Human Factors
Human Factors
Human Factors
• Human factors refer to the study of how people interact with systems,
products, and environments.
• The ‘cognitive skills’ of the aircraft crew refers to the mental processes used
for gaining and maintaining situational awareness, for solving problems and
for making decisions,
• Medicine will never be risk-free. From the beginning of train- ing, doctors are
taught that errors are unacceptable and that the philosophy of primum non
nocere (frst, do no harm) should permeate all aspects of treatment.
• The study of patient safety is now a healthcare discipline in its own right,
encompassing patient safety methodologies, health service design, investiga-
tion of incidents and related research.
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• The development of risk management strategies within the healthcare setting
attempts to address these failings.
• Error models can help us understand the factors that cause near misses and
adverse events
• Fitness to work or practice – competence – refers not just to knowledge and skills but
also to the attitudes required to be able to carry out one’s duties
• There are better treatment outcomes and fewer errors when there is good
communication, while poor communication is a common reason for patients
taking legal actions.
• Involving patients in and respecting their right to make decisions about their
care and treatment is crucial.
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Information to be provided when seeking consent for surgery.
• The condition and the reasons why it warrants surgery.
• The type of surgery proposed and how it might correct the
condition.
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Situational awareness: understanding the work environment and
working well within it
• The ‘more than one cause’ theory of accident causation can be aptly applied
to many aspects of surgical patient care during the perioperative period.
However, irrespective of the safety event or issue, the surgeon as the likely
senior team leader will play a key role in reporting and communicating these
events with patients and carers, other team members and hospital
administration. This is particularly so for those so-called ‘coal-face’ errors
where patients identify the surgeon as being responsible for a defned episode
of care.
Cuschieri and others have described coal-face errors as those that can potentially
be committed by surgeons during the care of their patients and include:
Operating theatres have been described as ‘among the most complex political, social
and cultural structures that exist, full of ritual, drama, hierarchy and too often con ct’
• Well- recognised and potential errors include
• the wrong patient in the operating theatre;
• surgery performed on the wrong side or site;
• the wrong procedure performed;
• failure to communicate changes in the patient’s condition;
• disagreements about proceeding;
• retained instruments or swabs
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• All these events are catastrophic for the patient and almost invariably occur
through a lack of communication (see Never events). This means that all
theatre staf should follow proto- cols and be familiar with the underlying
principles supporting a uniform approach to caring for patients.
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Technical and operative errors
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• Central to operative performance is pro ciency, an acquired state, honed by
sound teaching, practice and repetition, by which a surgeon consistently
performs operations with good outcomes.
• This should not carry negative connotations for trainee surgeons, who might
be at the conscious processing stage but still perform a perfectly good
operation, although it might take longer and be more tiring
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Failures in operative technique include:
• procedural, when the steps of an operation are not fol- lowed or are omitted;
• executional, when, for example, too much force is used, which may result in damage that
may or may not have consequences;
• misuse of instrumentation, such as with energised dissec- tion modalities (e.g. diathermy);
• missed iatrogenic injury either at the time of surgery or diagnosed late.
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never events
• Many national health services and institutions now require that all incidents are managed,
reported and investigated. Incidents can be de ned as events that could have or did result in
unintended and/or unnecessary serious harm
• However, serious harm or death is not required to have occurred for that incident to be
categorised as a ‘never or serious reportable event’. As previously described clinical incidents
of this nature, by defnition, mandate an open disclosure process with patients and their carers.
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QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
• inform the development of national clinical audits, includ- ing driving participation,
data completeness and accuracy; support shared decision making and
empowerment of patients, including their treatment options and choice of provider;
• improve the oversight and management of clinicians, their teams and practises, thus
reassuring patients that their clinical care is being actively monitored and improved;
• support team and individual quality improvement, includ- ing providing information
for appraisal and revalidation;
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• Structural measures outline the characteristics of the health system that
afect the system’s ability to meet the healthcare needs of individual patients
or a population.
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Process measures assess what the healthcare provider did for the patient
and how well it was done. Each surgical patient’s journey is a composite of
multiple processes, such as preoperative assessment, hospital admission and
undergoing an operation, among others.
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• Outcome measures describe the efects of care on the health status of
patients and populations – they are specifc, observable and measurable
changes that represent the achievement of an outcome of a quality
improvement initiative. Clinical outcome measures refer specifcally to
outcomes of healthcare interventions, whether they are to do with diagnosis,
treatment or care received by service users.
• Outcome measures are what are commonly used in clinical audit when
outcomes achieved are compared with evidence- based standards of clinical
care.
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THE PROCESS OF SURGICAL CARE
• Patients attend surgeons in many diferent settings depending on whether they present
electively (scheduled) or urgently (unscheduled).
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THE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT PATHWAY
• 2 exploring – is about defning the present state and visu- alising the future state;
• 3 designing – is about defning how to move from the pres- ent state to the future
state and identifying the priorities;
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• 4 refning – is about testing change, learning from the data and identifying the benefts;
• 5 introducing – is about managing communications and building the will and culture to
change;
• 6 spreading – is about showing the improvements, telling the story and disseminating
the message;
• Overproduction
• Example: ordering unnecessary preoperative tests
Solution: implementation of evidence-based preassessment pathways
• Inventory
• Example: storing excessive medication or supplies in ward storage with a risk
of them going out of date
Solution: alphabetically ordered medication cupboards with small amounts of
commonly used drugs in conjunction with an e cient replenishment system
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• Waiting
• Example: patients waiting long periods to come to theatre
Solution: staggered admission times aligned to operating theatre schedule
• Waste of transportation
• Example: using trolleys to bring ambulatory day patients to the operating
theatre Solution: better design of the admissions process to enable patients
to walk to theatre
• Waste of overprocessing
• Example: using computed tomography scans to assess children with possible
appendicitis Solution: consider whether ultrasound could be used instead
• Defect
• Example: patients arriving for surgery with incomplete or inappropriate
preoperative paperwork Solution: more robust checking systems before
patients come to theatre
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• Motion
• Example: frequent searching in theatres and the anaesthetic room to fnd
necessary drugs and equipment
Solution: an e cient theatre layout, common to all operating theatres in the
hospital, where everything needed is easily available with minimal movement
and always in the same place
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