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African Political Thought in a Nutshell

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 African Political Thought in a Nutshell
Hassan Mudane1

February, 2018

In this article excerpted from the Encyclopaedia of Political science edited by George
Thomas Kurian. It summarizes the political ideologies of colonial and modern African
political systems. I will begin with a brief outline of the African Political Economy (Section
1) and discussion of the African political thought from the 18th Century to 21st century and
Mudanism (An Afrocentric school of thought developed by the author) (Section 2), and then
look briefly at the African politics and society (Section 3).

Keywords: Marxism, African Socialism, African Political Thought, Pan-Africanism, African Nationalism,
Mudanism, African Political Economy, African Politics.
Emails: [email protected] or [email protected]

1
Author and Africa Analyst

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AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

African political economy is a field of study within political science that analyzes the
relationship between the state and the market in Africa. This field is generally geographically
delimited to include only sub-Saharan Africa. The major preoccupation of scholarship in this
discipline has been analyzing the role of the state in promoting economic growth and poverty
alleviation.

The failure of State-led Development

As sub-Saharan African countries gained independence (primarily in the 1950s and 1960s),
policy makers and scholars alike emphasized the importance of the state in driving
development in the new African countries. Due to the weakness of the indigenous capitalist
classes in these countries, it was assumed the state would lead the development process.

In both socialist countries, like Tanzania, and more market oriented countries, like Nigeria,
the state subsidized industries, manipulated exchange rates, and restricted international trade
with the goal of encouraging industrialization. However, by the early 1980s, the failures of
the prevailing development strategy had become clear. Most countries in Africa were
experiencing a decline in growth rates, an erosion of per capita income, and an increase in
external debt. A World Bank investigation into the economic crisis laid the blame squarely on
the interventionist policies adopted by African governments. The publication, which became
known as the Berg Report (World Bank, 1981), argued that these policies had undermined the
functioning of the market and had created bloated public sectors.

The major puzzle motivating academic research was why African governments had not
abandoned these interventionist policies once it became obvious they were not stimulating
growth. The key insight of the political economy literature was that governments often
secured political gains from economic mismanagement. Robert Bates (1981) influentially
argued that governments had incentives to distort the operation of the economy to secure
cheap food for organizationally powerful urbanites at the expense of the rural population.
Richard Sandbrook (1985) emphasized that African leaders depended on the disbursement of
patronage to maintain political support, which resulted in poor policy choices and
incompetent administration.

SAPs and External Accountability

In response to the recommendations of the Berg Report, the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) decided to make future loans to African governments conditional on a
reduction in state intervention in the economy. The structural adjustment programs (SAPs)
countries were required to adopt in return for new loans involved cutting the fiscal deficit,
devaluing exchange rates, and liberalizing trade policy. The prescribed policies were highly
contentious within Africa. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa challenged
the Berg Report’s explanation for the economic crisis, instead blaming colonialism and
Africa’s subordinate position in the global economy. Many countries experienced “IMF riots”
in which citizens protested against the austerity measures proscribed by the SAPs. However,
in the face of balance-of-payments crises, most African countries eventually had little choice
but to adopt SAPs.

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The political science literature on structural adjustment focused on the interaction between
regime type and economic reform. The initial consensus was that SAPs could only be
implemented by authoritarian governments, because draconian measures were necessary to
implement unpopular economic reforms. However, Nicolas van de Walle (2001)
demonstrated that authoritarian governments were not any more successful in implementing
reform than their democratic counterparts in Africa. He argued that both autocrats and
democratically elected leaders depend on the allocation of patronage to remain in power. As a
result, they have all resisted reducing public sector employment, even as they have cut
educational and medical programming. Although a few countries, such as Ghana, have
experienced sustained growth following economic reform, SAPs have brought limited
benefits overall.

State Capacity and Participatory Development

In the aftermath of structural adjustment, the new consensus was that African governments
needed to play a greater constructive role in fostering development; they could not simply
engage in fewer negative interventions. Governments must—at a minimum—provide basic
law and order if they are to encourage their citizens to be economically productive. In
addition, economic development requires public investment in infrastructure, education, and
health. Both academics and policy makers emphasized the need to build the capacity of
African states to deliver basic goods and services to their citizens. This view corresponded
with the United Nations’ development of the Millennium Development Goals, which commit
member states to increasing access to primary education and basic health care.

Furthermore, in contrast to the earlier consensus that citizen participation would hinder
economic reform, the new argument was that citizens should drive the development process
because they had an interest in ensuring economic improvement and poverty alleviation.
International agencies adopted the mantra of “participatory development” in the hope that
domestic pressure would be more successful than external pressure in encouraging economic
development.

As a result, many observers were optimistic about the reintroduction of multiparty elections
and the decentralization of government in Africa during the 1990s. Democratization and
decentralization were thought to increase citizens’ ability to demand development. In a
similar vein, the proliferation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society
associations was encouraged as means of delivering development.

Later studies have been more uncertain about the developmental impact of democracy and
participation. David Stasavage (2005) demonstrates that democratization is associated with
increased government spending on primary education. However, many scholars have argued
that elections and NGOs simply provide new venues for preexisting political practices;
established politicians will stay in power by disbursing patronage to their supporters, rather
than providing programming with broad welfare benefits.

Certainly, neither donor conditionality nor domestic participation has initiated a quick
recovery of African economies. In contrast, recent research has found that structural factors,
such as ethnic diversity and geography, explain a significant component of African
governments’ poor performance in providing public goods. A longer view of the
development process may be necessary, given the importance of historical factors in
explaining Africa’s weak economic performance.

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AFRICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

Modern African political thought refers to the political theories and ideologies enunciated in
the speeches, autobiographies, writings, and policy statements of African statesmen and
scholars. It varies according to historical circumstances and constantly changing African and
world political environments. Political theory and political practice are inextricably linked,
which makes for six distinctive periods of African history, each with its own dominant
theories: indigenous Africa; imperial Africa; colonial Africa; and (early, middle, and late)
modern or postcolonial Africa.

Early Modern African Nationalism

Early modern African nationalism was developed in the late nineteenth century by British-
educated elites in West Africa. In Sierra Leone, James Africanus B. Horton, a doctor of
medicine, challenged racist theories and argued that Africans were as capable of achieving
“civilization” as Europeans, both biologically and psychologically. He advocated the
development of “modern” states in Africa. In Liberia, Edward Wilmot Blyden, politician,
writer, and diplomat, developed an ideology of racial pride and nonacculturation and
advocated African development through an authentic indigenous Africa, based on an African
personality, history, and culture.

He also called for the establishment of a West African state. In the Gold Coast [Ghana],
Joseph E. Casely Hayford, a lawyer, advocated modernization from indigenous African roots.
He believed that African nations, civilization, and political institutions could be revived and
modernized to cater to modern needs in an “African way.” He also called for the creation of a
West African nation.

Pan-Africanism

The next major movement in African political thought, pan-Africanism, was prominently
promoted by the African Diaspora—scholars and activists of African descent living in other
nations. Pan-Africanism is a political and cultural ideal and movement born in the 1900s
aimed at regrouping and mobilizing Africans in Africa and in the Diaspora against foreign
domination, oppression, and discrimination.

Political pan-Africanism is linked to African nationalism (i.e., the struggle for independence),
while economic pan-Africanism is linked to the struggle against imperialism and
neocolonialism. The major proponents of pan-Africanism in North America were W. E. B.
Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Paul L. Robeson, and George Padmore. The so-called back to
Africa movement (i.e., the return of the African slaves to their continent of origin) mainly
advocated by Garvey, led to the creation of Sierra Leone in 1801 and Liberia in 1817.

Cultural pan-Africanism was expressed through Negritude, a cultural movement reasserting

African culture, values, and traditions as part of the common heritage of mankind.
Negritude emerged in France in the 1930s among African and Afro-Caribbean elites, notably
Aimé Césaire, Léon- Gontran Damas, and Léopold Sédar Senghor.

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Modern African Nationalism

Modern African nationalism is a political ideal and movement aimed a liberating Africans
from European colonial political domination, cultural oppression, social exclusion, and
economic exploitation. The goal was to achieve political independence as a prelude to
economic independence. In Kwame Nkrumah’s words, “Seek ye first the political kingdom
and all else will be added unto you.” The challenge of African nationalism was to build
viable nations out of more than fifty artificially created states, most of which attained
independence in the 1960s.

African Socialism

African socialism is a radical form of African nationalism. Influenced by Marxism-Leninism

(though officially non-Marxist), African socialism rejects capitalism as being alien to African
culture and traditions. Instead, it is based on the African tradition of communalism, according
to which the group takes precedence over the individual. The socialist model of development
includes a state-led development strategy based on planning, land reform, industrialization,
and the nationalization of the economy. The foreign policy of African Socialist states is pan-
Africanist. The African countries (and leaders) who adopted this ideology between 1960 and
1970 were Algeria (Ahmed Ben Bella); Ghana (Kwame Nkrumah, 1962); Guinea (Ahmed
Sékou Touré); Mali (Modibo Keïta), and Tanzania (Julius K. Nyerere, 1968). Senegal
(Léopold Senghor) and Kenya (Jomo Kenyatta) paid lip service to African socialism but did
not actually implement it.

African Theory of Revolution

Frantz Fanon, a French-born psychiatrist from Martinique who joined the Algerian
revolution, posits that under the guidance of revolutionary intellectuals, the peasantry is a
revolutionary force in Africa. He argues that it is only through violence that the colonized
people can achieve their freedom. For Fanon (1968), decolonization is a violent revolution
that destroys the social and political structures of the colonial regime, liberates consciousness,
and creates a new man. He argues that violence is a cleansing force, but that it must be
accompanied by political education if it is to be truly emancipator. Amilcar Cabral, an
agronomist and leader of the liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau, sees culture as a form of
resistance to foreign domination. Cabral (1972) argues that culture is a weapon against the
imperialist power; it becomes the instrument through which people reclaim their history. For
him, the main goal of the liberation movement is not only national independence and the
defeat of colonialism, but also the economic, social, and cultural progress of the people. This
can occur only when foreign domination has been totally eliminated.

African Marxist Regimes

The period 1969 to 1975 saw the emergence of African Marxist regimes—many of them
military—which adopted Marxism-Leninism as the state ideology. However, in general, the
self-proclaimed “Marxist” African leaders did not genuinely believe in this ideology but
simply used it an instrument of political domination and control of the people. The African
countries (and leaders) who adopted this ideology were Angola (Agostinho Neto and José
Eduardo dos Santos); Benin (Mathieu Kérékou); Congo-Brazzaville (Marien Ngouabi,
Joachim Yhombi-Opango, and Denis Sassou-Nguesso); Ethiopia (Mengistu Haile Mariam);
Guinea-Bissau (Luís Cabral and João Bernardo Vieira); Madagascar (Didier Ratsiraka);

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Mozambique (Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano); Namibia (Sam Nujoma); Somalia
(Mohammed Siad Barre); and Zimbabwe (Robert Mugabe), 1980–1995. Marxism as a state
ideology was officially abandoned everywhere in Africa by 1996.

African Populist Regimes

Emerging in the early 1980s, African populism borrows elements of both African socialism
and Marxism-Leninism, and places the people at the center of democracy and development in
Africa. Its main policy is to satisfy the basic needs of the peasantry, the largest and poorest
social class in Africa. African populist regimes advocate popular democracy and people-
centered development. African populist regimes include Burkina Faso (Thomas Sankara);
Ghana (Jerry Rawlings); Libya (Muammar Qaddafi) since 1977; and Zimbabwe (Robert
Mugabe) since 1995).

African Theories of Democracy and Development

Three African scholars (Claude Ake, Daniel Osabu-Kle, and Mueni wa Muiu) have recently
developed Africa-centered theories of democracy and development. Nigerian scholar-activist
Claude Ake notes that in the post-independence era, the African elites have privatized the
African state for their own benefit, leading to the marginalization of the African people. Ake
(1996, 1) argues that “the problem is not so much that development has failed as that it was
never really on the agenda in the first place.” Like the populists, he advocates popular
development (in which people are the end, agent, and means of development), and popular
democracy (which emphasizes political, social, and economic rights).

Ghanaian scholar Daniel Osabu-Kle (2000) starts from the assumptions that indigenous
African political culture was essentially democratic and consensual, based on the
accountability of the rulers to the people. He argues that only a democracy compatible with
the African cultural environment (i.e., a modernized form of Africa’s indigenous democracy)
is capable of achieving the political conditions for successful development in Africa. Mueni
wa Muiu introduces a new paradigm to study the African state. According to A New
Paradigm of the African State: Fundi wa Afrika (2009), the current African predicament may
26 African Politics and Society be explained by the systematic destruction of African states
and the dispossession, exploitation, and marginalization of African people through successive
historical processes (from the trans-Atlantic slave trade to globalization). Muiu argues that a
new, viable, and modern African state based on five political entities—the Federation of
African States—should be built on the functional remnants of indigenous African political
systems and institutions and be based on African values, traditions, and culture.

Afro-Marxism

Afro-Marxism refers to the adoption by postcolonial governments in Africa of Marxist-style

models of social and economic development supported through links with Communist Party–
led governments such as the Soviet Union and Cuba. Afro-Marxism is characterized by
centralized political decision making, typically within a one-party state, economic
collectivization or nationalization of productive property and industry, and the direction of a
national culture, often without regard for the cultures of ethnic minorities, by the ruling party.
It is to be distinguished from African socialism, which refers to the perspective that
traditional African communities exhibit characteristics, including social relations and sharing

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of resources that reflect a form of indigenous socialism based on local communal
organization and practices. African socialism offered an alternative to the “scientific” or
authoritarian socialism of Afro-Marxism, which was based on models borrowed from Soviet
or Maoist regimes. For many Africans involved in liberation movements and struggles
against colonialism, Marxism, especially the example of the Russian Revolution (1917),
offered a model for the launching of economic and political revolutions.

This revolutionary model, in which a seizure of national power provides a lever for rapid
industrialization, held great appeal throughout the twentieth century within numerous newly
liberated African countries. As postcolonial governments looked for means by which to
“catch up” with the industrial might of the former colonial powers, the approach of socialism,
especially statist socialism or Marxism, seemed to provide both a potentially effective
political program and an ideological justification for statist reorganization of the economy. It
seemed to offer a distinct alternative to the exploitative and oppressive political economic
regimes of imperialist rule.

The history of such movements in Africa dates especially to the movements against
colonialism from the middle or late twentieth century. Important examples of Afro-Marxist
movements and systems include the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
and the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which took power in those former
Portuguese colonies in 1975. Between 1974 and 1991 a socialist government under
Lieutenant Colonel Haile Mengitsu ruled Ethiopia. In addition, numerous Marxist parties and
organizations have been active in several African countries, including South Africa, where
the South African Communist Party played a significant part in the downfall of the apartheid
regime.

Among the most notable proponents of Afro-Marxism are Amilcar Cabral (Guinea-Bissau
and Cape Verde), Samora Machel (Mozambique), Michel Micombero (Burundi), Agostinho
Neto (Angola), and Thomas Sankara (Burkina Faso). Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who took
power in 1980 through an armed struggle movement deploying some elements of Marxist-
Leninist ideology, has positioned himself as a defender of African autonomy from Western
corporate interests while subjecting his population, especially the poor and his political
opponents, to ongoing repression and punishment. Afro-Marxism played an important part in
bringing about the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Angolan (MPLA) forces,
backed by Cuban troops along with forces of the South West Africa People’s Organization
(SWAPO), pushed back the South African forces that invaded Angola.

The stalemate forced the South African government to take part in negotiations that
eventually led to the independence of Namibia and indeed played a major part in the collapse
of the apartheid regime in 1994. Afro-Marxism held out a promise of self-sufficiency,
equality, economic development, and prosperity. In practice, most examples of Afro-
Marxism failed to deliver much in any of these areas. Also, many leaders who had advocated
the more moderate African socialism fell back on authoritarian forms of Soviet-style
government when attempting to implement their policies. Economic development primarily
directed wealth into the hands of the new elite, which consisted of leading members of the
ruling party.

Western versions of socialism, especially Soviet-inspired systems, were often inapplicable to

the specific social circumstances of less industrialized countries, whose labor base was often
concentrated in agricultural or resource-extractive industries. Similarly, Afro-Marxism failed

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to draw on local governance practices to organize social and productive life and instead relied
on the centralized statist models of Sovietism.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet systems in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, along with the passing of Maoism and China’s embrace of capitalism by the
late twentieth century, all dealt severe blows to Afro-Marxist regimes. The loss of aid and
trade ties with the Soviet economies left Marxist governments in Africa desperate for aid
from Western capitalist governments and international financial organizations like the
International Monetary Fund and World Bank. At the same time, China maintains aid and
investment in many African countries and seeks to expand its influence on the continent.
China’s financial connection with the regime in Sudan has been highly criticized by human
rights activists and commentators. While China has attempted to develop its influence, it has
not supported or encouraged the development of communist regimes or parties as the Soviet
Union did. Governments also became more vulnerable to the pressures of Western
governments and institutions to accept structural adjustment programs, including the
privatization of government works and lands.

Mudanism

Muxuu yahay iskuul fekerka Mudanism-ka? Waa su’aal isweyddiin mudan. Mudanism-ku
waa dugsi ka mida dugsiyada ka jira caalamka, sida: Marxism, Liberalism, Realism, Post-
colonialism etc. Ujeedka ugu weyni waa in bulshada Afrika lagu difaaco qalinka, iyo
buuxinta kaalintii bannaanayd, taas oo ah doorka bulshada Afrika ay ka ciyaarto aqoonta
dunida taalla. Inta badan aqoonyahannada, qoraayaasha, macallimiinta, ardayda iyo
siyaasiyiinta ku abtirsada qaaradda waxay dhagaysteyaal, daawadeyaal iyo akhristeyaal ka
yihiin aqoonta maanta dunida taalla. Haddaad tahay qof leh dareen Afrikaannimo, ugu yaraan
waa in aad isweyddiisaa: Keliya dhagayste un maxaan u ahay? Maxaan u ahay daawade un?
Akhriste oo keliya maxaan u ahay? Maxaa ii diiday in aan doorkayga ka ciyaaro aqoonta
maanta dunida lagu hoggaansho? Weyddiimahaasi waxay mashquuliyeen maankayga.

Intii aynu ku guda jirnay casharada jaamacadda ayaynu ka doodi jirnay mowduucyo kala
duwan, kuwaas oo la xiriira arrimaha Afrika. Balse dhammaanteen waxa aynu ahayn
akhristeyaal soo xiganaayey buuggaagta iyo maqaallada ay shishiiyuhu ka qoreen dhulkeenna
hooyo ee Afrika. Haddaba, taasi waxay sababtay marka aynu rabno in aynu sharaxno
dhibaatada Afrika, in aynu ku eegno ookiyaalka cas annaga oo ka shidaal qaadanayno
iskuulada fekerka ee reer galbeedka. Waxaan isweyddiiyey maxaynu ugu eegi waynay
ookiyaalka madow? Si kale u dhig, waxaan tabay doorkii bulshada madow marka ay
timaaddo wax ku biirinta aqoonta dunida taalla. Waxaan rumaystay in bulshada Afrika ay u
baahan tahay iskuul feker iyadu leedahay, kaas oo u taagan muujinta kaalinteeda kaga aaddan
kobcinta aqoonta dunida, iyo gorfayn ku saabsan sidii loo dhigay taariikhdeeda,
dhaqankeeda, ilbaxnimadeeda iyo feker siyaasadeedkeeda.

Aqoonta ku kaydsan buuggaagta yaalla iskuulada ay caruurteenna dhigtaan, intooda badan

waxaa qoray reer galbeed; taariikhdeennuna ayagaa inoo qoray; aqoonta sayniska, bulshada
iyo tiknoolojiyadda casriga waxaa hoggaaminaya waa reer galbeed. Ujeedkayga ma ahan in
aan si indha la’aan ah dhaliil dusha uga tuurayo reer galbeedka, sidoo kale ku canaannanayo
bulshada Afrika, balse waxaan tabayaa kaalinta bulshada Afrika ee kaga aaddan aqoonta
sayniska iyo arrimaha bulshada. Aqoontuna waa sida webi socda oo kale, bulsho walba wixii
ay ku biiriso un bay taariikhdu u weeleysaa.

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Markaad dib u fiiriso taariikhda aqoonta maanta dunida taalla waa mid la soo jaanqaadday
ilbaxnimada iyo taariikhda bini’aadamka. Aqoontaas waxay bilaabatay markii Xaawo iyo
Aadam dhulka la keenay. Haddaba, su’aasha isweyddiinta mudani waa maxaa keenay in
aqoontaasi lagu kala dheereeyey? Si kale u dhig, maxaa sababay in bulshooyinka qaar ay ka
faa’iideystaan halka qaarka kale ay marti ka yihiin aqoontaas? Miyeynu kala isir
duwannahay? Bini’aadamku dhammaantii waa dhashii Aadam iyo Xaawo, bulshada Afrikana
waxay ka mid tahay dhashaas.

Wixii ka dambeeyey gu’gii 1960, bulshada Afrika waxaa u furmay bog cusub, waana
sannadkii xorriyadda. Wixii ka horreeyey sannadkaas, bulshada Afrika waxay halgan dheer
ugu jirtay sidii ay mar un u noqon lahayd bulsho ka madax bannaan gumeysiga.
Dhallinyaradii hoggaaminaysay dhaqdhaqaaqa xornimo-doonka, intooda badan waxay
ahaayeen dhallinyaro wax ku soo bartay dalalka reer galbeedka. Ma naqdinayo qorshehoodii
ku aaddanaa helidda madax bannaanni, balse waxaan naqdiyey qorshehoodii dhanka feker
siyaasadeedka. Feker siyaasadeedkoodii muusan ahayn mid ka tarjumaayey dhaqanka
dhaladka ahi iyo baahida bulshada Afrika. Qaarkood waxay aqbaleyn fekerka Maaksiisimka
iyo hantiwadaagga cilmiyeesan balse dusha sare ay kaga tolan tahay fekerka dhuljacaylka,
keliya si loo marin habaabiyo bulshada. Maxay tahay sababta?

Jawaabta maangalka ahi waxay noqon kartaa, in xilligaasi uusan jirin iskuul feker u dhigmay
kii ay qaateyn, waana sababta igu dhalisay in aan curiyo iskuul fekerka Mudanism-ka.
Waxaan filayaa in uu noqon doono mid door muhiim ah ka ciyaaro kobcinta iyo faafinta
aqoonta ku jaan go’an fekerka Afrikaannimada iyo buuxinta kaalintii bannaanayd. Wixii ka
horreeyey sannadkii 1960, dhibka ugu weyn oo ay wajahayeen bulshada Afrika waxay ahayd
gumeysiga, balse wixii ka dambeeyey sannadkaas waxaa soo muuqday shiddo dhanka iskuul
feker la’aanta, kaas oo ka tarjumaya dhaqaalaha, siyaasadda iyo dhaqanka bulshada. Ugu
dambeyn, siyaasiga reer galbeedka ahi wuxuu ka shaqeeyey dib u dhaca Afrika; qoraaga reer
galbeedka ahi, isagana wuxuu qalinka ku masaxay ilbaxnimadii iyo taariikhdii bulshada
Afrika. Haddaba, mudanisteyaasha (xerta taabacsan iskuulka Mudanism-ka) ayaa waxay
qalinka u qaadan doonaan hoggaaminta baraaruga cusub ee bulshada Afrika.

9
AFRICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Throughout this entry, Africa refers to sub-Saharan Africa, the region south of the Saharan
Desert that is bounded in the north and west by Mauritania; in the east by Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Sudan, and Somalia; and in the south by the Republic of South Africa. The contemporary
political history of Africa is marked by imperialism, the expulsion of foreign powers and
settler elites, and the post independence travails of its roughly fifty states.

Imperialism

Africa was among the last regions of the globe to be subject to imperial rule. In the so-called
scramble for Africa, as described by Thomas Pakenham in his 1991 book of that title, the
British and French seized major portions of the continent; Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain seized lesser holdings as well. During the imperial era, most of Africa’s people
were subject to the rule of bureaucrats in London, Lisbon, and Paris rather than being ruled
by leaders they themselves had chosen.

Two states in Africa had long been independent: Ethiopia from time immemorial and Liberia
since 1847. In 1910, the settlers of South Africa succeeded in securing independence from
British bureaucrats. European immigrants settled in several territories: Kenya in the east, the
Rhodesias in the center, and portions of southern Africa. Conflicts between the settler
populations and colonial bureaucrats characterized the politics of the colonial era, as white
settlers strove to control the colonial governments of these colonies and to dominate their
native populations.

While Africa’s peoples fought against the seizure of their territories, they lacked the wealth,
organization, and weaponry to prevail. The situation changed, however, during World War I
(1914–1918) and World War II (1939–1945). The wars eroded the capacity and will of
Europeans to occupy foreign lands, while economic development increased the capacity and
desire of Africa’s people to end European rule.

During World War II, the allied powers maintained important bases in Africa, some poised to
support campaigns in the Mediterranean and others to backstop armies fighting in Asia. After
World War II, the colonial powers promoted the development of African export industries,
seeking thereby to earn funds to repay loans contracted with the United States to finance the
war. The increase in exports led to the creation of a class of prosperous farmers and the rise
of merchants and lawyers who provided services to the export industries.

As World War II gave way to the cold war, the United States began to stockpile precious
metals and invested in expanding Africa’s mines, refining its ores, and transporting its
precious metals overseas. That Africa’s economic expansion took place at the time of
Europe’s decline prepared the field for its political liberation. The one was prospering while
the other was not, and their relative power shifted accordingly.

10
Nationalist Revolt

Among the first Africans to rally against European rule were urban elites, whose aspirations
were almost immediately checked by resident officials of the colonial powers. Workers who
staffed the ports and railways that tied local producers to foreign markets soon joined them.
In the rural areas, peasants rallied to the struggle against colonial rule, some protesting
intensified demands for labor and the use of coercion rather than wage payment to secure it.
Among the primary targets of the rural population were the chiefs, who had been tasked by
colonial rulers with taxing the profits of farmers and regulating the use of their lands. Thus
did the Kenya Africa Union support dock strikes in Mombasa and the intimidation of chiefs
in the native reserves. Similarly, the Convention Peoples’ Party backed strikes in the Gold
Coast (now Ghana) port cities of Tema and Takoradi, while seeking to “destool” chiefs
inland.

Adding to the rise of nationalist protest was global inflation. Reconstruction in Europe and
rearmament in the United States ran up against shortages of materials and higher prices in
global markets. Throughout Africa and the developing world, consumers rallied to protest
against these increases, tending to blame them on European monopolies—such as in Ghana,
where the people focused their anger on the United Africa Company—or local trading
communities—such as the Indian merchants in Kenya or Lebanese traders in Sierra Leone.

The economic development of Africa thus transformed the social composition and political
preferences of its people. It was in the post-war period, however, that independence was
achieved by the vast majority of Africa’s people. At first, political liberty arrived in a
trickle—to the Sudan in 1956 and Ghana in 1957. Soon thereafter independence came as a
flood, with twenty-nine French- and English-speaking states securing independence from
1960 to 1965, the Portuguese territories in the mid-1970s, and the settler redoubts of southern
Africa in the last decades of the twentieth century.

The Post-independence Period

The optimism of the nationalist period very quickly gave way to pessimism, as governments
that had seized power turned authoritarian or were displaced by military regimes. Ghana’s
experience was emblematic of this early post independence trend. Ghana had been among the
first African countries to attain self-governance (1954) and then independence (1957).

Both events were celebrated not only in Africa but throughout the globe. In 1960, a change in
the constitution gave Kwame Nkrumah, as head of state, the power to dismiss civil servants,
judges, and military officers without the authorization of parliament. In 1963, the president
acquired the power to detain persons charged with political crimes and to try their cases in
special courts. When, in 1964, Nkrumah proclaimed the ruling party the sole legal party in
Ghana, he both followed and gave impetus to the trend toward single-party rule on the
continent.

When, in 1966, Ghana’s military toppled the Nkrumah regime, Ghana joined Sudan, Benin,
Togo, and the Central African Republic—all states in which the national military had
overthrown a civilian regime (in 1958, 1962, 1963, and 1965 respectively). Following the
military’s overthrow of Nkrumah’s government in Ghana, armed forces drove civilian
governments from power in Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Burundi in 1966, and Congo in 1968.
By the mid-1970s, the military held power in one-third of the nations of sub-Saharan Africa.

11
By the mid-1970s, the politics of Africa had turned authoritarian. Only four states in Africa—
Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, and Senegal—retained multiparty systems. Figure 1 captures
this turn to authoritarianism in post independence Africa.

Late-century

The politics of late-century Africa was marked by two major trends. The first was the return
to multiparty politics; the second, an increase in political violence. These trends had common
origins in global political and economic crises. Beginning with the rise in oil prices following
the Yom Kippur war of 1973, the economies of the advanced industrial nations fell into deep
recession. As a result of declining growth in these nations, Africa’s export earnings declined.

Private income fell, and so too did government revenues. Some economies initially eluded
economic decline: those that produced oil, of course, and others that produced crops, such as
coffee, whose prices rose when frost and war drove two major exporters from global markets.

Those countries blessed with rich natural endowments—Zambia, with its copper deposits, or
Zaire, with copper, cobalt, and gold—could borrow and thus postpone cuts in spending. In
the mid-1980s, their incomes also collapsed. In the early 1980s, the U.S. Federal Reserve had
precipitously increased the rate of interest, sharpening the level of recession. The subsequent
collapse of the Mexican peso led to an end of private lending to developing economies. When
in 1986 Arab countries increased oil production in an effort to revive the growth of the
industrial economies, Africa’s oil exporters experienced a decline in earnings. With this last
blow, virtually all the economies of the continent fell into recession.

In the recession, Africa’s citizens experienced increased poverty; so too did their
governments. The result was a decline in the quality of public services. Most African
governments secured their revenues from taxes on trade. Given the decline in exports, they
could respond to the fall in revenues either by freezing salaries and cutting their payrolls or
by running deficits, which lowered the real earnings of public servants by increasing prices.
Children attended schools that lacked text books. Teachers were often absent, seeking to
supplement their salaries with earnings from private trade. In clinics and hospitals, patients
suffered from the lack of medicines and the absence of staff. Soldiers went unpaid.

In response, the citizens of Africa began to turn against their governments. Parents and
children protested the decline in the quality of schools, hospitals, and clinics. Business
owners targeted the erratic supply of water and electricity and the crumbling systems of
transport and communications. Discontent with the decline in public services was heightened
by the disparity in fortunes between those with power and those without. High-ranking
officials could send their children to schools abroad or secure medical treatment in London,
Washington, or Paris. The political elite could recruit and pay their own security services,
purchase private generators, and maintain private means of transport. In general, those who
ruled could escape the misery that befell others. As the economies of African states collapsed,
citizens increasingly called for reform, particularly the restoration of multiparty politics and
an increase in the power of the masses relative to the power of those who governed.

Opposition to Africa’s authoritarian regimes also mounted from abroad. Governments had
fallen into debt, and foreign creditors increasingly demanded that the governments adopt
reform policies aimed at reigniting economic growth on the continent. Governments that
were accountable to their people, the creditors argued, would be less likely to prey upon

12
private assets, distort private markets, and favor public firms over private enterprises. Led by
officials of the World Bank, economic technocrats began to join with local activists in
demanding political reform.

In the later decades of the twentieth century, Africa’s political elites thus faced challenges
from home and abroad. To a remarkable degree, military and single-party regimes proved
able to hold onto power until a second global shock—the fall of communism—destabilized
many African regimes. Western governments had tolerated repressive practices in Africa
nations in exchange for support in the cold war, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Western governments no longer urged their economic technocrats to release loans to
repressive governments. They were willing to let fall those African elites whose services they
no longer required.

In response to increased pressures from home and abroad, some governments reformed. As
shown in Figure 1, whereas more than 80 percent of Africa’s governments had been no party
(largely military) or single-party systems in the mid-1980s, by the mid-1990s, multiparty
systems prevailed in nearly one half of African countries. Other governments, however,
reacted by intensifying the level of repression. In Togo, the armies of President Gnassingbé
Eyadéma fired on civilians who had gathered in the streets of Lomé, the national capital, to
protest his rule.

In Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, thugs hired by the governing parties harassed and
harried those who sought to displace them. In Burundi, the military, once displaced from
power, slaughtered the civilians who had seized it, while in neighboring Rwanda; the
government unleashed a program of mass killing, seeking to eradicate those who opposed it.
Since the late twentieth century, military coups have become rare, and multiparty elections
the norm in Africa. In addition, the continent has become more peaceful, with civil wars
ending in Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, and, less certainly,
Congo. In the mid-1990s, economic growth returned for the first time since the 1980s,
apparently sparked by the increased demand for primary products esulting from economic
growth in China and India, as well as the return of private investment, much by companies
from South Africa. When measured in terms of peace and prosperity, however, the nations of
Africa still occupy the lower rungs of the global community. For the first time in several
decades, there have been distinct signs of political and economic progress in the continent.

13
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