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Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Addressing

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Occasional Paper n° 24

Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes,

Consequences, and Addressing the Challenges

Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen S. Hendrix

July 2011
Copyright © WFP 2011

All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or
transmitted, in any form by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without prior
permission of WFP.

This document is available online at wfp.org/policy-resources

The authors are responsible for the choice and the presentation of the facts contained in this publication
and for the opinions expressed herein, which are not necessarily of, and do not commit, WFP.
Occasional Paper n° 24

Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes,

Consequences, and Addressing the Challenges

Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen S. Hendrix

July 2011
Abstract

This paper provides an overview of the link between Food insecurity – especially when caused by a rise in
food insecurity and violent conflict, addressing both food prices – is a threat and impact multiplier for
traditional and emerging threats to security and violent conflict. It might not be a direct cause and
political stability. It discusses the effects of food rarely the only cause, but combined with other
insecurity on several types of conflict, and the factors, for example in the political or economic
political, social, and demographic factors that may spheres, it could be the factor that determines
exacerbate these effects. It then discusses the whether and when violent conflicts will erupt.
interventions that can break the link between food Changes in food security, rather than levels of food
security and conflict, focusing on mechanisms that insecurity, are probably most influential. Food
can shield consumers and producers from food price insecurity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
shocks. Finally, it discusses ways in which the condition for violent conflict. Food price stabilization
international community can assist in breaking this measures and safety nets are critical instruments to
link and build peace. prevent violent conflict. Food assistance can
contribute to peacebuilding, restore trust in
governments and rebuild social capital.

Henk-Jan Brinkman is Chief, Policy, Planning and Application in the Peacebuilding Support Office of the
United Nations. Cullen S. Hendrix is Assistant Professor, The College of William & Mary, and Fellow, Robert
S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas at Austin. An earlier version of this
paper was prepared as a background paper for the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011: Conflict,
Security and Development. At that time, Henk-Jan was Senior Adviser for Economic Policy at the World Food
Programme (WFP). The authors wish to thank Jorge Fanlo, Alice Green, Luca Molinas, Joanna Syroka and
Miyuki Yamashita for inputs, Farzad Kapadia for excellent research assistance, Vanessa Howe-Jones for
editing suggestions and Steven Were Omamo and Lynn Brown and the World Development Report team for
constructive comments. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the official position of
WFP or the United Nations.

2
Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
2. Food Insecurity as a Cause of Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Civil Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Interstate War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
Democratic and Authoritarian Breakdowns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
Protest and Rioting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Communal Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Context Matters: Demographic, Social, Political, and Economic Mediators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
3. Food Prices and Fragile States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Focus on Fragile States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Violent Conflict as a Source of Higher Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
4. Breaking the Food Insecurity – Conflict Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Fragile States and Political Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Policy Interventions in Times of High Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Social Protection and Safety Nets: Taking the Longer View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
5. The International Community: Answering the Call, Promoting Peace . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Food Assistance and Peacebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Food Assistance and Social Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Transitions from Relief to Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
Getting Aid Sequencing Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Figure 1. Food Prices and Rioting, 2007-2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Table 1. Global factors causing high food prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Table 2. Shares of food imports in food consumption and of food in total household
consumption expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Box: A comparison of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Box: Transitioning school feeding in El Salvador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Box: School meals as a safety net that contributes to peacebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
Box: Food assistance for conflict-affected populations in Mindanao, the Philippines:
Peacebuilding before peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Box: WFP and IDPs in Côte d’Ivoire: Rebuilding social cohesion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
Annex: Responses of Fragile States to High Food Prices in 2007-08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

3
1. Introduction

Rising food prices contribute to food insecurity, violence and conflict. Generally, the risk of violent
which is a clear and serious threat to human security. conflict is higher where political regimes intermingle
Interest in food security as a catalyst for political democratic and authoritarian institutions or when a
instability and conflict has grown rapidly since youth bulge, low levels of development, deteriorating
2007–2008, when food protests and riots broke out economic conditions, or high inequalities among
in 48 countries as a result of record world prices. In groups are present.
February 2011, the food price index of the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Fragile states (which have a high share of food
(FAO) reached a new historic peak, and the rise in imports), and the households within them (who
food prices contributed to the wave of protests across must spend a large share of their income on food),
North Africa and the Middle East that toppled are particularly vulnerable to higher food prices.
Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Moreover, this vulnerability has increased over time.
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. On the other hand, violent conflicts have also
contributed to higher food prices and food
Among major development organizations, the insecurity, contributing to a vicious cycle.
unchallenged consensus is that war and conflict are
development issues: conflict ravages local While the situation seems bleak, the contingent
economies, often leading to forced migration, nature of food insecurity’s effect on conflict suggests
refugee populations, disease, a collapse of social that governments, international organizations (IOs),
trust, and acute food insecurity. But is food and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can
insecurity itself a cause of conflict? Based on a review take positive steps to reduce food insecurity and
of recent research, the answer is a highly qualified break the relationship between food insecurity and
yes. Food insecurity, especially when caused by conflict. Governments can act to shield their citizens
higher food prices, heightens the risk of democratic from higher prices and volatility in world markets by
breakdown, civil conflict, protest, rioting, and initiating measures to stabilize food prices and by
communal conflict. The evidence linking food establishing social protection systems that mitigate
insecurity to interstate conflict is less strong, though the impact of high food prices on vulnerable groups.
there is some historical evidence linking declining Unfortunately, the capacity of fragile states to do that
agricultural yields to periods of regional conflict in is limited. The World Food Programme and NGOs
Europe and Asia. can assist in times of acute crisis to provide relief.
Finally, governments, IOs and NGOs can work to
These links are highly context-specific: they are make food security a part of the post-conflict
contingent on existing political institutions, levels of peacebuilding and reconstruction process. The
economic development, social safety nets and challenges are great, but the potential social,
demographic pressures. Food insecurity is neither a economic, and political costs of inaction are even
necessary nor sufficient condition for acute political greater.

4
2. Food Insecurity as a Cause of Violence

The traditional security paradigm focuses on military Miguel, 2010). These arguments are most valid with
threats to sovereign states. The absence of war, respect to participation in civil war and rebellion,
however, does not equal peace and stability. Between where participation is better explained by a mixture
1990 and 2009, Kenya experienced neither interstate of grievances – which provide motivation – and
nor intrastate war, yet political and social violence, selective incentives – protection from violence and
including election-related rioting, communal conflict opportunities to engage in predation or to receive
and cattle raiding caused over 4,700 deaths food, clothing, shelter and other material benefits –
(Salehyan et al., 2011). Civil conflict and interstate rather than grievances alone (Berman, 2009). A
war are merely the most obvious manifestations of study of demobilized combatants in Sierra Leone
political violence; other types of conflict may pose found that poverty, lack of educational access and
similarly grave threats to human security. material rewards were associated with participation
in the civil war (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008).
The Roman poet Juvenal recognized in 100 CE that Interestingly, in Liberia, women were more likely
the provision of “bread and circuses” was an effective than men to fight for material benefits (Hill et al.,
mechanism for garnering public support and 2008). Thus, grievances are important, but so are
preventing the populace from expressing discontent. motivations related to that individual’s economic and
Contemporary observers note that it is not only the opportunistic considerations.
level of insecurity that matters, but also how this
insecurity is distributed. Relative deprivation, rather
than absolute deprivation, generates grievances that Civil Conflict
motivate violent behavior. Thus, many of the studies
linking economic grievances to conflict look at both Civil conflict is the prevalent type of armed conflict
the average level of food insecurity and at whether in the world today (Harbom and Wallersteen, 2010).
that food insecurity is widely experienced or It is almost exclusively a phenomenon of countries
concentrated in certain groups (Reenock, Bernhard with low levels of economic development and high
and Sobek, 2007; Østby, 2008). levels of food insecurity. Sixty-five percent of the
world’s food-insecure people live in seven countries:
Most of the types of political violence addressed here India, China, the Democratic Republic of Congo
are more prevalent in societies with higher levels of (DRC), Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan and
chronic food insecurity. There is a correlation Ethiopia (FAO, 2010), of which all but China have
between food insecurity and political conflict in part experienced civil conflict in the past decade, with
because both are symptoms of low development DRC, Ethiopia, India and Pakistan currently
(Collier et al., 2003). Nevertheless, a growing body of embroiled in civil conflicts.
research makes both direct links and indirect links –
as proxied by environmental scarcity or access to Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa (2008) find that
water resources – between food scarcity and various poor health and nutrition are associated with greater
types of conflict. probability of civil conflict, though their findings are
based on small sample sizes. Countries with lower
The causal arguments linking food insecurity to per capita caloric intake are more prone to
political violence lack microfoundational evidence – experience civil conflict, even accounting for their
evidence based on actions of individuals – to explain levels of economic development (Sobek and
how the mechanism works, but there are plenty of Boehmer, 2009). This relationship is stronger in
theories. The theories tend to rest either on the those states where primary commodities make up a
perspective of motivation, emphasizing the effect of large proportion of their export profile. Some of the
food insecurity on economic and social grievances; or countries most plagued by conflict in the past 20
on the perspective of the opportunity cost, years are commodity-rich countries characterized by
emphasizing the perceived costs and benefits of widespread hunger, such as Angola, DRC, Papua
participating in violence relative to other means of New Guinea and Sierra Leone. The mixture of
securing income or food (Gurr, 1970; Tilly, 1978; hunger – which creates grievances – and the
Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008; Blattman and availability of valuable commodities – which can

5
provide opportunities for rebel funding – is a volatile been challenged (Burke et al., 2009; Buhaug, 2010).
combination. Civil war is also more likely in the aftermath of
quick-onset natural disasters, such as earthquakes,
World commodity prices can trigger conflict, as major volcanic eruptions, floods, and cyclonic storms
higher prices, especially for food, increase affected (Brancati, 2007; Nel and Righarts, 2008). The
groups’ willingness to fight. Timothy Besley and relationship between disaster and conflict is
Torsten Persson (2008) find that as a country’s strongest in countries with high levels of inequality
import prices increase, thereby eroding real incomes, and slow economic growth; food insecurity and
the risk of conflict increases. Oeindrila Dube and resource scarcity are among the more plausible
Juan F. Vargas (2008) arrive at similar conclusions explanations for this correlation.
when looking at Colombia, where higher export
prices for coffee (which is labour intensive and a
source of rural income) reduced violence in coffee- Interstate War
producing areas while higher export prices for oil
(which is capital intensive and a source of income for The links between food insecurity and interstate war
rebels and paramilitary groups) increased violence in are less direct. While countries often go to war over
regions with oil reserves and pipelines. territory, previous research has not focused directly
on access to food or productive agricultural land as a
Other research links transitory weather shocks to major driver of conflict (Hensel, 2000). However,
civil conflict. In these studies, weather shocks – like wars have been waged to reduce demographic
drought and excess rainfall – are thought to fuel pressures arising from the scarcity of arable land, the
conflict by causing crops to fail and reducing clearest examples being the move to acquire
agricultural employment opportunities, thus Lebensraum (“living space”) that motivated Nazi
increasing food insecurity both in terms of food Germany’s aggression toward Poland and Eastern
availability and food access (ability to pay). The Europe (Hillgruber, 1981) and Japan’s invasion of
people most likely to participate in armed conflict – China and Indochina (Natsios and Doley, 2009).
young men from rural areas with limited education Water, for drinking and for agriculture, is also a
and economic prospects – are likely to seek work in cause of conflict (Klare, 2002). Countries that share
the agricultural sector. As that work dries up, river basins are more likely to go to war than are
fighting looks more attractive. However, the other countries that border one another (Toset et al.,
empirical link between transitory weather shocks 2000; Gleditsch et al., 2006). This relationship is
and civil conflict is still ambiguous. Some studies strongest in countries with low levels of economic
find that civil conflict is more likely to begin development. Institutions that manage conflicts over
following years of negative growth in rainfall water and monitor and enforce agreements can
(Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Hendrix and significantly reduce the risk of war (Postel and Wolf,
Glaser, 2007), suggesting that drought and 2001).
decreased agricultural productivity expand the pool
of potential combatants and give rise to more Jared Diamond (1997) has argued that for centuries
broadly held grievances. However, approaches that military power was built on agricultural production.
look at levels of rainfall, rather than growth in Zhang et al. (2007) show that long-term fluctuations
rainfall from year to year, find tenuous, or in fact in the prevalence of war followed cycles of
positive relationships, between rainfall abundance temperature change over the period 1400–1900 CE,
and the onset of conflict (Burke et al., 2009; Buhaug, with more war during periods of relatively cooler
2010; Hendrix and Salehyan, 2010; Ciccone, temperatures and thus lower agricultural
forthcoming). Some case-based research, however, productivity and greater competition for resources.
links drought to conflict – though mediated by the Similar findings linking cooler periods with more
government’s response to the crisis. For example, war have been established for Europe between 1000
during the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali, and 1750 CE (Tol and Wagner, 2008).
drought – aggravated by the government’s
embezzlement of drought relief supplies and food aid
– was a significant source of grievance that Democratic and Authoritarian
motivated young men and women to take up arms Breakdowns
(Benjaminsen, 2008).
Democratic breakdowns occur when leaders are
Recently, warmer temperatures have been linked to deposed and replaced by officials who come to power
an increase in civil conflict, though this finding has without regard for elections, legal rules, and

6
institutions. Not all breakdowns are violent – Europe in 1848 was at least in part a response to
“bloodless” coups account for 67 percent of all coups food scarcity, coming after three below-average
and coup attempts – but many have been very harvests across the continent (Berger and Spoerer
bloody, and the autocratic regimes and instability 2001).
that follow democratic breakdowns are more likely to
lead to the abuse of human rights, in some cases
leading to mass state killing (Poe and Tate, 1994; Protest and Rioting
Harff, 2003).
Throughout history higher food prices have
Food insecurity, proxied by low availability of contributed to or triggered violent riots. Protests and
calories for consumption per capita, makes rioting occurred in response to sharp increases in
democratic breakdown more likely, especially in world food prices in the 1970s and 1980s (Walton
higher-income countries, where people expect there and Seddon, 1994). Record-high world food prices
to be larger social surpluses that could be invested to triggered protest and violent rioting in 48 countries
reduce food insecurity (Reenock, Bernhard and in 2007/08 (see Figure 1). The ratio of violent to
Sobek, 2007). non-violent protest was higher in low-income
countries and in countries with lower government
Though statistical evidence is lacking, rising food effectiveness (von Braun, 2008). Recent research
prices have been implicated in the wave of links higher world food prices for the three main
demonstrations and transitions from authoritarian staple grains (wheat, rice and maize) to more
rule to fledgling democracy in some countries across numerous protests and riots in developing countries,
North Africa and the Middle East in 2011. There are though this relationship can be mitigated by policy
some historical precedents for this: a bad harvest in interventions designed to shield consumers from
1788 led to high food prices in France, which caused higher prices (Arezki and Brückner, 2011; Bates,
rioting and contributed to the French revolution in 2011).
1789; and the wave of political upheaval that swept

Figure 1. Food Prices and Rioting, 2007-2008

Price Indices (100 = Year 2000 Price)

Number of Food Price Riots

FAO Cereals Price Index FAO Food Price Index

UNCTAD Rice Price Index Food Riots

Source: Authors, based on WFP data (on riots) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (price indices)

7
International market prices are not the only source attacks leads to preemptive attacks – see Posen,
of food-related protests. The lifting of government 1993) and lack of alternative dispute mechanisms
subsidies can lead to rioting as well. Until recently, between groups and effective policing within groups
the biggest demonstrations in modern Egyptian (Fearon and Laitin, 1996).
history were the three-day “bread riots” in 1977 that
killed over 800 people, which were a response to the These conflicts have been particularly lethal in
Egyptian government’s removal of state subsidies for Kenya, Nigeria, the Sudan and Uganda. Repeated
basic foodstuffs, as mandated by the International clashes between Fulani herders and Tarok farmers in
Monetary Fund (IMF) (AFP, 2007). “IMF riots” can Nigeria’s Plateau State killed 843 people in 2004.
be traced to popular grievances over withdrawn food Similar clashes between Rizeigat Abbala and Terjam
and energy subsidies (Walton and Seddon, 1994; herders in the Sudan killed 382 in 2007. Cattle
Abouharb and Cingranelli, 2007). However, the raiding in the Karamoja Cluster, a cross-border
relationship between “IMF riots” and food insecurity region of Ethiopian, Kenyan and Ugandan territory,
is more complicated. Generalized food and energy resulted in more than 600 deaths and the loss of
subsidies are regressive, meaning that wealthy and 40,000 heads of livestock in 2004 alone (Meier,
middle-class households generally capture more of Bond and Bond, 2007). These conflicts tend to occur
the benefits. As such, it may be real income erosion, in politically marginalized territories far from the
rather than acute food insecurity, that is driving capital (Raleigh, 2010).
participation in protest.

Context Matters: Demographic, Social,

Communal Violence Political, and Economic Mediators

Competition over scarce resources, particularly land Food insecurity is a clear contributor to political
and water, often causes or exacerbates communal instability and conflict. But neither hunger nor
conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kahl, 2006; Ban, conflict exist in a vacuum: other aspects of the
2007). Communal conflict involves groups with political, economic and social environment affect the
permanent or semi-permanent armed militias but degree to which food insecurity, and grievances more
does not involve the government. However, it can generally, are expressed violently (Tilly, 1978).
escalate to include government forces, as in the
massacres in Darfur, Rwanda and Burundi. These Demographic and Social Factors
conflicts have the potential to escalate to civil war In general, countries with proportionately larger
when the government is perceived to be supporting, numbers of 15–24 year olds experience more protest
tacitly or otherwise, one communal group at the and rioting, civil conflict and terrorist attacks (Urdal,
expense of the other (Kahl, 2006). While the conflict 2006). Especially in developing countries where job
in Darfur began as a communal conflict over land opportunities are few, many youths engage in black-
and water, its impact escalated to devastating and grey-market activities or participate in gangs,
proportions following the government’s support for paramilitary groups and insurgent forces. Kenya’s
Janjaweed militias in their fight against the Sudan Mungiki, the Kikuyu street gang/paramilitary
People's Liberation Army/Movement and Justice organization based in Nairobi’s Mathare slum, has
and Equality Movement rebels. attracted many landless, unemployed Kikuyu youths.
Mungiki government violence claimed at least 195
Communal conflicts are common in the Sahel, the lives from 2007 to 2009 (Salehyan et al., 2011).
zone of transition between the Sahara desert and the
savanna, particularly in years of extremely high and Ethnic and religious diversity do not necessarily
low rainfall (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2010). make a society more prone to conflict: the United
Recurrent, long-lasting droughts in the Sahel have Republic of Tanzania, one of the world’s most
undermined cooperative relationships between ethnically diverse countries, has been peaceful for
migratory herders and sedentary farmers, leading to decades (see box on Kenya and the United Republic
food insecurity and increased competition for water of Tanzania). However, when ethnic groups are
and land between farmers and herders, but also made the basis for exclusionary patterns of rule, as in
within herding and farming groups. As a pastoralist South Africa under apartheid, conflict is more likely
in the Sudan noted: “When there is food, there is no (Langer, 2005; Nafziger et al., 2000; Østby, 2008;
cattle raiding.” (quoted in Schomerus and Allen, Østby, Nordås and Rød, 2009; Cederman,
2010). Once violence begins, conflict escalates and Weidmann and Gleditsch, forthcoming).
persists because of security dilemmas (fear of future

8
 A comparison of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania

Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania have much in common. Both are former British
colonies that gained independence in the early 1960s, with comparable populations, levels
of economic development and Human Development Index scores. Both are experiencing
rapid population growth, have large youth populations and are among the most ethnically
diverse in the world. Until 2002, hegemonic political parties that faced little opposition
governed both countries. Finally, both are characterized by significant food insecurity (the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 2009; WFP, 2009a).

Despite these similarities, conflict is much more prevalent in Kenya. Since independence,
Kenya has experienced only one brief episode of civil conflict (an attempted coup in 1982
that left 159 people dead). But social conflict has caused over 4,700 reported deaths
since 1990 (Salehyan et al., 2011), over 1,700 of which have been associated with
competition among ethnic groups for land, water and animal resources. In contrast, the
United Republic of Tanzania has had virtually no internal political violence. Since 1990,
political violence has been responsible for only 116 reported deaths, of which only 31 are
attributed to communal clashes between farmers and pastoralists.

Explanations for this divergence are varied. Economic growth rates have been higher and
less variable in the United Republic of Tanzania than in Kenya, and higher rates of
economic growth are associated with lower incidences of popular unrest. Kenya also has
higher income inequality. Kenya has made more progress toward democracy, and
democratization is associated with an increase in political violence and contestation in
lower-income countries (Collier and Rohner, 2008). While both countries are ethnically
diverse, Kenya is composed of fewer, comparatively larger ethnic groups, and these ethnic
divisions are the main basis of political competition. The United Republic of Tanzania is
home to over 120 ethnic groups, but these have not formed the basis for political
divisions; national identity is much stronger.

The differences may be attributable also to the trajectory of state- and nation-building in
the post-independence period. Under President Julius Nyerere, the government of
Tanzania instituted educational and language policies designed to promote a Tanzanian
identity. Moreover, Tanzania overhauled local government institutions, creating elected
village and district councils that enjoyed broad legitimacy across ethnic lines. Conversely,
Kenyan politics were marked by fewer attempts to create a national identity, and
successive Kenyan presidents have pursued educational and language policies that
reinforce, rather than mitigate, ethnic identities and divisions. Finally, central government
resources were distributed much more equitably in Tanzania than in Kenya, thus
decreasing incentives to compete over political and economic spoils (Miguel, 2004).

Finally, urbanization has crosscutting impacts on and autocratic institutions – has complex effects on
political violence that interact with food insecurity in political violence. Highly repressive authoritarian
complex ways. When rural populations move to the regimes may create incentives for clandestine action
city, they increase the ratio of food consumers to such as insurgency or revolution, but these regimes
producers and it is more difficult for them to turn to are generally well positioned to deter and repress
subsistence farming as a coping mechanism for public protest (Goodwin, 2001; Hendrix, Haggard,
dealing with higher food prices. However, urban and Magaloni, 2009). Peaceful protest should be
populations are more easily served by food more common where citizens are either legally
distribution networks and safety nets and tend to allowed to engage in demonstrations, as in
receive more attention from political actors because democracies, or where authoritarian governments
of their capacity for collective protest (Bates, 1981; choose to tolerate such acts of dissent, as in “semi-
Stasavage, 2005). authoritarian” or hybrid regimes (Magaloni, 2008).
Democratic institutions give politicians incentives to
Political Institutions address societal concerns, which may diminish the
The type of political regime – whether a country is grievances that motivate protest and rebellion
democratic, autocratic, or intermingles democratic (Natsios and Doley, 2009).

9
The level of a country’s economic development Societies with greater economic inequality
mediates the relationship between political violence experience more civil conflict, though the type of
and political regime type (Collier and Rohner, 2008). inequality matters. Vertical inequality – inequality
While political democracy provides accountability across households – has not been robustly linked to
mechanisms that may reduce grievances, it also political conflict (Cramer, 2003; Hegre and
diminishes the government’s capacity to repress Sambanis, 2006), though there is some evidence to
violent actors; the accommodative or repressive suggest that vertical inequality makes civil and
effect may dominate at different levels of economic guerrilla wars more likely when a country’s wealth is
development. At higher levels of economic in the form of immobile assets such as natural
development, democracies experience fewer civil resources (Boix, 2008). Horizontal inequality –
conflicts, riots, political strikes and demonstrations across groups, where groups are defined by region,
than autocratic regimes. At lower levels of economic ethnicity, class, religion or other political divisions –
development, democracies experience more. may be more closely associated with the expression
of group grievances and mobilization for violence.
Economic Factors
In the twenty-first century, violent conflicts are Economic shocks are strongly correlated with civil
overwhelmingly a phenomenon of countries with low conflict: Blattman and Miguel (2010) identify this as
income per capita, which often also suffer from food among the most robust findings in the literature.
insecurity (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Collier et al., Economic shocks redistribute incomes and political
2003; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Rates of power and can create incentives for rebellion, while
development matter as well as levels of development. reducing the capacity of governments to repress or
Civil conflict, protest, rioting and social conflict are accommodate potential challengers.
all more prevalent during periods of slow or negative
economic growth (Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti,
2004; Blattman and Miguel, 2010).

10
3. Food Prices and Fragile States

Food prices are inherently volatile because there is Food prices are expected to remain high and volatile
little elasticity in demand for food, and small for the foreseeable future. Global population growth,
changes in supply can have large effects on prices. and surging economies in emerging markets are
Table 1 identifies a number of factors that drive both driving demand higher, as are the use of foodgrains
long-and short-term price volatility. Exchange rates for biofuels, the increased penetration of food
can move suddenly, neighbouring countries can markets by institutional investors and the effects of
impose export restrictions overnight or natural climate change (see Brinkman and Hendrix, 2010).
disasters can affect food prices quickly. Policy
measures can mitigate some of these effects.

Table 1. Global factors causing high food prices

Demand factors Supply factors

Structural • Higher incomes and changing • Low investments in agriculture

or slowly demand and low productivity growth
evolving factors
• Population growth • Low stocks
• Demand for biofuels

Temporary • Low US$ exchange rate • Energy prices: fertilizer,

or sudden-onset mechanization, transport
factors • Institutional investment
(speculation) • Low US$ exchange rate
• Weather-related shocks
• Export restrictions
• Violent conflict

Source: Adapted from WFP (2009a)

Focus on Fragile States large share of their food and have fewer means to
stabilize food prices and mitigate the impact of
Higher international prices do not necessarily mean higher food prices on the population.
higher domestic prices. Whether they do depends on
structural factors such as how dependent the country The dependency of fragile states on imports has
is on food imports, transportation costs and market accelerated over time, especially relative to other
competitiveness; and on policy measures including developing countries. Imported food as a share of
trade barriers, taxes and subsidies, and government total food consumption is higher in fragile states
interventions (WFP, 2009a). than in other developing countries, increasing the
vulnerability of fragile states to international price
Households in fragile states1 are particularly movements (see Table 2, where lower numbers mean
vulnerable to higher food prices. Fragile and conflict- higher import dependency). FAO data show that
affected states often suffer from a lack of households in fragile states devote on average 57.5
infrastructure, in particular passable roads, markets percent of their expenditures to food (up from 57
with few buying or selling offers and a lack of percent in the 1990s; see Table 2), while in other
entrepreneurs, leading to less competitive markets developing countries the average is 49.4 percent
and higher transportation costs. They also import a (down from 55 percent in earlier years).

1 We use the World Bank’s list of fragile states, which is based on its Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) ratings.

11
 Table 2. Shares of food imports in food consumption and of food in total
household consumption expenditures

Food net import Change in food Average % Change in average

dependency, net import household % household
2003–2005 dependency expenditures expenditures
between spent on food, spent on food
1990–1992 2000–2007 between 1990s
and 2003–2005 and 2000–2007

Fragile states 2.4 -10% 57.5 +1%

Other 2.9 +1% 49.4 -10%

developing
countries

Source: Authors’ calculation based on FAO data.2

Violent Conflict as a Source of Higher and Zimbabwe who experienced violent conflict were
Prices significantly shorter (stunted) than others, affecting
their health, education and productivity throughout
Violent conflict itself has historically been an their lives (Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2006;
important factor behind high food prices and severe Blattman and Miguel, 2010).
food insecurity. Following World War II, countries
particularly affected include Angola (early 1980s), Refugees and internally displaced persons fleeing
Cambodia (1979–1980), Ethiopia (1984–1985), violence often experience the most acute insecurity.
Mozambique (1980s), Nigeria (1967–1969), Somalia The civil war in Southern Sudan left an estimated 2.6
(1992) and the Sudan (1987–1991) (Drèze and Sen, million people in need of emergency food aid by
1989; Ó Gráda, 2007; United Nations, 1993). 2000; since the conflict in Darfur broke out in 2003,
roughly 2 million people have been displaced. WFP
Conflict typically brings increased military spending has had to provide monthly food rations to nearly all
and the domestic use of military force, both of which of those people. More recently, Somali pirates have
have contributed to food security and child hunger targeted food-carrying vessels, driving up prices of
(Scanlan and Jenkins, 2001). Conflict often affects staples like wheat and rice by up to 22 percent (IRIN,
the ability to produce, trade and access food (United 2010).
Nations, 1993). Violent conflict causes death, disease
and displacement, destroys physical and social Political instability and conflict push food prices
capital, damages the environment, decreases school higher in both local and international markets. The
attendance and discourages investment. It crowds 2011 protests across North Africa and the Middle
out normal economic activity such as food East were in part a response to higher food and fuel
production, destroys infrastructure and cuts off prices, but the instability they have sown has in turn
access to food supplies, with blocking of food access roiled commodity markets, including markets for oil,
often used as a tool of political terror (Messer, Cohen a key agricultural input.
and Marchione, 2002; Collier et al., 2003).

The effects of conflict-induced food insecurity are

both immediate and long-term. Children in Burundi

2 FAO calculates the share of net food imports in total food consumption by subtracting the amount of food imports from the amount of food exports
based on kilocalories and then divides the countries into categories. A value of 2 is assigned when net food imports account for -25 to -50 percent of
food consumption. A value of 3 is assigned when net food imports account for 0 to -25 percent of food consumption. A lower number thus indicates
higher dependency. Averages and changes only include countries where at least two data points were available.

12
4. Breaking the Food Insecurity – Conflict Link

Though food insecurity contributes to violent conflict did not pay its employees […] police and army
and political instability, food insecurity is neither a provided predation and almost no protection,
necessary nor sufficient condition for it. schools barely functioned, and medical services were
Governments, IOs and NGOs can help reduce food provided almost exclusively by non-governmental
insecurity and break the food insecurity–conflict organizations” (McGovern, 2008: 337).
link.

Policy Interventions in Times of High

Fragile States and Political Capacity Prices

Fragile states have weak capacities to design, Even governments in fragile states have some means
implement and monitor policies and programmes. to limit the impact of higher international prices on
They have less capacity to stabilize food prices – in domestic food prices, including by:
part because they lack the capacity to analyse
markets – and to mitigate the impact of volatile and • reducing import tariffs to lower prices;
high food prices, which would require the capacity to • lowering import quotas and imposing export
design, target, implement and monitor safety nets. restrictions to increase availability;
Many fragile states don’t have the various capacities • lowering taxes and increasing subsidies to reduce
required by cash-based programmes, nor the prices;
weather stations and analytical and implementation • imposing price controls to keep prices stable; and
capacity required for weather-based index insurance. • releasing food reserves to increase supplies.
Food reserves can be looted when security is weak;
and fiscal capacity is often severely reduced. In 2007 and early 2008, 84 percent of 77 developing
countries surveyed had taken some policy measures
Many fragile countries have experienced recurrent to control food prices (FAO, 2008a; von Braun,
fiscal crises since the early 1980s that have severely 2008; World Bank, 2008a and 2009). About half of
curtailed their ability to intervene in domestic the countries reduced import taxes and more than
markets and ensure food security. Moreover, chronic half applied price controls and subsidies. About a
problems of macroeconomic instability, high quarter imposed export restrictions; a similar
external debts and policy conditionality make it number released food from a reserve (FAO, 2008b).
prohibitively costly for many countries to borrow in
tough times and ensure domestic consumption and Some of these measures are easier to design and
food security by engaging in counter-cyclical social implement than others and depend, of course, on
spending (Wibbels, 2006). previous actions: food cannot be released from a
reserve, or taxes reduced, if they were not there in
These structural weaknesses are exacerbated during the first place. Reducing taxes and tariffs is fairly
conflicts. Governments have less capacity to operate easy to implement, although it does have fiscal
social protection systems and have great difficulty in implications that need to be managed. Managing,
mobilizing revenue or collecting taxes. Moreover, storing, rotating and timely releasing of food stocks
conflict leads governments to divert funds from the is more complicated – and food stocks are often
social sectors to the military and security sectors. In targets of looting and theft. Price controls are
El Salvador between 1988 and 1990, military difficult in a conflict-affected country because the
spending accounted for 20 percent of the likelihood of evasion is very high when government
government’s expenditure, while expenditures for capacity and control are weak. Such difficulties mean
education and health were only 2 percent and 1 that in fragile states, if any action at all is taken to
percent, respectively (Del Castillo, 2001). In control food prices, the most common measure is a
Mozambique, the government’s pre-war expenditure reduction of taxes (see Annex).
on education of 12.1 percent of total expenditures
dropped to 4.4 percent by 1987. During the war in From an economic point of view, there is an order of
Liberia “the state provided virtually no services, it preference for the actions countries should take to

13
stabilize prices. The World Bank (2008a), for the range of instruments has multiplied to include
example, gave a green light to reducing taxes on food the following (World Bank, 2008a, 2008b; WFP
grains, raised some concerns about the use of food 2009a):
stocks, argued against price controls and consumer • conditional or unconditional transfers of food,
subsidies, and strongly discouraged export cash or vouchers;
restrictions. From a political point of view, however, • school meals, including breakfast, mid-morning
policymakers may make choices based on domestic snack or lunch and take-home rations, ideally
political calculus. China, India and Indonesia did not complemented by other health and nutrition
follow conventional economic wisdom in 2007– interventions;
2008 yet were largely able to insulate their societies • cash- or food-for-work programmes that create
from international price pressures. Each country assets such as roads, dams or irrigation systems;
followed a different set of policies and achieved • general or targeted food subsidies; and
relative stable food prices, with advantageous • weather-based index insurance.
political results: the incumbents in India and
Indonesia were both re-elected in 2009, partly Guaranteeing stable support over time may decrease
because of their success in keeping food prices stable the risks households perceive they face, thereby
(Timmer, 2010; see also FAO, 2009c for the case of reducing negative risk management and coping
China). These efforts at domestic price stabilization strategies and fostering entrepreneurship.
did, however, increase prices and volatility on
international markets, with disproportionate costs There are several ways social protection measures
for fragile states, which are more dependent on food both lower food insecurity and directly weaken its
imports and have less ability to meet these costs. link to conflict: by mitigating the impact of high food
prices or other shocks, they reduce the risk of violent
Governments or governing elites have played a role protests; by contributing to growth and reducing
in stabilizing prices for millennia. In ancient Greece inequality, they often address root causes of
and Rome, public interventions prevented frequent conflicts; and by delivering social services, they can
food crises from developing into famines, which were undermine the organizing principles of insurgent or
rare (Ó Gráda, 2009: 197). The leadership at times terrorist organizations (Berman, 2009).
had a sense of moral obligation, but the possibility of
civil unrest and the spread of disease, which affected Violent conflicts can be an important instigator for
leaders’ survival, played a role as well. Governments social protection. Both World Wars, for example,
and elites also recognized that the likelihood of riots triggered a consensus around social policy issues
and protests is largest at the time hunger increases, that contributed significantly to the formation of the
but is small when starvation and famine is welfare state in Europe (Thane, 1982). Moreover,
entrenched and apathy and exhaustion take over Bismarck used social protection in a newly unified
(Dirks, 1980; Ó Gráda, 2009: 55). Historically, the Germany to maintain social harmony and state
most common means to stabilize prices were storage control (Thane, 1982).
of reserves (often at the municipal level) and export
restrictions. The Ch’ing Dynasty (1644–1911) There is a need to overcome the policy and capacity
administered a nationwide granary system (Wright, constraints that prevent the most vulnerable and
2009). Price controls also have a long history – going food-insecure countries from introducing and scaling
back at least to AD 362–363 when they were up formal social protection systems (Chronic Poverty
imposed by Emperor Julian – and were often Research Center, 2008; WFP, 2004b). The choice of
combined with clampdowns on traders accused of instruments is more limited for fragile states
hoarding and profiteering (Ó Gráda, 2009). however, partly because of their limited capacity and
partly because some of these measures require
stronger institutions. For example, cash-based
Social Protection and Safety Nets: programmes are complicated to implement and
Taking the Longer View monitor and are vulnerable to corruption, bring
additional security concerns and require financial
Attempts at stabilizing prices are rarely completely institutions and functioning markets (WFP, 2008;
successful because they need to be combined with World Bank, 2008b). There have been fragile-state
safety nets and other social protection measures to situations where they have been used, as when
mitigate the impact of higher food prices and to help informal remittance systems were used for cash
prevent violent conflicts. In the past, safety nets transfers in Afghanistan and Somalia (Harvey,
relied heavily on public works, but in recent years, 2007, 2009).

14
5. The International Community:
Answering the Call, Promoting Peace
There is a reciprocal relationship between service Food Assistance and Peacebuilding
delivery and fragility (OECD, 2008) that also applies
to food assistance. Improving food security can Food assistance also offers valuable peace dividends.
reduce tensions and contribute to more stable Because post-conflict situations are fragile and
environments, but food assistance can also become a vulnerable to reversals, it is important that food
source of conflict (Anderson, 1998; Berdal and assistance benefits are delivered early, equitably,
Malone, 2000; Deng and Minear, 1992) and can broadly and for a considerable amount of time. Areas
undermine investment in local food production and affected by violence or neglected during the conflict
the development of local capacity. But if done right, should need particular attention.
the vicious cycle of food insecurity and conflict can
be transformed into a virtuous cycle of food security Provided they are founded on equity and
and stability that provides peace dividends, rebuilds accountability, international efforts to improve food
social trust and promotes human and economic security can increase the legitimacy of the state,
development. which is often undermined during the conflict
(OECD, 2008; Shearer, 2000). For example, if
Food and nutrition assistance are critical for horizontal inequalities in access to public services
development – of individuals and societies. The cost were a cause of conflict, a broad, equitable
of hunger amounts to as much as 11 percent of GDP distribution of food assistance is critical for
(CEPAL and WFP, 2007). If children do not get the peacebuilding.
right nutrition between conception and 24 months
they are likely to be stunted at 2 years of age, with Government capacity to improve food security must
life-long consequences for their health, education develop alongside the actual improvement of food
and productivity (Hoddinott et al., 2008; Victora et security. The role played by non-state actors and the
al., 2008). In this sense, there is no gap between international community must be clearly defined and
humanitarian relief and development: food and reduced over time, with the state increasingly taking
nutrition assistance is development. responsibility. This can be a long process (see box on
El Salvador).

Transitioning school feeding in El Salvador

In El Salvador, a school-feeding programme was started during the civil war in 1984 and
went through three distinct phases. In 1984, the programme reached 200,000 students and
completely relied upon WFP for funding and implementation. During the first phase, which
lasted until 1995, WFP assisted with the building of the institutional framework for school
feeding, including the creation of a technical and steering committee and a designated unit
in the Ministry of Education.

The second phase (1996–2005), began with the insertion of the programme into the national
school health programme. A hand-over strategy was adopted in 1997, oversight was
strengthened and the government explored alternative funding. In 2000, the government
and other donors joined WFP in funding the programme.

In the final phase (2006–2009), the government added a line to its annual budget for school
feeding and the official hand-over took place at the end of 2007. By 2008 all costs for the
programme, which included feeding 870,000 children aged 5–15 years, were covered by the
government. WFP continues to assist with logistics, procurement, redesigning of the food
basket, targeting and training.

One of the lessons learned is that transition takes time and requires a significant amount of
planning and resources. The government slowly built capacity, with WFP withdrawing first
from the less vulnerable regions and then from all regions.

Source: World Bank/WFP (2009)

15
 School meals as a safety net that contributes to peacebuilding

Some form of school feeding exists in 155 countries, including dozens of fragile and
conflict-affected states, where it can play an essential role, often as one of the few safety
nets. School feeding can address various objectives related to education, gender,
nutrition, peacebuilding and the wider economy, and can provide an important foundation
for recovery and development (World Bank-WFP, 2009).

Education during conflicts can provide a sense of structure and normalcy – along with
protection from harm, abduction and recruitment into armed groups (Penson and
Tomlinson, 2009). School feeding and community involvement in school committees can
play a key role in terms of peacebuilding to establish normalcy, enhance equity, help
reconciliation and rebuild social capital, cohesion and trust after a conflict (see WFP,
2009b for the case of Liberia).

The school system can provide an effective way to scale up existing safety nets and
prevent negative coping strategies, averting negative effects for millions of vulnerable
children and households.

In 2008 and 2009, WFP school feeding programmes were implemented in six conflict-
affected states: Afghanistan, Haiti, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia and the Sudan, with
clear impacts on stability and peacebuilding.

Cash- or food-for-work programmes are more comes about partly as a result of working closely with
difficult to implement when violence is still communities in the design and implementation of
widespread, but are very effective after violence programmes. In Liberia, for example, the evaluation
subsides. It is demanding for poverty-stricken of a protracted relief and recovery operation found
communities hit by an emergency to dedicate that 90 percent of the 1,200 participants interviewed
themselves to rebuilding infrastructure because believed that the short-term jobs provided through
community members are busy securing food. Food- the operation had helped to promote peace and
or cash-for-work programmes aim to help people reconciliation (WFP, 2009b). This percentage of
overcome that dilemma. Workers are paid in money positive replies was higher than for skills learned or
or food rations for building vital infrastructure such improvements in living conditions. Greater social
as dams, roads, swamp reclamation structures, cohesion can result even from brief exposure to new
hillside terraces, water facilities and catchment community-based participatory institutions (Fearon
areas. For example, to reduce the cost of et al., 2009). Focus on youth is essential, given the
transporting food and other humanitarian supplies, role that particularly unemployed youth have played
WFP has conducted a massive road rehabilitation in fueling violence. In Sierra Leone, for example, a
project in Southern Sudan since 2006. This has new programme targets youth by offering them cash-
improved links in Southern Sudan and with and food-for-work activities that rehabilitate roads,
neighbouring countries and helped revitalize trade. drainage systems, and other community assets.
The roads built so far have halved the average travel
time to markets, schools and health centres and Despite this, the evidence for the long-term impact
reduced cereal prices in locations with road access. on combatants is not always clear. A study of the UN
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Such programmes should be initiated as early as (DDR) operation in Sierra Leone found no evidence
possible to create employment and visible peace of a relation between participation in an
dividends. They can also accompany reintegration internationally sponsored DDR programme and the
programmes; WFP has offered food assistance as an likelihood of former combatants cutting ties with
incentive for former combatants to learn new skills their armed factions, holding pro-democratic values,
and abandon their weapons. or being reaccepted into their home communities.
The only significant effect was to decrease the
Food assistance programmes, including food-for- likelihood that the former combatant would be
work or food-for-training programmes, not only employed (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007).
increase access to food, create jobs and enhance
livelihoods, they also often directly build peace. This

16
 Food assistance for conflict-affected populations in Mindanao, the Philippines:
Peacebuilding before peace

In 2006, WFP returned to the Philippines to support the peace process in Mindanao. The
programme for Mindanao combined immediate interventions to meet humanitarian needs
and medium- to longer-term measures to support rehabilitation, recovery, and
development. The activities included school meals, mother-and-child health and nutrition
(MCHN), food for work and food for training, and assistance to internally displaced
persons (IDPs). Activities were concentrated in poor municipalities of Mindanao affected
by conflict, as identified by the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

WFP commissioned an evaluation of the programme’s effectiveness between June 2006

and March 2009, which showed that WFP’s activities indirectly supported the peace
process. IDPs reported that the international presence gave them hope for the future and
assurances for eventual return to their places of origin. Although there was some concern
about creating a dependency on food aid, the IDPs stated that they would indeed return
as soon as security conditions permitted.

School meals were effective in bringing more children to school and improving food access
at the household level. They also increased community participation: parents claimed to
have grown closer as a community, and become better able to trust members and be
more sensitive to others’ needs. School meals also strengthened the opportunities for
dialogue between the government and targeted communities.

Food for work or training took place on a limited scale, but had a positive impact on the
community. People became more cooperative and took on new projects together. The
food-for-work projects did not increase dependence on external support, and provided
valuable in-kind support to families. Given the limited period of implementation, it was
not possible to assess the effects of the MCHN programme, or measure if malnutrition had
been reduced.

It was clear that WFP’s presence and activities promoted peacebuilding in the region.
Beneficiaries and other stakeholders told the evaluation mission that WFP’s presence
provided a buffer from hunger and also from hopelessness. WFP activities encouraged
communities to work together and had a positive psychological impact. The food
assistance programmes provided peace dividends that helped foster a sense of stability
among the people most affected by the conflict in Mindanao.

Source: WFP (2009c)

Food Assistance and Social Capital Commission for Social Action. Beneficiaries
participated in school feeding management
Food assistance can play an important role in social committees and communities decided which WFP
cohesion and social capital, which refers to the trust, projects would take priority. They identified food-
norms and networks that are generated by for-recovery activities, including for rehabilitating
participation in informal or formal groupings and roads and drainage. Participants formed work
associations that facilitate interaction and groups to rehabilitate smallholder plantations,
cooperation among people (Collier, 2000). Social irrigation systems and roads, which strengthened
capital is often severely damaged by violent conflict. social cohesion. In Côte d’Ivoire, WFP assisted the
Food assistance can play a role in rebuilding social return of IDPs by promoting self-sufficiency and
capital by developing communities, networks and asset creation through food-for-work projects
trust. Food assistance can also serve to replace focused on rural access roads, small bridges,
informal safety nets based on social capital with irrigation systems and wells, and food-for-training
formal forms of social protection. activities. Communities helped identify the activities,
organize the workers, and provide raw materials.
In Sierra Leone, WFP supported the government’s
Poverty Reduction Strategy and National

17
 WFP and IDPs in Côte d’Ivoire: Rebuilding social cohesion

WFP worked alongside other humanitarian agencies to facilitate the return of IDPs in the
Blolequin area of Côte d’Ivoire. Bitter land disputes erupted as IDPs returned to resettle.
The village of Gohogbehi was surrounded by IDP camps; for some time, mutual fear
between the IDPs and Gohogbehi residents had brought work on the plantations to a
standstill, and the bridges joining the village and the camps were destroyed. Talks
between WFP and the two communities led to an agreement whereby the parties would
receive a one-month general food distribution followed by three months of food for work
in exchange for rehabilitating the bridges. Both communities received their general food
distribution at the same location; constructing the bridges together gave them an
opportunity to live and work together. Today, the two communities co-exist peacefully,
goods and people circulate freely and access to the town is ensured. Food assistance has
helped these communities further develop social cohesion.

Transitions from Relief to Recovery start early – yet it is often inadequately funded and
planned. Transition progress cannot be defined by
The route to peace is non-linear and full of clear benchmarks and programming must allow for
contradictions (Call, 2008). Humanitarian relief, activities to be upscaled and downscaled quickly
recovery and development do not happen in smooth (note for example operations in West Africa
sequence. A country may have relief and recovery described in WFP, 2004a).
activities taking place simultaneously in different
regions of a country or at seemingly contradictory A WFP evaluation of livelihood recovery activities
times (Maier, 2010). concluded that the timeframes are often too short for
full recovery to take place, and there is often
The transition of food assistance instruments over pressure from donors and host countries to phase
the course of relief to recovery and development is out relief and recovery assistance as quickly as
important. Traditionally, general food distributions possible (WFP, 2009d). But the short duration and
were eventually replaced by such recovery activities limited scale of intervention reduces the impact of
as food-for-work programmes. In recent years, the assistance. The evaluation recommended that:
blanket food distributions are used rarely: food the timeframes for livelihood recovery activities be
assistance is almost always targeted, yet who is longer; recovery-related activities be implemented
targeted and the size of the targeted population earlier and simultaneously with relief; the volume of
changes over time. During the relief phase, food activities be increased; and that livelihood recovery
assistance for affected groups is increasingly activities be better connected to other interventions
supplemented by interventions that provide school to enable people to build sustainable assets.
meals or that focus on such vulnerable groups as
pregnant and lactating women and young children.
During the recovery phase, the emphasis shifts Getting Aid Sequencing Right
towards a broader set of instruments that improve
food security. In the last ten years, it has become increasingly
evident that the traditional post-conflict approach of
It is often security that determines to what extent sequencing economic reforms after political stability
activities beyond immediate relief can be launched. was achieved was not leading to the desired goal of
In Mindanao, for example, the renewal of conflict in preventing countries from relapsing into conflict.
August 2008 led to a concentration on providing After estimating a hazard function of post-conflict
food to IDPs (WFP, 2009c). Similarly, in Liberia and risks every year for ten years of the post-conflict
Sierra Leone in 2000 and 2001, activities shifted to period, Paul Collier et al. (2006) found that political
relief when the conflict again intensified (WFP, arrangements of democracy building and elections
2004a). are not peace enhancing, but can leave a post-
conflict country vulnerable to the risk of further
The transition to complete recovery is a long-term conflict. In fact, 40 percent of post-conflict countries
process that can take ten years or more and should have relapsed into conflict (Collier et al., 2003).

18
This has led many scholars of peacebuilding to emerging from conflict can signal its intention to
reflect on ways to better sequence and prioritize honor the peace agreement and reduce horizontal
assistance for the future. There is no standard inequalities, which in many cases contributed to the
practice or approach to sequencing. Brahimi (2007) original conflict. Providing social services and food
noted: that “[a] clear understanding of the objective assistance can create early peace dividends, help
realities in the country concerned is necessary for the build state institutions, address the root causes of
international community to establish – in close conflicts by reducing horizontal inequalities,
cooperation with the local partners – the state- contribute to social cohesion and enhance the
building process required, and the type of resources, legitimacy of the government (Brinkman, 2001;
sequencing and time horizon necessary to rebuild.” Collier et al., 2003; Darcy, 2004; OECD, 2008).

Maier (2010) concludes that a consolidated There are many reasons why socio-economic
framework on early recovery is needed to “integrate priorities should be supported early and sustained by
a multidisciplinary approach covering humanitarian donors. First, as Darcy (2004) noted: “The provision
assistance, economic growth and development, of social protection (which comes with security and
peace-building and security, and governance as well improved economic conditions) is an agenda that
as state-building”, but emphasizes that in order to can strengthen the legitimacy of the state by allowing
avoid relapsing into conflict, priority should be given it to re-shoulder its responsibilities for ensuring the
to economic policy in early post-conflict recovery. He basic survival of its citizens.” Second, aid
lists 14 priority areas of early economic recovery, disbursements often fail to match commitments
comprising reintegration of ex-combatants, IDPs and (Forman and Patrick, 2000) and flows often decline
refugees; infrastructure; employment; agriculture; after an initial period of high media attention. Collier
education; health; private-sector development and et al. (2003) argued that aid is most effective and
entrepreneurship; economic governances; and capacity to manage it highest during the middle of
reduction of horizontal inequalities. the first post-conflict decade. Third, the risk of
recurrence of a conflict is halved after a decade. It is
Especially after the minimal conditions for security thus critical that international support for security
are established, an emphasis on social development and socio-economic policy reform are started early
is important. Through its emphasis on social rather and sustained for at least a decade to reduce the risk
than military issues, the government of a country of renewed conflict.

19
6. Conclusions

Food insecurity is both a cause and a consequence of to provide basic services in states experiencing
violence, contributing to a vicious cycle or “conflict conflict and because of the perceived impartiality of
trap”. Food security is critical for political stability. aid workers.
Food insecurity is linked to increased risk of
democratic failure, protests and rioting, communal Funding of food and nutrition assistance in post-
violence and civil conflict. Violent conflicts, in turn, conflict situations is often problematic, especially in
create food insecurity, malnutrition and – in some the recovery stage. Food is one of the better-funded
instances – famine. Thus food insecurity can areas in relief operations but in the recovery,
perpetuate conflict, although its effects depend on transitions and early development stages, food is
the context, with the strongest links evident in states often phased out too quickly, leaving populations at
that already have fragile markets and weak political risk and potentially reversing earlier gains in
institutions (Collier et al., 2003). building peace. Transition, peacebuilding, capacity
building and the recovery of agriculture are long-
Food price stabilization measures are important term processes; progress is measured in decades,
tools to prevent food prices from rising and causing rather than in years (Pritchett and Weijer, 2010).
unrest. Safety nets are critical instruments that can Food plays a critical – but often underemphasized –
mitigate the effect of short-term spikes in food prices role in these processes. Recovery activities focusing
on food insecurity, helping to prevent violent conflict on improving food access often come too late, last
and contribute to long-term development. Because too short a time, are poorly funded and are too small
young men as a group are most in need of livelihoods in scale.
and also most likely to participate in political
violence, income instability among them must be After decades of consistent gains in eradicating
addressed. Safety nets have the added advantage of hunger, food insecurity is once again on the rise. The
mitigating horizontal inequalities, which are one effects of food insecurity for human security are dire,
cause of conflict. as are the consequences for political stability and
conflict. Though the challenge is great, the
International food assistance plays an important role international community – and WFP in particular –
both during conflicts and in the post-conflict can play a positive role in addressing hunger and
recovery period. International organizations such as breaking the link between food insecurity and
WFP and NGOs are particularly important in these conflict.
situations because of reduced government capacity

20
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Annex: Responses of Fragile States to
High Food Prices in 2007–2008

Economy-wide policies

Increase Price
Reduce supply using controls/
taxes on food grain Export Consumer
Country food grains stocks restrictions subsidies
Afghanistan 3
Angola 3 3
Burundi 3
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Republic of 3
Côte d’Ivoire
Democratic Republic of Congo 3
Djibouti
Eritrea 3 3
Gambia, The
Guinea 3
Guinea-Bissau 3
Haiti
Kiribati
Kosovo 3
Liberia
Myanmar
Nepal 3
Papua New Guinea
São Tomé and Principe 3 3
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands 3 3
Somalia
Sudan 3 3
Tajikistan 3 3
Timor-Leste 3 3 3
Togo
Tongo
Yemen 3 3

Territories
West Bank & Gaza 3 3
Western Sahara

Blend
Bosnia & Herzegovina 3 3
Georgia
Zimbabwe 3 3 3

26
 Existing social protection programmes

Cash Food for Food ration/ School

transfer work stamp meals
3
3 3
3 3

3 3

3
3

3
3

Consistent with longer-

run policies to improve
3 3 food security

Some concerns relating

to longer-run food
security

Likely to create
problems for longer-run
food security depending
3 3 on duration and
3 3 targeting
3
Highly likely to create
problems for longer-run
3 food security and/or
create serious problems
for neighbouring
3 countries
3 3 3

3 3

Source: World Bank (2008a)

27
28
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