Cuevas vs. Cuevas, GR No. L-8327, December 14, 1956

[No. L-8327.
December 14, 1955]
ANTONINA CUEVAS, plaintiff and appellant vs. CRISPULO

CUEVAS, defendant and appellee.
1. DONATION; CHARACTERISTIC OF DONATION “INTER

Vivos."—Where the donor stated in the deed of donation that he
will not dispose or take away the land “because I am reserving it to
him (donee) upon my death,” he, in effect, expressly renounced the
right to freely dispose of the property in favor of another (a right
essential to full ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of the
conveyance of the naked title to the property in favor of the donee.
As stated in the case of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 50 Off. Gaz.
(8), p. 3568, Phil., 481, such irrevocability is characteristic of
donations inter vivos, because it is incompatible with the idea of a
disposition post mortem.
2. ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; “EJUSDEM

GENERIS."—When the donor stated that she would continue to
retain the “possession, cultivation, harvesting and all other rights
and attributes of ownership” she meant only the dominium utile, not
the full ownership. The words “rights and attributes of ownership”
should be construed ejusdem generis with the preceding rights of
“possession, cultivation and harvesting” expressly enumerated in
the deed. Had the donor meant to retain full or absolute ownership
she had no need to specify possession, cultivation and harvesting,
since all these rights are embodied in full or absolute ownership;
nor would she then have excluded the right of free disposition from
the “rights and attributes of ownership” that she reserved for
herself.
3. ID.; DUTY OF PERSONS CALLED UPON TO PREPARE OR

NOTARIZE DONATIONS.—Persons who are called to prepare or
notarize deeds of donation should call the attention of the donors to
the necessity of clearly specifying whether, notwithstanding the
donation, they wish to retain the right to control and dispose at will
of the property before their death, without need of the consent or
intervention of the beneficiary, since the express reservation of such
right would be conclusive indication that the liberality is to exist
only at the donor’s death, and therefore, the formalities of
testaments should be observed; while a converso, the express
waiver of the right of free disposition would place the inter vivos
character of the donation beyond dispute (Heirs of Bonsato vs.
Court of Appeals, supra.)
4. ID.; ACCEPTANCE; WHAT CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT
ACCEPTANCE.—To respect the terms of the donation and at the
same time express
69
VOL. 98, DECEMBER 14, 1955 69
Cuevas vs. Cuevas
gratitude for the donor’s benevolence, constitutes sufficient

acceptance of the donation.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva

Ecija. Mejia, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Pedro D. Maldia for appellant.
Teodoro P. Santiago for appellee.
REYES, J.B. L., J.:
On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized

conveyance entitled “Donación Mortis Causa,” ceding to her
nephew Crispulo Cuevas the northern half of a parcel of
unregistered land in barrio Sinasajan, municipality of Peñaranda,
Province of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit A). In the same instrument appears
the acceptance of Crispulo Cuevas.
“Subsequently, on May 26, 1952, the donor executed another
notarial instrument entitled “Revocación de Donación Mortis
Causa” (Exhibit B) purporting to set aside the preceding
conveyance; and on August 26, 1952, she brought action in the
Court of First Instance to recover the land conveyed, on the ground
(1) that the donation being mortis causa, it had been lawfully
revoked by the donor; and (2) even if it were a donation inter vivos,
the same was invalidated because (a) it was not properly accepted;
(b) because the donor did not reserve sufficient property for her own
maintenance, and (c) because the donee was guilty of ingratitude, for
having refused to support the donor.
Issues having been joined, and trial had, the Court of First
Instance denied the recovery sought, and Antonina Cuevas
thereupon appealed. The Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this
Court because, the case having been submitted on a stipulation of
facts, the appellant raised only questions of law.
70
70 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cuevas vs. Cuevas
The first issue tendered concerns the true nature of the deed “Exhibit
A"; whether it embodies a donation inter vivos, or a disposition of
property mortis
1 causa, revocable freely by the transferor at any time
before death.
It has been ruled that neither the designation mortis causa, nor
the provision that a donation is “to take effect at the death of the
donor”, is a controlling criterion in defining the true nature of
donations (Laureta vs. Mata, 44 Phil., 668; Concepcion vs.
Concepcion, 91 Phil., 823). Hence, the crux of the controversy
revolves around the following provisions of the deed of donation:
“Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay nabubuhay,

ang lupa na ipinagkakaloob ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin ang patuloy na
mamomosecion, makapagpapatrabaho, makikinabang at ang iba pang
karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa akin pa rin hanggang hindi ko binabawian
ng buhay ng Maykapal at ito naman ay hindi ko ñga iya-alis pagkat kung
ako ay mamatay na ay inilalaan ko sa kaniya.”
There is an apparent conflict in the expression above quoted, in that

the donor reserves to herself “the right of possession, cultivation,
harvesting and other rights and attributes of ownership while I am
not deprived of life by the Almighty”; but right after, the same donor
states that she “will not take away” (the property) “because I reserve
it for him (the donee) when I die.”
The question to be decided is whether the donor intended to part
with the title to the property immediately upon the execution of the
deed, or only later, when she had died. If the first, the donation is
operative inter vivos; if the second, we would be confronted with a
disposition mortis causa, void from the beginning because the
formalities of testaments were not observed (new Civil
2 Code, Arts.
728 and 828; heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 50 Off.
________________
1 ln Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 50 Off. Gaz. (8), p. 3568, we have called
attention to the legal inexistence of so-called “donation mortis causa” that our Civil
Code identifies with testamentary disposition.
2 95 Phil. 481.
71
VOL. 98, DECEMBER 14, 1955 71

Cuevas vs. Cuevas
Gaz. (8), p. 3568; Tuason vs. Posadas, 54 Phil., 289; Sent. Trib. Sup.
of Spain, 8 July 1943).
We agree with the Court below that the decisive proof that the
present donation is operative inter vivos lies in the final phrase to the
effect that the donor will not dispose or take away (“hindi ko ñga
iya-alis” in the original) the land “because I am reserving it to him
upon my death.” By these words the donor expressly renounced the
right to freely dispose of the property in favor of another (a right
essential to full ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of the
conveyance of the naked title to the property in favor of the donee.
As stated in our decision in Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, ante, such
irrevocability is characteristic of donations inter vivos, because it is
incompatible with the idea of a disposition post mortem. Witness
article 828 of the New Civil Code, that provides:
“ART. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his
death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void.”
It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that the
donor intended that she should retain the entire beneficial ownership
during her lifetime, but that the naked title should irrevocably pass
to the donee. It is only thus that all the expressions heretofore
discussed can be given full effect; and when the donor stated that
she would continue to retain the “possession, cultivation, harvesting
and all other rights and attributes of ownership,” she meant only the
dominium utile, not the full ownership. As the Court below correctly
observed, the the words “rights and attributes of ownership” should
be construed ejusdem generis with the preceding rights of
“possession, cultivation and harvesting” expressly enumerated in the
deed. Had the donor meant to retain full or absolute ownership she
had no need to specify possession, cultivation and harvesting, since
all these rights are embodied in full or absolute ownership; nor
would she then have excluded the right of free disposition f rom the
“rights and attributes of ownership” that she reserved for herself.
72
72 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cuevas vs. Cuevas
Hence, the Court below rightly concluded that the deed Exhibit A
was a valid donation inter vivos, with reservation of beneficial title
during the lifetime of the donor. We may add that it is highly
desirable that all those who are called to prepare or notarize deeds of
donation should call the attention of the donors to the necessity of
clearly specifying whether, notwithstanding the donation, they wish
to retain the right to control and dispose at will of the property
before their death, without need of the consent or intervention of the
beneficiary, since the express reservation of such right would be
conclusive indication that the liberality is to exist only at the donor’s
death, and therefore, the f ormalities of testaments should be
observed; while, a converso, the express waiver of the right of free
disposition would place the inter vivos character of the donation
beyond dispute (Heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 50 Off. Gaz.
(8), p. 3568).
The argument that there was no sufficient acceptance, because
the deed “merely recites that (1) the donee has duly read all the
contents of this donation; (2) that he ‘shall fully respect all its
terms’; and (3) that ‘for the act of benevolence’ he is expressing his
gratitude” but there is no show of acceptance (Appellant’s brief, p.
7), is without basis. To respect the terms of the donation, and at the
same time express gratitude for the donor’s benevolence, constitutes
sufficient acceptance. If the donee did not accept, what had he to be
grateful about? We are no longer under the formulary system of the
Roman law, when specific expressions had to be used under pain of
nullity.
Also unmeritorious is the contention that the donation is void
because the donor failed to reserve enough for her own support. As
we have seen, she expressly reserved to herself all the benefits
derivable from the donated property as long as she lived. During that
time, she suffered no diminution of income. If that was not enough
to support her, the deficiency was not due to the donation.
73
VOL. 98, DECEMBER 15, 1955 73

Cardenas vs. Cardenas and Riñen
Finally, the donee is not rightfully chargeable with ingratitude,

because it was expressly stipulated that the donee had a total income
of only P30 a month, out of which he had to support himself, his
wife and his two children. Evidently his means did not allow him to
add the donor’s support to his own burdens.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs in
this instance, appellant having obtained leave to litigate as a pauper.
So ordered.
Parás, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo,

Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
_______________
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[No. L-8327.

December 14, 1955]

ANTONINA CUEVAS, plaintiff and appellant vs. CRISPULO

1. DONATION; CHARACTERISTIC OF DONATION “INTER

2. ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; “EJUSDEM

3. ID.; DUTY OF PERSONS CALLED UPON TO PREPARE OR

VOL. 98, DECEMBER 14, 1955 69

Cuevas vs. Cuevas

gratitude for the donor’s benevolence, constitutes sufﬁcient

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva

REYES, J.B. L., J.:

On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized

70 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

“Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay nabubuhay,

There is an apparent conﬂict in the expression above quoted, in that

VOL. 98, DECEMBER 14, 1955 71

72 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 98, DECEMBER 15, 1955 73

Finally, the donee is not rightfully chargeable with ingratitude,

Parás, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo,

© Copyright 2024 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

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