Dinesh Dalmia vs C.B.

I on 18 September, 2007

Author: S.B. Sinha

Bench: S.B. Sinha, Harjit Singh Bedi

CASE NO.:

Appeal (crl.) 1249 of 2007

PETITIONER:

Dinesh Dalmia

RESPONDENT:

C.B.I.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/09/2007

BENCH:

S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi

JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1249 OF 2007 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 513 of 2007]

S.B. SINHA, J :

1. Leave granted.

2. Interpretation of Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 (for short "the Code") vis-`-vis Sub-section (2) of Section 309 thereof falls for
consideration of this Court in this appeal which arises out of an order dated
22.12.2006 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at
Madras in Crl. R.C. No. 1173 of 2006 setting aside an order dated 25.08.2006 passed
by the 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Chennai in R.C. 4/(E)/03/BSC/FC/CBI New
Delhi in Crl. R.C. No. 115 of 2006 whereby an order dated 30.05.2006 passed by the
Special Court in Crl. M.P. No. 788 of 2006 in C.C. No. 19189 of 2005 was set aside.

3. Appellant was proceeded against for commission of offences under Sections 409,
420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code.

4. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) lodged a first information report

against the appellant and three companies registered and incorporated under the
Companies Act, 1956 on a complaint made by the Securities and Exchange Board of
India. Indisputably, Appellant was named therein. He was, however, evading arrest.
He had gone to the United States. The learned Magistrate by an order dated
14.02.2005, on a prayer made in that behalf by the CBI, issued a non-bailable
warrant of arrest against him. Upon completion of investigation, a charge sheet was
submitted before the Magistrate in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the
Code. In the said charge sheet, name of the appellant appeared in Column No. 1
along with the said three companies. Name of one of the companies named in the
first information report, viz., M/s. DSQ Software Ltd., has been shown in Column
No. 2. In the said charge sheet, it was stated:

"Investigation has revealed that Sh. Dinesh

Dalmia, the then Managing Director & Custodian of properties, including shares, of
M/s. DSQ Software Ltd., fraudulently got dematerialized un- allotted and unlisted
share of DSQ Software Ltd. In the name of three entities namely New Vision
Investment Ltd., UK; Dinesh Dalmia Technology Trust and Dr. Suryanil Ghosh,
Trustee Softec Corporation and thereafter these shares were sold in the market and
the proceeds of sale of said shares were credited in the accounts of M/s. DSQ
Holdings Ltd., M/s. Hulda Properties and Trade Ltd. and M/s. Powerflow Holding
and Trading Pvt. Ltd. and thereby dishonestly misappropriated and
cheated investors including existing share holders and obtained undue gain to the
tune of Rs.

5,94,88,37,999/-.
Thus, Sh. Dinesh Dalmia has committed

fraudulent acts prima facie disclosing commission of offences of cheating, breach

of trust,forgery and using forged documents as genuine by getting wrongful gain in
the matter of partly paid shares. DSQ Software Ltd. in the name of New Vision

Investment Ltd., UK; unallotted shares in the name of Dinesh Dalmia Technology
Trust and "Dr.

Suryanil Ghosh Trustee Softec Corporation". M/s. DSQ Holdings Ltd., M/s. Hulda
Properties and Trades Ltd. and M/s. Powerflow Holding &

Trading Pvt Ltd have also committed offence of cheating in the matter of above
mentioned shares and the above facts disclose commission of

offences punishable U/s 409, 420, 468 and 471 IPC on the part of accused Sh.
Dinesh Dalmia (A- 1) and U/ 420 IPC on the part of accused

companies namely M/s DSQ Holdings Ltd (A-2)

represented by Sh. Dinesh Dalmia, Director, M/s. Hulda Properties & Trades Ltd (A-
3) represented by Sh Ashok Kumar Sharma, Director & M/s

Powerflow Holding & Trading Pvt Ltd (A-4)

represented by Sh Ashok Kumar Sharma, Director.

During investigation the allegations against DSQ Software Ltd could not be
substantiated and hence it is not being charge sheeted.

Accused Dinesh Dalmia is evading arrest

and has absconded to USA. He has not joined investigation. Ld. ACMM, Egmore
Chennai

issued an open ended non-bailable warrant of his arrest and a Red Corner Notice
(RCN) has been issued against him through INTERPOL for
locating him. His examination is necessary in this case as only he alone is aware of
the end use of the funds.

Further investigation on certain vital points including end use of the funds, foreign

investigation in the matter of genuineness of New Vision Investment Ltd and as

shown as its

authorized signatory, Sh. Hitendra Naik, in United Kingdom and other foreign
investigation are still continuing and after completion of the remaining investigation
the report of the same will be filed under section 173(8) Cr. PC in due course.

The questioned documents have been sent to

GEQD for expert opinion, it is still awaited. After being obtained, the same will be
submitted with additional list of documents.

The list of witnesses and list of documents

are enclosed herewith and additional list of documents & witnesses, if necessary, will
be submitted in due course.

It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble

court may be pleased to take cognizance of the offences, issue the process to secure
the presence of the accused and they may be tried according to law."

5. Although statements made by the witnesses under Section 161 of the Code
accompanied the charge sheet, the relevant documents could not be filed as they
were sent for examination before the Government Examiner of Questioned
Documents (GEQD). Cognizance was taken by the Magistrate on the said charge
sheet by an order dated 25.10.2005. It was specifically noted that non-bailable
warrant as against the appellant was still pending.

The CBI contended that the appellant entered into India illegally as no endorsement
had been made in his passport showing a valid travel undertaken by him. He was
produced before a Magistrate in Delhi for transit remand to Chennai. An order to
that effect was passed. On 14.02.2006, when he was produced before the concerned
Magistrate at Chennai, an order forpolice custody was prayed for and was granted
till 24.02.2006. Another application was filed for further police custody for four days
on 21.02.2006. An application was also filed seeking permission to conduct brain
mapping, polygraph test, on the appellant which was allowed.

6. Appellant had been handed over to the police for conducting investigation till
8.03.2006. He, however, was remanded to judicial custody till 14.03.2006 by an
order dated 9.03.2006. Allegedly, on the plea that further investigation was pending,
the CBI prayed for and obtained order of remand to judicial custody from the
learned Magistrate on 14.03.2006, 28.03.2006, 10.04.2006 and 28.04.2006. All the
applications were made purported to be under Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the
Code.

7. Appellant, on expiry of 60 days from the date of his arrest, filed an application for
statutory bail purported to be in terms of the proviso appended to Sub-section (2) of
Section 167 of the Code on the premise that no further charge sheet in respect of the
investigation under Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code has been filed. When
the said application was pending consideration, the CBI sought for his remand in
judicial custody under Sub-section (2) of Section 309 thereof.

The said application for statutory bail was rejected by the learned Magistrate
opining:

"Because, in this case, the petitioner was

arrested on the basis of Non-bailable warrant issued by this court, after taking
cognizance of the offences in charge sheet. Further, the respondent side has clearly
stated that before further

investigation commenced on 14.2.2006, the

petitioner was remanded to police custody, hence he was in the custody of the court
since his arrest on 12.2.2006. Therefore, after expiry of the police custody, the
petitioner should be remanded to judicial custody u/s 309(2) Cr. P.C. and not u/s
167(2) Cr.P.C. However, in this case, by mistake, provision of law under which the
petitioner was remanded to judicial custody was mentioned as Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.
in the remand report. In fact for remanding an accused in custody against whom
charge sheet has already been filed and an application for remand is not required.
Hence this court is inclined to state that the petitioner was remanded to police
custody u/s 167(2) Cr.P.C. and thereafter was remanded to judicial custody u/s 309
Cr.P.C."

The learned Magistrate further took note of the fact that two other cases have been
registered against him by the Calcutta Police.

8. A revision application filed by the appellant herein before the learned Sessions
Judge was allowed inter alia relying on or on the basis of the decision of this Court
in State Through CBI v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar and Others [(2000) 10 SCC 438]
stating:

"23. Taking into consideration of all these facts and circumstances of the case and
principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court I feel that in view of the
positive conduct of the respondent in relying upon Section 167(2) Cr. P.C. in all their
applications (up to the filing of the bail

application), the petitioner can also rely upon it and seek necessary orders
thereunder, that the respondent is now estopped from pleading

opposite to their own previous conduct and that Section 309(2) cannot be applied to
a person like the petitioner, who was arrested in the course of further investigation."

9. The CBI moved the High Court thereagainst. Its application was registered as Crl.
R.C. No. 1173 of 2006. The decision of the learned Sessions Judge was over-turned
by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment stating:

"Because of this interpretation the learned

Magistrate is empowered to give "Police custody". Once police custody is completed
the accused reverts back to judicial custody of post cognizance stage. Even if further
investigation continues as far as such accused are concerned scope of section 167
comes to an end. "Subject to fulfillment of the requirement and the limitation of
Section 167" only refers to the investigation during "police custody" especially when
an accused is in remand under Section 167. When further investigation keeping him
in police custody during post

cognizance stage is completed, the remand of an accused is only governed under

Section 309

Cr.P.C. Under such circumstances, invoking of proviso to section 167 and demand
for a

benevolent provision is inapplicable to such accused.

27. The object of enactment of such proviso in Section 167 Cr. P.C. is to have control
over a lethargic, delayed investigation, especially keeping a person in custody. It is a
specific direction to the police to collect material without any delay. If sufficient
incriminating materials are not collected against the accused with the crime alleged.
It safeguards the interest of such accused person. If materials are collected and
reported to the

Magistrate within the period stipulated by filing charge sheet, then the scope of
proviso to section 167 extinguishes and an accused can claim bail only on merit.

28. In the instant case most of the materials have been collected. The materials to
connect the accused with the crime is already available. Final conclusion also was
reached and charge sheet filed. However, custodial interrogation of the accused felt
necessary. Such interrogation

entrusting him in police custody was done between 12.02.2006 and 27.02.2006
cognizance of the case was taken much earlier on 25.10.2005. Only for custodial
interrogation he was entrusted under Section 167 to the CBI. Section 167 Cr.P.C. can
be invoked only for such purpose in a post
cognizance case. Otherwise a remand must be made only under Section 309 Cr.P.C.
If a wrong provision is quoted for further remand under section 167 Cr.P.C. instead
of 309 one cannot claim the benefit of a benevolent proviso to section

167. Proviso to section 167 is available only to safeguard an innocent person or a

person against whom no materials collected in spite of detaining him for 60/90 days.
In the instant case abundant materials have been already collected and final report
filed. Two years after the cognizance he was apprehended. He was entrusted with
police custody only for custodial interrogation. Further investigation may be pending
to comply with other formalities. There may be delay to receive opinion from experts
and such delay cannot be taken

advantage of by invoking the proviso to section 167 Cr.P.C."

10. Appellant is, thus, before us.

11. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant,
has raised two contentions before us:

(i) The charge sheet filed against the appellant and cognizance taken thereupon is
illegal and invalid and by reason thereof, a valuable right of the appellant to be
released on bail has been taken away. (ii) Even if the charge sheet is legal, the right
of the appellant under Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code continued to
remain available in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Elaborating his submission, Mr. Rohatgi urged that a police report must strictly
conform to the requirements laid down under Section 173 of the Code and the
prescribed form for submission of the final form wherefrom it would be evident that
no charge sheet can be filed upon purported completion of investigation against the
appellant as he had been absconding. As the CBI kept investigation as against the
appellant open, as would appear from the charge sheet itself as also the prayers
made and granted by the learned Magistrate which is permissible only under Sub-
section (2) of Section 167 of the Code, no chargesheet in law can be said to have been
filed so far as the appellant was concerned. The CBI moreover itself proceeded on
the basis that the investigation against the appellant had been pending and only in
that view of the matter applications for remand were filed under Sub-section (2) of
Section 167 of the Code. It was contended that only when the appellant applied for
grant of statutory bail, the CBI changed its stand and filed an application for remand
under Sub- section (2) of Section 309 of the Code.

12. Mr. Amarendra Sharan, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf
of the CBI, on the other hand, would submit that a charge sheet having been
submitted before the Court and cognizance having been taken on the basis thereof,
the only provision applicable for remand of the accused would be Sub-section (2) of
Section 309 of the Code and, thus, even if a wrong provision has been mentioned by
CBI in their applications for remand, the same by itself would not render the order of
the Court invalid in law.

In this case the CBI took a conscious decision to file charge sheet against the
appellant. His name was shown in Column No. 1 thereof although he was
absconding. It was found that a case for trial has been made out. There were five
accused against whom allegations were made by the complainant. One of the
companies was not sent for trial as nothing was found against it. All the other
accused named in the first information report had been sent for trial.

14. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence. The said power can be
exercised only under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code. The learned Magistrate noticed
the fact, while taking cognizance of the offence, that the appellant had been
absconding and a non-bailable warrant of arrest had been issued against him.

Whereas the charge sheet was submitted on 24.10.2005, the appellant was arrested
only on 12.02.2006. According to Mr. Sharan, the additional documents were filed
on 20.01.2006.

15. A charge sheet is a final report within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section
173 of the Code. It is filed so as to enable the court concerned to apply its mind as to
whether cognizance of the offence thereupon should be taken or not. The report is
ordinarily filed in the form prescribed therefor. One of the requirements for
submission of a police report is whether any offence appears to have been committed
and, if so, by whom. In some cases, the accused having not been arrested, the
investigation against him may not be complete. There may not be sufficient material
for arriving at a decision that the absconding accused is also a person by whom the
offence appears to have been committed. If the investigating officer finds sufficient
evidence even against such an accused who had been absconding, in our opinion, law
does not require that filing of the charge sheet must await the arrest of the accused.

16. Indisputably, the power of the investigating officer to make a prayer for making
further investigation in terms of Sub-section (8) of Section 173 is not taken away
only because a charge sheet under Sub-section (2) thereof has been filed. A further
investigation is permissible even if order of cognizance of offence has been taken by
the Magistrate.

17. We may notice that a Constitution Bench of this Court in K. Veeraswami v. Union
of India and Others [(1991) 3 SCC 655] stated the law in the following terms :

"76As observed by this Court in Satya Narain Musadi v. State of Bihar that the
statutory

requirement of the report under Section 173(2) would be complied with if the
various details prescribed therein are included in the report. This report is an
intimation to the magistrate that upon investigation into a cognizable offence the

investigating officer has been able to procure sufficient evidence for the Court to
inquire into the offence and the necessary information is being sent to the Court. In
fact, the report under Section 173(2) purports to be an opinion of the

investigating officer that as far as he is concerned he has been able to procure

sufficient material for the trial of the accused by the Court. The report is complete if
it is accompanied with all the

documents and statements of witnesses as required by Section 175(5). Nothing more

need be stated in the report of the Investigating Officer. It is also not necessary that
all the details of the offence must be stated. The details of the offence are required to
be proved to bring home the guilt to the accused at a later stage i.e. in the course of
the trial of the case by adducing acceptable evidence.

18. It is true that ordinarily all documents accompany the charge sheet. But, in this
case, some documents could not be filed which were not in the possession of the CBI
and the same were with the GEQD. As indicated hereinbefore, the said documents
are said to have been filed on 20.01.2006 whereas the appellant was arrested on
12.02.2006. Appellant does not contend that he has been prejudiced by not filing of
such documents with the charge sheet. No such plea in fact had been taken. Even if
all the documents had not been filed, by reason thereof submission of charge sheet
itself does not become vitiated in law. The charge sheet has been acted upon as an
order of cognizance had been passed on the basis thereof. Appellant has not
questioned the said order taking cognizance of the offence. Validity of the said
charge sheet is also not in question.

Application of Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code vis-`-vis Sub-section (2) of
Section 309 must be considered having regard to the aforementioned factual and
legal backdrop in mind.

19. Concededly, the investigating agency is required to complete investigation within

a reasonable time. The ideal period therefor would be 24 hours, but, in some cases, it
may not be practically possible to do so. The Parliament, therefore, thought it fit that
remand of the accused can be sought for in the event investigation is not completed
within 60 or 90 days, as the case may be. But, if the same is not done with the
stipulated period, the same would not be detrimental to the accused and, thus, he,
on the expiry thereof would be entitled to apply for bail, subject to fulfilling the
conditions prescribed therefor.

Such a right of bail although is a valuable right but the same is a conditional one; the
condition precedent being pendency of the investigation. Whether an investigation
in fact has remained pending and the investigating officer has submitted the charge
sheet only with a view to curtail the right of the accused would essentially be a
question of fact. Such a question strictly does not arise in this case inasmuch as,
according to the CBI, sufficient materials are already available for prosecution of the
appellant. According to it, further investigation would be inter alia necessary on
certain vital points including end use of the funds.

20. Apart from the appellant, three companies, registered and incorporated under
the Companies Act, have been shown as accused in the charge sheet. It was,
therefore, not necessary for the CBI to file a charge sheet so as to curtail the right of
the accused to obtain bail. It is, therefore, not a case where by reason of such
submission of charge sheet the appellant has been prejudiced in any manner
whatsoever.

21. It is also not a case of the appellant that he had been arrested in course of further
investigation. A warrant of arrest had already been issued against him. The learned
Magistrate was conscious of the said fact while taking cognizance of the offence.

It is now well settled that the court takes cognizance of an offence and not the
offender. [See Anil Saran v. State of Bihar and another (1995) 6 SCC 142 and Popular
Muthiah v. State represented by Inspector of Police (2006) 7 SCC 296]

22. The power of a court to direct remand of an accused either in terms of Sub-
section (2) of Section 167 of the Code or Sub-section (2) of Section 309 thereof will
depend on the stages of the trial. Whereas Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code
would be attracted in a case where cognizance has not been taken, Sub-section (2) of
Section 309 of the Code would be attracted only after cognizance has been taken.

23. If submission of Mr. Rohatgi is to be accepted, the Magistrate was not only
required to declare the charge sheet illegal, he was also required to recall his own
order of taking cognizance. Ordinarily, he could not have done so. [See Adalat
Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal and Ors. (2004) 7 SCC 338, Subramanium Sethuraman v.
State of Maharashtra and Anr. 2004 (8) SCALE 733 andEverest Advertising Pvt. Ltd.
v. State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Ors. JT 2007 (5) SC529] It is also well-settled
that if a thing cannot be done directly, the same cannot be permitted to be done
indirectly. If the order taking cognizance exists, irrespective of the conduct of the
CBI in treating the investigation to be open or filing applications for remand of the
accused to police custody or judicial remand under Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of
the Code stating that the further investigation was pending, would be of no
consequence if in effect and substance such orders were being passed by the Court in
exercise of its power under Sub-section (2) of Section 309 of the Code.

24. We, however, have no words to deprecate the stand of the CBI. It should have
taken a clear and categorical stand in the matter.

We, however, are proceeding on the basis that irrespective of the stand taken by the
CBI, law will prevail. We may notice the law operating in the field in this behalf.

25. In support of the submission in regard to interpretation of Sub-section (2) of

Section 167 and Sub-section (2) of Section 309 of the Code, strong reliance has been
placed by Mr. Rohatgi on Central Bureau of Investigation, Special Investigation Cell
I, New Delhi v. Anupam J. Kulkarni [(1992) 3 SCC 141] and Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar
(supra).

In Anupam J. Kulkarni (supra), the question which inter alia arose for consideration
of this Court was as to whether the period of remand ordered by an Executive
Magistrate in terms of Section 57 of the Code should be computed for the purpose of
Sub-section (2) of Section 167 thereof. This Court, keeping in view the provisions of
Clause (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India, answered the question in the
affirmative. It was held that a total period of remand during investigation is fifteen
days. In that context, this Court observed:

"However, taking into account the difficulties which may arise in completion of the
investigation of cases of serious nature the legislature added the proviso providing
for further detention of the accused for a period of ninety days but in clear terms it is
mentioned in the proviso that such detention could only be in the judicial custody.
During this period the police are expected to complete the investigation even in
serious cases. Likewise within the period of sixty days they are expected to complete
the investigation in respect of other offences. The legislature however

disfavoured even the prolonged judicial custody during investigation. That is why
the proviso lays down that on the expiry of ninety days or sixty days the accused shall
be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail"
In regard to the question as to whether such an order of remand would be
permissible in law when an accused is wanted in different cases, the answer was
again rendered in affirmative. We are not faced with such a problem in the instant
case.

26. In Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar (supra), this Court held:

"11. There cannot be any manner of doubt that the remand and the custody referred
to in the first proviso to the above sub-section are different from detention in
custody under Section 167. While remand under the former relates to a stage after
cognizance and can only be to judicial custody, detention under the latter relates to
the stage of investigation and can initially be either in police custody or judicial
custody. Since, however, even after cognizance is taken of an offence the police has a
power to investigate into it further, which can be exercised only in accordance with
Chapter XII, we see no reason whatsoever why the provisions of Section 167 thereof
would not apply to a person who comes to be later arrested by the police in course of
such investigation. If Section 309(2) is to be interpreted - as has been interpreted by
the Bombay High Court in Mansuri (supra) - to mean that after the Court takes
cognizance of an offence it cannot exercise its power of detention in police custody
under Section 167 of the Code, the

Investigating Agency would be deprived of an opportunity to interrogate a person

arrested during further investigation, even if it can on production of sufficient
materials, convince the Court that his detention in its (police) custody was essential
for that purpose. We are therefore of the opinion that the words "accused if in
custody" appearing in Section 309(2) refer and relate to an accused who was before
the Court when cognizance was taken or when enquiry or trial was being held in
respect of him and not to an accused who is subsequently arrested in course of
further investigation. So far as the accused in the first category is concerned he can
be remanded to judicial custody only in view of Section 309(2), but he who comes
under the second category will be governed by Section 167 so long as further
investigation continues. That necessarily means that in respect of the latter the Court
which had taken cognizance of the offence may exercise its power to detain him in
police custody, subject to the fulfilment of the
requirements and the limitation of Section 167."

27. We had noticed the dicta of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court. At
this juncture, we may notice the dicta laid down by this Court in Sanjay Dutt v. State
Through C.B.I. Bombay (II)[(1994) 5 SCC 410] wherein it was held:

"53(2)(b) The 'indefeasible right' of the accused to be released on bail in accordance

with Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act read with Section

167(2) of the CrPC in default of completion of the investigation and filing of the
challan within the time allowed, as held in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is a right which
enures to, and is enforceable by the accused only from the time of default till the
filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan
being filed. If the accused applies for bail under this provision on expiry of the period
of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on
bail forthwith. The accused, so

released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to the

provisions of the CrPC. The right of the accused to be released on bail after filing of
the challan, notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time allowed, is
governed from the time of filing of the challan only by the provisions relating to the
grant of bail applicable at that stage."

28. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation of statute that it is to be read in its

entirety. Construction of a statute should be made in a manner so as to give effect to
all the provisions thereof. Remand of an accused is contemplated by the Parliament
at two stages; pre-cognizance and post cognizance. Even in the same case depending
upon the nature of charge sheet filed by the investigating officer in terms of Section
173 of the Code, a cognizance may be taken as against the person against whom an
offence is said to have been made out and against whom no such offence has been
made out even when investigation is pending. So long a charge sheet is not filed
within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code, investigation
remains pending. It, however, does not preclude an investigating officer, as noticed
hereinbefore, to carry on further investigation despite filing of a police report, in
terms of Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code.

29. The statutory scheme does not lead to a conclusion in regard to an investigation
leading to filing of final form under Sub-section (2) of Section 173 and further
investigation contemplated under Sub-section (8) thereof. Whereas only when a
charge sheet is not filed and investigation is kept pending, benefit of proviso
appended to Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code would be available to an
offender; once, however, a charge sheet is filed, the said right ceases. Such a right
does not revive only because a further investigation remains pending within the
meaning of Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code.

30. The High Court, in our opinion, is correct in its finding that, in the fact situation
obtaining, the appellant had no statutory right to be released on bail.

31. We do not, thus, find any infirmity in the judgment of the High Court.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.