is a crucial condition for reaching
the epistemic aim UP, namely, explanation.
What are explanations and how are they obtained? As stated above,
explanations are arguments which fit a phenomenon into a broader the-
oretical framework. According to Hempel, they do so by deducing the
explanandum from covering laws plus boundary conditions. For example,
one can explain the fact that jets fly by deducing it from Bernoulli’s
principle and the relevant background conditions (borrowing an example
from Trout 2002, 202). Note, however, that merely knowing Bernoulli’s
principle and the background conditions is not equal to having an ex-
planation: in addition, one should be able to use this knowledge in the
right way to derive the explanandum. Thus, a student may have mem-
orized Bernoulli’s principle and have all background conditions available
but may still be unable to use this knowledge to account for the fact that
jets can fly. The extra ingredient needed to construct the explanation is a
skill: the ability to construct deductive arguments from the available
knowledge.
Harold Brown has shown this convincingly for the comparable case of
deductive proofs in formal logic. Brown (2000, 195; cf. 1988, 169ff) argues
that although each step in such a proof is justified by appeal to an explicit
rule, “the process of constructing a proof—that is, the process of deciding
which rule to apply at each stage—is not governed by any comparable
set of rules.” One learns to construct proofs by developing a skill, by
practicing guided by someone who already possesses the skill. In other
words, one develops the ability to make judgments about how to proceed
without an algorithm. It might be thought that judgment is relevant only
in the context of discovery, in which one tries to find new proofs. However,
Brown (1988, 170–171) observes that also in the evaluation of given proofs
logicians typically rely on judgment: “explicit following of rules is char-

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 EPISTEMIC VALUE OF UNDERSTANDING 589

acteristic of an unskilled, rather than of a skilled, performance.” While

the novice consciously follows rules, the expert immediately recognizes
which steps are valid and which ones are not: this “leaps to the mind.”
In other words, judgment plays a role in the context of justification as
well.
The fact that deductive reasoning—and accordingly deductive-nomo-
logical explanation—involves skill and judgment has two important im-
plications. First, skills cannot be acquired from textbooks but only in
practice, because they cannot be translated in explicit sets of rules (Brown
1988, 164–165). Accordingly, to possess a skill is to have ‘tacit knowledge’
(Polanyi 1958). It has been argued, most notably by Reber (1993), that
tacit knowledge involves implicit learning, that is, the unconscious and
unintentional adoption of rule-following procedures. However, Reber’s
thesis is questionable. In a recent review of the literature, Shanks (2005,
208–210) observes that, although some grammar learning experiments
prima facie suggest that people do achieve unconscious knowledge of
rules, the results are equally well explained without recourse to such im-
plicit learning. Moreover, other experiments support the idea that gram-
maticality decisions are not based on adopted implicit rules but on ac-
cumulated information that generates a feeling of familiarity. Shanks
(2005, 216) concludes that “it has yet to be proved beyond doubt that
there exists a form of learning that proceeds both unintentionally and
unconsciously.” Brown (1988, 171–173) presents an additional philo-
sophical argument against the thesis that developing skills is equivalent
to internalizing rules: it would require the assumption of an ‘unconscious
mind’ that follows the rules. But the existence of such a mind is implausible
from a naturalistic point of view, and, moreover, it does not really solve
a problem but rather generates new problems, namely, about the way the
unconscious mind would work and about its interaction with the conscious
mind and with the nervous system. Instead, Brown (1988, 173, 177) argues
that a more fruitful approach is to regard the learning of cognitive skills
as analogous to the development of physical skills, and to assume that it
involves training of the nervous system in a comparable manner. Inter-
estingly, Trout too (2002, 221–223) emphasizes the role of skills and im-
plicit knowledge and argues that it proves that the psychological sense of
understanding (FU) is epistemically irrelevant: if explanatory knowledge
can be implicit, a conscious experience like FU cannot be required for it.
However, although Trout is surely right that FU is neither necessary nor
sufficient for UP and that (implicit) skills are crucially important for
achieving UP, it does not follow that the process of achieving UP can be
captured in an objectivist account based on internalization of rule-fol-
lowing procedures, as Trout suggests. On the contrary, the arguments of
Brown and Shanks render this claim implausible.

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590 HENK W. DE REGT

Second, the fact that particular skills of the scientist are crucial for
constructing and evaluating explanations and for achieving understanding
entails that explanation has a pragmatic dimension that is epistemically
relevant. Many philosophers of science hold that the pragmatic and the
epistemic dimension of science can and should be kept separate. Thus,
Hempel (1965, 426) argues that scientific laws, theories, and explanations
are “objective in the sense that their empirical implications and their
evidential support are independent of what particular individuals happen
to test or to apply them” and that philosophers of science should therefore
construct “a nonpragmatic concept of scientific explanation” that “does
not require relativization with respect to questioning individuals.” In a
similar vein, Bas van Fraassen (1980, 4, 88) explicitly contrasts an epi-
stemic and a pragmatic dimension of theory acceptance. The epistemic
dimension contains the relevant beliefs concerning the relation between
a theory and the world, while the pragmatic dimension contains reasons
scientists may have for accepting a theory independently of their beliefs
about its relation to the world; these reasons typically pertain to the use
and usefulness of the theory. In contrast to Hempel, van Fraassen (1980,
Chapter 5) argues that explanation is not an epistemic aim of science but
rather belongs to the pragmatic dimension of theory acceptance. Both
Hempel and van Fraassen see the epistemic and the pragmatic as sharply
distinguished domains. On their view, the pragmatic dimension pertains
to the relation between the theory and its users, that is, to the dimension
that seems to be excluded from the epistemic dimension by definition.
The thesis that the epistemic and the pragmatic can and should be kept
separate presupposes that the epistemic status of a theory exclusively
depends on a direct evidential relation with the phenomena it purports
to describe or explain. On this presupposition, pragmatic elements—for
example, virtues of a theory that facilitate its use by scientists—are indeed
epistemically irrelevant: they do not carry any additional justificatory
weight. However, as the previous discussion of the role of skills in de-
ductive reasoning has made clear, this presupposition is false. Skills and
judgment are required for the establishing and evaluating relations be-
tween theories and phenomena (e.g., deductive-nomological explana-
tions). It follows that, although it is possible and useful to distinguish
analytically between the epistemic and the pragmatic, the two are inex-
tricably intertwined in scientific practice: epistemic activities and evalu-
ations (production and assessment of knowledge claims) are possible only
if particular pragmatic conditions are fulfilled.
Thus, the pragmatic dimension of explanation is epistemically relevant.
This is the case for deductive-nomological explanations but even more so
for scientific explanations that do not conform to the deductive-nomo-
logical ideal. And the latter are the rule rather than the exception in

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 EPISTEMIC VALUE OF UNDERSTANDING 591

scientific practice: usually there is no strictly deductive relation between

explanans (theoretical laws and initial conditions) and explanandum (the
phenomenon or phenomenological laws). Instead, as Cartwright (1983),
Morgan and Morrison (1999), and others have shown, in scientific practice
the connection between theory and phenomena is usually made through
models. A model is conventionally taken as a representation of the object
or system that one wants to understand scientifically.1 In order to see what
the role of models is in achieving understanding, we should first clarify
the relation between models, theory, and empirical data. Morgan and
Morrison (1999, 10–11) have argued for the ‘autonomy’ of models: models
are not derived from theory, but neither do they follow from the empirical
data. They typically contain both theoretical and empirical information.
How are such models constructed, and what precisely is their role in
scientific explanation? The function of a model is to represent the target
system in such a way that the theory can be applied to it. In other words,
models replace the bridge principles that traditionally connect theory to
empirical phenomena. In the terminology of Morgan and Morrison
(1999), models ‘mediate’ between theory and phenomena. The crucial
difference between bridge principles and mediating models is that the
former establish a strict deductive relation between theory and phenom-
enon (explanans and explanandum), while the latter connect the two in
a looser way. The construction of models and their role in scientific ex-
planation has been analyzed extensively by Nancy Cartwright (1983).
According to her simulacrum account of explanation, “to explain a phe-
nomenon is to construct a model that fits the phenomenon into a theory”
(Cartwright 1983, 17). In the modeling stage, the target system is presented
in such a way that the theory can be applied to it: we decide to describe
system S as if it is an M (where M is a model of which the behavior is
governed by equations derived from the theory). The construction of
models is not a matter of deduction but rather a complex process involving
approximations and idealizations. There are no algorithms or formal prin-
ciples that tell us how to get from the description of a real system to a
suitable model: “There are just rules of thumb, good sense, and, ultimately,
the requirement that the equation we end up with must do the job”
(Cartwright 1983, 33). This implies that the construction of a model, as
well as the assessment of the model as a good (or good enough) repre-
sentation of the system, is a process in which scientists have to make
pragmatic decisions and must accordingly rely on skills and judgment.
Understanding in the sense of UP (having an appropriate explanation
of the phenomenon) is an epistemic aim of science, but this aim can be

1. Note, however, that there are widely different accounts of representation, and that the
target systems of models may be real, fictional, or ideal (Knuuttila 2005).

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592 HENK W. DE REGT

achieved only by means of pragmatic understanding UT (the ability to

use the relevant theory). This is the case for deductive-nomological ex-
planations and even more so for model-based explanations that are typ-
ically not deductive. Achieving the epistemic aim of science is a complex
process that unavoidably has a pragmatic dimension in which skills and
judgment play crucial roles. Consequently, the epistemic value of a theory
cannot be determined in isolation from its use, and successful use of a
theory requires pragmatic understanding.

4. Scientific Understanding, Pragmatic Understanding, and the Intelligibility

of Theories. In the previous section, pragmatic understanding UT was
defined somewhat loosely as the ability to use the relevant theory. In this
section I will give a more precise characterization of the nature of and
conditions for pragmatic understanding. Pragmatic understanding is re-
quired for constructing models that relate theories to phenomena. As we
have seen above, this activity involves making suitable idealizations and
approximations: scientists need to make the right judgments regarding
idealization and approximation and to possess the right skills to build a
model on this basis. What are the right skills? This depends on which
theory the scientist is dealing with, in particular on which pragmatic
virtues the theory possesses. Particular virtues of theories—for example,
visualizability or simplicity—may be valued by scientists because they
facilitate the use of the theory in constructing models; in this sense they
are pragmatic virtues. But not all scientists value the same qualities: their
preferences are related to their skills, acquired by training and experience,
and to other contextual factors such as their background knowledge,
metaphysical commitments, and the virtues of already entrenched theories.
Philosophers of science have listed and discussed the theoretical virtues
that generally play a role in the evaluation of scientific theories, for ex-
ample, accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, unifying power, and fer-
tility (see Kuhn 1977; Longino 1990; Lacey 2005).2 Many historical studies
have revealed that, in evaluations of theories, scientists employ other
criteria than accuracy alone, and that there is sometimes a trade-off be-
tween accuracy and other virtues. Such evaluations cannot be the result
of algorithmic decision procedures, and accordingly judgment plays a
crucial role. In addition to the general virtues cited above, scientists in
various fields and historical periods have promoted other, more specific
theoretical qualities (e.g., visualizability, continuity, and locality; see De
Regt 2001 and De Regt and Dieks 2005).

2. These virtues are called ‘values’ by Kuhn, Longino, and Lacey. I use the term ‘virtues’
in order to avoid confusion: the virtue is a property of the theory, which may be valued
by scientists.

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 EPISTEMIC VALUE OF UNDERSTANDING 593

Scientists may prefer theories with particular pragmatic virtues because

they possess the skills to construct models for explaining phenomena on
the basis of these theories. In other words, they have pragmatic under-
standing UT of such theories. I suggest to rephrase this with the help of
the notion of intelligibility. If scientists understand a theory, the theory
is intelligible to them. I define the intelligibility of a theory (for scientists)
as follows:
Intelligibility. The value that scientists attribute to the cluster of vir-
tues (of a theory in one or more of its representations) that facilitate
the use of the theory for the construction of models.
It is important to note that intelligibility, thus defined, is not an intrinsic
property of a theory but rather a value that is projected onto the theory
by a scientist or group of scientists. Moreover, it is a pragmatic, context-
dependent value related both to properties (virtues) of a theory and its
representation(s)3 and to scientists’ skills. Intelligibility is a measure of
the fruitfulness of a theory, but it is not an objective measure, because a
theory can be more fruitful for one scientist than for another.4 Which
theories are deemed intelligible can vary through time or across disciplines.
Scientists prefer a more intelligible theory to a less intelligible one, not
because it gives them a psychological sense of understanding but rather
because they have to be able to use the theory.
The arguments presented in Section 3 can be summarized by the thesis
that scientific understanding of phenomena requires intelligible theories.
Only an intelligible theory allows scientists to construct models through
which they can derive explanations of phenomena on the basis of the
given theory. In other words, understanding scientific theories is a pre-
requisite for understanding phenomena scientifically. This can be stated
as a Criterion for Understanding Phenomena:
CUP. A phenomenon P is understood scientifically iff a theory T of
P exists that is intelligible (and the explanation of P by T meets
accepted logical and empirical requirements).
First, note that in Section 3 understanding a phenomenon (UP) was
defined as ‘having an appropriate explanation of it’, and explanations

3. It often happens that a theory can be represented in different ways (think of the various
formulations of classical mechanics), and each of these representations may have its own
specific virtues, which may be relevant to the intelligibility of the theory.
4. It may be the case that there is a discrepancy between scientists’ perception of the
fruitfulness of a theory and its actual fruitfulness for these scientists. Such errors of
judgment will hamper their work. I assume that they are the exception rather than the
rule.

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594 HENK W. DE REGT

were defined as arguments that fit a phenomenon into a broader theoretical

framework. CUP states that having an intelligible theory T is a necessary
condition for scientifically understanding P. Of course, in addition we
need to use T to actually construct the explanation that fits P in the
theoretical framework. Therefore, CUP also contains a requirement about
the actual explanation, in which accepted logical and empirical require-
ments determine what a good fit is.5 Accordingly, CUP does not entail
that, for example, astrologers understand personality traits of people if
only they have an intelligible astrological theory of these personality traits.
In addition, explanations on the basis of this theory have to meet accepted
requirements such as accuracy and consistency. Second, note that CUP
is implicitly pragmatic (i.e., it refers to the scientists involved in the process
of explanation) because it involves the pragmatic notion of intelligibility.
Since intelligibility is not an intrinsic property of theories but a context-
dependent value ascribed to theories, one cannot specify universally valid
criteria for intelligibility. But this does not entail that intelligibility is
merely a matter of taste and that no criteria can be formulated at all.
Since intelligibility can be regarded as a measure of how fruitful a theory
is for the construction of models (by scientists in a particular context), it
is possible to determine this measure by means of a criterion or test. There
may be different ways to test whether a theory is intelligible for scientists,
and not all of them may be applicable in all cases or for all disciplines.
As one way of testing the intelligibility of theories, I want to suggest the
following criterion:

CIT. A scientific theory T (in one or more of its representations) is

intelligible for scientists (in context C ) if they can recognize quali-
tatively characteristic consequences of T without performing exact
calculations.

In Section 3 it was argued that the skills and judgments involved in

achieving understanding cannot be reduced to rule-following procedures.
Criterion CIT can be regarded as a test of such ‘tacit’ (implicit) skills.
The criterion applies specifically to mathematical theories as used in the
physical sciences. It is based on a suggestion by Werner Heisenberg about
understanding in physics (see De Regt and Dieks 2005 for an elaborate
defense of CIT). For theories in other disciplines, especially nonmathe-
matical ones, other criteria may apply. Moreover, there may be other ways

5. To be sure, these requirements are included in the list of theoretical virtues that are
subject to valuation by scientists. Accordingly, there may be some variation in the way
they are valued and applied in specific cases. However, they are clearly generally accepted
among scientists, and explanations that completely fail to meet them will generally be
rejected as unscientific.

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 EPISTEMIC VALUE OF UNDERSTANDING 595

to determine intelligibility of theories in the physical sciences as well. CIT

is a sufficient condition for intelligibility, not a necessary one.
Whether theory T is intelligible depends not only on the virtues of T
itself but also on such contextual factors as the capacities, background
knowledge, and background beliefs of the scientists in C. Accordingly,
CIT can accommodate the variety of ways in which understanding is
achieved in scientific practice. Qualitative insight into the consequences
of a theory can be gained in many ways, and therefore the criterion does
not favor one particular skill or theoretical virtue. Its fulfillment requires
an appropriate combination of skills and virtues. The preferred theoretical
virtues, to which skills have to be attuned, provide ‘tools’ for achieving
understanding. For example, a theory (or a particular representation of
it) may possess the virtue of visualizability, which allows for visualization,
which in turn may be a useful tool to construct models of the phenomena.
Visualization is an important tool for understanding, valued by many
scientists, but it is not a necessary condition, and there are also scientists
who prefer abstract theories over visualizable ones (see De Regt 2001).

5. Conclusion. Understanding of phenomena (UP) is among the epistemic

aims of science, and such understanding is provided by explanations. In
this article I have argued, contra the objectivist view of Hempel and Trout,
that a pragmatic type of understanding (UT) is a necessary condition for
UP. Such pragmatic understanding amounts to the ability to use relevant
theories to construct explanations. I have presented a further analysis of
UT, based on the notion of intelligibility, and provided criteria for un-
derstanding phenomena (CUP) and for pragmatic understanding UT (the
criterion for intelligibility CIT). Scientific understanding of phenomena
(UP) requires intelligible theories, where intelligibility is defined as the
positive value that scientists attribute to the theoretical virtues that fa-
cilitate the construction of models of the phenomena. Intelligibility is not
an intrinsic property of a theory but rather a value projected onto the
theory by scientists. It is a pragmatic, context-dependent value related
both to the theoretical virtues and to the scientists’ skills (see De Regt
2009 for a more detailed defense of this account and application to a
concrete example).
The conclusion that intelligibility has epistemic relevance is in direct
opposition to the objectivism of Hempel and Trout: it implies that of two
people who possess exactly the same theories and background knowledge,
one may achieve understanding of a phenomenon while the other does
not. Accordingly, scientific understanding is not completely objective, that
is, it is not fully independent of the subject. It might be objected that this
implies a relativist view of scientific understanding and hence of science
itself. But that worry is unfounded. Skills are acquired within a community

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596 HENK W. DE REGT

and assessed by that community, which guarantees that judgments based

on skills are not arbitrary. As Brown (2000, 201–202) observes, “Scientists
develop judgment in the specific fields that they have mastered, and this
results in the existence of a set of cognitive skills in the scientific com-
munity. These skills are fallible, but their fallibility does not make them
epistemically worthless.”
The thesis that pragmatic understanding of theories (UT, intelligibility)
is a necessary condition for understanding phenomena (UP) undermines
traditional objectivist conceptions of science. But abandoning such con-
ceptions does not necessarily open the door to relativism: intelligibility is
necessary but insufficient for scientific understanding. Criterion CUP in-
cludes accepted logical and empirical requirements to which explanations
have to conform. These requirements can be listed as a set of theoretical
virtues that generally play a role in the evaluation of scientific theories,
which together provide a shared basis for assessing explanations (cf. Kuhn
1977, 322). Intelligible theories can be fruitfully employed in the con-
struction of explanatory models, but the resulting explanations are sci-
entific explanations if and only if they conform to the shared virtues to
a sufficient extent. Intelligibility is not the only requirement for scientific
theories but is an essential one if one wants to understand the phenomena.

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