1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 vs.

13 14 15 16 17 This case is on remand from the Federal Circuit for a new trial on damages for MICROSOFT CORPORATION, Defendant. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Plaintiff, CASE NO. 07-CV-2000 H (CAB) ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MICROSOFTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL WITH A REMITTITUR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

18 Microsofts infringement of claims 19 and 21 of U.S. Patent Number 4,763,356 (Day 19 patent). See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 20 The first jury returned a finding of infringement and validity of the Day patent, and Microsoft 21 appealed the verdict and damages award. See id. The Federal Circuit affirmed the jurys 22 verdict on the infringement and validity of the Day patent, but remanded the case for a new 23 trial on damages. Id. 24 On July 29, 2011, the jury returned a verdict of $70 million as the lump-sum reasonable

25 royalty for Microsofts infringement of the Day patent for Microsoft Outlook (versions 2000, 26 2002, and 2003); Microsoft Money (versions 2000 through 2006); and Windows Mobile 27 (versions Pocket PC 2000, 2002, and 2003, Windows Mobile 2003, and Windows Mobile 5). 28 (Doc. No. 1383.) On July 29, 2011, this Court issued judgment in favor of Lucent against
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1 Microsoft in the amount of $70 million. (Doc. No. 1387.) 2 On August 26, 2011, Microsoft filed a motion for a new trial (Doc. No. 1434) and a

3 post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law (Doc. No. 1433).1 On September 27, 2011, 4 Lucent filed a response in opposition to Microsofts motion for a new trial and post-trial 5 motion for judgment as a matter of law. (Doc. Nos. 1451 & 1454.) On October 4, 2011, 6 Microsoft filed its reply. (Doc. Nos. 1457 & 1458.) 7 On October 12, 2011, the Court held a hearing on these post-trial motions. Luke

8 Dauchot, Jeanne Heffernan, and Ryan Kane appeared for Plaintiff Lucent. Roger Denning, 9 Michael Florey, Francis Albert, and Craig Countryman appeared for Defendant Microsoft. 10 The Court compliments the attorneys and trial counsel for their excellent advocacy in this case. 11 After due consideration, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion for The Court also

12 judgment as a matter of law and enters judgment of $26.3 million.

13 conditionally grants in part and denies in part the motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of 14 Civil Procedure 50(c), with a remittitur of $26.3 million. 15 I. Background 16 This case illustrates the difficulty of properly valuing a small patented component,

17 without a stand-alone market, within a larger program. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324; Uniloc 18 U.S.A., Inc. v. Microsoft, 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011); ResQNet.com Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 19 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 20 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 21 Microsofts popular Outlook product infringes claims 19 and 21 of the Day patent.

22 Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1321; (PX-1 at 17:27-18:14, 18:19-22.) Specifically, the date-picker 23 permits users to calendar appointments by clicking on a calendar and populating the field with 24 the resulting date. The Day patents technology is included in 109.3 million Office suite 25 (Office) licenses and in 241,800 stand-alone Outlook products, for a total of 109.5 million 26 During trial, Microsoft filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of 27 Lucents case (Doc. No. 1369) and Microsoft filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all evidence. (Doc. No. 1377.) During trial, Lucent filed its opposition to these 28 motions. (Doc. Nos. 1371 & 1381.) The Court submitted these motions. (Doc. No. 1422.)
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1 licenses during the relevant period from January 13, 2003 to December 11, 2006.2 2 Additionally, Microsoft Money and Windows Mobile infringe the Day patent, but the vast 3 majority of the claimed damages relate to the 109.3 million Office licenses. 4 In a trial for damages for patent infringement, a prevailing party deserves damages

5 adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty 6 for the use made of the invention by the infringed. 35 U.S.C. 284 (2006). The parties 7 dispute whether the jury had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to award $70 million for the 8 infringement as a lump-sum royalty. Microsoft argues that Lucent failed to provide the jury 9 with a properly-apportioned damages calculation in violation of the entire market value rule. 10 (Doc. Nos. 1434 & 1433.) Lucent responds that it properly apportioned between the patented 11 features and unpatented features under the relevant Georgia-Pacific factors without relying on 12 the entire market value rule. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 13 To support its claim of damages, Lucent called Bruce Tognazzini, a well-recognized

14 technical expert; Dr. Deborah Jay, a survey expert sought by both sides for her renowned 15 expertise in probability surveys; Raymond Sims, an economic expert; Stephen Samuels, Bruce 16 Schneider, and Roger Stricker, Lucents licensing witnesses; and adverse witness, William 17 Kennedy, a Microsoft executive. Microsoft strategically elected to put Lucent to its burden 18 of proof. In so doing, Microsoft declined to call its survey expert, a licensing witness, or an 19 economist to evaluate damages. Instead, Microsoft called a professor of negotiation theory, 20 Robert Mnookin, and Microsoft executives William Kennedy and Jensen Harris. The jury, 21 after evaluating the credibility of witnesses, agreed with Lucent and rejected Microsofts 22 arguments and biased witness testimony in reaching its valuation of $70 million. 23 II. Microsofts Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law 24 25 26 27 The Court again rejects Microsofts challenge under Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.Ct. 2060 (2011), to the notice period as it did not preserve this issue on appeal 28 and on the merits. (See Doc. No. 1304.)
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A. Legal Standards for Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law A jury verdict can be overturned and a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law

1 granted only if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the 2 verdict. In other words, the motion should be granted only if there is no legally sufficient 3 basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue. Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. 4 Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001). In ruling on a motion for judgment 5 as a matter of law, the district court is not to make credibility determinations or weigh the 6 evidence. Id. The district court must accept the jurys credibility findings consistent with 7 the verdict. Id. 8 For the motion, the district court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

9 the non-moving party and draw all reasonable evidentiary inferences in favor of the 10 non-moving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); 11 Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court must uphold a jurys 12 verdict even if the record contains evidence that might support a contrary conclusion to the 13 jurys verdict. Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). The district court must 14 disregard evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. 15 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150-51; Pavao, 307 F.3d at 918; Winarto, 274 F.3d at 1283, 1286-87 16 (district court must accept the jurys credibility findings consistent with the verdict and 17 disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe 18 because [w]hen two sets of inferences find support in the record, the inferences that support 19 the jurys verdict of course win the day.). 20 On post-trial JMOL motions, district court judges must scrutinize the evidence

21 carefully to ensure that the substantial evidence standard is satisfied. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 22 1336. Although a reasonable royalty analysis necessarily involves an element of

23 approximation and uncertainty, Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 (Fed. 24 Cir. 1995), the damages cannot stand if any part of the calculation leading to it was 25 unsupported or contrary to law. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1317, 1321. Beginning from a 26 fundamentally flawed premise and adjusting it based on legitimate considerations specific to 27 the facts of the case nevertheless results in a fundamentally flawed conclusion. Id. at 1317. 28 Moreover, when an accused device includes patented and unpatented features, as in this case
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1 for the Day patent, the patentee ... must in every case give evidence tending to separate or 2 apportion the defendants profits and the patentees damages between the patented feature and 3 the unpatented features, and such evidence must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural 4 or speculative, or show that the entire value of the whole machine, as a marketable article, 5 is properly and legally attributable to the patented feature. Uniloc, 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 6 (citing Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884)); see also Lucent, 580 F.3d at 133637. 7 For minor patent improvements, a patentee cannot justify using the entire market value of an 8 accused product simply by asserting a low enough royalty rate. Uniloc, 632 F.3d 1292, 1320. 9 If the plaintiff, as in this case, cannot meet the entire market value rule, the plaintiff must 10 apportion between the patented and unpatented features. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318. 11 12 B. Lucents Damages Calculation Microsoft challenges the jurys $70 million verdict. (Doc. No. 1434-1 at 1.)

13 Significantly, Microsoft argues that Lucent presented no evidence, much less substantial 14 evidence, that could have led a reasonable jury to conclude that Microsoft would have lost $67 15 in revenue for any fraction of the 109 million licenses to Office if Outlook did not include the 16 date-picker. (Id.) Specifically, Microsoft argues that Lucent failed to provide the jury with 17 a properly-apportioned damages calculation for Outlook based on reliable expert methodology 18 as required by the Federal Circuit and this Courts previous rulings. (See Doc. No. 1323, 19 Courts Motion in Limine Order, at 9-10; Uniloc, 632 F.3d 1292.) 20 Lucent refers to the entire record at trial and the jurys credibility determinations in

21 support of the jurys damage award. Further, Lucent emphasizes that this is a reasonable 22 royalty case based on the outcome of a hypothetical negotiation for a lump-sum, not a lost 23 profits case. (Doc. No. 1451 at 1.) 24 A lump-sum license is an upfront, paid-in-full royalty. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1326. A

25 lump-sum royalty benefits the licensor by raising a substantial amount of money quickly. Id. 26 On the other hand, a lump-sum royalty benefits the licensee by allowing it to use the patented 27 technology without any concerns of further expenditure. Id. Furthermore, a lump-sum royalty 28 removes the inherent risk of under-reporting the actual usage of the patented technology by the
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1 licensee, and eliminates administrative burden of having to monitor usage. Id. A lump-sum 2 royalty also eliminates any ability for the licensee to reevaluate the value of the patented 3 technology. The licensee agrees to pay the lump-sum royalty regardless of whether the 4 patented technology is successful or even used. Id. 5 A lump-sum royalty may also create risks. If either party incorrectly forecasts the use

6 of the patented feature, a licensee may end up paying a lump-sum far in excess of what the 7 patented invention is later shown to be worth or a licensor may end up accepting a lump-sum 8 that is far less than what the patented invention is later shown to be worth. Id. The licensee 9 may also consider its risk of not including the patented invention in its product under Georgia10 Pacific. 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 11 During a hypothetical negotiation for a lump-sum royalty figure, the parties may

12 consider the expected or estimated usage of the patented invention. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 13 1327. Generally, a frequently used invention is more valuable and commands a higher 14 lump-sum royalty. Id. Conversely, a minimally used feature commands a lower lump-sum 15 payment. The lump-sum analysis does not require the parties to precisely calculate the use of 16 the patented feature, unlike a running royalty license. In a typical running royalty, the license 17 is tied to the use of the patented feature standing alone or incorporated into other products. In 18 a lump-sum calculation, the parties agree on a fully paid up amount based on expected or 19 estimated usage. Id. at 1327. 20 Here, Lucent sought a lump-sum royalty based on its Georgia-Pacific analysis and the

21 business risk to Microsoft from not including the Day patent technology in its products. 22 Lucent properly points out that its evidentiary burden to show a lump-sum reasonable royalty 23 under Georgia-Pacific was to present sufficient evidence regarding the outcome of a 24 hypothetical negotiation based on competing positions about the value of the Day patent 25 technology to Microsoft. (Id.) 26 Lucents $70 million figure considered an expected financial impact to Microsoft

27 without the Day patent technology in Outlook. (R. Tr. at III-244:13-257:4; IV-5:22-32:19.) 28 It is undisputed that Microsoft sold 109.3 million Outlook licenses within Office during the
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1 damages period. (R. Tr. at IV-160:4-8.) Mr. Raymond Sims (Mr. Sims), Lucents economic 2 expert, included the 109.3 million Office licenses in his analysis, along with 241,800 licenses 3 for Outlook sold on a stand-alone basis, for a total of 109.5 million licenses. (Id.; see also R. 4 Tr. at IV-15:4-16:12.) 5 Mr. Sims then multiplied the 109.5 million total Outlook licenses by 3% to obtain the

6 number of license sales Microsoft would potentially lose if the Day patent technology was not 7 included in Outlook. The result is a risk of loss of up to 3.3 million license sales. (R. Tr. at IV8 14:16-15:3.) He arrived at the 3% figure using data generated by a survey conducted by 9 Lucents expert Dr. Deborah Jay (Dr. Jay). (R. Tr. at IV-11:20-16:12.) Dr. Jays survey 10 results showed that 7% of Outlook purchase-decision makers that use the drop-down calendar 11 feature would not have bought Outlook if it lacked the drop-down calendar. (R. Tr. at II-66:2412 67:7, 153:11-19,118:10-119; PX-1012; PX-1616.) Mr. Sims multiplied the 7% by the 13 percentage of all Outlook users who use the drop-down calendar43%to arrive at 3%. (R. 14 Tr. at IV-10:6-14:15; Doc. No. 1454-3 at 33-37, 43-46 (RS11-RS15, RS21-RS24).) Dr. Jay 15 agreed with Mr. Sims calculation of the 3% figure. (R. Tr. at II-159:7-160:21; Doc. No. 145416 3 at 523 (DJ34).) This evidentiary record supports the conclusion that Microsoft would face 17 a potential loss of 3.3 million licenses at the hypothetical negotiation if Microsoft did not 18 include the Day patent technology in Outlook. 19 Mr. Sims next step was to calculate a hypothetical revenue loss associated with selling

20 3.3 million fewer licenses of Outlook. Mr. Sims testified that Microsofts average per-unit 21 revenue is $67 from sales of stand-alone Outlook. (R. Tr. at IV-167:23-168:4.) Mr. Sims also 22 testified that Microsofts average per-unit revenue from sales of Office that includes Outlook 23 is $98.19. (R. Tr. at IV-166:13-167:4.) Based on the testimony of Microsofts Rule 30(b)(6) 24 witness on the subject, Mr. Sims testified that Microsoft does not attribute revenue received 25 from sales of Office to the individual programs within Office. (R. Tr. at III-186:14-189:10; IV26 17:5-18:1.) As a result, Mr. Sims used a $67 stand-alone value of Outlook as a proxy for the 27 value of Outlook sold as part of Office. 28
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Mr. Sims testified that his use of $67 as the value for Outlook sold as part of Office was

2 corroborated by a 2010 Microsoft pricing document. The internal document showed that the 3 difference in retail prices between Office with Outlook ($279.99) and Office without Outlook 4 ($149.99) was $130, roughly the retail price of stand-alone Outlook at that time ($139.99). 5 (PX-1895; R. Tr. at IV-167:23-169:5, 174:6-175:7, 181:10-182:9.) 6 Mr. Sims also testified that use of $67 as the value of Outlook within Office was

7 appropriate based on internal Microsoft documents showing that Microsoft Outlook is the most 8 frequently used Office application by far. (PX-838; R. Tr. at III-218:21-219:23; R. Tr. at IV9 163:14-164:15.) Mr. Sims testified that he reviewed internal Microsoft records concerning use 10 of the calendar feature within Outlook and Office. (Id.) An internal Microsoft presentation 11 states 83% of respondents use Outlooks calendar to manage their work

12 appointments/events/meetings. In another internal Microsoft survey, Microsoft listed several 13 calendar based tasks as high-impact, noting that 90% of the respondents used calendar 14 features, 84% set up new appointments or meetings, and 79% forwarded or changed meeting 15 requests. (Doc. No. 1399, PX-838.) Therefore, Mr. Sims multiplied the 3.3 million licenses 16 for Office and Outlook by $67 to arrive at his opinion that Microsoft would have potentially lost 17 $221.4 million in revenue if it did not include the Day patent technology in Outlook. (R. Tr. at 18 IV-16:14-18:1, 167:23-168:13, 172:7-10.) The Court also dismisses Microsofts claim that only 19 50% of Office licenses infringe. That testimony came from a biased Microsoft employee that 20 both the jury and the Court reject as not credible. 21 Mr. Sims next multiplied the $221.4 million by Microsofts uncontested 76.2% division-

22 wide profit margin and, after performing a similar calculation for Money, discounted the total 23 expected forgone profit to 2003 to yield a total of $138.7 million.3 (R. Tr. at IV-18:3-14, 24 22:13-28:10.) 25 26 The Court finds no legal error in Lucents calculations for Microsoft Money and 27 Microsoft Mobile/Pocket PC, but these figures are insignificant compared to the Outlook numbers in the damages calculation. 28
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Mr. Sims also performed an analysis of time savings to consumers by using the Day

2 patent technology over other methods in Microsofts three infringing products. Based on 3 internal Microsoft documents, Mr. Sims testified that Microsoft values the time saved by its 4 consumers. (R. Tr. at IV-33:7-38:9, 40:156-41:8, 53:11-54:2; PX-1000; PX-1048; PX-1889.) 5 Mr. Bruce Tognazzini, Lucents technical expert, and Mr. Sims testified to the amount of time 6 a person saves when using the Day patent technology compared to other methods. (R. Tr. at 7 IV-42:2-17, 54:7-55:8; I-197:20-200:20.) Based on internal Microsoft documents, Mr. Sims 8 determined the number of events over the life of a product where a user can save time by using 9 the infringing technology to schedule appointments. (R. Tr. at IV-44:3-47:2, 48:23-49:6; Doc. 10 No. 1451-4 at 543-547 (RS34-RS37, RS40); PX-829.) Mr. Sims monetized the time by using 11 $12.09, the average per-hour wage in 1996 for workers at the time of the hypothetical 12 negotiation. (R. Tr. at IV-48:2-49:19.) Finally, Mr. Sims testified that he took the number of 13 licenses sold during the infringement period and reduced the number of licenses to account for 14 the users of the Day patent technology. (Id.) Mr. Sims performed the same analysis for Money 15 and Pocket PC, discounted the total amount to 2003, and concluded that the time savings value 16 to the consumer is $170 million. (R. Tr. at IV-49:25-53:10.) 17 Mr. Sims next opined on the outcome of the Georgia-Pacific hypothetical negotiation.

18 This hypothetical negotiation tries to recreate the ex ante licensing negotiation 19 scenario[i]n other words, if infringement had not occurred, willing parties would have 20 executed a license agreement specifying a certain royalty payment scheme. Lucent, 580 F.3d 21 at 1324-25. In evaluating the hypothetical negotiation, the parties often apply the

22 Georgia-Pacific framework. 23 The fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors include: (1) established royalty rate for the patent;

24 (2) license rates paid for comparable patents; (3) type of license (exclusive/non-exclusive or 25 restricted/non-restricted); (4) licensors established licensing policies; (5) competitive 26 relationship between licensor and licensee; (6) convoyed sales; (7) duration and terms of the 27 license; (8) commercial success and established profitability; (9) advantages over old methods; 28 (10) nature of patented invention and benefits to those that use it; (11) extent of use of the
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1 patent by the infringer; (12) customary industry rate for invention or analogous inventions; (13) 2 portion of profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from nonpatented 3 elements, manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features added by the infringer; 4 (14) opinion testimony of qualified experts; and (15) amount that licensor and licensee would 5 have agreed upon. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. In Uniloc, the Federal Circuit 6 explicitly sanction[s] the use of the Georgia-Pacific factors to frame the reasonable royalty 7 inquiry. 632 F.3d at 1317. Those factors properly tie the reasonable royalty calculation to 8 the facts of the hypothetical negotiation at issue. Id. Mr. Sims testimony concerning the 9 applicable Georgia-Pacific factors was proper as was the Courts instruction to the jury on the 10 factors. 11 Mr. Sims reviewed the survey results, expected foregone profits, value of time savings

12 to consumers, documents reflecting the qualitative value of the patented technology, Lucents 13 licensing policy, and the parties respective bargaining positions. He concluded that, during the 14 hypothetical negotiation, Microsoft and Lucent would choose a lump-sum license payment 15 closer to $138.7 million than to zero based on the applicable Georgia-Pacific factors. (R. Tr. 16 at IV-91:2-13; see also R. Tr. at IV-90:19-91:13, 94:11-19.) 17 Mr. Sims also examined the hypothetical negotiation using a business realities approach.4

18 This approach takes into account the parties various interests and alternatives to reaching an 19 agreement. Mr. Sims testified that Microsoft would consider that it would be at risk for 20 potentially losing $138.7 million dollars if it did not reach an agreement with Lucent. (R. Tr. 21 at IV-91:17-95:24.) Microsofts competitor to Outlook, Lotus Notes, included the Day patent 22 technology. (R. Tr. at III-250:10-13.) He also testified that while Microsoft would attempt to 23 Mr. Sims business realities approach is somewhat similar to Microsofts expert 24 Professor Mnookins testimony concerning the interests of the parties in a hypothetical negotiation but with different conclusions. Professor Mnookin referred to one of the parties 25 interests as a BATNA, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement and a reservation price. Professor Mnookin acknowledged that the parties will come to an agreement if there is overlap 26 in the zone of potential agreement. Microsoft acknowledged that Professor Mnookins methodology is based on well-established negotiation theories that are widely accepted. (Doc. 27 No. 1257 at 6.) The jury soundly rejected Professor Mnookins conclusionsnot his methodology about negotiationsbecause there was no credible evidence to support 28 Microsofts licensing value of $2 to $5 million.
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1 pay the lowest amount it could for a license to the Day patent, Lucent would seek a royalty as 2 close to $138.7 million as possible to preserve the value of its intellectual property portfolio. 3 (Id.) Based on his apportionment, the Georgia-Pacific factors, and business realities, Mr. Sims 4 testified that a conservative lump-sum royalty would be $70 million. (R. Tr. at IV-95:5-96:6, 5 94:13-16.) The jury agreed. The issue is whether the jurys verdict is supported by legally 6 sufficient substantial evidence. Winarto, 274 F.3d at 1283. 7 8 9 The Court next evaluates whether the trial record supports a legally sufficient basis of C. The Court Advised Lucent that it Needed to Properly Apportion the Value of the Day Patent

10 apportionment between the patented and unpatented features of the Day patented technology 11 within Outlook and Office as required by the Federal Circuit and this Courts previous rulings. 12 (See Doc. No. 1323, Courts Motion in Limine Order, at 9-10; Uniloc, 632 F.3d 1292.) 13 Lucent is entitled to a reasonable royalty for Microsofts infringement of the Day patent.

14 See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324; see also 35 U.S.C. 284 (2006). A reasonable royalty is the 15 floor below which damages shall not fall. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324. The amount of damages 16 based on a reasonable royalty is an issue of fact for the jury. Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 17 317 F.3d 1387, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 2003). A jurys award is entitled to deference. Monsanto Co. 18 v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In damages cases, courts should resolve any 19 doubts about the amount . . . against the infringer. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 20 1293, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In measuring damages, Lucent conceded that it cannot show that 21 the Day patent technologythe date-pickeris the basis for consumer demand of Outlook or 22 Office. Therefore, Lucent cannot meet the entire market value rule. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318. 23 The entire market value rule allows a patentee to assess damages based on the entire

24 market value of the accused product only where the patented feature creates the basis for 25 customer demand or substantially create[s] the value of the component parts, Uniloc, 632 26 F.3d at 1318 (citing Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336; Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 27 1538, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1995)), or where the patented feature was of such paramount 28 importance that it substantially created the value of the component parts. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d
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1 at 1549. Application of the entire market value rule requires adequate proof of three conditions: 2 (1) the infringing components must be the basis for customer demand for the entire machine 3 including the parts beyond the claimed invention, Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 4 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1997); (2) the individual infringing and non-infringing components must be sold 5 together so that they constitute a functional unit or are parts of a complete machine or single 6 assembly of parts, Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 23 (Fed. 7 Cir. 1984); and (3) the individual infringing and non-infringing components must be analogous 8 to a single functioning unit, Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 9 Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286-87 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Rader, 10 C.J., by designation).5 It is not enough that the infringing and non-infringing parts are sold 11 together for mere business advantage. See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549-50. Instead, Lucent 12 argues that its analysis apportions the value of the Day patent within Outlook between the 13 patented and unpatented features as required by Uniloc. 14 In Uniloc, the Federal Circuit noted the qualifying language in the Lucent case that

15 forecloses the entire market value rule because of the lack of evidence demonstrating the 16 patented method of the Day patent as the basisor even a substantial basisof the consumer 17 demand for Outlook. . . . The only reasonable conclusion supported by the evidence is that the 18 infringing use of the date-picker tool in Outlook is but a very small component of a much larger 19 software program. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1219-20; see Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1338. If the patentee 20 cannot meet the entire market value rule, then the patentee . . . must in every case give 21 evidence tending to separate or apportion the defendants profits and the patentees damages 22 between the patented feature and the unpatented features. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318 (citing 23 Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884)). 24 Lucent conceded that it cannot satisfy the entire market value rule in this case. (R. Tr.

25 at 65:10-21.) As a result, Lucent needed to separate or apportion the defendants profits and 26 the patentees damages between the patented and unpatented features. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 27 The parties declined the Courts suggestion to instruct the jury on the entire market 28 value rule. (R. Tr., July 18, 2011, at 65:12-21.)
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1 1318. The Court concludes that Lucents initial apportionment of 7% of the purchase-decision 2 makers for Outlook who would not buy Outlook without the drop-down calendar with 43% who 3 use the drop-down calendar sought to apportion between the patented and unpatented features 4 as required by Uniloc.6 (R. Tr. at IV-10:6-14:15; Doc. No. 1454-3 at 33-37, 43-46 (RS115 RS15, RS21-RS24.)) The jury credited the testimony of Dr. Jay and Mr. Sims over vigorous 6 cross-examination by Microsoft. The Court declines to re-weigh the evidence or make 7 credibility determinations on Lucents initial apportionment. Winarto, 274 F.3d at 1283. 8 Lucent further apportioned the damages by using a $67 per license figure for all Outlook

9 programs. The Court gave Lucent plenty of notice that it would have to justify its use of the 10 $67 royalty base7or apportionment of its usein its damages calculation. During three 11 rounds of motions in limine, the Court concluded that Lucent failed to properly apportion 12 between the patented and unpatented features of Outlook in a way that separates out from the 13 royalty base the portion that can be attributed to the Day patent technology. See Uniloc, 632 14 F.3d at 1318. In particular, the Court pointed out: 15 16 17 18 19 (Doc. No. 1284 at 12-13.) The Court explained its rationale for a further apportionment: [f]or 20 a product that is feature-rich like Outlook, use as a proxy for value does not appropriately 21 account for all the other unpatented features that consumers use besides the Day patent 22 technology even when consumers invoke the Day patent methods. (Doc. No. 1284 at 12-13.) 23 See IP Innovation LLC v. Redhat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689-90 (E.D. Tex. 2010). Pretrial, 24 the Court questioned Lucents use of $67 as a proper base: [p]ut into concrete terms, if a 25
6 The Court also rejects Microsofts argument that Lucent violated the entire market 26 value rule. Rather, Lucent sought to apportion between the patented and unpatented features in Microsofts infringing products. 27 7 Both parties round Lucents base to $67 in their briefs, but in reality, Lucent used 28 $67.39 as the base of Outlook.

Though Lucent discounts the base to include only the revenue from Outlook where a user uses the Day patent technology, Lucent fails to show that it is entitled to capture this entire market value as the base. Specifically, Lucent has not shown that the Day patent technology is the basis for consumer demand for most Outlook users. At best, Lucent has introduced evidence to show that the Day patent technology is the basis for consumer demand for about 7% of users based on the Jay survey.

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1 sample user uses the infringing Day patent technology but also uses many other features in 2 Outlook, Lucent has not shown that it is entitled to include in the royalty base all $67 of revenue 3 generated from this sample user. (Doc. No. 1284 at 12-13.) 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 (Doc. No. 1284 at 13.) The Federal Circuit also noted that the Day patent is a minor feature 14 within Outlook. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1331. Because the patentee . . . must in every case give 15 evidence tending to separate or apportion the defendants profits and the patentees damages 16 between the patented feature and the unpatented features, and such evidence must be reliable 17 and tangible, and not conjectural or speculative, the Court warned Lucent before trial that its 18 expert failed to properly apportion the Day patent technology as one feature within many 19 features of Outlook and within Office.8 Uniloc, 632 F.3d 1292, 1318. 20 21 22 The Court turns to Lucents specific evidence of apportionment of the $67 for Outlook. D. Lucents Evidence of its Valuation of Outlook within Office is Not Supported by Substantial Evidence The Court included a diagram to illustrate the need for a further apportionment:

23 Despite the Courts pretrial admonitions, Mr. Sims concluded at trial that the average revenue 24 for Outlook during the relevant time period was $67, whether sold as part of Office or as a 25 stand-alone product. (R. Tr. at IV-14:16-21:10; 159:9-160:8; 161:22-162:5; 167:23-169:16; 26 174:6-17; 181:10-182:9; Ex. N, PX 1895; Ex. L, RS16-RS20.) The majority of the damages 27 The Federal Circuit decided Uniloc at the time of the Courts initial Daubert evidentiary hearing of Lucents economic expert. In response, the Court permitted the parties 28 to supplement and revise their expert reports. (Doc. Nos. 1194 & 1284.)
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8

1 for the 109.5 million licenses are for Office versus the 241,800 stand-alone Outlook sales. 2 In Uniloc, the Federal Circuit additionally held that for minor patent improvements, a

3 patentee cannot justify using the entire market value of an accused product simply by asserting 4 a low enough royalty rate. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1320; see also Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple, 5 Inc., 2011 WL 1304488, at *16 (E.D. Tex., Apr. 4, 2011). Although a reasonable royalty 6 analysis necessarily involves an element of approximation and uncertainty, Unisplay, 69 F.3d 7 at 517, the Court must ensure that the jury verdict is supported by sufficient evidence. 8 Microsoft contends that Lucent introduced no competent evidence to support application

9 of the $67 stand-alone Outlook revenue to the lost sales of Outlook licenses within Office.9 10 (Doc. No. 1434-1 at 9-11.) Specifically, Microsoft argues that applying the stand-alone revenue 11 figure to Office licenses improperly apportions the revenue associated with Outlook when 12 included in Office. The bundled Office price offers a significant discount over purchasing the 13 component software individually. (Id.) Lucents expert, Mr. Sims, relied on the evidence 14 available from internal Microsoft documents10 and Microsoft component prices as a proxy for 15 the value of Outlook when sold as part of Office. (Doc. No. 1451 at 14.) 16 For example, Rodney Jenkins, Microsofts profit and loss controller, testified at trial that

17 Microsoft did not attribute Office revenue to individual programs found within Office. (R. Tr. 18 at III-186:14-189:10; R. Tr. at IV-17:5-18:1.) Nevertheless, an internal Microsoft document 19 indicates that Outlook is the most popular of the Office components (see Doc. No. 1399, PX20 838 at 39) and other internal Microsoft documents demonstrate that use of calendar features in 21 Outlook ranks among the top-10 rated tasks. (Id. at 41). The jury agreed with the evidence of 22 Microsoft agrees that Mr. Sims accurately calculated the average per-unit revenue for stand-alone Outlook using Microsofts internal financial documents. (R. Tr. at IV-17:518:1; 23 161:22162:5.) 10 24 Microsoft did not turn over these documents during discovery before the 2008 trial, even though the documents were responsive to broad discovery requests. The documents 25 included consumer studies regarding the Day patent. (Doc. No. 1246, Courts Order.) Lucent became aware of the existence of the consumer studies involving the Day patent when William 26 Kennedy testified for Microsoft during the 2008 trial that Microsoft gathered information about how its customers use Outlook through focus groups, consumer feedback, and usability tests. 27 (Doc. No. 119 at 15.) The Court denied Lucents motion for sanctions for Microsofts earlier non-production of records. (Doc. No. 1246.) During discovery for the new trial, Lucents 28 specific discovery requests led Microsoft to produce the documents.
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9

1 Outlooks value within Office and rejected the biased testimony of Microsoft witnesses who 2 attempted to contradict the internal Microsoft documents. As a result, Lucent contends that Mr. 3 Sims presented the best evidence of value of Outlook within Office for purposes of the 4 hypothetical negotiation. (Doc. No. 1451 at 14.) Lucent also cites to other portions of the trial 5 record to support its substantial evidence position. (R. Tr. at IV-14:16-21:10, 159:9-160:8, 6 161:22-162:5, 167:23-169:16, 174:6-17, 181:10-182:9; Ex. H; PX 1895; Ex. G, RS 17.) 7 At the same time, Mr. Sims estimated that the average revenue attributable to Office was

8 $98.19. (R. Tr. at IV-166:13-167:4.) Lucents calculation using a $67 revenue figure assumes 9 that Outlook represents 68% of the revenue of Office. If so, the collective value of Word, 10 Excel, and PowerPoint represents only $31 for these popular programs. A current version of 11 Office including Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and Outlook retails for $279.95, but each individual 12 component retails for $139.95 as a stand-alone product.11 (Doc. No. 1434, Ex. E at 70, 92-93.) 13 Added together, the stand-alone components retail for well over twice the bundled price, but 14 Mr. Sims applied a $67 revenue figure to Outlook as a component of Office. The Court 15 concludes that Lucents attribution of $31 collectively to Microsoft Word, PowerPoint, and 16 Excel is not based on sound economic or factual predicates. 17 For a proper calculation of patent damages, the Federal Circuit requires sound economic

18 and factual predicates. See Riles v. Shell Exploration and Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1301, 1311 19 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co., 185 F. 3d 20 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (To prevent the hypothetical from lapsing into pure speculation, 21 this court requires sound economic proof of the nature of the market and likely outcomes with 22 infringement factored out of the economic picture.); Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech 23 Microelectronics Intern., Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Such market 24 reconstruction, though hypothetical, requires sound economic proof of the nature of the 25 market.). 26 /// 27
11

28 to 2006.

The Court excludes OneNote as inapplicable for the damages period between 2003

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Mr. Sims attempts to justify the $67 value by comparing the sales price of a version of

2 Office with Outlook ($279.99) to a version of Office without Outlook ($149.99). (R. Tr. at IV3 167:23169:5; 174:617; 181:10182:9; Ex. N, PX-1895.) Lucent argues that the difference 4 of $130 dollars, a number close to the $139.99 retail price of Outlook sold on its own, 5 demonstrates that Microsoft values Outlook at $130. (Doc. No. 1451, Ex. N, PX-1895.) In 6 other words, because the price difference ($130) is approximately the price of stand-alone 7 Outlook ($139), Lucent argues that Microsoft values Outlook within Office at the same price 8 ($67) that it values stand-alone Outlook ($67). The Court recognizes that there is some 9 evidence in the record to support Lucents position. But the version of Office without Outlook 10 that Mr. Sims references was directed at the academic market. (R. Tr. at V-40, 1-25.) The 11 Home and Student version was not sold until the end of the damages period in late 2006. (Doc. 12 No. 1451, Ex. N, PX-1895.) Therefore, Mr. Sims reliance on the sales price of the Home and 13 Student version without Outlook does not provide substantial evidence that Outlook is worth 14 $67 within Office. 15 Microsoft, on the other hand, suggested to the jury through attorney argument that

16 $13.45 is the correct amount to attribute to Outlook when it is sold as part of Office. (Doc. No. 17 1434-1 at 10.) Based on Microsofts contention that $13.45 is a reasonable base for Outlook 18 sales, Outlook would account for 13.7% of the $98 of revenue per unit of Office. (Doc. No. 19 1434, Ex. D at 172-73, 175.) The Court, and the jury, disagree with this apportionment as well. 20 Internal Microsoft documents demonstrate that Outlook is the most popular Office component. 21 (See Doc. No. 1399, PX-838 at 39). Microsofts internal documents also demonstrate that 84% 22 of Outlook 2007 users set up new appointments or meetings and 90% use calendar features. 23 (Id.) Further, Microsofts internal consumer feedback surveys demonstrate that use of calendar 24 features in Outlook ranks among the top-10 rated tasks. (Id. at 41.) Internal Microsoft 25 documents also list Calendar & Meetings Base menu as a strength of Outlook. (Id. at 47.) 26 Further, internal Microsoft documents state that Outlook is the most frequently used Office 27 application by far, with nearly all [purchasers] using it at least several times a week. By 28 contrast, PowerPoint is the least used Office application. (Id. at 53; Ex. I, PX-838.) The Court
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1 concludes that Microsofts $13.45 apportionment to Outlook within Office is not supported by 2 substantial evidence. Similarly unavailing is Microsofts assertion that Outlook accounts for 3 only 13.7% of the $98 of revenue per unit of Office. In fact, the Court finds it telling that 4 Microsoft never sold Office without Outlook between almost all of 2003-2006. (R. Tr. at V-39, 5 11-23.) It was not until late 2006 that Microsoft first launched a Home and Student version of 6 Office, directed at the academic market, that did not include Outlook. (R. Tr. at V-40, 1-25.) 7 The evidentiary record demonstrates that Outlook is worth more than Microsofts suggested 8 apportionment of 13.7%. 9 Moreover, the district court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

10 non-moving party and draw all reasonable evidentiary inferences in favor of the non-moving 11 party. Reeves, 530 U.S. 133 at 150. The jury chose to reject the testimony from biased 12 Microsoft executives regarding the interpretation of the internal Microsoft documents, and the 13 Court agrees that the Microsoft executive witnesses were discredited. 14 On post-trial motions, the district court must scrutinize the evidence carefully to ensure

15 that the substantial evidence standard is satisfied. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336 (quoting 16 Unisplay, 69 F.3d at 517)). Although a reasonable royalty analysis necessarily involves an 17 element of approximation and uncertainty, Unisplay, 69 F.3d at 517, it is the courts duty to 18 ensure that estimates are tied to . . . proper economic methodologies, not just numbers in an 19 accounting format. Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 290. The Court concludes that no reasonable 20 jury could conclude that Outlook within Office is worth $67, leaving the value of Word, Excel, 21 and PowerPoint combined to be only $31. (R. Tr. at IV-159:6-160:22.) As a result, the Court 22 concludes that the jurys verdict is not supported by substantial evidence, and therefore, 23 damages are excessive. 24 Microsoft suggests an alternative apportionment of $24.55 based on the four components

25 of Office. The Court agrees with the alternative apportionment. The Court concludes that, 26 when Outlook is sold as part of Office, the highest amount of revenue attributable to Outlook 27 that is supported by substantial evidence is $24.55. The 2010 pricing data for Microsoft 28 products shows that the prices for stand-alone Outlook, Word, Excel, and PowerPoint were each
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1 $139.99. (PX-1895.) Thus, the Court concludes that the evidence supports, at most, allocating 2 25% of the Office revenue to Outlook, representing one-fourth of Office productsOutlook, 3 Word, Excel, and PowerPoint. This allocation yields a per-unit revenue attributable to Outlook 4 within Office of $24.55 by multiplying the $98.19 per unit revenue of Outlook by 25%. 5 In response, Lucent cites to an internal Microsoft document that characterizes Outlook

6 as the most frequently used Office application by far and PowerPoint as the least frequently 7 used application. (PX-838). But the pricing data for the components of Office was the same, 8 (PX-1895), adding additional justification in the evidentiary record for $24.55 for each 9 component. 10 At the post-trial motion hearing, Lucent argued that if the Court applied the $24.55 per

11 unit figure for Outlook when sold as part of Office, the Court should enter judgment in the 12 amount of $52.6 million under the maximum recovery doctrine. Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 236 13 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Unisplay, 69 F.3d at 519. Lucent contends that Mr. Sims 14 testimony supports an award of all of Microsofts expected forgone profits to Lucent. (R. Tr. 15 at IV-9:23-10:5, 91:2-9, 92:1-6, 94:5-19.) The Court disagrees. Any award above $26.3 16 million would contradict the methodology of Lucents expert and result in a speculative 17 windfall to Lucent. As a result, the highest damages award supported by substantial evidence 18 results in a lump-sum damages award of $26.3 million. 19 Therefore, the Court adjusts Lucents damages calculation to apply only $24.55not

20 $67to the 109.3 million Office licenses and otherwise follows Lucents damages calculation. 21 The Court concludes that $67 is the appropriate per-unit revenue to use for the 241,800 units 22 of stand-alone Outlook that were included in Lucents damages calculation. The Court 23 determines that a lump-sum reasonable royalty of $26.3 million is the highest damages award 24 that is supported by substantial evidence, and that this award reflects a proper apportionment 25 as required by law. See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318.12 26 /// 27 The Court is not persuaded that a further micro-apportionment is warranted to account for the minor nature of the date-picker within Outlook. Lucents initial apportionment, based 28 on testimony credited by the jury, is substantial evidence to support the $26.3 million award.
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12

1 2

E. Lucents Survey Evidence Microsoft renews its Daubert challenges to the testimony of Lucents survey expert, Dr.

3 Jay. (Doc. No. 1434-1 at 2.) The Federal Circuit in Lucent suggested the use of a consumer 4 survey on remand as a possible source of data for evaluating reasonable royalties. 580 F.3d at 5 1333-1334 (Consideration of evidence of usage after infringement started can, under 6 appropriate circumstances, be helpful to the jury and the court in assessing whether a royalty 7 is reasonable. Usage (or similar) data may provide information that the parties would 8 frequently have estimated during the negotiation. . . . Such data might, depending on the case, 9 come from sales projections based on past sales, consumer surveys, focus group testing, and 10 other sources.). 11 After remand, both parties conducted a consumer survey. Lucent hired Dr. Jay and

12 questioned 3,387 online survey respondents. Microsoft hired Philip Johnson, questioned 600 13 people in a public mall, and had its 30(b)(6) witness, William Kennedy, remove Outlook from 14 Office for testing. (R. Tr. at II-147; IV-126; V-63-64, 139.) Microsoft declined on work 15 product grounds to share the results of its survey. And Microsofts 30(b)(6) witness, discredited 16 on other grounds, disavowed any knowledge of the test results. 17 Microsoft contends that Dr. Jays survey employed biased and misleading questions and

18 did not adequately control its results or account for sampling error. (Id.) Lucent responds that 19 Dr. Jay explained in detail every question, result, and calculation in her survey. She presented 20 the jury with 68 demonstratives to facilitate their understanding of the survey. She explained 21 the mathematical calculations she performed, the margin of error, and the effect of guessing on 22 the results. She demonstrated that her methodology and results were consistent with internal 23 Microsoft surveys conducted during the ordinary course of business. (Doc. No. 1451 at 5.) 24 Further, the jury heard that Dr. Jay is a top survey expert in probability-based surveys. (R. Tr. 25 at III-60:2461:18.) In sum, Dr. Jay persuaded the jury that the survey questions were proper 26 and yielded reliable results. (R. Tr. at II-181-182.) 27 Under Daubert, the court is charged with a gatekeeper function to ensure expert

28 testimony is both reliable and relevant. Courts have the responsibility of ensuring that all
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1 expert testimony must pertain to scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. 2 Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315. The court must decide if such testimony is based on a firm scientific 3 or technical grounding as required under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Id. Under Rule 702, 4 a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education can 5 testify in opinion or otherwise if: (1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (2) the 6 testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) the witness has applied the 7 principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702. 8 In addition to reliability and relevancy, the patentee must sufficiently tie the expert

9 testimony on damages to the facts of the case. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315 (citing Daubert, 509 10 U.S. at 59)). [O]ne major determinant of whether an expert should be excluded under Daubert 11 is whether he has justified the application of a general theory to the facts of the case. Id. 12 A trial courts decision to admit expert testimony under Daubert follows the law of the

13 regional circuit. Micro Chem., 317 F.3d at 1390-91. A trial court has broad discretion in 14 assessing the relevance and reliability of expert testimony. United States v. Finley, 301 F.3d 15 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). The requirement of Rule 702(1) is not intended to authorize a trial 16 court to exclude an experts testimony on the ground that the court believes one version of the 17 facts and not the other. Fed. R. Evid. 702, Adv. Comm. Note (2000). The inquiry into 18 admissibility of expert opinion is a flexible one, where [s]haky but admissible evidence is 19 to be attacked by cross examination, contrary evidence, and attention to the burden of proof, 20 not exclusion. Primiano v. Cook, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 8858, at *4 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 2010). 21 Under Daubert, the district judge is a gatekeeper, not a fact finder. When an expert meets 22 the threshold established by Rule 702 as explained in Daubert, the expert may testify and the 23 jury decides how much weight to give that testimony. Id. (quoting United States v. 24 Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 654 (9th Cir. 2006)). As the Supreme Court noted in 25 Daubert, [v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful 26 instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky 27 but admissible evidence. 509 U.S. at 596. 28 ///
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The Court concludes that Dr. Jay is highly qualified in probability surveys. Further, a

2 probability survey is a scientific model that is recognized as a reputable method for a survey. 3 (R. Tr. at II-51-60; III-43.) Moreover, Dr. Jay was subject to vigorous cross-examination about 4 her questions, methods, and conclusions. Dr. Jays survey was drawn from a representative 5 sample of 3,387 online users. Dr. Jay adequately explained the error rate and correlated it to 6 the data to show that it did not invalidate the survey results. The jury found her reasoning to 7 be persuasive.13 8 The Court observes that Dr. Jay responded to each of Microsofts challenges, and

9 adequately explained her methodology and reasoning. Dr. Jay had a reasonable explanation for 10 not asking specifically about Office applications since the overwhelming use of 11 Outlook99.8%is within Office. Microsofts contrary percentages, suggested in attorney 12 questioning, do not constitute evidence to challenge the verdict on JMOL. In sum, Dr. Jay met 13 the standards in Daubert, and the jury was persuaded by her reasoned opinions. Reeves, 530 14 U.S. at 150; Landes Const. Co. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833 F.2d 1365, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987); 15 Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 331 F.3d 735, 743 (9th Cir. 2003). 16 Microsoft claims that it was error for the Court to permit Lucent to question Microsoft

17 witnesses on the survey Microsoft conducted but did not disclose after Microsoft challenged 18 Dr. Jays survey on cross-examination. Microsofts criticisms of the Jay survey methodology 19 and results and Kennedys testimony made relevant and not overly prejudicial the fact that 20 Microsoft conducted its own survey. (R. Tr. at III-34:6-19.) The Court finds no error in its 21 decision to allow Lucents limited questions about the survey. 22 23 F. The Court Properly Admitted the Time Savings Analysis Microsoft challenges the Courts admission of Lucents time savings analysis.

24 Microsofts own documents admitted without objection showed that it valued the time saved 25 by its consumers. (PX-1000; PX-1048; PX-1889.) Mr. Sims time savings analysis indicated 26 In a bench trial, the outcome may have been different. The Court questions whether 7% of Outlook users would not buy Outlook or Office simply because it lacks the date-picker. 27 But the Court is not the trier of fact, and it is not the role of the Court to weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations on a JMOL motion. Winarto, 274 F.3d at 1286-87. 28
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13

1 that consumers would value the Day patent technology at $170 million and explained why that 2 value is important to Microsoft. (R. Tr. at IV-33:738:9, 40:1641:8, 53:1154:2.) Based on 3 internal Microsoft documents, Mr. Sims testified that Microsoft values the time saved by its 4 consumers. (Id.; see also PX-1000; PX-1048; PX-1889.) Mr. Sims testified that some portion 5 of the time savings amount would be paid by Microsoft to Lucent as a royalty. (R. Tr. at IV6 40:1641:8, 53:1154:2, 87:189:7.) Additionally, the Court gave a limiting instruction that 7 the evidence was to show the value to consumers. Courts have considered time savings as a 8 proper basis for calculating damages. See Grepke v. Gen. Elec. Co., 280 F.2d 508, 511-513 9 (7th Cir. 1960); Ziggity Sys. Inc. v. Val. Watering Sys., 769 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 10 Finally, the fact that consumers of Microsofts Outlook may enjoy a time savings as a result of 11 the Day patent technology is relevant to Georgia-Pacific factors 9, 10, and 11, including the 12 advantages of the patented technology. 318 F. Supp. at 1120. As a result, the Court properly 13 admitted the evidence. 14 15 G. Lucents Licensing Policy Regarding Acer and Locus Microsoft also challenges Mr. Sims reference to Lucents licensing policy at trial, as

16 well as the Acer and Locus agreements. The Court concludes that Lucents licensing policy and 17 the Acer and Locus agreements are relevant to Georgia-Pacific factors 4 and 12 and were 18 properly admitted at trial. (See also Doc. No. 1284 at 15-16 (allowing evidence and testimony 19 regarding Lucents licensing policy and Acer and Locus agreements).) 20 A district court may only consider license agreements that are sufficiently comparable

21 to the hypothetical license at issue in suit. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325; see also ResQNet, 594 22 F.3d at 872. The district court must consider licenses that are commensurate with what the 23 defendant has appropriated. If not, a prevailing plaintiff would be free to inflate the reasonable 24 royalty analysis with conveniently selected licenses without an economic or other link to the 25 technology in question. ResQNet, 594 F.3d at 872. In ruling on motions in limine, the Court 26 permitted Lucent to introduce two licenses, Acer and Locus, covering graphical user interfaces 27 such as the Day patent, and declined to permit use of other licenses. (Doc. No. 1180.) 28 ///
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In order for a license agreement to support a reasonable royalty rate, the license

2 agreement must involve similar technology. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1327. Both agreements were 3 executed about the time of the hypothetical negotiation and include licenses that covered the 4 Day patent. (R. Tr. at IV-67:11-24; 72:24-74:9; PX-1541; PX-1153.) The Court carefully 5 examined whether the cross license structure precluded their admission, and the Federal 6 Circuits previous criticism of the Acer license. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1331. Lucent called three 7 licensing witnesses and had limited expert testimony concerning the agreements. The record 8 demonstrates Lucent consistently asked for a minimum of 1% per patent. The Acer and Locus 9 licenses demonstrated Lucents license structure, industry practice, and Lucents licensing 10 practices for the hypothetical negotiation. (Doc. No. 1451 at 23-24.) Ultimately, the Court 11 instructed the jury that the licenses had to be comparable in order for the jury to consider them 12 as examples of Lucents licensing policy. (Doc. No. 1392, Jury Instructions, No. 25.) 13 Moreover, Lucent used Acer and Locus, in combination with testimony about its

14 licensing policy, to rebut Microsofts speculative claims from witnesses William Kennedy and 15 Microsoft expert, Professor Mnookin, that Lucent would take only $2 million to $5 million for 16 the Day patent. (R. Tr. at IV-75:15-77:16.) Lucent introduced evidence at trial that Lucents 17 negotiators had a policy to follow in licensing negotiations. (R. Tr. at III-180:2-183:19; IV18 60:5-65:18.) Specifically, Lucent introduced evidence that Lucents licensing policy is to 19 receive 1% of the total revenue from the smallest commercially saleable unit of a product 20 practicing one of its patents. (R. Tr. at V-188:5-11, IV-70:10-23, 72:1-12, 74:14-21.) Mr. Sims 21 testified that the smallest commercially saleable unit in this case was Outlook. (Id.)

22 Additionally, at trial, Lucent called Lucents licensing witness Stephen Samuels, a former 23 Lucent employee who worked in Lucents licensing division for almost 29 years, Bruce 24 Schneider, and Roger Stricker, to confirm Lucents 1% licensing policy for its intellectual 25 property portfolio. (R. Tr. at III-180:2-183:19; IV-60:5-65:18.) 26 Further, the Court excluded evidence regarding Microsofts settlement license, z4, which

27 involved infringing features within Office. (Doc. No. 1180); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 28 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58374 (E.D. Tex. 2006). In z4, Microsofts damages expert testified
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1 that the patented feature was a small feature worth a small lump-sum royalty of $3 million to 2 $5 million. z4 Techs., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58374. Despite Microsofts assertion that 3 although it valued the technology at $3 million to $5 million, Microsoft settled the case for $225 4 million after infringement was affirmed. z4 Techs., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58374. Lucent 5 wanted to introduce the z4 Microsoft license to rebut Professor Mnookins testimony that 6 Microsoft would only pay $2 million to $5 million for the Day patent as a small feature within 7 Office. The Court kept this license out of evidence because the technology was not sufficiently 8 comparable to the Day patent technology even though it was a small feature within Office. 9 (Doc. No. 1180.) 10 Accordingly, the Court concludes that it was not error under the totality of the record to

11 admit the Acer and Locus licenses to rebut Microsofts speculative claims that Lucent would 12 take only $2 million to $5 million for the Day patent, and in any event, harmless error. See, 13 e.g., Mondis Technology Ltd. v. LG Electronics Inc., Case No. 07-cv-565-TJW-CE Doc. No. 14 55 at 5 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2011). 15 16 H. JMOL Motion Conclusion The Court concludes that judgment as a matter of law, and an alternative new trial, is the

17 appropriate remedy. Tronzo, 236 F.3d at 1351-52; Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 291-92.14 18 Accordingly, the Court grants in part Microsofts motion for judgment as a matter of law that 19 a reasonable jury could not have returned a verdict in excess of $26.3 million based on the 20 evidence of record. The Court otherwise denies Microsofts motion for judgment as a matter 21 of law. 22 III. Microsofts Motion for a New Trial 23 Microsoft also moved for a new trial. A trial court may grant a new trial only if the

24 jurys verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, and may not grant it simply because 25 the court would have arrived at a different verdict. Pavao, 307 F.3d at 918. The jury, and not 26 the court, is given the task of weighing conflicting evidence and making credibility 27 At the hearing on the JMOL and motion for new trial, the Court discussed a new trial, but the parties preferred an order granting the motion for judgment as a matter of law and 28 alternatively for a new trial rather than a new trial only.
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14

1 determinations. See Roy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 896 F.2d 1174, 1179 (9th Cir. 1990), 2 amended and rehg en banc denied by 920 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Landes Const. Co., 3 833 F.2d at 1372 (jury entitled to believe one set of witnesses over others). And, it is not the 4 courts place to substitute our evaluations for those of jurors. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 331 F.3d 5 at 743. In evaluating a motion for new trial, the court need not view the evidence from the 6 perspective most favorable to the prevailing party. Landes, 833 F.2d at 1371. Instead, the 7 court should set aside the verdict of the jury, even though supported by substantial evidence, 8 where, in the courts conscientious opinion, the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the 9 evidence. Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007). For the reasons 10 previously stated, the Court conditionally grants in part Microsofts motion for a new trial. 11 The Court also considers a remittitur. [W]here there is no evidence that passion and

12 prejudice affected the liability finding, remittitur is an appropriate method of reducing an 13 excessive verdict. Snyder v. Freight, Constr. Gen. Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, 175 14 F.3d 680, 689 (9th Cir. 1999). 15 In the event that the judgment as a matter of law is vacated or reversed on appeal, the

16 original verdict is not reinstated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings, the Court 17 grants a new trial, subject to Lucents decision whether to accept a remittitur award of $26.3 18 million. Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 291-92 (granting judgment as a matter of law and entering 19 judgment on a particular amount, but also conditionally granting a new trial in the alternative 20 subject to a remittitur in the same amount). The Court denies the remainder of Microsofts new 21 trial motion to the extent Microsoft seeks a new trial based on any other ground. 22 IV. Conclusion 23 24 Based on the foregoing, the Court orders the following: (1) The Court grants in part Microsofts motion for judgment as a matter of law and

25 enters judgment of $26.3 million plus interest and costs. The Court denies Microsofts motion 26 for judgment as a matter of law in all other respects. 27 (2) In the alternative, the Court conditionally grants in part Microsofts motion for a new

28 trial, and, in the event of a remand, offers Lucent a remittitur award of $26.3 million plus
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1 interest and costs. The Court denies Microsofts motion for a new trial in all other respects. 2 (3) The Court previously taxed costs for the 2008 and 2011 trials against Microsoft in

3 the amount of $450,479.68. (Doc. No. 1460.) Because the Court ordered Microsoft to pay 4 $156,646.82 of that amount within 30 days, the Court deducts that amount from the final 5 judgment. The Court incorporates the remaining costs into the final judgment.15 6 (4) The Court previously awarded Lucent pre-judgment interest calculated from January

7 13, 2003 through December 11, 2006. Applying that calculation to a judgment of $26.3 million 8 yields pre-judgment interest in the amount of $14,401,653.81. The Court incorporates that 9 amount into the final judgment. 10 Therefore, the Court enters a final judgment in Lucents favor, inclusive of costs and

11 pre-judgment interest, in the amount of $40,995,486.67. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED.

13 Dated: November 10, 2011 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

________________________________ MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Both parties agreed to this deduction from the final judgment. (See Doc. No. 1476-3.)
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