Final Report v07182024
Final Report v07182024
Final Report v07182024
FOR
AND
BY
A NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF RETIRED AND ACTIVE-DUTY FBI SPECIAL AGENTS AND ANALYSTS
IN COORDINATION WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT PARTNERS
JULY 2024
Table of Contents
A. ExecuEve Summary 7
B. Key Findings 8
C. IntroducEon 12
I. The FBI Director’s Comments on the FBI and Local Law Enforcement 37
J. Highlights of the Raw Data: ValidaEng the Ten (10) Key Findings 40
K. RecommendaEons 96
L. Conclusion 103
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II. REPORTING PERSONS, SOURCES & SUB-SOURCES
-3-
E. Crisis of Confidence in FBI-led Task Forces
G. Today’s Tone-Deaf FBI Disregards the Value of ReEred FBI Special Agents
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I. The New GeneraEon of Sub-Standard FBI Special Agents
-5-
Appendices
APPENDIX A: Request for InformaIon (RFI), dated February 19, 2024 217
APPENDIX B: Missouri A\orney General Le\er, dated July 13, 2022 223
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I. Report on Local Law Enforcement’s Loss of Trust in the Federal Bureau of
InvesIgaIon (FBI) and the CriIcal Impact on Public Safety and NaIonal
Security
A. ExecuEve Summary
1. This Report on Local Law Enforcement’s Loss of Trust in the Federal Bureau of
Inves<ga<on (FBI) and the Cri<cal Impact on Public Safety and Na<onal Security is
being presented to the American people for full transparency and review by a
NaConal Alliance of reCred and acCve-duty FBI Special Agents and Analysts in
consultaCon and close coordinaCon with trusted local law enforcement partners.
3. Beginning in February 2024 and conCnuing through June 2024, the Alliance received
detailed, anecdotal reporCng on local law enforcement’s disturbing loss of trust in
the FBI - in direct correlaCon with the public’s unfavorable views of the FBI - from
more than 30 independent, highly credible law enforcement Sources and Sub-
sources.
4. The Sources and Sub-sources also include acCve-duty and reCred veterans of the FBI
who had direct access to and first-hand knowledge of the informaCon provided.
5. Analysis of the informaCon generated ten (10) Key Findings that point directly to a
real-Cme, criCcal impact on Public Safety and NaConal Security.
6. The Key Findings detailed in the secCon below are followed by recommendaCons for
an immediate, bi-parCsan response by the appropriate Congressional CommiVees
responsible for oversight of the U.S. Department of JusCce and the FBI to:
b. ADVOCATE for bold administraCve acCon and FBI leadership change based on an
assessment of the potenCal harm to the American people who, based on the Key
Findings in this Report, are more vulnerable to exploitaCon and aVack by highly
moCvated violent criminals, terrorist organizaCons, and our NaCon’s adversaries
because of the deterioraCng trust in today’s FBI.
-7-
B. Key Findings
Because they do not trust the FBI, local law enforcement partners who both
knowingly and unknowingly contributed to this Report are not only reluctant to
work with the FBI but reportedly have decided to no longer share acEonable,
substanEve informaEon on criminal and other intelligence-related acEvity with
the FBI.
Local law enforcement partners who ahended and were graduated from the FBI
NaEonal Academy (for select U.S. and internaEonal law enforcement execuEves)
are also sounding the alarm, saying they are troubled by the FBI’s apparent
poliEcal bias and failure to execute the law enforcement mission without
contaminaEon by a poliEcal agenda.
-8-
Key Finding #4:
Local law enforcement partners across the country reporEng as independent and
separate Sources and Sub-sources say with extensive corroboraEon that the FBI
in recent years has become increasingly isolated and is consistently unresponsive
to ahempts by local law enforcement to iniEate contact, conduct liaison, develop
working relaEonships with, and request specialty training from the FBI.
While the relaEonship between local law enforcement officers and the FBI has
historically been complicated by inherent challenges, local law enforcement
officers say they generally feel so disrespected by today’s FBI Special Agents and
supervisory personnel that any posiEve opinions of individual FBI personnel -
characterized as rare excepEons by local law enforcement officers - are
overshadowed by a predominantly persistent and negaEve opinion of the FBI as
an organizaEon.
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Key Finding #7:
TODAY’S TONE-DEAF FBI DISREGARDS THE VALUE OF RETIRED FBI SPECIAL AGENTS
ReEred FBI Special Agents, some of whom in their post-FBI careers currently
serve as heads of local law enforcement agencies, reported stories of tone-deaf
FBI personnel, including FBI ExecuEve Managers, across mulEple FBI Field Offices
who commonly disregard ahempts by these reEred FBI Special Agents – as part
of their official duEes as local law enforcement agency heads - to conduct liaison
with the FBI, share Eme-sensiEve invesEgaEve leads, and offer experEse
developed during decades of service in the FBI.
Local law enforcement partners with extensive experience working with and
around FBI Special Agents are observing a notable decline in the quality of the
new generaEon of FBI Special Agents, described as “completely worthless” by a
local law enforcement officer currently serving in a supervisory posiEon and as
“the worst batch of people” by a senior FBI employee.
FBI supervisory personnel, including FBI ExecuEve Managers, are obsessed with
self-promoEon and rotate in and out of supervisory posiEons so frequently
because of the FBI’s “up-or-out” promoEonal program that local law
enforcement officers, most notably those who are members of mulE-law
enforcement agency Task Forces, say they have given up on trying to develop
meaningful, long-lasEng relaEonships with their FBI supervisory contacts.
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Key Finding #10:
Not only does the FBI Academy for New Agent Training promote a cult of
narcissism by imbuing a false sense of superiority over all local, state and federal
law enforcement, taxpayer dollars are being spent to build a “Wellness Center”
for yoga and meditaEon at the FBI Academy in lieu of prioriEzing resources to
provide a formal training curriculum that teaches FBI New Agent Trainees - with
humility and a higher sense of service and professionalism - the value of
developing posiEve working relaEonships with local law enforcement.
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C. IntroducEon
a. Local, county, and state law enforcement officers are the heroes of American law
enforcement.
b. The moment their shics begin, these law enforcement officers – dedicated men
and women who wear the badge - step into harm’s way to keep all of us safe.
They patrol our neighborhoods, respond to calls for service 24 hours a day, and
make split-second decisions under extraordinary stress to save lives.
c. Their days are never easy. Threats against law enforcement are everywhere,
always evolving. To go home at night requires a constant, heightened state of
alert. FighCng crime on the street requires the fierce mindset of a warrior but
also compassion to comfort a stranger and duty to protect the innocent.
d. They are the heroes of American law enforcement, and for their daily service and
sacrifice, ciCzens of our NaCon owe America’s finest a debt of graCtude.
a. Members of the NaConal Alliance of reCred and acCve-duty FBI Special Agents
and Analysts – the Authors of this Report – have had the great honor and
privilege to serve alongside these outstanding local, county, and state law
enforcement officers all across the country.1
c. Without excepCon, we hold them in the highest regard, and together as equals,
we watched each other’s backs. Mutual respect was earned. We valued our
partnership. So much was invested to develop and preserve the quality of our
unique working relaConships, and the bonds we share sCll hold strong today.
1
Some members of the Alliance in their post-FBI careers currently serve on or are working in direct support of
local, county, and state law enforcement agencies.
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d. At the local, county, and state levels, the “need to share” informaCon between
law enforcement officers fighCng crime on the street is a maVer of life and death
because it “...can save officer lives. The present use of technology has provided
officers with real-4me informa4on that is cri4cal not only to their safety but
the safety of those they are assis4ng. Wanted no4ces, alerts, BOLOs (Be On
The Lookouts), license plate readers and gunshot detec4on technology have
enhanced officer safety. Informa4on is key to much of what law enforcement
encounters.”9
f. But when there is more division than unity – when local law enforcement officers
do not trust the FBI and the FBI, for its part, fails to set as an organizaConal
priority a daily commitment to respect the value of local law enforcement –
American law enforcement is diminished and the American people are caught in
the middle, facing greater, unnecessary risk.
g. Because so much is at stake for the NaCon, this Report on Local Law
Enforcement’s Loss of Trust in the Federal Bureau of Inves<ga<on (FBI) and the
Cri<cal Impact on Public Safety and Na<onal Security - a first-of-its-kind, formally
sourced analysis based on direct reporCng from local law enforcement officers –
seeks to (i) fully explore the reasons for the current divide between local law
enforcement and the FBI and (ii) offer recommendaCons for immediate repair.10
1. January 6, 2021
a. From ciCes and states across the NaCon, trusted local law enforcement partners
who both knowingly and unknowingly contributed as Sources and Sub-sources to
this Report independently point to the events in and around the U.S. Capitol in
Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021 as the final straw – following a series of
negaCve headlines about the FBI11 – that led them in recent years to form an
extremely negaCve and unfavorable view of the FBI.
9
“Q&A: Exploring the evolution, importance and challenges of information sharing in law enforcement,” Police1,
July 27, 2023, https://www.police1.com/data-sharing-law-enforcement/articles/qa-exploring-the-evolution-
importance-and-challenges-of-information-sharing-in-law-enforcement-JHn72LVrMIgI8D1h/.
10
See Section K, “Recommendations,” pages 96-102.
11
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 42, pages 128-131.
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b. CiCng the FBI’s invesCgaCve prioriCes in connecCon with the events on January 6,
2021, a law enforcement veteran who served as a sergeant in the Major Crimes
Division of a large, local law enforcement agency in the Western U.S. expressed
disbelief and sadness at the fall of the FBI and disgust by the FBI’s obvious
poliCcal biases:
BRAVO 53 said he/she cannot understand why the FBI is not going aber (the
“an@-fascist”, far-leb militant group known as) An@fa, BLM (Black Lives Maeer),
and pro-Pales@nian rioters with the same vigor the FBI brought to bear against
individuals associated with the events in and around the U.S. Capitol in
Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021.
BRAVO 53 said that to the average American ci@zen, this apparent discrepancy
in the way the FBI sets its inves@ga@ve priori@es and deploys its personnel and
resources does not seem right.12
NOTE: Sources and Sub-sources featured in this Report were assigned a code
name (BRAVO) and random numbers for tracking purposes and to protect them
from retalia@on by the FBI.13
c. CiCng the FBI’s handling of the events of January 6, 2021, a state law
enforcement officer in the Southern U.S. with more than 15 years of experience
said he/she loves the United States of America but doesn’t trust the FBI or the
U.S. Department of JusCce (DOJ):
BRAVO 94 said other law enforcement agencies have built up a distrust of the
FBI and the U.S. Department of Jus@ce (DOJ) based on news reports of what
BRAVO 94 called the FBI’s corrupt handling of the January 6th defendants and
the search of former U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s Mar-a-Lago residence in
Palm Beach, Florida on August 8, 2022.
12
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 53, pages 125-126.
13
See Section G, “Sources and Methodology,” and Section H, “Record of Retaliation by the FBI,” pages 33-36.
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BRAVO 94 said many locals, i.e. local law enforcement officers, believe they
could be targeted by the FBI and the U.S. Department of Jus@ce (DOJ) because
of their love for the United States of America and may be perceived as domes@c
terrorists because of how they may vote.14
d. Also ciCng the events of January 6, 2021, the Chief ExecuCve of a local law
enforcement agency in the Northern U.S. and a member of the FBI NaConal
Academy Associates, Inc. (FBINAA) was disappointed in the perceived decline of
the FBI:
BRAVO 92 did not have complaints about his/her interac@ons with FBI Special
Agents in his/her local area, but it was evident, based on observa@ons by
ROMEO PAPA 85, that BRAVO 92 was disappointed in the perceived decline of
the FBI.15
14
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 94, pages 110-111.
15
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 92, pages 138-139.
16
The FBI Naional Academy Associates, Inc. is “a non-profit (501(c)(3)), internaional organizaion of
14,000+ senior law enforcement professionals dedicated to providing...communiies, states, countries, and
profession with the highest degree of law enforcement experise, training, educaion and informaion.”
See hmps://www.ninaa.org/.
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e. CorroboraCng the reporCng provided by these local law enforcement officers and
others, a senior corporate execuCve who served in the U.S. Armed Forces and
later as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)
confirmed Sub-sources within the FBI also reported the FBI’s acCons in
connecCon with January 6, 2021 invesCgaCons have put a strain on the FBI’s
relaConship with local law enforcement:
BRAVO 86 said Sub-sources who were at the time assigned to the FBI Inspection
Division but were unwilling to publicly discuss details reported that since the
events in and around the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021,
the FBI’s relationship with local law enforcement has been strained.
...
BRAVO 86 said that during inspections of FBI Field Offices, numerous details
have emerged of the FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice putting pressure on
local law enforcement to assist with cases linked to the events in and around
the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021.
BRAVO 86 further stated the pressure placed on local law enforcement agencies
has been a strain on available law enforcement personnel and has impacted
morale within these agencies.17
SOURCE: BRAVO 86 is a senior corporate execu<ve who served in the U.S. Armed
Forces and later in the FBI for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA)
and FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA). BRAVO 86 was known by his/her peers
at the FBI and other law enforcement agencies as a highly mo<vated
inves<gator who led complex Counterterrorism opera<ons in the U.S. and
overseas. In addi<on to his/her accomplishments as a Counterterrorism
inves<gator, BRAVO 86 par<cipated in the inspec<ons of several FBI Field Offices
while assigned to the Inspec<on Division at FBI Headquarters.
17
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 86, pages 208-212.
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b. A local law enforcement veteran who served on the command staff of a local law
enforcement agency in the Western U.S. listed the real-life consequences of a
“poli4cally mo4vated” FBI:
BRAVO 68 said his/her ac@ve-duty and re@red peers in local law enforcement
all believe the FBI is poli@cally mo@vated, and BRAVO 68 believed this
percep@on damages the FBI’s credibility as an organiza@on, making it more
difficult for its front-line FBI Special Agents to gain public trust and advance
cases, which BRAVO 68 characterized as a significant safety hazard.
BRAVO 68 said he/she discouraged his/her son who is comple@ng his U.S.
Armed Forces service commitment from applying to the FBI because of the FBI’s
terrible reputa@on. BRAVO 68 said he/she would have encouraged his/her
children to join the FBI several years ago, but not anymore.18
Citing additional reasons for his/her negative, overall assessment of the FBI and
FBI Special Agents, BRAVO 46 said newer FBI Special Agents identify themselves
as “woke or liberal” and are often openly critical of Conservative or Christian
values in front of mixed company.19
18
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 68, pages 117-119.
19
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 46, pages 189-192.
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SOURCE: BRAVO 46 has more than 25 years of law enforcement experience and
is currently serving in a large, local law enforcement agency as the Officer In
Charge (OIC) of a mul<-law enforcement agency Task Force.
d. A supervisor in a large, local law enforcement agency with more than 25 years of
law enforcement experience said the FBI is a poliCcal tool:
The FBI, according to BRAVO 82, is held in disdain by many of his/her local law
enforcement peers and is not considered an arm of law enforcement but rather
a tool of the woke and liberal political apparatus currently in power.
BRAVO 82 said simply, “The quality just isn't there at the FBI anymore. The
pursuit of justice is no longer their priority. It's just sad."20
SOURCE: BRAVO 82 has more than 25 years of law enforcement experience and
is currently serving as a supervisor in a large, local law enforcement agency.
BRAVO 82 has been a supervisor for a number of years, and his/her du<es have
included the supervision of a number of mul<-law enforcement agency Task
Forces.
e. A 35-plus year law enforcement veteran who served in a large, local law
enforcement agency in the Western U.S. said that while aVending the FBI
NaConal Academy (FBINA) at the FBI Academy in QuanCco, Virginia, an FBI
NaConal Academy Instructor regularly denigrated Republicans:
BRAVO 49 said his/her FBI National Academy class was regularly subjected to
one particular FBI National Academy instructor who, during his/her formal
classroom presentations, regularly denigrated then-U.S. Presidential Candidate
Donald J. Trump and all Republicans.
BRAVO 49 said that the FBI National Academy instructor’s political commentary
about then-Presidential Candidate Trump and Republicans drew such a reaction
from FBI National Academy students that they rallied together to hold up in
20
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 82, pages 196-199.
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front of the instructor handwritten signs displaying the word “STOP” in an
attempt to stop the instructor from continuing to deliver his/her politically
charged rhetoric during class.21
SOURCE: BRAVO 49 is a re<red law enforcement officer with more than 35 years
of law enforcement experience. BRAVO 49 served in a large, local law
enforcement agency in the Western U.S., and BRAVO 49 is also a graduate of the
FBI Na<onal Academy (FBINA).22
a. The trusted local law enforcement officers cited in this Report as Sources and
Sub-sources were characterized by their ReporCng Persons as highly reliable and
credible, and their reporCng of poliCcal bias within the FBI has been extensively
corroborated, most recently by a nonprofit, nonparCsan educaConal
organizaCon.
b. On June 11, 2024, Empower Oversight23 issued the following press release
detailing “poli4cal bias and abuse in FBI security clearance probes against
employees who expressed support for President Trump or opposi4on to COVID-
19 vaccine mandates.”24
21
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 49, pages 135-137.
22
The FBI Naional Academy in Quanico, Virginia is “a professional course of study for U.S. and
internaional law enforcement managers nominated by their agency heads because of demonstrated
leadership qualiies. The 10-week program serves to improve the administraion of jusice in police
departments and agencies at home and abroad and to raise law enforcement standards, knowledge, and
cooperaion worldwide.” See hmps://le.ni.gov/file-repository/ni-naional-academy-brochure-
031524.pdf.
23
“Empower Oversight Whistleblowers & Research (EMPOWR) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan educational
organization dedicated to enhancing independent oversight of government and corporate wrongdoing.” See
https://empowr.us/mission/.
24
“Documents Reveal Political Bias and Abuse of the FBI Security Clearance Process,” Empower Oversight, June 11,
2024, https://empowr.us/documents-reveal-political-bias-and-abuse-of-the-fbi-security-clearance-process/.
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F. No More InformaEon Sharing with an Unpopular FBI
2. It also validates the suspicions of local law enforcement officers and re-affirms their
decision, as unfortunate as that decision may be, not to share acConable,
substanCve informaCon on criminal and other intelligence-related acCvity with the
FBI:
a. A law enforcement officer who served in a large, local law enforcement agency in
the Western U.S. expressed a parCcularly negaCve view of sharing informaCon
with the FBI:
When asked whether BRAVO 74 would ever go to the FBI to share intelligence
or ask for assistance, BRAVO 74 angrily replied, “FUCK NO! Don't trust them,
don't respect them...Overall they're generally useless!"
BRAVO 74 said the FBI used to be the premier agency years ago and really did
some great work.
Not anymore, according to BRAVO 74, who further stated FBI personnel are
viewed as inept, corrupt, and arrogant and who no longer function as an
independent and unbiased member of the law enforcement community.
BRAVO 74 said even other federal law enforcement agencies that interact with
BRAVO 74’s Task Force are known to avoid working with the FBI.25
25
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 74, pages 105-109.
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b. Even a former FBI employee with a deep legal background who analyzed and
reported intelligence at the FBI for more than ten (10) years, in addiCon to
serving in the U.S. Armed Forces in defense of our NaCon, “would absolutely not
provide the informa4on to the FBI”:
BRAVO 42 said he/she doubted the FBI’s ability – specifically, the ability of its
leadership – to professionally handle many criminal cases.
...
SOURCE: BRAVO 42 has served across four (4) decades in the U.S. Armed Forces
and the U.S. Intelligence Community, including serving for more than ten (10)
years at the FBI analyzing and repor<ng intelligence. With a deep legal
background, BRAVO 42 also served in supervisory and management roles in the
U.S. Government.
26
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 42, pages 128-131.
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G. Sources and Methodology
a. On July 19, 2023, the first in a series of anecdotal reports was received by the
Authors of this Report, indicaCng that in correlaCon with the public’s unfavorable
opinions of the FBI, local and state law enforcement personnel have in recent
years formed an increasingly negaCve opinion of the FBI.
b. In the first source report, a highly reliable and credible Source received
informaCon via an e-mail that the FBI and an FBI agent are considered persona
non grata by employees of both a local police department and a county
prosecutor’s office.
c. In the Source’s report, the FBI agent was characterized as overtly and poliCcally
biased because, according to the Source, “the agent had bragged it was his life’s
mission to hunt down ‘J-6’ offenders”. The Source also reported the FBI was an
organizaCon that “has lost almost all credibility locally and likely na4onally.”38
a. To validate this iniCal source report and others and to further explore an issue of
vital importance to the Public’s Safety and the NaConal Security of the United
States, the Authors of this Report, uClizing familiar informaCon-gathering
methods and tradecrac developed during decades of conducCng complex
criminal invesCgaCons and classified Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence
operaCons, issued a formal Request for InformaCon (RFI) on February 19, 2024.39
b. The RFI was issued naConwide to a select group of trusted security, intelligence
and law enforcement professionals bound by their connecCon to the FBI and
local law enforcement agencies across the country, with the following three (3)
objecCves:
i. “COLLECT the unfiltered opinions of the FBI’s security and public safety
partners in local, state and federal law enforcement to inventory, analyze
and report on their views of today’s FBI.”
38
“Report on Alarming Trends in FBI Special Agent Recruitment and Selection,” A National Alliance of Retired and
Active-Duty FBI Special Agents and Analysts, October 2023,
https://www.scribd.com/document/701275030/Report-on-FBI-Special-Agent-Recruitment-and-Selection.
39
See Appendix A, “Request for Information (RFI),” dated February 19, 2024, pages 217-222.
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ii. “ASSESS whether these disturbing examples of anE-FBI senEment are
isolated or representaEve of the prevailing views of security and law
enforcement professionals across the country.”
iii. “DETERMINE what impact, if any, the public’s percepEon of poliEcal bias
and weaponizaEon of the FBI have had on the quality of informaEon
sharing and interagency working relaEonships between the FBI and its
local, state and federal law enforcement partners.”
b. The final source report was received on June 5, 2024, bringing the total number
of independent Sources and Sub-sources to 32.
c. Every source report was verified and reviewed for accuracy with their respecCve
ReporCng Persons before the source reports were finalized and accepted for
inclusion into this Report.
b. Code names were used instead – ROMEO PAPA for ReporCng Persons and BRAVO
for Sources and Sub-sources – and each was randomly assigned a number for
tracking purposes.
c. Biographical data (to the extent that they did not reveal the idenCCes of the
ReporCng Persons, Sources and Sub-sources) were made available and are
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3. Security Clearance Reinstated
a. In response to complaints filed with the U.S. Department of JusCce Office of the
Inspector General (OIG), the FBI, on May 31, 2024, fully reinstated the security
clearance of an FBI whistleblower whom the FBI had “retaliated against” by
“falsely accusing (the whistleblower, a U.S. Marine Corps combat veteran) of
disloyalty to the United States”. The FBI “illegally suspend(ed) him without pay
for more than two years” for making protected disclosures regarding the
Congressional tesCmony of FBI Director Christopher Wray following the events in
and around the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021.41
c. And even when the FBI gets it wrong and reverses its own decision (as in the case
cited above), the intended, chilling impact of the FBI’s retaliaCon is achieved.
The vast majority of FBI personnel who want to say something because they see
something wrong with the FBI remain silent because they know the emoConal
toll would be too extreme and the risk to their financial security too high.
a. The FBI, many would argue, operates by its own set of unwriVen rules for
retaliaCon. It is for all pracCcal purposes unencumbered by Federal
Whistleblower ProtecCon Statutes.42
b. The only opCon remaining for FBI personnel and local law enforcement officers
witnessing an agency in decline is to report their direct, first-hand observaCons
to the American people from behind the shield of anonymity.
c. For these reasons, the idenCCes of the ReporCng Persons, Sources and Sub-
sources featured in this Report were not disclosed.
d. To relinquish this tacCcal advantage – to come out from behind protecCve cover -
would only enable corrupt FBI officials to further abuse their authority to
retaliate against anyone who dares to criCcize the FBI.
41
“FBI Whistleblower’s Security Clearance Reinstated in Full,” Empower Oversight, June 4, 2024,
https://empowr.us/fbi-whistleblowers-security-clearance-reinstated-in-full/.
42
“Compilation of Federal Whistleblower Protection Statutes,” Congressional Research Service, April 25, 2024,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/r/r46979.
- 36 -
c. As reported by the Society’s ExecuCve Director Nancy Savage, Director Wray
made the following comments during the meeCng with the Society’s Chapter
Chairs regarding the FBI’s “Partnership” with state and local law enforcement:
“The Director commented that the FBI has excellent rela4onships with state
and local law enforcement. He noted that FBI task forces have grown in
number and size. Despite law enforcement having staffing problems
universally, the FBI task forces have maintained their local and state task force
officers as other departments want to con4nue their partnerships with the FBI.
The FBI has approximately six thousand task force officers at the present 4me.
Only through these partnerships is the FBI able to deal with the increasing
threats to the United States. These partnerships are cri4cal to other law
enforcement agencies to deal with the criminal threats within their own
communi4es and jurisdic4ons.”45
c. And while anyone who fully supports American law enforcement would prefer to
wholeheartedly believe what Director Wray said is true – that all is right with the
FBI’s relaConship with law enforcement - it is difficult for the thoughsul, wary
observer to reconcile Director Wray’s unequivocally posiCve assessment with the
stark contrast of negaCve opinions and widely reported stories told by seasoned,
veteran local law enforcement officers.
45
Nancy Savage, “Society Chapter Chairs Visit the FBI Academy March 7, 2024,” the Grapevine Vol. 89, No. 2
(March/April 2024): 6. See Appendix C, pages 225-228.
46
To properly frame the context of Director Wray’s remarks, they were delivered as part of a featured event in an
orchestrated “dog and pony show” at the FBI Academy for an FBI-friendly audience. That there was no one there
who had the courage to challenge Director Wray in this setting was not unexpected.
- 38 -
3. Two Strikingly Different Versions of Reality
c. But when there is elevated inter-agency fricCon, and loss of trust issues linger as
unaddressed and unresolved, dubious proclamaCons - such as Director Wray’s
proclamaCon that the FBI’s relaConships with law enforcement are “excellent” -
not only create a false sense of insCtuConal stability and control, they can be
expected to deeply offend local law enforcement officers who feel their
intelligence is being insulted.
- 39 -
J. Highlights of the Raw Data: ValidaEng the Ten (10) Key Findings
a. The Sources and Sub-sources featured in this Report have served or are currently
serving in local law enforcement or the FBI and are considered for the purposes
of this Report Law Enforcement Subject MaVer Experts (SMEs).
b. Their reporCng in complete, raw form with available biographical data of the
ReporCng Persons, Sources and Sub-sources are provided later in this Report in
SecCon II.47
c. Relevant highlights of their reporCng that form the basis of each of the Report’s
ten (10) Key Findings are excerpted beginning on the following page, sorted by
each of their corresponding Key Findings for the reader to independently review
and evaluate.
vi. Local Law Enforcement Officers Feel Disrespected by FBI Special Agents
vii. Today’s Tone-Deaf FBI Disregards the Value of ReEred FBI Special Agents
d. NOTE: The ReporCng Persons (code name ROMEO PAPA) and the Sources and
Sub-sources (code name BRAVO) are assigned numbers both for tracking
purposes and to protect them from retaliaCon by the FBI.
47
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources and Sub-Sources,” pages 104-215.
- 40 -
NO TRUST FOR THE FBI OR DOJ
BRAVO 94 said he/she loves the United States of America but doesn’t trust the FBI or the U.S.
Department of Jus@ce (DOJ).
...
BRAVO 94 said other law enforcement agencies have built up a distrust of the FBI and the U.S.
Department of Jus@ce (DOJ) based on news reports of what BRAVO 94 called the FBI’s corrupt
handling of the January 6th defendants and the search of former U.S. President Donald J.
Trump’s Mar-a-Lago residence in Palm Beach, Florida on August 8, 2022.
BRAVO 94 said many locals, i.e. local law enforcement officers, believe they could be targeted
by the FBI and the U.S. Department of Jus@ce (DOJ) because of their love for the United States
of America and may be perceived as domes@c terrorists because of how they may vote.49
SOURCE: BRAVO 94 has more than 15 years of experience serving as a law enforcement officer
in a state law enforcement agency in the Southern U.S.
The FBI, according to BRAVO 82, is held in disdain by many of his/her local law enforcement
peers and is not considered an arm of law enforcement but rather a tool of the woke and liberal
political apparatus currently in power.
BRAVO 82 said simply, “The quality just isn't there at the FBI anymore. The pursuit of justice is
no longer their priority. It's just sad."50
SOURCE: BRAVO 82 has more than 25 years of law enforcement experience and is currently
serving as a supervisor in a large, local law enforcement agency. BRAVO 82 has been a
supervisor for a number of years, and his/her du<es have included the supervision of a number of
mul<-law enforcement agency Task Forces.
49
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 94, pages 110-111.
50
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 82, pages 196-199.
- 42 -
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS POLLED
BRAVO 29 said he/she spoke with numerous local law enforcement officers who are s@ll working
as beat/patrol officers for BRAVO 29’s former large, local law enforcement agency in the
Western U.S. Details of each officer’s background and the exact number of officers who spoke
with BRAVO 29 were not provided.
According to BRAVO 29, these local law enforcement officers from BRAVO 29’s former large,
local law enforcement agency do not have faith in or trust the word of, or any informa@on
provided by, any FBI Special Agent assigned to the FBI Field Office that operates in the area
where BRAVO 29’s former large, local law enforcement agency is located.51
SOURCE: BRAVO 29 is a highly decorated veteran of law enforcement, re<ring a]er serving for
nearly three (3) decades in a large, local law enforcement agency in the Western U.S.
During a lunch mee@ng with ROMEO PAPA 26, BRAVO 53 expressed disbelief and sadness at the
FBI's fall from its image as a once reputable and competent law enforcement agency.
BRAVO 53 said he/she was disgusted with the FBI's obvious poli@cal biases and focus on maeers
that are not significant threats to the Na@on.
BRAVO 53 believed the FBI should be focused on important issues like elec@on fraud,
transna@onal gangs and drugs, counterintelligence, poli@cal corrup@on, and terrorism – not
including Domes@c Terrorism (commonly referred to as DT) - that pose real, legi@mate threats
to the American public.
BRAVO 53 believed cases categorized as Domes@c Terrorism (DT) should not be viewed by the
FBI as compara@vely high priority cases because Domes@c Terrorism typically does not pose, in
BRAVO 53’s opinion, as serious a poten@al threat to the U.S. Homeland as, for example, the
threat posed by Interna@onal Terrorism.
51
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 29, pages 112-113.
- 43 -
TWO-TIERED INVESTIGATIVE PRIORITIES
BRAVO 53 said he/she cannot understand why the FBI is not going aber (the “an@-fascist”, far-
leb militant group known as) An@fa, BLM (Black Lives Maeer), and pro-Pales@nian rioters with
the same vigor the FBI brought to bear against individuals associated with the events in and
around the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021.
BRAVO 53 said that to the average American ci@zen, this apparent discrepancy in the way the
FBI sets its inves@ga@ve priori@es and deploys its personnel and resources does not seem right.52
SOURCE: BRAVO 53 is a 25-year veteran of law enforcement who re<red just under two (2) years
ago as a sergeant in the Major Crimes Division of a large, local law enforcement agency in the
Western U.S.
BRAVO 68 said he/she always held the FBI and its FBI Special Agents in high regard for the quality
of their inves@ga@ve work, professionalism, and technical support provided to his/her local law
enforcement agency throughout his/her career.
However, BRAVO 68 said his/her local law enforcement peers believe the FBI has gone off track
due to its poli@cally mo@vated leadership and focus on priori@es that do not keep the country
safe.
...
BRAVO 68 said his/her ac@ve-duty and re@red peers in local law enforcement all believe the FBI
is poli@cally mo@vated, and BRAVO 68 believed this percep@on damages the FBI’s credibility as
an organiza@on, making it more difficult for its front-line FBI Special Agents to gain public trust
and advance cases, which BRAVO 68 characterized as a significant safety hazard.
52
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 53, pages 125-126.
- 44 -
BRAVO 68 said he/she discouraged his/her son who is comple@ng his U.S. Armed Forces service
commitment from applying to the FBI because of the FBI’s terrible reputa@on. BRAVO 68 said
he/she would have encouraged his/her children to join the FBI several years ago, but not
anymore.53
SOURCE: BRAVO 68 is a veteran of local law enforcement who served on the command staff of a
local law enforcement agency located in the Western U.S.
BRAVO 97 did report, however, that he/she and his/her law enforcement peers are very aware
of some of the actions initiated and taken by the FBI against certain subjects in other locations
across the country.
BRAVO 97 said he/she and his/her law enforcement peers viewed these actions by the FBI as
inappropriate and politically motivated.
BRAVO 97 stated the FBI’s actions over the last few years have definitely helped to foment
distrust of the FBI by BRAVO 97 and some of his/her peers in his/her local law enforcement
agency.
BRAVO 97 said they would have to be convinced the FBI was not acting inappropriately or was
not motivated by politics before BRAVO 97 and his/her law enforcement peers would willingly
assist the FBI.54
SOURCE: BRAVO 97 is a law enforcement veteran with nearly three (3) decades of law
enforcement experience. BRAVO 97 is currently an ac<ve-duty law enforcement officer employed
by a large, local law enforcement agency in the Western U.S.
53
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 68, pages 117-119.
54
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 97, pages 114-115.
- 45 -
DISTRUST OF THE FBI
BRAVO 98 said that during his/her career at the FBI, he/she witnessed this early cri@cism of the
FBI’s management style bloom into distrust of the FBI.
This distrust, BRAVO 98 said, has grown exponen@ally over the past ten (10) years.
BRAVO 98 said the FBI’s once spotless reputa@on has been stained by constant media coverage
of scandals brought on by poor management decisions within FBI Headquarters and the Field.
...
BRAVO 98 said today’s FBI is not the FBI that BRAVO 98 joined. Today’s FBI, BRAVO 98 said, is
not the FBI he/she loves and wants so desperately to defend.
BRAVO 98 said his/her contemporary peers were trained as FBI Special Agents to be impar@al,
non-par@san and apoli@cal in their professional interac@ons, and they were told to avoid even
the appearance of impropriety.
Unfortunately, that is not what is being seen in today’s FBI, BRAVO 98 said.
Today, according to BRAVO 98, America is witnessing the results of the “cabal” of senior FBI
leaders who were so blatantly par@san in how they directed FBI inves@ga@ons into allega@ons
of Russian collusion, allega@ons that classified informa@on was mishandled, and Hunter Biden’s
laptop.
BRAVO 98 said Congressional inquiry has revealed the FBI’s posi@ons on these maeers were
clearly par@san, and the results have led to distrust of the FBI by the public and local law
enforcement.55
SOURCE: BRAVO 98 served for more than 25 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) in mul<ple FBI
Field Offices and at the FBI Academy in Quan<co, Virginia as an instructor.
55
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 98, pages 120-124.
- 46 -
POLITICIZATION OF THE FBI
Addi@onally, BRAVO 61 said there is a growing concern among re@red FBI personnel about the
ac@vi@es the FBI is currently engaging in, and according to BRAVO 61, many re@rees are alarmed
by the poli@ciza@on of the FBI.56
SOURCE: BRAVO 61 has served for more than 20 years in the FBI, including as an FBI Special
Agent (SA), FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), and staff instructor at the FBI Academy in
Quan<co, Virginia.
56
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 61, pages 193-194.
- 47 -
NO INFORMATION SHARING WITH THE FBI
When asked whether BRAVO 42 would volunteer informa@on about known criminal ac@vity to
the FBI, BRAVO 42 unequivocally said that while he/she would provide informa@on about
criminal ac@vity to local law enforcement, BRAVO 42 would absolutely not provide the
informa@on to the FBI.
BRAVO 42 said he/she doubted the FBI’s ability – specifically, the ability of its leadership – to
professionally handle many criminal cases.
...
BRAVO 42 said if the leadership at the FBI believed it were advantageous to do so, FBI leadership
would exploit any informa@on provided to them to violate the law and the Cons@tu@onal rights
of suspects who are under inves@ga@on, as well as innocent ci@zens.
...
BRAVO 42 concluded his/her remarks to ROMEO PAPA 85 by no@ng that if he/she (BRAVO 42)
would not provide informa@on to the FBI, members of the general public would also be less
likely to provide informa@on to the FBI. BRAVO 42 believed if that were, in fact, the case, the
lack of informa@on sharing with the FBI would be detrimental to public safety and the Na@onal
Security of the United States.58
SOURCE: BRAVO 42 has served across four (4) decades in the U.S. Armed Forces and the U.S.
Intelligence Community, including serving for more than ten (10) years at the FBI analyzing and
repor<ng intelligence. With a deep legal background, BRAVO 42 also served in supervisory and
management roles in the U.S. Government.
58
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 42, pages 128-131.
- 49 -
BRAVO 94 said he/she will never work with the U.S. Department of Jus@ce (DOJ) again and used
the word “pathe@c” to describe the DOJ and the FBI.
BRAVO 94 further described the FBI’s behavior as that of a Third World country, and he/she
believed the FBI should be dismantled and its personnel prosecuted and given long prison
sentences.
BRAVO 94 said current FBI Special Agents are too scared to do what is right.
According to BRAVO 94, there are FBI Special Agents who do not agree with the handling of
defendants linked to the events in and around the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January
6, 2021, but those same FBI Special Agents, BRAVO 94 said, are doing what they are told to do
so they do not ruin their careers.59
SOURCE: BRAVO 94 has more than 15 years of experience serving as a law enforcement officer
in a state law enforcement agency in the Southern U.S.
BRAVO 75 said he/she and his/her law enforcement peers believe command personnel at
today’s FBI are motivated by politics and are representative of the politicization of law
enforcement.
BRAVO 75 cited as examples the types of individuals and groups the FBI chooses to target.
Because of this negative perception, BRAVO 75 said he/she and his/her law enforcement peers
would be very reluctant to work with FBI Special Agents in the future.
Before they would agree to work with the FBI again, BRAVO 75 said he/she and his/her law
enforcement peers would demand a clear delineation of (1) the FBI’s reason – including the
legal predication – for choosing to open and conduct an investigation of a particular individual
or group and (2) the investigative methods the FBI plans to utilize to achieve its objectives.60
59
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 94, pages 110-111.
60
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 75, pages 132-133.
- 50 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 75 is a 20-year law enforcement veteran who re<red last year a]er working
numerous assignments, including patrol and gangs, for a large, local law enforcement agency
located in the Western U.S.
BRAVO 29 said that based on their personal contacts with the FBI Special Agents assigned to this
par@cular FBI Field Office, the ac@ve-duty local law enforcement officers viewed FBI Special
Agents as arrogant and unwilling to work as part of a team of equals.
...
BRAVO 29 further stated these ac@ve-duty local law enforcement officers from BRAVO 29’s
former large, local law enforcement agency will not willingly work with the FBI on joint
opera@ons.
BRAVO 29 said there were excep@ons, and those were, according to BRAVO 29, FBI Special
Agents who were assigned to the FBI Field Office’s bank robbery squad and tac@cal team.61
SOURCE: BRAVO 29 is a highly decorated veteran of law enforcement, re<ring a]er serving for
nearly three (3) decades in a large, local law enforcement agency in the Western U.S.
61
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 29, pages 112-113.
- 51 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 49 is a re<red law enforcement officer with more than 35 years of law
enforcement experience. BRAVO 49 served in a large, local law enforcement agency in the
Western U.S., and BRAVO 49 is also a graduate of the FBI Na<onal Academy (FBINA).
BRAVO 49 said he/she remains in contact with numerous active-duty and retired law
enforcement officers, and BRAVO 49 said he/she has found consensus among them that the
FBI’s political motivation driving the direction of its investigations is very apparent and
troubling.
BRAVO 49 said the consensus reached by his/her law enforcement peers would strongly
influence any decision by them to cooperate with the FBI in joint investigations, depending
upon the mission.
Additionally, BRAVO 49 said he/she believed how the FBI chooses its subjects and conducts
investigations are blatantly motivated by politics, and BRAVO 49 added the politicization of the
FBI makes him/her carefully consider whether or not he/she would work with the FBI.63
SOURCE: BRAVO 49 is a re<red law enforcement officer with more than 35 years of law
enforcement experience. BRAVO 49 served in a large, local law enforcement agency in the
Western U.S., and BRAVO 49 is also a graduate of the FBI Na<onal Academy (FBINA).
While aeending a local FBI Na@onal Academy Associates chapter event in 2023, BRAVO 92 asked
ROMEO PAPA 85 about the current state of the FBI. ROMEO PAPA 85 said the ques@on posed
by BRAVO 92 was unsolicited.
BRAVO 92 referenced news repor@ng about the FBI’s apparent poli@ciza@on, ci@ng as an
example the handling of the inves@ga@ons conducted and arrests made in connec@on with the
events in and around the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021.
63
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 49, pages 135-137.
- 53 -
PERCEIVED DECLINE OF THE FBI
BRAVO 92 did not have complaints about his/her interac@ons with FBI Special Agents in his/her
local area, but it was evident, based on observa@ons by ROMEO PAPA 85, that BRAVO 92 was
disappointed in the perceived decline of the FBI.
BRAVO 92 was one of two FBI Na@onal Academy graduates who aeended the local FBI Na@onal
Academy Associates chapter event in 2023.
According to ROMEO PAPA 85, both BRAVO 92 and the second FBI Na@onal Academy graduate
in aeendance raised concerns with ROMEO PAPA 85 about the current state of the FBI.
ROMEO PAPA 85 said inquiries like these are representa@ve of the type of interac@ons he/she
has with alumni of the FBI Na@onal Academy.64
SOURCE: BRAVO 92 currently serves as the Chief Execu<ve of a local law enforcement agency
located in the Northern region of the U.S. BRAVO 92 is also a graduate of the FBI Na<onal
Academy (FBINA) and a member of the FBI Na<onal Academy Associates, Inc. (FBINAA).
64
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 92, pages 138-139.
- 54 -
On at least one occasion, members of a second, FBI-led Task Force, according to BRAVO 65,
requested assistance from local law enforcement to execute an arrest or raid opera@on. BRAVO
65 said a local law enforcement agency refused to send marked units to assist.
BRAVO 65 said he/she did not know whether the refusal to send local law enforcement units to
assist was outright or veiled with a more subtle reply that “no units were currently available.”
To add to the underlying issues, BRAVO 65 said members of the FBI-led Task Force stated that
when inspec@on personnel from FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) conducted their inspec@on of the
Task Force, there seemed to be liele interest in Task Force opera@ons or the “mission”.
BRAVO 65 stated FBI Headquarters inspec@on personnel reportedly did not seem overly
interested in the sta@s@cal accomplishments of the Task Force but did, instead, seem interested
in knowing whether Task Force managers supported Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI).
BRAVO 65 said FBI Headquarters inspec@on personnel reportedly wanted members of the Task
Force to provide examples of how Task Force managers were advancing the DEI agenda,
including gender, transgender and gay rights.65
SOURCE: BRAVO 65 is a U.S. Armed Forces veteran who deployed to mul<ple loca<ons overseas
and who later served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory
Special Agent (SSA). Highly decorated for his/her service in the FBI, BRAVO 65 has been formally
recognized for his/her dedica<on to law enforcement by local, state and federal law enforcement
organiza<ons throughout the country.
65
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 65, pages 141-143.
- 56 -
TAKING ALL THE CREDIT
BRAVO 74 cited numerous examples of solid cases on the verge of being completed that were
“stolen” by the FBI from the law enforcement agency or department of origin for the sole
purpose of aggrandizing the FBI’s own self-promotion, despite putting little, if any, meaningful
work that impacted the cases’ overall outcomes.
Additionally, BRAVO 74 said that at case status meetings held by various law enforcement
groups, ongoing investigations were discussed to assist, support, and deconflict the various
resources utilized in this particular region of the State.
BRAVO 74 said that at these meetings, different Task Forces began to recognize a pattern: the
FBI always chose to go last at these briefings after listening to all of the intelligence and progress
reports, and then – and this happened on more than one occasion, according to BRAVO 74 - the
FBI would then advise Task Force members that the FBI would be taking over their
investigations and that the Task Force members were to relinquish control of all files and
Confidential Informants (CIs) to the FBI.
BRAVO 74 said that in such instances, little diplomacy was used by FBI personnel who simply
explained, “We have federal jurisdiction.” This, according to BRAVO 74, was the FBI’s normal,
all-encompassing response, which undermined any desire by Task Force members to work with
the FBI, and it effectively alienated the FBI from others in law enforcement.
BRAVO 74 said another egregious breach of trust by the FBI occurred when the FBI didn't take
over an entire case but instead “stole” highly valuable Confidential Informants (CIs) who had
often taken non-FBI Task Force members years to cultivate.
Many of these CIs, according to BRAVO 74, were the nexus to numerous other critical
investigations, many running concurrently. BRAVO 74 said that by removing the Task Force
members’ access to and control of these CIs, the FBI effectively damaged or destroyed many
other criminal cases being pursued by the law enforcement agencies or departments that
originated the investigations.
BRAVO 74 further stated that complaints about such transgressions to FBI supervisory
personnel rarely resulted in anything more than what BRAVO 74 described as pitiful justification
about “serving a greater good.”
- 57 -
And in a sad attempt to assuage the offended law enforcement agency or department, FBI
personnel in this particular jurisdiction, according to BRAVO 74, were known to occasionally
offer as a gift a Pelican brand briefcase – and often a used one - to the lead investigator whose
primary Confidential Informant (CI) had just been ripped away by the FBI.
BRAVO 74 said this became a bitter joke among a few on the Task Force who would say, “The
FBI just fucked me over, and all I got was this lousy briefcase.”66
SOURCE: BRAVO 74 served as a law enforcement officer in a large, local law enforcement agency
in the Western U.S.
BRAVO 99 advised ROMEO PAPA 13 that the FBI Supervisory Special Agent in charge of BRAVO
99’s FBI Resident Agency (also known as the FBI SSRA) did a very poor job of cul@va@ng liaison
contacts with outside law enforcement officers and their agencies.
BRAVO 99 said the FBI SSRA had rela@vely liele “street” experience prior to being assigned to
FBI Headquarters and then to the FBI Resident Agency where he/she served as the FBI SSRA.
According to BRAVO 99, the FBI Resident Agency where BRAVO 99 is currently assigned
par@cipated in two mul@-law enforcement agency Task Forces – a Joint Terrorism Task Force
(JTTF) and a Safe Streets Task Force (SSTF).
BRAVO 99 said par@cipa@on by local law enforcement officers in either Task Force was
considered a “plum assignment”.
Unfortunately, the FBI SSRA in charge of BRAVO 99’s FBI Resident Agency was arrogant,
according to BRAVO 99, who further stated the FBI SSRA projected a my-way-or-the-highway
autude onto members of the Task Forces, including significant liaison partners.
66
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 74, pages 105-109.
- 58 -
BRAVO 99 said that as a direct result of the FBI SSRA’s behavior and ac@ons, the Safe Streets
Task Force – or SSTF - that operated out of the FBI Resident Agency where BRAVO 99 is currently
assigned was closed following the departure of long-@me, highly valuable local law enforcement
partners.
During its most sta@s@cally produc@ve period, the SSTF, according to BRAVO 99, was comprised
of one (1) FBI Special Agent and approximately ten (10) local law enforcement officers, and it
was instrumental in conducing significant, long-term criminal cases.
Likewise, due to the FBI SSRA’s poor behavior, the FBI Resident Agency’s par@cipa@on in the
Joint Terrorism Task Force – the JTTF - was also terminated, according to BRAVO 99, who further
stated the FBI’s ability to effec@vely respond to significant terrorist events and violent crime
maeers was drama@cally diminished.
BRAVO 99 said the FBI’s reputa@on was needlessly tarnished because of the ac@ons of the FBI
SSRA in charge of the FBI Resident Agency, and what liele goodwill the FBI currently enjoys in
this par@cular FBI Resident Agency is due solely to the efforts of the FBI Special Agents who s@ll
serve there.
BRAVO 99 believes it will take a significant effort to rebuild the rela@onships between the FBI
and local law enforcement officers and their agencies.67
SOURCE: BRAVO 99 is employed by the FBI as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and is currently assigned
to an FBI Resident Agency (RA).
NOTE: FBI Resident Agencies are smaller, satellite offices operaCng remotely and
under the control and jurisdicCon of a larger FBI Field Office that serves as the
headquarters for the FBI in the area.
67
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 99, pages 144-146.
- 59 -
FBI JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE
BRAVO 44 said he/she received information regarding an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).
...
According to BRAVO 44, all but one of the local, state and federal agencies that were members
of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force have pulled out of the Task Force.
BRAVO 44 reported having indirect knowledge that the local, state and federal agencies pulled
out of the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) because the agencies believed the work at the
FBI’s JTTF did not justify the allocation and deployment of their officers and agents to the Task
Force.
Of greater concern was BRAVO 44’s reporting based on information received indirectly that the
local, state and federal agencies pulled out of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force because they
also believed there was no benefit to continuing to develop a working relationship with the
Task Force or the FBI.68
SOURCE: BRAVO 44 is a law enforcement officer with a state law enforcement agency in the
Eastern U.S. with more than 20 years of law enforcement experience.
NOTE: The location of the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the FBI Field
Office to which it is affiliated were not disclosed to protect BRAVO 44 from
retaliation by the FBI.
BRAVO 18 served as an FBI Special Agent for more than 20 years, and based on his/her first-
hand experience working as a member of a number of Task Forces, BRAVO 18 said he/she
learned that every law enforcement agency - whether it was local, state or federal - brought
something to the table, including knowledge, sources, manpower, capabili@es, resources,
perspec@ve and experience.
68
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 44, pages 147-148.
- 60 -
BRAVO 18 further stated that aber his/her first mul@-defendant inves@ga@on, he/she also
learned which Task Force members he/she could work with and what cri@cal resources their law
enforcement agencies could bring to the inves@ga@on.
More importantly, BRAVO 18 said that in order to conduct successful inves@ga@ons, the FBI
could not work in a vacuum.
BRAVO 18 said he/she advised everyone he/she worked with that it was important for all Task
Force members from every law enforcement agency to work together. When they don’t work
together and choose instead to work against each other, there is only one winner and that
winner, according to BRAVO 18, isn’t the inves@gator figh@ng crime, it’s the bad guy.69
SOURCE: BRAVO 18 served in the FBI for more than 30 years as a Professional Support employee
and later as an FBI Special Agent leading complex, long-term inves<ga<ons of major criminal
enterprises, including violent offenders profi<ng from the distribu<on of illegal narco<cs.
69
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 18, pages 149-152.
- 61 -
VIEWS FROM THE MIDWEST
BRAVO 65 also reported details of a conversa@on he/she had with the Director of a
regional/state law enforcement academy located in the Midwestern U.S.
BRAVO 65 said the Director of the law enforcement academy asked him/her, “What the hell is
going on at the FBI? It seems that the FBI is shooting itself in the foot. It’s not the FBI I
remember.”
The Director of the law enforcement academy advised BRAVO 65 that the FBI does not interact
with local law enforcement officers anymore and that the FBI does not return telephone calls.
BRAVO 65 said the Director also told him/her that the only time FBI personnel show up is when
they want something.
BRAVO 65 reported that at a law enforcement training conference, he/she spoke to law
enforcement officers from smaller law enforcement agencies who stated it is difficult for them
to receive training from the FBI.
In the past, according to BRAVO 65, FBI Police Instructors provided training on various topics,
but BRAVO 65 said the law enforcement officers told him/her that they don’t receive the
training they used to receive.71
SOURCE: BRAVO 65 is a U.S. Armed Forces veteran who deployed to mul<ple loca<ons overseas
and who later served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory
Special Agent (SSA). Highly decorated for his/her service in the FBI, BRAVO 65 has been formally
recognized for his/her dedica<on to law enforcement by local, state and federal law enforcement
organiza<ons throughout the country.
BRAVO 84 said he/she has worked with federal law enforcement agents in the past and is not
opposed to working with them.
BRAVO 84 further stated his/her local law enforcement agency has detec@ves currently assigned
to a federal drug Task Force.
71
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 65, pages 141-143.
- 63 -
BRAVO 84 said he/she has a good working rela@onship with personnel from the U.S. Aeorney’s
Office, and BRAVO 84 describes them as very capable but extremely busy.
In contrast, BRAVO 84 said he/she has very limited contact with FBI Special Agents and went on
to note that they are very difficult to contact.
BRAVO 84 indicated the FBI had changed and that he/she was concerned about FBI personnel
being “woke”.
...
BRAVO 84 said he/she has significant liaison contact with state law enforcement agencies.
BRAVO 84 further stated a majority of the intelligence his/her local law enforcement agency
receives comes from these state law enforcement agencies, not the FBI.72
SOURCE: BRAVO 84 is an ac<ve-duty law enforcement officer who serves as the head of a small
local law enforcement agency located in the Western U.S. between two rela<vely large
popula<on centers.
BRAVO 78 said he/she is generally frustrated with the lack of resources and support provided
by the FBI.
Very infrequently, BRAVO 78 or BRAVO 78’s local law enforcement agency will hear from the FBI,
and according to BRAVO 78, liaison with the FBI has fallen off because the FBI will only contact
BRAVO 78 or BRAVO 78’s local law enforcement agency when the FBI needs something specific
from them.
Addi@onally, BRAVO 78 said he/she has approached the FBI with cases that BRAVO 78 believed
could have possibly been inves@gated federally. BRAVO 78 said the FBI ini@ally showed interest
in BRAVO 78’s cases and, in fact, informed BRAVO 78 the cases would be opened by the FBI.
72
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 84, pages 156-158.
- 64 -
BRAVO 78 said some@mes months would go by before BRAVO 78 would hear back from the FBI,
only to receive word aber all that @me that liele to no work had been done by the FBI on some
of the cases.
BRAVO 78 said he/she has beeer working rela@onships with other federal law enforcement
agencies, such as the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administra@on (DEA) and the U.S. Secret Service
(USSS).73
SOURCE: BRAVO 78 is a local law enforcement officer in the Eastern U.S. with more than 20
years of experience, including extensive experience working alongside mul<ple federal law
enforcement agencies.
BRAVO 57 said he/she is completely confused by the role of today’s FBI and its priori@es.
Ci@ng one interac@on with the FBI, BRAVO 57 said he/she provided a substan@al fraud case to
the FBI for the FBI to inves@gate but never heard back from the FBI Special Agent who served as
the point of contact.
BRAVO 57 said that aber he/she made several calls, BRAVO 57 was finally able to reach the FBI
Special Agent who served as the point of contact only to be told the U.S. Aeorney’s Office
declined to prosecute the case.
Because of the FBI’s failure to communicate in a responsive and @mely fashion with BRAVO 57
and the FBI’s general lack of engagement with BRAVO 57 and BRAVO 57’s local law enforcement
agency, BRAVO 57 is now reluctant to bring any cases to the FBI.74
73
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 78, pages 159-160.
74
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 57, pages 161-162.
- 65 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 57 is a local law enforcement officer in the Eastern U.S. with more than ten (10)
years of experience.
BRAVO 81 said that for a number of years, he/she has repeatedly asked his/her local FBI Field
Office to provide support for training on a variety of topics but has received no assistance from
the FBI.
BRAVO 81 said that based on personal, direct knowledge, other local law enforcement agencies
have “given up” on asking for training support from the FBI.
BRAVO 81 said that when he/she was an FBI Special Agent, the FBI regularly provided training
to local law enforcement on a variety of topics as requested by local law enforcement agencies.
BRAVO 81 believed providing training to local law enforcement was cri@cal to developing strong
liaison @es with local law enforcement, adding the liaison was cri@cal to puung the FBI in a
posi@on to adequately address emerging threats.
BRAVO 81 cited one example involving the head of a local law enforcement agency who is also
a graduate of the FBI Na@onal Academy (FBINA).
...
BRAVO 81 said the FBI Na@onal Academy graduate asked the FBI for support to combat a
metastasizing drug trafficking threat in his/her jurisdic@on. The FBI Na@onal Academy
graduate’s law enforcement agency is located adjacent to a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
(also known as HIDTA).
BRAVO 81 said the FBI refused to provide any assistance to the FBI Na@onal Academy graduate’s
law enforcement agency.75
75
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 81, pages 170-176.
- 66 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 81 is a U.S. Armed Forces veteran who served for more than 20 years as an FBI
Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) in mul<ple FBI Field Offices and at FBI
Headquarters. A]er re<ring from the FBI, BRAVO 81 remained in government service, accep<ng
a posi<on as a member of the command staff of a law enforcement agency. BRAVO 81 now
serves as the head of the law enforcement agency.
The lieutenant, according to BRAVO 71, asked BRAVO 71 to contact the head of the lieutenant’s
local law enforcement agency.
The local law enforcement agency head - a graduate of the FBI’s Na@onal Academy (FBINA) –
was angry, according to BRAVO 71, because the agency head had asked the FBI for assistance in
connec@on with an ongoing, high-profile homicide case but had not received any responses
from the FBI.
...
MAKING IT RIGHT
BRAVO 71 said he/she immediately contacted the head of the lieutenant’s local law
enforcement agency and asked for and received an in-person mee@ng with the head of the
agency.
During the mee@ng, BRAVO 71 apologized to the local law enforcement agency head for the
FBI’s lack of response.
BRAVO 71 said he/she was then able to ini@ate contact with the unit at FBI Headquarters
(FBIHQ) that had been the subject of the local law enforcement agency head’s ini@al inquiry.
...
BRAVO 71 stated that at the conclusion of BRAVO 71’s mee@ng with the head of the lieutenant’s
local law enforcement agency, BRAVO 71 contacted by telephone the FBI Supervisory Special
Agent in charge of the FBI Resident Agency (also known as the SSRA) and briefed the FBI SSRA
on the FBI’s lack of response and BRAVO 71’s efforts to remedy it.
BRAVO 71 said he/she suggested/requested the FBI SSRA contact the head of the lieutenant’s
local law enforcement agency directly to rehabilitate the damage done.
- 67 -
According to BRAVO 71, the FBI SSRA responded by saying he/she (the FBI SSRA) “would call
(the local law enforcement agency head) in a day or two.”
BRAVO 71 said he/she was flabbergasted by the lack of concern exhibited by the FBI SSRA and
strongly suggested the FBI SSRA contact the head of the local law enforcement agency
immediately.
BRAVO 71 said he/she did not know whether the FBI SSRA ever did.
BRAVO 71 said he/she witnessed numerous incidents where the FBI SSRA failed to properly
handle liaison maeers.
According to BRAVO 71, the highest-ranking local representa@ve of another federal law
enforcement agency once expressed sympathy to BRAVO 71 because the ac@ons of the FBI SSRA
were reflec@ng poorly on the FBI.
BRAVO 71 said he/she believes that based on the results of employee surveys, this and other
issues were brought to the aeen@on of the FBI Field Office’s Execu@ve Management, but
according to BRAVO 71, there was no improvement in the FBI SSRA’s behavior.
...
BRAVO 71 said the FBI pays “lip service” to liaison and appears to view cul@va@ng rela@onships
with other law enforcement officers and their agencies as a “box checking” exercise conducted
primarily to support promo@ons of FBI managers.
The end result, according to BRAVO 71, is a culture at the FBI that (1) does not value local law
enforcement; (2) produces managers, not leaders; and (3) significantly damages rela@onships
with local law enforcement officers and their agencies that typically require years of concerted
effort by FBI personnel on the front lines to repair.76
SOURCE: BRAVO 71 re<red from the FBI a]er serving for more than 20 years as an FBI Special
Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA). BRAVO 71 is also an acorney.
76
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 71, page 163-166.
- 68 -
FBI RESPONSE WITHIN 24 HOURS
BRAVO 34 said the FBI used to adhere to a mandate that senders of all communications
addressed to the FBI would be acknowledged by the FBI within 24 hours of the receipt of the
communications and that the FBI Field Office handling the matter would be promptly notified.
BRAVO 34 said that is clearly no longer the case, regardless of the sender, except perhaps in
cases of Congressional inquiries.
BRAVO 34 said the telephone answering service at the FBI is horrible, adding that telephone
calls are either answered after 20-plus rings by an operator who often answers in an appalling
manner, or the calls go unanswered and then are rerouted to an automated system that leaves
much to be desired for an agency – the FBI – that is supposed to serve the public.77
SOURCE: BRAVO 34 is an expert security consultant with a deep legal background and more
than 20 years of service in the FBI, including as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory
Special Agent (SSA). BRAVO 34 is widely respected for his/her knowledge of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as well as FBI opera<ons and inves<ga<ons, and is sought a]er for his/her
exper<se on legal macers and challenges facing the FBI.
77
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 34, pages 183-187.
- 69 -
Based on these repeated observations, BRAVO 74 was left with the impression that FBI
personnel looked down on other agencies, often including other law enforcement agencies of
the federal government.78
SOURCE: BRAVO 74 served as a law enforcement officer in a large, local law enforcement agency in
the Western U.S.
The detec@ve, according to BRAVO 93, said – without hesita@on – that based on their experience
working with FBI Special Agents, the consensus among the detec@ve and his/her local law
enforcement peers is that FBI Special Agents “are a bunch of academics with no real interest or
experience in law enforcement.”
BRAVO 93 said the detec@ve further stated it is a common experience for FBI Special Agents to
look down or disrespect local law enforcement officers.
The excep@ons, according to the detec@ve, were FBI Special Agents who were assigned to the
local FBI Field Office’s bank robbery squad.79
SUB-SOURCE: BRAVO 93’s Sub-source is a local law enforcement officer – a patrol officer turned
detec<ve – who has served for 12 years and is s<ll ac<vely serving in a large, local law
enforcement agency in the Southern U.S.
78
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 74, pages 105-109.
79
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 93, pages 167-168.
- 71 -
BRAVO 81 said the FBI Special Agent made no offer of assistance or resources and did not ask
any ques@ons about evidence related to the shoo@ng of the state law enforcement officer.
In stark contrast, the State Highway Patrol, according to BRAVO 81, did call and ask what
assistance it could provide.
BRAVO 81 said he/she was “appalled” by the lack of concern by the FBI Special Agent and the
FBI Special Agent’s unwillingness to offer assistance.
Addi@onally, BRAVO 81 stated that given the seriousness of the shoo@ng and the response by
the agency heads from other law enforcement agencies, BRAVO 81 was shocked by the FBI’s
decision to delegate the responsibility of making official contact on this sensi@ve maeer to a
non-supervisory FBI Special Agent.
BRAVO 81 said this lack of professional considera@on demonstrated the arrogance of many FBI
Special Agents and FBI leadership directed toward local law enforcement, and the three (3)
other agency heads who responded to the hospital in support of the state law enforcement
officer who had been shot agreed with BRAVO 81’s assessment.
...
BRAVO 81 also noted the FBI has refused criminal referrals from his/her law enforcement
agency, saying that on two (2) occasions, BRAVO 81’s agency provided the FBI informa@on on
drug trafficking cases possibly linked to a Mexican Drug Trafficking Organiza@on (DTO).
BRAVO 81 said his/her assessment of these drug trafficking cases were based on his/her prior
federal inves@ga@ve experience as an FBI Special Agent. BRAVO 81 said he/she believed the
cases referred to the FBI also possibly met the standards for a RICO (Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organiza@ons) inves@ga@on.
According to BRAVO 81, the FBI declined to use the informa@on provided on the drug trafficking
cases.
BRAVO 81 noted that as an FBI Special Agent, he/she worked as part of a team inves@ga@ng
approximately 20 cases, including cases with @es to Mexican Drug Trafficking Organiza@ons
(DTOs).80
80
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 81, pages 170-176.
- 73 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 81 is a U.S. Armed Forces veteran who served for more than 20 years as an FBI
Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) in mul<ple FBI Field Offices and at FBI
Headquarters. A]er re<ring from the FBI, BRAVO 81 remained in government service, accep<ng
a posi<on as a member of the command staff of a law enforcement agency. BRAVO 81 now
serves as the head of the law enforcement agency.
BRAVO 27 described his/her aeempts to establish liaison with the local FBI Field Office in BRAVO
27’s jurisdic@on when he/she took command as the Chief Execu@ve of a local law enforcement
agency.
BRAVO 27 said he/she called his/her local FBI Field Office to schedule a “meet and greet” and
to introduce himself/herself because BRAVO 27 had moved in from another State and was new
to the area.
BRAVO 27, a re@red FBI Special Agent, expressed frustra@on because he/she could not reach a
live person via telephone at the local FBI Field Office.
In the message, BRAVO 27 iden@fied himself/herself as a re@red FBI Special Agent and current
head of a local law enforcement agency. BRAVO 27 said he/she requested his/her call be
returned.
BRAVO 27 was disappointed with what he/she described as the complete lack of a response
from the local FBI Field Office.
BRAVO 27, however, persisted and was finally able to reach an FBI Supervisory Special Agent
(SSA) on the telephone.
BRAVO 27 said the FBI Supervisory Special Agent agreed to an in-person mee@ng, but the
mee@ng, according to BRAVO 27, occurred “many months” aber BRAVO 27’s ini@al aeempt to
contact someone at the local FBI Field Office.
- 74 -
BRAVO 27 said the FBI Supervisory Special Agent was rela@vely new to the FBI Field Office and
apologized to BRAVO 27 for the absence of professional courtesy displayed by the FBI Field
Office when BRAVO 27’s ini@al request to conduct liaison with the FBI was ignored.
BRAVO 27 credited the FBI Supervisory Special Agent’s effort to repair the damage, but BRAVO
27 said he/she was disappointed by the ueer disregard for BRAVO 27’s aeempt to reach out to
the local FBI Field Office, par@cularly aber BRAVO 27 iden@fied himself/herself as a re@red FBI
Special Agent and the Chief Execu@ve of a local law enforcement agency.
BRAVO 27 said that type of behavior by the local FBI Field Office would have been completely
unacceptable during his/her career at the FBI.81
SOURCE: BRAVO 27 served for 20 years as an FBI Special Agent, and a]er re<ring from the FBI,
BRAVO 27 took command of a local law enforcement agency as the agency’s Chief Execu<ve.
BRAVO 33 said he/she raised a concern to an FBI Execu@ve Manager regarding the experience
of one of BRAVO 33’s friends who is the head of a local law enforcement agency.
BRAVO 33’s friend - the head of a local law enforcement agency - in his/her official capacity as
the agency head, aeempted to contact his/her local FBI Field Office by telephone, according to
BRAVO 33, to disseminate informa@on about criminal ac@vity of poten@al interest to the FBI.
The local law enforcement agency head, BRAVO 33 said, was unable to reach a live person at
the local FBI Field Office and was forced to leave a voicemail message.
BRAVO 33 said that in the message, the local law enforcement agency head (1) iden@fied
himself/herself as the head of a local law enforcement agency and (2) requested a return
telephone call.
BRAVO 33 said that aber a period of @me – BRAVO 33 did not say exactly how long – the same
local law enforcement agency head again aeempted to reach a live person at the FBI by
telephone, this @me by calling the local FBI Resident Agency (RA).
81
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 27, pages 177-179.
- 75 -
...
The head of the local law enforcement agency, according to BRAVO 33, was again unsuccessful
in his/her aeempt to speak to a live person at the FBI and was relegated to leaving a second
voicemail message.
BRAVO 33 said that aber receiving no response from the FBI, the head of the local law
enforcement agency finally opted to report the informa@on to the FBI’s Na@onal Threat
Opera@ons Center (NTOC), which is based in another region of the country.
BRAVO 33 said that upon hearing details of BRAVO 33’s friend’s repeated aeempts to reach a
live person at the local FBI Field Office and FBI Resident Agency, the FBI Execu@ve Manager who
was briefed on the story by BRAVO 33 dismissed the maeer as insignificant and concluded the
informa@on would be handled appropriately once it was reported to the FBI’s NTOC.
BRAVO 33 was trying to point out a poten@al deficiency – the lack of response by the local FBI
Field Office – for the benefit of the FBI Execu@ve Manager because the FBI Field Office was, at
the @me, under the control and supervision of the FBI Execu@ve Manager.
The FBI Execu@ve Manager, however, responded to BRAVO 33’s story with indifference and
defensiveness, BRAVO 33 said.82
SUB-SOURCE: BRAVO 33 re<red from the FBI a]er serving for more than 20 years as an FBI
Special Agent and is located in the Northern U.S. BRAVO 33’s Sub-source is the head of a local
law enforcement agency.
82
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 33, pages 180-182.
- 76 -
According to BRAVO 34, one of the vic@ms was defrauded out of more than half a million dollars
when fraudsters induced the vic@m to wire transfer money the vic@m had in his/her investment
bank accounts.
BRAVO 34 said the vic@m transferred the money to a bank in the U.S. The bank, according to
BRAVO 34, was based in a foreign country.
The vic@m, BRAVO 34 said, never heard from the fraudsters again and never got any of his/her
money back.
BRAVO 34 said a limited inquiry into the bank transac@on showed the account used to commit
the fraud was closed within six months aber the account was opened.
...
BRAVO 34 said a re@red FBI Special Agent with decades of experience inves@ga@ng fraud cases
authored a leeer that provided details of the online fraud and suppor@ng documenta@on.
The leeer, according to BRAVO 34, was sent to the head of an FBI Field Office who was asked to
ini@ate an inves@ga@on.
BRAVO 34 said the leeer and the request to inves@gate the fraud went unanswered.
Later, according to BRAVO 34, details of the online fraud were again brought to the attention
of the head of the FBI Field Office who stated the matter should be reported to the FBI’s Internet
Crime Complaint Center, also known as IC3 (see https://www.ic3.gov/).
BRAVO 34 said the head of the FBI Field Office was advised the matter had already been
reported to the IC3 not once but two times and no response was received.
According to BRAVO 34, the matter was then sent by the head of the FBI Field Office to a
subordinate member of FBI Field Office’s Executive Management Team.
BRAVO 34 said that approximately four (4) months had passed before word was received from
an active-duty FBI Special Agent who was assigned to the case.
The FBI Special Agent, according to BRAVO 34, believed there would be no way to locate and
arrest the fraudsters or recover the money because it was believed the money ended up in a
foreign country.
- 77 -
BRAVO 34 said the FBI Special Agent was advised detailed bank account, transactional and other
identifying information that would shed light on the account’s history, ownership, identification
documents used to open and close the account, as well as outgoing transactions by type and by
whom, could easily be obtained by way of a Federal Grand Jury Subpoena because of the type
of predicate offense.
In response to the guidance and expertise provided, the FBI Special Agent, according to BRAVO
34, said that obtaining and issuing a Federal Grand Jury Subpoena for bank records would be of
no avail since the money was believed to have been transferred to person(s) in a foreign
country.
BRAVO 34 said there was no way for the FBI Special Agent to know that without the actual bank
records, adding that without the bank records, the FBI Special Agent would not be able to
identify the fraudsters who were in the U.S. to open the accounts.
BRAVO 34 was frustrated by the FBI Field Office’s unsatisfactory response, the FBI Special
Agent’s incomplete knowledge of common investigative techniques, and the FBI’s overall lack
of interest and effort.
BRAVO 34 said he/she believed the bank’s conduct and due diligence should have clearly
merited an investigation and that cases like these do not resolve themselves.
They must be investigated, BRAVO 34 said, emphasizing the “I” in FBI stands for “Investigation”.
...
BRAVO 34 observed that historically at the FBI, referral of criminal matters from former and
retired FBI Special Agents generated a high-priority response from the FBI because as compared
to communications received from the general public, allegations of criminal activity referred to
the FBI by former and retired FBI Special Agents were vetted and FBI jurisdictional questions
answered and resolved, leading to the potential for greater investigative success and
apprehension of subjects.83
SOURCE: BRAVO 34 is an expert security consultant with a deep legal background and more
than 20 years of service in the FBI, including as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory
Special Agent (SSA). BRAVO 34 is widely respected for his/her knowledge of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as well as FBI opera<ons and inves<ga<ons, and is sought a]er for his/her
exper<se on legal macers and challenges facing the FBI.
83
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 34, pages 183-187.
- 78 -
FBI SPECIAL AGENTS ON THE PERIMETER
BRAVO 46 cited one example, recalling a take-down of a known felon with a violent criminal
history who was at the time believed to be armed.
BRAVO 46 said that while members of his/her multi-law enforcement agency Task Force were
making contact with the felon, BRAVO 46 observed two (2) FBI Special Agents on the perimeter
of the active containment area with their heads down, looking at their cellular telephones.
Their weapons, according to BRAVO 46, were slung/holstered, and the FBI Special Agents
continued to maintain this posture - apparently unaware contact was being made with the felon
– while other members of the Task Force were attempting to take the felon into custody.
BRAVO 46 said he/she verbally reprimanded the two (2) FBI Special Agents for their poor tactics,
critical lack of common sense, and disregard for officer safety.
BRAVO 46 said despite the fact that multiple FBI Special Agents are assigned to his/her multi-
law enforcement agency Task Force, only one or two of them actively participate in Field
activities.
Other non-FBI members of the Task Force, according to BRAVO 46, often discount the FBI’s
participation in Task Force activities because a majority of the FBI Special Agents assigned to
the Task Force rarely show up. BRAVO 46 said that if they do show up, the FBI Special Agents
assigned to the Task Force rarely contribute anything of significance.
...
BRAVO 46 said it is rare for non-FBI members of his/her multi-law enforcement agency Task
Force or any other Task Force or non-FBI investigator to seek out the FBI for assistance because
of the FBI’s lack of cooperation, lack of ambition or urgency, as well as the sub-standard quality
of FBI personnel and time delays.84
SOURCE: BRAVO 46 has more than 25 years of law enforcement experience and is currently
serving in a large, local law enforcement agency as the Officer In Charge (OIC) of a mul<-law
enforcement agency Task Force.
84
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 46, pages 189-192.
- 80 -
THE WORST BATCH OF FBI SPECIAL AGENTS
BRAVO 12 said he/she is not impressed with the caliber of the recent generation of FBI Special
Agents.
BRAVO 12 further stated he/she has worked closely with hundreds of FBI Special Agents over
the course of many years and without hesitation described today's generation of FBI Special
Agents as the worst batch of people due to their poor work ethic, sense of entitlement,
immaturity, pettiness, political biases, and unprofessionalism.
BRAVO 12 said he/she never before thought he/she would be thinking about counting down
the time until retirement, further stating he/she does not respect or want to work with most of
the FBI Special Agents in today's FBI.
...
BRAVO 12 said that almost every day, he/she observes several FBI Special Agents assigned to
his/her squad speaking for hours as if they are in high school all over again.
These FBI Special Agents, according to BRAVO 12, bad mouth their coworkers behind their backs
on various issues, speak highly of themselves, and discuss almost everything besides actually
doing their jobs. BRAVO 12 said this kind of behavior occurs in most squad areas throughout
the office.
BRAVO 12 said the FBI Special Agents of today are more interested in working collateral duties,
going to exciting arrests, and volunteering for Temporary Duty Assignments (TDYs) instead of
conducting investigations.
BRAVO 12 said that on several occasions, BRAVO 12 has been dumped on by both the squad’s
supervisor and FBI Special Agents who have asked BRAVO 12 to support their cases by creating
tactical products that they were just as skilled to produce themselves.
BRAVO 12 said he/she was once tasked to verbally brief FBI Executive Managers on a case when
it was the FBI Special Agent’s job as Case Agent to conduct the briefing.
BRAVO 12 added that when he/she completed producing tactical, written products and
provided hard copies to FBI Special Agents, the FBI Special Agents were typically too lazy to read
and discuss the findings of the reports.
- 81 -
According to BRAVO 12, he/she was asked several times in his/her role as an FBI Staff
Operations Specialist (SOS) to accompany FBI Special Agents to meetings with witnesses and
sources, only to discover the FBI Special Agents had never read the relevant reports or were not
prepared for the meeting.
BRAVO 12 said today’s FBI Special Agents are so arrogant that they believe they can simply wing
it during these interviews.
...
BRAVO 12 added today's FBI Special Agents believe they are above local and state investigators.
BRAVO 12 said that while riding as a passenger in an FBI Special Agent’s government vehicle,
the FBI Special Agent received a parking ticket, crushed it, and then threw it to the back seat as
if the FBI Special Agent were discarding a piece of trash. BRAVO 12 said the FBI Special Agent
said he/she did not care about the local violation, a statement that made BRAVO 12
uncomfortable with the FBI Special Agent’s character and integrity.85
SOURCE: BRAVO 12 is a seasoned FBI Staff Operations Specialist (SOS) who for many years
worked on Criminal, Counterterrorism (CT) and Counterintelligence (CI) squads in several
administrative support positions and as a tactical analyst.
BRAVO 82 said he/she and members of BRAVO 82’s multi-law enforcement agency Task Forces
have worked with or around FBI Special Agents on a daily basis for the past several years.
BRAVO 82 said a majority of these FBI Special Agents have between twelve (12) and fifteen (15)
years of experience and are considered valued members of their respective Task Forces.
However, BRAVO 82 said there is a noticeable difference – observed most notably during the
past few years - between the more experienced FBI Special Agents and younger FBI Special
Agents who, according to BRAVO 82, are not acclimating well and are not maintaining
acceptable law enforcement standards for investigations conducted by the Task Forces.
85
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 12, pages 200-203.
- 82 -
MILITARY AND PRIOR LAW ENFORCEMENT EXPERIENCE MATTERS
BRAVO 82 said FBI Special Agents with military or prior law enforcement experience seem to
integrate more effectively and more quickly into the Task Forces.
FBI Special Agents with no military, prior law enforcement, or similar backgrounds do not have
the same team-oriented mindset, according to BRAVO 82, that would enable them to more
successfully operate in a cooperative environment under stress.
BRAVO 82 said that it has been noted by many of BRAVO 82’s local law enforcement peers that
the change in climate, mission quality, and professionalism at the FBI during the past couple of
years have been much lower than expected.86
SOURCE: BRAVO 82 has more than 25 years of law enforcement experience and is currently
serving as a supervisor in a large, local law enforcement agency. BRAVO 82 has been a
supervisor for a number of years, and his/her du<es have included the supervision of a number of
mul<-law enforcement agency Task Forces.
When asked to provide concrete examples of how the FBI’s reputa@on nega@vely impacts its
working rela@onship with local law enforcement, BRAVO 81 said that as the head of a law
enforcement agency, he/she would be reluctant to hire former or re@red FBI Special Agents as
law enforcement officers.
...
BRAVO 81 said none of the employees in his/her law enforcement agency want to work for the
FBI.
Several employees, however, have applied to work for other federal law enforcement agencies,
including the U.S. Marshals Service, BRAVO 81 said.
86
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 82, pages 196-199.
- 83 -
BRAVO 81 said whenever his/her employees spoke of the FBI, they were almost always speaking
of the FBI “to make fun of them.”
BRAVO 81 also noted the FBI Special Agents who visited his/her law enforcement agency were
dressed unprofessionally, almost always without collared shirts, coats or @es. BRAVO 81 said
they looked like “homeless people” and “ragamuffins”.87
SOURCE: BRAVO 81 is a U.S. Armed Forces veteran who served for more than 20 years as an FBI
Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) in mul<ple FBI Field Offices and at FBI
Headquarters. A]er re<ring from the FBI, BRAVO 81 remained in government service, accep<ng
a posi<on as a member of the command staff of a law enforcement agency. BRAVO 81 now
serves as the head of the law enforcement agency.
BRAVO 34 believed the relative decline in praiseworthy work by the FBI is likely due to the
paucity of FBI Special Agents who actually investigate cases as sole Case Agents singularly
responsible for working cases from the very first communications that open cases to the
sentencing of subjects.
According to BRAVO 34, FBI Special Agents often work non-prosecutable cases that are not
subject to scrutiny by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, review by Federal Grand Juries, cross-
examination by skilled defense attorneys, or oversight by federal judges.88
SOURCE: BRAVO 34 is an expert security consultant with a deep legal background and more
than 20 years of service in the FBI, including as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory
Special Agent (SSA). BRAVO 34 is widely respected for his/her knowledge of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as well as FBI opera<ons and inves<ga<ons, and is sought a]er for his/her
exper<se on legal macers and challenges facing the FBI.
87
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 81, pages 170-176.
88
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 34, pages 183-187.
- 84 -
FBI’S MICRO-MANAGERS
BRAVO 58 recalled several incidents when FBI Special Agents in the Field would work over ten
(10) hours on a case overnight, only to receive a call or text from an FBI Manager asking why the
FBI Special Agents in the Field were not in the office (at the start of the standard workday) around
8:00 a.m. or (at the end of the standard workday) at 5:00 p.m.
BRAVO 58 said he/she was shocked that the FBI would promote people who were so peey and
uncaring of their own people who were risking their lives to fight crime.
BRAVO 58 worked as a mid-level manager for his/her law enforcement agency, and BRAVO 58
said he/she rarely interacted directly with FBI Supervisory Special Agents (SSAs), FBI Assistant
Special Agents In Charge (ASACs), or the FBI Special Agent In Charge (SAC) unless there was an
opportunity for those FBI supervisory personnel or members of FBI Execu@ve Management to
promote themselves posi@vely in the press.90
SOURCE: BRAVO 58’s law enforcement experience stretches across 25 years and includes
assignments ranging from liaison between his/her law enforcement agency head and the local
government to assignments in various specialized units, including as a member of Task Forces
inves<ga<ng violent crimes, gangs, and drug trafficking. BRAVO 58 re<red as a sergeant in 2021
from a large law enforcement agency located in the Western U.S. BRAVO 58 currently works as a
corporate security professional employed by a Fortune 100 Company.
FBI supervisory personnel, BRAVO 34 said, have risen through the ranks with very little
experience and success as Case Agents leading an investigation.
BRAVO 34 said the experience of some FBI supervisory personnel is limited to working as
members of multi-law enforcement agency Task Forces where responsibility for the success of
an investigation is placed on the Task Force overall and not on the individual FBI Special Agent
assigned to each Task Force.
90
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 58, pages 204-206.
- 86 -
BRAVO 34 called this a huge shortcoming, resulting in positions at FBI Headquarters populated
by supervisory personnel who no longer have the direct and singularly personal street
experience of seasoned FBI Special Agents from years past.
BRAVO 34 said supervisory personnel at FBI Headquarters are often promoted from the position
of FBI Special Agent in the field after less than five (5) years of actual street experience.
They are assigned prematurely, according to BRAVO 34, with the task of providing oversight of
other, more senior FBI Special Agents with more street experience.91
SOURCE: BRAVO 34 is an expert security consultant with a deep legal background and more
than 20 years of service in the FBI, including as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory
Special Agent (SSA). BRAVO 34 is widely respected for his/her knowledge of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as well as FBI opera<ons and inves<ga<ons, and is sought a]er for his/her
exper<se on legal macers and challenges facing the FBI.
According to BRAVO 98, the FBI’s promo@on process has long been a “go along to get along”
process of self-promo@on, and BRAVO 98 said those seeking promo@on simply need to raise
their hands to advance.
In the FBI, FBI Special Agents and other FBI personnel write their own Form FD-954 to self-
promote their experiences, BRAVO 98 said. This self-promo@on process, according to BRAVO
98, has clearly skewed the quality of personnel who are being promoted within the FBI and has
increased the “tribalism” that is occurring within the FBI.
BRAVO 98 said that while no system to iden@fy and select personnel for promo@on is perfect,
local law enforcement does require specific management skill sets and qualifica@ons prior to
advancement.
Local law enforcement, BRAVO 98 said, uses peer review, comple@on of specific management
courses, and an established path for advancement.
The FBI would benefit from such an approach, BRAVO 98 said, because while the FBI promotes
managers, local law enforcement, as a result of its skills- and qualifica@ons-based processes,
promotes leaders.
91
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 34, pages 183-187.
- 87 -
BRAVO 98 said the FBI needs selfless leaders, not more managers.92
SOURCE: BRAVO 98 served for more than 25 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) in mul<ple FBI
Field Offices and at the FBI Academy in Quan<co, Virginia as an instructor.
BRAVO 68 recalled a mee@ng he/she had with a re@red FBI Special Agent In Charge (SAC) who
was at the @me of the mee@ng working for a Big Tech company.
BRAVO 68 said the mee@ng took place in the office of the re@red FBI Special Agent In Charge
who had on display several plaques commemora@ng his/her FBI promo@ons through the years.
BRAVO 68 noted the dates on the plaques indicated the re@red FBI Special Agent In Charge had
moved from one FBI supervisory posi@on to another typically every year to 18 months.
FBI Execu@ve Management, BRAVO 68 said, rotate too frequently and are not engaged or have
the necessary amount of @me to build rela@onships based on trust with local law enforcement.93
SOURCE: BRAVO 68 is a veteran of local law enforcement who served on the command staff of a
local law enforcement agency located in the Western U.S.
BRAVO 63 said he/she conducted inspec@ons of FBI Field Offices as a first-line inspector and
team leader, part of a team of inspectors that operated under the authority and direc@on of a
Chief Inspector assigned to FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ).
92
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 98, pages 120-124.
93
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 68, pages 117-119.
- 88 -
BRAVO 63 said that in the process of obtaining his/her cer@fica@on to conduct inspec@ons of
FBI Field Offices, BRAVO 63 learned every inspec@on included interviewing the FBI Field Offices’
local and state law enforcement partners to obtain their feedback on the status and condi@on
of their working rela@onships with FBI Field Offices.
According to BRAVO 63, feedback from the FBI Field Offices’ law enforcement partners became
notably worse aber then-FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III (who served in that capacity from
September 4, 2001 to September 4, 2013) implemented the FBI’s first five-year “up-or-out”
promo@onal program.
...
Previously, before the “up-or-out” promo@onal program was implemented, FBI supervisors
assigned to criminal squads, Task Forces, and other assignments requiring significant law
enforcement liaison were usually less transitory and more sta@onary, according to BRAVO 63,
allowing FBI supervisors and their law enforcement partners to take the necessary @me to
develop long-term working rela@onships, trust, and respect.
BRAVO 63 said that during the FBI Field Office inspec@ons in which he/she took part, the FBI
Field Offices’ law enforcement partners stated this was no longer the case.
BRAVO 63 said FBI Field Offices’ law enforcement partners reported on their evalua@ons that it
was no longer worth their effort to aeempt to develop a working rela@onship with the FBI
supervisors who served as their contacts because the FBI supervisors would be reassigned to
another posi@on in another loca@on typically within a year or two.
A comment commonly made by the FBI Field Offices’ law enforcement partners, according to
BRAVO 63, was that just as the FBI supervisors were learning the process, the FBI supervisors
would be reassigned.
BRAVO 63 said FBI Field Offices’ law enforcement partners also did not believe it was worth
their effort to con@nue educa@ng and working with the FBI because they knew FBI supervisors
would be moved before any real benefit could be realized.
- 89 -
BRAVO 63 said despite the fact that transitory FBI supervisory personnel was a consistent
cri@cism and regularly reported by first-line inspectors, BRAVO 63 did not know if the issue of
transitory FBI supervisory personnel was ever reported to FBI Headquarters.
According to BRAVO 63, the Chief Inspector determined what contents of the final inspec@on
report would be shared with FBI Headquarters and the heads of the FBI Field Offices that were
inspected.94
SOURCE: BRAVO 63 served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) in mul<ple FBI Field Offices before entering the private sector.
BRAVO 63 currently provides expert consul<ng services and instruc<on on law enforcement
macers.
NOTE: The FBI’s “up-or-out” promoConal program required FBI Field Office
Supervisory Special Agents (SSAs) – squad-level, Grade GS-14 supervisors – to
transfer “up” to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. within a fixed, pre-
determined number of years (iniCally, five (5) years when the program was first
implemented) OR step “out” of the promoConal track and accept a demoCon
back down to the posiCon of a non-supervisory Grade GS-13 level FBI Special
Agent. The “up-or-out” promoConal program was implemented as part of the
FBI’s aVempt to fill persistent vacancies of supervisory posiCons at FBI
Headquarters.
94
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 63, pages 213-215.
- 90 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 46 has more than 25 years of law enforcement experience and is currently
serving in a large, local law enforcement agency as the Officer In Charge (OIC) of a mul<-law
enforcement agency Task Force.
BRAVO 82 was asked to identify internal problems the FBI might want to focus on to improve
overall as a law enforcement agency.
BRAVO 82 said the FBI does not take constructive criticism from the outside, i.e. from external
sources, well at all.
Even when shortcomings and deficiencies are repeatedly brought to the attention of FBI
supervisory personnel in the Field or FBI Executive Management, BRAVO 82 said, “They (the
FBI) are terrible at policing themselves.”
BRAVO 82 said emphatically that he/she and BRAVO 82’s local law enforcement peers
personally view the FBI’s ego and arrogance as undermining the organization.
BRAVO 82 said, “The new generation of (FBI) agent(s) are very full of themselves and blatantly
look down on other (law enforcement) agencies...”
BRAVO 82 said the most friction with and distrust of the FBI is caused by what the FBI Academy
(at Quantico, Virginia) is telling FBI New Agent Trainees.
BRAVO 82 said proclamations made to FBI New Agent Trainees that they are “the best LE (law
enforcement) agency in the land”, that they are members of “the premier agency...(with)
jurisdiction over all others”, and that “LE (law enforcement) throughout the country look(s) up
to you” are very far from the truth.96
96
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 82, pages 196-199.
- 92 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 82 has more than 25 years of law enforcement experience and is currently
serving as a supervisor in a large, local law enforcement agency. BRAVO 82 has been a
supervisor for a number of years, and his/her du<es have included the supervision of a number of
mul<-law enforcement agency Task Forces.
BRAVO 61 said each FBI New Agent Trainee class is designed to hold a total of 200 New Agent
Trainees (NATs) who are divided into four (4) sec@ons of 50 NATs each.
BRAVO 61 further stated the FBI is currently only able to fill two (2) of the four (4) sec@ons of an
FBI New Agent Trainee class and that recrui@ng efforts by the FBI to hire FBI Special Agent
candidates are proving unsuccessful.
According to BRAVO 61, the FBI does not have any formal curriculum aimed at educa@ng FBI
New Agent Trainees on the need to develop good rela@onships with local, state, tribal or
interna@onal law enforcement partners.
The only @me “liaison” is men@oned to FBI New Agent Trainees, according to BRAVO 61, is when
seasoned FBI Special Agents from the Field become instructors at the FBI Academy.
BRAVO 61 said that even then, lessons on developing good working rela@onships with law
enforcement officers from other agencies is sporadic at best and incidental to the instruc@on
currently provided.97
SOURCE: BRAVO 61 has served for more than 20 years in the FBI, including as an FBI Special
Agent (SA), FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), and staff instructor at the FBI Academy in
Quan<co, Virginia.
97
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 61, pages 193-194.
- 93 -
Nancy Savage, “discussed the new Wellness Center being built at the (FBI)
Academy” in response to a quesCon from one of the Chapter Chairs.
The Society magazine arCcle goes on to report that the new Wellness Center at
the FBI Academy “will have exercise and rehabilita4on equipment, as well as
space for yoga and medita4on classes. They are also taught breathing
techniques (emphasis added).”99
99
Nancy Savage, “Society Chapter Chairs Visit the FBI Academy March 7, 2024,” the Grapevine Vol. 89, No. 2
(March/April 2024): 8. See Appendix C, pages 225-228.
- 95 -
K. RecommendaEons
1. No maVer who or which organizaCon(s) bear some, most or all of the blame –
whether it is the FBI or local law enforcement or both – reporCng by highly credible
and well-placed Sources and Sub-sources with direct, first-hand knowledge of local
law enforcement’s assessment of today’s FBI shows in the aggregate a criCcal loss of
trust and alarming deficiencies in the quality of informaCon sharing and open
cooperaCon between local law enforcement agencies and the FBI.
2. These deficiencies are puwng the American people at greater, unnecessary risk.
3. And while the evidence detailed extensively in this Report is enCrely anecdotal, the
Authors of this Report – with the benefit of mulCple generaCons of professional
experience, knowledge of FBI operaCons, and experCse on local law enforcement
maVers – believe the requisite level of proof has been met to trigger grave public
concern and an immediate, bi-parCsan response by the appropriate Congressional
CommiVees responsible for oversight of the U.S. Department of JusCce and the FBI.
4. At stake are no less than the Public’s Safety and America’s NaConal Security, and in
line with the promise of their oath to always serve the American people first, the
Authors of this Report propose for consideraCon the following two (2)
recommendaCons:
b. CALL on the American people, and by extension the Congress, to advocate for
bold, administraEve acEon to change the leadership of the FBI.
5. RECOMMENDATION #1:
i. The NaConal Alliance of reCred and acCve-duty FBI Special Agents and
Analysts working in close coordinaCon with trusted local law enforcement
partners recommends the House CommiVee on the Judiciary, the Select
SubcommiVee on the WeaponizaCon of the Federal Government, and/or the
House CommiVee on Oversight and Accountability obtain and review copies
of the FBI’s own FBI InspecCon Division records produced in connecCon with
FBI Field Office inspecCons.
- 96 -
ii. Because the FBI rouCnely conducts its own internal inspecCons of FBI Field
Offices, the FBI – more specifically, the FBI InspecCon Division at FBI
Headquarters – maintains records of the reported status and condiCon of
each FBI Field Office’s relaConship with local law enforcement.
iv. BRAVO 86, a 20-plus year veteran of the FBI who during his/her career was
assigned to the FBI InspecCon Division at FBI Headquarters, provided the
following informaCon based on first-hand knowledge of the FBI’s inspecCon
process, which includes guidance for Congressional invesCgators on where to
find historical data required to saCsfy their responsibility to conduct oversight
of the U.S. Department of JusCce and the FBI:
BRAVO 86 said the FBI’s Inspec@on Division (INSD) conducts inspec@ons of FBI Field
Offices and FBI Divisions at FBI Headquarters on a rota@onal basis every few years.
In some cases, according to BRAVO 86, inspec@ons are ordered by the FBI Director’s
Office aber significant high-profile incidents, reports of misconduct, poor
performance by the FBI Field Office Execu@ve Management Team, and/or a
breakdown in communica@on between the FBI Field Office and local and state law
enforcement agencies located in the FBI Field Office’s Area of Opera@ons.
...
BRAVO 86 said that often, before their arrival at an FBI Field Office, the inspectors
have already spent weeks reviewing the FBI Field Office and its performance based
on FBI metrics, complaints, and general perceptions of the FBI Field Office by
members of local and state law enforcement partners in the FBI Field Office’s Area
of Operations.
...
- 97 -
The deficiencies are meticulously documented as part of the FBI Inspection
Division’s record keeping process, and BRAVO 86 added the documents are
maintained by the FBI’s Inspection Division at FBI Headquarters and copies are
forwarded to the FBI Director’s Office at the conclusion of the inspection.
...
...
BRAVO 86 said the FBI Inspection Division’s final report on each inspection of an FBI
Field Office includes a section that details findings related to the status and
condition of the FBI Field Office’s relationship with local and state law enforcement.
BRAVO 86 further stated it would be very easy administratively for the FBI
Inspection Division to assemble these reports and provide them to Congress for
review and oversight of the deteriorating relationship of late between the FBI and
local and state law enforcement.100
SOURCE: BRAVO 86 is a senior corporate execu<ve who served in the U.S. Armed
Forces and later in the FBI for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and
FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA). BRAVO 86 was known by his/her peers at the
FBI and other law enforcement agencies as a highly mo<vated inves<gator who led
complex Counterterrorism opera<ons in the U.S. and overseas. In addi<on to his/her
accomplishments as a Counterterrorism inves<gator, BRAVO 86 par<cipated in the
inspec<ons of several FBI Field Offices while assigned to the Inspec<on Division at FBI
Headquarters.
100
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 86, pages 208-212.
- 98 -
6. RECOMMENDATION #2:
i. The NaConal Alliance of reCred and acCve-duty FBI Special Agents and
Analysts working in close coordinaCon with trusted local law enforcement
partners are calling on the American people, and by extension the Congress,
to advocate for the resignaCon of FBI Director Christopher Wray.
ii. Mr. Wray was a career U.S. Department of JusCce lawyer who never served as
a law enforcement officer or FBI Special Agent,101 and the lack of experience
working patrol in a local, county, or state law enforcement agency or
operaCng as an 1811 Series invesCgator in any federal law enforcement
agency made him from the outset fundamentally unqualified to lead the FBI.
iii. And as confirmed by Sources and Sub-sources featured in this Report, this
missing piece in Mr. Wray’s extensive record of commendable government
service was, in retrospect, predicCve of how he has failed as FBI Director to
provide the leadership necessary to establish a disCnctly pervasive, agency-
wide culture of mutual respect for and open cooperaCon with local law
enforcement partners.
iv. The consequences of Mr. Wray’s performance as FBI Director are in this
Report well-documented, and compounding Mr. Wray’s failure is his inability
in the nearly seven (7) years since his tenure as FBI Director began102 to
muster the self-awareness to understand and publicly acknowledge what is
readily apparent to local law enforcement officers across the country: “The
FBI Director Needs Law Enforcement Experience.”
101
“Directors, Then and Now,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed 2024,
https://www.fbi.gov/history/directors/christopher-wray.
102
FBI Director Christopher Wray’s tenure as FBI Director began on August 2, 2017.
- 99 -
v. ReporCng by BRAVO 68, a law enforcement veteran who served on the
command staff of a local law enforcement agency in the Western U.S., is
representaCve of the assessment shared by law enforcement professionals:
BRAVO 68 said it is not right that the FBI Director is typically a lawyer with no first-
hand experience as a law enforcement officer.
BRAVO 68 further stated the FBI's problems start at the top and cascade down to
the front-line troops, and BRAVO 68 asked – paraphrasing here - if the FBI Director
has never conducted law enforcement opera@ons, how can the FBI Director serve
as the best advocate for the FBI and its staff?103
vi. Under the leadership of a new FBI Director with law enforcement experience,
the FBI can do beVer as a member agency of the American law enforcement
community.
vii. In fact, the FBI can do beVer by replacing FBI personnel in leadership
posiCons throughout the agency at all levels.
103
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 68, pages 117-119.
- 100 -
L. Conclusion
1. Calling for the resignaCon of an FBI Director is an extreme measure of last resort.
4. But the NaConal Alliance of reCred and acCve-duty FBI Special Agents and Analysts
guided by the promise of their oath to “support and defend the ConsCtuCon of the
United States”107 and to faithfully serve the American people were compelled and
duty-bound to use their considerable professional experience, extensive network of
trusted local law enforcement partners, and insCtuConal knowledge of FBI
operaCons to present for full transparency and review the Key Findings and
RecommendaCons detailed in this Report.
5. And precisely because this Report is so highly criCcal of the FBI, its Authors, Sources
and Sub-sources will predictably be targeted for idenCficaCon, personal aVacks, and
retaliaCon by the most ineffecCve, defensively minded FBI personnel and ExecuCve
Managers who will, with rare excepCon, actually do nothing to resolve the issues.
Based on past behavior, they will instead aVack the criCcs and ignore the criCcism.108
Internally, they will “go along to get along”,109 and they will conCnue to prioriCze
their personal self-interests and obsession with their next promoCons110 rather than
stand up on principle to make it right with local law enforcement for - first and
foremost – the health and well-being of the American people.
7. At stake are no less than the Public’s Safety and America’s NaConal Security, and unCl
the loss of trust in the FBI and the working relaConship between the FBI and local
law enforcement are repaired under the guidance of stronger, more “effecCve” FBI
leadership, the American people will remain at greater risk to exploitaCon and aVack
by highly moCvated violent criminals, terrorist organizaCons, and our NaCon’s
adversaries who view this low point in the FBI’s history as the perfect opportunity to
do harm.
107
Title 5, PART III, Subpart B, CHAPTER 33, SUBCHAPTER II - OATH OF OFFICE, Office of the Law Revision Counsel,
United States Code, accessed June 30, 2024, https://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=80&page=424.
108
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 82, pages 196-199.
109
See Section II, “Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources,” for reporting by BRAVO 98, pages 120-124.
110
See Key Finding #9, Section J, “Highlights of the Raw Data: Validating the Ten (10) Key Findings,” pages 85-90.
- 103 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 74
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | 25 Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 9, 2024 and March 10, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 31), a
local law enforcement veteran with a highly specialized skill set who served with disCncCon for
nearly three (3) decades in a large, local law enforcement agency in the Western U.S. and who
designed and delivered advanced in-service training that significantly enhanced the health and
safety of law enforcement officers in his/her agency, voluntarily provided the following
informaCon obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename BRAVO 74):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 74 later served as a law enforcement officer in a large, local law enforcement agency in
the Western U.S. BRAVO 74 received numerous commendaCons for outstanding bravery, as
well as for his/her invesCgaCve skills. BRAVO 74 was involved in mulCple shooCngs during
his/her law enforcement career and was selected for coveted specialty assignments based on
his/her professionalism, unique skill set, background, and capabiliCes. BRAVO 74 is also
recognized by his/her peers for developing high quality intelligence assets involving numerous
law enforcement agencies at the local, state and federal levels.
Based on his/her experience working with and around FBI Special Agents on a semi-regular
basis for almost ten (10) years while assigned to a mulC-law enforcement agency Task Force,
- 105 -
BRAVO 74 responded to the quesCon “What did you think of them?” by staCng bluntly that
he/she did not trust FBI personnel, nor did anyone else on the Task Force.
BRAVO 74 said it wasn’t a personal matter regarding a random FBI Special Agent or specific
office or group from the FBI but all FBI personnel in general. They almost always came across
as arrogant, aloof and condescending, according to BRAVO 74, with little, if any, tactical skills to
support themselves or the safety of their team while out on the streets.
BRAVO 74 further stated FBI Special Agents would often awkwardly bring up their university
level educations or law degrees in failed attempts to impress or legitimize their individual
credibility.
BRAVO 74 said, “The FBI agents often think they're the smartest guys in the room, just ask
them..."
As for their ability on the streets, BRAVO 74 added, "Tactically, the FBI are soup
sandwiches. The lone exception that I saw were the HRT (Hostage Rescue Team) guys."
SHAMELESS SELF-PROMOTION
According to BRAVO 74, numerous Task Force members with whom he/she worked had
impressive military backgrounds, were combat veterans, or were distinguished street cops from
their respective departments who earned their colleagues’ respect based on their skills,
accomplishments, teamwork, and selfless commitment in the pursuit of justice.
BRAVO 74 said this was in direct contrast to the seemingly shameless self-promotion and
arrogance projected by many FBI Special Agents (SAs) and FBI Supervisory Special Agents
(SSAs).
BRAVO 74 said that on several occasions, one particular FBI Special Agent with whom he/she
and others on the Task Force worked would act in a friendly and cooperative manner when in
the company of Task Force members only to immediately become cold and distant when the
FBI Special Agent and fellow Task Force members were at an FBI facility in the presence of
other FBI personnel or FBI supervisors.
Based on these repeated observations, BRAVO 74 was left with the impression that FBI
personnel looked down on other agencies, often including other law enforcement agencies of
the federal government.
- 106 -
NO MORAL COMPASS
BRAVO 74 said that if being perceived as cocky, arrogant, and tactically inept wasn't a big
enough problem for the image projected by the FBI and the resulting damage to its once
vaunted reputation and prestige, FBI personnel are also viewed by many as untrustworthy,
unreliable, and operating without a moral compass.
BRAVO 74 cited numerous examples of solid cases on the verge of being completed that were
“stolen” by the FBI from the law enforcement agency or department of origin for the sole
purpose of aggrandizing the FBI’s own self-promotion, despite putting little, if any, meaningful
work that impacted the cases’ overall outcomes.
Additionally, BRAVO 74 said that at case status meetings held by various law enforcement
groups, ongoing investigations were discussed to assist, support, and deconflict the various
resources utilized in this particular region of the State.
BRAVO 74 said that at these meetings, different Task Forces began to recognize a pattern: the
FBI always chose to go last at these briefings after listening to all of the intelligence and
progress reports, and then – and this happened on more than one occasion, according to
BRAVO 74 - the FBI would then advise Task Force members that the FBI would be taking over
their investigations and that the Task Force members were to relinquish control of all files and
Confidential Informants (CIs) to the FBI.
BRAVO 74 said that in such instances, little diplomacy was used by FBI personnel who simply
explained, “We have federal jurisdiction.” This, according to BRAVO 74, was the FBI’s normal,
all-encompassing response, which undermined any desire by Task Force members to work with
the FBI, and it effectively alienated the FBI from others in law enforcement.
BRAVO 74 said another egregious breach of trust by the FBI occurred when the FBI didn't take
over an entire case but instead “stole” highly valuable Confidential Informants (CIs) who had
often taken non-FBI Task Force members years to cultivate.
Many of these CIs, according to BRAVO 74, were the nexus to numerous other critical
investigations, many running concurrently. BRAVO 74 said that by removing the Task Force
members’ access to and control of these CIs, the FBI effectively damaged or destroyed many
- 107 -
other criminal cases being pursued by the law enforcement agencies or departments that
originated the investigations.
BRAVO 74 further stated that complaints about such transgressions to FBI supervisory
personnel rarely resulted in anything more than what BRAVO 74 described as pitiful justification
about “serving a greater good.”
And in a sad attempt to assuage the offended law enforcement agency or department, FBI
personnel in this particular jurisdiction, according to BRAVO 74, were known to occasionally
offer as a gift a Pelican brand briefcase – and often a used one - to the lead investigator whose
primary Confidential Informant (CI) had just been ripped away by the FBI.
BRAVO 74 said this became a bitter joke among a few on the Task Force who would say, “The
FBI just fucked me over, and all I got was this lousy briefcase.”
BRAVO 74 said it was later learned that many of these highly valuable Confidential Informants
(CIs) pilfered by the FBI were entered into the FBI's informant database and falsely claimed by
the FBI as being developed by a specific FBI Field Office or FBI Special Agent.
And according to BRAVO 74, the FBI would then often neglect or forget about the stolen CIs for
months or years, regrettably leading some of the CIs to contact their original handler from the
local law enforcement agency or department to ask why no one followed up with them.
BRAVO 74 said some of these CIs were ranking members of criminal enterprises, compromised
executives of international corporations, as well as government officials, to name a few.
When asked whether BRAVO 74 would ever go to the FBI to share intelligence or ask for
assistance, BRAVO 74 angrily replied, “FUCK NO! Don't trust them, don't respect them...Overall
they're generally useless!"
BRAVO 74 said the FBI used to be the premier agency years ago and really did some great work.
Not anymore, according to BRAVO 74, who further stated FBI personnel are viewed as inept,
corrupt, and arrogant and who no longer function as an independent and unbiased member of
the law enforcement community.
BRAVO 74 said even other federal law enforcement agencies that interact with BRAVO 74’s
Task Force are known to avoid working with the FBI.
- 108 -
The perception of today's FBI, according to BRAVO 74, could not be further from the once
noble, revered and proudly heralded foundation of Fidelity, Bravery and Integrity.
#####
- 109 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 94
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | 12 Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 17, 2024 and March 29, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 43), a
veteran of the FBI who served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) and who invesCgated organized crime, complex white collar
crime, suspected terrorists and terrorist organizaCons, voluntarily provided the following
informaCon obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename BRAVO 94):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 94 has more than 15 years of experience serving as a law enforcement officer in a state
law enforcement agency. BRAVO 94 has worked in mulC-law enforcement agency Task Force
environments and is currently a member of a Task Force that includes FBI Special Agents.
ROMEO PAPA 43 has known BRAVO 94 for 12 years. Based on ROMEO PAPA 43’s professional
assessment, BRAVO 94 is reliable and had direct access to the following informaCon provided by
BRAVO 94 in October 2023.
BRAVO 94 said he/she loves the United States of America but doesn’t trust the FBI or the U.S.
Department of JusCce (DOJ).
BRAVO 94 said he/she will never work with the U.S. Department of JusCce (DOJ) again and used
the word “patheCc” to describe the DOJ and the FBI.
- 110 -
BRAVO 94 further described the FBI’s behavior as that of a Third World country, and he/she
believed the FBI should be dismantled and its personnel prosecuted and given long prison
sentences.
BRAVO 94 said current FBI Special Agents are too scared to do what is right.
According to BRAVO 94, there are FBI Special Agents who do not agree with the handling of
defendants linked to the events in and around the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 6,
2021, but those same FBI Special Agents, BRAVO 94 said, are doing what they are told to do so
they do not ruin their careers.
BRAVO 94 added FBI Special Agents on the job today just want to work cases and do not want
to be caught up in the FBI’s corrupt behavior.
BRAVO 94 said other law enforcement agencies have built up a distrust of the FBI and the U.S.
Department of JusCce (DOJ) based on news reports of what BRAVO 94 called the FBI’s corrupt
handling of the January 6th defendants and the search of former U.S. President Donald J.
Trump’s Mar-a-Lago residence in Palm Beach, Florida on August 8, 2022.
BRAVO 94 said many locals, i.e. local law enforcement officers, believe they could be targeted by
the FBI and the U.S. Department of JusCce (DOJ) because of their love for the United States of
America and may be perceived as domesCc terrorists because of how they may vote.
#####
- 111 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 29
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | 17 Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On April 7, 2024 and April 15, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 76), a
veteran of the U.S. Armed Forces who later served for more than 25 years as an FBI Special
Agent (SA) in mulCple FBI Field Offices and who as a widely respected leader in the military and
the FBI has maintained close personal and professional Ces with prominent members of local,
state and federal law enforcement communiCes across the country, voluntarily provided the
following informaCon obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename BRAVO 29):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 29 is a highly decorated veteran of law enforcement, reCring acer serving for nearly
three (3) decades in a large, local law enforcement agency in the Western U.S. BRAVO 29’s law
enforcement career included service as a tacCcal team leader.
ROMEO PAPA 76 has known BRAVO 29 for 17 years as both a work colleague and as a close,
personal friend. ROMEO PAPA 76 holds BRAVO 29 in the highest regard for his/her honesty and
integrity, and ROMEO PAPA 76 characterizes BRAVO 29’s quality of reporCng as reliable and
consistent throughout the years.
BRAVO 29 said he/she spoke with numerous local law enforcement officers who are sCll working
as beat/patrol officers for BRAVO 29’s former large, local law enforcement agency in the
Western U.S. Details of each officer’s background and the exact number of officers who spoke
with BRAVO 29 were not provided.
- 112 -
According to BRAVO 29, these local law enforcement officers from BRAVO 29’s former large,
local law enforcement agency do not have faith in or trust the word of, or any informaCon
provided by, any FBI Special Agent assigned to the FBI Field Office that operates in the area
where BRAVO 29’s former large, local law enforcement agency is located.
BRAVO 29 said that based on their personal contacts with the FBI Special Agents assigned to this
parCcular FBI Field Office, the acCve-duty local law enforcement officers viewed FBI Special
Agents as arrogant and unwilling to work as part of a team of equals.
NOTE: The loca<on of the FBI Field Office cited by BRAVO 29 was not disclosed to
protect BRAVO 29 and his/her local law enforcement peers from retalia<on by the
FBI.
BRAVO 29 further stated these acCve-duty local law enforcement officers from BRAVO 29’s
former large, local law enforcement agency will not willingly work with the FBI on joint
operaCons.
BRAVO 29 said there were excepCons, and those were, according to BRAVO 29, FBI Special
Agents who were assigned to the FBI Field Office’s bank robbery squad and tacCcal team.
#####
- 113 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 97
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | Almost Two (2) Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 30, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 16), a reCred FBI Special
Agent (SA) who for more than 25 years invesCgated major narcoCcs and other criminal
violaCons and who as a highly respected cerCfied instructor trained FBI and other law
enforcement personnel, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained first-hand from
a human source (Codename BRAVO 97):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 97 is a law enforcement veteran with nearly three (3) decades of law enforcement
experience. BRAVO 97 is currently an acCve-duty law enforcement officer employed by a large,
local law enforcement agency in the Western U.S.
ROMEO PAPA 16 said he/she has known BRAVO 97 for almost two (2) years. ROMEO PAPA 16
added that he/she and BRAVO 97 know many of the same local law enforcement officers from
BRAVO 97’s agency.
ROMEO PAPA 16 characterized BRAVO 97’s character and integrity as beyond reproach, and
according to ROMEO PAPA 16, BRAVO 97 had direct access to the informaCon provided.
BRAVO 97 said his/her direct interacCons with the FBI throughout his/her law enforcement
career were infrequent.
- 114 -
BRAVO 97 said that when he/she did work with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies,
BRAVO 97 did so because he/she was called upon, typically on an “as needed” basis, to
augment exisCng Task Force staffing levels in support of certain invesCgaCons.
BRAVO 97 said that on those occasions, he/she never noted any discordant attitudes or
behavior by the FBI Special Agents with whom BRAVO 97 interacted. BRAVO 97 said they were
professional and hard-working.
BRAVO 97 did report, however, that he/she and his/her law enforcement peers are very aware
of some of the actions initiated and taken by the FBI against certain subjects in other locations
across the country.
BRAVO 97 said he/she and his/her law enforcement peers viewed these actions by the FBI as
inappropriate and politically motivated.
BRAVO 97 stated the FBI’s actions over the last few years have definitely helped to foment
distrust of the FBI by BRAVO 97 and some of his/her peers in his/her local law enforcement
agency.
BRAVO 97 said they would have to be convinced the FBI was not acting inappropriately or was
not motivated by politics before BRAVO 97 and his/her law enforcement peers would willingly
assist the FBI.
#####
- 115 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 68
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | 14 Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On April 6, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 26), a Board-CerCfied
Corporate Security Professional who served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA)
and FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) and who now leads security programs as a Senior
Corporate ExecuCve, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained first-hand from a
human source (Codename BRAVO 68):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 68 is a veteran of local law enforcement who served on the command staff of a local law
enforcement agency located in the Western U.S.
ROMEO PAPA 26 has known BRAVO 68 for 14 years, and they first met when BRAVO 68 was
overseeing his/her local law enforcement agency’s tacCcal team, as well as the detecCves
assigned to several state and federal Violent Crime, Drug, and Counterterrorism Task Forces.
BRAVO 68 reCred from law enforcement acer a disCnguished career and now owns a security
consulCng business.
ROMEO PAPA 26 holds BRAVO 68 in high regard for his/her law enforcement service and
leadership. ROMEO PAPA 26 said BRAVO 68 is highly reliable and his/her character and integrity
are beyond reproach.
- 117 -
BRAVO 68 said he/she always held the FBI and its FBI Special Agents in high regard for the
quality of their invesCgaCve work, professionalism, and technical support provided to his/her
local law enforcement agency throughout his/her career.
However, BRAVO 68 said his/her local law enforcement peers believe the FBI has gone off track
due to its poliCcally moCvated leadership and focus on prioriCes that do not keep the country
safe.
As a law enforcement veteran who served as a high-ranking member of his/her local law
enforcement agency’s command staff, BRAVO 68 said he/she believed the FBI Director should
have a law enforcement background.
BRAVO 68 said it is not right that the FBI Director is typically a lawyer with no first-hand
experience as a law enforcement officer.
BRAVO 68 further stated the FBI's problems start at the top and cascade down to the front-line
troops, and BRAVO 68 asked – paraphrasing here - if the FBI Director has never conducted law
enforcement operaCons, how can the FBI Director serve as the best advocate for the FBI and its
staff?
BRAVO 68 said his/her acCve-duty and reCred peers in local law enforcement all believe the FBI
is poliCcally moCvated, and BRAVO 68 believed this percepCon damages the FBI’s credibility as
an organizaCon, making it more difficult for its front-line FBI Special Agents to gain public trust
and advance cases, which BRAVO 68 characterized as a significant safety hazard.
BRAVO 68 said he/she discouraged his/her son who is compleCng his U.S. Armed Forces service
commitment from applying to the FBI because of the FBI’s terrible reputaCon. BRAVO 68 said
he/she would have encouraged his/her children to join the FBI several years ago, but not
anymore.
BRAVO 68 recalled a meeCng he/she had with a reCred FBI Special Agent In Charge (SAC) who
was at the Cme of the meeCng working for a Big Tech company.
BRAVO 68 said the meeCng took place in the office of the reCred FBI Special Agent In Charge
who had on display several plaques commemoraCng his/her FBI promoCons through the years.
- 118 -
BRAVO 68 noted the dates on the plaques indicated the reCred FBI Special Agent In Charge had
moved from one FBI supervisory posiCon to another typically every year to 18 months.
FBI ExecuCve Management, BRAVO 68 said, rotate too frequently and are not engaged or have
the necessary amount of Cme to build relaConships based on trust with local law enforcement.
BRAVO 68 said he/she hopes the FBI will reverse its course because countless disasters have
been associated with the organizaCon.
#####
- 119 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 98
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | More Than 25 Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On June 2, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 52), a former federal law
enforcement officer and reCred FBI Special Agent who for more than a decade led classified
Counterintelligence operaCons and invesCgated criminal Public CorrupCon subjects and who
currently operates in mulCple States as a licensed invesCgator and Board-cerCfied security
professional, received the following informaCon obtained first-hand from a human source
(Codename BRAVO 98):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 98 served for more than 25 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) in mulCple FBI Field
Offices and at the FBI Academy in QuanCco, Virginia as an instructor.
Highly sought acer for his/her experCse on specialty training and law enforcement maVers,
BRAVO 98 is a licensed invesCgator with extensive knowledge of the law, and BRAVO 98
maintains a trusted network of close contacts in local, state and federal law enforcement
communiCes across the country.
ROMEO PAPA 52 has known BRAVO 98 for more than 25 years. ROMEO PAPA 52 and BRAVO 98
served in the same FBI Field Office, and working as part of a team, they parCcipated in the
execuCon of a number of court-authorized federal search and arrest warrants.
ROMEO PAPA 52 said BRAVO 98’s character and integrity are beyond reproach. BRAVO 98’s
credibility as a source is highly reliable, and according to ROMEO PAPA 52, BRAVO 98 had direct
access to the informaCon provided.
- 120 -
BRAVO 98 said during his/her career at the FBI, he/she worked closely with local law
enforcement.
BRAVO 98 said he/she was assigned to a mulC-law enforcement agency Gang Task Force early in
his/her career and later worked as a member of a Crimes Against Children Task Force.
BRAVO 98 said he/she also spent a number of years operaCng an evidence recovery program
that mainly assisted local law enforcement with the collecCon of evidence in unresolved cases.
BRAVO 98 said local law enforcement always complimented the FBI on the resources it brought
to the table, but local law enforcement, BRAVO 98 said, was also ocen criCcal of the FBI’s
management style.
BRAVO 98 said that during his/her career at the FBI, he/she witnessed this early criCcism of the
FBI’s management style bloom into distrust of the FBI.
This distrust, BRAVO 98 said, has grown exponenCally over the past ten (10) years.
BRAVO 98 said the FBI’s once spotless reputaCon has been stained by constant media coverage
of scandals brought on by poor management decisions within FBI Headquarters and the Field.
BRAVO 98 said that before and acer reCrement from the FBI, BRAVO 98’s iniCal interacCons
with his/her local law enforcement peers focused not on their professional work together as
peers but rather on the latest media reports of the failures of FBI management.
BRAVO 98 cited the following examples of FBI management failures: (1) the text messages
between Former FBI AVorney Lisa Page and Former FBI Deputy Assistant Director Peter Strzok,
(2) Former FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe’s acCons during the 2016 elecCon cycle, and (3)
then-FBI Director James B. Comey’s announcement on July 5, 2016 that the FBI was
recommending no charges be brought against then-Democratic U.S. Presidential Nominee
Hillary R. Clinton in connection with the use of a private e-mail server located in the basement
of Clinton’s New York home during her tenure as U.S. Secretary of State. Then-FBI Director
Comey’s announcement came approximately one (1) month after Clinton clinched the
Democratic Nomination for U.S. President.
BRAVO 98 said then-FBI Director Comey did not have the authority to recommend that no
charges be brought against Clinton, and BRAVO 98 added then-FBI Director Comey’s decision
- 121 -
(to usurp the authority of the U.S. Attorney General, as determined by the U.S. Department of
Justice Office of the Inspector General) was previously unheard of by an FBI Director.
BRAVO 98 said that during a recent speech delivered to reCred FBI Special Agents, a former FBI
Deputy Director spoke of the events cited above and expressed that his greatest concern for the
FBI was the “tribalism” that was emerging from within the FBI.
BRAVO 98 further stated that what the former FBI Deputy Director referred to as “tribalism” can
be more clearly defined as “poliCcal parCsanship”.
BRAVO 98 said that in both FBI Headquarters and emerging in FBI Field Offices is an “us vs.
them” mindset.
This “tribalism”, according to BRAVO 98, is creeping into decisions made by FBI management on
personnel maVers, whether and how to open invesCgaCons, disciplinary decisions, and how
informaCon is reported.
BRAVO 98 said his/her local law enforcement peers see these decisions made by FBI
management playing out in the media, and their quesCon to BRAVO 98 is “Is this true?”
BRAVO 98 said that sadly, he/she must confirm their concerns and say it is true.
BRAVO 98 said today’s FBI is not the FBI that BRAVO 98 joined. Today’s FBI, BRAVO 98 said, is
not the FBI he/she loves and wants so desperately to defend.
BRAVO 98 said his/her contemporary peers were trained as FBI Special Agents to be imparCal,
non-parCsan and apoliCcal in their professional interacCons, and they were told to avoid even
the appearance of impropriety.
Unfortunately, that is not what is being seen in today’s FBI, BRAVO 98 said.
Today, according to BRAVO 98, America is witnessing the results of the “cabal” of senior FBI
leaders who were so blatantly parCsan in how they directed FBI invesCgaCons into allegaCons of
Russian collusion, allegaCons that classified informaCon was mishandled, and Hunter Biden’s
laptop.
- 122 -
BRAVO 98 said Congressional inquiry has revealed the FBI’s posiCons on these maVers were
clearly parCsan, and the results have led to distrust of the FBI by the public and local law
enforcement.
BRAVO 98 said that while all law enforcement agencies have their challenges with personnel,
the FBI has been, and rightly so, held to a higher standard.
Local law enforcement partners, according to BRAVO 98, interact with and rightly judge their
encounters with FBI Special Agents. BRAVO 98 said that while most interacCons are posiCve,
local law enforcement partners occasionally cannot believe an individual is actually an FBI
Special Agent or worse, an FBI supervisor.
BRAVO 98 said that in his/her opinion, senior FBI Special Agents would resoundingly agree that
the FBI has a leadership crisis.
According to BRAVO 98, the FBI’s promoCon process has long been a “go along to get along”
process of self-promoCon, and BRAVO 98 said those seeking promoCon simply need to raise
their hands to advance.
In the FBI, FBI Special Agents and other FBI personnel write their own Form FD-954 to self-
promote their experiences, BRAVO 98 said. This self-promoCon process, according to BRAVO
98, has clearly skewed the quality of personnel who are being promoted within the FBI and has
increased the “tribalism” that is occurring within the FBI.
BRAVO 98 said that while no system to idenCfy and select personnel for promoCon is perfect,
local law enforcement does require specific management skill sets and qualificaCons prior to
advancement.
Local law enforcement, BRAVO 98 said, uses peer review, compleCon of specific management
courses, and an established path for advancement.
The FBI would benefit from such an approach, BRAVO 98 said, because while the FBI promotes
managers, local law enforcement, as a result of its skills- and qualificaCons-based processes,
promotes leaders.
BRAVO 98 said the FBI needs selfless leaders, not more managers.
- 123 -
ONE OF THE GOOD FBI SPECIAL AGENTS
BRAVO 98 said that since reCring, he/she has worked with many reCred and current local law
enforcement officers.
BRAVO 98 said he/she is ocen introduced in group sewngs as “one of the good FBI agents.”
BRAVO 98 said that while he/she is always flaVered by the introducCon, the fact that BRAVO 98
is introduced this way clearly shows how local law enforcement presumes to perceive today’s
FBI.
The FBI’s constant missteps and failure to be transparent and take correcCve acCon will,
according to BRAVO 98, conCnue to worsen the FBI’s current negaCve reputaCon.
#####
- 124 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 53
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | More than Twelve (12) Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 22, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 26), a Board-CerCfied
Corporate Security Professional who served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA)
and FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) and who now leads security programs as a Senior
Corporate ExecuCve, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained first-hand from a
human source (Codename BRAVO 53):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 53 is a 25-year veteran of law enforcement who reCred just under two (2) years ago as a
sergeant in the Major Crimes Division of a large, local law enforcement agency in the Western
U.S. BRAVO 53 worked in patrol and on all types of invesCgaCons, including with the FBI for
almost 20 years on several local and federal Task Forces.
ROMEO PAPA 26 has known BRAVO 53 for more than twelve (12) years, and according to
ROMEO PAPA 26, BRAVO 53 earned a reputaCon as a stellar law enforcement officer with a no-
bullshit kind of awtude.
During a lunch meeCng with ROMEO PAPA 26, BRAVO 53 expressed disbelief and sadness at the
FBI's fall from its image as a once reputable and competent law enforcement agency.
BRAVO 53 said he/she was disgusted with the FBI's obvious poliCcal biases and focus on maVers
that are not significant threats to the NaCon.
- 125 -
BRAVO 53 believed the FBI should be focused on important issues like elecCon fraud,
transnaConal gangs and drugs, counterintelligence, poliCcal corrupCon, and terrorism – not
including DomesCc Terrorism (commonly referred to as DT) - that pose real, legiCmate threats
to the American public.
BRAVO 53 believed cases categorized as DomesCc Terrorism (DT) should not be viewed by the
FBI as comparaCvely high priority cases because DomesCc Terrorism typically does not pose, in
BRAVO 53’s opinion, as serious a potenCal threat to the U.S. Homeland as, for example, the
threat posed by InternaConal Terrorism.
BRAVO 53 said he/she cannot understand why the FBI is not going acer (the “anC-fascist”, far-
lec militant group known as) AnCfa, BLM (Black Lives MaVer), and pro-PalesCnian rioters with
the same vigor the FBI brought to bear against individuals associated with the events in and
around the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021.
BRAVO 53 said that to the average American ciCzen, this apparent discrepancy in the way the
FBI sets its invesCgaCve prioriCes and deploys its personnel and resources does not seem right.
BRAVO 53 said the only thing that gives him/her hope is knowing people like ROMEO PAPA 26
and acCve-duty FBI personnel who are sCll fulfilling their oaths have not allowed their personal
poliCcs to improperly influence their behavior and acCviCes at work.
#####
- 126 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 42
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | Several Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On February 15, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 85), a U.S. Armed Forces
veteran and former local law enforcement officer who later served for more than 20 years as an
FBI Special Agent (SA) and who as a law enforcement standards expert provides administraCve
support to law enforcement operaCons, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained
first-hand from a human source (Codename BRAVO 42):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 42 has served across four (4) decades in the U.S. Armed Forces and the U.S. Intelligence
Community, including serving for more than ten (10) years at the FBI analyzing and reporCng
intelligence. With a deep legal background, BRAVO 42 also served in supervisory and
management roles in the U.S. Government and is described by ROMEO PAPA 85 as highly
reliable.
On several occasions since 2021, ROMEO PAPA 85 and BRAVO 42 have discussed the FBI’s
reputaCon, and BRAVO 42 provided the following informaCon:
When asked whether BRAVO 42 would volunteer informaCon about known criminal acCvity to
the FBI, BRAVO 42 unequivocally said that while he/she would provide informaCon about
criminal acCvity to local law enforcement, BRAVO 42 would absolutely not provide the
informaCon to the FBI.
BRAVO 42 said he/she doubted the FBI’s ability – specifically, the ability of its leadership – to
professionally handle many criminal cases.
- 128 -
FBI’S LARRY NASSAR SEXUAL ABUSE CASE
To support his/her claim, BRAVO 42 cited the failure of the FBI’s leadership at the FBI’s
Indianapolis Field Office to properly handle the Larry Nassar case, including the FBI’s failure to
noCfy local and state law enforcement officials about allegaCons of sexual abuse.
BRAVO 42 also cited the FBI’s decision, as reported by the media, to “overstaff” the on-scene
invesCgaCon with as many as 15 agents in June 2020 of an alleged hate crime at the Talladega
Superspeedway in Talladega, Alabama. A NASCAR driver alleged a noose was hanging in a
garage, but invesCgaCon by the FBI determined the noose in quesCon was, in fact, a garage
door pull rope fashioned like a noose. The FBI also determined the driver was not the target of
a hate crime.
AddiConally, BRAVO 42 cited the Cming of the FBI’s search of Jeffrey Epstein’s home in the
Caribbean and the private island on which the home sits. The raid took place in August 2019,
two days acer Epstein was found unresponsive in his prison cell at the Metropolitan
CorrecConal Center in New York. He was later pronounced dead. BRAVO 42 believed the raid
conducted by the FBI should have taken place when Epstein was arrested and not acer he died.
BRAVO 42 also cited what he/she characterized as improper the FBI’s execuCon of a search
warrant in March 2021 of 1,400 safe deposit boxes located at U.S. Private Vaults in Beverly Hills,
California. The search, inventory and seizure of items stored in the boxes are at the center of an
ongoing class acCon lawsuit against the U.S. Government.
Lastly, BRAVO 42 cited the failure of the FBI to act on a telephone Cp received by the FBI that a
former student at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida bought guns and
planned to enter the school and start shooCng. In February 2018, about five (5) weeks acer the
Cp was received by the FBI, the former student shot and killed 17 people and wounded another
17. In November 2021, the vicCms’ families reached a mulC-million dollar seVlement with the
U.S. Department of JusCce over the FBI’s failure to stop the gunman.
- 129 -
BRAVO 42 said if the leadership at the FBI believed it were advantageous to do so, FBI
leadership would exploit any informaCon provided to them to violate the law and the
ConsCtuConal rights of suspects who are under invesCgaCon, as well as innocent ciCzens.
To support this claim, BRAVO 42 cited the case of Kevin Clinesmith, a former FBI lawyer assigned
to the NaConal Security and Cyber Law Branch of the FBI’s Office of General Counsel.
Clinesmith pleaded guilty in August 2020 to making a false statement. More specifically,
Clinesmith altered an e-mail later used in support of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) applicaCon to the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). The applicaCon was
filed with the FISC by the FBI for authority to conduct surveillance in connecCon with the FBI’s
invesCgaCon called “Crossfire Hurricane.” BRAVO 42 believed the illegal acCon of the former FBI
lawyer Clinesmith potenCally resulted in the Fourth Amendment violaCon of hundreds and
possibly thousands of ciCzens.
BRAVO 42 also cited the FBI’s numerous violaCons of the rules allowing the government to
search without a warrant a classified database of informaCon associated with communicaCons
of Non-U.S. Persons located outside of the U.S., including when they are incidentally
communicaCng with U.S. Persons. In May 2023, the Office of the Director of NaConal
Intelligence authorized the release to the public of a memorandum opinion and order by the
U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) that showed the FBI conducted over 278,000
non-compliant inquiries, in violaCon of the rules set forth in SecCon 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The Court found the FBI’s warrantless searches violated the
rules because there was no reasonable basis to expect the searches would return foreign
intelligence or evidence of a crime.
BRAVO 42 also cited the secure FBI work environment located in the Washington, D.C. law office
of Perkins Coie. Perkins Coie is an internaConal law firm with extensive Ces to the DemocraCc
Party and former DemocraCc PresidenCal Candidate Hillary Clinton. BRAVO 42 opined that it is
highly unlikely there was a legiCmate, pracCcal need for a secure FBI work environment in a law
office affiliated with the DemocraCc Party or any other poliCcal party, despite the reasons
reportedly given by the FBI. BRAVO 42 also quesConed whether the secure FBI work
environment was legally authorized to carry informaCon classified up to Top Secret (TS) and
SensiCve Compartmented InformaCon (SCI), including informaCon stored in a Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) database.
- 130 -
BRAVO 42 concluded his/her remarks to ROMEO PAPA 85 by noCng that if he/she (BRAVO 42)
would not provide informaCon to the FBI, members of the general public would also be less
likely to provide informaCon to the FBI. BRAVO 42 believed if that were, in fact, the case, the
lack of informaCon sharing with the FBI would be detrimental to public safety and the NaConal
Security of the United States.
#####
- 131 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 75
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | One (1) Year
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 30, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 16), a reCred FBI Special
Agent (SA) who for more than 25 years invesCgated major narcoCcs and other criminal
violaCons and who as a highly respected cerCfied instructor trained FBI and other law
enforcement personnel, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained first-hand from
a human source (Codename BRAVO 75):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 75 is a 20-year law enforcement veteran who reCred last year acer working numerous
assignments, including patrol and gangs, for a large, local law enforcement agency located in
the Western U.S.
ROMEO PAPA 16 has known BRAVO 75 for approximately one (1) year, and based on
professional assessments by ROMEO PAPA 16’s trusted network of contacts, BRAVO 75 is
considered reliable and had direct access to the informaCon provided.
BRAVO 75 said he/she worked with FBI Special Agents assigned to Task Forces and could not
recall any negative behavior or attitudes displayed by those FBI Special Agents.
According to BRAVO 75, the FBI Special Agents discharged their duties well and showed no
negative interactions with local law enforcement officers or the public. BRAVO 75 further
stated the FBI Special Agents with whom BRAVO 75 worked never displayed any political biases
in their statements or actions, and BRAVO 75 said the FBI Special Agents worked well with
everyone associated with the Task Forces.
- 132 -
A DIFFERENT OPINION OF FBI COMMAND
BRAVO 75 did, however, recall notably different observations of FBI personnel who were in
positions of command.
The following observations shared by BRAVO 75 were also observed by BRAVO 75’s law
enforcement peers who, according to BRAVO 75, were still working at their law enforcement
agency.
BRAVO 75 said he/she and his/her law enforcement peers believe command personnel at
today’s FBI are motivated by politics and are representative of the politicization of law
enforcement.
BRAVO 75 cited as examples the types of individuals and groups the FBI chooses to target.
Because of this negative perception, BRAVO 75 said he/she and his/her law enforcement peers
would be very reluctant to work with FBI Special Agents in the future.
Before they would agree to work with the FBI again, BRAVO 75 said he/she and his/her law
enforcement peers would demand a clear delineation of (1) the FBI’s reason – including the
legal predication – for choosing to open and conduct an investigation of a particular individual
or group and (2) the investigative methods the FBI plans to utilize to achieve its objectives.
#####
- 133 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 49
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | Almost 30 Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 31, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 16), a reCred FBI Special
Agent (SA) who for more than 25 years invesCgated major narcoCcs and other criminal
violaCons and who as a highly respected cerCfied instructor trained FBI and other law
enforcement personnel, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained first-hand from
a human source (Codename BRAVO 49):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 49 is a reCred law enforcement officer with more than 35 years of law enforcement
experience. BRAVO 49 served in a large, local law enforcement agency in the Western U.S., and
BRAVO 49 is also a graduate of the FBI NaConal Academy (FBINA).
ROMEO PAPA 16 said he/she has known BRAVO 49 for almost 30 years. They worked narcoCcs
invesCgaCons together, and ROMEO PAPA 16 added he/she considers BRAVO 49 a dear friend.
ROMEO PAPA 16 said BRAVO 49 is as honest as the day is long, and ROMEO PAPA 16 gives
BRAVO 49 the highest marks for reliability as a source of informaCon.
- 135 -
POLITICALLY MOTIVATED FBI
BRAVO 49 said he/she remains in contact with numerous active-duty and retired law
enforcement officers, and BRAVO 49 said he/she has found consensus among them that the
FBI’s political motivation driving the direction of its investigations is very apparent and
troubling.
BRAVO 49 said the consensus reached by his/her law enforcement peers would strongly
influence any decision by them to cooperate with the FBI in joint investigations, depending
upon the mission.
Additionally, BRAVO 49 said he/she believed how the FBI chooses its subjects and conducts
investigations are blatantly motivated by politics, and BRAVO 49 added the politicization of the
FBI makes him/her carefully consider whether or not he/she would work with the FBI.
BRAVO 49 said one of his/her law enforcement peers - a law enforcement officer in a
management position – advised him/her, “This politicization starts at the top. I have not
directly seen it evidenced in (the FBI Special) Agents working with my people in prior
investigations, however..."
BRAVO 49 attended the FBI National Academy (FBINA) during the 2016 run-up to the
nominations of the major political party candidates running for U.S. President.
BRAVO 49 described his/her FBI National Academy class as a mix of national and international
students, including command staff from law enforcement agencies around the world.
BRAVO 49 said his/her FBI National Academy class was regularly subjected to one particular FBI
National Academy instructor who, during his/her formal classroom presentations, regularly
denigrated then-U.S. Presidential Candidate Donald J. Trump and all Republicans.
BRAVO 49 said that the FBI National Academy instructor’s political commentary about then-
Presidential Candidate Trump and Republicans drew such a reaction from FBI National Academy
students that they rallied together to hold up in front of the instructor handwritten signs
displaying the word “STOP” in an attempt to stop the instructor from continuing to deliver
his/her politically charged rhetoric during class.
To add context to the incident, BRAVO 49 said the rebuke from the FBI National Academy
students was intended to be presented to the instructor in a humorous manner, but it was
- 136 -
presented nonetheless to demand that the instructor stop infusing his/her personal political
views into formal classroom instruction at the FBI National Academy.
BRAVO 49 recalled an incident involving then-FBI Director James B. Comey at the FBI National
Academy during the height of the controversy surrounding his nationally televised, public
recommendation that no charges be filed against then-Democratic U.S. Presidential Nominee
Hillary R. Clinton in connection with the use of a private e-mail server located in the basement
of Clinton’s New York home during her tenure as U.S. Secretary of State.
BRAVO 49 said then-FBI Director Comey (who served as FBI Director from September 4, 2013 to
May 9, 2017) was in and around the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia for several days and
while there, then-FBI Director Comey attended a meeting with BRAVO 49’s FBI National
Academy class.
BRAVO 49 said that during the meeting with BRAVO 49’s FBI National Academy class, questions
were asked about the decision-making process that led to the recommendation that no charges
be filed against then-Democratic Presidential Nominee Clinton.
Suddenly, according to BRAVO 49, then-FBI Director Comey was advised during the meeting
that he had urgent telephone calls and left the meeting. BRAVO 49 said then-FBI Director
Comey never returned.
#####
- 137 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 92
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | Seven (7) Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 10, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 85), a U.S. Armed Forces
veteran and former local law enforcement officer who later served for more than 20 years as an
FBI Special Agent (SA) and who as a law enforcement standards expert provides administraCve
support to law enforcement operaCons, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained
first-hand from a human source (Codename BRAVO 92):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 92 currently serves as the Chief ExecuCve of a local law enforcement agency located in
the Northern region of the U.S.
ROMEO PAPA 85 knows BRAVO 92 through their professional associaCon with the FBI NaConal
Academy Associates, Inc. (FBINAA).
- 138 -
dedicated to providing...communi<es, states, countries, and profession with the
highest degree of law enforcement exper<se, training, educa<on and
informa<on.” (See hbps://www.cinaa.org/).
ROMEO PAPA 85 and BRAVO 92 aVend social gatherings and training events hosted by their
local chapter of the FBI NaConal Academy Associates.
ROMEO PAPA 85 has no doubt about BRAVO 92’s authenCcity, trustworthiness or competence.
While aVending a local FBI NaConal Academy Associates chapter event in 2023, BRAVO 92
asked ROMEO PAPA 85 about the current state of the FBI. ROMEO PAPA 85 said the quesCon
posed by BRAVO 92 was unsolicited.
BRAVO 92 referenced news reporCng about the FBI’s apparent poliCcizaCon, ciCng as an
example the handling of the invesCgaCons conducted and arrests made in connecCon with the
events in and around the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021.
BRAVO 92 did not have complaints about his/her interacCons with FBI Special Agents in his/her
local area, but it was evident, based on observaCons by ROMEO PAPA 85, that BRAVO 92 was
disappointed in the perceived decline of the FBI.
BRAVO 92 was one of two FBI NaConal Academy graduates who aVended the local FBI NaConal
Academy Associates chapter event in 2023.
According to ROMEO PAPA 85, both BRAVO 92 and the second FBI NaConal Academy graduate
in aVendance raised concerns with ROMEO PAPA 85 about the current state of the FBI.
ROMEO PAPA 85 said inquiries like these are representaCve of the type of interacCons he/she
has with alumni of the FBI NaConal Academy.
#####
- 139 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 65
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | Three (3) Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On February 20, 2024 and February 26, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA
52), a former federal law enforcement officer and reCred FBI Special Agent who for more than a
decade led classified Counterintelligence operaCons and invesCgated criminal Public CorrupCon
subjects and who currently operates in mulCple States as a licensed invesCgator and Board-
cerCfied security professional, received the following informaCon obtained first-hand from a
human source (Codename BRAVO 65):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 65 is a U.S. Armed Forces veteran who deployed to mulCple locaCons overseas and who
later served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory Special
Agent (SSA). Highly decorated for his/her service in the FBI, BRAVO 65 has been formally
recognized for his/her dedicaCon to law enforcement by local, state and federal law
enforcement organizaCons throughout the country.
ROMEO PAPA 52 has personally known BRAVO 65 for three (3) years. They have developed a
close, personal friendship based on mutual respect, and ROMEO PAPA 52 has great admiraCon
for BRAVO 65’s humility, character, and love for the United States of America. BRAVO 65’s
credibility is described as beyond reproach, and the quality of BRAVO 65’s reporCng is
considered highly reliable.
BRAVO 65 received informaCon regarding an FBI-led Task Force located in the Western U.S.
- 141 -
The FBI-led Task Force, according to BRAVO 65, is “imploding” because of a difference in mission
prioriCes between the FBI and at least one of the Task Force member agencies described by
BRAVO 65 as a local law enforcement agency.
BRAVO 65 stated FBI ExecuCve Management either cannot or will not address the underlying
issues, resulCng in a deterioraCon of morale within the ranks of both FBI Special Agents and
local law enforcement officers.
According to BRAVO 65, deterioraCng morale has driven some local law enforcement officers to
request transfers off the FBI-led Task Force and back to their local law enforcement agencies.
BRAVO 65 characterized these requests as very unusual because working on a Task Force is
typically considered a presCgious assignment.
BRAVO 65 said the problem is not with the FBI Special Agents or the local law enforcement
officers but with the FBI’s management of the Task Force.
BRAVO 65 further stated the deterioraCon of relaCons between the FBI and local law
enforcement has goVen so bad that it is impacCng “Officer Safety”.
On at least one occasion, members of a second, FBI-led Task Force, according to BRAVO 65,
requested assistance from local law enforcement to execute an arrest or raid operaCon. BRAVO
65 said a local law enforcement agency refused to send marked units to assist.
BRAVO 65 said he/she did not know whether the refusal to send local law enforcement units to
assist was outright or veiled with a more subtle reply that “no units were currently available.”
To add to the underlying issues, BRAVO 65 said members of the FBI-led Task Force stated that
when inspecCon personnel from FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) conducted their inspecCon of the
Task Force, there seemed to be liVle interest in Task Force operaCons or the “mission”.
BRAVO 65 stated FBI Headquarters inspecCon personnel reportedly did not seem overly
interested in the staCsCcal accomplishments of the Task Force but did, instead, seem interested
in knowing whether Task Force managers supported Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI).
- 142 -
BRAVO 65 said FBI Headquarters inspecCon personnel reportedly wanted members of the Task
Force to provide examples of how Task Force managers were advancing the DEI agenda,
including gender, transgender and gay rights.
BRAVO 65 also reported details of a conversaCon he/she had with the Director of a
regional/state law enforcement academy located in the Midwestern U.S.
BRAVO 65 said the Director of the law enforcement academy asked him/her, “What the hell is
going on at the FBI? It seems that the FBI is shooting itself in the foot. It’s not the FBI I
remember.”
The Director of the law enforcement academy advised BRAVO 65 that the FBI does not interact
with local law enforcement officers anymore and that the FBI does not return telephone calls.
BRAVO 65 said the Director also told him/her that the only time FBI personnel show up is when
they want something.
BRAVO 65 reported that at a law enforcement training conference, he/she spoke to law
enforcement officers from smaller law enforcement agencies who stated it is difficult for them
to receive training from the FBI.
In the past, according to BRAVO 65, FBI Police Instructors provided training on various topics,
but BRAVO 65 said the law enforcement officers told him/her that they don’t receive the
training they used to receive.
They would like to receive, according to BRAVO 65, training on how to process crime scenes
and preserve evidence, including DNA evidence and processing. The law enforcement officers
also advised BRAVO 65 that they could also use training on report writing and testifying in
court.
#####
- 143 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 99
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS | Not Disclosed
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | More Than A Dozen Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 18, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 13), an aVorney and
veteran of the FBI who served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained first-
hand from a human source (Codename BRAVO 99):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 99 is employed by the FBI as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and is currently assigned to an FBI
Resident Agency (RA).
NOTE #1: FBI Resident Agencies are smaller, satellite offices opera<ng remotely
and under the control and jurisdic<on of a larger FBI Field Office that serves as
the headquarters for the FBI in the area.
NOTE #2: The loca<on of the FBI Resident Agency to which BRAVO 99 is currently
assigned was not disclosed to protect BRAVO 99 from retalia<on by the FBI.
ROMEO PAPA 13 has verified BRAVO 99’s reliability, trustworthiness, and competence.
BRAVO 99 had direct access to the informaCon provided, including informaCon communicated
to BRAVO 99 by his/her local law enforcement partners.
BRAVO 99 has commented on the events detailed below to other FBI personnel, and according
to ROMEO PAPA 13, the following events took place over a period of more than a dozen years,
up to and including 2024.
- 144 -
POOR FBI LIAISON WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT
BRAVO 99 advised ROMEO PAPA 13 that the FBI Supervisory Special Agent in charge of BRAVO
99’s FBI Resident Agency (also known as the FBI SSRA) did a very poor job of culCvaCng liaison
contacts with outside law enforcement officers and their agencies.
BRAVO 99 said the FBI SSRA had relaCvely liVle “street” experience prior to being assigned to
FBI Headquarters and then to the FBI Resident Agency where he/she served as the FBI SSRA.
According to BRAVO 99, the FBI Resident Agency where BRAVO 99 is currently assigned
parCcipated in two mulC-law enforcement agency Task Forces – a Joint Terrorism Task Force
(JTTF) and a Safe Streets Task Force (SSTF).
BRAVO 99 said parCcipaCon by local law enforcement officers in either Task Force was
considered a “plum assignment”.
Unfortunately, the FBI SSRA in charge of BRAVO 99’s FBI Resident Agency was arrogant,
according to BRAVO 99, who further stated the FBI SSRA projected a my-way-or-the-highway
awtude onto members of the Task Forces, including significant liaison partners.
BRAVO 99 said that as a direct result of the FBI SSRA’s behavior and acCons, the Safe Streets
Task Force – or SSTF - that operated out of the FBI Resident Agency where BRAVO 99 is currently
assigned was closed following the departure of long-Cme, highly valuable local law enforcement
partners.
During its most staCsCcally producCve period, the SSTF, according to BRAVO 99, was comprised
of one (1) FBI Special Agent and approximately ten (10) local law enforcement officers, and it
was instrumental in conducing significant, long-term criminal cases.
Likewise, due to the FBI SSRA’s poor behavior, the FBI Resident Agency’s parCcipaCon in the
Joint Terrorism Task Force – the JTTF - was also terminated, according to BRAVO 99, who further
stated the FBI’s ability to effecCvely respond to significant terrorist events and violent crime
maVers was dramaCcally diminished.
- 145 -
BRAVO 99 said the FBI’s reputaCon was needlessly tarnished because of the acCons of the FBI
SSRA in charge of the FBI Resident Agency, and what liVle goodwill the FBI currently enjoys in
this parCcular FBI Resident Agency is due solely to the efforts of the FBI Special Agents who sCll
serve there.
BRAVO 99 believes it will take a significant effort to rebuild the relaConships between the FBI
and local law enforcement officers and their agencies.
BRAVO 99 noted FBI Field Office ExecuCve Managers whose duty it was to oversee the FBI
Resident Agency knew about the problems with the FBI SSRA but were ineffecCve in resolving
them, possibly due to an internal FBI Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) invesCgaCon.
Since then, according to BRAVO 99, there has been no notable follow-up by the current group of
FBI Field Office ExecuCve Managers.
BRAVO 99 said those FBI Field Office ExecuCve Managers have been in contact with local law
enforcement partners, but when queried, the FBI Field Office ExecuCve Managers appeared to
be unaware of the concerns regarding the FBI SSRA and the fallout from the FBI SSRA’s behavior
and acCons.
#####
- 146 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 44
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | More Than Twelve (12) Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 18, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 36), a veteran of the U.S.
Armed Forces who served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) in mulCple FBI
Field Offices, FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) at FBI Headquarters, and FBI Supervisory
Special Agent for an FBI Resident Agency (SSRA) and who currently serves his/her community as
a local law enforcement officer, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained first-
hand from a human source (Codename BRAVO 44):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 44 is a law enforcement officer with a state law enforcement agency in the Eastern U.S.
ROMEO PAPA 36 has known BRAVO 44 for more than twelve (12) years, and based on ROMEO
PAPA 36’s professional assessment, BRAVO 44 has always provided completely reliable
informaCon.
This is the first Cme BRAVO 44 has formally reported to ROMEO PAPA 36, and according to
ROMEO PAPA 36, BRAVO 44 had both direct and indirect access to the informaCon provided.
BRAVO 44 said he/she received information regarding an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).
- 147 -
NOTE: The location of the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and the FBI Field Office
to which it is affiliated were not disclosed to protect BRAVO 44 from retaliation
by the FBI.
According to BRAVO 44, all but one of the local, state and federal agencies that were members
of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force have pulled out of the Task Force.
BRAVO 44 reported having indirect knowledge that the local, state and federal agencies pulled
out of the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) because the agencies believed the work at the
FBI’s JTTF did not justify the allocation and deployment of their officers and agents to the Task
Force.
Of greater concern was BRAVO 44’s reporting based on information received indirectly that the
local, state and federal agencies pulled out of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force because they
also believed there was no benefit to continuing to develop a working relationship with the
Task Force or the FBI.
#####
- 148 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 18
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | Approximately One (1) Year
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 13, 2024 and May 20, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 52), a
former federal law enforcement officer and reCred FBI Special Agent who for more than a
decade led classified Counterintelligence operaCons and invesCgated criminal Public CorrupCon
subjects and who currently operates in mulCple States as a licensed invesCgator and Board-
cerCfied security professional, received the following informaCon obtained first-hand from a
human source (Codename BRAVO 18):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 18 served in the FBI for more than 30 years as a Professional Support employee and
later as an FBI Special Agent.
As an FBI Special Agent, BRAVO 18 led complex, long-term invesCgaCons of major criminal
enterprises, including violent offenders profiCng from the distribuCon of illegal narcoCcs.
Currently a licensed private invesCgator whose work ethic and professional experCse are highly
regarded by his/her clients, BRAVO 18 has earned a reputaCon as a dedicated and commiVed
crime fighter whose integrity and character are beyond reproach.
BRAVO 18’s previous reporCng has been corroborated by independent sources and is
characterized by ROMEO PAPA 52 as highly reliable. According to ROMEO PAPA 52, BRAVO 18
had direct access to the informaCon provided.
- 149 -
BRAVO 18 flourished as an FBI Special Agent in the Task Force environment, eager to collaborate
with anyone from any law enforcement agency who was as skilled and moCvated as BRAVO 18
was to achieve a high degree of success conducCng complex, mulC-law enforcement agency
invesCgaCons.
BRAVO 18 served as an FBI Special Agent for more than 20 years, and based on his/her first-
hand experience working as a member of a number of Task Forces, BRAVO 18 said he/she
learned that every law enforcement agency - whether it was local, state or federal - brought
something to the table, including knowledge, sources, manpower, capabiliCes, resources,
perspecCve and experience.
BRAVO 18 further stated that acer his/her first mulC-defendant invesCgaCon, he/she also
learned which Task Force members he/she could work with and what criCcal resources their law
enforcement agencies could bring to the invesCgaCon.
More importantly, BRAVO 18 said that in order to conduct successful invesCgaCons, the FBI
could not work in a vacuum.
BRAVO 18 said he/she advised everyone he/she worked with that it was important for all Task
Force members from every law enforcement agency to work together. When they don’t work
together and choose instead to work against each other, there is only one winner and that
winner, according to BRAVO 18, isn’t the invesCgator fighCng crime, it’s the bad guy.
BRAVO 18 said he/she was once strongly admonished for working more with local law
enforcement officers than with other FBI Special Agents. BRAVO 18 said this was unbelievable
but true.
At the Cme, according to BRAVO 18, he/she was working drug cases out of a small FBI Resident
Agency (RA) in the Eastern U.S.
NOTE: FBI Resident Agencies are smaller, satellite offices opera<ng remotely and
under the control and jurisdic<on of a larger FBI Field Office that serves as the
headquarters for the FBI in that area.
- 150 -
BRAVO 18 said there were only about a dozen FBI Special Agents working in this FBI Resident
Agency (RA) at the Cme, and only three or four of those FBI Special Agents were assigned to
invesCgate drug cases.
BRAVO 18 said that as an FBI Special Agent, he/she didn’t know the other FBI Special Agents
working drugs cases out of the FBI Resident Agency (RA) well enough; and because BRAVO 18
believed at the Cme that the FBI Special Agents either were not available or were not as
qualified as they needed to be, BRAVO 18 iniCated contact with narcoCcs invesCgators at local
law enforcement agencies.
BRAVO 18 said he/she respected these local law enforcement officers because of their extensive
knowledge of criminal acCvity in the area, the quality of their human intelligence sources, and
their experience working drug cases.
BRAVO 18 said his/her working relaConship with local law enforcement angered the FBI Team
Leader who oversaw the drug program at the FBI Resident Agency (RA).
The FBI Team Leader, in BRAVO 18’s opinion, believed BRAVO 18 was arrogant for collaboraCng
with local law enforcement in favor of working with other FBI Special Agents despite the success
BRAVO 18 achieved as an invesCgator working complex drug cases.
BUNCH OF ASSHOLES
BRAVO 18 said the local law enforcement officers with whom he/she worked did not know
BRAVO 18 was admonished by an FBI Team Leader for working with them.
If they had known, BRAVO 18 said all of them – every single one of them - would have taken
BRAVO 18’s side and called the FBI a bunch of assholes because BRAVO 18 had earned the
respect of the local law enforcement officers.
While this event happened years ago, BRAVO 18 said he/she believes this anC-local law
enforcement mindset lingers in today’s FBI, and as a result, weakens the FBI’s ability to
effecCvely invesCgate crimes in a collaboraCve environment and collect intelligence.
BRAVO 18 said he/she did not have any issues working with any member in any Task Force
environment unless a Task Force member – specifically, an officer from another law
- 151 -
enforcement agency or a fellow FBI Special Agent - took BRAVO 18’s case informaCon and used
that informaCon to work up a parallel case, which, according to BRAVO 18, did happen.
#####
- 152 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 88
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini@al | # of Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 17, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 43), a veteran of the FBI
who served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory Special
Agent (SSA) and who invesCgated organized crime, complex white collar crime, suspected
terrorists and terrorist organizaCons, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained
first-hand from a human source (Codename BRAVO 88):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 88 reCred from a local law enforcement agency that employs more than 1,000
personnel.
When ROMEO PAPA 43 met BRAVO 88, BRAVO 88 was, following his/her reCrement, serving in a
new posiCon as a member of the command staff of a smaller, local law enforcement agency in
the Southern U.S. that employs fewer than 500 personnel.
- 154 -
While ROMEO PAPA 43’s encounter with BRAVO 88 was brief, ROMEO PAPA 43 believed that
based on his/her professional assessment, BRAVO 88 was reliable and had direct access to the
informaCon provided.
BRAVO 88 said his/her current local law enforcement agency is headquartered in close
proximity to a large FBI Field Office in the Southern U.S.
BRAVO 88 further stated that despite the relaCvely short distance between his/her local law
enforcement agency and the FBI Field Office, the FBI, according to BRAVO 88, has during the
past three (3) years become isolated from its law enforcement partners in the area.
According to ROMEO PAPA 43, BRAVO 88’s opinion (that the FBI has become isolated from its
law enforcement partners in the area) is based on the revelaCon of perceived corrupCon and
poliCcal bias at the FBI.
#####
- 155 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 84
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | Approximately Three (3) Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On June 5, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 13), an aVorney and veteran of
the FBI who served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory
Special Agent (SSA), voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained first-hand from a
human source (Codename BRAVO 84):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 84 is an acCve-duty law enforcement officer who serves as the head of his/her local law
enforcement agency.
BRAVO 84’s local law enforcement agency employs fewer than ficy (50) sworn law enforcement
officers and is located in the Western U.S. between two relaCvely large populaCon centers.
ROMEO PAPA 13 has known BRAVO 84 for approximately three (3) years. During that period of
Cme, BRAVO 84 was promoted from a senior leadership posiCon within BRAVO 84’s local law
enforcement agency to the top posiCon as the agency’s head.
ROMEO PAPA 13 said he/she has verified BRAVO 84’s reliability, trustworthiness and
competence, further staCng BRAVO 84 is well regarded by his/her fellow law enforcement
officers and agencies in BRAVO 84’s current area of responsibility.
Prior to serving in his/her current local law enforcement agency, BRAVO 84 served in a large law
enforcement agency in the Southern U.S. where BRAVO 84 conducted long-term drug
invesCgaCons as a member of a federal law enforcement Task Force.
- 156 -
BRAVO 84 provided the following informaCon to ROMEO PAPA 13 in early June 2024, and
according to ROMEO PAPA 13, BRAVO 84 had direct access to the informaCon provided.
BRAVO 84 said he/she rarely has any contact with FBI personnel in his/her official capacity as
head of his/her local law enforcement agency.
BRAVO 84 said there is an FBI Resident Agency (RA) within approximately an hour’s drive from
the municipality where BRAVO 84’s local law enforcement agency is located.
NOTE: FBI Resident Agencies are smaller, satellite offices opera<ng remotely and
under the control and jurisdic<on of a larger FBI Field Office that serves as the
headquarters for the FBI in the area.
BRAVO 84 said he/she has worked with federal law enforcement agents in the past and is not
opposed to working with them.
BRAVO 84 further stated his/her local law enforcement agency has detecCves currently assigned
to a federal drug Task Force.
BRAVO 84 said he/she has a good working relaConship with personnel from the U.S. AVorney’s
Office, and BRAVO 84 describes them as very capable but extremely busy.
In contrast, BRAVO 84 said he/she has very limited contact with FBI Special Agents and went on
to note that they are very difficult to contact.
BRAVO 84 indicated the FBI had changed and that he/she was concerned about FBI personnel
being “woke”.
BRAVO 84 said that at one point in his/her law enforcement career, a federal law enforcement
agency – not the FBI – aVempt to recruit BRAVO 84.
BRAVO 84 said he/she declined the offer to join the federal law enforcement agency because
BRAVO 84 felt that federal law enforcement agencies in general were ineffecCve because of
their voluminous paperwork and overly restricCve regulaCons that hamper good police work.
- 157 -
LIAISON WITH STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT
BRAVO 84 said he/she has significant liaison contact with state law enforcement agencies.
BRAVO 84 further stated a majority of the intelligence his/her local law enforcement agency
receives comes from these state law enforcement agencies, not the FBI.
When asked about the possibility of violence that may erupt as a result of the current poliCcal
climate and increasing number of illegal aliens entering the United States, BRAVO 84 expressed
concern and reiterated that it would be wise to plan for low probability, high damage type of
events.
BRAVO 84 said he/she believed most of the planning for these types of events involve other
local and state law enforcement agencies.
#####
- 158 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 78
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | More Than Ten (10) Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 18, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 36), a veteran of the U.S.
Armed Forces who served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) in mulCple FBI
Field Offices, FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) at FBI Headquarters, and FBI Supervisory
Special Agent for an FBI Resident Agency (SSRA) and who currently serves his/her community as
a local law enforcement officer, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained first-
hand from a human source (Codename BRAVO 78):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 78 is a local law enforcement officer with more than 20 years of experience, including
extensive experience working alongside mulCple federal law enforcement agencies.
ROMEO PAPA 36 has known BRAVO 78 for more than ten (10) years, and based on ROMEO PAPA
36’s professional assessment, BRAVO 78 has always provided completely reliable informaCon.
This is the first Cme BRAVO 78 has formally reported to ROMEO PAPA 36, and according to
ROMEO PAPA 36, BRAVO 78 had direct access to the informaCon provided.
BRAVO 78 said he/she is generally frustrated with the lack of resources and support provided by
the FBI.
Very infrequently, BRAVO 78 or BRAVO 78’s local law enforcement agency will hear from the FBI,
and according to BRAVO 78, liaison with the FBI has fallen off because the FBI will only contact
- 159 -
BRAVO 78 or BRAVO 78’s local law enforcement agency when the FBI needs something specific
from them.
AddiConally, BRAVO 78 said he/she has approached the FBI with cases that BRAVO 78 believed
could have possibly been invesCgated federally. BRAVO 78 said the FBI iniCally showed interest
in BRAVO 78’s cases and, in fact, informed BRAVO 78 the cases would be opened by the FBI.
BRAVO 78 said someCmes months would go by before BRAVO 78 would hear back from the FBI,
only to receive word acer all that Cme that liVle to no work had been done by the FBI on some
of the cases.
BRAVO 78 said he/she has beVer working relaConships with other federal law enforcement
agencies, such as the U.S. Drug Enforcement AdministraCon (DEA) and the U.S. Secret Service
(USSS).
#####
- 160 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 57
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | More Than Eight (8) Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 18, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 36), a veteran of the U.S.
Armed Forces who served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) in mulCple FBI
Field Offices, FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) at FBI Headquarters, and FBI Supervisory
Special Agent for an FBI Resident Agency (SSRA) and who currently serves his/her community as
a local law enforcement officer, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained first-
hand from a human source (Codename BRAVO 57):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 57 is a local law enforcement officer with more than ten (10) years of experience.
ROMEO PAPA 36 has known BRAVO 57 for more than eight (8) years, and based on ROMEO
PAPA 36’s professional assessment, BRAVO 57 has always provided completely reliable
informaCon.
This is the first Cme BRAVO 57 has formally reported to ROMEO PAPA 36, and according to
ROMEO PAPA 36, BRAVO 57 had direct access to the informaCon provided.
BRAVO 57 said he/she is completely confused by the role of today’s FBI and its prioriCes.
- 161 -
CiCng one interacCon with the FBI, BRAVO 57 said he/she provided a substanCal fraud case to
the FBI for the FBI to invesCgate but never heard back from the FBI Special Agent who served as
the point of contact.
BRAVO 57 said that acer he/she made several calls, BRAVO 57 was finally able to reach the FBI
Special Agent who served as the point of contact only to be told the U.S. AVorney’s Office
declined to prosecute the case.
Because of the FBI’s failure to communicate in a responsive and Cmely fashion with BRAVO 57
and the FBI’s general lack of engagement with BRAVO 57 and BRAVO 57’s local law enforcement
agency, BRAVO 57 is now reluctant to bring any cases to the FBI.
Just recently, according to BRAVO 57, the FBI received informaCon regarding a potenCal threat
to an insCtuCon in the Greater Washington, D.C. area. The threat, according to BRAVO 57,
appeared to be geographically Ced to a locaCon within the boundaries of BRAVO 57’s
jurisdicCon.
In response to the threat, FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ), BRAVO 57 said, sent a lead to an FBI
Special Agent to interview an individual located in BRAVO 57’s jurisdicCon and to evaluate the
validity of the threat.
However, according to BRAVO 57, instead of traveling the relaCvely short distance to conduct
the interview jointly with BRAVO 57 and BRAVO 57’s local law enforcement agency, the FBI
Special Agent who was assigned to cover the lead asked BRAVO 57 to (1) conduct the interview
without the FBI or the FBI Special Agent present and to (2) report the interview results back to
the FBI Special Agent.
BRAVO 57 said he/she was not happy about how the FBI Special Agent handled this potenCal
threat, specifically the FBI Special Agent’s refusal to make what would have been a reasonable
effort to acCvely parCcipate in the invesCgaCon and the FBI Special Agent’s unilateral decision
to ask an outside agency to cover the FBI Special Agent’s own lead.
Fortunately, according to BRAVO 57, the threat was later found to be miCgated by other factors.
#####
- 162 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 71
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | Approximately 1.5 Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 18, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 52), a former federal law
enforcement officer and reCred FBI Special Agent who for more than a decade led classified
Counterintelligence operaCons and invesCgated criminal Public CorrupCon subjects and who
currently operates in mulCple States as a licensed invesCgator and Board-cerCfied security
professional, received the following informaCon obtained first-hand from a human source
(Codename BRAVO 71):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 71 reCred from the FBI acer serving for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA)
and FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA). BRAVO 71 is also an aVorney whose reliability as a
source, trustworthiness and competence have been independently verified by other FBI Special
Agents.
ROMEO PAPA 52 has personally known BRAVO 71 for more than 1.5 years, and based on
ROMEO PAPA 52’s direct interacCon with BRAVO 71, ROMEO PAPA 52 has nothing but the
highest marks for BRAVO 71’s character and integrity.
The informaCon provided by BRAVO 71 was provided voluntarily and has been shared by BRAVO
71 with other FBI personnel.
AddiConally, the events detailed below occurred during an approximately five-year period while
BRAVO 71 was sCll employed by the FBI.
- 163 -
BRAVO 71 was assigned to an FBI Resident Agency (RA) located in the Western U.S.
NOTE #1: FBI Resident Agencies are smaller, satellite offices opera<ng remotely
and under the control and jurisdic<on of a larger FBI Field Office that serves as
the headquarters for the FBI in the area.
NOTE #2: The loca<on of the FBI Resident Agency to which BRAVO 71 was
assigned was not disclosed to protect BRAVO 71 from retalia<on by the FBI.
BRAVO 71 said that during the course of his/her duCes at the FBI Resident Agency, BRAVO 71
was contacted by a lieutenant from a local law enforcement agency.
BRAVO 71 described the lieutenant as someone with whom BRAVO 71 had culCvated a
professional relaConship as a liaison partner.
The lieutenant, according to BRAVO 71, asked BRAVO 71 to contact the head of the lieutenant’s
local law enforcement agency.
The local law enforcement agency head - a graduate of the FBI’s NaConal Academy (FBINA) –
was angry, according to BRAVO 71, because the agency head had asked the FBI for assistance in
connecCon with an ongoing, high-profile homicide case but had not received any responses
from the FBI.
NOTE: The FBI Na<onal Academy is “a professional course of study for U.S. and
interna<onal law enforcement managers nominated by their agency heads
because of demonstrated leadership quali<es. The 10-week program serves to
improve the administra<on of jus<ce in police departments and agencies at home
and abroad and to raise law enforcement standards, knowledge, and coopera<on
worldwide.” (See hbps://le.ci.gov/file-repository/ci-na<onal-academy-
brochure-031524.pdf).
MAKING IT RIGHT
BRAVO 71 said he/she immediately contacted the head of the lieutenant’s local law
enforcement agency and asked for and received an in-person meeCng with the head of the
agency.
During the meeCng, BRAVO 71 apologized to the local law enforcement agency head for the
FBI’s lack of response.
BRAVO 71 said he/she was then able to iniCate contact with the unit at FBI Headquarters
(FBIHQ) that had been the subject of the local law enforcement agency head’s iniCal inquiry.
- 164 -
BRAVO 71 said he/she was familiar with a member of the unit at FBIHQ and was able to start
the process of obtaining the needed assistance.
BRAVO 71 stated that at the conclusion of BRAVO 71’s meeCng with the head of the lieutenant’s
local law enforcement agency, BRAVO 71 contacted by telephone the FBI Supervisory Special
Agent in charge of the FBI Resident Agency (also known as the SSRA) and briefed the FBI SSRA
on the FBI’s lack of response and BRAVO 71’s efforts to remedy it.
BRAVO 71 said he/she suggested/requested the FBI SSRA contact the head of the lieutenant’s
local law enforcement agency directly to rehabilitate the damage done.
According to BRAVO 71, the FBI SSRA responded by saying he/she (the FBI SSRA) “would call
(the local law enforcement agency head) in a day or two.”
BRAVO 71 said he/she was flabbergasted by the lack of concern exhibited by the FBI SSRA and
strongly suggested the FBI SSRA contact the head of the local law enforcement agency
immediately.
BRAVO 71 said he/she did not know whether the FBI SSRA ever did.
BRAVO 71 said he/she witnessed numerous incidents where the FBI SSRA failed to properly
handle liaison maVers.
According to BRAVO 71, the highest-ranking local representaCve of another federal law
enforcement agency once expressed sympathy to BRAVO 71 because the acCons of the FBI SSRA
were reflecCng poorly on the FBI.
BRAVO 71 said he/she believes that based on the results of employee surveys, this and other
issues were brought to the aVenCon of the FBI Field Office’s ExecuCve Management, but
according to BRAVO 71, there was no improvement in the FBI SSRA’s behavior.
BRAVO 71 said that while the FBI SSRA’s unwillingness to properly engage with the head of the
lieutenant’s local law enforcement agency occurred years ago, the incident reflects a lack of real
commitment by the FBI to develop meaningful liaison with local law enforcement officers and
their agencies.
- 165 -
The FBI SSRA, according to BRAVO 71, had only three (3) years of “street” Cme before
transferring to FBI Headquarters and then to the FBI Resident Agency to serve as the FBI SSRA.
BRAVO 71 said the FBI pays “lip service” to liaison and appears to view culCvaCng relaConships
with other law enforcement officers and their agencies as a “box checking” exercise conducted
primarily to support promoCons of FBI managers.
The end result, according to BRAVO 71, is a culture at the FBI that (1) does not value local law
enforcement; (2) produces managers, not leaders; and (3) significantly damages relaConships
with local law enforcement officers and their agencies that typically require years of concerted
effort by FBI personnel on the front lines to repair.
#####
- 166 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 93
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | Five (5) Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On April 7, 2024 and April 15, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 76), a
veteran of the U.S. Armed Forces who later served for more than 25 years as an FBI Special
Agent (SA) in mulCple FBI Field Offices and who as a widely respected leader in the military and
the FBI has maintained close personal and professional Ces with prominent members of local,
state and federal law enforcement communiCes across the country, voluntarily provided the
following informaCon obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename BRAVO 93):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 93 is a 30-year law enforcement veteran who reCred acer serving in a large, local law
enforcement agency in the Southern U.S. BRAVO 93’s law enforcement career included serving
as a detecCve.
ROMEO PAPA 76 has known BRAVO 93 for five (5) years. ROMEO PAPA 76 and BRAVO 93 are
work colleagues, and ROMEO PAPA 76 also considers BRAVO 93 a close, personal friend.
ROMEO PAPA 76 said BRAVO 93 is a person of high moral character who loves the United States
of America. BRAVO 93’s reporCng over the years, according to ROMEO PAPA 76, has been both
reliable and consistent.
BRAVO 93 said he/she spoke directly with a local law enforcement officer – a patrol officer
turned detecCve – who has served for 12 years and is sCll acCvely serving in a large, local law
enforcement agency in the Southern U.S.
- 167 -
The patrol officer turned detecCve, BRAVO 93 said, is an immediate family member of BRAVO
93’s friend.
BRAVO 93 said the patrol officer turned detecCve shared not only his/her views of the FBI (as a
Sub-Source) but also the opinions of other local law enforcement personnel assigned to the
detecCve’s unit.
The detecCve, according to BRAVO 93, said – without hesitaCon – that based on their
experience working with FBI Special Agents, the consensus among the detecCve and his/her
local law enforcement peers is that FBI Special Agents “are a bunch of academics with no real
interest or experience in law enforcement.”
BRAVO 93 said the detecCve further stated it is a common experience for FBI Special Agents to
look down or disrespect local law enforcement officers.
The excepCons, according to the detecCve, were FBI Special Agents who were assigned to the
local FBI Field Office’s bank robbery squad.
#####
- 168 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 81
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS | Not Disclosed
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | More than Ten (10) Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 30, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 96), a former government
aVorney who served for decades in both the U.S. Armed Forces and the U.S. Intelligence
Community, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained first-hand from a human
source (Codename BRAVO 81):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 81 is a U.S. Armed Forces veteran who served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special
Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) in mulCple FBI Field Offices and at FBI
Headquarters.
Acer reCring from the FBI, BRAVO 81 remained in government service, accepCng a posiCon as a
member of the command staff of a law enforcement agency. BRAVO 81 now serves as the head
of the law enforcement agency.
NOTE: The name, loca<on and size of BRAVO 81’s law enforcement agency were
not disclosed to protect BRAVO 81 from retalia<on by the FBI.
A disCnguished leader in the local, state and federal law enforcement communiCes, BRAVO 81
was formally recognized with an award by a member of the U.S. Congress for BRAVO 81’s
service to his/her locality and country.
ROMEO PAPA 96 and BRAVO 81 were assigned to the same FBI Field Office. ROMEO PAPA 96
has personal knowledge of BRAVO 81’s reputaCon within the FBI. According to ROMEO PAPA
96, BRAVO 81’s reporCng is reliable and BRAVO 81 had direct access to the informaCon
provided.
- 170 -
EMPTY PROMISES BY AN FBI SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
BRAVO 81 said that acer he/she advanced to the posiCon of agency head at his/her law
enforcement agency, an FBI Special Agent In Charge (SAC) contacted BRAVO 81 and advised
BRAVO 81 to contact the FBI SAC directly if BRAVO 81 needed anything.
BRAVO 81 subsequently discovered he/she needed to obtain copies of the FBI training
curriculum records of an individual who had reCred from the FBI; and following up on the offer
by the FBI Special Agent In Charge (SAC), BRAVO 81 said he/she asked for assistance from the
FBI SAC to obtain copies of the reCred FBI employee’s FBI training curriculum records.
NOTE: The request by BRAVO 81 was made with the consent of the re<red FBI
employee, and the iden<ty of the re<red FBI employee and the reason for the
request were not disclosed here to protect BRAVO 81 from retalia<on by the FBI.
BRAVO 81 said he/she did not hear back from the FBI Special Agent In Charge (SAC) for two (2)
weeks.
BRAVO 81 then called the FBI SAC’s office and was connected to the FBI SAC’s secretary, not the
FBI SAC.
BRAVO 81 said he/she asked the FBI SAC‘s secretary to relay to the FBI SAC BRAVO 81’s request
for the FBI SAC’s assistance to obtain the reCred FBI employee’s FBI training curriculum records.
Approximately ten (10) days later, BRAVO 81 said he/she was contacted by a low-level staffer
from the FBI SAC’s Field Office who, according to BRAVO 81, told BRAVO 81 that a Freedom of
InformaCon Act (FOIA) request would need to be filed to obtain copies of the reCred FBI
employee’s FBI training curriculum records.
BRAVO 81 said the staffer further advised BRAVO 81 that the FBI Field Office would not provide
any addiConal assistance.
As a reCred FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) and current head of a
law enforcement agency, BRAVO 81 said the lack of follow-up by the FBI Special Agent In Charge
- 171 -
(SAC) and the lack of assistance from the FBI overall demonstrated a lack of professionalism and
courtesy.
BRAVO 81 further stated this experience was evidence of a “what’s in it for the FBI” mentality
that is harmful to developing good working relaConships with local law enforcement.
BRAVO 81 recalled details of an interacCon with the FBI while BRAVO 81 and the heads of three
other law enforcement agencies responded to a local area hospital where a state law
enforcement officer was receiving emergency medical treatment.
BRAVO 81 said that while at the hospital, BRAVO 81 and the other agency heads were contacted
by mobile telephone by a non-supervisory FBI Special Agent from the local FBI Field Office.
BRAVO 81 described the FBI Special Agent as someone who had never previously introduced
himself/herself as a liaison partner to the agency heads.
BRAVO 81 said the FBI Special Agent asked BRAVO 81 whether the shooCng of the state law
enforcement officer was a DomesCc Terrorism (DT) event.
When BRAVO 81 informed the FBI Special Agent the shooCng of the state law enforcement
officer was not related to DomesCc Terrorism, the FBI Special Agent, according to BRAVO 81,
indicated he/she (the FBI Special Agent) had no further interest in the case.
BRAVO 81 said the FBI Special Agent made no offer of assistance or resources and did not ask
any quesCons about evidence related to the shooCng of the state law enforcement officer.
In stark contrast, the State Highway Patrol, according to BRAVO 81, did call and ask what
assistance it could provide.
BRAVO 81 said he/she was “appalled” by the lack of concern by the FBI Special Agent and the
FBI Special Agent’s unwillingness to offer assistance.
AddiConally, BRAVO 81 stated that given the seriousness of the shooCng and the response by
the agency heads from other law enforcement agencies, BRAVO 81 was shocked by the FBI’s
- 172 -
decision to delegate the responsibility of making official contact on this sensiCve maVer to a
non-supervisory FBI Special Agent.
BRAVO 81 said this lack of professional consideraCon demonstrated the arrogance of many FBI
Special Agents and FBI leadership directed toward local law enforcement, and the three (3)
other agency heads who responded to the hospital in support of the state law enforcement
officer who had been shot agreed with BRAVO 81’s assessment.
BRAVO 81 did note that the FBI’s Cellular Analysis Survey Team (CAST) was much more
responsive and helpful. BRAVO 81 believed this was because the FBI’s CAST was located far
from FBI Headquarters (in Washington, D.C.) and enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy.
When asked to provide concrete examples of how the FBI’s reputaCon negaCvely impacts its
working relaConship with local law enforcement, BRAVO 81 said that as the head of a law
enforcement agency, he/she would be reluctant to hire former or reCred FBI Special Agents as
law enforcement officers.
BRAVO 81 said most agency heads of smaller law enforcement agencies have similarly negaCve
views of the FBI based on a general disagreement with the FBI on policy issues, including how
the FBI prioriCzes and allocates resources for its invesCgaCons of DomesCc Terrorism cases.
According to BRAVO 81, larger law enforcement agencies tend to have beVer working
relaConships with the FBI, but BRAVO 81 said the FBI is experiencing a drop in support from
these larger agencies, too.
CiCng as an example of this drop in support, BRAVO 81 said several large ciCes and regions in
his/her State have lost their joint, mulC-law enforcement agency Drug Task Forces.
BRAVO 81 said none of the employees in his/her law enforcement agency want to work for the
FBI.
Several employees, however, have applied to work for other federal law enforcement agencies,
including the U.S. Marshals Service, BRAVO 81 said.
- 173 -
MAKING FUN OF THE FBI
BRAVO 81 said whenever his/her employees spoke of the FBI, they were almost always speaking
of the FBI “to make fun of them.”
BRAVO 81 also noted the FBI Special Agents who visited his/her law enforcement agency were
dressed unprofessionally, almost always without collared shirts, coats or Ces. BRAVO 81 said
they looked like “homeless people” and “ragamuffins”.
BRAVO 81 said his/her non-law enforcement neighbors and friends have also expressed a low
opinion of the FBI based on what they believe is the FBI’s overreacCon to the events in and
around the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021 and the arrests of ciCzens for
misdemeanor offenses.
BRAVO 81 said he/she agreed with his/her neighbors and friends, noCng he/she had never
invesCgated a misdemeanor case while serving in the FBI. BRAVO 81 added the FBI’s pursuit of
misdemeanor cases was a misuse of federal resources.
BRAVO 81 said this same group of neighbors and friends also based their low opinion of the FBI
on what they described as the poor treatment of whistleblowers by the FBI.
BRAVO believed these non-law enforcement neighbors and friends are “well informed” about
the FBI despite having no background in law enforcement.
BRAVO 81 said that for a number of years, he/she has repeatedly asked his/her local FBI Field
Office to provide support for training on a variety of topics but has received no assistance from
the FBI.
BRAVO 81 said that based on personal, direct knowledge, other local law enforcement agencies
have “given up” on asking for training support from the FBI.
- 174 -
BRAVO 81 said that when he/she was an FBI Special Agent, the FBI regularly provided training to
local law enforcement on a variety of topics as requested by local law enforcement agencies.
BRAVO 81 believed providing training to local law enforcement was criCcal to developing strong
liaison Ces with local law enforcement, adding the liaison was criCcal to puwng the FBI in a
posiCon to adequately address emerging threats.
BRAVO 81 cited one example involving the head of a local law enforcement agency who is also a
graduate of the FBI NaConal Academy (FBINA).
BRAVO 81 said the FBI NaConal Academy graduate asked the FBI for support to combat a
metastasizing drug trafficking threat in his/her jurisdicCon. The FBI NaConal Academy
graduate’s law enforcement agency is located adjacent to a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
(also known as HIDTA).
BRAVO 81 said the FBI refused to provide any assistance to the FBI NaConal Academy graduate’s
law enforcement agency.
BRAVO 81 also noted the FBI has refused criminal referrals from his/her law enforcement
agency, saying that on two (2) occasions, BRAVO 81’s agency provided the FBI informaCon on
drug trafficking cases possibly linked to a Mexican Drug Trafficking OrganizaCon (DTO).
BRAVO 81 said his/her assessment of these drug trafficking cases were based on his/her prior
federal invesCgaCve experience as an FBI Special Agent. BRAVO 81 said he/she believed the
cases referred to the FBI also possibly met the standards for a RICO (Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt OrganizaCons) invesCgaCon.
According to BRAVO 81, the FBI declined to use the informaCon provided on the drug trafficking
cases.
- 175 -
BRAVO 81 noted that as an FBI Special Agent, he/she worked as part of a team invesCgaCng
approximately 20 cases, including cases with Ces to Mexican Drug Trafficking OrganizaCons
(DTOs).
BRAVO 81 repeated that in his/her opinion, the cases referred to the FBI were good cases.
#####
- 176 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 27
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | Five (5) Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On February 11, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 85), a U.S. Armed Forces
veteran and former local law enforcement officer who later served for more than 20 years as an
FBI Special Agent (SA) and who as a law enforcement standards expert provides administraCve
support to law enforcement operaCons, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained
first-hand from a human source (Codename BRAVO 27):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 27 served for 20 years as an FBI Special Agent, and acer reCring from the FBI, BRAVO 27
took command of a local law enforcement agency as the agency’s Chief ExecuCve.
ROMEO PAPA 85 did not know BRAVO 27 while they were serving in the FBI, but they have been
friends and professional colleagues for the past five (5) years.
ROMEO PAPA 85 has no doubt about BRAVO 27’s authenCcity, trustworthiness or competence.
BRAVO 27 provided the following story in a group sewng and was not responding to any specific
request for informaCon.
BRAVO 27 described his/her aVempts to establish liaison with the local FBI Field Office in
BRAVO 27’s jurisdicCon when he/she took command as the Chief ExecuCve of a local law
enforcement agency.
- 177 -
BRAVO 27 said he/she called his/her local FBI Field Office to schedule a “meet and greet” and to
introduce himself/herself because BRAVO 27 had moved in from another State and was new to
the area.
BRAVO 27, a reCred FBI Special Agent, expressed frustraCon because he/she could not reach a
live person via telephone at the local FBI Field Office.
In the message, BRAVO 27 idenCfied himself/herself as a reCred FBI Special Agent and current
head of a local law enforcement agency. BRAVO 27 said he/she requested his/her call be
returned.
BRAVO 27 was disappointed with what he/she described as the complete lack of a response
from the local FBI Field Office.
BRAVO 27, however, persisted and was finally able to reach an FBI Supervisory Special Agent
(SSA) on the telephone.
BRAVO 27 said the FBI Supervisory Special Agent agreed to an in-person meeCng, but the
meeCng, according to BRAVO 27, occurred “many months” acer BRAVO 27’s iniCal aVempt to
contact someone at the local FBI Field Office.
BRAVO 27 said the FBI Supervisory Special Agent was relaCvely new to the FBI Field Office and
apologized to BRAVO 27 for the absence of professional courtesy displayed by the FBI Field
Office when BRAVO 27’s iniCal request to conduct liaison with the FBI was ignored.
BRAVO 27 credited the FBI Supervisory Special Agent’s effort to repair the damage, but BRAVO
27 said he/she was disappointed by the uVer disregard for BRAVO 27’s aVempt to reach out to
the local FBI Field Office, parCcularly acer BRAVO 27 idenCfied himself/herself as a reCred FBI
Special Agent and the Chief ExecuCve of a local law enforcement agency.
BRAVO 27 said that type of behavior by the local FBI Field Office would have been completely
unacceptable during his/her career at the FBI.
- 178 -
#####
- 179 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 33
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | More than 15 Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On February 11, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 85), a U.S. Armed Forces
veteran and former local law enforcement officer who later served for more than 20 years as an
FBI Special Agent (SA) and who as a law enforcement standards expert provides administraCve
support to law enforcement operaCons, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained
first-hand from a human source (Codename BRAVO 33):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 33 reCred from the FBI acer serving for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent.
ROMEO PAPA 85 has known BRAVO 33 for more than 15 years, and while serving as FBI Special
Agents, ROMEO PAPA 85 and BRAVO 33 worked for several years in the same FBI Field Office but
were assigned to different squads.
ROMEO PAPA 85 has no doubt about BRAVO 33’s authenCcity, trustworthiness or competence.
BRAVO 33 was not responding to a specific request for informaCon when BRAVO 33 provided
the following details of an encounter he/she had with an FBI ExecuCve Manager.
BRAVO 33 said he/she raised a concern to an FBI ExecuCve Manager regarding the experience of
one of BRAVO 33’s friends who is the head of a local law enforcement agency.
- 180 -
BRAVO 33’s friend - the head of a local law enforcement agency - in his/her official capacity as
the agency head, aVempted to contact his/her local FBI Field Office by telephone, according to
BRAVO 33, to disseminate informaCon about criminal acCvity of potenCal interest to the FBI.
The local law enforcement agency head, BRAVO 33 said, was unable to reach a live person at
the local FBI Field Office and was forced to leave a voicemail message.
BRAVO 33 said that in the message, the local law enforcement agency head (1) idenCfied
himself/herself as the head of a local law enforcement agency and (2) requested a return
telephone call.
BRAVO 33 said that acer a period of Cme – BRAVO 33 did not say exactly how long – the same
local law enforcement agency head again aVempted to reach a live person at the FBI by
telephone, this Cme by calling the local FBI Resident Agency (RA).
NOTE: FBI Resident Agencies are smaller, satellite offices opera<ng remotely and
under the control and jurisdic<on of a larger FBI Field Office that serves as the
headquarters for the FBI in the area.
The head of the local law enforcement agency, according to BRAVO 33, was again unsuccessful
in his/her aVempt to speak to a live person at the FBI and was relegated to leaving a second
voicemail message.
BRAVO 33 said that acer receiving no response from the FBI, the head of the local law
enforcement agency finally opted to report the informaCon to the FBI’s NaConal Threat
OperaCons Center (NTOC), which is based in another region of the country.
BRAVO 33 said that upon hearing details of BRAVO 33’s friend’s repeated aVempts to reach a
live person at the local FBI Field Office and FBI Resident Agency, the FBI ExecuCve Manager who
was briefed on the story by BRAVO 33 dismissed the maVer as insignificant and concluded the
informaCon would be handled appropriately once it was reported to the FBI’s NTOC.
BRAVO 33 was trying to point out a potenCal deficiency – the lack of response by the local FBI
Field Office – for the benefit of the FBI ExecuCve Manager because the FBI Field Office was, at
the Cme, under the control and supervision of the FBI ExecuCve Manager.
- 181 -
The FBI ExecuCve Manager, however, responded to BRAVO 33’s story with indifference and
defensiveness, BRAVO 33 said.
BRAVO 33 said the FBI ExecuCve Manager did not seem surprised by the informaCon provided
by BRAVO 33 and that the FBI ExecuCve Manager’s reacCon suggested failure to reply to
messages lec by law enforcement professionals and by extension the public is not out of the
ordinary and may be an unwriVen policy.
#####
- 182 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 34
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | Almost Three (3) Decades
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 31, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 52), a former federal law
enforcement officer and reCred FBI Special Agent who for more than a decade led classified
Counterintelligence operaCons and invesCgated criminal Public CorrupCon subjects and who
currently operates in mulCple States as a licensed invesCgator and Board-cerCfied security
professional, received the following informaCon obtained first-hand from a human source
(Codename BRAVO 34):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 34 is an expert security consultant with a deep legal background and more than 20 years
of service in the FBI, including as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory Special Agent
(SSA).
BRAVO 34 is widely respected for his/her knowledge of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as well as FBI operaCons and invesCgaCons, and is sought acer for his/her experCse on legal
maVers and challenges facing the FBI.
ROMEO PAPA 52 has known BRAVO 34 for almost three (3) decades. ROMEO PAPA 52 and
BRAVO 34 served in the same FBI Field Office for many years, and ROMEO PAPA 52 holds BRAVO
34 in the highest regard for his/her integrity, professional experience, and love for the United
States of America.
- 183 -
BRAVO 34 reported details of an FBI Field Office’s delayed, unsaCsfactory response to
informaCon it received from a reCred FBI Special Agent regarding a case of online fraud that
cost its vicCms, it was believed, more than a million dollars.
According to BRAVO 34, one of the vicCms was defrauded out of more than half a million dollars
when fraudsters induced the vicCm to wire transfer money the vicCm had in his/her investment
bank accounts.
BRAVO 34 said the vicCm transferred the money to a bank in the U.S. The bank, according to
BRAVO 34, was based in a foreign country.
The vicCm, BRAVO 34 said, never heard from the fraudsters again and never got any of his/her
money back.
BRAVO 34 said a limited inquiry into the bank transacCon showed the account used to commit
the fraud was closed within six months acer the account was opened.
NOTE: BRAVO 34 provided addi<onal details of the online fraud, but those details
were not disclosed here to protect BRAVO 34 from retalia<on by the FBI.
BRAVO 34 said a reCred FBI Special Agent with decades of experience invesCgaCng fraud cases
authored a leVer that provided details of the online fraud and supporCng documentaCon.
The leVer, according to BRAVO 34, was sent to the head of an FBI Field Office who was asked to
iniCate an invesCgaCon.
BRAVO 34 said the leVer and the request to invesCgate the fraud went unanswered.
Later, according to BRAVO 34, details of the online fraud were again brought to the attention of
the head of the FBI Field Office who stated the matter should be reported to the FBI’s Internet
Crime Complaint Center, also known as IC3 (see https://www.ic3.gov/).
BRAVO 34 said the head of the FBI Field Office was advised the matter had already been
reported to the IC3 not once but two times and no response was received.
According to BRAVO 34, the matter was then sent by the head of the FBI Field Office to a
subordinate member of FBI Field Office’s Executive Management Team.
- 184 -
NO WORD FOR FOUR (4) MONTHS
BRAVO 34 said that approximately four (4) months had passed before word was received from
an active-duty FBI Special Agent who was assigned to the case.
The FBI Special Agent, according to BRAVO 34, believed there would be no way to locate and
arrest the fraudsters or recover the money because it was believed the money ended up in a
foreign country.
BRAVO 34 said the FBI Special Agent was advised detailed bank account, transactional and
other identifying information that would shed light on the account’s history, ownership,
identification documents used to open and close the account, as well as outgoing transactions
by type and by whom, could easily be obtained by way of a Federal Grand Jury Subpoena
because of the type of predicate offense.
In response to the guidance and expertise provided, the FBI Special Agent, according to BRAVO
34, said that obtaining and issuing a Federal Grand Jury Subpoena for bank records would be of
no avail since the money was believed to have been transferred to person(s) in a foreign
country.
BRAVO 34 said there was no way for the FBI Special Agent to know that without the actual bank
records, adding that without the bank records, the FBI Special Agent would not be able to
identify the fraudsters who were in the U.S. to open the accounts.
BRAVO 34 was frustrated by the FBI Field Office’s unsatisfactory response, the FBI Special
Agent’s incomplete knowledge of common investigative techniques, and the FBI’s overall lack
of interest and effort.
BRAVO 34 said he/she believed the bank’s conduct and due diligence should have clearly
merited an investigation and that cases like these do not resolve themselves.
They must be investigated, BRAVO 34 said, emphasizing the “I” in FBI stands for “Investigation”.
BRAVO 34 said another incident, similar to the one described above, occurred in another FBI
Field Office with similar, non-responsive results.
BRAVO 34 said the FBI’s frequent response is, “We are so busy.”
- 185 -
THE WAY IT USED TO BE AT THE FBI
BRAVO 34 observed that historically at the FBI, referral of criminal matters from former and
retired FBI Special Agents generated a high-priority response from the FBI because as compared
to communications received from the general public, allegations of criminal activity referred to
the FBI by former and retired FBI Special Agents were vetted and FBI jurisdictional questions
answered and resolved, leading to the potential for greater investigative success and
apprehension of subjects.
BRAVO 34 said the FBI used to adhere to a mandate that senders of all communications
addressed to the FBI would be acknowledged by the FBI within 24 hours of the receipt of the
communications and that the FBI Field Office handling the matter would be promptly notified.
BRAVO 34 said that is clearly no longer the case, regardless of the sender, except perhaps in
cases of Congressional inquiries.
BRAVO 34 said the telephone answering service at the FBI is horrible, adding that telephone
calls are either answered after 20-plus rings by an operator who often answers in an appalling
manner, or the calls go unanswered and then are rerouted to an automated system that leaves
much to be desired for an agency – the FBI – that is supposed to serve the public.
FBI Special Agents and FBI Executive Management cannot be bothered, according to BRAVO 34,
and FBI supervisory personnel have little to no effective supervision of those who serve under
them and who are, in BRAVO 34’s opinion, disinclined to actually seek out criminals.
BRAVO 34 further stated they are quite adept at patting themselves on the back with the great
work they do. BRAVO 34 said that in some cases, that is absolutely the case and the praise very
well-deserved, but BRAVO 34 also said the FBI doing great work seems to be a bit of an
exception than the norm.
BRAVO 34 believed the relative decline in praiseworthy work by the FBI is likely due to the
paucity of FBI Special Agents who actually investigate cases as sole Case Agents singularly
responsible for working cases from the very first communications that open cases to the
sentencing of subjects.
- 186 -
According to BRAVO 34, FBI Special Agents often work non-prosecutable cases that are not
subject to scrutiny by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, review by Federal Grand Juries, cross-
examination by skilled defense attorneys, or oversight by federal judges.
FBI supervisory personnel, BRAVO 34 said, have risen through the ranks with very little
experience and success as Case Agents leading an investigation.
BRAVO 34 said the experience of some FBI supervisory personnel is limited to working as
members of multi-law enforcement agency Task Forces where responsibility for the success of
an investigation is placed on the Task Force overall and not on the individual FBI Special Agent
assigned to each Task Force.
BRAVO 34 called this a huge shortcoming, resulting in positions at FBI Headquarters populated
by supervisory personnel who no longer have the direct and singularly personal street
experience of seasoned FBI Special Agents from years past.
BRAVO 34 said supervisory personnel at FBI Headquarters are often promoted from the
position of FBI Special Agent in the field after less than five (5) years of actual street experience.
They are assigned prematurely, according to BRAVO 34, with the task of providing oversight of
other, more senior FBI Special Agents with more street experience.
BRAVO 34 added that to a large measure, the same is true with FBI supervisory personnel in the
Field.
#####
- 187 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 46
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS | Not Disclosed
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | At Least 20 Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On May 5, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 31), a local law enforcement
veteran with a highly specialized skill set who served with disCncCon for nearly three (3)
decades in a large, local law enforcement agency in the Western U.S. and who designed and
delivered advanced in-service training that significantly enhanced the health and safety of law
enforcement officers in his/her agency, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained
first-hand from a human source (Codename BRAVO 46):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 46 has more than 25 years of law enforcement experience and is currently serving in a
large, local law enforcement agency as the Officer In Charge (OIC) of a mulC-law enforcement
agency Task Force.
NOTE: The name and loca<on of BRAVO 46’s large, local law enforcement agency
and specific, iden<fying details of BRAVO 46’s mul<-law enforcement agency Task
Force were not disclosed to protect BRAVO 46 and his/her agency from retalia<on
by the FBI.
ROMEO PAPA 31 has known BRAVO 46 for at least 20 years. According to ROMEO PAPA 31,
BRAVO 46’s character and integrity are beyond reproach, and ROMEO PAPA 31 said BRAVO 46
had direct, first-hand knowledge of the informaCon provided.
BRAVO 46 said a number of FBI Special Agents are assigned to his/her mulC-law enforcement
agency Task Force.
- 189 -
NOTE: The exact number of FBI Special Agents assigned to BRAVO 46’s mul<-law
enforcement agency Task Force was not disclosed to protect BRAVO 46 and
his/her local law enforcement agency from retalia<on by the FBI.
BRAVO 46 said all but one of the FBI Special Agents assigned to his/her mulC-law enforcement
agency Task Force are completely worthless.
When asked to provide details to support his/her assessment, BRAVO 46 said the primary issue
is the level of unjustified and abrasive arrogance shown by a majority of the FBI Special Agents
assigned to the Task Force.
BRAVO 46 said the secondary issue is the FBI Special Agents assigned to the Task Force are so
“stupid” that it shakes his/her confidence in the FBI to the core.
BRAVO 46 said that based on his/her experience, almost all newer FBI Special Agents “hide at
their FBI Field Office” and make a minimal effort to contribute to the Task Force.
Additionally, BRAVO 46 said roughly half of the FBI Special Agents assigned to his/her multi-law
enforcement agency Task Force have never put a case together, never conducted interviews
that netted any tangible or actionable intelligence, and are often so unsafe in the Field that
they pose a liability to the Task Force as well as to themselves.
BRAVO 46 cited one example, recalling a take-down of a known felon with a violent criminal
history who was at the time believed to be armed.
BRAVO 46 said that while members of his/her multi-law enforcement agency Task Force were
making contact with the felon, BRAVO 46 observed two (2) FBI Special Agents on the perimeter
of the active containment area with their heads down, looking at their cellular telephones.
Their weapons, according to BRAVO 46, were slung/holstered, and the FBI Special Agents
continued to maintain this posture - apparently unaware contact was being made with the
felon – while other members of the Task Force were attempting to take the felon into custody.
BRAVO 46 said he/she verbally reprimanded the two (2) FBI Special Agents for their poor
tactics, critical lack of common sense, and disregard for officer safety.
- 190 -
LACK OF PARTICIPATION AND CONTRIBUTION
BRAVO 46 said despite the fact that multiple FBI Special Agents are assigned to his/her multi-
law enforcement agency Task Force, only one or two of them actively participate in Field
activities.
Other non-FBI members of the Task Force, according to BRAVO 46, often discount the FBI’s
participation in Task Force activities because a majority of the FBI Special Agents assigned to
the Task Force rarely show up. BRAVO 46 said that if they do show up, the FBI Special Agents
assigned to the Task Force rarely contribute anything of significance.
According to BRAVO 46, there is one (1) FBI Special Agent assigned to the Task Force who is
reliable, highly regarded, self-motivated, and looked upon as the “ace in the hole”.
BRAVO 46 said this one (1) FBI Special Agent embraces the concept of Team.
BRAVO 46 emphasized, however, that this one (1) FBI Special Agent assigned to the Task Force
is an anomaly and not the norm when dealing with the FBI.
BRAVO 46 said FBI Special Agents with military or prior law enforcement experience are the
most effective Task Force members because, as a direct result of their past training and
operational experience, they contribute more to a unified cause, communicate well with
others, and are dependable.
BRAVO 46 said these FBI Special Agents with military or prior law enforcement experience were
the exceptions because they were sought after and considered assets, unlike the other FBI
Special Agents BRAVO 46 supervises or regularly interacts with on the Task Force.
BRAVO 46 said it is rare for non-FBI members of his/her multi-law enforcement agency Task
Force or any other Task Force or non-FBI investigator to seek out the FBI for assistance because
of the FBI’s lack of cooperation, lack of ambition or urgency, as well as the sub-standard quality
of FBI personnel and time delays.
When asked again to provide additional details to support his/her negative, overall assessment
of the FBI and FBI Special Agents, BRAVO 46 quickly replied his/her assessment was based on
their unjustified arrogance. BRAVO 46 said it was immediately off-putting to most.
- 191 -
Citing additional reasons for his/her negative, overall assessment of the FBI and FBI Special
Agents, BRAVO 46 said newer FBI Special Agents identify themselves as “woke or liberal” and
are often openly critical of Conservative or Christian values in front of mixed company.
BRAVO 46 also said it is readily apparent that FBI Executive Management embraces the concept
of Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) to such an extent that it is counterproductive to
meritocracy and detrimental to overall efficiency.
BRAVO 46 said the FBI Special Agents whom he/she respects and holds in high esteem blame
the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia for filling the new generation of FBI New Agent Trainees
with liberal propaganda and for failing to properly prepare FBI New Agent Trainees with any
way to deal with challenges in the “real world”.
#####
- 192 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 61
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | One (1) Year On This Subject Maeer
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 18, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 13), an aVorney and
veteran of the FBI who served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI
Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained first-
hand from a human source (Codename BRAVO 61):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 61 has served for more than 20 years in the FBI, including as an FBI Special Agent (SA),
FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), and staff instructor at the FBI Academy in QuanCco,
Virginia.
ROMEO PAPA 13 verified BRAVO 61’s reliability, trustworthiness and competence, and according
to ROMEO PAPA 13, the informaCon provided by BRAVO 61 was obtained first-hand while
engaged in teaching FBI New Agent Trainees (NATs) at the FBI Academy.
BRAVO 61 said each FBI New Agent Trainee class is designed to hold a total of 200 New Agent
Trainees (NATs) who are divided into four (4) secCons of 50 NATs each.
BRAVO 61 further stated the FBI is currently only able to fill two (2) of the four (4) secCons of an
FBI New Agent Trainee class and that recruiCng efforts by the FBI to hire FBI Special Agent
candidates are proving unsuccessful.
- 193 -
According to BRAVO 61, the FBI does not have any formal curriculum aimed at educaCng FBI
New Agent Trainees on the need to develop good relaConships with local, state, tribal or
internaConal law enforcement partners.
The only Cme “liaison” is menConed to FBI New Agent Trainees, according to BRAVO 61, is when
seasoned FBI Special Agents from the Field become instructors at the FBI Academy.
BRAVO 61 said that even then, lessons on developing good working relaConships with law
enforcement officers from other agencies is sporadic at best and incidental to the instrucCon
currently provided.
AddiConally, BRAVO 61 said there is a growing concern among reCred FBI personnel about the
acCviCes the FBI is currently engaging in, and according to BRAVO 61, many reCrees are alarmed
by the poliCcizaCon of the FBI.
#####
- 194 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 82
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS | Not Disclosed
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | One (1) Year
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On May 5, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 31), a local law enforcement
veteran with a highly specialized skill set who served with disCncCon for nearly three (3)
decades in a large, local law enforcement agency in the Western U.S. and who designed and
delivered advanced in-service training that significantly enhanced the health and safety of law
enforcement officers in his/her agency, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained
first-hand from a human source (Codename BRAVO 82):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 82 has more than 25 years of law enforcement experience and is currently serving as a
supervisor in a large, local law enforcement agency.
BRAVO 82 has been a supervisor for a number of years, and his/her duCes have included the
supervision of a number of mulC-law enforcement agency Task Forces.
NOTE: The name and loca<on of BRAVO 82’s large, local law enforcement
agency, the exact number of years BRAVO 82 has served as a supervisor, and
specific, iden<fying details of BRAVO 82’s mul<-law enforcement agency Task
Forces were not disclosed to protect BRAVO 82 and his/her agency from
retalia<on by the FBI.
ROMEO PAPA 31 has known BRAVO 82 for one (1) year. According to ROMEO PAPA 31, BRAVO
82 is an outstanding, highly respected local law enforcement officer and supervisor whose
commitment to serve and loyalty to the mission are matched only by his/her unimpeachable
character and integrity. ROMEO PAPA 31 said BRAVO 82 had direct, first-hand knowledge of the
informaCon provided.
- 196 -
SEEKING ASSISTANCE FROM THE FBI
When asked if BRAVO 82 and members of his/her multi-law enforcement agency Task Forces
often seek assistance from the FBI to investigate cases, BRAVO 82 replied this way - if help is
required from the FBI, they only engage with FBI Special Agents with whom they have a long-
standing relationship that is based on mutual trust.
BRAVO 82 said they would never contact the FBI directly because the FBI could not be relied
upon to provide a timely response and because BRAVO 82 and members of his/her multi-law
enforcement agency Task Forces question the competency and efficiency of the FBI.
BRAVO 82 said he/she and members of BRAVO 82’s multi-law enforcement agency Task Forces
have worked with or around FBI Special Agents on a daily basis for the past several years.
BRAVO 82 said a majority of these FBI Special Agents have between twelve (12) and fifteen (15)
years of experience and are considered valued members of their respective Task Forces.
However, BRAVO 82 said there is a noticeable difference – observed most notably during the
past few years - between the more experienced FBI Special Agents and younger FBI Special
Agents who, according to BRAVO 82, are not acclimating well and are not maintaining
acceptable law enforcement standards for investigations conducted by the Task Forces.
BRAVO 82 said FBI Special Agents with military or prior law enforcement experience seem to
integrate more effectively and more quickly into the Task Forces.
FBI Special Agents with no military, prior law enforcement, or similar backgrounds do not have
the same team-oriented mindset, according to BRAVO 82, that would enable them to more
successfully operate in a cooperative environment under stress.
BRAVO 82 said that it has been noted by many of BRAVO 82’s local law enforcement peers that
the change in climate, mission quality, and professionalism at the FBI during the past couple of
years have been much lower than expected.
- 197 -
OTHER FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AVOID THE FBI
The FBI, according to BRAVO 82, has not been as actively sought out as it has been in the past.
BRAVO 82 said other federal law enforcement agencies seem to be contributing the most to
active investigations. BRAVO 82 said those other federal law enforcement agencies include the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (commonly referred to as the “ATF”), the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and the
U.S. Marshals Service.
BRAVO 82 added federal law enforcement agencies avoid working with the FBI whenever
possible because working with the FBI generates too much red tape and results in extensive
delays.
BRAVO 82 also cited as among the common reasons federal law enforcement agencies avoid
working with the FBI – poor cooperation by the FBI.
BRAVO 82 did emphasize that there are many dedicated FBI Special Agents in the Field who are
working hard, but BRAVO 82 said they are often hamstrung by wavering, indecisive FBI
supervisory personnel.
BRAVO 82 was asked to identify internal problems the FBI might want to focus on to improve
overall as a law enforcement agency.
BRAVO 82 said the FBI does not take constructive criticism from the outside, i.e. from external
sources, well at all.
Even when shortcomings and deficiencies are repeatedly brought to the attention of FBI
supervisory personnel in the Field or FBI Executive Management, BRAVO 82 said, “They (the
FBI) are terrible at policing themselves.”
BRAVO 82 said emphatically that he/she and BRAVO 82’s local law enforcement peers
personally view the FBI’s ego and arrogance as undermining the organization.
BRAVO 82 said, “The new generation of (FBI) agent(s) are very full of themselves and blatantly
look down on other (law enforcement) agencies...”
- 198 -
BLAMING THE FBI ACADEMY
BRAVO 82 said the most friction with and distrust of the FBI is caused by what the FBI Academy
(at Quantico, Virginia) is telling FBI New Agent Trainees.
BRAVO 82 said proclamations made to FBI New Agent Trainees that they are “the best LE (law
enforcement) agency in the land”, that they are members of “the premier agency...(with)
jurisdiction over all others”, and that “LE (law enforcement) throughout the country look(s) up
to you” are very far from the truth.
The FBI, according to BRAVO 82, is held in disdain by many of his/her local law enforcement
peers and is not considered an arm of law enforcement but rather a tool of the woke and liberal
political apparatus currently in power.
BRAVO 82 said simply, “The quality just isn't there at the FBI anymore. The pursuit of justice is
no longer their priority. It's just sad."
#####
- 199 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 12
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS | Not Disclosed
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | Not Disclosed
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 22, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 26), a Board-CerCfied
Corporate Security Professional who served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA)
and FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) and who now leads security programs as a Senior
Corporate ExecuCve, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained first-hand from a
human source (Codename BRAVO 12):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 12 is a seasoned FBI Staff Operations Specialist (SOS) who for many years worked on
Criminal, Counterterrorism (CT) and Counterintelligence (CI) squads in several administrative
support positions and as a tactical analyst.
NOTE: The number of years of BRAVO 12’s ongoing service in the FBI, current
squad assignment, and location of BRAVO 12’s FBI Field Office were not disclosed
to protect BRAVO 12 from retaliation by the FBI.
FBI Executive Management created the FBI Staff Operations Specialist (SOS) position after 9/11
to formalize the case support function designed to assist investigators, i.e. FBI Special Agents
classified as 1811 Series Investigators.
BRAVO 12 said the FBI Staff Operations Specialist (SOS), also known as a tactical analyst,
specializes in analyzing and interpreting data to assist decision-making processes in the context
of criminal law enforcement and Counterintelligence.
BRAVO 12 added that in his/her role as a tactical analyst, he/she researches and analyzes data
mined from unclassified, law enforcement sensitive, and classified computer systems.
- 200 -
The FBI Staff Operations Specialist (SOS), according to BRAVO 12, also develops actionable
strategies, creates in-depth analyses, and provides real-time information to help build
investigations.
Additionally, BRAVO 12 said that when the public thinks about the FBI, they do not think about
the hundreds of other critical roles behind the scenes at the FBI that contribute to the
protection of the American people.
BRAVO 12 said the FBI Staff Operations Specialist (SOS) should have strong critical thinking and
problem-solving skills and, sometimes, knowledge of a foreign language.
BRAVO 12 said he/she is not impressed with the caliber of the recent generation of FBI Special
Agents.
BRAVO 12 further stated he/she has worked closely with hundreds of FBI Special Agents over
the course of many years and without hesitation described today's generation of FBI Special
Agents as the worst batch of people due to their poor work ethic, sense of entitlement,
immaturity, pettiness, political biases, and unprofessionalism.
BRAVO 12 said he/she never before thought he/she would be thinking about counting down
the time until retirement, further stating he/she does not respect or want to work with most of
the FBI Special Agents in today's FBI.
According to BRAVO 12, he/she has for many years loved working with his/her colleagues and
doing his/her part to protect the American people.
However, BRAVO 12 said he/she is angry with FBI Director Christopher Wray and many of the
FBI Executive Managers because BRAVO 12 believes they are politicizing and destroying the
FBI's credibility.
BRAVO 12, unfortunately, had too many specific examples to discuss, examples that show the
FBI's inability to attract, keep, and promote people with integrity, competence, humility, and
compassion.
BRAVO 12 said what is left of the FBI’s once excellent reputation is built on a few FBI Special
Agents, analysts, and other FBI personnel who still believe in the FBI’s motto - Fidelity, Bravery,
and Integrity.
- 201 -
These employees, according to BRAVO 12, do not care about all the extraneous stuff FBI
Executive Management shoves down their throats – like Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI)
mandates - and BRAVO 12 added the same FBI Executive Managers use their positions of
authority to promote political causes and investigative priorities that are not real threats to the
Nation, like Domestic Terrorism.
BRAVO 12 said that almost every day, he/she observes several FBI Special Agents assigned to
his/her squad speaking for hours as if they are in high school all over again.
These FBI Special Agents, according to BRAVO 12, bad mouth their coworkers behind their
backs on various issues, speak highly of themselves, and discuss almost everything besides
actually doing their jobs. BRAVO 12 said this kind of behavior occurs in most squad areas
throughout the office.
BRAVO 12 said the FBI Special Agents of today are more interested in working collateral duties,
going to exciting arrests, and volunteering for Temporary Duty Assignments (TDYs) instead of
conducting investigations.
BRAVO 12 said that on several occasions, BRAVO 12 has been dumped on by both the squad’s
supervisor and FBI Special Agents who have asked BRAVO 12 to support their cases by creating
tactical products that they were just as skilled to produce themselves.
BRAVO 12 said he/she was once tasked to verbally brief FBI Executive Managers on a case when
it was the FBI Special Agent’s job as Case Agent to conduct the briefing.
BRAVO 12 added that when he/she completed producing tactical, written products and
provided hard copies to FBI Special Agents, the FBI Special Agents were typically too lazy to
read and discuss the findings of the reports.
According to BRAVO 12, he/she was asked several times in his/her role as an FBI Staff
Operations Specialist (SOS) to accompany FBI Special Agents to meetings with witnesses and
sources, only to discover the FBI Special Agents had never read the relevant reports or were not
prepared for the meeting.
BRAVO 12 said today’s FBI Special Agents are so arrogant that they believe they can simply wing
it during these interviews.
- 202 -
BRAVO 12 said he/she is treated by FBI Special Agents and FBI Executive Management like a
second-class citizen, despite BRAVO 12’s many years of experience working in the Criminal,
Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence programs.
BRAVO 12 said some FBI Special Agents wear their FBI badges and guns like status symbols
instead of the valuable items the American people have entrusted them to carry.
BRAVO 12 added today's FBI Special Agents believe they are above local and state investigators.
BRAVO 12 said that while riding as a passenger in an FBI Special Agent’s government vehicle,
the FBI Special Agent received a parking ticket, crushed it, and then threw it to the back seat as
if the FBI Special Agent were discarding a piece of trash. BRAVO 12 said the FBI Special Agent
said he/she did not care about the local violation, a statement that made BRAVO 12
uncomfortable with the FBI Special Agent’s character and integrity.
Although BRAVO 12 is frustrated by the direction of today’s FBI, BRAVO 12 said he/she is trying
to keep a positive attitude by conferring with like-minded, hard-working coworkers and by
keeping his/her head down.
ROMEO PAPA 26 thanked BRAVO 12 for upholding the U.S. Constitution and for holding the line
for the truth.
#####
- 203 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 58
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini@al | # of Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On February 26, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 26), a Board-CerCfied
Corporate Security Professional who served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA)
and FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) and who now leads security programs as a Senior
Corporate ExecuCve, voluntarily provided the following informaCon obtained first-hand from a
human source (Codename BRAVO 58):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 58 reCred as a sergeant in 2021 from a large law enforcement agency located in the
Western U.S. BRAVO 58 currently works as a corporate security professional employed by a
Fortune 100 Company.
BRAVO 58’s law enforcement experience stretches across 25 years and includes assignments
ranging from liaison between his/her law enforcement agency head and the local government
to assignments in various specialized units, including as a member of Task Forces invesCgaCng
violent crimes, gangs, and drug trafficking.
BRAVO 58 has received several awards from his/her law enforcement agency, the community,
and non-profit organizaCons for his/her service and efforts to protect the community. On two
(2) separate occasions, BRAVO 58 was awarded the Medal of Valor for a life-saving incident and
for confronCng a violent criminal whose acCons resulted in the use of deadly force.
- 204 -
BRAVO 58 advised ROMEO PAPA 26 that overall, he/she experienced a posiCve outlook on the
FBI based on his/her personal and professional interacCons with the FBI Special Agents he/she
worked with while assigned to various Task Forces.
LASTING FRIENDSHIPS
BRAVO 58 said he/she sCll maintains friendships with these FBI Special Agents who are either
about to reCre or have already reCred and gone on to do something different in their lives.
BRAVO 58 further stated that while working in the Task Force environment, he/she personally
noCced the differences between an FBI Special Agent in the Field (someCmes referred to as a
Field Agent) and an FBI Manager. These observaCons, according to BRAVO 58, were based on
his/her discussions with the FBI Special Agents with whom he/she worked.
BRAVO 58 described FBI Special Agents who worked in the Field as the people who did what
needed to be done to put criminals in prison.
BRAVO 58 described Managerial Agents of the FBI as those who were only concerned about
producing staCsCcs and gewng their faces in front of the news cameras acer a big takedown.
BRAVO 58 further described FBI Managerial Agents as those who were unwilling to take any
risks that may negaCvely impact their careers.
FBI’S MICRO-MANAGERS
BRAVO 58 recalled several incidents when FBI Special Agents in the Field would work over ten
(10) hours on a case overnight, only to receive a call or text from an FBI Manager asking why the
FBI Special Agents in the Field were not in the office (at the start of the standard workday)
around 8:00 a.m. or (at the end of the standard workday) at 5:00 p.m.
- 205 -
BRAVO 58 said he/she was shocked that the FBI would promote people who were so peVy and
uncaring of their own people who were risking their lives to fight crime.
BRAVO 58 worked as a mid-level manager for his/her law enforcement agency, and BRAVO 58
said he/she rarely interacted directly with FBI Supervisory Special Agents (SSAs), FBI Assistant
Special Agents In Charge (ASACs), or the FBI Special Agent In Charge (SAC) unless there was an
opportunity for those FBI supervisory personnel or members of FBI ExecuCve Management to
promote themselves posiCvely in the press.
According to BRAVO 58, the morale at the FBI is the lowest it has ever been due to the
perceived poliCcal biases, lack of support for its employees, and focus on lower priority threats
like DomesCc Terrorism.
As an outsider, BRAVO 58 said he/she believes the FBI's mission is too broad and that the FBI is
mediocre in everything.
BRAVO 58, however, stated he/she loved being a law enforcement officer and working with
those FBI Special Agents in the Field who earned and built the FBI's once-excellent reputaCon.
#####
- 206 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 86
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | More Than 25 Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On April 1, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 52), a former federal law
enforcement officer and reCred FBI Special Agent who for more than a decade led classified
Counterintelligence operaCons and invesCgated criminal Public CorrupCon subjects and who
currently operates in mulCple States as a licensed invesCgator and Board-cerCfied security
professional, received the following informaCon obtained first-hand from a human source
(Codename BRAVO 86):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 86 is a senior corporate execuCve who served in the U.S. Armed Forces and later in the
FBI for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA).
BRAVO 86 was known by his/her peers at the FBI and other law enforcement agencies as a
highly moCvated invesCgator who led complex Counterterrorism operaCons in the U.S. and
overseas.
ROMEO PAPA 52 has known BRAVO 86 for more than 25 years. ROMEO PAPA 52 and BRAVO 86
served in the same FBI Field Office for more than a decade, and ROMEO PAPA 52 holds BRAVO
86 in high regard for his/her candor, loyalty, and devoCon to the United States of America.
ROMEO PAPA 52 said BRAVO 86’s reliability is beyond reproach, and BRAVO 86 had direct access
to the informaCon provided.
- 208 -
FBI’S INSPECTION DIVISION
BRAVO 86 said the FBI’s InspecCon Division (INSD) conducts inspecCons of FBI Field Offices and
FBI Divisions at FBI Headquarters on a rotaConal basis every few years.
In some cases, according to BRAVO 86, inspecCons are ordered by the FBI Director’s Office acer
significant high-profile incidents, reports of misconduct, poor performance by the FBI Field
Office ExecuCve Management Team, and/or a breakdown in communicaCon between the FBI
Field Office and local and state law enforcement agencies located in the FBI Field Office’s Area
of OperaCons.
There is, according to BRAVO 86, a prescribed, very programmed and rouCne methodology
uClized by the FBI’s InspecCon Division when it conducts inspecCons.
BRAVO 86 said the FBI holds itself to a higher standard and is one of the few U.S. Government
agencies that is allowed to self-inspect, i.e. conduct its own internal invesCgaCons.
Other U.S. Government agencies, according to BRAVO 86, are by design not allowed to self-
inspect and are inspected instead by their respecCve Office of Inspector General, also known as
the agencies’ IG or OIG.
BRAVO 86 said the FBI Inspection Division’s inspections of FBI Field Offices are conducted by FBI
Executive Inspectors – members of the U.S. Government’s Senior Executive Service (SES) – who
are assigned full-time to the FBI’s Inspection Division at FBI Headquarters; FBI Assistant
Inspector Team Leaders – Grade GS-15 employees – who are also assigned full-time but are on
a rotational 12- or 18-month Temporary Duty Assignment (TDY) to FBI Headquarters; and
younger, up-and-coming FBI supervisory personnel who travel from their respective FBI Field
Offices to conduct inspections.
BRAVO 86 said that often, before their arrival at an FBI Field Office, the inspectors have already
spent weeks reviewing the FBI Field Office and its performance based on FBI metrics,
complaints, and general perceptions of the FBI Field Office by members of local and state law
enforcement partners in the FBI Field Office’s Area of Operations.
BRAVO 86 said a key component of the inspection of an FBI Field Office for its effectiveness and
efficiency is an examination of how much of time and resources were devoted by the FBI Field
- 209 -
Office to conducting investigations that align with priorities set forth by FBI Headquarters and
the FBI Director.
For instance, according to BRAVO 86, if International Counterterrorism was a top priority for
the FBI Field Office but the FBI Field Office allocated a majority of its work hours to White Collar
Crime investigations, the inspectors would issue a negative finding.
BRAVO 86 said another component of the inspection process is interviewing local and state law
enforcement partners in the FBI Field Office’s Area of Operations to determine how they assess
the performance of the FBI Field Office.
Usually, according to BRAVO 86, local and state law enforcement partners characterize their
partnerships with FBI Field Offices as neutral - not particularly great or particularly bad.
However, BRAVO 86 said that on occasion, major deficiencies in the relationship between the
FBI Field Office and its local and state law enforcement partners are discovered.
The deficiencies are meticulously documented as part of the FBI Inspection Division’s record
keeping process, and BRAVO 86 added the documents are maintained by the FBI’s Inspection
Division at FBI Headquarters and copies are forwarded to the FBI Director’s Office at the
conclusion of the inspection.
BRAVO 86 said achievements, positive highlights, important Investigative case work, statistical
accomplishments, and significant and positive cooperation with local and state law
enforcement are documented, as well as negative findings.
These negative findings, according to BRAVO 86, often include a deterioration of the
cooperation between the FBI Field Office and its local and state law enforcement partners,
misconduct, misaligned FBI Field Office priorities, inefficient use of resources, and ineffective
investigations that have little impact on growing crime problems or threats in the FBI Field
Office’s Area of Operations.
BRAVO 86 said that after these inspections are completed, corrective disciplinary actions are
occasionally taken in cases where negative findings were issued by the FBI Inspection Division,
including the removal of FBI Special Agents In Charge (SACs), FBI Assistant Special Agents In
Charge (ASACs), and/or FBI Supervisory Special Agents (SSAs).
- 210 -
CORRUPTION TASK FORCE FELL APART
Citing an example of the deteriorating relationship between the FBI and local law enforcement,
BRAVO 86 said a Corruption Task Force was established in the Western U.S. that included an FBI
Field Office and a local prosecutor’s office and its investigators.
The Corruption Task Force, however, fell apart, according to BRAVO 86, because of poor
communication, distrust, and personality conflicts, resulting in a finding issued by the FBI
Inspection Division during its inspection of the FBI Field Office.
BRAVO 86 said Sub-sources who were at the time assigned to the FBI Inspection Division but
were unwilling to publicly discuss details reported that since the events in and around the U.S.
Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021, the FBI’s relationship with local law
enforcement has been strained.
According to BRAVO 86, the Sub-sources reported the relationship between the FBI and local
law enforcement has been strained because of the high-profile investigations led by the U.S.
Department of Justice and certain units within the FBI of subjects linked to the events of
January 6, 2021 and their arrests for misdemeanor offenses.
BRAVO 86 said that during inspections of FBI Field Offices, numerous details have emerged of
the FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice putting pressure on local law enforcement to assist
with cases linked to the events in and around the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 6,
2021.
BRAVO 86 further stated the pressure placed on local law enforcement agencies has been a
strain on available law enforcement personnel and has impacted morale within these agencies.
BRAVO 86 said the FBI Inspection Division’s final report on each inspection of an FBI Field Office
includes a section that details findings related to the status and condition of the FBI Field
Office’s relationship with local and state law enforcement.
BRAVO 86 further stated it would be very easy administratively for the FBI Inspection Division
to assemble these reports and provide them to Congress for review and oversight of the
deteriorating relationship of late between the FBI and local and state law enforcement.
- 211 -
#####
- 212 -
SOURCE: BRAVO 63
LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS
RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable |Unknown
REPORTING
HISTORY: Ini?al | Approximately 28 Years
COOPERATION
TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official
CORROBORATION
LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document
On March 26, 2024, the ReporCng Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 52), a former federal law
enforcement officer and reCred FBI Special Agent who for more than a decade led classified
Counterintelligence operaCons and invesCgated criminal Public CorrupCon subjects and who
currently operates in mulCple States as a licensed invesCgator and Board-cerCfied security
professional, received the following informaCon obtained first-hand from a human source
(Codename BRAVO 63):
SOURCE DESCRIPTION
BRAVO 63 served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent (SA) and FBI Supervisory
Special Agent (SSA) in mulCple FBI Field Offices before entering the private sector. BRAVO 63
currently provides expert consulCng services and instrucCon on law enforcement maVers.
ROMEO PAPA 52 and BRAVO 63 served in the same FBI Field Office for many years, and ROMEO
PAPA 52 holds BRAVO 63 in the highest regard based on BRAVO 63’s character, integrity, and
outstanding leadership skills.
BRAVO 63’s credibility and reliability are beyond reproach, and his/her access to the informaCon
provided is based on direct, first-hand knowledge of the events detailed below.
BRAVO 63 said he/she conducted inspecCons of FBI Field Offices as a first-line inspector and
team leader, part of a team of inspectors that operated under the authority and direcCon of a
Chief Inspector assigned to FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ).
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FEEDBACK FROM THE FBI’S LAW ENFORCEMENT PARTNERS
BRAVO 63 said that in the process of obtaining his/her cerCficaCon to conduct inspecCons of FBI
Field Offices, BRAVO 63 learned every inspecCon included interviewing the FBI Field Offices’
local and state law enforcement partners to obtain their feedback on the status and condiCon of
their working relaConships with FBI Field Offices.
According to BRAVO 63, feedback from the FBI Field Offices’ law enforcement partners became
notably worse acer then-FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III (who served in that capacity from
September 4, 2001 to September 4, 2013) implemented the FBI’s first five-year “up-or-out”
promoConal program.
NOTE: The FBI’s “up-or-out” promo<onal program required FBI Field Office
Supervisory Special Agents (SSAs) – squad-level, Grade GS-14 supervisors – to
transfer “up” to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. within a fixed, pre-
determined number of years (ini<ally, five (5) years when the program was first
implemented) OR step “out” of the promo<onal track and accept a demo<on
back down to the posi<on of a non-supervisory Grade GS-13 level FBI Special
Agent. The “up-or-out” promo<onal program was implemented as part of the
FBI’s abempt to fill persistent vacancies of supervisory posi<ons at FBI
Headquarters.
Previously, before the “up-or-out” promoConal program was implemented, FBI supervisors
assigned to criminal squads, Task Forces, and other assignments requiring significant law
enforcement liaison were usually less transitory and more staConary, according to BRAVO 63,
allowing FBI supervisors and their law enforcement partners to take the necessary Cme to
develop long-term working relaConships, trust, and respect.
BRAVO 63 said that during the FBI Field Office inspecCons in which he/she took part, the FBI
Field Offices’ law enforcement partners stated this was no longer the case.
BRAVO 63 said FBI Field Offices’ law enforcement partners reported on their evaluaCons that it
was no longer worth their effort to aVempt to develop a working relaConship with the FBI
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supervisors who served as their contacts because the FBI supervisors would be reassigned to
another posiCon in another locaCon typically within a year or two.
A comment commonly made by the FBI Field Offices’ law enforcement partners, according to
BRAVO 63, was that just as the FBI supervisors were learning the process, the FBI supervisors
would be reassigned.
BRAVO 63 said FBI Field Offices’ law enforcement partners also did not believe it was worth
their effort to conCnue educaCng and working with the FBI because they knew FBI supervisors
would be moved before any real benefit could be realized.
BRAVO 63 said despite the fact that transitory FBI supervisory personnel was a consistent
criCcism and regularly reported by first-line inspectors, BRAVO 63 did not know if the issue of
transitory FBI supervisory personnel was ever reported to FBI Headquarters.
According to BRAVO 63, the Chief Inspector determined what contents of the final inspecCon
report would be shared with FBI Headquarters and the heads of the FBI Field Offices that were
inspected.
NOTE: Most FBI Field Offices are led by an FBI Special Agent In Charge (SAC). The
largest FBI Field Offices are headed by an FBI Assistant Director In Charge (ADIC).
#####
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Appendices
APPENDIX A: Request for InformaIon (RFI), dated February 19, 2024 217
APPENDIX B: Missouri A\orney General Le\er, dated July 13, 2022 223
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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
Subject: Request For InformaCon (RFI) on how the Federal Bureau of InvesCgaCon’s
security and public safety partners in local, state and federal law enforcement
view today’s FBI.
On July 19, 2023, the first in a series of anecdotal reports was received, indicaCng that in
parallel to the public’s declining trust in the FBI, local and state law enforcement personnel have
in recent years formed an increasingly negaCve opinion of the FBI.
According to a highly reliable and credible source, the FBI and an FBI agent featured in the
source’s iniCal report are considered persona non grata by employees of both a local police
department and a county prosecutor’s office. The FBI agent was viewed as overtly and
poliCcally biased, and the FBI as an organizaCon, according to the source, “has lost almost all
credibility locally and likely naConally.”111
1. COLLECT the unfiltered opinions of the FBI’s security and public safety
partners in local, state and federal law enforcement to inventory, analyze and
report on their views of today’s FBI.
3. DETERMINE what impact, if any, the public’s percepEon of poliEcal bias and
weaponizaEon of the FBI have had on the quality of informaEon sharing and
interagency working relaEonships between the FBI and its local, state and
federal law enforcement partners.
111
Report on Alarming Trends in FBI Special Agent Recruitment and Selection. (2023, October). A
National Alliance of Retired and Active-Duty FBI Special Agents and Analysts.
https://www.scribd.com/document/701275030/Report-on-FBI-Special-Agent-Recruitment-and-
Selection.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE FBI
The FBI must maintain close, posiCve working relaConships with local, state and other federal
law enforcement agencies to adequately address complex threats facing the United States.
These relaConships between the FBI and all law enforcement agencies must be acCve,
conCnuous and built on a foundaCon of trust. When they are not, agent and officer safety on
the street is compromised and the American public is endangered.
With approximately 35,000 employees, including posiCons budgeted for approximately 13,000
Special Agents and 3,000 Intelligence Analysts, the FBI is smaller than the New York City Police
Department.112,113,114 Because of its relaCvely small size in comparison to its wide-ranging
duCes as the principal invesCgaCve agency both internaConally and within the United States,
the FBI necessarily relies heavily on leads from local, state and federal law enforcement
partners, as well as the public, to iniCate cases.115,116
As noted in the preface to the FBI Informa<on Sharing and Safeguarding Report 2012:
“The FBI has for many years recognized the value and the necessity of
cooperaEon between law enforcement and the American people, and
among the agencies that serve them. The foundaEon of this cooperaEon
is mutual respect, trust and the sharing of informaEon both within the
government, and between the government and its ciEzens.”117
112
How many people work for the FBI? (n.d.). FBI. https://www.fbi.gov/about/faqs/how-many-people-
work-for-the-fbi.
113
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) FY 2023 Budget Request At A Glance. (n.d.). Department of
Justice. https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1489476/download.
114
About NYPD. (n.d.). New York City Police Department. https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/about-
nypd/about-nypd-landing.page.
115
What is the FBI’s role in combating terrorism? (n.d.). FBI. https://www.fbi.gov/about/faqs/what-is-
the-fbis-role-in-combating-terrorism.
116
Counterintelligence | The FBI’s Counterintelligence Program. (n.d.). FBI.
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence.
117
FBI Information Sharing and Safeguarding Report 2012. (2012). FBI. https://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/national-information-sharing-strategy-1.
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END OF REPORT
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