Intl Courts PV T Public

Public and Private International Law in
International Courts and Tribunals:

Evidence of an Inescapable Interaction
DIEGO P. FERNÁNDEZ ARROYO* AND MAKANE MOÏSE MBENGUE**
Public international law and private interna-

tional law have traditionally been perceived
as being distinct and unrelated. The practice
of international courts and tribunals shows
that in reality both fields are interdependent,
complementary and mutually supportive. The
present contribution highlights how the In-
ternational Court of Justice and tribunals
dealing with investment arbitration and
commercial arbitration have developed a
pragmatic body of case-law that has allowed
public international law and private interna-
tional law to nurture each other.
INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 800

I. DEFINING THE KEY CONCEPTS ....................................... 802
II. THE INTERACTION BEFORE THE PERMANENT COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE .............................................................. 804
A. Scenario One: The Adoption of Private
International Law Rules to Resolve Public
International Law Disputes ............................ 806
B. Scenario Two: The Interpretation of Private
International Law Treaties or the
Construction of Private International Law
Concepts as a Precondition to the
Resolution of Public International Law
Matters.......................................................... 808
C. Scenario Three: The Consideration of
Domestic Private International Law Rules to
798 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [56:797
Resolve Public International Law Matters ...... 811

D. Scenario Four: The Resolution of Public
International Law Matters Arising Out of
States’ Application of Private International
Law................................................................ 817
III. THE INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION............................................................ 819
A. Scenario One: The Consideration and
Application of Public International Law to
Resolve Public International Law Issues
Before International Commercial Arbitral
Tribunals........................................................ 820
1. The Invocation of Public International Law
as a Means to Escape Commercial
Arbitration Obligations.............................. 820
2. Sovereign Immunity Defenses before
International Commercial Arbitration
Tribunals ................................................... 822
3. Domestic Law Defenses Before
International Commercial Arbitration
Tribunals ................................................... 825
B. Scenario Two: Public International Law
Limiting or Guiding the Application of
Private International Law............................... 826
IV. THE INTERACTION IN HYBRID FORMS OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION ............................................................ 830
A. Investor-State Arbitration ............................. 830
B. Establishing Jurisdiction ................................ 832
C. Determining Applicable Law at the Merits
Stage............................................................. 833
1. Compound Choice of Law Clauses ............ 834
2. The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts.......... 841
3. Sovereign Immunity .................................. 855
4. Conclusion................................................. 858
V. THE INTERACTION IN A SINGULAR HYBRID JUDICIAL SETTING:
THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL ................................ 859
A. The Impact of the Tribunal’s Nature on the
2018] PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 799
Interaction Between Private and Public

International Law........................................... 859
B. Determining Applicable Law .......................... 861
C. Conclusion ..................................................... 865
CONCLUSION .................................................................... 865
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, scholars and practitioners have drawn

a sharp distinction between public and private interna-
tional law. Reinforced by centuries of legal education and
practice, the divide between these two disciplines seems
so great that they are generally regarded as distinct, mu-
tually exclusive areas of law.1 The problem with this divi-
sion, however, is that it has never truly reflected reality.
The relationship between public and private international
law is far more nuanced than the traditional distinctions
would suggest.
Asserting a strict divide between public and private
international law masks a necessary confluence between
the two disciplines and has left both public and private
international law scholars and practitioners blind to the
numerous ways in which they interact. The artificial di-
vide has restricted our ability to draw on legal theories,
arguments and techniques developed in one strain of law
to resolve analogous issues in the other.2
* Sciences Po Law School, Paris.

** University of Geneva, Faculty of Law and Sciences Po Law School,
Paris.
The authors are grateful to Mr. Jason Mitchenson for his invaluable
assistance in the preparation of the present contribution.
1. Philip Brown, Private Versus Public International Law, 36 AM. J. INT’L.
L. 448 (1942); John R. Stevenson, The Relationship of Private International
Law to Public International Law, 52 COLUM. L REV. 561 (1952); Joel R. Paul,
The Isolation of Private International Law, 7 WIS. INT’L L. J. 149, 149 (1989).
See also leading public and private international law texts which treat the
two subjects as completely distinct including PIERRE MAYER & VINCENT HEUZÉ,
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ (11th ed. 2014); PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY & YANN KERBRAT,
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (12th ed. 2014); JAMES FAWCETT ET AL., CHESHIRE,
NORTH & FAWCETT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (14th ed. 2008); JAMES CRAWFORD,
BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed. 2012).
2. LUCY REED, MIXED PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW SOLUTIONS TO
INTERNATIONAL CRISES, 306 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 201 (2003); B.A. WORTLEY, THE INTERACTION OF PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW TODAY, 85 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 238, 257 (1954); Alex Mills, The Private
Most of the literature seeking to bridge the divide

between public and private international law has focused
on the historical and theoretical links that exist between
the two disciplines.3 Of course, much can be gained from
both historical and theoretical analysis. In particular,
scholars have shown that public and private international
law emerged as part of a single international law of na-
tions.4 However, a review of the literature reveals a lack
of black-letter law evidence of the interaction between
public and private international law.
The purpose of this Article, then, is to fill the void:
to offer black-letter law evidence of the interaction be-
tween public and private international law in cases that
have come before international courts and tribunals. This
Article progresses as follows: Part II defines key con-
cepts; Part III details decisions of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ) and its successor, the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ); Part IV details awards
from international commercial arbitral tribunals; and Parts
V and VI detail awards from hybrid forms of dispute reso-
lution, such as investor-State arbitration and the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal. By analyzing the decisions
and awards of international courts and tribunals, we hope
to add to the growing body of literature calling for an
History of International Law, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 46 (2006).

3. See, e.g., ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW: JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDERING OF PRIVATE LAW (2009); HANS VAN LOON, THE GLOBAL HORIZON OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, i380 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 25–27 (2015); Fernández Arroyo, Réflexions Autour du
Besoin Réciproque entre le Droit International Privé et le Droit International
Public, in LE 90E ANNIVERSAIRE DE BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI: HOMMAGE DU CURATORIUM
À SON PRÉSIDENT (2012); Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the
State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843
(2006); Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, Private Law and the State—Comparative
Perceptions and Historical Dimensions, 71 RABELS Z. 345 (2007); Muir Watt,
New Challenges in Public and Private International Legal Theory: Can
Comparative Scholarship Help?, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 271–84 (Mark Van Hoecke ed., 2004); Ernest A. Young,
Supranational Rulings as Judgments and Precedents, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 477 (2008); FERNÁNDEZ ARROYO & LIMA MARQUES, EDS., DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
PRIVADO Y DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO: UN ENCUENTRO NECESARIO (2011).
4. Mills, supra note 3, at 26–73.

end to the strict divide between public and private inter-

national law that has plagued both scholarship and prac-
tice.
I. DEFINING THE KEY CONCEPTS
The asserted divide between public and private in-

ternational law suggests that the two occupy different,
mutually exclusive domains. On the one hand, public in-
ternational law comprises the legally binding rules and
principles governing States’ interactions.5 On the other,
private international law concerns the civil and commer-
cial interactions of private actors—who might hail from
different States but who are subject to domestic law re-
garding jurisdiction, the applicable law, and the enforce-
ment of judgments.6 While public international law is
commonly regarded as truly international, private inter-
national law is generally considered to be international
only in name.
Distinctions along these lines no longer reflect, and
perhaps never reflected, reality.7 Changes in the rela-
tions among States, individuals, and multinational corpo-
rations have led scholars and practitioners to reconsider
the traditional boundaries of each discipline. For exam-
5. See, e.g., The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk), Judgement,
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser A), No. 10, (Sept. 7) ¶ 44 (“International law governs re-
lations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States
therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or
by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established
in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent
communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restric-
tions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.”);
see also. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA: CONFLICT
OF LAWS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR THEIR INTERACTION, 163
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979); WORTLEY,
supra note 2.
6. MAYER & HEUZÉ, supra note 1; FAWCETT ET. AL., supra note 1; Stephanie
De Dycker, Private International Law Disputes before the International Court
of Justice, 2 J. Int’l Disp. Settlement 475, 476 (2010).
7. Arroyo, supra note 3; Fernández Arroyo, El derecho internacional
privado en el diván – Tribulaciones de un ser complejo, in LIBRO HOMENAJE A
ROBERTO RUIZ DÍAZ LABRANO 17 (2013).
ple, non-State actors now exert considerable influence in

the development of public international law.8 Interna-
tional economic law and international investment law
have become central features of public international law.9
The growing corpus of international human rights law
demonstrates a (re)discovery of individuals as subjects
of public international law.10 These developments chal-
lenge the traditional conception of public international
law as concerned only with States’ interests.11
Private international law has undergone relevant
changes as well. Recently, scholars and practitioners
have alluded to the “internationalization” of private in-
ternational law. Private international law is increasingly
referenced in international arbitrations; arbitral tribunals
8. Non-State actors cover a broad range of entities, from

intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations,
multinational corporations and more recently individuals: MATH NOORTMANN,
AUGUST REINISCH & CEDRIC RYNGAERT, NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1–2
(2015); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Privatization of Public Law, 25 GEO. WASH.
J. INT’L L. & ECON. 523, 544 (1991). See also the recent position of an ICSID
Tribunal according to which: “A principle may be invoked in this regard
according to which corporations are by nature not able to be subjects of
international law and therefore not capable of holding obligations as if they
would be participants in the State-to-State relations governed by
international law. While such principle had its importance in the past, it has
lost its impact and relevance in similar terms and conditions as this applies
to individuals . . . it can no longer be admitted that companies operating
internationally are immune from becoming subjects of international law.”
Urbaser S.A.
et al. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award (8 Dec. 2016) ¶¶
1195–96.
9. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS
(2006).
10. See, e.g., Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v Dem. Rep. Congo),
Preliminary Objection, 2007 I.C.J. 924 (May 24); Cançado Trindade, The
Historical Recovery of the Human Person as a Subject of the Law of Nations,
1 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 3 (2012); Cançado Trindade, The Emancipation
of the Individual from his Own State: the Historical Recovery of the Human
Person as Subject of the Law of Nations, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND THE
RULE OF LAW: LIBER AMICORUM LUZIUS WILDHABER (2007).
11. See for example, the position expressed by Judge Bennouna in his
Declaration in Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger): ‘The exercise of
sovereignty has thus become inseparable from responsibility towards the
population’ Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), Judgment, 2013 I.C.J.
1042 (April 16) ¶ 95.
are beginning to develop truly transnational principles,

rules, and methodologies of private international law that
are completely devoid of connections with the State.12
States regularly conclude treaties on private international
law13 or otherwise harmonize their domestic laws relevant
to private international disputes.14 Most notably, States
in the European Union have largely relinquished their leg-
islative power with respect to private international law in
favor of developing uniform solutions.15 Much of what
we describe as domestic private international law now
has its origins outside the domestic sphere of States. In-
deed, private international law, like public international
law, may now play a regulatory function.16
In this context it is clear that broader functional
definitions of “public” and “private” international law are
needed. Our definitions, moving forward, must recognize
public and private international law as part of a larger ju-
ridical system concerned with the regulation of interna-
tional relations, more generally.
II. THE INTERACTION BEFORE THE PERMANENT COURT OF

INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
12. EMMANUEL GAILLARD, ASPECTS PHILOSOPHIQUES DU DROIT DE L’ARBITRAGE

INTERNATIONAL,
329 COLLECTED COURSES OF THEHAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
49 (2007).
13. KATHARINA BOELE-WOELKI, UNIFYING AND HARMONIZING SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND
THE ROLE OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, 340 COLLECTED COURSES OF THEHAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 271 (2009).
14. Arroyo, supra note 3.
15. To be sure, domestic private international law is still significant—
although residually—for several questions. Erik Jayme, Die künftige
Bedeutung der nationalen IPR-Kodifikationen, 37 Praxis des Internationalen
Privatund Verfahrensrechts 2, 179 (2017).
16. MUIR WATT & FERNÁNDEZ ARROYO, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE (2014); William S. Dodge, The Public-Private Distinction in the
Conflict of Laws,18 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 371 (2007); Robert Wai,
Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of
Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L
L. 209 (2002); Muir Watt, Integration and Diversity: The Conflict of Laws as
a Regulatory Tool, in THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 107
(2006).
JUSTICE
This Part traces the interaction between public and

private international law in the decisions of the PCIJ and
the ICJ (together, “the Court”). The Court is a public in-
ternational law institution: pursuant to Article 34 of the
ICJ Statute, only States may be parties in cases before
the Court.17 However, the Court’s past cases show that
the Court has been required to examine issues of private
international law in order to properly discharge its public
international law function.18
The decisions analyzed below demonstrate that
there are essentially four different scenarios in which
public and private international law may interact before
theCcourt. The first arises when the Court is confronted
with a lacuna in public international law, capable of being
filled by reference to private international law. In these
types of cases, the Court borrows private international
law rules to resolve analogous public international law is-
sues. The second arises when the Court is required, as a
prerequisite to resolving a public international law issue,
to interpret a private international law treaty or construe
a private international law concept. The third arises
when public international law rights and obligations flow
directly from States’ domestic laws regarding private in-
ternational disputes. The fourth arises when the Court is
required to determine whether a State’s exercise of its
domestic laws regarding private international disputes
17. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 5, ¶
25 (Apr. 9) (“But to ensure respect for international law, of which it is the
organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British Navy consti-
tuted a violation of Albanian sovereignty”); Certain German Interests in Pol-
ish Upper Silesia (Ger. v Pol.), Merits, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7 at ¶ 52
(May 25) (“[f]rom the standpoint of International Law and of the Court
which is its organ…”); LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgement, 2001 ICJ Rep. 466
at ¶ 486; Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala, Judgement, 1955 I.C.J.
Rep. 4, ¶ 420-421 (Apr. 6). See also ROBERT KOLB, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 57 (2013); ANDREAS ZIMMERMAN ET AL., THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE 731 (2d ed. 2012).
18. Mills, supra note 2; Th.M de Boer, Living Apart Together: the
relationship between public and private international law, 57 NETH. INT’L L.
REV. 183–207 (2001); C.G. WEERAMANTRY, UNIVERSALISING INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Brill Nijhoff 2004).
has infringed public international law.
A. Scenario One: The Adoption of Private International

Law Rules to Resolve Public International Law
Disputes
Arguably, the most notable interaction between
public and private international law occurred in the Ser-
bian and Brazilian Loans cases.19 The PCIJ had been
charged with determining whether the service of pre-WWI
Serbian and Brazilian bonds issued in France should be af-
fected on the basis of the French paper franc or the gold
franc. Each case turned on the same question of which
law was applicable to the loan contracts and to the cur-
rency in which payment of the debts was to be made.
There was no relevant treaty law in either case.
In determining the applicable law, the PCIJ was re-
quired to define the role and importance of private inter-
national law in the context of public international law dis-
putes. Most notably, it held:
Any contract which is not a contract be-
tween States in their capacity as subjects of
international law is based on the municipal
law of some country. The question as to
which this law is forms the subject of that
branch of law which is at the present day
usually described as private international law
or the doctrine of the conflict of laws. The
rules thereof may be common to several
States and may even be established by in-
ternational conventions or customs, and in
the latter case may possess the character or
true international law governing the relations
between States. But apart from this, it has
to be considered that these rules form part
of municipal law.20
19. Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Yugo.),

Judgment, 1929 P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 20 (July 12); see also Payment in Gold
of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France (Fr. v. Braz.), 1929 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 21 (July 12).
20. Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Yugo.),
Evidently, the PCIJ considered that private international

law forms part of the domestic law of States. However,
it also recognized that certain private international law
rules may be elevated to the status of public interna-
tional law rules and may thus govern the relations be-
tween States.
Throughout its decision, the PCIJ treated public
and private international law as if linked, using States’
municipal laws and practice to develop its own choice-of-
law rules.21 For example, the PCIJ recognized a distinc-
tion between the mode of payment and the substance of
the debt—a distinction familiar to many State courts in
the application of their private international law rules.
Applying the private international law principle of dé-
peçage, which permits the application of two applicable
laws, the PCIJ held that this distinction meant that the
substance of the debt was governed by Serbian law but
French law applied to the currency in which payment was
to be made. Similarly, the Court recognized the legal
presumption familiar to State courts that a contracting
State, not contracting under public international law,
submits to its own law.22 In sum, the PCIJ considered
private international law to determine the “general prin-
ciples of law recognized by civilized nations,” a source of
public international law.23
Judgment, 1929 P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 20, ¶ 86.(July 12).

21. Id. ¶¶ 85–87.
22. Of course, this only a presumption as States may submit to foreign
law: MAURO MEGLIANI, SOVEREIGN DEBT: GENESIS—RESTRUCTURING—LITIGATION 224–
225 (2015); VAUGHAN BLACK, FOREIGN CURRENCY CLAIMS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
[pincite required] (2010); CAROLINE KLEINER, LA MONNAIE DANS LES RELATIONS
PRIVÉES INTERNATIONALES 32–33 (2010) . Payment of Various Serbian Loans
Issued in France (Fr. v. Yugo.), Judgment, 1929 P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 20, ¶ 52
(July 12) (“The bonds are bearer bonds signed at Belgrade by the
representatives of the Serbian Government. It follows from the very nature
of bearer bonds that, in respect of all holders, the substance of the debt is
necessarily the same and that the identity of the holder and the place where
he obtained it are without relevancy. Only the individuality of the borrower is
fixed: in this case it is a sovereign State, which cannot be presumed to have
made the substance of its debt and the validity of the obligations accepted
by it in respect thereof, subject to any law other than its own.”).
23. Under Article 38(1)(c) of its Statute (previously Article 38(3) of the
PCIJ Statute), the Court is permitted to draw upon the “general principles of
The Serbian and Brazilian Loans cases demonstrate

that the Court views public and private international law
as complements. Often public international law scholars
and practitioners assume that if there is no relevant cus-
tomary norm or treaty provision, there is simply no public
international law on the subject.24 This assumption ig-
nores the close link between public and private interna-
tional law.25 When faced with a lacuna in public interna-
tional law, private international law should serve as
guidance.
B. Scenario Two: The Interpretation of Private

International Law Treaties or the Construction of
Private International Law Concepts as a
Precondition to the Resolution of Public
International Law Matters
The Court has previously interpreted private inter-
national law treaties in order to resolve public interna-
tional law matters. The interaction between public and
private international law in these types of cases is evi-
dent, and the Court’s decisions have the potential to af-
fect the development and application of both public and
private international law. As the Court in the Serbian
Loans case suggested, treaties can move traditionally
private international law issues into public international
law’s regulatory scope.
In the Boll case,26 the ICJ was required to interpret
the scope of the Hague Guardianship Convention (the
“Convention”), drafted by the Hague Convention on Pri-
law recognized by civilized nations” as a source of public international law.

Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Yugo.), Judgment,
1929 P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 20 ¶ 41 (July 12).
24. The contention that under international law everything which is not
prohibited is permitted was given some countenance in S.S. Lotus (Fr. v.
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶¶ 44 and 60 (Sept. 7).
25. Wortley, supra note 2, at 298.
26. Guardianship of an Infant (Neth. v. Swed.), Judgment, 1958 I.C.J
Rep. 55 (Nov. 28).
vate International Law in 1902. The Netherlands pled

that Sweden had violated its international family law obli-
gations with respect to a Dutch national, who had been
born to a Dutch father and Swedish mother. Ultimately,
the ICJ held that the Convention, a private international
law instrument, did not cover Sweden’s conduct.27
In a separate opinion Judge Lauterpacht suggested
that the private international law concept of ordre public
should apply, as a general principle of law complementing
the treaty regime.28 Though the drafters of the Conven-
tion had deliberately rejected his interpretation, Judge
Lauterpacht considered the protection of children an ob-
vious part of ordre public. He argued:
[I]n the sphere of private international law,
the exception of ordre public, of public pol-
icy, as a reason for the exclusion of foreign
law in a particular case is generally – or
rather, universally – recognized. . .the recog-
nition of the part of ordre public must be re-
garded as a general principle of law in the
field of private international law. If that is so,
then it may not improperly be considered to
be a general principle of law in the sense of
Article 38 of the Statute of the Court. That
circumstance also provides an answer to the
question as to the nature and content of the
conception of public policy by reference to
which must be judged the propriety of the
Swedish legislation in the matter. Clearly, it is
not the Swedish notion of ordre public which
can provide the exclusive standard in this
connection. The answer is that, the notion of
ordre public – of public policy – being a gen-
eral legal conception, its content must be
determined in the same way as that of any
other general principle of law in the sense of
Article 38 of the Statute, namely, by refer-
ence to the practice and the experience of
27. Id. ¶ 71; De Dycker, supra note 6, at 486.

28. Guardianship of an Infant (Neth. v. Swed.), Judgment, 1958 I.C.J
Rep. 55, ¶¶ 92–94 (Nov. 28) (separate opinion by Lauterpacht, J.).
the municipal law of civilized nations in that

field.29
Though Judge Lauterpacht did not prevail on the point,
recent decisions have adopted his sentiment regarding
ordre public—incorporating the private international law
concept into public international law.30
The Boll case shows how easily public and private
international law can come into contact.31 It also demon-
strates that the Court has not hesitated in interpreting
the scope of private international law conventions when
necessary. Indeed, some judges, like Judge Lauterpacht,
have argued for a more robust relationship between pub-
lic and private international law.32
Moreover, there is a trend towards the internation-
alization of private international law. This is particularly
evident in Europe, where private international law is
largely governed by supranational and international in-
29. Id.
30. Certain recent decisions of international courts have noticed that
trend of making the concept of ordre public a concept of public international
law. See, e.g., World Duty Free Company Limited v. Rep. of Kenya, Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶¶ 138–139 (Oct. 4, 2004) (“The con-
cept of public policy (“ordre public”) is rooted in most, if not all, legal sys-
tems . . .”In this respect, a number of legislatures and courts have decided
that a narrow concept of public policy should apply to foreign awards. This
narrow concept is often referred to as “international public policy” (“ordre
public international”) “The term ‘international public policy’, however, is
sometimes used with another meaning, signifying an international consensus
as to universal standards and accepted norms of conduct that must be ap-
plied in all fora.”) See Pierre Lalive, Ordre public transnational (ou réellement
international) et arbitrage international, 3 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE 329 (1986).
31. A similar situation arose more recently in 2009, when the ICJ was
called upon to settle a dispute between Belgium and Switzerland. The case,
however, was discontinued on Belgium’s request and as a result was
removed from the ICJ’s case list in 2011. We do not know whether the ICJ
would have assumed jurisdiction or what it would have decided on the
merits. Had it assumed jurisdiction, the case would have required the ICJ to
interpret yet another private international law instrument. As in Boll, the
result of such a decision would have affected the rights and obligations of
public and private actors and the development and application of both public
and private international law. See Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Belg. v Switz.), Application,
2009 I.C.J. Rep. No. 145 (Dec. 2009).
32. De Dycker, supra note 6, at 486.
struments.33 As more States enter private international

law treaties in an effort to reduce jurisdictional conflicts,
it is likely that we will see a number of cases similar to
the Boll case. The recent Belgium v. Switzerland case,
submitted to the ICJ in 2009 but resolved by the parties
before the ICJ had assumed jurisdiction, might be the
first in a line of contemporary cases. At the very least,
Belgium v. Switzerland demonstrates that States still
perceive the ICJ as an institution at the intersection of
public and private international law.34
C. Scenario Three: The Consideration of Domestic Private

International Law Rules to Resolve Public
International Law Matters
The Court has also considered private international
law when public international law rights and obligations
flow directly from a State’s domestic law. This is not to
say that the Court has, in these cases, applied domestic
law as public international law. Rather, the Court has
used domestic law as if it were a fact relevant to the
resolution of its dispute.35
Even though private international law does not op-
erate as a source of public international law in these
cases, it can still have decisive influence.36 This arises,
for example, whenever a State exercises diplomatic pro-
tection on behalf of an injured person. Because States
can only avail the rights of their own nationals, the Court
has to investigate the State’s nationality laws—largely a
matter of private international law—to determine
33. See generally, THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF EU PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

AFTER OPINION 1/13 (Pietro Franzina ed., 2016). Of course, this is not only
the case in Europe. See, e.g., Fernández Arroyo, Main Characteristics of the
New Private International Law of the Argentinian Republic, 80 RABELS Z. 130,
135–138 (2016).
34. De Dycker, supra note 6, at 477 and 486.
35. German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germ. v. Pol.), Judgment,
1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6 ¶ 52 (May. 25) (“From the standpoint of
International Law and of the Court which is its organ, municipal laws are
merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States, in
the same manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures.”).
36. De Dycker, supra note 6, at 491.
whether the injured person is a national of the rights-

asserting State. The Court has delivered three notable
judgments in this area of law; each provides evidence of
the interaction between public and private international
law and reinforces the Court’s position at the juncture
between these two disciplines.
In the Nottebohm case,37 the ICJ had to determine
whether Liechtenstein could exercise diplomatic protec-
tion on behalf of one of its nationals, Friedrich Notte-
bohm. Nottebohm was a German national by birth but
had left Germany for Guatemala in 1905, taking up resi-
dence in Guatemala and making it the center of his busi-
ness activities. To avoid being considered an enemy na-
tional if Guatemala were to side with the Allies,
Nottebohm sought and obtained Liechtenstein nationality
and relinquished his German nationality in 1939. Still,
when Guatemala declared war on Germany, Nottebohm
was arrested and transferred to the United States. When
he tried to return to Guatemala, he was refused entry
and his property in Guatemala was expropriated. In an
attempt to avail Nottebohm’s rights, Liechtenstein insti-
tuted proceedings against Guatemala before the ICJ.
Guatemala countered that Nottebohm was not actually a
Liechtenstein national and that the dispute was improp-
erly brought.38
The ICJ drew a clear distinction between States’
sovereign power to frame their own nationality laws and
States’ right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf
of its nationals. Though the ICJ lacked jurisdiction over
the former, the latter fell within the ambit of public inter-
national law.39 Of course, the relevance of the latter
would, as a preliminary matter, depend on the former—
here, whether Nottebohm had complied with Liechten-
stein’s nationality laws and was properly, as a matter of
domestic law, a Liechtenstein national.
The ICJ did not apply domestic law to resolve the
37. Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Second Phase, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 18, at
4 (Apr. 6).
38. Counter-Memorial of Guatemala, Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.).
Pleadings, 1955 I.C.J. 184, ¶¶ 11–41 (Apr. 20, 1944).
39. Id. ¶ 24.
Nottebohm case. Rather, it considered Liechtenstein’s

nationality laws and Nottebohm’s conduct as facts, the
existence of which were necessary to decide the public
international law issue. The ICJ concluded that Notte-
bohm had fulfilled the nationality criteria laid down by
Liechtenstein40 and thus proceeded to analyze whether
Nottebohm’s nationality was “real and effective” for pub-
lic international law purposes.41
After analyzing Nottebohm’s connection with
Liechtenstein in detail, the ICJ held that Nottebohm—
inarguably a Lichtenstein national—did not have Liech-
tenstein nationality for the purposes of diplomatic pro-
tection. The connection between Nottebohm and Liech-
tenstein was not effective, so Liechtenstein could not
exercise diplomatic protection on his behalf.42 Interest-
ingly, the ICJ appeared to find inspiration for its effective
nationality test in the practice and experience of State
courts and tribunals in cases concerning dual national-
ity.43 In this regard, the ICJ held:
According to the practice of States, to arbi-
tral and judicial decisions and to the opinions
of writers, nationality is a legal bond having
as its basis a social fact of attachment, a
genuine connection of existence, interests
and sentiments, together with the existence
of reciprocal rights and duties . . . Conferred
by a State, it only entitles that State to ex-
ercise protection vis-a-vis another State, if it
constitutes a translation into juridical terms
of the individual’s connection with the State
which has made him its national.44
The ICJ’s characterization of nationality and its effect
vis-à-vis other States in the context of exercising diplo-
40. Id. ¶ 21.

41. Id.
42. Id. ¶ 25(“No settled abode, no prolonged residence in that country
at the time of his application for naturalization . . . No intention of settling
there was shown...There is no allegation of any economic interests or of any
activities exercised or to be exercised in Liechtenstein.”)
43. Id. ¶¶ 22–23.
44. Id ¶ 23.
matic protection are based on the characterization of the

same concept given by State courts and tribunals in cir-
cumstances where they are required to determine appli-
cable law where nationality is a connecting factor.45
However, it should be noted that the Court’s use of pri-
vate international law in this manner is different from the
way in which it was used in the Serbian and Brazilian
Loans cases. In those cases, the ICJ applied private in-
ternational law rules regarding choice of law to determine
the exact same issue in public international law—that
was, choice of law between States.
In this case, the ICJ’s use of private international
law was different because the factual circumstances sup-
porting the analogy were different. Indeed, the ICJ used
the concept of effective nationality, as applied between
State courts and tribunals in the context of determining
applicable law, to determine whether diplomatic protec-
tion could be exercised. In the Nottebohm case, the ICJ
applied the concept in circumstances where there was no
conflict of nationality since Nottebohm had lost his Ger-
man citizenship. In this sense, private international law
appears solely to provide inspiration for the ICJ’s adop-
tion of the effective nationality test in public interna-
tional law. Indeed, the ICJ has confirmed that it is not
restricted to borrowing concepts of private international
law “lock, stock and barrel” but rather may use such
concepts as inspiration for the effective resolution of
public international law matters.46
Another nationality issue arose in the ICJ’s Barce-
45. Id. ¶¶ 20–25. Where the court reviews the general practice of
States courts and tribunals and scholarly writings.
46. International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950
I.C.J. Rep. 128, ¶ 148 (separate opinion by McNair, J.). Cited by Rosalyn
Higgins, The International Court of Justice and Private International Law
Thoughts, in THEMES AND THEORIES: SELECTED ESSAYS, SPEECHES, AND WRITINGS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1310 (2009) (“The way in which international law borrows
from its source is not by means of importing private law institutions ‘lock,
stock and barrel’, ready-made and fully equipped with a set of rules... In my
opinion, the true view of the duty of international tribunals in this matter is
to regard any features or terminology which are reminiscent of the rules and
institutions of private law as an indication of policy and principles rather than
as directly importing these rules and institutions.”).
lona Traction case,47 albeit in relation to corporate iden-

tity. In that case, Belgium sought to exercise diplomatic
protection on behalf of its investors in the Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Company, a utility company
operating in Spain, incorporated in Canada, and owned
primarily by Belgians. The ICJ held that only the State
under whose laws a company is incorporated, and not
any State whose shareholders have been affected, could
bring a claim under public international law.48 Finding
that the company was properly incorporated under Cana-
dian rather than Belgian law, the ICJ refused Belgium’s
application.49
The ICJ revisited the relationship between domes-
tic nationality and diplomatic protection in its recent Di-
allo case. In that case,50 the Republic of Guinea instituted
proceedings against the Democratic Republic of Congo
(“DRC”) on behalf of Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, a business-
man who had resided in the DRC for over thirty years.
Diallo had incorporated two companies in the DRC pursu-
ant to Congolese law. He held 100% of the shares in one
company and 40% in the other. In the 1980s, Diallo and
his companies sued several Congolese public institutions
to recover money they were owed by the government.
Congolese authorities arrested and detained Diallo in
198851 and then arrested, detained, expelled, and expro-
priated property belonging to Diallo in 1995.52
Guinea sought to exercise diplomatic protection
regarding the violation of Diallo’s human rights and re-
garding the injuries Diallo suffered as a shareholder.53
The DRC did not contest the first exercise but did con-
47. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Second
Phase, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 50 (Feb. 5)
48. Id. ¶ 70.
49. Id.
50. Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v Dem. Rep. Congo),
Preliminary Objections, 2007 ICJ Rep. No. 924, (May 24).
51. The claims regarding this earlier arrest and detention were found
inadmissible, as they were raised late and not sufficiently connected to the
claims made in the application instituting the proceedings.
52. See id. ¶¶ 15–20.
53. Diallo, 2007 ICJ Rep. No. 924 ¶¶ 31 and 77.
test the second; the DRC, relying on Barcelona Traction,

argued that States cannot exercise diplomatic protection
on behalf of corporations incorporated abroad, even if
their nationals are majority shareholders. The ICJ agreed
with the DRC’s arguments, confirming the reasoning of
Nottebohm and Barcelona Traction.54
Though the DRC did not contest Guinea’s standing
to avail Diallo’s human rights, this exercise of diplomatic
protection warrants attention. In explaining why the ex-
ercise was proper, the ICJ pronounced that public inter-
national law had shifted, so as to regulate State conduct
regarding individuals:
Owing to the substantive development of in-
ternational law over recent decades in re-
spect of the rights it accords to individuals,
the scope ratione materiae of diplomatic
protection, originally limited to alleged viola-
tions of the minimum standard of treatment
of aliens, has subsequently widened to in-
clude, inter alia, internationally guaranteed
human rights.55
The claims regarding Diallo’s human rights, including his
personal rights as associé of the two companies, were
admissible.56
Diallo, and the general approach of the ICJ, has the
potential to affect the content and scope of public and
private international law. The logic of Diallo might permit
States to advance similar claims when another State’s
exercise of its private international law rules deprives
their nationals of property. It is not difficult to imagine
scenarios in which a State’s decision not to assume juris-
diction in accordance with its domestic private interna-
tional law rules or a decision not to recognize a decision
in contravention of a State’s ordre public would affect
the rights of foreign nationals.57
54. Id. at ¶¶ 74, 84–95.

55. Id. at ¶ 39.
56. This includes Diallo’s right to property over his parts sociales in the
companies. Id. ¶¶ 39, 65.
57. See Lalive, supra note 30. French source available at
https://www.trans-lex.org/125600/_/lalive-pierre-ordre-public-
D. Scenario Four: The Resolution of Public International

Law Matters Arising Out of States’ Application of
Private International Law
The Court has also been required to resolve public
international law matters arising out of a State’s applica-
tion of its private international law. This arises most
prominently in cases regarding jurisdictional immunities.
Jurisdictional immunities limit the permissible exercise of
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments by domestic courts under private international
law. The subject falls at the intersection of public and
private international law.58
In its Jurisdictional Immunities case,59 the ICJ was
required to determine whether Italy was liable under pub-
lic international law for failing to respect the jurisdictional
immunity of Germany. Pursuant to Italian private interna-
tional law rules, Italian courts had reviewed civil claims
against Germany regarding violations of international hu-
manitarian law during WWII. Italian courts had also rec-
ognized Greek judgments concerning similar civil claims.60
After a detailed analysis of relevant State practice,
the ICJ concluded, “customary international law contin-
ues to require that a State be accorded immunity in pro-
ceedings for torts allegedly committed on the territory of
another State by its armed forces and other organs of
State in the course of conducting armed conflict.”61 Italy
had violated its obligation to respect the jurisdictional
immunity that Germany enjoyed under public interna-
tional law by allowing and recognizing claims against
Germany in Italian courts.62
transnational-et-arbitrage-international-revdarb-1986-at-329-et-seq/
[https://perma.cc/WNQ9-FE6F].
58. Higgins, supra note 46, at 1310.
59. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. Italy: Greece
intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 143, ¶ 78 (Feb. 3).
60. See id. ¶¶ 27-36.
61. Id.
62. For a critical appraisal of this solution, see Andrea Bianchi, Gazing at
the Crystal Ball (Again): State Immunity and Jus Cogens beyond Germany v.
Italy, 4 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 457, 457 (2013); Burkhard Hess,
Staatenimmunität und ius cogens im geltenden Völkerrecht: Der
The case arose out of purely private international

law relations between States regarding the exercise of ju-
risdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. The ICJ had to determine the scope and con-
tent of a public international law principle affecting the
scope and content of Italy’s private international law. In
other words, public international law placed limits on Ital-
ian private international law.
The Jurisdictional Immunities judgment has been
contentious; the relationship between public and private
international law in this area is yet unsettled. In late
2014, the Italian Constitutional Court struck down the
Italian legislation implementing the judgment.63 The Con-
stitutional Court held that legislation cannot, consistent
with the Constitution, preclude Italian courts from assum-
ing jurisdiction in cases involving jus cogens violations.
Such preclusion would prevent victims from obtaining ac-
cess to justice,64 which is a fundamental and non-
derogable right protected by the Constitution. States
cannot invoke their jurisdictional immunities to escape li-
ability for international crimes.65
Internationale Gerichtshof zeigt die Grenzen auf, 32 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN

PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS 201 (2012).
63. Corte Cost., 22 ottobre 2014, n. 238, Racc. uff. corte. cost. 2014
(It.).
64. The legislation in question was Law No 5/2013. Article 3 of Law No
5/2013 stated that Italian judges must comply with the ICJ judgment:
“[W]here the International Court of Justice, in a judgment set-
tling a dispute in which Italy is a party, excluded the possibility of
subjecting a specific conduct of another State to civil jurisdiction,
the judge hearing the case, ex officio and even where he has al-
ready passed a decision which is not final but has the effect
of res judicata with regard to the existence of jurisdiction, shall
ascertain the lack of jurisdiction in every stage and instance of
the proceeding . . . Decisions constituting res judicata contrary to
the above mentioned ICJ judgments, even where the latter have
been passed subsequently, can be reconsidered not only in the
cases provided by Article 395 of the Italian Code of Civil Proce-
dure [‘Revocazione’], but also due to lack of civil jurisdiction . . .”
(Translated in Fulvio Maria Palombino, Italy’s Compliance with ICJ Decisions
vs Constitutional Guarantees: Does the “Counter-Limits” Doctrine Matter?,
22 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 187, 197 (2012)).
65. Corte Cost., 22 ottobre 2014, n. 238, Racc. uff. corte. cost. 2014,
3.4 (It.). Similar comments were made by Judge Cançado Trindade in his
dissent in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece
The ICJ and the Italian Constitutional Court are evi-

dently in conflict.66 This conflict evidences a continuing
discussion regarding how public and private international
law should interact to regulate, among other issues, sov-
ereign immunity. On the one hand, the Jurisdictional Im-
munities judgment suggests that public international law
plays a limiting role, shaping the development and appli-
cation of private international law in accordance with
customary international law. On the other, the decision of
the Italian Constitutional Court, a form of State practice
relevant to identification of customary international law,
could play a role in changing the applicability of State
immunity in cases arising out of international crimes. In
this sense, private international law, as informed by con-
stitutional rules, has the power to shape the develop-
ment and application of public international law.
III. THE INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
This Part traces and characterizes the interaction

between public and private international law in awards
rendered by international commercial arbitral tribunals.67
intervening) Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 143, ¶ 179 (Feb 3) (separate

opinion by Trindade, J. ) (“No State can, nor was ever allowed, to invoke
sovereignty to enslave and/or to exterminate human beings, and then to
avoid the legal consequences by standing behind the shield of State
immunity. There is no immunity for grave violations of human rights and of
international humanitarian law, for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Immunity was never conceived for such iniquity. To insist on pursuing a
strictly inter-State approach in the relationships of responsibility leads to
manifest injustice.”).
66. See Micaela Frulli, Time Will Tell Who Just Fell and Who’s Been Left
Behind: On the Clash between the International Court of Justice and the
Italian Constitutional Court, 14 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 587, 587 (2016).
67. Tracing and characterizing the interaction between public and
private international law in international commercial arbitration is much more
difficult than analyzing the judgments of the ICJ. Firstly, whilst the
judgments of the ICJ are made public as a matter of course, commercial
arbitral awards are generally confidential, notwithstanding the trends
towards transparency. This significantly limits the number of arbitral awards
that may be analyzed in order to determine the extent of the interaction
between public and private international law in commercial arbitration and
precludes us from developing a complete picture. Secondly, unlike the ICJ,
It identifies two circumstances in which the interaction

occurs: First, when one of the parties is a State or State
entity, public international law issues may arise regarding
the State or State entity’s status. Second, when a tribu-
nal’s application of private international law, as such,
would contravene public international law, that tribunal
might limit or otherwise modify its application.
A. Scenario One: The Consideration and Application of

Public International Law to Resolve Public
International Law Issues Before International
Commercial Arbitral Tribunals
1. The Invocation of Public International Law as a Means
to Escape Commercial Arbitration Obligations
States and State entities occasionally invoke public

international law to escape their contractual obligations
to arbitrate or to frustrate enforcement proceedings. For
example, in ICC case 6476 of 1992,68 the respondent, a
largely-unrecognized State at the time, pleaded its own
illegitimacy under public international law as grounds for
not enforcing commercial contracts, including an arbitra-
tion agreement, it concluded with the applicant:
[A]n international tribunal must decline to
exercise jurisdiction over a dispute involving
[the respondent] in the light of the superior
interest of the international community in re-
fusing to acknowledge in any form whatso-
ever the existence of [the respondent] as a
State [under public international law].69
there is much more diversity among arbitral tribunals in terms of arbitrators,

parties, and issues. Thus, it becomes more difficult to characterize the
interaction between public and private international law in a concrete way
because arbitral tribunals necessarily characterize and resolve issues
differently.
68. Case No. 6476 of 1992 (unpublished award) (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) and
Case No. 6474 of 1992 25 Y.B Comm. Arb. 279 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) cited in
HORACIO A. GRIGERA NAÓN, CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, 289 COLLECTED COURSES OF THEHAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
9, 172–76 (2001).
69. Id.
In rejecting the respondent’s submission, the Tribunal

considered and applied numerous concepts of public in-
ternational law. The Tribunal held that the principle of
good faith, a general principle of law, prohibited the re-
spondent from relying on its disputed status to avoid its
previous undertaking to arbitrate under its contracts.70
The respondent’s position was tantamount to a “unilat-
eral rescission or withdrawal of the arbitration undertak-
ing, a course of conduct . . . generally rejected by the in-
ternational community as in flat contradiction with the
fundamental principle of good faith.”71 Moreover, the
Tribunal reviewed public international law decisions and
literature to determine that “the non-recognition of for-
eign States or foreign governments is generally consid-
ered as irrelevant” for identifying legal rights and respon-
sibilities.72
Finally, the Tribunal assessed whether it was bound
by General Assembly resolutions, Security Council resolu-
tions, or jus cogens norms to decline jurisdiction over the
dispute. The respondent had argued that the jus cogens
prohibition of apartheid prevented the arbitrators, “or-
gans of the international community” bound to uphold
principles of public international law, from assuming juris-
diction and thus recognizing the respondent.73 The Tri-
bunal found no basis for declining jurisdiction.
In ICC case 7748 of 1995,74 the Tribunal had to
determine whether the respondent-State was the suc-
cessor of a State that had previously signed a contract
containing the disputed arbitration clause. It additionally
had to address the respondent-State’s argument that
under the “applicable doctrine of public international
law,” private rights and obligations of an “unliquidated
character” cannot pass to a successor-State.75 The Tri-
70. Id. at 173.

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Case No. 6476 of 1992 (unpublished award) (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) and
Case No. 6474 of 1992, 25 Y.B Comm. Arb. 279 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) cited in
GRIGERA NAÓN, supra note 68, at 174–175.
74. Case No. 7748 of 1995 (unpublished partial award) (ICC Int’l Ct.
Arb.) cited in GRIGERA NAÓN, supra note 68, at 175.
75. GRIGERA NAÓN, supra note 68, at 176.
bunal itself noted that “public international law is relevant

to most, if not all, the elements necessary to decide this
Issue.”76 The Tribunal did not hesitate to hear, and ren-
der its decision based on, testimony from public interna-
tional law experts regarding the relevant rules and
authorities.77
Another situation arose in ICC case 1512 of
1990. 78
In that case, the respondent-State pleaded that
a war between itself and the applicant constituted force
majeure and precluded the Tribunal’s assumption of ju-
risdiction under the arbitration agreement. The Tribunal
examined public international law to determine that the
hostilities between the two States did not create a state
of war. It therefore rejected the respondent’s submis-
sion and assumed jurisdiction in accordance with the ar-
bitration agreement.
Each of the aforementioned awards demonstrates
how tribunals can face mixed public-private international
law disputes. When public international law issues do ex-
ist, the awards suggest that tribunals will not hesitate to
investigate and apply public international law rules and
principles. The awards also make it clear that issues re-
lating to public international law will not always be de-
cided by public international law institutions. Rather,
there are circumstances in which public international law
issues are so intertwined with private international law—
and the interests of non-State actors incapable of invok-
ing the ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction—that they neces-
sarily will be resolved by international commercial arbitral
tribunals.
2. Sovereign Immunity Defenses before International

Commercial Arbitration Tribunals
Public international law issues also arise when a

State or State entity raises a sovereign immunity defense
76. Id.
77. Id. at 177.
78. Case No. 1512 of 1990, (unpublished partial award) (ICC Int’l Ct.
Arb.) cited in GRIGERA NAÓN, supra note 68, at 177.
to challenge the jurisdiction of the tribunal.79 Sovereign

immunity is based on the principle of comity and the fun-
damental equality of States under customary interna-
tional law. As there is no international convention in
force,80 or uniform rules regulating sovereign immunity in
toto, its content and effect depends on each jurisdic-
tion.81 Though States once enjoyed absolute immunity
from the jurisdiction of foreign courts, including from
recognition and enforcement of judgments and awards,82
the increased involvement of sovereign entities in trans-
national commerce has eroded sovereign immunity.83
In many jurisdictions, absolute immunity has been
replaced by restrictive immunity, which permits courts to
assume jurisdiction, grant interim measures, and enforce
judgments and awards against State parties in certain
circumstances.84 Restrictive immunity usually distin-
79. DHISADEE CHAMLONGRASDR, FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY AND ARBITRATION 79

(2007); HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY (3d ed., 2015).
80. The current state and the conditions for the entering into force of
the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property,
G.A. Res. 59/38 (Dec. 14, 2004) may be consulted on U.N. TREATY SERVICE,
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR
PROPERTY: STATUS (2018)
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&ta
bid=2&mtdsg_no=III-13&chapter=3&lang=en [https://perma.cc/KGK7-
44H3].
81. While sovereign immunity is considered to be part of customary
international law, there is no consensus on, or Convention in place dealing
with, all aspects of sovereign immunity. Thus, domestic rules on sovereign
immunity still vary significantly. For a comprehensive analysis of the sources
of State immunity, see Fox & Webb, supra note 79, at Part II, 101–338.
82. Some jurisdictions, most notably China, still accord absolute
immunity to sovereign defendants. Democratic Republic of the Congo, et.
al., v. FG Associates LLC, [2010] 14 H.K.C.F.A.R. 95, ¶ 260 (C.F.I.), per
Chan PJ, Ribeiro PJ and Mason NPJ: “China has consistently adhered to the
doctrine that a state and its property enjoy absolute immunity from
jurisdiction and from execution. It has never subscribed to the theory of
restrictive immunity…”
83. Tai-Heng Cheng & Ivo Entchev, State Incapacity and Sovereign
Immunity in International Arbitration, 26 SING. ACAD. L. J. 942, 956 (2014).
84. The doctrine of restrictive immunity is reflected in international
conventions such as the European Convention on State Immunity, entered
into force Nov. 6, 1976, E.T.S. No. 074, and the International Law
Commission Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunity, U.N. Doc. A/46/10
guishes between sovereign acts (acta jure imperii) and

commercial acts (acta jure gestionis) to determine if a
State or State entity is entitled to claim immunity.85
Most jurisdictions provide immunity for sovereign, but
(1991) reprinted in [1991] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 13, prepared by the

International Law Commission, as well as in most national codifications. See
Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529 at
555E–556C (Lord Denning, J.) (outlining the general acceptance of the
doctrine of restrictive immunity in other jurisdictions):
In the last 50 years there has been a complete transformation in
the functions of a sovereign state. Nearly every country now en-
gages in commercial activities. . . This transformation has
changed the rules of international law relating to sovereign im-
munity. Many countries have now departed from the rule of ab-
solute immunity. So many have departed from it that it can no
longer be considered a rule of international law. It has been re-
placed by a doctrine of restrictive immunity. . . In 1951 Sir
Hersch Lauterpacht showed that, even at that date, many Euro-
pean countries had abandoned the doctrine of absolute immunity
and adopted that of restrictive immunity. . . Since that date there
have been important conversions to the same view. . . Many
countries have now adopted it. We have been given a valuable
collection of recent decisions in which the courts of Belgium, Hol-
land, the German Federal Republic, the United States of America
and others have abandoned absolute immunity and granted only
restrictive immunity…)
For some of those other jurisdictions see, e.g., Zodiak Int’l Products Inc. v.
Polish People’s Rep. (1977) 81 D.L.R. 3d 656 (Can.); Kaffraria Property Co
(Pty) Inc. v. Rep. of Zambia [1980] 2 S.A. 709 (S. Afr.); A.M. Qureshi v.
U.S.S.R. (1981) 33 PLD (SC) 377 (Pak.); Claim against the Empire of Iran,
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerGF] [German Constitutional Court] Apr. 30,
1963, 16 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 27, 45
I.L.R. 57.
85. In Claim against the Empire of Iran, BVerGF Apr. 30, 1963, 16
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 27, 45 I.L.R. 57,
80 the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany held:
“As a means for determining the distinction between acts jure imperii and
jure gestionis one should rather refer to the nature of the State transaction
or the resulting legal relationships, and not to the motive or purpose of the
State activity. It thus depends on whether the foreign State has acted in
exercise of its sovereign authority, that is in public law, or like a private
person, that is in private law.” See also the English State Immunity Act 1978
which states that, “a State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United Kingdom subject to the exceptions set out in the legislation.”
Those exceptions included situations where the State had submitted to the
jurisdiction and where the proceedings related to a commercial transaction
or a contract to be performed wholly or partly in the forum State. State
Immunity Act 1978, c.33 §§ 1–23 (Eng.).
not commercial acts.86

When States or State entities have invoked sover-
eign immunity, tribunals have, in fact, referenced both
public and private international law. In Société de Grands
Travaux de Marseille (France) v. East Pakistan Industrial
Development Corp87 and Westland Helicopters Ltd v.
Arab Organization for Industrialization (‘AOI’),88 the Tri-
bunals analyzed public international law and Swiss private
international law to determine that restrictive, rather
than absolute, immunity applied. Because the underlying
transactions in the arbitration were commercial in nature,
the Tribunals were empowered to exercise jurisdiction.
Similarly, the Tribunal in SPP v. The Arab Republic of
Egypt89 relied on public and Egyptian private international
law to determine that the respondent-State could not
rely on sovereign immunity to avoid its contractual obli-
gation to arbitrate.90 There, too, the underlying transac-
tion was commercial in nature.
3. Domestic Law Defenses Before International

Commercial Arbitration Tribunals
Issues of public international law also arise before

international commercial arbitral tribunals when respon-
dent-States or State entities raise domestic law defenses
to challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction. In the Italian
Company v. African State-Owned Entity ICC arbitration,91
the Tribunal employed public international law to reject
the respondent-State entity’s claim of primacy of its do-
mestic law. In this case, the Tribunal was asked to rule
86. Julia B. Brooke, The International Law Association Draft Convention

on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: A Comparative Approach, 23 VA. J. INT’L L.
635, 635 (1983).
87. Case No. 1803 of 1972, 5 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 177 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.).
88. CHAMLONGRASDR, supra note 79, at 80.
89. Id. at 80–81.
90. Id.
91. Italian Company v African State-Owned Entity (1973) REVUE DE
L’ARBITRAGE122 at 145; see also Yves Derains, Cour d’abritrage de la
chambre de commerce internationale : Chronique des sentences arbitrales,
109 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 971 (1982).
on the validity of an arbitration agreement entered into

by a State entity and a private commercial party. The
State entity had argued that the arbitration agreement
was invalid because it conflicted with its domestic Code
of Civil Procedure, which prohibited arbitration of dis-
putes arising out of State contracts. The Tribunal sug-
gested that the State entity’s argument ran afoul of the
principle of good faith:
[I]nternational public policy would be
strongly opposed to the idea that a public
entity, when dealing with a foreign party,
could openly, knowingly and willingly enter
into an arbitration agreement, on which its
co-contractor would rely, only to claim sub-
sequently, whether during the arbitral pro-
ceedings or on enforcement of the award,
that its own undertaking was void.
Similar comments were made in Benteler v. State of Bel-
gium,92 where the Tribunal concluded that Belgium could
not rely on its national law to avoid an obligation to arbi-
trate. The Tribunal noted that it was common for tribu-
nals to apply principles of public international law, in par-
ticular the principle of good faith, in order to reject
assertions of State immunity in such circumstances.
These awards demonstrate that tribunals use a
combination of public and private international law to ad-
dress sovereign immunity and domestic law defenses
when a State or State entity agreed to arbitrate but later
seeks to avoid its legal obligation to do so.
B. Scenario Two: Public International Law Limiting or

Guiding the Application of Private International Law
International commercial arbitration awards show
that when a straightforward application of private inter-
national law would conflict with public international law,
tribunals permit public international law to limit private
international law. As such, public international law rests
atop the dispute resolution process, regulating the way in
92. Benteler v State of Belgium, ad hoc award (1983), REVUE DE

L’ARBITRAGE
339.
which tribunals may exercise their powers. Scholars and

practitioners who consider international commercial arbi-
tration to fall exclusively within the ambit of private in-
ternational law may overlook this.
Tribunals are rarely confronted with discernible
public international law issues that require them to di-
rectly consider and apply public international law. Rather,
analysis of available awards suggests that the role of
public international law in international commercial arbi-
tration is often far more subtle and is intricately inter-
twined with private international law. This is illustrated,
as an example, by cases that present complex choice of
law issues, where public international law may place sig-
nificant restrictions on a tribunal’s power.93
In some cases, tribunals must determine whether a
domestic mandatory rule should be given extraterritorial
effect to govern aspects of a dispute in international ar-
bitration, thus becoming an “overriding” mandatory rule
or loi de police.94 Generally, a domestic mandatory rule
may only be considered a loi de police if the goals or ob-
jectives underlying the rule are so important to the is-
sues at stake that they outweigh any other considera-
tions that may lead to the application of other laws.95
93. GEORGE A. BERMANN, ARBITRATION AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: GENERAL

COURSE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 381 COLLECTED COURSES OF THEHAGUE
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 310–25 (2015); Pierre Mayer, Mandatory Rules
of Law in International Arbitration, 2 ARBITRATION INT’L 274, 274–75 (1986);
Mohammad Reza Baniassadi, Do Mandatory Rules of Public Law Limit Choice
of Law in International Commercial Arbitration? 10 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 59, 63
(1992); RADICATI DI BROZOLO, ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL ET LOIS DE
POLICE: CONSIDÉRATIONS SUR LES CONFLITS DE JURIDICTIONS DANS LE COMMERCE
INTERNATIONAL, 315 COLLECTED COURSES, HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005); Nathalie Voser, Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law
Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 319
(1996); JULIAN D. M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KROLL, COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 420 (2003); CHRISTOPHE SERAGLINI, LOIS DE
POLICE ET JUSTICE ARBITRALE INTERNATIONALE (2001); MANDATORY RULES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (GEORGE BERMANN & LOUKAS MISTELIS eds., 2011).
94. On lois de police generally, see Horatia Muir-Watt & Luca Radicati di
Brozolo, Party Autonomy and Mandatory Rules in a Global World, 4 GLOBAL
JURIST 1 (2004).
95. Within the context of the European Union, the 2008 Regulation on
the law applicable to contractual obligations gives the following definition:
Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for
Tribunals follow a two-step process when assessing the

extraterritorial application of domestic mandatory rules.96
First, a tribunal will examine the rule in the context of the
forum enacting it—i.e. will check whether the rule would
be applicable if the dispute was wholly domestic. Sec-
ond, a tribunal will examine whether the rule can apply in
the international context. It is at this second step that a
tribunal will consider whether public international law
would conflict with the potential loi de police.
Public international law may place restrictions on
the tribunal’s ability to apply or ignore a potential loi de
police, as well as on the parties’ ability to choose their
applicable law.97 In this sense, public international law
has both a negative and positive effect; it can not only
provide limitations on the consideration or application of
lois de police but can also provide a duty to apply lois de
police. The former includes, inter alia, circumstances in
which giving effect to a loi de police would result in a vio-
lation of international human rights law. The latter in-
cludes circumstances in which parties have sought, by
choosing arbitration and selecting a particular law, to
fraudulently evade otherwise applicable mandatory law.98
which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its

public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisa-
tion, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation
falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise appli-
cable to the contract under this Regulation.
Commission Regulation 593/2008, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,
2008 O.J. (L 177/6) art. 9(1).
96. For an excellent example of how this two-step process is applied, see
ICC Award 7528 of 1993, XXII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 125. See
also GRIGERA NAÓN, supra note 68, at 293–333 for an analysis of this process
with reference to the following cases: ICC Award 6320 (1992); ICC Award
9333 (1998); ICC Award 5622 (1988); ICC Award 9298 (1998); ICC Award
10246 (2000); ICC Award 9163 (2001); ICC Award 7528 (1993). See also
Baniassadi, supra note 93, at 68–71.
97. DI BROZOLO, supra note 93, at 464. See also EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN
SAVAGE, FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
847–57 (1999); LEW, MISTELIS & KROLL, supra note 93, at 420–425; Mayer,
supra note 93, at 275; Naón, supra note 68, at 200–206 .
98. Preliminary ICC Award 5505 of 1987 cited in GRIGERA NAÓN, supra
Thus, public international law may restrict the tribunal’s

choice of law process by: (1) limiting the application of a
loi de police because it contravenes public international
law; (2) obliging the tribunal to apply a loi de police be-
cause not doing so would contravene public international
law; or (3) permitting the application of a loi de police
because the necessary conditions for its application are
met and it does not contravene public international law.
Tribunals do not hesitate to apply lois de police or
to use public international law to limit identification of
lois de police.99 To illustrate, in ICC Case 6320, the Tri-
bunal had to determine whether the U.S. RICO statute,
which relates to racketeering and the payment of treble
damages, was a loi de police.100 Though the applicable
law was Brazilian law, the Tribunal stated that this did not
in principle preclude application of U.S. law. Ultimately,
the Tribunal determined that RICO could not control the
case because application of RICO would exceed the
United States’s prescriptive jurisdiction. This, as the Tri-
bunal recognized, was a public international law limita-
tion:
[E]ven if a particular state does claim the
mandatory extraterritorial application of its
laws, that—by itself—is not sufficient to lead
to the mandatory application of such laws in
international arbitration. Otherwise, those
states that make extensive use of such
claims and thereby show less recognition of
the sovereignty of other states embedded in
note 68, at 205:

Except in those situations in which compliance with mandatory
rules is required, the parties are generally free to choose by way
of express stipulation the law applicable to their relationship...In
this case, the arbitrator finds that the parties have a reasonable
interest in the application of English law...There is further no indi-
cation that the choice of English substantive law was made to
escape some mandatory provisions of the law of the Netherlands
(country of Respondent) or Mozambique (country of Claimant).
99. Serge Lazareff, Mandatory Extraterritorial Application of National
Law, 11 ARB. INT’L 137, 137–150 (1995); Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Does
International Arbitration Need a Mandatory Rules Method?, 18 AM. REV. OF
INT’L. ARB. 103, 103–119 (2007).
100. ICC Award 6320 (1992) cited in GRIGERA NAÓN, supra note 68, at
297.
the principle of territoriality could attain a

privileged position in relation to other
states.101
This statement coincides with the growing tendency in
public international law to limit States’ promulgation of
exorbitant or overreaching private international law
rules.102
From the example of lois de police, it is evident
that public international law has a strong influence on the
development and application of private international law.
Though many scholars and practitioners treat interna-
tional commercial arbitration as if disconnected from
public international law,103 in certain circumstances com-
mercial arbitral bodies must consider and apply public in-
ternational law rules and principles to discharge their ju-
dicial function. In other words, public international law
issues will not always come before public international
law institutions, and private international law matters will
not always be decided on domestic law alone.
IV. THE INTERACTION IN HYBRID FORMS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The interaction between public and private interna-

tional law finds its most fertile ground in hybrid forms of
international dispute resolution, or in international dis-
pute resolution mechanisms that cannot be rationalized
as falling cleanly in either public or private international
law.104 This Part investigates investor-State arbitral tri-
bunals and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.
A. Investor-State Arbitration
Investor-State arbitration combines public and pri-
vate international law, as a matter of substance, onto the
101. Id. at 302.

102. GRIGERA NAÓN, supra note 68, at 344.
103. This is particularly evident by the way in which most textbooks on
commercial arbitration are written. With some exceptions, little attention is
given to the role and importance of public international law in practice.
104. ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 6 (2012).
procedural skeleton of international commercial arbitra-

tion.105 In doing so, it has wedded two professions, one
coming from the world of inter-State disputes and the
other from private commercial arbitration.106 On the one
hand, those from a public international law background
tend to emphasize the public nature of the dispute reso-
lution process.107 They preference State interests108 and
highlight the legal constraints on both States and inves-
tors. On the other hand, those from private commercial
arbitration tend to stress the private nature of the dis-
pute resolution process in resolving commercial disputes
between two parties based on the principle of party
autonomy.
The fact that investor-State arbitration and com-
mercial arbitration involve similar dispute resolution pro-
cedures has led many to see them as two sides of the
same coin. This is not wholly accurate. Though com-
mercial arbitration can involve consideration of public in-
ternational law, investor-State arbitration sits at the apex
of the confluence between public and private interna-
tional law. Public international law is particularly relevant
in the contexts of establishing jurisdiction, determining
the applicable law, and demonstrating sovereign immu-
nity.109
105. JOSE ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, 344 COLLECTED COURSES OFTHE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 193, 259 (2009).
106. See Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Commercial and Investment Arbitration:
How Different are They Today? The Lalive Lecture 2012, 28 ARB. INT’L. 577,
578 (2012).
107. Cf. Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration
as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. OF INT’L. LAW, 121, 145–
50 (2006); Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/14, Final Award, ¶ 160(2) (2008) where the Tribunal noted that
investor-State arbitration “ . . .combines a public law system of State liability
with private arbitration.”
108. This seems to be the rationale of the Article 8(27)(4) of the
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the
European Union (CETA), which includes among the eligibility requirements to
the Tribunal created by the Agreement to “have demonstrated expertise in
public international law.”
109. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration without Privity, 10 ICSID R. - FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L. J. 232 (1995).
B. Establishing jurisdiction
Investor-State arbitration, like international com-
mercial arbitration, is based on the agreement of the par-
ties. The investor and the State may sign an arbitration
clause, following the traditional method of consent in in-
ternational commercial arbitrations. Arbitration clauses
arising out of direct agreement have been the basis of
numerous investor-State arbitrations.110 More recently,
investors have used bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”)
or multilateral treaties, which establish the terms and
conditions for private investment by nationals and com-
panies of one State in another State, to establish juris-
diction.
BITs and multilateral treaties do not, of them-
selves, establish jurisdiction. Rather, they are an offer by
States to eligible investors offering access to arbitration.
Nationals of another State party to the treaty can accept
this offer simply by commencing arbitration proceedings.
In many investor-State arbitrations, States will raise juris-
dictional objections that the tribunal must deal with be-
fore proceeding to the merits. Tribunals decide the ap-
plicable law to issues of jurisdiction, typically pursuant to
a mix of public and private international law.
In Amco v. Indonesia,111 jurisdiction was established
by virtue of an investment application accepted by the
Government of Indonesia. In the Tribunal’s opinion, the
proper method for determining whether consent to arbi-
tration had been given was to interpret the investment
application in the spirit of the ICSID Convention and Indo-
nesia’s private international law. The Tribunal determined
the intent of the parties “from the normal expectations
110. See, e.g., Pierre Lalive, The First ‘World Bank’ Arbitration (Holiday
Inns v. Morocco)—Some Legal Problems, 51 BRIT. YEAR BOOK OF INT’L. LAW 123,
128 (1980); Adriano Gardella SpA v. Government of the Ivory Coast, Case
No. ARB/74/1, 1 ICSID Rep. 287 (1977); Kaiser Bauxite v. Government of
Jamaica, Case No. ARB/74/3, 1 ICSID Rep. 301 (1975); Klockner v. the
Republic of Cameroon, Case No. ARB/81/2, 2 ICSID Rep. 10 (1983); SOABI
v. State of Senegal, Case No. ARB/82/1, 2 ICSID Rep. 179 (1984); Liberian
Eastern Timber Corporation (LETCO) v. Republic of Liberia, Case No.
ARB/83/2, 2 ICSID Rep. 347 (1986).
111. Amco v. Rep. of Indonesia, Case No. ARB/81/1, 1 ICSID Rep. 398
(1983).
of the parties” but also from “the aim and the spirit of
the Washington Convention as well as of the Indonesian
legislation and behaviour.”112
In SPP(ME) v. Egypt113 the Tribunal held that both
public and private international law were relevant for es-
tablishing jurisdiction. In that case, jurisdiction was
based on a provision of Egyptian legislation, which pur-
ported to constitute consent to ICSID arbitration. The is-
sue was whether the legislation in question created an in-
ternational obligation to arbitrate under the ICSID
Convention. In determining this issue, the Tribunal re-
jected the contention that consent to arbitrate should be
interpreted solely in accordance with either the rules of
treaty interpretation or Egypt’s private international law.
Rather, the Tribunal found both relevant and applied the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,114 as directed
by public international law, and rules of Egyptian statu-
tory interpretation, as directed by private international
law.
These awards suggest that questions of jurisdic-
tion are governed by their own system of mixed public
and private international law.
C. Determining Applicable Law at the Merits Stage

By far, the most interaction between public and
private international law occurs in the tribunal’s determi-
nation of the applicable law governing the merits.115
These interactions arise in two scenarios: when tribunals
112. Id.
113. SPP(ME) v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Case No. ARB/84/3, 3 ICSID Rep.
142 (1988).
114. The tribunal treated the Egyptian legislation as if it were a unilateral
declaration. The Vienna Convention applies, at least in this case, mutatis
mutandis to unilateral declarations.
115. While it may seem that the tribunal’s basis of jurisdiction would
determine the law applicable to it, tribunals have consistently held that the
law governing the merits is independent of the law governing jurisdictional
issues. Cf. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 41 (July 17, 2003); cf.
Christoph Schreuer, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 1 MCGILL J. OF DISP. RESOL. 1 (2014).
have to determine the applicable law under commonly-

found “compound choice of law clauses” and when tribu-
nals may have cause to consider the UNIDROIT Principles
of International Commercial Contracts.
1. Compound Choice of Law Clauses
Choice of law determinations may be made in a va-

riety of ways, the simplest of which arises when the
agreement governing the dispute, whether a BIT, MIT, or
arbitration agreement, contains a choice of law clause.116
Some of these clauses refer exclusively to public interna-
tional law,117 while others refer to the domestic law of
the State.118 In the majority of cases, the choice of law
rules refer to both.119 These are compound choice of law
clauses.
In some cases, the parties have made no determi-
nation as to applicable law. In this scenario, tribunals
look to various other sources in determining what law
governs the merits of the dispute, most prominently the
ICSID Convention.120
Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention directs the
116. See, e.g., International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-

putes, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, art. 42, Oct. 14, 1966; see also Inter-
national Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID Additional Fa-
cility Rules, art. 54, Sept. 27, 1978.
117. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1131, Dec.
8, 1993, H.R. Doc. No. 103–159, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
118. See, e.g., MINE v Republic of Guinea, Case No. ARB/84/4, 4 ICSID
Rep. 94 (1988).
119. See, e.g., International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, art. 42(1), Oct. 14, 1966, ,17 U.ST.
1270, 575 U.N.T.S.; Texaco Overseas Petroleum v. Libyan Arab Republic, 17
ILM 1, 404 (1978); Libyan American Oil Co (LIAMCO) v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 62 ILR 140, 172 (1977).
120. Paul Peters, Dispute Settlement Arrangements in Investment
Treaties, 22 NETH. YEARBOOK OF INT’L. LAW 91, 91 (1991); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata
& Antonio R. Parra, The Experience of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes, 14 ICSID REV. 299, 336 (1999); Antoine
Goetz v Republic of Burundi, Case No. ARB/95/3,6 ICSID Rep. 5, 94 (1999).
tribunal to refer first to the parties’ agreement on the

applicable law.121 In absence of an agreement, tribunals
are bound to apply public international law and the
State’s domestic law.
Article 42(1) gestures toward a meeting point for
public and private international law, acting in a similar
way to the compound choice of law clauses contained in
many BITs. In their application of Article 42(1), many
tribunals have found that the private international law of
the State and public international law lead to the same
result.122 However, the awards demonstrate that there
are competing theories as to the relationship between
public and private international law in the application of
Article 42(1). One theory is reflected in the doctrine of
supplementation and correction.
Historically, tribunals have endorsed the doctrine
of supplementation and correction, which provides that
public international law fills lacunae in domestic law and
corrects the application of domestic law when it is incon-
sistent with public international law.123 In this sense,
public international law plays an ancillary role. The ancil-
lary nature of this role was highlighted by the ad-hoc
121. See, e.g., International Centre for Settlement of Investment

Disputes, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, art. 42, Oct. 14, 1966.
122. Adriano Gardella SpA v. The Government of the Ivory Coast, Case
No. ARB/74/1,1 ICSID Rep. 287 (1977); Benvenuti & Bonfant v. People’s
Republic of Congo, Case No. ARB/77/2, 1 ICSID Rep. 330, 357 (1980);
CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 624–25 (2d ed.
2009); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata & Antonio R. Parra, Applicable Substantive Law in
Disputes Between States and Private Foreign Parties: The Case of Arbitration
under the ICSID Convention, 9 ICSID REV. 183, 191 (1994); Zachary Douglas,
The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.B. OF
INT’L L. 151, 194 (2003).
123. Amco v. Rep. of Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB 81/1, 1 ICSID Rep. 509,
518 (1986); Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (LETCO) v. Rep. of Liber.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/83/2, 2 ICSID Rep. 347, 658 (1986); Compania de
Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. (CDSE) v. Rep. of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No.
ARB/96/1, 15 ICSID Rev. 180, 191 (2000); see also ARON BROCHES, THE
CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND
NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES, 136 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW1972, 392 (1972).
committee in Klöckner v Cameroon:124

[T]he arbitrators may have recourse to the
“principles of international law” only after
having inquired into and established the con-
tent of the law of the State party to the dis-
pute (which cannot be reduced to one prin-
ciple, even a basic one) and after having
applied the relevant rules of the State’s law.
Under this theory, though public international law “cor-
rects” domestic law, consideration of public international
law is expressly secondary and limited.
There are scholars and tribunals who suggest that,
despite the doctrine of supplementation and correction,
public international law has in practice always had more
than an ancillary role. In the resubmitted case of Amco
v. Indonesia125 the second Tribunal provided that public
international law is “fully applicable” and that classifica-
tion of its role as “‘only’ ‘supplemental and corrective’
seems a distinction without a difference.”126 Similar re-
marks were made in CDSE v. Costa Rica,127 in which the
Tribunal provided that arbitrations based on compound
clauses were, in effect, governed by public international
law. These decisions suggest that tribunals were paying
lip-service to domestic law and were giving public inter-
national law a larger role than mere supplementation and
correction.
Scholars and practitioners go even further.128 Most
124. Klöckner Industrie-Analgen GmbH, Klöckner Belge, SA and Klöckner

Handelsmaatschppij BV v. Rep. of Cameroon and Société Camerounaise des
Engrais SA, Case No. ARB/81/2, 2 ICSID Rep. 95, 122 (1985).
125. Amco v. Rep. of Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Resubmitted
Case: Award, 1 ICSID Rep. 569, 580 (1986).
126. Id.
127. Compania de Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. (CDSE) v. Rep. of Costa
Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award, 15 ICSID Rep. 153, 170
(2000).
128. Prosper Weil, The State, the Foreign Investor and International Law:
The No Longer Stormy Relationship of a Ménage À Trois, 15 ICSID REV. 401,
409 (2000) (“The reference to the domestic law of the host State, even if
designed only to ascertain whether it is, or is not, compatible with
international law, is indeed a pointless exercise. . . .”); Emmanuel Gaillard &
Yas Banifatemi, The Meaning of “and” in Article 42(1), Second Sentence, of
notably, Gaillard and Banifatemi argue that the doctrine

of supplementation and correction should be abandoned
and that public international law should be directly acces-
sible to the tribunal without initial scrutiny of the State’s
domestic law. In their opinion, the extent of the interac-
tion between public international law and domestic law
should be discretionary.129
In the 2002 Wena Hotels v. Egypt decision, the
Tribunal adopted the Gaillard and Banifatemi position, ex-
pressing an entirely new approach to choice of law under
Article 42(1).130 The underlying investment treaty pro-
vided that States expropriating investors’ property must
be “prompt, adequate and effective” in providing com-
pensation, and that the compensation must “amount to
the market value of the investment expropriated immedi-
ately before the expropriation.”131 The Tribunal had to
determine whether public international law or a State’s
domestic law governed the calculation of interest payable
on the compensation. The Tribunal determined that
Egyptian law conflicted with the terms of the investment
treaty and applied the concept of compound interest,
which it claimed to have derived from public international
law.132 An adhoc committee reviewing the Tribunal’s
award upheld it, stating:
This discussion brings into light the various
views expressed as to the role of interna-
tional law in the context of Article 42(1) . . .
Some of these views have in common the
fact that they are aimed at restricting the
role of international law and highlighting that
of the law of the host State. Conversely, the
view that calls for a broad application of in-
ternational law aims at restricting the role of
the Washington Convention: The Role of International Law in the ICSID

Choice of Law Process, 18 ICSID REV. 375 (2003).
129. Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 128, at 403–11.
130. Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Rep. of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4
(2002).
131. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Egypt-
U.K., June 11, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1470.
132. Wena Hotels Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4.
the law of the host State. There seems not

to be a single answer as to which of these
approaches is the correct one. The circum-
stances of each case may justify one or an-
other solution . . . [T]he use of the word
‘may’ in the second sentence of this provi-
sion indicates that the Convention does not
draw a sharp line for the distinction of the
respective scope of international and of do-
mestic law and, correspondingly, that this
has the effect to confer on to the Tribunal a
certain margin and power for interpretation.
What is clear is that the sense and meaning
of the negotiations leading to the second
sentence of Article 42(1) allowed for both
legal orders to have a role. The law of the
host State can indeed be applied in conjunc-
tion with international law if this is justified.
So too international law can be applied by it-
self it the appropriate rule is found in this
other ambit.133
The decision in Wena Hotels v. Egypt is a striking depar-
ture from prior decisions supporting the doctrine of sup-
plementation and correction.134 It removes public inter-
national law from its ancillary role, molding it into an
equally applicable source of law. Under this approach, a
tribunal may apply a rule of public international law, with-
out any need to identify either a lacuna or an inadequacy
in the law of the State.135
Though the doctrine of supplementation and cor-
rection has not been formally abandoned, the Wena Ho-
tels approach appears to be gaining traction. A string of
recent decisions has endorsed the equal-application ap-
proach, holding that tribunals may directly apply public
international law rules without first having to find an in-
133. Wena Hotels Ltd.,ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, ¶¶ 38–40 (2002)

(emphasis added).
134. Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 128, at 406.
135. Wena Hotels Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4 ; Gaillard & Banifatemi,
supra note 128, at 407.
consistency in the State’s domestic law.136 For example,

the Tribunal in Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine verbatim quoted
Wena Hotels’s propositions that “[t]he law of the host
State can indeed be applied in conjunction with interna-
tional law if this is justified. So too international law can
be applied by itself if the appropriate rule is found in this
other ambit.”137 The Tribunal in El Paso Energy Interna-
tional Co v Argentine Republic138 endorsed the same pas-
sage, holding that:
[I]n order to establish which rights have
been recognized by Argentina to the Claim-
ant as a foreign investor, resort will have to
be had to Argentina’s law. However,
whether a modification or cancellation of
such rights, even if legally valid under Argen-
tina’s law, constitutes a violation of a pro-
tection guaranteed by the BIT is a matter to
be decided solely on the basis of the BIT it-
self and the other applicable rules of interna-
tional law.
BITs often utilize compound choice of law clauses similar
to Article 42(1).139 Arbitral practice demonstrates that
tribunals’ interpretations of these BIT clauses parallels
the interpretation adopted in Wena Hotels. Tribunals
place each legal question in its proper context and make
issue-by-issue decisions on the applicable law. For exam-
ple, in Fedax v. Venezuela,140 the Tribunal held that:
136. See, e.g., El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/15, ¶¶ 132–41 (2011); Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/18, ¶¶ 140–43 (2007); Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Rep.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 236–38 (2007); Azurix Corp v. Argentine
Rep., ICSID ARB/01/12, ¶¶ 66–67 (2006); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v.
Rep. of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/9, ¶¶ 116–17 (2005).
137. Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, ¶ 140
(2007).
138. El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/15, ¶ 135 (2011). The Tribunal endorsed comments in Wena
Hotels and supported its conclusion by reference to the academic opinion of
Prosper Weil. Id. ¶¶ 132–34; see also Weil, supra note 128.
139. See, e.g., Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Arg.-Neth., Oct. 1, 1992, 2242 U.N.T.S. 205.
140. Fedax N.V. v. Rep. of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, ¶ 30
[T]he various sources of the applicable law

referred to in Article 9(5) of the Agreement
[the BIT], including the laws of the Contract-
ing Party, the Agreement, other special
agreements connected with the investment
and the general principles of international
law, have all had an important and supple-
mentary role in the consideration of this case
as well as in providing the basis for the deci-
sion on jurisdiction and the award on the
merits. This broad framework of the appli-
cable law further confirms the trends dis-
cernible in ICSID practice and decisions.
The Fedax Tribunal applied the agreement provisions and
general principles to find that the purchase of promissory
notes constituted an investment for the purpose of the
dispute. Likewise, the obligation to honor the promissory
notes arose directly from the BIT and was regulated by
the BIT and general principles. The same Tribunal found
that the promissory notes were governed by the Vene-
zuelan Commercial Code and Law on Public Credit.141
Similarly, in Maffezini v. Spain,142 the Tribunal ap-
plied public international law to certain issues and domes-
tic law to others. In Maffezini, the Tribunal applied public
international law relating to State responsibility to de-
termine whether Spain was responsible for the actions of
its State entity. The same Tribunal applied the Spanish
Civil Code and Commercial Code to determine whether a
contract had been concluded between the investor and
State entity. Interestingly, the Tribunal navigated Span-
ish legislation, a European Community directive, the BIT,
and customary international law to determine if Spain had
lawfully required the investor to produce an environ-
mental impact assessment.143
Cumulatively, these cases show that public interna-
(1998).
141. Id. ¶¶ 29–30.
142. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, Case No. ARB/97/7, 5 ICSID Rep. 419
(2000); see also Antoine Goetz v. Republic of Burundi, Case No. ARB/95/3,
6 ICSID Rep. 3 (1999).
143. Maffezini,, Case No. ARB/97/7, ¶¶ 50–57, 77.
tional law is stepping out of the shadow of domestic law

and becoming an equally applicable source of law in in-
vestor-State disputes. As this trend continues, it is likely
that other cases will adopt the more liberal approach
found in Wena Hotels.144 This will allow tribunals to apply
the rules, whether international or domestic, which are
most appropriate and which would most likely achieve
just dispute resolution.
2. The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles of International

Commercial Contracts
In the context of determining applicable law it is

also worth reviewing awards in which tribunals have con-
sidered the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commer-
cial Contracts (UNIDROIT Principles). A review of avail-
able awards demonstrates that on a number of occasions
tribunals have made reference to the UNIDROIT Principles
in their determination of applicable law.145 There is, how-
ever, significantly varied practice in this regard, most
likely stemming from the ambiguous status of the
UNIDROIT Principles and their role in investor-State dis-
putes. In this vein, the Tribunal in Joseph Lemire v.
Ukraine146 noted:
It is impossible to place the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples – a private codification of civil law, ap-
proved by an intergovernmental institution –
within the traditional sources of law. The
UNIDROIT Principles are neither treaty, nor
compilation of usages, nor standard terms of
contract. They are in fact a manifestation of
transnational law. . .
The UNIDROIT Principles were developed as a non-
legislative codification or restatement of transnational
contract law, and are a combination of generally ac-
144. Wena Hotels, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4.

145. Jarrod Hepburn, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts and Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Limited Relationship, 64 INT’L
& COMP. L. Q. 905, 905–06 (2015).
146. Joseph Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 109 (2010).
knowledged principles of contract law and best practice

rules.147 They are generally considered to form part of
the lex mercatoria but many of the rules may be consid-
ered generally accepted principles of law, thus forming a
source of public international law under Article 38(1)(c)
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.148
The function of the UNIDROIT Principles is explained in
the Preamble:
These Principles set forth general rules for
international commercial contracts. They
shall be applied when the parties have
agreed that their contract be governed by
them. They may be applied when the parties
have agreed that their contract be governed
by general principles of law, the lex mercato-
ria or the like. They may be applied when
the parties have not chosen any law to gov-
ern their contract. They may be used to in-
terpret or supplement international uniform
law instruments. They may be used to in-
terpret or supplement domestic law. They
may serve as a model for national and inter-
national legislators.149
The Preamble obviously envisaged that the UNIDROIT
Principles could be used for a wide variety of purposes
and by a wide variety of dispute resolution services.
While the UNIDROIT Principles are commonly regarded as
apt for application in international commercial arbitration,
more recently, references to the UNIDROIT Principles
have been made in the context of investor-State arbitra-
tion.150 The awards demonstrate that the UNIDROIT Prin-
147. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, Preamble (2010); Ralf
Michaels, The UNIDROIT Principles as Global Background Law, 19 UNIFORM L.
REV. 643 (2014).
148. See generally GUIDITTA CORDERO-MOSS, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS 27–36, 41–57 (2014), ch. 2 & 4.
149. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, Preamble (2010).
150. Charles N. Brower & Jeremy K. Sharpe, The Creeping Codification of
Transnational Commercial Law: An Arbitrator’s Perspective, 45 VA. J. INT’L L.
199, 210–11 (2004).
ciples have been applied or referenced by investor-State

tribunals in a number of different ways—including, as the
directly applicable law to the dispute,151 as a source of
public international law,152 as a corroboration of public in-
ternational law,153 and as a corroboration of domestic
law.154
For example, in Lemire v. Ukraine,155 the Tribunal
held that the parties had implicitly chosen the UNIDROIT
Principles as the rules of law to govern the substance of
the dispute. Lemire was an ICSID arbitration resulting in
two separate cases: Lemire I156 and Lemire II.157 In
Lemire II the claims were based on the USA-Ukraine BIT
and the award handed down in Lemire I. Whilst the two
cases are interesting for a number of reasons, for our
purposes we are concerned only with how the UNIDROIT
Principles were determined to be the applicable law.
In Lemire I, the parties negotiated a settlement
agreement and thus the case did not proceed to the
merits stage. Rather, as is commonly done, the agree-
ment was incorporated into the final award issued by the
Tribunal. The award also included a section titled ‘Princi-
151. Joseph Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18 (2011).

152. Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Rep., SCC Arbitration No. 126/2003 (2005).
153. Eureko v. Poland, Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Arbitration (2005); Gemplus &
Talsud v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/3 (2010); El Paso Energy v.
Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15 (2011).
154. AIG Capital Partners & CJSC Tema Real Estate v. Kazakhstan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/6 (2003); African Holding Company of America, Inc. and
Société Africaine de Construction au Congo S.A.R.L. v. La République
Démocratique du Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/21 (2008); Sax v. City of
Saint Petersburg, Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Arbitration (2012); Mohamed
Abdulmohsen Al-Kharafi & Sons v. Libya, Ad Hoc Arbitration in Accord with
Unified Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab States
(Mar. 22, 2013); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona & Vivendi
Universal v. Argentina & AWG Group v. Argentina (2010) ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/19 and Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Arbitration.
Jurisdiction and Liability (2011).
156. Joseph Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/1, Award
(2000).
Jurisdiction and Liability (2011).
ples of Interpretation and Implementation of the Agree-

ment’ which reproduced (with only slight linguistic modi-
fication) the UNIDROIT Principles. In this context, the
UNIDROIT Principles were incorporated as terms of the
settlement agreement between the parties. In addition,
the settlement agreement included an explicit choice of
law provision holding that the agreement was to be gov-
erned by the applicable law as determined by Article
54(1) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules.158
Article 54(1) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules
required that the Tribunal apply a “law” as determined by
the conflict of law rules that the Tribunal considers ap-
propriate and “‘rules of international law” that the Tribu-
nal considers applicable.159 Analyzing the question of ap-
plicable law, the Tribunal held that it would not be
appropriate to apply either Ukrainian or U.S. law. Rather,
the Tribunal held that the parties had incorporated the
UNIDROIT Principles into the terms of the settlement
agreement. The Tribunal held that:
The Settlement Agreement contains an ex-
tensive chapter called “Principles of Interpre-
tation and Implementation of the Agree-
ment,” which includes Clauses 20 through
26. These Clauses were reproduced, with
very light linguistic adjustments, from the
1994 UNIDROIT Principles . . .160
When negotiating the Settlement Agree-
ment, the parties evidently gave thought to
the issue of applicable law, and were appar-
ently unable to reach an agreement to apply
either Ukrainian or US law. In this situation,
what the parties did was to incorporate ex-
tensive parts of the UNIDROIT Principles into
their agreement, and to include a clause
which authorizes the Tribunal either to select
158. Joseph Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/1, Award, ¶

30 (2000).
159. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID
Additional Facility Rules, art. 54, Sept. 27, 1978.
Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 108 (2011).
a municipal legal system, or to apply the

rules of law the Tribunal considers appropri-
ate. Given the parties’ implied negative
choice of any municipal legal system, the
Tribunal finds the most appropriate decisions
is to submit the Settlement Agreement to
the rules of international law, and within
these, to have particular regard to the
UNIDROIT Principles.161
It appears that the UNIDROIT Principles, in certain circum-
stances, may also be considered as a source of public in-
ternational law. In Petrobart v Kyrgyz Republic,162 the
Tribunal referenced the UNIDROIT Principles as a source
of public international law because of their status as gen-
erally recognized principles of law. In that case, the Tri-
bunal was required to determine whether the Kyrgyz Re-
public had violated its treaty obligation under the Energy
Charter Treaty. Accordingly, because of the nature of
the claim, the Tribunal held that the applicable law was
the treaty and relevant principles of public international
law.163 In determining the amount of interest payable,
the Tribunal held that Article 7.4.9 of the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples164 was an appropriate source of public international
law by which to calculate the amount of interest pay-
able.165
161. Id. ¶ 111.

162. Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic, SCC Case No. 126/2003 (2005).
163. Id. at 80–86.
164. Article 7.4.9 (interest for failure to pay money) of the UNIDROIT
Principles states:
(1) If a party does not pay a sum of money when it falls due the
aggrieved party is entitled to interest upon that sum from the
time when payment is due to the time of payment whether or not
the non-payment is excused. (2) The rate of interest shall be the
average bank short-term lending rate to prime borrowers prevail-
ing for the currency of payment the place for payment, or where
no such rate exists that place, then the same rate in the State of
the currency of payment. In the absence of such a rate either
place the rate of interest shall be the appropriate rate fixed by
the law of the State of the currency of payment. (3) The ag-
grieved party is entitled to additional damages if the non-
payment caused it a greater harm.
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2010).
165. Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic, SCC Case No. 126/2003 at 88–89
Petrobart demonstrates that the UNIDROIT Princi-

ples may be considered as sufficient proof of general
principles of law, and as such, directly applicable as a
source of public international law. As pointed out above,
general principles of law may be considered a source of
public international law under Article 38(1)(c) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. According
to the prevailing theory, general principles of law are de-
rived from features common to multiple domestic legal
systems.166 It is important to note however, that the
UNIDROIT Principles are not only a collection of general
principles, but also contain rules considered to be best
practices, thus not all UNIDROIT Principles are capable of
being applied as a source of public international law.167 It
is therefore necessary to distinguish the rules that ex-
press generally recognized principles from those that do
not. It may be reasonable to conclude that most (but
not all) of the principles established in the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciple would qualify as general principles of law that could
be applied as a source of public international law in inves-
tor-State arbitration.168
(2005). Some examples of general principles of international law include

pacta sunct servanda, res judicata, and good faith.
166. SCHREUER, supra note 122 at 191–270.
167. The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(2010) introduction reads:
For the most part the UNIDROIT Principles reflect concepts to be
found in many, if not all, legal systems. Since however the
UNIDROIT Principles are intended to provide a system of rules es-
pecially tailored to the needs of international commercial transac-
tions, they also embody what are perceived to be the best solu-
tions, even if still not yet generally adopted.
168. CORDERO-MOSS, supra note 148, at 43–51:
The [UNIDROIT Principles] may contain principles and rules that
do not reflect generally acknowledged standards, but represent
what the restatements’ authors considered to be the best rule.
Hence, they may not be used as evidence of the general acknow-
ledgement of the principles contained therein; however, they
could become evidence if they are used consistently and widely in
practice.’ In this vein, it could be argued that Article 7.4.9 does
not represent a generally accepted principle of law with regard to
the calculation of interest because a comparative analysis of legal
systems demonstrates that there is a significant difference in
methodologies used by different legal systems.
The most common and legally defensible way in

which the UNIDROIT Principles are used by tribunals is as
a means of corroborating the content of public interna-
tional law principles. A number of cases demonstrate
that tribunals will not hesitate to draw on the UNIDROIT
Principles to assist in their determination of the content
and method of application of public international law
principles. The most instructive example of this is the
award in El Paso v. Argentine,169 where the Tribunal was
required to determine whether Argentina had breached
its obligations under the USA-Argentina BIT.170
In El Paso, the Tribunal held that the applicable law
was the BIT supplemented by public international law and
Argentinean law. In this case, the Tribunal made refer-
ence to the UNIDROIT Principles in order to corroborate
general principles of law used to interpret specific provi-
sions of the USA-Argentina BIT—in particular, the inter-
pretation of “Article XI: Admissibility of the State’s De-
fense.” After discussing the International Law
Commission Articles on Responsibility of States for Inter-
national Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles) and the general
principles of law on the preclusion of wrongfulness, the
Tribunal cited the UNIDROIT Principles as corroborating
evidence of its content and status.171 In this regard the
Tribunal held:
So far, this Tribunal has limited itself to ex-
amining the question of whether the above-
mentioned precept is a rule of general inter-
national law, applicable between the Parties
to the BIT and, hence, a rule which may be
used to interpret Article XI of the latter. It
has reached an affirmative conclusion on this
point. One could also ask whether the rule
exists as a “general principle of law recog-
nized by civilized nations” in the sense of Ar-
169. El Paso Energy v. Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15

(2011).
170. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, Arg.-U.S., Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-2 (1993), 31
I.L.M 124.
171. El Paso Energy v. Argentine, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶¶
613–26 (2011).
ticle 38 (1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ.

Volumes have been written on the subject of
“general principles.” Some authors consider
that the latter must meet requirements simi-
lar to those applied to customary rules (gen-
eral practice and opinio juris), which sug-
gests that in reality this category is not an
autonomous one. The mainstream view
seems to be, however, that “general princi-
ples” are rules largely applied in foro domes-
tico, in private or public, substantive or pro-
cedural matters, provided that, after
adaptation, they are suitable for application
on the level of public international law.172
That there is a general principle on the pre-
clusion of wrongfulness in certain situations
can hardly be doubted, as is confirmed by
the UNIDROIT Principles on International
Commercial Contracts, a sort of international
restatement of the law of contracts reflect-
ing rules and principles applied by the major-
ity of national legal systems. Article 6(2)(2)
of these Principles, dealing with “hardship,”
provides that events causing hardship must
be “beyond the control of the disadvantaged
Party.” Article 7(1)(6) on “exemption
clauses” prescribes that a party may not
claim exemption from liability “if it would be
grossly unfair to [exempt it] having regard
to the purpose of the contract.” Finally, Ar-
ticle 7(1)(7), relating to “force majeure” (vis
maior) excuses non-performance of a con-
tract “. . . if that Party proves that the non-
performance was due to an impediment be-
yond its control and that it could not rea-
sonably be expected to have taken the im-
pediment into account at the time of the
conclusion of the contract or to have
avoided or overcome its consequences.” Ex-
emption from liability for non-performance or
other forms of relief are therefore excluded
172. Id. ¶¶ 621–22.

under the UNIDROIT Principles if the Party

claiming it was “in control” of the situation
or if it would be “grossly unfair” to allow for
such exemption.173
In this sense, the Tribunal used the UNIDROIT Principles
to corroborate the content and status of the interna-
tional legal principle on the preclusion of wrongfulness
spelled out in the ILC Articles. While the ILC Articles
were used as the primary source of such a general princi-
ple, the UNIDROIT Principles were helpful in corroborating
the existence of similar principles in national legal sys-
tems so that it could be applied as a generally accepted
principle of law. Similar methodologies have been used in
a number of other cases including Eureko v. Poland174 and
Gemplus v. Mexico.175
For example, in Eureko the ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribu-
nal used Article 7.1.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles to cor-
roborate their understanding of the exception of non-
performance. The Tribunal held:
The Tribunal must now determine whether
the [Respondent] can rely on the Article 1
waiver because it has allegedly not per-
formed its own obligations under the First
Addendum. In other words, is the exception
of non-performance applicable, as Claimant
contends? Without deciding whether the
exception of non-performance is a maxim of
interpretation or a rule of international law,
the Tribunal is of the view that the exception
cannot assist Claimant because it essentially
applies to cases of simultaneous or condi-
tional performance. For example, Article
7.1.3 of the UNIDROIT principles of Interna-
tional Commercial Contracts provides that,
“Where the parties are to perform simulta-
neously, either party may withhold perform-
173. Id. ¶ 623.

174. Eureko B.V. v. Poland, Partial Award, (Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Arb. Aug.
19, 2005).
175. Gemplus & Talsud v. Mexico, ICSID Case Nos. ARB(AF)/03/3 and
ARB(AF)/04/3, Award (June 16, 2010).
ance” if the other party is not willing and

able to perform.176
In this sense, the Tribunal’s opinion as to the content and
application of the exception was corroborated by the
UNIDROIT Principles.
Likewise, in Gemplus, the Tribunal used the
UNIDROIT Principles to corroborate public international
law on the “certainty of harm principle” contained in the
ILC Articles. In that case the Tribunal was required to
determine whether, under the France-Mexico BIT177 and
Argentina-Mexico BIT,178 Mexico had unlawfully expropri-
ated the claimant’s investments. According to the nature
of this dispute, the Tribunal applied public international
law as the law applicable to the dispute. After determin-
ing that Mexico had breached its expropriation obligations
under both BITs, the Tribunal analyzed the issue of com-
pensation for damages. In regard to lost profits, the Tri-
bunal again discussed the ILC Articles. The Tribunal held:
In this ILC Commentary [on the issue of lost
profits] there is an emphasis on “certainty”
to be established evidentially by a claimant in
all cases; but it is clear from other legal ma-
terials there cited that the concept of cer-
tainty is both relative and reasonable in its
application, to be adjusted to the circum-
stances of the particular case.179
In deciding the evidentiary standard for awarding lost
profits under public international law, the Tribunal cited
ILC Article 142 for the principle that there must be a
relative and reasonable level of certainty about future in-
come streams. To support and corroborate this princi-
176. Eureko B.V. v. Poland, Partial Award, ¶¶ 176–8 (Ad Hoc UNCITRAL
Arb. Aug. 19, 2005).
177. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Fr.-Mex., Nov. 12, 1998, 249 Journal Officiel de la République
Française 17062.
178. Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Arg.-Mex., Nov. 13, 1996, 2033 U.N.T.S. 293.
179. Gemplus, S.A., SLP S.A., Gemplus Industrial S.A. & Talsud S.A. v.
Mexico, ICSID Case Nos. ARB(AF)/03/3 and ARB(AF)/04/3, Award, ¶ 13.82
(June 16, 2010).
ple, the Tribunal cited the UNIDROIT Principles:

It may be noted that Article 7.4.3(1) of the
UNIDROIT Principles requires a “reasonable
degree of certainty” for establishing com-
pensation for future harm, thereby further
confirming that the requirement for certainty
in proving a claimant’s claim for compensa-
tion is relative and not incompatible with an
award of compensation for loss of opportu-
nity, nor is the latter necessarily linked to an
arbitrator’s power to decide ex aequo et
bono.180
The Tribunal also noted that the UNIDROIT Principles
could be viewed as corroborating the general proposition
that lost profit is an accepted and well-established com-
ponent in assessing compensation under public interna-
tional law.181 After providing an example from English
case law, the Tribunal justified its reference to the
UNIDROIT Principles stating:
It would be possible to illustrate these gen-
eral principles from several other national le-
gal systems (both common law and civilian);
but it is unnecessary to do so here because,
first, such principles are broadly re-stated in
the UNIDROIT Principles; and, second, the
Tribunal is in no doubt that similar principles
form part of international law, as expressed
in the ILC Articles.182
Notably, the Tribunal used the UNIDROIT Principles as a
substitute for a comparative analysis of other domestic
legal systems to corroborate general principles of law
that formed a part of public international law as ex-
pressed by the ILC Articles.
Lastly, a number of awards demonstrate that the
UNIDROIT Principles are often used by tribunals to cor-
roborate the content and method of application of na-
tional law.183 The most instructive example is the case of
180. Id. ¶ 13.88.

181. Id. ¶ 13.88–90.
182. Id. ¶ 13.89.
183. Radicati di Brozolo, Non-National Rules and Conflict of Laws.
AIG v. Kazakhstan,184 where the Tribunal was required to

determine whether Kazakhstan had expropriated AIG’s in-
vestment in a real estate development project under the
USA-Kazakhstan BIT.185 Using the conflict of law rules
contained in Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention, the
Tribunal held that the applicable law was Kazakh law, to
be read with and controlled by the BIT and general prin-
ciples of public international law.186
In determining the issue of mitigating damage, the
Tribunal held that the claimant was entitled to refuse to
accept an offer for an alternative piece of land for the
real estate development project.187 In their decision, the
Tribunal used the UNIDROIT Principles to corroborate Ka-
zakh law regarding the mitigation of damages. The Tribu-
nal declared:
(1) Mitigation of damages, as a principle, is
applicable in a wide range of situations. It
has been adopted in common law and in civil
law countries, as well as in International Con-
ventions and other international instru-
ments—as for instance in Article 77 of the
Vienna Convention and Article 7.4.8 of the
UNIDROIT Principles for International Com-
mercial Contracts. It is frequently applied by
international arbitral tribunals when dealing
with issues of international law. In commer-
cial trade relations, it is said that a purchaser
“. . . must take measures that are reasonable
in the circumstances to mitigate the loss . . .
“ (Vienna Convention, Article 77): as when
for example a seller fails to deliver materials
Reflections in Light of the UNIDROIT and Hague Principles, 48 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO

INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE 841, 842–43 (2012); Michaels, supra
note 147, at 648.
184. AIG Capital Partners, Inc. & CJSC Tema Real Estate v. Kazakhstan,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/6, Award (Oct. 7, 2003).
185. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Kazak., May 19, 1992, S. EXEC. REPT. 103-11 (1993).
186. AIG Capital Partner & CJSC Tema Real Estate v. Kazakhstan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/6, Award, ¶ 10.1.4 (Oct. 7, 2003).
187. Id. ¶ 10.6.
contracted to be sold, and the buyer ne-

glects to purchase substitute materials avail-
able in the market, the shutdown losses that
the purchaser could have prevented would
not be recoverable.188
In this sense, the Tribunal used the UNIDROIT Principles
to corroborate the content of the duty to mitigate under
Kazakh law. A similar methodology was used in African
Holding v. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)189 where
the Tribunal was required to determine whether the DRC
had breached its obligations under the USA-DRC BIT.190
In this case, the UNIDROIT Principles played a significant
role, corroborating general principles of Congolese con-
tract law. First, the Tribunal used the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples to corroborate Congolese law on the formation of
contracts. In this regard, the Tribunal held:
[C]ontracts do not necessarily need to be
made in writing following Congolese legisla-
tion or international law. In fact, Article 1.2
of the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts expressly provides
that a contract must not be concluded in or
evidenced by writing and that it may be
proved by all possible means, including by a
witness.191
We reach the same conclusion when assess-
ing the matter in accordance with UNIDROIT
Principles mentioned above, more particularly
pursuant to Article 2.1.1, a contract can also
be concluded from the conduct of the par-
ties which is showing sufficiently their
agreement. This is the case in the present
188. Id. ¶ 10.6.4.

189. African Holding Company of America, Inc. & Société Africaine de
Construction au Congo S.A.R.L. v. La République Démocratique du Congo,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/21, Award (July 29, 2008).
190. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, U.S.-Zaire, Aug. 3, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-17 (1986).
191. African Holding Company of America, Inc. & Société Africaine de
Construction au Congo S.A.R.L. v. La République Démocratique du Congo,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/21, Award, ¶ 32 (July 29, 2008)
matter even if no written text were made.192

In this context, the Tribunal referred to the UNIDROIT
Principles to support the conclusion of an expert witness
giving evidence regarding the content of Congolese con-
tract law. Similarly, the Tribunal used the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples with regard to determining the issue of non-
performance of the contract.
Reference should also be made to the decisions of
Carl Sax v City of Saint Petersburg193 and Al-Kharafi v
Libya,194 which similarly support the use of UNIDROIT
Principles as corroborating the content of domestic law.
In Carl Sax, the Tribunal used Article 7.4.9195 of the
UNIDROIT Principles on the calculation of interest to cor-
roborate the principle found in Article 395 of the Russian
Civil Code, states that the application of interest is to be
determined according to the jurisdiction where the pre-
vailing party resides.196 Likewise, in Al-Kharafi, the Tribu-
nal used the UNIDROIT Principles to corroborate provi-
sions found in Libyan law on the issue of compensation
for lost profits. The Tribunal held that Article 224 of the
Libyan Civil Code (confirmed by Libyan case law) creates
a right to compensation for lost profits.197 To support
this conclusion, the Tribunal referred to Article 7.4.2198
of the UNIDROIT Principles on full compensation and Arti-
192. Id. ¶35.

193. Sax v. City of Saint Petersburg, Award (Ad Hoc UNCITRAL
Arbitration, Mar. 30, 2012).
194. Mohamed Abdulmohsen Al-Kharafi & Sons v. Libya, Award (Ad Hoc
Arbitration Mar. 22, 2013).
195. Id. at 209.
196. Sax v. City of Saint Petersburg, Award, ¶ 810 (Ad Hoc UNCITRAL
Arbitration, Mar. 30, 2012).
197. Mohamed Abdulmohsen Al-Kharafi & Sons v. Libya, Award, at 369–
74 (Ad Hoc Arbitration, Mar. 22, 2013).
198. Article 7.4.2 (full compensation):
The aggrieved party is entitled to full compensation for harm sus-
tained as a result of the non- performance. Such harm includes
both any loss which it suffered and any gain of which it was de-
prived, taking into account any gain to the aggrieved party re-
sulting from its avoidance of cost or harm.
cle 7.4.3199 on the certainty of harm principle.

As the Tribunal in Joseph Lemire v Ukraine200
noted, the UNIDROIT Principles do not fall within the tra-
ditional sources of law. They are neither public nor pri-
vate. Yet, this does not stop them from being applied in
the context of investment arbitration. As we have seen
above, references to the UNIDROIT Principles are varied,
and they may be applied in a number of ways—including,
as the directly applicable law to the dispute, as a source
of public international law, as a corroboration of public in-
ternational law, and as a corroboration of domestic law.
They are, in short, a manifestation of transnational law.
3. Sovereign Immunity
Just as in international commercial arbitration,

questions of sovereign immunity may also arise in the
context of investor-State arbitration because of the
State’s status under public international law. However,
tribunals rarely address questions of sovereign immunity,
as consent to arbitration through BITs, MITs, or other ar-
bitration agreements bars States from pleading sovereign
immunity to escape their contractual obligation to arbi-
trate.201 Rather, consent to arbitration bars States from
pleading sovereign immunity to escape their contractual
obligation to arbitrate. However, questions of sovereign
immunity do continue to arise in the context of domestic
court proceedings where the non-State party seeks the
assistance of a domestic court to support the arbitral
proceedings.
199. Article 7.4.3 (certainty of harm):

(1) Compensation is due only for harm, including future harm,
that is established with a reasonable degree of certainty. (2)
Compensation may be due for the loss of a chance in proportion
to the stability of its occurrence. (3) Where the amount of dam-
ages cannot be established with a sufficient degree of certainty,
the assessment is the discretion of the court.
Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 108–9 (Jan. 14, 2010).
201. SCHREUER, supra note 122, at 1153; see also G.R. Delaume, Foreign
Sovereign Immunity: Impact on Arbitration, 38 ARB. J. 34, 38 (1983).
Just like in the context of commercial arbitration,

States retain immunity from interim measures unless
they have made a special reservation or have given ex-
press consent for domestic courts to exercise such
power in support of the arbitration.202 For example, in
ETO Euro Telecom Intl NV v. Republic of Bolivia,203 the
English Court of Appeals held that pursuant to the Sov-
ereign Immunity Act of 1978, Bolivia could not be held to
have waived its sovereign immunity from an assets freez-
ing order by entering into a BIT containing an ICSID arbi-
tration clause. The court held that, because the ICSID
Convention requires that ICSID arbitration is the exclusive
forum to seek a remedy for the dispute, and because the
ICSID Convention and Rules permit the tribunal to issue
interim measures, the arbitration clause in the BIT was
not sufficient to waive sovereign immunity.204 The court
held that the Sovereign Immunity Act of 1978 required
“written consent of the State” in order for the court to
issue an injunction against a State party.205
Issues of sovereign immunity most commonly arise
in the context of enforcement proceedings in domestic
courts. The ability to execute an award against the as-
sets of a State party is wholly determined by the law of
the State where enforcement is sought.206 As such,
courts will look to domestic law for rules relating to sov-
ereign immunity.207 The awards and decisions of State
courts demonstrate the general position that investors
202. LEW, MISTELIS & KROLL, supra note 93, at 775; SCHREUER, supra note
122, at 1153.
203. ETI Euro Telecom Intl NV v. Republic of Bolivia [2008] EWCA Civ
880, [2009] WLR 665.
204. Id. ¶¶ 110–114.
205. Id. ¶ 112.
206. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, art. 3, Jun. 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
207. SCHREUER, supra note 148. at 1152–53. This is true of ICSID
arbitration, as Article 55 of the ICSID Convention states that the rules of
recognition and execution in Article 54 do not override the laws relating to
sovereign immunity in the State where execution is sought. International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, art. 42(1), Oct. 14, 1966, 17 U.ST. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S.
may execute an award against commercial assets of a

State if they are able to locate such assets. In this con-
text, two investor-State execution proceedings are in-
structive. Both cases demonstrate that non-State parties
will generally face considerable hurdles in attempting to
execute against State assets.
In the first case, LETCO v. Liberia,208 LETCO
brought an action in the US District Court for the South-
ern District of New York to enforce an Award it obtained
against Liberia in an ICSID arbitration. The court granted
an order for the enforcement of LETCO’s award against
Liberia. Shortly thereafter, a writ of execution was issued
in LETCO’s favor, attaching various registration fees and
taxes owed to the government of Liberia. Liberia ap-
pealed the execution order, arguing that those fees and
taxes were sovereign assets immune from execution un-
der the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).
The court agreed and quashed the execution order. How-
ever, it gave LETCO leave to seek execution against
commercial assets of the government of Liberia under
the commercial exception to sovereign immunity in the
FSIA.209 LETCO then obtained execution orders attaching
bank accounts of the Embassy of Liberia in Washington.
However, the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia quashed those orders, finding that the accounts
were immune from attachment under the FSIA. The
court reasoned that even though the accounts contained
funds used for both sovereign and commercial activities,
the use of certain embassy funds for commercial activi-
ties incidental to embassy operations did not deprive the
entire bank account of its sovereign character.210
The second case, AIG v. Kazakhstan,211 concerned
a similar situation in which AIG sought execution against
208. Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (LETCO) v. Republic of Liberia,

650 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
209. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11, 1330,
1332, 1391(f), 1441(d) (2012).
210. Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. v. Republic of Liberia, 659 F. Supp.
606 (D.D.C. 1987).
211. AIG Capital Partners, Inc. & CJSC Tema Real Estate Company v.
Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/06, ICSID Rep. 11, 118
(2007).
assets of Kazakhstan in England. In that case, AIG ob-

tained interim third-party debt and charging orders
against the assets of the National Bank of Kazakhstan
held by various London Banks. The National Bank of Ka-
zakhstan intervened in the attachment proceedings,
seeking discharge of the orders based on sovereign im-
munity. The English High Court agreed, discharging the
orders based on section 14(4) of the U.K. State Immu-
nity Act of 1987 under which the property of a State’s
central bank is not to be regarded as in use for or in-
tended to be used for a commercial purpose. The court
concluded that although the National Bank of Kazakhstan
possessed the assets, they were the property of the Re-
public of Kazakhstan and thus were immune from en-
forcement.212
4. Conclusion
The fact that investor-State arbitration and com-

mercial arbitration involve similar dispute resolution pro-
cedures has led many to see them as two sides of the
same coin. However, the influence of public international
law qualifies such a characterization. Although there are
authors who continue to express their view that investor-
State arbitration falls under one ambit of law more than
the other, most contemporary literature tends to ac-
knowledge that as a dispute resolution process it cannot
adequately be explained as a purely public or private in-
ternational law phenomena.213 Arguably, the awards ana-
lyzed above position investor-State arbitration as a hy-
brid form of dispute resolution, finding its foundations in
both public and private international law. The fact that
investment claims may involve contract-based claims,
treaty-based claims or both means that in many cases
tribunals will be faced with rules of interpretation that
may find their source in public, transnational, or domestic
law to determine whether or not they ought to assume
jurisdiction. In a similar vein, the now common practice
212. Id. ¶ 94.

213. Julie Maupin, Public and Private in International Investment Law: An
Integrated Systems Approach, 54 VA. J. INT’L. L. 367, 407 (2014).
of concluding compound choice of law clauses means

that in most cases tribunals will be required to apply pub-
lic international law in conjunction with the domestic law
of the State. Lastly, as we have seen, questions of sov-
ereign immunity will always present similar problems be-
cause domestic law will always inform the scope of the
obligation to execute investment awards. It follows that
those practicing in investor-State arbitration will, very of-
ten, face mixed public-private problems, which require a
rather comprehensive expertise.
V. THE INTERACTION IN A SINGULAR HYBRID JUDICIAL SETTING: THE

IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
A. The Impact of the Tribunal’s Nature on the Interaction

Between Private and Public International Law
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is a hybrid form of
dispute resolution that has many similarities to investor-
State arbitration.214 The Tribunal was created in 1981 as
one element of the settlement process resulting from the
fifteen-month hostage crisis between the United States
of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran.215 It was
formed by the two Governments to help resolve a wide
variety of claims by each Government against the other,
as well as claims by individuals against the opposing Gov-
ernment. Article II(1) and (2) of the Tribunal’s constitu-
tive treaty (Claims Settlement Declaration) lay out the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction:
1. An International Arbitral Tribunal (the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal) is hereby es-
tablished for the purpose of deciding claims
of nationals of the United States against Iran
and claims of nationals of Iran against the
214. This paper acknowledges that there is still, to this day, considerable
debate as to the exact nature of the Tribunal. For the purpose of this
paper, the Tribunal is classified as hybrid in nature because it has the ability
to hear both public and private international law issues and apply both public
and private international law.
215. John R. Crook, Applicable Law in International Arbitration: The Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal Experience, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 278, 279 (1989).
United States, and any counterclaim which

arises out of the same contract, transaction
or occurrence that constitutes the subject
matter of that national’s claim . . .
2. The Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction
over official claims of the United States and
Iran against each other arising out of con-
tractual arrangements between them for the
purchase and sale of goods and services.216
The question of the Tribunal’s nature—whether it is a
public or private international law body—has generated
substantial debate not only among scholars but also
among members of the Tribunal.217 One might simply
conclude that the Tribunal, established by two sovereigns
on the basis of an international treaty in the form of the
Claims Settlement Declaration, is a creation of public in-
ternational law. Such a view would be supported by the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear inter-State claims be-
tween the two Governments. However, it would ignore
the fact that the Tribunal also has jurisdiction to hear the
private claims of individuals against opposing Govern-
ments.218 The ability of the Tribunal to hear both public
and private matters has led many scholars, and the Tri-
bunal itself, to conclude that it is of a hybrid nature. In
Case A/18219 the Tribunal characterized itself in the fol-
lowing way:
While the Tribunal is clearly an international
tribunal established by treaty and while some
of its cases involve disputes between the
two Governments and involve the interpreta-
tion and application of public international
law, most disputes (including all those
216. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular

Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the United
States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran of Jan
19, 1981, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9 (1983).
217. MOHSEN MOHEBI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW CHARACTER OF THE IRAN-UNITED
STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL xxiii (1999).
218. Id.
219. Jurisdiction Over Claims of Persons With Dual Nationality, 5 Iran-U.S.
Cl. Trib. Rep. 251 (1984).
bought by dual nationals) involve a private

party on one side and a Government or Gov-
ernment-controlled entity on the other, and
may involve primarily issues of municipal law
and general principles of law. In such cases it
is the rights of the claimant, not of his na-
tional that are to be determined by the Tri-
bunal . . .
Although this Tribunal is not an organ of a
third State, it is also not, as noted above, a
tribunal where claims are espoused by a
State at its discretion and decided solely by
reference to public international law.220
This characterization clearly demonstrates that the Tri-
bunal sees itself as a hybrid form of dispute resolution,
often required to apply both public and private interna-
tional law to resolve matters that come before it. While
decisions such as Case A/18 demonstrate that both pub-
lic and private international law have a role to play in the
resolution of disputes before the Tribunal, there is con-
siderable difficulty in characterizing how this interaction
occurs. This difficultly typically arises because the Tribu-
nal often does not provide comprehensive reasons for its
choice of law determinations.221 This Part will focus on
the exceptions—that is, those awards that provide rea-
sons for choice of law decisions—in an effort to deduce
the Tribunal’s general practice in this area.
B. Determining Applicable Law

Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration pro-
vides the Tribunal with broad discretion as to choice of
law. It states that the Tribunal must:
[D]ecide all cases on the basis of respect for
law, applying such choice of law rules and
principles of commercial and international law
as the Tribunal determines to be applicable,
taking into account relevant usages of the
220. Id. at 261.

221. Crook, supra note 215, at 287.
trade, contract provisions and changed cir-

cumstances.222
Unfortunately, Article V provides little guidance as to the
role public and private international law should play in
cases that come before the Tribunal. The reason for such
a broad choice of law clause boils down to political ne-
cessity. When the Claims Settlement Declaration was
negotiated in 1980, the United States and Iran could not
agree on what system of law or conflict of law rules
should govern the claims, thus the negotiators thought it
best to leave the adoption of choice of law rules to the
discretion of the Tribunal.223 In CMI International Inc. v.
Iran,224 the Tribunal held that:
It is difficult to conceive of a choice of law
provision that would give the Tribunal
greater freedom in determining case by case
the law relevant to the issues before it. Such
freedom is consistent with, and perhaps al-
most essential to, the scope of the tasks
confronting the Tribunal . . . [T]he Tribunal
may often find it necessary to interpret and
apply treaties, customary international law,
general principles of law and national laws,
“taking into account relevant usages of the
trade, contract provisions and changed cir-
cumstances”, as Article V directs. With re-
spect to the assessment of damages, the
Tribunal considers its main task to be deter-
mining what are the losses suffered by the
Claimant and to award compensation there-
fore . . .225
The freedom afforded to the Tribunal under Article V has
lead to a diverse practice in the context of determining
222. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular

Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the United
States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran of Jan
19, 1981, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9 (1983).
224. CMI International, Inc. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation and
The Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 263 (1983).
225. Id. at 267–68.
applicable law. However, in searching for the applicable

law, the Tribunal has, to a large extent, been influenced
by the nature of the dispute before it. Thus, in cases
concerning issues arising out of public international law,
the Tribunal has applied relevant rules of public interna-
tional law in the determination of such claims.226 For ex-
ample, in Amoco International Finance Corporation v.
Iran,227 the Tribunal held that customary public interna-
tional law was applicable to determine the issue of
whether just compensation was required for property
taken. Likewise, the Tribunal has applied principles of
customary public international law to other public inter-
national law issues such as the determination of inter-
est,228 attribution,229 and the effective nationality of dual
nationals.230
However, the Tribunal’s practice in relation to de-
terminations of applicable law in private claims is more
complex. Because of the political context in which it ex-
ists, the Tribunal has generally attempted to base its
choice of law determinations on politically neutral factors
such as the contract between the parties or on general
principles of law common to the parties.231 By and large,
the majority of private claims have been decided entirely
or substantively on the basis of the parties’ contract.
However, in the absence of a contract between the par-
ties, or where the contract did not provide sufficient or
satisfactory rules for the determination of the dispute,
the Tribunal has regularly identified and applied general
226. Oil Field of Texas, Inc. v. Iran, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 347, 361
(1982).
227. Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, 223,
246–48 (1987); similar determinations of applicable law were made in: Sha-
hin Shaine Ebrahimi v. Iran, 30 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 174 (1994); Nat’l Ira-
nian Oil Co., 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 180, 184–187 (1986).
228. McCollough and Company, Inc. v. Ministry of Post, Telegraph and
Telephone, 11 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 26–31 (1986); Sylvania Technical
Systems Inc v. Iran, 8 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 298, 320–322 (1985).
229. Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Iran, 6 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 149 (1984);
Rankin v. Iran, 17 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 135 (1986).
230. Jurisdiction Over Claims of Persons With Dual Nationality, 5 Iran-U.S.
Cl. Trib. Rep. 251 (1984).
principles of substantive law or general principles of pri-

vate international law to determine the substantive
law.232
Generally, the Tribunal has refrained from applying
the private international law of a State because of its re-
luctance to place one party’s domestic law above the
other’s.233 Likewise, because of the broad scope of Arti-
cle V and because the Tribunal is of an international
character, it is not bound by any national choice of law or
even lex fori.234 Rather, often the Tribunal has applied
general principles of private international law leading to
the application of a State’s domestic law. The practice
of the Tribunal was summarized by Judge Lagergren, the
Claim Tribunal’s first President, who stated that:
[S]ince the Tribunal possesses the character
of an international tribunal, governed by pub-
lic international law, it does not apply any
national (for instance Dutch) conflict of law
rules, but instead applies general principles
of conflict of law.235
For example, in Harnischfeger Corp. v. Ministry of Roads
and Transportation,236 the Tribunal applied general princi-
ples of private international law to conclude that the
United States Uniform Commercial Code was the applica-
ble law. The Tribunal held:
The agreement . . . makes no reference to
governing law; however, under general
choice of law principles, the law of the
United States, the jurisdiction with the most
significant connection with the transaction
and the parties, must be taken to govern in
this specific case . . . The United States law
applicable to this commercial transaction is
232. Id.
233. Mobil Oil Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 27 (1987)
(finding that it did not consider it appropriate that the Agreement be
governed by the laws of one party).
234. MOHEBI, supra note 217, at 120.
235. Id.
236. Harnischfeger Corp v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, 7 Iran–
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 90 (1984).
the Uniform Commercial Code. . .237

Similarly, in Economy Forms Corp. v. Iran,238 the Tribunal
held that the application of general principles of private
international law led to the application of the IOWA Uni-
form Commercial Code as the applicable law. The Tribunal
explained that the U.S. law applied because “the center
of gravity of [the] business dealings was the United
States, that being the test under general principle of
conflict of law.”239 In doing so, the Tribunal acknowl-
edged the “closest connection” or “centre of gravity” as
a generally accepted principle of private international law
and one disconnected from the domestic law of either
party.
C. Conclusion
To this day, the exact nature of the Tribunal is dis-
puted. However, an analysis of the relevant awards deliv-
ered by the Tribunal demonstrates that it has jurisdiction
to adjudicate both public and private claims and apply
both public and private international law. In this sense, it
has been said that the Tribunal “somehow exists and op-
erates on the borderline of public and private interna-
tional law, sometimes falling in the domain of one and
sometimes in that of the other.”240 We would argue that
it is better characterized as a hybrid form of dispute
resolution acting at the confluence of public and private
international law.
CONCLUSION
There is nothing revolutionary in the idea of aban-

doning the simple dichotomy between public and private
237. Id. at 99; see also Queens Office Tower Assocs. v. Iran Nat'l Airline
Corp., 2 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 247, 250 (1983).
238. Economy Forms Corp v. Iran, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 42 (1984).
239. Id. at 48.
240. Aida B. Avanessian, The New York Convention and Denationalised
Arbitral Awards (With Emphasis on the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal), 8
J. Int. Arb. 5, 8 (1991).
international law.241 Modern international relations and

commerce are characterized by a complex and some-
times disordered web of relations between States, indi-
viduals, international organizations, and multinational
corporations.242 However, while there is a considerable
amount of literature calling for the divide between public
and private international law to be removed (mainly
based on historical data), there is, most notably, a lack of
concrete practical evidence to support such claims. This
Article seeks to fill that void, reinvigorating the push for
a more nuanced understanding of the interaction be-
tween public and private international law—particularly, in
the context of international dispute resolution.
Taken cumulatively, the decisions and awards ana-
lyzed above demonstrate that public and private interna-
tional law are intricately linked, working together to pro-
vide a legal framework to regulate the international
activity of both public and private actors. The ways in
which public and private international law interact de-
pends on a variety of factors. However, what is clear is
that we are witnessing, now more than ever, a conflu-
ence of public and private international law before inter-
national courts and tribunals. As international courts and
tribunals continue to be confronted with disputes that
require mixed public/private international law answers,
the theoretical divide between these two disciplines will
continue to erode.
241. DOUGLAS, supra note 104, at 7.

242. Id.

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Public and Private International Law in

International Courts and Tribunals:

DIEGO P. FERNÁNDEZ ARROYO* AND MAKANE MOÏSE MBENGUE**

Public international law and private interna-

INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 800

Resolve Public International Law Matters ...... 811

Interaction Between Private and Public

Traditionally, scholars and practitioners have drawn

* Sciences Po Law School, Paris.

Most of the literature seeking to bridge the divide

History of International Law, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 46 (2006).

4. Mills, supra note 3, at 26–73.

end to the strict divide between public and private inter-

I. DEFINING THE KEY CONCEPTS

The asserted divide between public and private in-

ple, non-State actors now exert considerable influence in

8. Non-State actors cover a broad range of entities, from

are beginning to develop truly transnational principles,

II. THE INTERACTION BEFORE THE PERMANENT COURT OF

12. EMMANUEL GAILLARD, ASPECTS PHILOSOPHIQUES DU DROIT DE L’ARBITRAGE

This Part traces the interaction between public and

has infringed public international law.

A. Scenario One: The Adoption of Private International

19. Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Yugo.),

Evidently, the PCIJ considered that private international

Judgment, 1929 P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 20, ¶ 86.(July 12).

The Serbian and Brazilian Loans cases demonstrate

B. Scenario Two: The Interpretation of Private

law recognized by civilized nations” as a source of public international law.

vate International Law in 1902. The Netherlands pled

27. Id. ¶ 71; De Dycker, supra note 6, at 486.

the municipal law of civilized nations in that

struments.33 As more States enter private international

C. Scenario Three: The Consideration of Domestic Private

33. See generally, THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF EU PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

whether the injured person is a national of the rights-

Nottebohm case. Rather, it considered Liechtenstein’s

40. Id. ¶ 21.

matic protection are based on the characterization of the

lona Traction case,47 albeit in relation to corporate iden-

test the second; the DRC, relying on Barcelona Traction,

54. Id. at ¶¶ 74, 84–95.

D. Scenario Four: The Resolution of Public International

The case arose out of purely private international

Internationale Gerichtshof zeigt die Grenzen auf, 32 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN

The ICJ and the Italian Constitutional Court are evi-

III. THE INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

This Part traces and characterizes the interaction

intervening) Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 143, ¶ 179 (Feb 3) (separate

It identifies two circumstances in which the interaction

A. Scenario One: The Consideration and Application of

States and State entities occasionally invoke public

there is much more diversity among arbitral tribunals in terms of arbitrators,

In rejecting the respondent’s submission, the Tribunal

70. Id. at 173.

bunal itself noted that “public international law is relevant

2. Sovereign Immunity Defenses before International

Public international law issues also arise when a

to challenge the jurisdiction of the tribunal.79 Sovereign