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Marquez vs. Elisan Credit Corp.

Case Ponente Decision Date

G.R. No. 194642 BRION, J Apr 6, 2015

A petitioner challenges a court decision regarding the payment of an unpaid

loan balance, interest, penalty, and attorney's fees, as well as the foreclosure
and sale of a motor vehicle under a chattel mortgage, ultimately resulting in a
ruling that the petitioner must pay the unpaid balance of the loan with
reduced interest, penalty, and attorney's fees, while the respondent must
return the seized motor vehicle or pay the petitioner its value.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 194642. April 6, 2015.

NUNELON R. MARQUEZ, petitioner, vs. ELISAN CREDIT CORPORATION, respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J p:

We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari assailing the May 17, 2010
decision and the November 25, 2010 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 102144.

The Factual Antecedents

 On December 16, 1991, Nunelon R. Marquez (petitioner) obtained a loan (first loan)
from Elisan Credit Corporation (respondent) for fifty-three thousand pesos
(Php53,000.00) payable in one-hundred eighty (180) days.

The petitioner signed a promissory note which provided that it is payable in weekly
installments and subject to twenty-six percent (26%) annual interest. In case of non-
payment, the petitioner agreed to pay ten percent (10%) monthly penalty based on the total
amount unpaid and another twenty-five percent (25%) of such amount for attorney's fees
exclusive of costs, and judicial and extrajudicial expenses.

To further secure payment of the loan, the petitioner executed a chattel mortgage
over a motor vehicle. The contract of chattel mortgage provided among others, that the
motor vehicle shall stand as a security for the first loan and "all other obligations of every
kind already incurred or which may hereafter be incurred."

Both the petitioner and respondent acknowledged the full payment of the first loan.

Subsequently, the petitioner obtained another loan (second loan) from the
respondent for fifty-five thousand pesos (P55,000.00) evidenced by a promissory note
and a cash voucher both dated June 15, 1992.

The promissory note covering the second loan contained exactly the same terms
and conditions as the first promissory note.

When the second loan matured on December 15, 1992, the petitioner had only paid
twenty-nine thousand nine hundred sixty pesos (P29,960.00),leaving an unpaid balance
of twenty five thousand forty pesos (P25,040.00).

Due to liquidity problems, the petitioner asked the respondent if he could pay in
daily installments (daily payments) until the second loan is paid. The respondent granted
the petitioner's request. Thus, as of September 1994 or twenty-one (21) months after the
second loan's maturity, the petitioner had already paid a total of fifty-six thousand four-
hundred forty pesos (P56,440.00),an amount greater than the principal.

Despite the receipt of more than the amount of the principal, the respondent filed a
complaint for judicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage because the petitioner allegedly
failed to settle the balance of the second loan despite demand.
 The respondent further alleged that pursuant to the terms of the promissory note,
the petitioner's failure to fully pay upon maturity triggered the imposition of the ten
percent (10%) monthly penalty and twenty-five percent (25%) attorney's fees.

The respondent prayed that the petitioner be ordered to pay the balance of the
second loan plus accrued penalties and interest.

Before the petitioner could file an answer, the respondent applied for the issuance
of a writ of replevin. The MTC issued the writ and by virtue of which, the motor vehicle
covered by the chattel mortgage was seized from the petitioner and delivered to the
respondent.

Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The MTC Ruling

The MTC found for the petitioner and held that the second loan was fully
extinguished as of September 1994.

It held that when an obligee accepts the performance or payment of an obligation,

knowing its incompleteness or irregularity and without expressing any protest or
objection, the obligation is deemed fully complied with. The MTC noted that the
respondent accepted the daily payments made by the petitioner without protest. The
second loan having been fully extinguished, the MTC ruled that respondent's claim for
interests and penalties plus the alleged unpaid portion of the principal is without legal
basis.

The MTC ordered:

1. "the plaintiff Elisan Credit Corporation to return/deliver the seized motor vehicle
with Plate No. UV-TDF-193 to the possession of the defendant and in the event its delivery
is no longer possible, to pay the defendant the amount of P30,000.00 corresponding to
the value of the said vehicle;"

2. "the bonding company People's Trans-East Asia Insurance Corporation to pay the
defendant the amounts of P20,000.00 and P5,000.00 representing the damages and
attorney's fees under P.T.E.A.I.C Bond No. JCL (13)-00984;"
 3. "the plaintiff is likewise directed to surrender to the defendant the originals of the
documents evidencing indebtedness in this case so as to prevent further use of the same
in another proceeding."

The RTC Ruling

Except for the MTC's order directed to the bonding company, the RTC initially
affirmed the ruling of the MTC.

Acting on the respondent's motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself.
Citing Article 1253 of the Civil Code, it held that "if the debt produces interest, payment of
the principal shall not be deemed to have been made until the interests have been
covered." It also sustained the contention of the respondent that the chattel mortgage was
revived when the petitioner executed the promissory note covering the second loan.

The RTC ordered:

1. "the defendant to pay the plaintiff the following: a) P25,040.00, plus interest
thereon at the rate of 26% per annum and penalties of 10% per month thereon from due
date of the second promissory note until fully paid, b) 25% of the defendant's outstanding
obligation as and for attorney's fees, c) costs of this suit;"

2. "the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage dated December 16, 1991 and the sale of
the mortgaged property at a public auction, with the proceeds thereof to be applied as and
in payment of the amounts awarded in a and b above."

The CA Ruling

The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling with modification.

The CA observed that the disparity in the amount loaned and the amount paid by
the petitioner supports the respondent's view that the daily payments were properly
applied first for the payment of interests and not for the principal.

According to the CA, if the respondent truly condoned the payment of interests as
claimed by the petitioner, the latter did not have to pay an amount in excess of the
principal. The CA believed the petitioner knew his payments were first applied to the
interests due.
 The CA held that Article 1253 of the Civil Code is clear that if debt produces interest,
payment of the principal shall not be deemed made until the interests have been covered.
It ruled that even if the official receipts issued by the respondent did not mention that the
payments were for the interests, the omission is irrelevant as it is deemed by law to be for
the payment of interests first, if any, and then for the payment of the principal amount.

The CA, however, reduced the monthly penalty from ten percent (10%) to two
percent (2%) pursuant to Article 1229 of the Civil Code which gives the courts the power to
decrease the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly
complied with by the debtor.

The dispositive portion of the CA decision provides:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of

merit. The Order dated 07 May 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 222, Quezon City
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty charge should only be two
(2%) per month until fully paid."

The CA denied the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated May 17, 2010 on
November 25, 2010 for failing to raise new matters. Hence, this present petition.

The Petition

The petitioner seeks the reversal of the CA's decision and resolution. He argues that
he has fully paid his obligation. Thus, the respondent has no right to foreclose the chattel
mortgage.

The petitioner insists that his daily payments should be deemed to have been
credited against the principal, as the official receipts issued by the respondent were silent
with respect to the payment of interest and penalties. He cites Article 1176 of the Civil
Code which ordains that "the receipt of the principal by the creditor without reservation
with respect to the interest, shall give rise to the presumption that the interest has been
paid. The petitioner invokes Article 1235 of the Civil Code which states that "when the
obligee accepts the performance of an obligation, knowing its incompleteness or
irregularity, and without expressing any protest or objection, the obligation is deemed
fully complied with."
 The petitioner denies having stipulated upon and consented to the twenty-six per
cent (26%) per annum interest charge, ten percent (10%) monthly penalty and twenty-five
percent (25%) attorney's fees. According to the petitioner, he signed the promissory note
in blank.

The petitioner likewise disclaims receiving any demand letter from the respondent
for the alleged balance of the second loan after he had paid fifty-six thousand four-
hundred forty pesos (Php56,440.00) as of September 1994, and further argues that the
chattel mortgage could not cover the second loan as it was annulled and voided upon full
payment of the first loan.

The Respondent's Case

The respondent claims that the daily payments were properly credited against the
interest and not against the principal because the petitioner incurred delay in the full
payment of the second loan.

It argues that pursuant to the terms and conditions of the promissory note, the
interest and penalties became due and demandable when the petitioner failed to pay in
full upon maturity. The respondent relies on Article 1253 of the Civil Code which provides
that if the debt produces interest, payment of the principal shall not be deemed to have
been made until the interests have been covered.

The respondent likewise maintains that the chattel mortgage could validly secure
the second loan invoking its provision which provided that it covers "obligations ...which
may hereafter be incurred."

Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues for our resolution:

I. "WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO PAY THE
RESPONDENT THE AMOUNT OF PHP24,040.00 PLUS INTEREST AND PENALTY FROM
DUE DATE UNTIL FULLY PAID; AND

II. "WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ORDERING THE FORECLOSURE AND SALE
OF THE MORTGAGED PROPERTY."

In simpler terms, did the respondent act lawfully when it credited the daily
payments against the interest instead of the principal? Could the chattel mortgage cover
the second loan?

The Court's Ruling

We find the petition partly meritorious.

We rule that: (1) the respondent acted pursuant to law and jurisprudence when it
credited the daily payments against the interest instead of the principal; and (2) the
chattel mortgage could not cover the second loan.

Rebuttable presumptions; Article

1176 vis- -vis Article 1253

There is a need to analyze and harmonize Article 1176 and Article 1253 of the Civil
Code to determine whether the daily payments made after the second loan's maturity
should be credited against the interest or against the principal.

Article 1176 provides that:

"The receipt of the principal by the creditor, without reservation with respect to the
interest, shall give rise to the presumption that said interest has been paid.

...."

On the other hand, Article 1253 states:

"If the debt produces interest, payment of the principal shall not be deemed to have
been made until the interests have been covered."

The above provisions appear to be contradictory but they in fact support, and are in
conformity with, each other. Both provisions are also presumptions and, as such, lose
their legal efficacy in the face of proof or evidence to the contrary.

Thus, the settlement of the first issue depends on which of these presumptions
prevails under the given facts of the case.
 There are two undisputed facts crucial in resolving the first issue: (1) the petitioner
failed to pay the full amount of the second loan upon maturity; and (2) the second loan
was subject to interest, and in case of default, to penalty and attorney's fees.

But before proceeding any further, we first tackle the petitioner's denial of the
genuineness and due execution of the second promissory note. He denies that he
stipulated upon and consented to the interest, penalty and attorney's fees because he
purportedly signed the promissory note in blank.

This allegation deserves scant consideration. It is self-serving and unsupported by

evidence.

As aptly observed by the RTC and the CA, the promissory notes securing the first
and second loan contained exactly the same terms and conditions. They were mirror-
image of each other except for the date and amount of principal. Thus, we see sufficient
basis to believe that the petitioner knew or was aware of such terms and conditions even
assuming that the entries on the interest and penalty charges were in blank when he
signed the promissory note.

Moreover, we find it significant that the petitioner does not deny the genuineness
and due execution of the first promissory note. Only when he failed to pay the second loan
did he impugn the validity of the interest, penalty and attorney's fees. The CA and the RTC
also noted that the petitioner is a schooled individual, an engineer by profession, who,
because of these credentials, will not just sign a document in blank without appreciating
the import of his action.

These considerations strongly militate against the petitioner's claim that he did not
consent to and stipulated on the interest and penalty charges of the second loan. Thus, he
did not only fail to fully pay the second loan upon maturity; the loan was also subject to
interest, penalty and attorney's fees.

Article 1176 in relation to Article 1253

Article 1176 falls under Chapter I (Nature and Effect of Obligations) while Article
1253 falls under Subsection I (Application of Payments),Chapter IV (Extinguishment of
Obligations) of Book IV (Obligations and Contracts) of the Civil Code.
 The structuring of these provisions, properly taken into account, means that Article
1176 should be treated as a general presumption subject to the more specific presumption
under Article 1253. Article 1176 is relevant on questions pertaining to the effects and
nature of obligations in general, while Article 1253 is specifically pertinent on questions
involving application of payments and extinguishment of obligations.

A textual analysis of the above provisions yields the results we discuss at length
below:

The presumption under Article 1176 does not resolve the question of whether the
amount received by the creditor is a payment for the principal or interest. Under this
article the amount received by the creditor is the payment for the principal, but a doubt
arises on whether or not the interest is waived because the creditor accepts the payment
for the principal without reservation with respect to the interest. Article 1176 resolves this
doubt by presuming that the creditor waives the payment of interest because he accepts
payment for the principal without any reservation.

On the other hand, the presumption under Article 1253 resolves doubts involving
payment of interest-bearing debts. It is a given under this Article that the debt produces
interest. The doubt pertains to the application of payment; the uncertainty is on whether
the amount received by the creditor is payment for the principal or the interest. Article
1253 resolves this doubt by providing a hierarchy: payments shall first be applied to the
interest; payment shall then be applied to the principal only after the interest has been
fully-paid.

Correlating the two provisions, the rule under Article 1253 that payments shall first
be applied to the interest and not to the principal shall govern if two facts exist: (1) the
debt produces interest (e.g.,the payment of interest is expressly stipulated) and (2) the
principal remains unpaid.

The exception is a situation covered under Article 1176, i.e.,when the creditor waives
payment of the interest despite the presence of (1) and (2) above. In such case, the
payments shall obviously be credited to the principal.

Since the doubt in the present case pertains to the application of the daily
payments, Article 1253 shall apply. Only when there is a waiver of interest shall Article
1176 become relevant.
 Under this analysis, we rule that the respondent properly credited the daily
payments to the interest and not to the principal because: (1) the debt produces interest,
i.e.,the promissory note securing the second loan provided for payment of interest; (2) a
portion of the second loan remained unpaid upon maturity; and (3) the respondent did
not waive the payment of interest.

There was no waiver of interest

The fact that the official receipts did not indicate whether the payments were made
for the principal or the interest does not prove that the respondent waived the interest.

We reiterate that the petitioner made the daily payments after the second loan had
already matured and a portion of the principal remained unpaid. As stipulated, the
principal is subject to 26% annual interest.

All these show that the petitioner was already in default of the principal when he
started making the daily payments. The stipulations providing for the 10% monthly
penalty and the additional 25% attorney's fees on the unpaid amount also became effective
as a result of the petitioner's failure to pay in full upon maturity.

In other words, the so-called interest for default (as distinguished from the
stipulated monetary interest of 26% per annum) in the form of the 10% monthly penalty
accrued and became due and demandable. Thus, when the petitioner started making the
daily payments, two types of interest were at the same time accruing, the 26% stipulated
monetary interest and the interest for default in the form of the 10% monthly penalty.

Article 1253 covers both types of interest. As noted by learned civilist, Arturo M.
Tolentino, no distinction should be made because the law makes no such distinction. He
explained:

"Furthermore, the interest for default arises because of non-performance by the

debtor, and to allow him to apply payment to the capital without first satisfying such
interest, would be to place him in a better position than a debtor who has not incurred in
delay.The delay should worsen, not improve, the position of a debtor." Emphasis supplied.

The petitioner failed to specify which of the two types of interest the respondent
allegedly waived. The respondent waived neither.
 In Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we applied Article 1253 of
the Civil Code in resolving whether the debtor has waived the payments of interest when
he issued receipts describing the payments as "capital repayment." We held that,

"Under Article 1253 of the Civil Code, if the debt produces interest, payment of the
principal shall not be deemed to have been made until the interest has been covered. In
this case, the private respondent would not have signed the receipts describing the
payments made by the petitioner as "capital repayment" if the obligation to pay the
interest was still subsisting.

"There was therefore a novation of the terms of the three promissory notes in that
the interest was waived ..." Emphasis supplied.

The same ruling was made in an older case where the creditor issued a receipt
which specifically identified the payment as referring to the principal. We held that the
interest allegedly due cannot be recovered, in conformity with Article 1110 of the Old Civil
Code, a receipt from the creditor for the principal, that contains no stipulation regarding
interest, extinguishes the obligation of the debtor with regard thereto when the receipt
issued by the creditor showed that no reservation whatever was made with respect to the
interest.

In both of these cases, it was clearly established that the creditors accepted the
payment of the principal. The creditors were deemed to have waived the payment of
interest because they issued receipts expressly referring to the payment of the principal
without any reservation with respect to the interest. As a result, the interests due were
deemed waived. It was immaterial whether the creditors intended to waive the interest or
not. The law presumed such waiver because the creditors accepted the payment of the
principal without reservation with respect to the interest.

In the present case, it was not proven that the respondent accepted the payment of
the principal. The silence of the receipts on whether the daily payments were credited
against the unpaid balance of the principal or the accrued interest does not mean that the
respondent waived the payment of interest. There is no presumption of waiver of interest
without any evidence showing that the respondent accepted the daily installments as
payments for the principal.
 Ideally, the respondent could have been more specific by indicating on the receipts
that the daily payments were being credited against the interest. Its failure to do so,
however, should not be taken against it. The respondent had the right to credit the daily
payments against the interest applying Article 1253.

It bears stressing that the petitioner was already in default. Under the promissory
note, the petitioner waived demand in case of non-payment upon due date. The stipulated
interest and interest for default have both accrued. The only logical result, following
Article 1253 of the Civil Code, is that the daily payments were first applied against either or
both the stipulated interest and interest for default.

Moreover, Article 1253 is viewed as having an obligatory character and not merely
suppletory. It cannot be dispensed with except by mutual agreement. The creditor may
oppose an application of payment made by the debtor contrary to this rule.

In any case, the promissory note provided that "interest not paid when due shall be
added to, and become part of the principal and shall likewise bear interest at the same
rate, compounded monthly."

Hence, even if we assume that the daily payments were applied against the
principal, the principal had also increased by the amount of unpaid interest and the
interest on such unpaid interest. Even under this assumption, it is doubtful whether the
petitioner had indeed fully paid the second loan.

Excessive interest, penalty

and attorney's fees

Notwithstanding the foregoing, we find the stipulated rates of interest, penalty and
attorney's fees to be exorbitant, iniquitous, unconscionable and excessive. The courts can
and should reduce such astronomical rates as reason and equity demand.

Article 1229 of the Civil Code provides:

"The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been
partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance,
the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable."

Article 2227 of the Civil Code ordains:

"Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably
reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.

More importantly, Article 1306 of the Civil Code is emphatic:

"The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy."

Thus, stipulations imposing excessive rates of interest and penalty are void for
being contrary to morals, if not against the law.

Further, we have repeatedly held that while Central Bank Circular No. 905-82,which
took effect on January 1, 1983, effectively removed the ceiling on interest rates for both
secured and unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in the said circular could
possibly be read as granting carte blanche authority to lenders to raise interest rates to
levels that would be unduly burdensome, to the point of oppression on their borrowers.

In exercising this power to determine what is iniquitous and unconscionable,

courts must consider the circumstances of each case since what may be iniquitous and
unconscionable in one may be totally just and equitable in another.

In the recent case of MCMP Construction Corp. v. Monark Equipment Corp., we

reduced the interest rate of twenty-four percent (24%) per annum to twelve percent (12%)
per annum; the penalty and collection charge of three percent (3%) per month, or thirty-
six percent (36%) per annum, to six percent (6%) per annum; and the amount of attorney's
fees from twenty-five percent (25%) of the total amount due to five percent (5%).

Applying the foregoing principles, we hereby reduce the stipulated rates as follows:
the interest of twenty-six percent (26%) per annum is reduced to two percent (2%) per
annum; the penalty charge of ten percent (10%) per month, or one-hundred twenty
percent (120%) per annum is reduced to two percent (2%) per annum; and the amount of
attorney's fees from twenty-five percent (25%) of the total amount due to two percent (2%)
of the total amount due.

We believe the markedly reduced rates are reasonable, equitable and just under the
circumstances.
 It is not entirely the petitioner's fault that he honestly, albeit wrongly, believed that
the second loan had been fully paid. The respondent is partly to blame for issuing receipts
not indicating that the daily payments were being applied against the interest.

Moreover, the reduction of the rates is justified in the context of its computation
period. In Trade & Investment Dev't. Corp. of the Phil. v. Roblett Industrial Construction
Corp., we equitably reduced the interest rate because the case was decided with finality
sixteen years after the filing of the complaint. We noted that the amount of the loan
swelled to a considerably disproportionate sum, far exceeding the principal debt.

It is the same in the present case where the complaint was filed almost twenty-
years ago.

The Chattel Mortgage could

not cover the second loan

The chattel mortgage could not validly cover the second loan. The order for
foreclosure was without legal and factual basis.

In Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the debtor executed a
chattel mortgage, which had a provision to this effect:

"In case the MORTGAGOR executes subsequent promissory note or notes either as
a renewal of the former note, as an extension thereof, or as a new loan, or is given any
other kind of accommodations such as overdrafts, letters of credit, acceptances and bills
of exchange, releases of import shipments on Trust Receipts, etc.,this mortgage shall also
stand as security for the payment of the said promissory note or notes and/or
accommodations without the necessity of executing a new contract and this mortgage
shall have the same force and effect as if the said promissory note or notes and/or
accommodations were existing on the date thereof." Emphasis supplied.

In due time, the debtor settled the loan covered by the chattel mortgage.
Subsequently, the debtor again borrowed from the creditor. Due to financial constraints,
the subsequent loan was not settled at maturity.

On the issue whether the chattel mortgage could be foreclosed due to the debtor's
failure to settle the subsequent loan, we held that,
 "contracts of security are either personal or real. ...In contracts of real security, such
as a pledge, a mortgage or an antichresis, that fulfillment is secured by an encumbrance of
property in pledge, the placing of movable property in the possession of the creditor; in
chattel mortgage, by the execution of the corresponding deed substantially in the form
prescribed by law; ... upon the essential condition that if the principal obligation becomes
due and the debtor defaults, then the property encumbered can be alienated for the
payment of the obligation, but that should the obligation be duly paid, then the contract
is automatically extinguished proceeding from the accessory character of the
agreement. As the law so puts it, once the obligation is complied with, then the contract
of security becomes, ipso facto,null and void."

While a pledge, real estate mortgage, or antichresis may exceptionally secure after-
incurred obligations so long as these future debts are accurately described, a chattel
mortgage, however, can only cover obligations existing at the time the mortgage is
constituted. Although a promise expressed in a chattel mortgage to include debts that
are yet to be contracted can be a binding commitment that can be compelled upon, the
security itself, however, does not come into existence or arise until after a chattel
mortgage agreement covering the newly contracted debt is executed either by
concluding a fresh chattel mortgage or by amending the old contract conformably with
the form prescribed by the Chattel Mortgage Law.Refusal on the part of the borrower to
execute the agreement so as to cover the after-incurred obligation can constitute an act of
default on the part of the borrower of the financing agreement whereon the promise is
written but, of course, the remedy of foreclosure can only cover the debts extant at the
time of constitution and during the life of the chattel mortgage sought to be foreclosed."
Emphasis supplied.

We noted that the Chattel Mortgage Law requires the parties to the contract to
attach an affidavit of good faith and execute an oath that

"...(the) mortgage is made for the purpose of securing the obligation specified in the
conditions thereof, and for no other purposes,and that the same is a just and valid
obligation, and one not entered into for the purposes of fraud."

It is obvious therefore that the debt referred in the law is a current, not an
obligation that is yet merely contemplated.

The chattel mortgage in the present case had the following provision:
"...in consideration of the credit accommodation granted by the MORTGAGEE to the
MORTGAGOR(S) in the amount of FIFTY-THREE THOUSAND ONLY PESOS (P53,000.00)
...and all other obligations of every kind already incurred or which may hereafter be
incurred, for or accommodation of the MORTGAGOR(S),as well as the faithful
performance of the terms and conditions of this mortgage ..." Emphasis supplied.

The only obligation specified in the chattel mortgage contract was the first loan
which the petitioner later fully paid. By virtue of Section 3 of the Chattel Mortgage Law,
the payment of the obligation automatically rendered the chattel mortgage terminated; the
chattel mortgage had ceased to exist upon full payment of the first loan. Being merely an
accessory in nature, it cannot exist independently of the principal obligation.

The parties did not execute a fresh chattel mortgage nor did they amend the chattel
mortgage to comply with the Chattel Mortgage Law which requires that the obligation
must be specified in the affidavit of good faith. Simply put, there no longer was any chattel
mortgage that could cover the second loan upon full payment of the first loan. The order
to foreclose the motor vehicle therefore had no legal basis.

WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing findings and legal premises, we PARTIALLY

GRANT the petition. We MODIFY the May 17, 2010 Decision and the November 25, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 102144.

ACCORDINGLY,petitioner Nunelon R. Marquez is ORDERED to pay:

1. Twenty-five thousand forty pesos (P25,040.00) representing the amount of the

unpaid balance of the second loan;

2. Interest of two percent (2%) per annum on the unpaid balance to be computed
from December 15, 1992 until full payment;

3. Penalty of two percent (2%) per annum on the unpaid balance to be computed
from December 15, 1992;

4. Attorney's Fees of two percent (2%) of the total amount to be recovered.

The total amount to be recovered shall further be subject to the legal interest rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
 Respondent Elisan Credit Corporation, on the other hand, is ORDERED to
return/deliver the seized motor vehicle with Plate No. UV-TDF-193, subject of the chattel
mortgage, to the possession of the petitioner; in the event its delivery is no longer
possible, to pay the petitioner the amount of P30,000.00 corresponding to the value of the
said vehicle.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Del Castillo, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.