Issue 4:

Whether Dvipa can be held liable to compensate Raktasura for the acts of Mr. Joshi in publishing his
personal information in Media?

To held Dvipa liable for the acts of Mr. Joshi, it must be established that the acts of Mr. Joshi is against
the law. Publishing the personal information in Media shall be invasion of the privacy or defamation
to held liable for the wrong done.

a) Whether act of Mr. Joshi is against the law?

Referring to section 23 of Press Council Act, 1978:

“23. Protection of action taken in good faith. —

(1) No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Council or any member thereof or any
person acting under the direction of the Council in respect of anything which is in good faith
done or intended to be done under this Act.

(2) No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against any newspaper in respect of the
publication of any matter therein under the authority of the Council.”

Moreover, according to sec 2(b) and sec 4 of the act –

“(b) “Council” means the Press Council of Devanala established under section 4;

4. Incorporation of the Council.—

(1) With effect from such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, appoint, there shall be established a Council by the name of the Press Council of
Devanala.

(2) The said Council shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal
and shall by the said name sue and be sued.

Mr. Joshi being the National Editor for the ‘Verdict Times’ which is a prominent news channel, thus Mr.
Joshi is the person acting under the direction and authority of the Council, acting in good faith as
Raktasura was a threat to the society due to his criminal conviction and his multi personality disorder.
Hence, act of Mr. Joshi is not against the law.

b) Whether Mr. Joshi defamed Raktasura or invaded his privacy?

Referring sec 499 of Devanala Penal Code, 1860:

 “Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible
representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm,
or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such
person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter expected, to defame that person.”

Exceptions:

“First Exception. — Imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published.
— It is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person, if it be for the
public good that the imputation should be made or published. Whether or not it is for the
public good is a question of fact.”

“Fourth Exception. — Publication of reports of proceedings of Courts. — It is not defamation

to publish substantially true report of the proceedings of a Court of Justice, or of the result of
any such proceedings.”

Although Mr. Joshi published personal data of Raktasura but the intention behind was not to harm but
in the good faith to make public aware of the threat. Conviction of Raktasura and his diagnosis of multi
personality disorder is a threat towards society and especially to women is the truth which is required
to be published concerning the society and it is purely for the public good.

Moreover, what was published is a report of proceedings of court, and thus according to fourth
exception it not defamation.

from Hindustan Times v. High Court of Allahabad, (2011) 13 SCC 155 : 2011 SCC OnLine SC 1172

“6. The unbridled power of the media can become dangerous if checks and balances are not
inherent in it. The role of the media is to provide to the readers and the public in general with
information and views tested and found as true and correct. This power must be carefully
regulated and must reconcile with a person's fundamental right to privacy. Any wrong or
biased information that is put forth can potentially damage the otherwise clean and good
reputation of the person or institution against whom something adverse is reported. Pre-
judging the issues and rushing to conclusions must be avoided.”

The data published is factually true and correct and there is no curtailment of any person’s
fundamental right to privacy.

Referring R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N., (1994) 6 SCC 632 at page 649

“26. We may now summarise the broad principles flowing from the above discussion:
(1) The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of
this country by Article 21. It is a “right to be let alone”. A citizen has a right to safeguard the
privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education
among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his
consent — whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he
would be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action
for damages. Position may, however, be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into
controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy.

(2) The rule aforesaid is subject to the exception, that any publication concerning the
aforesaid aspects becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon public records
including court records. This is for the reason that once a matter becomes a matter of public
record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for
comment by press and media among others. We are, however, of the opinion that in the
interests of decency [Article 19(2)] an exception must be carved out to this rule, viz., a female
who is the victim of a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence should not further be
subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident being publicised in press/media.

(3) There is yet another exception to the rule in (1) above — indeed, this is not an exception
but an independent rule. In the case of public officials, it is obvious, right to privacy, or for that
matter, the remedy of action for damages is simply not available with respect to their acts and
conduct relevant to the discharge of their official duties. This is so even where the publication
is based upon facts and statements which are not true, unless the official establishes that the
publication was made (by the defendant) with reckless disregard for truth. In such a case, it
would be enough for the defendant (member of the press or media) to prove that he acted
after a reasonable verification of the facts; it is not necessary for him to prove that what he
has written is true. Of course, where the publication is proved to be false and actuated by
malice or personal animosity, the defendant would have no defence and would be liable for
damages. It is equally obvious that in matters not relevant to the discharge of his duties, the
public official enjoys the same protection as any other citizen, as explained in (1) and (2) above.
It needs no reiteration that judiciary, which is protected by the power to punish for contempt
of court and Parliament and legislatures protected as their privileges are by Articles 105 and
104 respectively of the Constitution of India, represent exceptions to this rule.
 (4) So far as the Government, local authority and other organs and institutions exercising
governmental power are concerned, they cannot maintain a suit for damages for defaming
them.

(5) Rules 3 and 4 do not, however, mean that Official Secrets Act, 1923, or any similar
enactment or provision having the force of law does not bind the press or media.

(6) There is no law empowering the State or its officials to prohibit, or to impose a prior
restraint upon the press/media.

Also,

29. “Applying the above principles, it must be held that the petitioners have a right to publish,
what they allege to be the life story/autobiography of Auto Shankar insofar as it appears from
the public records, even without his consent or authorisation. But if they go beyond that and
publish his life story, they may be invading his right to privacy and will be liable for the
consequences in accordance with law. Similarly, the State or its officials cannot prevent or
restrain the said publication.”

from K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1642

341.2. “The Puttaswamy [K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1] judgment refers
to the expert group report and identifies nine privacy principles pertaining to notice, choice
and consent, collection limitation, purpose limitation, access and correction, non-disclosure of
information, security of data, openness or proportionality as to the scale, scope and sensitivity
to the data collected and accountability. At the same time, privacy is a subset of liberty. All
liberties may not be exercised in privacy. It lies across the spectrum of protected freedoms.
Further, the notion of reasonable expectation of privacy has both subjective and objective
elements. At a subjective level it means “an individual desires to be left alone”. On an objective
plain privacy is defined by those constitutional values which shape the content of the
protected zone where the individual “ought to be left alone”. Further, the notion of reasonable
expectation of privacy ensures that while on the one hand, the individual has a protected zone
of privacy, yet on the other “the exercise of individual choices is subject to the right of others
to lead orderly lives”. The extent of the zone of privacy would, therefore, depend upon both
the subjective expectation and the objective principle which defines a reasonable
expectation.”
From the above citations, it can be inferred that every person has a right to safeguard the privacy of
his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education among other
matters but it carves an exception of court proceedings. The present case falls inside these two
exceptions mentioned above and hence not liable for defamation. Nor it is liable for the invasion of
privacy as the published data is a court proceeding.

Hence, referring to sec 23 of the Press Council Act, 1978 and the above citations it is held that Dvipa is
not liable to compensate Raktasura.