CRIMINAL LAW 2

By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares

Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN
G.R. No. 120915
Date: April 3, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN,
plaintiff-appellee, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
On the morning of December 13, 1988, law enforcement officers received information from an informant
named “Benjie” that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be leaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988, and
would be carrying a large volume of marijuana. On the evening of December 14, 1988, Rosa Aruta alighted
from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a traveling bag, and the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement
officers. The law enforcement officers approached Rosa Aruta, introduced themselves as NARCOM
(Narcotics Command) agents, and asked about the contents of her bag. She handed over her bag to Lt.
Abello, and when it was opened, dried marijuana leaves were found. Rosa Aruta was then brought to the
NARCOM office for investigation.

During her arrest and investigation, Rosa Aruta claimed that she had just come from watching a movie at the
theater and was asked by an old woman to help carry a shoulder bag. She stated that she was arrested in the
middle of the road. Rosa Aruta disclaimed any knowledge about the identity of the woman and mentioned
that no search warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers during the investigation.

The defense filed a “Demurrer to Evidence” alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items and
their inadmissibility in evidence. After the presentation of testimonies and technical reports, the prosecution
rested its case. The defense argued that the warrantless search was illegal and violated Rosa Aruta’s
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court denied the “Demurrer to
Evidence” without ruling on the alleged illegality of the search and seizure and continued to hear the case.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, initially found Rosa Aruta guilty of drug trafficking,
but the decision was later reversed and set aside by the higher court in favor of Rosa Aruta due to the lack of
evidence to establish her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. She was acquitted and ordered to be released from
confinement.
ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure of Aruta’s bag violated her constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
RULING:
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, finding Aruta guilty of drug trafficking, was reversed and set aside.
Aruta was acquitted and ordered to be released due to lack of evidence to establish her guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The warrantless search and seizure of Aruta’s bag were deemed illegal and violated her
constitutional rights.The evidence obtained through the unlawful search and seizure, specifically the
confiscated marijuana leaves, was declared inadmissible.The court emphasized the importance of strict
adherence to constitutional guarantees and the need for probable cause to justify warrantless searches and
seizures.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AARON FLORES @ "RONITO",
SULPECIO SILPAO y ORTEGA @ "SULPING" and EDGAR VILLERAN y
MAGBANUA
G.R. No. 116488
Date: May 31, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AARON FLORES @ "RONITO", SULPECIO
plaintiff-appellee, SILPAO y ORTEGA @ "SULPING" and
EDGAR VILLERAN y MAGBANUA,
accused-appellants.
FACTS:
The accused-appellants, Aaron Flores, Edgar Villeran, Sulpecio Silpao, and Sergeant Tampioc, were seen
together with the victim, Samson Sayam, at a store where they were having a drinking spree. They were later
observed engaged in a heated argument.
Accused-appellants forcibly brought Samson out of the store by holding and pulling him towards the road.
Another witness saw them arresting Samson on the road.
Accused-appellants then brought Samson towards the direction of the detachment of Brgy. Tabu.
A gunshot was heard coming from the direction of the detachment around ten minutes later.
It should be noted that these circumstances were based on testimonial evidence and were considered as
circumstantial evidence by the prosecution. However, the court found these circumstances to be insufficient
to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. They concluded that there was no clear
establishment of illegal or arbitrary detention, intent to deprive Samson of his liberty, or a conspiracy among
the accused. Therefore, the evidence was considered grossly insufficient to sustain a conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants
beyond reasonable doubt for the charges of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
RULING:
After thorough review and assessment of the evidence presented, including testimonial and circumstantial
evidence, the Court found that the evidence of the prosecution was grossly insufficient to sustain a
conviction. The court concluded that the accused-appellants should be acquitted due to the lack of credible
evidence establishing the elements of the crime. The court emphasized that it is better to acquit a guilty
person than to convict an innocent one.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: BENITO ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 154130
Date: August 20, 2004
BENITO ASTORGA, Petitioner, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Benito Astorga, was convicted of the crime of Arbitrary Detention by the Sandiganbayan. The
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. The petitioner then filed an “Urgent Motion
for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration” with an attached “Motion for Reconsideration” raising
several grounds for reconsideration. The supposed victims themselves, as stated in their Joint Affidavit of
Desistance, declared the innocence of the petitioner.

The prosecution was required to comment on the petitioner’s second Motion for Reconsideration. The Court
found the grounds raised by the second Motion for Reconsideration well-taken. The Court recognized that a
second motion for reconsideration is generally prohibited but exercised its discretion to admit it in the interest
of substantive justice. The Court emphasized that the rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate
justice, and if their application would frustrate justice, the Court has the power to suspend or exempt a
particular case from the rules. The elements of the crime of Arbitrary Detention were discussed.

The Court stated that when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, the presumption
of innocence must be sustained, and exoneration should be granted as a matter of right. The Court
emphasized the constitutional presumption of innocence and the need to accord the accused the benefit of the
doubt, especially when the evidence for the prosecution is weak. The Court found that the petitioner’s guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, acquitted the petitioner of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner’s conviction for Arbitrary Detention should be reconsidered based on the lack of fear
and detention grounds.
RULING:
The Court granted the reconsideration and set aside its previous decision affirming the petitioner’s
conviction. The Sandiganbayan’s judgment convicting the petitioner of Arbitrary Detention was reversed.
The petitioner, Benito Astorga, was acquitted of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable
doubt.

No costs were imposed. Pronouncement: The Decision dated October 1, 2003, was reconsidered and set
aside. The appealed judgment of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986 was reversed. Petitioner
Benito Astorga was acquitted of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: FERNANDO CAYAO vs. JUDGE JUSTINIANO A. DEL MUNDO
A.M. No. MTJ-93-813
Date: September 15, 1993
FERNANDO CAYAO, complainant, JUDGE JUSTINIANO A. DEL
MUNDO, respondent.
FACTS:
Fernando R. Cayao filed an administrative complaint against Judge Justiniano A. Del Mundo for abuse of
authority. The incident occurred on October 22, 1992, when Cayao, driving a bus, almost collided with a
jeepney owned by Judge Del Mundo. Immediately after the incident, Cayao was picked up by policemen and
brought before Judge Del Mundo without proper parking his bus. Without giving Cayao an opportunity to
explain, Judge Del Mundo insisted on punishing him for the incident and presented three alternative
punishments: (a) facing a charge of multiple attempted homicide, (b) revocation of his driver’s license, or ©
three days in jail. Cayao chose the third option and was forced to sign a waiver of detention. Although not
actually incarcerated, Cayao remained in the premises of the municipal jail for three days before being
released.
ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether Judge Del Mundo’s actions amounted to abuse of authority, unjust detention,
and misconduct.
RULING:
Clearly, there is not, an iota of doubt that respondent, through his oppressive and vindictive actuations, has
committed a disservice to the cause of justice. He has unequivocably demonstrated his unfitness to continue
as a member of the judiciary and should accordingly be removed from the service.

WHEREFORE, respondent judge Justiniano A. Del Mundo of the Municipal Trial Court of Indang, Cavite is
hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits with
prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: MILO and VALDEZ vs. SALANGA and TUVERA, SR.,
G.R. No. L-37007
Date: July 20, 1987
RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as
Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and ARMANDO Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
VALDEZ, petitioners, (Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA,
SR., respondents
FACTS:
On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas
Mendoza, and Rodolfo Mangsat in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The information accuses the
three individuals, including Juan Tuvera, Sr. who is a barrio captain, of committing the crime of Arbitrary
Detention by maltreating and detaining Armando Valdez without legal grounds. Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Ramon S. Milo filed an opposition to Tuvera’s motion to quash the information.

The trial court, represented by Judge Angelito C. Salanga, granted Tuvera’s motion to quash the information,
stating that Tuvera, Sr. is not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention. This ruling led to
the filing of a petition for review on certiorari by the prosecution, questioning the legal validity of charging a
barrio captain with Arbitrary Detention. The petitioner argues that barrio captains, such as Tuvera, Sr., were
recognized as persons in authority even before the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 299.

The Supreme Court disagrees with the respondent judge’s ruling and asserts that a barrio captain can be held
liable for Arbitrary Detention, as they are considered public officers with the authority to maintain peace and
order and detain individuals within legal limits. The petition for certiorari is granted, and the order to quash
the information is set aside. The case is remanded to the appropriate trial court for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether a barrio captain can be charged with Arbitrary Detention.
RULING:
The Supreme Court, in granting the petition for review on certiorari, set aside the order of the lower court and
remanded the case to the appropriate trial court for further proceedings. The court held that a barrio captain,
like Tuvera, can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention as they are considered persons in authority.

The grounds relied upon by Tuvera for the motion to quash were rejected by the court, ruling that the facts
and evidence on record showed the existence of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. Respondent's contention
holds no water. An order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is not merely
interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused cannot claim double jeopardy as the
dismissal was secured not only with his consent but at his instance.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned Order of
April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded to the appropriate
trial court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: SAYO vs. THE CHIEF OF POLICE
G.R. No. L-2128
Date: May 12, 1948
MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN
MOSTERO, petitioners, CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF
CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
FACTS:
The case involves the arrest and detention of petitioners Melencio Sayo and Joaquin Mostero by policeman
Benjamin Dumlao on April 2, 1948, based on a complaint filed by Bernardino Malinao for the alleged crime
of robbery. The petitioners were detained from the time of their arrest until the petition for habeas corpus was
filed with the court on April 5, 1948. The arrest and detention were made without a warrant. The city fiscal’s
office of Manila had not yet released or filed any information against the petitioners with the proper courts of
justice by April 7, 1948. The question in the case is the legality of the petitioners’ detention by non-judicial
authorities and the definition of judicial authority under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were being illegally restrained of their liberty due to the failure of the respondents,
including the City Fiscal of Manila, to deliver them to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six
hours as required by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING:
The court ruled that the detention and confinement of the petitioners, who were charged with robbery, is
illegal. It is stated that the city fiscal of Manila is not considered a judicial authority within the meaning of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Furthermore, it explains that the judicial authority refers to the courts
of justice, such as the Supreme Court and other inferior courts, as well as justices and judges. Therefore, the
detention of the petitioners by the city fiscal without a warrant of arrest or commitment from a judicial
authority is deemed illegal and in violation of the Constitution. The respondents are ordered to immediately
release the two petitioners.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: AGBAY vs. THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE
MILITARY, SPO4 NEMESIO NATIVIDAD, JR. and SPO2 ELEAZAR M.
SOLOMON
G.R. No. 134503
Date: July 2, 1999
JASPER AGBAY, petitioner, THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN
FOR THE MILITARY, SPO4 NEMESIO
NATIVIDAD, JR. and SPO2 ELEAZAR M.
SOLOMON, respondent.
FACTS:
The petitioner, along with another individual, was arrested and detained for alleged violation of R.A. 7610
(Special Protection of Children Against Child abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). A complaint was
filed against the petitioner before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu. The petitioner
later filed a complaint for delay in the delivery of detained persons against the respondents, who were police
officers stationed at the Liloan Police Substation. The complaint was transferred to the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Military, which recommended its dismissal. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was denied. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the resolution and
order of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military.
ISSUE:
Whether the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court constitutes a “proper judicial authority” as
required by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code regarding the delay in the delivery of detained persons.
RULING:
The court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the resolution and
order of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military. The court held that the filing of the complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court interrupted the period prescribed in Article 125, as it served the purpose of informing
the detained person of the crime imputed against him and allowing for release on bail. The court also noted
that the judge of the Municipal Trial Court retained the power to issue an order of release or commitment,
even when conducting preliminary investigations. Thus, the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial
Court satisfied the intent behind Article 125. No pronouncement was made as to costs.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: TAURO vs. JUDGE ANGEL V. COLET
AM No. RTJ-99-1434.
Date: April 29, 1999
ARNULFO B. TAURO, JUDGE ANGEL V. COLET, Regional Trial
Complainant, Court of Manila, Branch 8, Respondent.
FACTS:
The case of Arnulfo B. Tauro filing a complaint against Judge Angel V. Colet of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 8. Tauro alleges that Judge Colet failed to decide Criminal Case Nos. 92-109346, 92-109347,
and 92-109348 within the reglementary period of 90 days as mandated by law. Tauro claims that Judge
Colet’s delays in deciding the cases caused the postponement and considerable delay in the resolution of the
cases.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Angel V. Colet violated his duty to decide the aforementioned criminal cases within the 90-
day period mandated by law, and if so, what administrative sanctions should be imposed on him.
RULING:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found Judge Colet guilty of failing to perform his duty to
decide the cases within the prescribed period. Judge Colet admits his failure but pleads for leniency, citing
delays caused by the private prosecutor and defense counsel, as well as his transfer to different stations and
loss of records. However, the OCA emphasizes that judges are expected to dispose of court business
promptly and decide cases within the required period. The OCA recommends a fine of P10,000 for Judge
Colet. The document agrees with the recommendation and imposes the recommended fine, citing
respondent’s violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires judges to
administer justice impartially and without delay.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: ALBIOR vs. AUGUIS
A.M. No. P-01-1472
Date: June 26, 2003
ADRIANO V. ALBIOR, Complainant, DONATO A. AUGUIS, Clerk of Court II, 4th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Talibon-
Getafe, Bohol, Respondent.
FACTS:
The case involves Judge Angel V. Colet of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 8, who was
charged with failure to decide Criminal Case Nos. 92-109346, 92-109347, and 92-109348 within the
reglementary period of 90 days. The complaining witness, Arnulfo B. Tauro, alleged that the cases had been
terminated in 1995, but Judge Colet failed to decide them within the mandated 90-day period. After the lapse
of the 90-day period, Judge Colet was transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court and later to the
Baguio City Regional Trial Court. The cases remained undecided for more than a year and a half, and Judge
Colet was accused of ignoring and disregarding the 90-day period mandated by law.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Angel V. Colet should be held administratively liable for his failure to decide the cases within
the prescribed period of 90 days.
RULING:
The Office of the Court Administrator found Judge Colet guilty of failing to perform his duty to decide cases
within the reglementary period. Judge Colet admitted his violation and pleaded for leniency, stating that the
delays in the cases were caused by the motions for postponement or non-appearance of the prosecutor and
defense counsel. However, the OCA concluded that Judge Colet’s admission of violating the constitutional
provision requiring cases to be decided within three months, as well as his failure to ask for an extension,
justified holding him administratively liable. Judges are expected to dispose of the court’s business promptly,
and delay in the disposition of cases is deemed inexcusable. Therefore, Judge Colet’s failure to decide the
cases within the prescribed period constituted gross inefficiency, and he was found guilty.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GO y KO alias "KING LOUIE"
G.R. No. L-116001
Date: March 14, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, LUISITO GO y KO alias "KING
plaintiff-appellee, LOUIE", accused-appellant.
FACTS:
On October 22, 1992, police officers received an intelligence report about the supply of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu in Calamba, Laguna.

The police officers went to the Flamingo Disco House and saw accused-appellant Luisito Go, also known as
“King Louie,” entering the establishment with two women.

An informant informed the police officers that Go had a gun tucked in his waist.

The police officers conducted an “Operation Bakal” (search for illegally possessed firearms) with the
permission of the disco owner and accompanied by a waiter.

Upon reaching the second floor, the lights were turned on, and the police officers saw Go and his companions
seated at a table.
ISSUE:
1. Did the police officers have the authority to effect the arrest without a warrant?
2. Were the search and subsequent seizure legal?
RULING:
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of accused-appellant Luisito Go for illegal possession of a firearm
and shabu. The court held that the arrest and subsequent seizure were lawful under the recognized exceptions
to the constitutional requirement of a warrant. The gun was plainly visible on Go’s waist, making it an
offense committed in the presence of the police officers. The substances found in Go’s possession were
positively identified as shabu, a regulated drug, through laboratory examination, establishing his guilt for
illegal possession of shabu beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court’s factual findings, affirmed by the
appellate court, were considered binding and were not found to be biased or arbitrary.

Therefore, accused-appellant Luisito Go’s conviction for illegal possession of a firearm and shabu was
upheld by the court. He was sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine. The shabu and drug
paraphernalia seized were to be destroyed.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: ALVAREZ vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS
G.R. No. L-45358
Date: January 29, 1937
NARCISO ALVAREZ, petitioner, THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
TAYABAS and THE ANTI-USURY
BOARD, respondents.
FACTS:
On June 3, 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board presented an affidavit to Judge
Eduardo Gutierrez David of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. The affidavit stated that the petitioner,
Alvarez, was allegedly keeping accounting books, documents, receipts, lists, and other papers related to his
activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. Based on this affidavit,
Judge David issued a search warrant for Alvarez’s house in Infanta, Tayabas. On June 4, 1936, several agents
of the Anti-Usury Board entered Alvarez’s store and residence and seized various articles, including
accounting books, documents, and papers. Alvarez opposed the search and seizure, claiming that the warrant
was illegal for several reasons. He argued that the warrant was based solely on the affidavit of the chief of the
secret service, who had no personal knowledge of the facts, and that the warrant was issued for the sole
purpose of seizing evidence for possible criminal proceedings against him. Alvarez also contended that the
warrant did not meet the requirements for a search and seizure at night. Furthermore, he claimed that the
warrant should have been supported by additional affidavits of witnesses, as the chief of the secret service’s
affidavit only contained hearsay information. Additionally, Alvarez argued that a detailed description of the
items to be seized was necessary, but it was not required to be excessively technical. Alvarez requested that
the warrant be declared illegal and set aside, and that all the seized articles be returned to him. The court
eventually declared the search warrant and seizure illegal, and ordered the immediate return of nineteen
specific documents to Alvarez.
ISSUE:
Whether the search warrant and seizure of the accounting books and documents were legal. Specifically, it
focuses on the sufficiency of the affidavit submitted as probable cause for issuing the search warrant.
RULING:
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner and declared the search warrant and seizure illegal. They set aside
the orders of the respondent court authorizing the seizure and ordered the immediate return of the seized
documents to the petitioner. The court concluded that the affidavit submitted as probable cause was
insufficient because the agent who made the affidavit did not have personal knowledge of the facts and relied
on hearsay information. Additionally, the court emphasized the importance of protecting constitutional rights
and gave a liberal construction to the provisions of the Constitution and General Orders regarding search and
seizure.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: BURGOS vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF
G.R. No. L-64261
Date: December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
SERVICES, INC., petitioners, CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL
OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY
COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS:
On December 7, 1982, two search warrants were issued by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. These warrants authorized the search of the premises known as
No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
which were the business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers, respectively.
The warrants allowed for the seizure of office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor
vehicles, and other articles used in the printing, publication, and distribution of the said newspapers, as well
as numerous papers, documents, books, and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control
of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr., the publisher-editor of “We Forum” newspaper. Petitioners challenged the
validity of the search warrants, raising several reasons to nullify them. They argued that there was a failure to
conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the
constitutional provision and the Rules of Court. However, during the hearing, it was conceded that an
examination did take place.

Petitioners also contested the sufficiency of the allegations in the joint affidavit filed with the application for
the search warrants. They argued that the statement in the affidavit did not meet the test of sufficiency
established by the court in a previous case. The joint affidavit stated that the premises and items described
therein were used and continuously being used for subversive activities. Respondents raised the argument
that petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr., having used some of the seized documents as evidence in a criminal case, was
now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. However, the court rejected this
argument, stating that the lawful ownership of the documents by petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. allows him to use
them as evidence without affecting the validity of the search warrants. Respondents also argued that the
petitioners’ delay in filing the petition rendered it subject to dismissal based on laches. The search warrants
were issued on December 7, 1982, and the petition was filed on June 16, 1983. However, the court found that
the delay was due to petitioners’ efforts to exhaust other remedies and the urgency of the constitutional issues
raised. The court held that the charge of laches was unfounded. After analyzing the arguments and objections
raised, the court declared the search warrants null and void and ordered the release of the seized articles. The
court emphasized that the search warrants did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, and the seizure
of the premises and closure of the newspapers constituted a violation of the freedom of the press.
ISSUE:
Whether the issue of search warrants are valid and whether they were based on probable cause and satisfied
the constitutional requirements.
RULING:
The court declared the search warrants null and void and set them aside. They found that there were several
reasons to annul the search warrants. Firstly, they ruled that the joint affidavit presented as evidence failed to
establish probable cause as required by the Constitution. Secondly, the search warrants were deemed to be in
the nature of general warrants, as they did not sufficiently describe the alleged subversive materials to be
seized. The warrants were considered to be a mere conclusion of law and did not meet the requirements of
probable cause. Additionally, the court noted that the search warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
alone, but articles belonging to his co-petitioners and media company were also seized. Finally, the court
rejected the arguments of jurisdiction, laches, and the theory that the use of seized documents as evidence
estopped the petitioner from challenging the validity of the search warrants. The court found these reasons to
be meritless. Consequently, the court granted the prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of
the seized articles and declared the search warrants null and void.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. ALIPIT
G.R. No. L-18853
Date: August 22, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE EXEQUIEL ALIPIT and VICTORIO D.
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, ALEMUS, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
The case involves defendants Exequiel Alipit, who was the municipal president, and Victorio D. Alemus,
who was the chief of police, in the municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna, Philippines. On May 30,
1920, they attended a meeting of the municipal council, which was being presided over by vice-president
Manuel Basa. During the meeting, Alipit fired a shot in the air, entered the session room, and ordered Alemus
to arrest vice-president Basa. Alemus obeyed the order, and both defendants used violence, intimidation, and
force to arrest Basa and dissolve the meeting.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendants acted unlawfully by interrupting and dissolving the meeting of the municipal council,
and whether their actions constituted a violation of Section 1 of Act No. 1755
RULING:
The court found the defendants guilty of a violation of Section 1 of Act No. 1755, which pertains to the
prevention, disturbance, or disorderly conduct in the presence of any legislative body. The court determined
that the meeting of the municipal council, which had a quorum present, was entitled to respect and
presumption of legality. Therefore, the defendants’ actions in interrupting and dissolving the meeting were
deemed unlawful and punishable. The court modified the judgment, sentencing Exequiel Alipit to three
years’ imprisonment and Victorio Alemus to one year’s imprisonment. The defendants’ appeal was denied,
and the judgment was affirmed.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE M. BAES
G.R. No. G.R. No. L-46000
Date: May 25, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, JOSE M. BAES, appellant.
FACTS:
The case revolves around an incident in which the accused, Jose M. Baes, caused a funeral procession of a
person belonging to the "Church of Christ" to pass through the churchyard of the Roman Catholic Church in
Lumban, Province of Laguna, against the opposition of the Parish Priest. The Parish Priest filed a complaint
against the accused under Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, "Offending religious feelings".
ISSUE:
Whether the act committed by the accused, passing a funeral procession through a churchyard belonging to
the Roman Catholic Church, constituted an offense under Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING:
Initially, the lower court dismissed the case, reasoning that the act did not offend the religious feelings of
Catholics and could be charged as trespass or coercion instead of violating Article 133. However, on appeal,
the court reversed the decision and ordered the fiscal to file the appropriate information regarding the offense
committed by the accused under Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court emphasized the two
essential elements needed for an offense under Article 133 – that the act was performed in a place devoted to
religious worship and that the act was notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. The court
highlighted the significance of determining whether the churchyard was a place devoted to religious worship
and if the act was offensive to the faithful, stating that passing a funeral procession under the rites of another
religion through such a place could indeed be offensive to the feelings of the Catholics.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: THE UNITED STATES vs. DALMACIO LAGNASON.
G.R. No. G.R. No. 1582
Date: March 28, 1904
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, DALMACIO LAGNASON, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
The defendant in the case was charged with treason under section 1 of Act No. 292 for leading a band of men
in arms against the Government of the United States in the province of Occidental Negros, Philippines. The
defendant's band was constantly armed and aimed to establish an independent government. They engaged in
armed resistance and attacks, with the defendant being captured in a battle where several of his men were
killed, along with casualties on the opposing side.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the defendant's actions constituted treason by "levying war" against the United States, as per
the constitutional definition of treason, or if it amounted to rebellion or insurrection under a different
section of the act.

2. Whether the defendant's actions aligned more with treason or rebellion and whether the penalty for
these offenses should differ.
RULING:
The court ruled that the defendant's actions amounted to both "levying war" against the United States as well
as rebellion or insurrection under the provisions of Act No. 292. The ruling acknowledged the apparent
inconsistency in the different sections of the act regarding the punishment for treason and rebellion,
ultimately affirming the conviction of the defendant but changing the penalty from death to ten years'
imprisonment and a fine of $10,000. The court also highlighted that regardless of whether the offense was
considered treason or rebellion, the punishment could not exceed ten years' imprisonment and a fine.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TEOFILO PAAR
G.R. No. G.R. No. L-2318
Date: March 31, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- TEOFILO PAAR (alias TEOFILO PAJAR, alias
appellee, BEN PAJAR), defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
The appellant, Teofilo Paar, was found guilty of treason by the People's Court in the Philippines for his
involvement with the Japanese Kempei Tai as an undercover man during the Japanese occupation. The
prosecution presented evidence of Paar's direct participation in treasonous acts, such as delivering individuals
to the Japanese Military Police for questioning and investigation. The appellant's actions included aiding in
the arrest, detention, and torture of individuals suspected of supporting the resistance movement. Various
witnesses confirmed Paar's involvement in delivering individuals to the Japanese authorities and
collaborating with them.

ISSUE:
Whether the appellant, Teofilo Paar, was guilty of treason based on his actions in collaborating with the
Japanese Kempei Tai during the occupation of the Philippines.
RULING:
The court found Teofilo Paar guilty of treason based on his direct participation in aiding the Japanese Kempei
Tai and delivering individuals to them, leading to their arrest, detention, and torture. Despite the appellant's
claims of innocence and following orders from an underground resistance movement, the court determined
that his actions clearly demonstrated adherence to the enemy, hence convicting him of treason. The initial
sentence of reclusion perpetua was modified to seventeen years, four months, and one day of reclusion
temporal due to the absence of fatalities resulting from his actions. The judgment was affirmed by the court
with costs. The court rejected the appellant's defense that he joined the Kempei Tai under the instruction of
Major Laconico for the resistance movement, stating that his actions with the Japanese Military Police
negated his exculpatory explanations. Ultimately, the court found Paar's association with the Kempei Tai and
his participation in their activities as evidence of his guilt for treason .
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO MANGAHAS
G.R. No. G.R. No. 118777
Date: July 28, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- RODRIGO MANGAHAS, accused-appellant.

Appellee
FACTS:
The case involves the murder conviction of accused-appellant Rodrigo Mangahas for the shooting death of
Rufino Gestala in Bulacan, Philippines. The prosecution presented witnesses, including a doctor who
performed the autopsy on the victim, and evidence to support their case. The defense claimed self-defense,
with the accused stating that he shot Gestala in response to being threatened with a gun. There were
inconsistencies in the accused's defense, with differing statements made during the preliminary investigation
and trial.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused-appellant acted in self-defense when he shot the victim, as claimed, or if the shooting
was a deliberate act of murder.
RULING:
The trial court affirmed the murder conviction of Rodrigo Mangahas for the killing of Rufino Gestala,
rejecting the self-defense claim and finding inconsistencies in the accused's testimony. The appellate court
upheld the original verdict, emphasizing the trial court's authority in assessing witness credibility and
demeanor. The court concluded that there was not enough evidence to reverse the conviction and found the
accused's testimony lacking in credibility, leading to the affirmation of the murder conviction.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROQUE BADILI, Mariano M. Magsalin
G.R. No. G.R. No. L-565
Date: June 27, 1949
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- ROQUE BADILI, Defendant-Appellant.
Appellee, Mariano M. Magsalin for the Appellant.
FACTS:
The defendant, Roque Badili, was accused of treason on eight counts, including illegal arrest and
maltreatment of Macario Castañares and conspiring with the enemy to capture and murder Lt. Pacifico
Rosales of the guerrillas.

Multiple witnesses testified against Roque on the count of conspiring with the enemy, stating that they saw
him and other undercover agents capture Lt. Rosales, tie, torture him, and then drag him to a sailboat where
he was eventually killed at sea. Roque denied knowing Lt. Rosales and claimed alibi but evidence pointed to
his involvement in serving as a secret agent for the enemy and hindering Lt. Rosales from carrying out his
activities as part of the guerrilla forces/
ISSUE:
The appeal in focus was on counts 2 and 8, with the prosecutor agreeing that counts 1 and 7 had not been
established. Count 2 involved the arrest and maltreatment of Macario Castañares, while count 8 involved the
capture and murder of Lt. Pacifico Rosales. The main issue was to determine the guilt of Roque Badili in
these specific counts based on the evidence presented during the trial.
RULING:
The court found Roque Badili guilty of serving the enemy as a secret agent and preventing Lt. Pacifico
Rosales from pursuing his activities as a member of the guerrilla forces. As a result, his sentence was reduced
to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal. Despite Roque's denial and alibi, the court
considered the testimonies of witnesses, such as Francisca Garcia, Basilio Argoso, and Pastor Abellana, as
credible evidence supporting the claim of conspiracy with the enemy and the capture of Lt. Rosales, leading
to the ruling of guilt in count 8.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: THE UNITED STATES vs. MAXIMO ABAD
G.R. No. G.R. No. 976
Date: October 22, 1902
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, MAXIMO ABAD, Defendant-Appellant.
Perfecto Gabriel and Pablo Borbon, for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.
FACTS:
The defendant, a former insurgent officer in the Philippines, was charged with violating an oath of allegiance
to the United States by denying the existence of rifles to a U.S. Army officer. The defendant had concealed
the rifles at the time of his surrender and was aware of their location when he denied their existence.
ISSUE:
Whether the offense of violating oaths of allegiance fell under the categories of treason and sedition which
were covered by an amnesty proclamation.
RULING:
The court decided that the offense of violating oaths of allegiance could be considered within the amnesty for
treason and sedition provided by the proclamation. The court held that the offense was political in nature and
that the defendant was entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. Therefore, upon filing the prescribed oath, the
defendant was to be discharged from the charges.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FERNANDO MARTIN
G.R. No. G.R. No. L-2537
Date: January 10, 1951
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- FERNANDO MARTIN (alias
appellee, VASQUES), defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
The facts of the case of Fernando Martin alias Vasques involved his membership in the Makapili organization
during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in 1945. He received military training from the Japanese,
wore their uniform, and acted as an informer. He was accused of multiple crimes, including the killing of
Baldomero Soriano, an alleged guerrilla lieutenant, and two other individuals. There were witnesses who
testified to these acts and provided evidence against him..
ISSUE:
Whether Fernando Martin alias Vasques was guilty of the crimes attributed to him or if his defense of being
arrested by the Japanese and not participating in the crimes was valid.
RULING:
The trial court initially sentenced Vasques to death, but on appeal, it was reduced to reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment) with a fine of PHP 10,000. This decision was made after eight Justices of the Court failed to
reach a verdict on the death penalty. The Court found that the prosecution's evidence against Vasques was
stronger than his defense, leading to the guilty verdict and final ruling.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOAQUIN FLAVIER
G.R. No. G.R. No. L-2998
Date: May 23, 1951
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- JOAQUIN FLAVIER, Defendant-Appellant.
Appellee,
FACTS:
The facts of the case involve the defendant, Joaquin Flavier, being accused of committing acts of treason
during wartime in Lopez, Tayabas. The charges included aiding the Japanese Imperial Forces, involvement in
the killing of three guerrillas, arresting individuals suspected of being guerrillas, and participating in the
torture of captives. Witnesses testified to the encounters and incidents that implicated the defendant in the
crimes, including the arrest and torture of victims. Despite the defendant's attempts to deny his involvement
or shift blame, the evidence presented strongly supported the charges against him. The court found the
defendant guilty on counts 2, 7, 8, and 10, affirming the original judgment of treason and sentencing him to
life imprisonment with a fine. The case highlighted the importance of accountability for individuals who
collaborate with enemy forces during wartime and serves as a legal precedent for determining criminal
liability in such actions. Additionally, the defendant's Filipino citizenship, which was questioned in the
appeal, was confirmed through official records and witness testimonies.
ISSUE:
Whether Joaquin Flavier is the question of his involvement in acts of treason during wartime, specifically
aiding the Japanese Imperial Forces and committing various crimes against guerrillas in Lopez, Tayabas.
RULING:
The court's ruling was to affirm the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, finding the defendant
Joaquin Flavier guilty of treason and sentencing him to life imprisonment with legal accessories, as well as a
fine of P15,000. The court found the defendant guilty on counts 2, 7, 8, and 10, while dismissing count 1.
Despite the defendant's attempts to challenge the evidence and proof of citizenship, the court upheld the
conviction based on the strong testimonies of witnesses and victims supporting the charges. The court
rejected the defense's arguments and emphasized the importance of accountability for individuals who
collaborate with enemy forces during wartime.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS vs. PEDRO MARCAIDA
G.R. No. G.R. No. L-953
Date: September 18, 1947
EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS, querellante-apelado, PEDRO MARCAIDA, acusado-apelante.
FACTS:
Pedro Marcaida was convicted of treason and sentenced to life imprisonment, a fine of P10,000, and court
costs after a trial. The defense argued that the evidence did not sufficiently prove Marcaida's Filipino
citizenship and loyalty to the Commonwealth government.

There were questions regarding Marcaida's citizenship status, with discussions on whether he was Filipino or
a foreigner based on his birth or parents' residency status. The dispute centered around the interpretation of
laws related to Filipino citizenship by birth or descent from Spanish subjects and the application of the crime
of treason in the Philippines to residents owing allegiance to the government. Marcaida's defense contended
that if he was not proven to be Filipino, he could not be criminally responsible for treason as the law required
loyalty to the Commonwealth government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Marcaida should be convicted of treason.
RULING:
The court ruled in favor of the appellant, Pedro Marcaida, and revoked the sentence imposed on him for the
crime of treason. The court ordered his immediate release with costs of the case to be paid by the
government. The defense successfully argued that the evidence presented did not clearly establish Marcaida's
Filipino citizenship and allegiance to the Commonwealth government, and therefore he could not be held
criminally responsible for the crime of treason as a Filipino citizen. The court scrutinized the interpretation of
laws regarding citizenship and treason, ultimately leading to the decision to overturn the conviction against
Marcaida. Additionally, the court considered previous legal doctrines and precedents to arrive at their ruling
in favor of Marcaida.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: THE UNITED STATES vs. DALMACIO LAGNASON
G.R. No. G.R. No. 1582
Date: March 28, 1904
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee DALMACIO LAGNASON, Defendant-Appellant
FACTS:
The defendant in the case was charged with treason under section 1 of Act No. 292 for leading a band of men
in arms against the Government of the United States in the province of Occidental Negros, Philippines. The
defendant's band was constantly armed and aimed to establish an independent government. They engaged in
armed resistance and attacks, with the defendant being captured in a battle where several of his men were
killed, along with casualties on the opposing side.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the defendant's actions constituted treason by "levying war" against the United States, as per
the constitutional definition of treason, or if it amounted to rebellion or insurrection under a different
section of the act.

2. Whether the defendant's actions aligned more with treason or rebellion and whether the penalty for
these offenses should differ.
RULING:
The court ruled that the defendant's actions amounted to both "levying war" against the United States as well
as rebellion or insurrection under the provisions of Act No. 292. The ruling acknowledged the apparent
inconsistency in the different sections of the act regarding the punishment for treason and rebellion,
ultimately affirming the conviction of the defendant but changing the penalty from death to ten years'
imprisonment and a fine of $10,000. The court also highlighted that regardless of whether the offense was
considered treason or rebellion, the punishment could not exceed ten years' imprisonment and a fine.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: Cramer v. United States
G.R. No. 325 U.S. 1
Date: Argued March 9, 1944
Reargued November 6, 1944
Decided April 23, 1945
Cramer United States
FACTS:
The facts of the case involve the defendant, Anthony Cramer, being charged with treason for adhering to
enemies of the United States and giving them aid and comfort. The overt acts alleged against Cramer include
meeting and conversing with the enemies, Werner Thiel and Edward John Kerling, at various locations in
New York City. However, there was no evidence presented that Cramer provided any valuable information or
support to the enemies during these meetings.
ISSUE:
Whether the overt acts alleged were sufficient to prove that Cramer actually provided aid and comfort to the
enemies in violation of the law.
RULING:
In the ruling, the court determined that the overt acts presented in the case were not enough to support a
finding that Cramer had given aid and comfort to the enemy. Therefore, the judgment of conviction of
treason was reversed. The court emphasized the importance of meeting the legal standard of proof in cases of
treason, especially in proving acts of aiding the enemy.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: Haupt v. United States
G.R. No. 330 U.S. 631
Date: Argued November 21, 22, 1946
Decided March 31, 1947
Haupt United States
FACTS:
The case involves a defendant who was indicted and convicted of treason for providing shelter, assistance,
and support to an enemy agent engaged in sabotage activities. The defendant was found to have harbored the
saboteur for six days, helped him purchase a vehicle, and aided him in obtaining employment at a plant
manufacturing military equipment. The direct testimony of two witnesses provided evidence of the
defendant's overt acts, including allowing the saboteur to stay in his house and assisting in the purchase of the
vehicle. Additionally, the case involves considerations of the defendant's motives, instructions to the jury on
determining guilt based on intent, and the admissibility of prior sympathies and hostilities towards Germany
and hostility towards the United States as evidence of intent.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendant could be found guilty of treason for providing shelter, assistance, and support to an
enemy agent engaged in sabotage activities.
RULING:
The ruling in the case discussed in the document was that the defendant was found guilty of treason. The
court affirmed the conviction of the defendant based on the direct testimony of two witnesses proving overt
acts, including harboring the saboteur and aiding in the purchase of a vehicle [1a]. The jury was instructed to
determine whether the defendant's acts were motivated by parental solicitude or adherence to the enemy
cause. Additionally, conversations and occurrences showing the defendant's sympathies and hostilities were
deemed admissible as evidence of intent. The court rejected claims of unfair trial conduct and upheld the
conviction.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO DE LOS SANTOS
G.R. No. G.R. No. L-1975
Date: December 21, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- FRANCISCO DE LOS SANTOS, Defendant-
Appellee Appellant
FACTS:
The case of Francisco de los Santos involves his charge with treason for aiding the enemy during the
Japanese occupation of the Philippines. He was found guilty of participating in the arrest, investigation, and
torture of Filipino civilians suspected of being guerrilla members, which resulted in the deaths of several
individuals. Witnesses provided compelling testimonies of his involvement in these crimes, including taking
jewelry from the victims' homes.
ISSUE:
Whether Francisco de los Santos, a Filipino citizen who owed allegiance to the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, was guilty of treason for collaborating with the enemy by aiding in the arrest and torture of his
fellow countrymen who were involved in the resistance movement.
RULING:
The court affirmed the guilt of Francisco de los Santos and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, a fine of
P20,000, and to pay indemnities to the heirs of the deceased victims. The judgment was modified to adjust
the indemnity amounts for specific victims, reduce the death penalty to reclusion perpetua due to
disagreement among the justices, and affirm the rest of the judgment with costs against the appellant. The
justices voted in favor of the ruling, concurring with the decision. Despite the appellant's denial, the court
found the witness testimonies corroborating his involvement in the crimes to be convincing, ultimately
leading to his conviction for treason.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MATIAS ALMAZAN
G.R. No. G.R. No. L-2323
Date: January 9, 1951
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- MATIAS ALMAZAN, Defendant-Appellant
Appellee
FACTS:
The facts of the case involve Matias Almazan being accused of treason on five counts before the People's
Court. The charges against him include being a member of subversive societies such as "Ganap" and
"Sakdal," as well as joining the pro-Japanese organization known as "Makapili" during the Japanese
occupation of the Philippines. He actively participated in assisting the Japanese forces, receiving military
training, and engaging in campaigns against the guerrilla resistance movement. Almazan was involved in the
arrest of guerrilla suspects, including Felipe Capili and three unknown Filipinos in Siniloan, and delivering
them to the Japanese garrison in Calamba. Additionally, he was accused of arresting Enrique Alcabasa and
his sons, who were members of the guerrilla corps, resulting in the death of Enrique due to torture by the
Japanese. Witnesses testified against Almazan, providing evidence of his active participation in these arrests
and collaborations with the Japanese forces. Despite his denial of the accusations brought against him, the
trial court found him guilty, leading to his sentencing to life imprisonment, a fine, and costs.
ISSUE:
Whether Matias Almazan was guilty of the charges brought against him, specifically for joining subversive
societies, collaborating with the Japanese forces, and facilitating the arrest and torture of guerrilla suspects
during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines.
RULING:
The court's ruling was that Matias Almazan was found guilty on four counts of treason before the People's
Court. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, a fine of P10,000, and costs. The charges against him included
being a member of subversive societies, such as "Ganap" and "Sakdal," and actively participating in the pro-
Japanese organization known as "Makapili" during the Japanese occupation. He was also accused of arresting
guerrilla suspects and delivering them to the Japanese headquarters, resulting in torture and death. Despite
denying the accusations brought against him, witnesses testified against him, and evidence such as documents
and victim testimonies were presented, leading to the court's decision to find him guilty.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. APOLINAR ADRIANO
G.R. No. G.R. No. L-477
Date: June 30, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- APOLINAR ADRIANO, Defendant-Appellant
Appellee
FACTS:
The case involves Apolinar Adriano, a Filipino citizen accused of treason for adhering to the Japanese
Imperial Forces during the occupation of the Philippines in 1945. The accusations against him include
participation in raids, confiscation of property with Japanese soldiers, being armed, drilling with the Makapili
army, and being a member of the Makapili organization formed to assist the Japanese military in their war
efforts against the United States and the Philippines. The charges against Adriano involve acts committed in
the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains of Luzon, including surrendering to the Americans after the
liberation of Gapan by the American forces. The prosecution, however, failed to provide substantial evidence
meeting the strict requirements of the two-witness rule in treason cases, which led to the reversal of the
judgment and the acquittal of the appellant. Membership in the Makapili organization was considered in itself
constitutive of an overt act of treason, without the necessity of engaging in actual battle or committing further
nefarious acts. The court highlighted the inflexible nature of the two-witness rule in treason cases, stressing
the importance of requiring corroboration through direct testimony of two witnesses to establish guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. Ultimately, the lack of conclusive evidence regarding the specific acts attributed to
Adriano led to his acquittal on appeal.
ISSUE:
The main issue in the case revolves around the interpretation and application of the two-witness rule in
treason cases. Specifically, whether membership in the Makapili organization constitutes an overt act of
treason that needs to be proven by the testimony of two witnesses.
RULING:
The judgment of conviction is reversed, and the appellant, Apolinar Adriano, is acquitted due to the lack of
evidence meeting the strict requirements of the two-witness rule in treason prosecutions. The prosecution
failed to provide substantial evidence supported by two witnesses to corroborate the specific acts of treason
attributed to the accused. The court found that while membership in the Makapili organization could imply
treasonous intent, it still needed to be proven by the testimony of two witnesses to meet the statutory test. The
ruling emphasizes the importance of adhering to the legal standards, even in cases as grave as treason.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AQUILINO VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. G.R. No. L-5838
Date: February 9, 1953
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- AQUILINO VILLANUEVA, Defendant-Appellant
Appellee
FACTS:
The facts of the case of Aquilino Villanueva include his involvement in a pro-Japanese organization called
"Makapili," where he held the rank of captain. Villanueva's unit was responsible for patrolling the town,
looking for guerrillas and individuals suspected of aiding the underground movement against the Japanese
soldiers. He and some members of his unit wore uniforms similar to Japanese soldiers and arm bands with
Japanese characters.

During an incident on December 24, 1944, Villanueva accompanied Japanese soldiers to arrest Filipino
guards who were doing neighborhood association guard duty. The Japanese soldiers were armed with rifles,
while Villanueva carried a pistol[1b]. Villanueva denied any involvement in the arrests and claimed he was
the head of a religious organization and engaged in tinsmith business during that period.
ISSUE:
Whether Aquilino Villanueva was guilty of treason for collaborating with Japanese soldiers in arresting
Filipino civilians during World War II, based on his involvement in the Makapili organization and
participation in the arrests of suspected guerrillas or underground supporters.
RULING:
The ruling of the case was that Villanueva was found guilty by the trial court and initially sentenced
to 16 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals increased his sentence to
reclusion perpetua. The higher court affirmed the trial court's decision, as there was no evidence linking
Villanueva to any killings or disappearances. The defendant's denial and alibi were not given weight by the
court, and he was ultimately held accountable for his association with the Japanese military and the arrests he
was involved in.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE FERNANDO
G.R. No. G.R. No. L-1138
Date: December 17, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- JOSE FERNANDO, Defendant-Appellant
Appellee
FACTS:
The case of Jose Fernando involves his conviction for treason during the Japanese occupation of the
Philippines. He was found guilty of collaborating with the Kempei-tai as an informer and spy, leading raids
against guerrillas, arresting and torturing individuals suspected of being part of the resistance, and attempting
to suppress the underground resistance movement. Fernando's activities included arresting Ponciano Briones,
father of a guerrilla leader, and attempting to arrest Consolacion Tongol, the sister of a guerrilla fighter.
Despite his defense of being forced into service by the enemy and claiming approval from guerrilla leaders,
the court rejected these arguments. Witness testimonies detailed how Fernando and his associates detained,
interrogated, and maltreated individuals during the wartime occupation, actively aiding the Japanese forces
against Filipino guerrilla fighters. The prosecution successfully proved Fernando's involvement in aiding the
Japanese military forces, leading to his conviction for treason.
ISSUE:
Whether he is guilty of the crime of treason for collaborating with the Japanese forces during the occupation
of the Philippines. Fernando was accused of being an informer and active member of the Kempei-tai, aiding
in the arrests, investigations, and torture of individuals suspected of being part of the resistance movement.
RULING:
The ruling of the court was to affirm Fernando's guilt and sentence him to reclusion perpetua, with the
accessories of the law, and to pay a fine of P15,000.00, as well as the costs. Fernando's defenses of being
forced into service by the enemy and claiming approval from guerrilla leaders were rejected by the court, as
they did not exculpate him from criminal responsibility for his actions aiding the Japanese forces against
Filipino guerrilla fighters.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title:
G.R. No.
Date:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title:
G.R. No.
Date:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title:
G.R. No.
Date:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title:
G.R. No.
Date:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title:
G.R. No.
Date:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
By: Danica Jean S. Vacalares
Title:
G.R. No.
Date:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING: