E.Y. Industrial Sales vs. Shien Dar Electricity and Machinery Co., G.R. No. 184850, 20 October 2010

5/5/24, 2:31 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 634
Note.—The absence of the consent of one spouse in the

sale of a conjugal property renders the sale null and void,
while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable.
(Guiang vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 372 [1998])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 184850. October 20, 2010.*
E.Y. INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC. and ENGRACIO YAP,

petitioners, vs. SHEN DAR ELECTRICITY AND
MACHINERY CO., LTD., respondent.
Appeals; Supreme Court; As a general rule, this Court is not a

trier of facts; Exceptions.—Petitioners raise the factual issue of
who the true owner of the mark is. As a general rule, this Court is
not a trier of facts. However, such rule is subject to exceptions. In
New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
460 SCRA 220 (2005), the Court ruled that: We are very much
aware that the rule to the effect that this Court is not a trier of
facts admits of exceptions. As we have stated in Insular Life
Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA: [i]t is a settled rule that in the
exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the Court is not
a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties
during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of
the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the
Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
https://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000018f4763a0dc4b597e37000d00d40059004a/p/ATC329/?username=Guest 1/30
364
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. vs. Shen Dar Electricity and Machinery
Co., Ltd.
to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.
Administrative Law; Intellectual Property Office (IPO);
Trademarks and Trade Names; Inter Partes Proceedings; As a
quasi-judicial agency and as stated in Rule 2, Sec. 5 of the
Regulations on Inter Partes Proceedings, the Bureau of Legal
Affairs (BLA) of the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) is not bound
by technical rules of procedure; As long as the petition is verified
and the pieces of evidence consisting of the affidavits of the
witnesses and the original of other documentary evidence are
attached to the petition and properly marked, these shall be
considered as the evidence of the petitioner—there is no
requirement under the rules that the evidence of the parties must
be formally offered to the Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA).—In other
words, as long as the petition is verified and the pieces of evidence
consisting of the affidavits of the witnesses and the original of
other documentary evidence are attached to the petition and
properly marked in accordance with Secs. 7.1 and 8.1
abovementioned, these shall be considered as the evidence of the
petitioner. There is no requirement under the abovementioned
rules that the evidence of the parties must be formally offered to
the BLA. In any case, as a quasi-judicial agency and as stated in
Rule 2, Sec. 5 of the Regulations on Inter Partes Proceedings, the
BLA is not bound by technical rules of procedure. The evidence
attached to the petition may, therefore, be properly considered in
the resolution of the case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; That administrative quasi-judicial
bodies are not bound by technical rules of procedure in the
adjudication of cases does not mean that the basic rules on proving
allegations should be entirely dispensed with.—The above rule
reflects the oft-repeated legal principle that quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies are not bound by technical rules of
procedure. Such principle, however, is tempered by fundamental

evidentiary rules, including due process. Thus, we ruled in Aya-
ay, Sr. v. Arpaphil Shipping Corp., 481 SCRA 282 (2006): That
administrative quasi-judicial
365
VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 365
Co., Ltd.
bodies like the NLRC are not bound by technical rules of

procedure in the adjudication of cases does not mean that the
basic rules on proving allegations should be entirely dispensed
with. A party alleging a critical fact must still support his
allegation with substantial evidence. Any decision based on
unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend due
process. x x x The liberality of procedure in administrative actions
is subject to limitations imposed by basic requirements of due
process. As this Court said in Ang Tibay v. CIR, the provision for
flexibility in administrative procedure “does not go so far as to
justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative value.” More specifically, as held in Uichico v. NLRC: It
is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the
NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the
adjudication of cases. However, this procedural rule should not be
construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental
evidentiary rules.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The fact that no petition for
cancellation was filed against the Certificate of Registration (COR)
issued to a party does not preclude the cancellation of its COR.—
The fact that no petition for cancellation was filed against the
COR issued to Shen Dar does not preclude the cancellation of
Shen Dar’s COR. It must be emphasized that, during the hearing
for the cancellation of EYIS’ COR before the BLA, Shen Dar tried
to establish that it, not EYIS, was the true owner of the mark
“VESPA” and, thus, entitled to have it registered. Shen Dar had
more than sufficient opportunity to present its evidence and argue
its case, and it did. It was given its day in court and its right to
due process was respected. The IPO Director General’s disregard
of the procedure for the cancellation of a registered mark was a
valid exercise of his discretion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The general rule in this
jurisdiction is that the factual findings of administrative bodies
deserve utmost respect when supported by evidence; Exceptions.—
We agree with petitioners that the general rule in this jurisdiction
is that the factual findings of administrative bodies deserve

utmost respect when supported by evidence. However, such
general rule is subject to exceptions. In Fuentes v. Court of
Appeals, 268 SCRA 703 (1997), the Court established the rule of
conclusiveness of factual findings of the CA as follows:
Jurisprudence teaches us that “(a)s a rule, the jurisdiction of this
Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals x x x is
limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly
366
Co., Ltd.
committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are

deemed conclusive. As such this Court is not duty-bound to
analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered
in the proceedings below. This rule, however, is not without
exceptions.” The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which
are as a general rule deemed conclusive, may admit of review by
this Court: (1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
and the trial court are contradictory; (2) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (3)
when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its
findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (4)
when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts; (5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes
beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a
misapprehension of facts; (7) when the Court of Appeals fails
to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; (8) when the
findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (9) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; and (10) when the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but
such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Notarial Law; While a Declaration
of Actual Use is a notarized document, hence, a public document,
it is not conclusive as to the fact of first use of a mark.—The CA
anchors its finding that Shen Dar was the first to use the mark on
the statements of the parties in their respective Declarations of
Actual Use. Such conclusion is premature at best. While a
Declaration of Actual Use is a notarized document, hence, a public
document, it is not conclusive as to the fact of first use of a mark.
The declaration must be accompanied by proof of actual use as of

the date claimed. In a declaration of actual use, the applicant
must, therefore, present evidence of such actual use.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Invoices; The fact that the seller
described itself in its sales invoice as an importer, wholesaler and
retailer does not preclude its being a manufacturer—there is no
requirement that a sales invoice should accurately state the nature
of all the businesses of the seller.—This is a non sequitur. It does
not
367
VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 367
Co., Ltd.
follow. The fact that EYIS described itself in its sales invoice as
an importer, wholesaler and retailer does not preclude its being a
manufacturer. Sec. 237 of the National Internal Revenue Code
states: x x x There is no requirement that a sales invoice should
accurately state the nature of all the businesses of the seller.
There is no legal ground to state that EYIS’ “declaration” in its
sales invoices that it is an importer, wholesaler and retailer is
restrictive and would preclude its being a manufacturer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intellectual Property Code (R.A.
No. 8293); First-to-File Rule; Republic Act (RA) No. 8293 espouses
the “first-to-file” rule; While Republic Act (RA) No. 8293 removed
the previous requirement of proof of actual use prior to the filing of
an application for registration of a mark, proof of prior and
continuous use is necessary to establish ownership of a mark.—RA
8293 espouses the “first-to-file” rule as stated under Sec. 123.1(d)
which states: Section 123. Registrability.—123.1. A mark cannot
be registered if it: x x x x (d) Is identical with a registered mark
belonging to a different proprietor or a mark with an earlier
filing or priority date, in respect of: (i) The same goods or
services, or (ii) Closely related goods or services, or (iii) If it nearly
resembles such a mark as to be likely to deceive or cause
confusion. Under this provision, the registration of a mark is
prevented with the filing of an earlier application for registration.
This must not, however, be interpreted to mean that ownership
should be based upon an earlier filing date. While RA 8293
removed the previous requirement of proof of actual use prior to
the filing of an application for registration of a mark, proof of
prior and continuous use is necessary to establish ownership of a
mark. Such ownership constitutes sufficient evidence to oppose
the registration of a mark.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The prior and

continuous use of a mark may even overcome the presumptive
ownership of the registrant and be held as the owner of the mark.
—Sec. 134 of the IP Code provides that “any person who believes
that he would be damaged by the registration of a mark x x x”
may file an opposition to the application. The term “any person”
encompasses the true owner of the mark¾the prior and
continuous user. Notably, the Court has ruled that the prior and
continuous use of a mark may even overcome the presumptive
ownership of the registrant and be held as the owner of the mark.
As aptly stated by the Court in Shan-
368
Co., Ltd.
gri-la International Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group

of Companies, Inc., 486 SCRA 405 (2006): Registration, without
more, does not confer upon the registrant an absolute right to the
registered mark. The certificate of registration is merely a prima
facie proof that the registrant is the owner of the registered mark
or trade name. Evidence of prior and continuous use of the
mark or trade name by another can overcome the
presumptive ownership of the registrant and may very
well entitle the former to be declared owner in an
appropriate case. x x x x Ownership of a mark or trade name
may be acquired not necessarily by registration but by adoption
and use in trade or commerce. As between actual use of a mark
without registration, and registration of the mark without actual
use thereof, the former prevails over the latter. For a rule widely
accepted and firmly entrenched, because it has come down
through the years, is that actual use in commerce or business
is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of the right of
ownership.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
H.V. Mina Law Office for petitioners.
Rualdo C. Diansuy, Jr. for respondent.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

seeks to nullify and reverse the February 21, 2008
Decision1 and the October 6, 2008 Resolution2 rendered by
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99356 entitled
Shen Dar Electricity
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 56-70. Penned by Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas and

concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando
(Chairperson) and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente.
2 Id., at pp. 71-78.
369
VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 369

E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. vs. Shen Dar Electricity and
Machinery Co., Ltd.
and Machinery Co., Ltd. v. E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. and

Engracio Yap.
The assailed decision reversed the Decision dated May
25, 20073 issued by the Director General of the Intellectual
Property Office (IPO) in Inter Partes Case No. 14-2004-
00084. The IPO Director General upheld Certificate of
Registration (COR) No. 4-1999-005393 issued by the IPO
for the trademark “VESPA” in favor of petitioner E.Y.
Industrial Sales, Inc. (EYIS), but ordered the cancellation
of COR No. 4-1997-121492, also for the trademark
“VESPA,” issued in favor of respondent Shen Dar
Electricity and Machinery Co., Ltd. (Shen Dar). The
Decision of the IPO Director General, in effect, affirmed the
Decision dated May 29, 20064 issued by the Director of the
Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) of the IPO.
The Facts
EYIS is a domestic corporation engaged in the

production, distribution and sale of air compressors and
other industrial tools and equipment.5 Petitioner Engracio
Yap is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of EYIS.6
Respondent Shen Dar is a Taiwan-based foreign
corporation engaged in the manufacture of air
compressors.7
Both companies claimed to have the right to register the
trademark “VESPA” for air compressors.
From 1997 to 2004, EYIS imported air compressors from
Shen Dar through sales contracts. In the Sales Contract
8
dated April 20, 2002, for example, Shen Dar would supply
EYIS in one (1) year with 24 to 30 units of 40-ft. containers
worth of
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 231-241.

4 Id., at pp. 218-229.
5 Id., at p. 12.
6 Id., at p. 58.
7 Id., at p. 12.
8 Id., at p. 88.
370

Machinery Co., Ltd.
air compressors identified in the Packing/Weight Lists

simply as SD-23, SD-29, SD-31, SD-32, SD-39, SD-67 and
SD-68. In the corresponding Bill of Ladings, the items were
described merely as air compressors.9 There is no
documentary evidence to show that such air compressors
were marked “VESPA.”
On June 9, 1997, Shen Dar filed Trademark Application
Serial No. 4-1997-121492 with the IPO for the mark
“VESPA, Chinese Characters and Device” for use on air
compressors and welding machines.10
On July 28, 1999, EYIS filed Trademark Application
Serial No. 4-1999-005393, also for the mark “VESPA,” for
use on air compressors.11 On January 18, 2004, the IPO
issued COR No. 4-1999-005393 in favor of EYIS.12
Thereafter, on February 8, 2007, Shen Dar was also issued
COR No. 4-1997-121492.13
In the meantime, on June 21, 2004, Shen Dar filed a
Petition for Cancellation of EYIS’ COR with the BLA.14 In
the Petition, Shen Dar primarily argued that the issuance
of the COR in favor of EYIS violated Section 123.1
paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) of Republic Act No. (RA) 8293,
otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code (IP
Code), having first filed an application for the mark. Shen
Dar further alleged that EYIS was a mere distributor of air
compressors bearing the mark “VESPA” which it imported
from Shen Dar. Shen Dar also argued that it had prior and
exclusive right to the use and registration of the mark
“VESPA” in the Philippines under the provisions of the
Paris Convention.15
In its Answer, EYIS and Yap denied the claim of Shen

Dar to be the true owners of the mark “VESPA” being the
sole
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 169-173.

10 Id., at p. 57.
11 Id., at p. 234.
12 Id., at p. 57.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id., at p. 58.
371
VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 371

Machinery Co., Ltd.
assembler and fabricator of air compressors since the early

1990s. They further alleged that the air compressors that
Shen Dar allegedly supplied them bore the mark “SD” for
Shen Dar and not “VESPA.” Moreover, EYIS argued that
Shen Dar, not being the owner of the mark, could not seek
protection from the provisions of the Paris Convention or
the IP Code.16
Thereafter, the Director of the BLA issued its Decision
dated May 29, 2006 in favor of EYIS and against Shen Dar,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for

Cancellation is, as it is hereby, DENIED. Consequently,
Certificate of Registration No. 4-1999-[005393] for the mark
“VESPA” granted in the name of E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. on 9
January 2007 is hereby upheld.
Let the filewrapper of VESPA subject matter of this case be
forwarded to the Administrative, Financial and Human Resource
Development Services Bureau for issuance and appropriate action
in accordance with this DECISION and a copy thereof furnished
to the Bureau of Trademarks for information and update of its
records.
SO ORDERED.”17
Shen Dar appealed the decision of the BLA Director to

the Director General of the IPO. In the appeal, Shen Dar
raised the following issues:
1. Whether the BLA Director erred in ruling that Shen

Dar failed to present evidence;
2. Whether the registration of EYIS’ application was
proper considering that Shen Dar was the first to file
an application for the mark; and
3. Whether the BLA Director correctly ruled that EYIS
is the true owner of the mark.18
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 59-60.

17 Id., at pp. 60-61.
372

Machinery Co., Ltd.
Later, the IPO Director General issued a Decision dated

May 25, 2007 upholding the COR issued in favor of EYIS
while cancelling the COR of Shen Dar, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED.

Certificate of Registration No. 4-1999-005393 for the mark
VESPA for air compressor issued in favor of Appellee is hereby
upheld. Consequently, Certificate of Registration No. 4-1997-
121492 for the mark VESPA, Chinese Characters & Device for
goods air compressor and spot welding machine issued in favor of
Appellant is hereby ordered cancelled.
Let a copy of this Decision as well as the records of this case be
furnished and returned to the Director of Bureau of Legal Affairs
for appropriate action. Further, let also the Directors of the
Bureau of Trademarks, the Administrative, Financial and Human
Resources Development Services Bureau, and the Documentation,
Information and Technology Transfer Bureau be furnished a copy
of this Decision for information, guidance, and records
purposes.”19
Shen Dar appealed the above decision of the IPO

Director General to the CA where Shen Dar raised the
following issues:
1. Whether Shen Dar is guilty of forum shopping;
2. Whether the first-to-file rule applies to the instant
case;
3. Whether Shen Dar presented evidence of actual use;
4. Whether EYIS is the true owner of the mark

“VESPA”;
5. Whether the IPO Director General erred in
cancelling Shen Dar’s COR No. 4-1997-121492
without a petition for cancellation; and
_______________
18 Id., at p. 61.
19 Id., at pp. 56-57.
373
VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 373

Machinery Co., Ltd.
6. Whether Shen Dar sustained damages.20

In the assailed decision, the CA reversed the IPO
Director General and ruled in favor of Shen Dar. The
dispositive portion states:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

GRANTED. Consequently, the assailed decision of the Director
General of the Intellectual Property Office dated May 25, 2007 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, a new one is
entered: a) ordering the cancellation of Certificate of Registration
No. 4-1999-005393 issued on January 19, 2004 for the trademark
VESPA in favor of E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc.; b) ordering the
restoration of the validity of Certificate of Registration No. 4-
1997-121492 for the trademark VESPA in favor of Shen Dar
Electricity and Machinery Co., Ltd. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”21
In ruling for Shen Dar, the CA ruled that, despite the

fact that Shen Dar did not formally offer its evidence before
the BLA, such evidence was properly attached to the
Petition for Cancellation. As such, Shen Dar’s evidence
may be properly considered. The CA also enunciated that
the IPO failed to properly apply the provisions of Sec.
123.1(d) of RA 8293, which prohibits the registration of a
trademark in favor of a party when there is an earlier filed
application for the same mark. The CA further ruled that
Shen Dar should be considered to have prior use of the
mark based on the statements made by the parties in their
respective Declarations of Actual Use. The CA added that
EYIS is a mere importer of the air compressors with the
mark “VESPA” as may be gleaned from its receipts which
indicated that EYIS is an importer, wholesaler and

retailer, and therefore, cannot be considered an owner of
the mark.22
_______________
20 Id., at p. 63.
21 Id., at pp. 69-70.
22 Id., at pp. 66-67.
374

Machinery Co., Ltd.
EYIS filed a motion for reconsideration of the assailed

decision which the CA denied in the assailed resolution.
Hence, the instant appeal.
Issues
EYIS and Yap raise the following issues in their

petition:
A. Whether the Director General of the IPO correctly upheld the

rights of Petitioners over the trademark VESPA.
B. Whether the Director General of the IPO can, under the
circumstances, order the cancellation of Respondent’s certificate of
registration for VESPA, which has been fraudulently obtained and
erroneously issued.
C. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals was justified in
reversing the findings of fact of the IPO, which affirm the rights of
Petitioner EYIS over the trademark VESPA and when such
findings are supported by the evidence on record.
D. Whether this Honorable Court may review questions of fact
considering that the findings of the Court of Appeals and the IPO
are in conflict and the conclusions of the appellee court are
23
contradicted by the evidence on record.
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
First Issue:
Whether this Court may review the

questions of fact presented
Petitioners raise the factual issue of who the true owner

of the mark is. As a general rule, this Court is not a trier of
facts. However, such rule is subject to exceptions.
_______________
23 Id., at p. 18.
375
VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 375

Machinery Co., Ltd.
In New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations

Commission,24 the Court ruled that:
“We are very much aware that the rule to the effect that this
Court is not a trier of facts admits of exceptions. As we have
stated in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA:
[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme
Court’s power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and
does not normally undertake the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the
CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the
Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there
is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, the records will show that the IPO
and the CA made differing conclusions on the issue of
ownership based on the evidence presented by the parties.
Hence, this issue may be the subject of this Court’s review.
_______________
24 G.R. No. 149281, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 220, 227.
376

Machinery Co., Ltd.
Second Issue:
Whether evidence presented before the BLA

must be formally offered
Preliminarily, it must be noted that the BLA ruled that
Shen Dar failed to adduce evidence in support of its
allegations as required under Office Order No. 79, Series of
2005, Amendments to the Regulations on Inter Partes
Proceedings, having failed to formally offer its evidence
during the proceedings before it. The BLA ruled:
“At the outset, we note petitioner’s failure to adduce any

evidence in support of its allegations in the Petition for
Cancellation. Petitioner did not file nor submit its marked
evidence as required in this Bureau’s Order No. 2006-157 dated
25 January 2006 in compliance with Office Order No. 79, Series of
2005, Amendments to the Regulations on Inter Partes
Proceedings.”25 x x x
In reversing such finding, the CA cited Sec. 2.4 of BLA

Memorandum Circular No. 03, Series of 2005, which states:
“Section 2.4. In all cases, failure to file the documentary

evidences in accordance with Sections 7 and 8 of the rules on
summary proceedings shall be construed as a waiver on the part
of the parties. In such a case, the original petition, opposition,
answer and the supporting documents therein shall constitute the
entire evidence for the parties subject to applicable rules.”
The CA concluded that Shen Dar needed not formally

offer its evidence but merely needed to attach its evidence
to its position paper with the proper markings,26 which it
did in this case.
The IP Code provides under its Sec. 10.3 that the

Director General of the IPO shall establish the procedure
for the application for the registration of a trademark, as
well as the opposition to it:
_______________
25 Rollo, p. 225.
26 Id., at p. 68.
377
VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 377

Machinery Co., Ltd.
“Section 10. The Bureau of Legal Affairs.—The Bureau of

Legal Affairs shall have the following functions:
xxxx
10.3. The Director General may by Regulations establish the
procedure to govern the implementation of this Section.”
Thus, the Director General issued Office Order No. 79,

Series of 2005 amending the regulations on Inter Partes
Proceedings, Sec. 12.1 of which provides:
“Section 12. Evidence for the Parties—

12.1. The verified petition or opposition, reply if any,
duly marked affidavits of the witnesses, and the documents
submitted, shall constitute the entire evidence for the
petitioner or opposer. The verified answer, rejoinder if any,
and the duly marked affidavits and documents submitted
shall constitute the evidence for the respondent. Affidavits,
documents and other evidence not submitted and duly
marked in accordance with the preceding sections shall not
be admitted as evidence.”
The preceding sections referred to in the above provision

refer to Secs. 7.1, 8.1 and 9 which, in turn, provide:
“Section 7. Filing of Petition or Opposition—

7.1. The petition or opposition, together with the affidavits of
witnesses and originals of the documents and other requirements,
shall be filed with the Bureau, provided, that in case of public
documents, certified copies shall be allowed in lieu of the
originals. The Bureau shall check if the petition or opposition is in
due form as provided in the Regulations particularly Rule 3,
Section 3; Rule 4, Section 2; Rule 5, Section 3; Rule 6, Section 9;
Rule 7, Sections 3 and 5; Rule 8, Sections 3 and 4. For petition for
cancellation of layout design (topography) of integrated circuits,

Rule 3, Section 3 applies as to the form and requirements. The
affidavits, documents and other evidence shall be marked
consecutively as “Exhibits” beginning with the letter “A”.
Section 8. Answer—
378

Co., Ltd.
8.1. Within three (3) working days from receipt of the

petition or opposition, the Bureau shall issue an order for the
respondent to file an answer together with the affidavits of
witnesses and originals of documents, and at the same time shall
notify all parties required to be notified in the IP Code and these
Regulations, provided, that in case of public documents, certified
true copies may be submitted in lieu of the originals. The
affidavits and documents shall be marked consecutively as
“Exhibits” beginning with the number “1”.
Section 9. Petition or Opposition and Answer must be verified
—Subject to Rules 7 and 8 of these regulations, the petition or
opposition and the answer must be verified. Otherwise, the same
shall not be considered as having been filed.”
In other words, as long as the petition is verified and the

pieces of evidence consisting of the affidavits of the
witnesses and the original of other documentary evidence
are attached to the petition and properly marked in
accordance with Secs. 7.1 and 8.1 abovementioned, these
shall be considered as the evidence of the petitioner. There
is no requirement under the abovementioned rules that the
evidence of the parties must be formally offered to the BLA.
In any case, as a quasi-judicial agency and as stated in
Rule 2, Sec. 5 of the Regulations on Inter Partes
Proceedings, the BLA is not bound by technical rules of
procedure. The evidence attached to the petition may,
therefore, be properly considered in the resolution of the
case.
Third Issue:
Whether the IPO Director General can

validly cancel Shen Dar’s Certificate of Registration
In his Decision, the IPO Director General stated that,
despite the fact that the instant case was for the
cancellation of the COR issued in favor of EYIS, the
interests of justice dictate, and in view of its findings, that
the COR of Shen Dar must be cancelled. The Director

General explained:
379
VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 379

Machinery Co., Ltd.
“Accordingly, while the instant case involves a petition to

cancel the registration of the Appellee’s trademark VESPA, the
interest of justice requires that Certificate of Registration No. 4-
1997-121492 be cancelled. While the normal course of proceedings
should have been the filing of a petition for cancellation of
Certificate of Registration No. 4-1997-121492, that would involve
critical facts and issues that have already been resolved in this
case. To allow the Applicant to still maintain in the Trademark
Registry Certificate of Registration No. 4-1997-121492 would
nullify the exclusive rights of Appellee as the true and registered
owner of the mark VESPA and defeat the purpose of the
trademark registration system.”27
Shen Dar challenges the propriety of such cancellation

on the ground that there was no petition for cancellation as
required under Sec. 151 of RA 8293.
Office Order No. 79, Series of 2005, provides under its
Sec. 5 that:
“Section 5. Rules of Procedure to be followed in the conduct of

hearing of Inter Partes cases.—The rules of procedure herein
contained primarily apply in the conduct of hearing of Inter
Partes cases. The Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily. The
Bureau shall not be bound by strict technical rules of
procedure and evidence but may adopt, in the absence of
any applicable rule herein, such mode of proceedings
which is consistent with the requirements of fair play and
conducive to the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of cases, and which will give the Bureau the greatest
possibility to focus on the contentious issues before it.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
The above rule reflects the oft-repeated legal principle

that quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are not bound
by technical rules of procedure. Such principle, however, is
tempered by fundamental evidentiary rules, including due
process. Thus, we ruled in Aya-ay, Sr. v. Arpaphil Shipping
Corp.:28
_______________
27 Id., at p. 241.
28 G.R. No. 155359, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 282, 296-297.
380

Machinery Co., Ltd.
“That administrative quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are

not bound by technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of
cases does not mean that the basic rules on proving allegations
should be entirely dispensed with. A party alleging a critical fact
must still support his allegation with substantial evidence. Any
decision based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it
will offend due process.
x x x The liberality of procedure in administrative actions is
subject to limitations imposed by basic requirements of due
process. As this Court said in Ang Tibay v. CIR, the provision for
flexibility in administrative procedure “does not go so far as to
justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative value.” More specifically, as held in Uichico v. NLRC:
It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the
NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the
adjudication of cases. However, this procedural rule should not be
evidentiary rules.”
This was later reiterated in Lepanto Consolidated

Mining Company v. Dumapis:29
“While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies

like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of procedure
in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule should not be
evidentiary rules. The evidence presented must at least have a
modicum of admissibility for it to have probative value. Not only
must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion,
but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Thus, even though technical rules of evidence are not
strictly complied with before the LA and the NLRC, their decision
must be based on evidence that must, at the very least, be
substantial.”
The fact that no petition for cancellation was filed

against the COR issued to Shen Dar does not preclude the
cancella-
_______________
29 G.R. No. 163210, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 103, 113-114.
381
VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 381

Machinery Co., Ltd.
tion of Shen Dar’s COR. It must be emphasized that,

during the hearing for the cancellation of EYIS’ COR before
the BLA, Shen Dar tried to establish that it, not EYIS, was
the true owner of the mark “VESPA” and, thus, entitled to
have it registered. Shen Dar had more than sufficient
opportunity to present its evidence and argue its case, and
it did. It was given its day in court and its right to due
process was respected. The IPO Director General’s
disregard of the procedure for the cancellation of a
registered mark was a valid exercise of his discretion.
Fourth Issue:
Whether the factual findings of the IPO

are binding on the CA
Next, petitioners challenge the CA’s reversal of the
factual findings of the BLA that Shen Dar and not EYIS is
the prior user and, therefore, true owner of the mark. In
arguing its position, petitioners cite numerous rulings of
this Court where it was enunciated that the factual
findings of administrative bodies are given great weight if
not conclusive upon the courts when supported by
substantial evidence.
We agree with petitioners that the general rule in this
jurisdiction is that the factual findings of administrative
bodies deserve utmost respect when supported by evidence.
However, such general rule is subject to exceptions.
In Fuentes v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court established
the rule of conclusiveness of factual findings of the CA as
follows:
“Jurisprudence teaches us that “(a)s a rule, the jurisdiction of

this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals x x x is
limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly
committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are
deemed conclusive. As such this Court is not duty-bound to

analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered
in the proceedings below.
_______________
30 G.R. No. 109849, February 26, 1997, 268 SCRA 703, 708-709.
382

Co., Ltd.
This rule, however, is not without exceptions.” The findings of fact

of the Court of Appeals, which are as a general rule deemed
conclusive, may admit of review by this Court:
(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the
trial court are contradictory;
(2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures;
(3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its
findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation
of facts;
(5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes
beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on
a misapprehension of facts;
(7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of the specific evidence on which they are based; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are
contradicted by the evidence on record.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Thereafter, in Villaflor v. Court of Appeals,31 this Court

applied the above principle to factual findings of quasi-
judicial bodies, to wit:
“Proceeding by analogy, the exceptions to the rule on

conclusiveness of factual findings of the Court of Appeals,
enumerated in Fuentes vs. Court of Appeals, can also be applied
to those of quasi-judicial bodies x x x.” (Emphasis supplied.)
_______________
31 G.R. No. 95694, October 9, 1997, 280 SCRA 297, 330-331.
383
VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 383

Machinery Co., Ltd.
Here, the CA identified certain material facts that were

allegedly overlooked by the BLA and the IPO Director
General which it opined, when correctly appreciated, would
alter the result of the case. An examination of the IPO
Decisions, however, would show that no such evidence was
overlooked.
First, as to the date of first use of the mark by the
parties, the CA stated:
“To begin with, when respondents-appellees filed its

application for registration of the VESPA trademark on July 28,
1999, they stated under oath, as found in their DECLARATION
OF ACTUAL USE, that their first use of the mark was on
December 22, 1998. On the other hand, [Shen Dar] in its
application dated June 09, 1997 stated, likewise under oath in
their DECLARATION OF ACTUAL USE, that its first use of the
mark was in June 1996. This cannot be made any clearer. [Shen
Dar] was not only the first to file an application for registration
but likewise first to use said registrable mark.”32
Evidently, the CA anchors its finding that Shen Dar was

the first to use the mark on the statements of the parties in
their respective Declarations of Actual Use. Such
conclusion is premature at best. While a Declaration of
Actual Use is a notarized document, hence, a public
document, it is not conclusive as to the fact of first use of a
mark. The declaration must be accompanied by proof of
actual use as of the date claimed. In a declaration of actual
use, the applicant must, therefore, present evidence of such
actual use.
The BLA ruled on the same issue, as follows:
“More importantly, the private respondent’s prior adoption and

continuous use of the mark ‘VESPA’ on air compressors is
bolstered by numerous documentary evidence consisting of sales
invoices issued in the name of E.Y. Industrial and Bill of Lading
(Exhibits ‘4’ to ‘375’). Sales Invoice No. 12075 dated March 27,
1995 antedates petitioner’s date of first use on January 1, 1997
indicated in its
_______________
32 Rollo, pp. 66-67.
384

Co., Ltd.
trademark application filed on June 9, 1997 as well as the date of

first use in June of 1996 as indicated in the Declaration of Actual
Use submitted on December 3, 2001 (Exhibit ‘385’). The use by
respondent registrant in the concept of owner is shown by
commercial documents, sales invoices unambiguously describing
the goods as “VESPA” air compressors. Private respondents have
sold the air compressors bearing the “VESPA” to various locations
in the Philippines, as far as Mindanao and the Visayas since the
early 1990’s. We carefully inspected the evidence consisting of
three hundred seventy-one (371) invoices and shipment
documents which show that VESPA air compressors were sold not
only in Manila, but to locations such as Iloilo City, Cebu City,
Dumaguete City, Zamboanga City, Cagayan de Oro City, Davao
City, to name a few. There is no doubt that it is through private
respondents’ efforts that the mark “VESPA” used on air
compressors has gained business goodwill and reputation in the
Philippines for which it has validly acquired trademark rights.
Respondent E.Y. Industrial’s right has been preserved until the
passage of RA 8293 which entitles it to register the same.”33
Comparatively, the BLA’s findings were founded upon

the evidence presented by the parties. An example of such
evidence is Invoice No. 12075 dated March 29, 199534
where EYIS sold four units of VESPA air compressors to
Veteran Paint Trade Center. Shen Dar failed to rebut such
evidence. The truth, as supported by the evidence on
record, is that EYIS was first to use the mark.
Moreover, the discrepancy in the date provided in the
Declaration of Actual Use filed by EYIS and the proof
submitted was appropriately considered by the BLA, ruling
as follows:
“On the contrary, respondent EY Industrial was able to prove

the use of the mark “VESPA” on the concept of an owner as early
as 1991. Although Respondent E.Y. indicated in its trademark
application that its first use was in December 22, 1998, it was
able to prove by clear and positive evidence of use prior to such
date.
_______________
33 Id., at p. 228.
34 Id., at p. 173.
385
VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 385

Co., Ltd.
In Chuang Te v. Ng Kian-Guiab and Director of Patents, L-

23791, 23 November 1966, the High Court clarified: Where an
applicant for registration of a trademark states under oath the
date of his earliest use, and later on he wishes to carry back his
first date of use to an earlier date, he then takes on the greater
burden of presenting “clear and convincing evidence” of adoption
and use as of that earlier date. (B.R. Baker Co. vs. Lebrow Bros.,
150 F. 2d 580.)”35
The CA further found that EYIS is not a manufacturer

of air compressors but merely imports and sells them as a
wholesaler and retailer. The CA reasoned:
“Conversely, a careful perusal of appellees’ own

submitted receipts shows that it is not manufacturer but
an importer, wholesaler and retailer. This fact is
corroborated by the testimony of a former employee of
appellees. Admittedly too, appellees are importing air
compressors from [Shen Dar] from 1997 to 2004. These matters,
lend credence to [Shen Dar’s] claim that the letters SD followed
by a number inscribed in the air compressor is only to describe its
type, manufacturer business name and capacity. The VESPA
mark is in the sticker which is attached to the air compressors.
The ruling of the Supreme Court, in the case of UNNO
Commercial Enterprises, Inc. vs. General Milling Corporation et
al., is quite enlightening, thus We quote:
“The term owner does not include the importer of the
goods bearing the trademark, trade name, service mark, or
other mark of ownership, unless such importer is actually
the owner thereof in the country from which the goods are
imported. Thus, this Court, has on several occasions ruled
that where the applicant’s alleged ownership is not shown
in any notarial document and the applicant appears to be
merely an importer or distributor of the merchandise
covered by said trademark, its application cannot be
granted.”36
This is a non sequitur. It does not follow. The fact that

EYIS described itself in its sales invoice as an importer,
wholesaler and retailer does not preclude its being a manu-
_______________
35 Id., at p. 227.
36 Id., at pp. 67-68.
386

Machinery Co., Ltd.
facturer. Sec. 237 of the National Internal Revenue Code

states:
“Section 237. Issuance of Receipts or Sales or Commercial

Invoices.—All persons subject to an internal revenue tax shall, for
each sale and transfer of merchandise or for services rendered
valued at Twenty-five pesos (P25.00) or more, issue duly
registered receipts or sale or commercial invoices, prepared at
least in duplicate, showing the date of transaction, quantity,
unit cost and description of merchandise or nature of
service: Provided, however, That where the receipt is issued to
cover payment made as rentals, commissions, compensation or
fees, receipts or invoices shall be issued which shall show the
name, business style, if any, and address of the purchaser,
customer or client.
The original of each receipt or invoice shall be issued to the
purchaser, customer or client at the time the transaction is
effected, who, if engaged in business or in the exercise of
profession, shall keep and preserve the same in his place of
business for a period of three (3) years from the close of the
taxable year in which such invoice or receipt was issued, while the
duplicate shall be kept and preserved by the issuer, also in his
place of business, for a like period.
The Commissioner may, in meritorious cases, exempt any
person subject to an internal revenue tax from compliance with
the provisions of this Section.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Correlatively, in Revenue Memorandum No. 16-2003

dated May 20, 2003, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
defined a Sales Invoice and identified its required
information as follows:
“Sales Invoices (SI)/Cash Invoice (CI)—is written account of goods

sold or services rendered and the prices charged therefor used in the
ordinary course of business evidencing sale and transfer or agreement to
sell or transfer of goods and services. It contains the same information

found in the Official Receipt.
Official Receipt (OR)—is a receipt issued for the payment of services
rendered or goods sold. It contains the following information:
a. Business name and address;
387
VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 387

Machinery Co., Ltd.
b. Taxpayer Identification Number;

c. Name of printer (BIR Permit No.) with inclusive serial number of
booklets and date of issuance of receipts.
There is no requirement that a sales invoice should

accurately state the nature of all the businesses of the
seller. There is no legal ground to state that EYIS’
“declaration” in its sales invoices that it is an importer,
wholesaler and retailer is restrictive and would preclude its
being a manufacturer.
From the above findings, there was no justifiable reason
for the CA to disregard the factual findings of the IPO. The
rulings of the IPO Director General and the BLA Director
were supported by clear and convincing evidence. The facts
cited by the CA and Shen Dar do not justify a different
conclusion from that of the IPO. Hence, the findings of the
BLA Director and the IPO Director General must be
deemed as conclusive on the CA.
Fifth Issue:
Whether EYIS is the true owner of the mark

“VESPA”
In any event, given the length of time already invested
by the parties in the instant case, this Court must write
finis to the instant controversy by determining, once and
for all, the true owner of the mark “VESPA” based on the
evidence presented.
RA 8293 espouses the “first-to-file” rule as stated under
Sec. 123.1(d) which states:
“Section 123. Registrability.—123.1. A mark cannot be registered if

it:
xxxx
(d) Is identical with a registered mark belonging to a different
proprietor or a mark with an earlier filing or priority date, in respect
of:
388

Machinery Co., Ltd.
(i) The same goods or services, or

(ii) Closely related goods or services, or
(iii) If it nearly resembles such a mark as to be likely to deceive or
cause confusion.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Under this provision, the registration of a mark is

prevented with the filing of an earlier application for
registration. This must not, however, be interpreted to
mean that ownership should be based upon an earlier filing
date. While RA 8293 removed the previous requirement of
proof of actual use prior to the filing of an application for
registration of a mark, proof of prior and continuous use is
necessary to establish ownership of a mark. Such
ownership constitutes sufficient evidence to oppose the
registration of a mark.
Sec. 134 of the IP Code provides that “any person who
believes that he would be damaged by the registration of a
mark x x x” may file an opposition to the application. The
term “any person” encompasses the true owner of the
mark¾the prior and continuous user.
Notably, the Court has ruled that the prior and
continuous use of a mark may even overcome the
presumptive ownership of the registrant and be held as the
owner of the mark. As aptly stated by the Court in
Shangri-la International Hotel Management, Ltd. v.
Developers Group of Companies, Inc.:37
“Registration, without more, does not confer upon the

registrant an absolute right to the registered mark. The
certificate of registration is merely a prima facie proof that the
registrant is the owner of the registered mark or trade name.
Evidence of prior and continuous use of the mark or trade
name by another can overcome the presumptive
ownership of the registrant and may very well entitle the
former to be declared owner in an appropriate case.
xxxx
_______________
37 G.R. No. 159938, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 405, 419-421.
389
VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 389

Co., Ltd.
Ownership of a mark or trade name may be acquired not

necessarily by registration but by adoption and use in trade or
commerce. As between actual use of a mark without registration,
and registration of the mark without actual use thereof, the
former prevails over the latter. For a rule widely accepted and
firmly entrenched, because it has come down through the years, is
that actual use in commerce or business is a pre-requisite
to the acquisition of the right of ownership.
xxxx
By itself, registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
When the applicant is not the owner of the trademark
being applied for, he has no right to apply for registration
of the same. Registration merely creates a prima facie
presumption of the validity of the registration, of the registrant’s
ownership of the trademark and of the exclusive right to the use
thereof. Such presumption, just like the presumptive regularity in
the performance of official functions, is rebuttable and must give
way to evidence to the contrary.”
Here, the incontrovertible truth, as established by the

evidence submitted by the parties, is that EYIS is the prior
user of the mark. The exhaustive discussion on the matter
made by the BLA sufficiently addresses the issue:
“Based on the evidence, Respondent E.Y. Industrial is a

legitimate corporation engaged in buying, importing, selling,
industrial machineries and tools, manufacturing, among others
since its incorporation in 1988. (Exhibit “1”). Indeed private
respondents have submitted photographs (Exhibit “376”, “377”,
“378”, “379”) showing an assembly line of its manufacturing or
assembly process.
More importantly, the private respondent’s prior adoption and
continuous use of the mark “VESPA” on air compressors is
bolstered by numerous documentary evidence consisting of sales
invoices issued in the name of respondent EY Industrial and Bills
of Lading. (Exhibits “4” to “375”). Sales Invoice No. 12075 dated
March 27, 1995 antedates petitioner’s date of first use in January
1, 1997 indicated in its trademark application filed in June 9,
1997 as well as the date of first use in June of 1996 as indicated in
the Declaration of Actual Use submitted on December 3, 2001
(Exhibit “385”). The use by respondent-registrant in the concept of
owner is shown by commer-
390

Co., Ltd.
cial documents, sales invoices unambiguously describing the

goods as “VESPA” air compressors. Private respondents have sold
the air compressors bearing the “VESPA” to various locations in
the Philippines, as far as Mindanao and the Visayas since the
early 1990’s. We carefully inspected the evidence consisting of
three hundred seventy one (371) invoices and shipment
documents which show that “VESPA” air compressors were sold
not only in Manila, but to locations such as Iloilo City, Cebu City,
Dumaguete City, Zamboanga City, Cagayan de Oro City, Davao
City to name a few. There is no doubt that it is through private
respondents’ efforts that the mark “VESPA” used on air
compressors has gained business goodwill and reputation in the
Philippines for which it has validly acquired trademark rights.
Respondent EY Industrial’s right has been preserved until the
passage of RA 8293 which entitles it to register the same. x x x”38
On the other hand, Shen Dar failed to refute the

evidence cited by the BLA in its decision. More
importantly, Shen Dar failed to present sufficient evidence
to prove its own prior use of the mark “VESPA.” We cite
with approval the ruling of the BLA:
“[Shen Dar] avers that it is the true and rightful owner of the
trademark “VESPA” used on air compressors. The thrust of [Shen
Dar’s] argument is that respondent E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. is a
mere distributor of the “VESPA” air compressors. We disagree.
This conclusion is belied by the evidence. We have gone over
each and every document attached as Annexes “A”, “A” 1-48 which
consist of Bill of Lading and Packing Weight List. Not one of these
documents referred to a “VESPA” air compressor. Instead, it
simply describes the goods plainly as air compressors which is
type “SD” and not “VESPA”. More importantly, the earliest date
reflected on the Bill of Lading was on May 5, 1997. (Annex –
“A”-1). [Shen Dar] also attached as Annex “B” a purported Sales
Contract with respondent EY Industrial Sales dated April 20,
2002. Surprisingly, nowhere in the document does it state that
respondent EY Industrial agreed to sell “VESPA” air compressors.
The document only mentions air compressors which if genuine
merely bolsters respondent
_______________
38 Rollo, p. 228.
391
VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 391

Co., Ltd.
Engracio Yap’s contention that [Shen Dar] approached them if it

could sell the “Shen Dar” or “SD” air compressor. (Exhibit “386”)
In its position paper, [Shen Dar] merely mentions of Bill of Lading
constituting respondent as consignee in 1993 but never submitted
the same for consideration of this Bureau. The document is also
not signed by [Shen Dar]. The agreement was not even drafted in
the letterhead of either [Shen Dar] nor [sic] respondent –
registrant. Our only conclusion is that [Shen Dar] was not able to
prove to be the owner of the VESPA mark by appropriation.
Neither was it able to prove actual commercial use in the
Philippines of the mark VESPA prior to its filing of a trademark
application in 9 June 1997.”39
As such, EYIS must be considered as the prior and

continuous user of the mark “VESPA” and its true owner.
Hence, EYIS is entitled to the registration of the mark in
its name.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
CA’s February 21, 2008 Decision and October 6, 2008
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 99356 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 25,
2007 issued by the IPO Director General in Inter Partes
Case No. 14-2004-00084 and the Decision dated May 29,
2006 of the BLA Director of the IPO are hereby
REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del

Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside.
Notes.—While the Civil Service Commission is not

bound by technical rules of procedure in administrative
proceedings, this does not preclude the CSC from
considering a document’s technical defects and the
tardiness of its submission in weigh-
_______________
39 Id., at p. 226.
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5/5/24, 2:31 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 634

Note.—The absence of the consent of one spouse in the

G.R. No. 184850. October 20, 2010.*

E.Y. INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC. and ENGRACIO YAP,

Appeals; Supreme Court; As a general rule, this Court is not a

364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

procedure. Such principle, however, is tempered by fundamental

VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 365

bodies like the NLRC are not bound by technical rules of

is that the factual findings of administrative bodies deserve

366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are

The declaration must be accompanied by proof of actual use as of

VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 367

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The prior and

368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

gri-la International Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

1 Rollo, pp. 56-70. Penned by Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas and

VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 369

and Machinery Co., Ltd. v. E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. and

EYIS is a domestic corporation engaged in the

3 Id., at pp. 231-241.

370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

air compressors identified in the Packing/Weight Lists

In its Answer, EYIS and Yap denied the claim of Shen

9 Id., at pp. 169-173.

VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 371

assembler and fabricator of air compressors since the early

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for

Shen Dar appealed the decision of the BLA Director to

1. Whether the BLA Director erred in ruling that Shen

16 Id., at pp. 59-60.

372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Later, the IPO Director General issued a Decision dated

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED.

Shen Dar appealed the above decision of the IPO

4. Whether EYIS is the true owner of the mark

VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 373

6. Whether Shen Dar sustained damages.20

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

In ruling for Shen Dar, the CA ruled that, despite the

indicated that EYIS is an importer, wholesaler and

374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

EYIS filed a motion for reconsideration of the assailed

EYIS and Yap raise the following issues in their

A. Whether the Director General of the IPO correctly upheld the

The Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

Whether this Court may review the

Petitioners raise the factual issue of who the true owner

VOL. 634, OCTOBER 20, 2010 375

In New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations

376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Whether evidence presented before the BLA

“At the outset, we note petitioner’s failure to adduce any

In reversing such finding, the CA cited Sec. 2.4 of BLA