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LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NIGERIA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

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 LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NIGERIA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

By

Maliki, Ahmadu Seidu (BSc, LLB, MSc, PhD)

Department of Sociology,
Ahmadu Bello University,
Zaria, Nigeria.
[email protected]

Zaria Journal of Social Sciences. Published by the Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello
University, Zaria - Nigeria. Vol.3, No. 2. December 2015. Pp 53-79.

ABSTRACT
Law, though central to social control, does not operate in isolation from other social control
methods. It can be a determining or determined variable in the intricate network of social
relations, social change, and societal existence. It shapes and is shaped by the social context in
which it is found. Among the issues raised and tackled by this paper, is that of the extent to
which law, as a formal social control measure, is sourced, shaped, and reinforced or
undermined by other social control measures. To analyse the inter-relationship of law, social
change and the Nigerian social context, this paper interweaves a critical review of literature and
theories with content analysis of statutes and empirical analysis of primary data generated from
earlier studies by the author. The conclusion drawn at the end of the analysis is that the law can
only play the role of social engineering, effectively and efficiently, when it reflects popular
consciousness, take account of other norms of social control, is cognizant of the character and
nature of operations of agencies in the justice network, and coexist in a mutually reinforcing
relationship of reciprocity with social change. Among the major recommendations of the paper,
with particular regards to Nigeria, is that public policy, law-making, law-enforcement, legal
interpretation, corrections, and the whole criminal justice apparatus must operate in awareness
of social psychology and the socio-cultural and politico-economic milieu. This is more so,
when the intention of new legislation is to drive social change. Otherwise, such laws may just
remain dead letters.
Key Terms: Law, Social Context, Social Change, Discretion, Justice.

INTRODUCTION: PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY OF STUDY

Law is the most visible and dominant social control mechanism in all modern societies. It is the
policy instrument most relied upon, by governments and society to bring about change and reforms in
many areas needing intervention. Policy directions of government ultimately have to be enacted as
law to give policies some bite. The law, in transforming policy into reality, however does not work in
isolation. The enactment, enforcement, interpretation, and sanctions of law are dependent on other
social forces as well as on politics and power (both local and international). The nature and character

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of these forces are in turn dependent on the overall social context. Many social theorists have drawn
attention to this fact even before the formal emergence of Sociology and Sociology of Law as
disciplines (e.g. Montesquieu (1748) De l’ Esprit des Lois and Maine (1861) Ancient Law).

This paper seeks to problematize the issues of what the law really is and how it can be distinguished
from other rules of conduct. This is with a view to situating the content and operation of the law
within its proper social context. Among the issues and questions raised and addressed is that of the
extent to which law, as a formal social control measure, is sourced, shaped, and reinforced or
undermined by other social control measures (especially informal ones) to achieve obedience and
conformity from societal members. For example, what is the relation of law to morality, custom,
justice, freedom, force, rule of law, state, and sovereignty? How does the social, cultural, economic,
and political milieu determine the content, nature, and operations of law and its agencies? Is it the
law that determines social change or is it the other way round or is it mutual? What is the nature of
the relationship? What is the experience of Nigeria in the dynamics of law and social change?

In methodology, this study employs an essentially exploratory and descriptive design with major
reliance on a desk top or library review of literature and theories, which are presented alongside the
analyses of relevant issues in the remaining five segments of this paper. The review is however
supplemented and complemented by secondary data from statutes and official records which contents
are analysed. In addition, primary data generated from previous empirical studies by this author 1
were employed to illustrate and provide empirical bases for conclusions reached.

The paper is broken into six major sections inclusive of this introduction. The other five sections are:
the Meaning and Theories of Law; the Meaning and Nature of Social Context of Law; the
Reciprocity of Law and Social Change; the Dialectics of Law, Social Change and Social Context in
Nigeria; and Conclusions and Recommendations.

THE MEANING AND THEORIES OF LAW

The concept of law is an extraordinarily complex one. In its broadest meaning, it denotes “rules” that
govern virtually every aspect of human interpersonal, group and organizational activities and
relationships. Such a loose usage however, creates problems of delimitation for users of the term who
must constantly specify the particular sense in which they are using it. For example, the second
edition of the Webster's dictionary contains six entries for the word “law” and the first of these alone

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has 13 separate meanings. The Webster‟s Universal Dictionary & Thesaurus (2010), however,
attempts to hit the nail on the head by simply defining law as “all rules of conduct in an organized
community as upheld by authority”.

The idea that the term “law” should be reserved for rules that emanates from the state authority or for
“commands of a sovereign" is not new. This position, also referred to as the imperative or command
theory of law, is most popular among jurists and was the thrust of the arguments of Positivist School
of Jurisprudence eloquently expounded by Austin (1954) and Salmond (1954). The historical School
of jurisprudence, expounded by Savigny (1840), has however, drawn attention to the problems that
arise from such a narrow definition of law as it tend to exclude rules of conduct in primitive societies,
which had no "state" nor centralized law enforcement/administration and the many rules that are not
in form of commands. Hence, the Historical school of jurisprudence maintains that law is not the
creation of the legislator or any sovereign, but emanates from the popular consciousness of a nation
(Volkgeist) and exists for regulating the action of individuals and the whole community.

The exponents of the Realist School of jurisprudence such as Holmes (1949), on their part stressed
the empirical and pragmatic aspect of law, arguing that the law is “what the courts will decide” and
not what is enacted by the legislature, nor nebulous notions of popular consciousness. The immediate
and obvious problem with such a definition is how to know what the law is before judges pronounce
on it? The problem is compounded by the positions of the Natural Law school of Jurisprudence,
which maintains that there is a natural law which is higher than, and should be emulated by man-
made law. For example, Aquinas (1270) argued for a hierarchy of laws derived ultimately from the
divine law of God. Furthermore, the Sociological school of Jurisprudence argues that the law in
action is not the same with, and is more important than the law in the law books, and should therefore
be the proper focus of a study of law (see Pound, 1943).

Friedman (1967) argued that what distinguishes rules of law from other rules is that consequences or
sanctions, which could be negative (punishment) or positive (rewards), must follow its infringement.
Furthermore, the agents of the law must act with legitimacy while the people subject to legal
regulation must consider compliance obligatory. Maliki (2015) also observed that the distinction of
law from other of social control methods is that it is a formal control measure that relies on agencies
of government such as the police, courts and prisons for enforcement. It entails the formalization of
the informal control mechanisms of pre-modern societies, such as folkways and mores, hitherto

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enforced by family, religious, peer, and other informal organizations. Reid (2000) noted that unlike
other methods of social control, law is specific, arises from a more rational procedure, applies
sanctions exclusively through organized political agencies, is characterized by regularity, does not
reward conformity, and is not arbitrary or spontaneous. Hence, Maliki (2006:31) defines law as; “a
body of rules of social conduct which are recognised as obligatory by the people whose conduct it
guides, and which visits specific sanctions administered by legitimate authority on violators”.

The sources of law are the materials from which legal rules are made. Such materials include custom,
religious beliefs, morality, habits, mores and folkways, etc. Sources of law could also consist in the
manner of making the laws. Hence, legislation, judicial precedents, and equity are also sources of
law. Legislation is the law that results from the deliberative activities of a law enacting authority such
as the legislature. When such a body delegates the power to make laws to government ministries,
departments, agencies and parastatals, the resulting law is called delegated legislation. Forms of
legislation in Nigeria include Ordinances, Acts, Laws, Decrees, Edicts, Delegated legislation and By-
laws. Judicial precedents (decisions of judges in past cases) and equity (notion of justness or fairness)
are also sources of law in Nigeria.

Law is classified into two major types: criminal law and civil law. While criminal law refers to those
aspects of law dealing with offences against society and which are punished by the state in its name,
civil law denotes laws governing conducts that are deemed to be against the individual and therefore
not punishable by the state. The more obvious manifest functions of law include, preserving the
existing legal order, ensuring the maintenance of peace and order, providing redress for harm done to
individuals, protecting basic freedom of individuals, and reinforcing family relationships.

In the social sciences, there are two major alternative theoretical conceptions of law. These are the
consensus/Functionalist and the conflict/Marxist conceptions. Functionalists views law as an
embodiment of communally agreed upon values. The law is therefore, fair, impartial, and a
disinterested third party. It exists to serve the interest of the corporate whole and this subsumes the
interest of individuals. These lofty attributes are also held to characterise the agents of the law such
as the police, prison and courts. An important function that prominent structural functionalist such as
Emile Durkheim (1893), Talcott Parsons (1951), and Harry Bredemeier (1962), attributed to law was
that of social integration.

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To Durkheim Law is not just a mechanism of social integration, but in performing that function, it
reproduces the major forms of social solidarity, namely; mechanical and organic solidarity.
Repressive laws which thrive in primitive and homogeneous societies, produce mechanical solidarity
while restitutive laws that are preponderant in modern heterogeneous societies reproduce organic
solidarity. Both Talcott Parsons (1951) and Harry Bredemeier (1962) maintained that law is the
major mechanism for bringing about integration, by ensuring control and coordination among the
constituent elements of society. Thomas Hobbes (1651:34) was very emphatic that without the
instrumentality of law to restrain the evil nature of man, men will live in “continual fear and danger
of violent death and the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”.

Conflict theorists are of the view that society is characterised by many conflicting interests. As such,
values are not the same for all people. The values enacted as law are the values of particular groups,
not of the whole society. It follows therefore that law is not the beneficial thing (at least not to
everybody) that Functionalist theories portray it to be. Marxist theories are most prominent amongst
the conflict theories of law. Although Marx himself did not explicitly articulate a theory of law, it is
implicit in his vast theoretical system. Marx and Engels had written in the German Ideology that:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is
the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The
class which has the means of material production at its disposal, consequently also
controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means
of mental production are on the whole subject to it. (Cited in Anleu 2009:7).
Marxist theories of law depict it as an ideological instrument, which reflects class interests, creates
false consciousness, and distort reality. Since the two classes in a capitalist society have opposing
interests, the law cannot at the same time embody opposite values. It ends up taking sides with one of
the parties to the conflict, namely the capitalist or dominant class. In Marxist parlance, the law
becomes, simply, an aspect of the superstructure twitching to the dictates of the economic
infrastructure. This attribute of the law is reflected by all the other components of the legal system.
That is to say, the police, courts, prison, and other judicial agencies are on the side of the capitalist
class and cannot be impartial, neutral or benevolent (see Taylor et al 1973, 1975; Chambliss 1974;
Spitzer, 1975; Thompson, 1975, Quinney 1978).

THE MEANING AND NATURE OF SOCIAL CONTEXT OF LAW

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The social context of law is the social environment (including political, economic, historical, cultural,
psychological), which influences and is influenced by the nature, content, and operation of law. It
manifests at major levels of social control, particularly in law making, enforcement, adjudication and
corrections. According to Friedman (1967), rules devolve upon human operators, not machines. The
law-maker is under various pressures regarding the content of what is eventually enacted as law. The
police officer who stumbles upon a brawl between two men may ignore the fight, break up the fight
and say nothing further, arrest the two men, detain or grant them bail, interrogate them by any of
several methods, throw them into cell, arraign them before a court or dispose the case at a police
station. The court judge may decide to let both of them go, or book them for trial. At trial, the judge
may dismiss the case if he wishes, or grant the minimum or maximum (or in between) penalty
available. The prison officer may employ subjective criteria in running the prisons. There is always
an operating level, at which laws are personally administered by criminal justice operators. Yet the
criteria relied upon by law officers in enforcing and administering the law may not always be visible
or legal.

A strict or rigid adherence to procedural rules by criminal justice system (CJS) operatives is neither
possible nor desirable as it is bound to negate the principles of flexibility, individuality, humanity,
equity and expediency, which are so necessary to a meaningful administration of justice. As Brietel
(1960:35) puts it:

If every policeman, every prosecutor, every court, and every post-sentence agency
perform his or its responsibility in strict accordance with the rule of law, precisely and
narrowly laid down, the criminal law would be ordered but intolerable, living would be
a sterile compliance with soul killing rules and taboos. By contrast, a primitive tribal
society would seem free indeed.
The influences of social context at major stages in the criminal process are examined in more specific
details below.

The Social Context of Law-Making

The ideas and values that are codified as law must ultimately reflect the aspirations of the society and
this is why laws are largely derived from the norms and values of a society (at least of the more
powerful groups in that society). Even when laws are a product of a deliberately convened
assemblage of people with the express aim of legislating new laws to change society, the ideas that

5
such a body will codify as law can still not be divorced from their lived social realities and context.
Informal sources of social control serve as sources of law and continue to exist side by side with law
in every society. Usually they supplement and reinforce law in its functions but they have their own
separate identity and sometimes may function independently of, or even undermine, the law.

Morality, usually rooted in religion, readily comes to mind in any discussion of informal norms of
social control. This is because it is pervasive and, quite often, openly competes with law. It is a
yardstick by which most people judge the validity of, and decide on whether to obey, law. Anleu
(2009) argued that in tribal societies, religious systems and legal systems were so intertwined as to be
almost synonymous. Lloyd (1987) also noted that the notion of a natural or higher value, which law
must reflect is linked to morality. Quite often, the values that law embodies are moral values, but
they need not necessarily be so. Some things that are legal may be judged to be morally wrong, or
some things that are illegal may be morally right. For example, the law may accept abortion,
homosexuality between consenting adults, and even same sex marriages as legal, but such acts stand
morally condemned. Auknotes (2011) opined that some activities that are clearly illegal but not
considered by many to be immoral include; driving over the speed limit, smoking marijuana,
cheating on a tax return, and splitting a cable signal to send it to more than one television. Others that
are legal but considered by many to be immoral include, cheating on your spouse or breaking a
promise to a friend.

Morality does not attach the many qualifications required by law for one to be adjudged guilty, and it
punishes omission which the law may not (e.g. watching a child drown who could have been saved at
no risk to the watcher). Sometimes the law may deliberately refrain from supporting the moral rule
because the machinery of enforcing such may be cumbersome. For example, in a number of so-called
“victimless offences” (such as prostitution, drug abuse, gambling). Lloyd (1987) observed that
sometimes law and morality may diverge so much, that morality may require a disobedience of law!
Even in the military where the norm is "obey before complain", a subordinate is morally right when
he disobeys an immoral order.

Custom also sources and supplements law in social control. Both law and custom are rules of
conduct, which members of society recognize and consider obligatory to observe. Their differences
come from the nature of the rules, how they are made, how they are enforced, who enforces them, in
whose name they are enforced, and who executes the penalty. Custom is the habits or practices of a

6
people that have been observed over a period and seen to be useful for their corporate well-being. It
becomes not just what ought to be done, but what must be done and non-observance attracts
sanctions. The major difference between law and custom is that custom, unlike law, tends to be
unwritten, and lack centralized state organs to enact, enforce, interpret, and record it. The operative
custom therefore, largely depends on the accuracy, reliability and honesty of the memories of the
custodians of custom and tradition. When the law and custom diverge, it results in hiccups in the
operation of the legal system.

Other important ideas that are closely associated with law include the ideas of Force, Justice,
Freedom, and “Rule of Law”. The notion of force entails the whole machinery of the state, organised
legitimately and entrusted with the authority of enforcing the sanctions implied in law. It is a force
characterized by the twin elements of legitimacy and authority. It implies that the state has law
enforcement and administration agencies, that there are laws governing the operation of the agencies,
that the citizens recognise the legitimacy of the agencies, and so, feel obliged to comply with the
orders of the agents and not out of fear of force alone.

The idea of justice is implied in and is the ultimate purpose of law (Lloyd 1987). Though the term is
nebulous, a core requirement is that it must not just be done, but must be seen to have been done. In
addition to complying with the formal attributes of justice, the actual rules of law must possess a just
content and must by their provision aim at conforming to some criterion of rightness, which reposes
on values exterior to justice itself.

Freedom is another aim of law. Ordinarily, it means the ability to do what one wishes without
restraint. In law, however, freedom is the liberty to do whatever one wants within the limits imposed
by law. The idea of legal freedom is aptly captured in the aphorism by the famous English Law Lord,
Lord Denning, that: “your right to swing your fist ends where my nose begins”. Chapter 4 (Sections
33 to 46) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria contains provisions on Fundamental Rights or
freedoms. These provisions are fairly representative of the values expressed in the concept of legal
freedom. They include: Right to life (S.33); Right to dignity of human person (S.34); Right to
personal liberty (S.35); Right to fair hearing (S.36); Right to private and family life (S.37); Right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion (s.38); Freedom of expression and the press (S.39);
Right to peaceful assembly and association (S.40); and Freedom from discrimination (S.42).

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The concept of “rule of law” is closely linked with that of legal freedom. It requires that things are
done in society according to law rather than by the whims and caprices of man or arbitrarily. Dicey
(1915) reduced the concept to the presence of three elements in any society: absolute supremacy or
predominance of regular law over arbitrary power; equality of every one before the law; and
independence of the courts in administering the laws as the custodians of peoples‟ right. Dicey's
formulations have undergone re-formulation and expansion. The modern understanding of the Rule
of Law is that in addition to the qualified existence of the three elements identified by Dicey, it
presupposes; a system based on law and order, the existence of a democratic system of Government,
a separation of powers between the three major arms of government, and operation of the twin
principles of legality and due process. Legality has to do with imposing restraint on application of
criminal label or sanction against an alleged offender. Due process requires that the process of
justice, from arrest to eventual sentence of an offender, be conducted in such a way as to minimize
the chances of convicting the innocent. The Nigerian 1999 Constitution gives lucid expression to
these two elements in Section 36(1-12).

The content of law is also influenced by power equation in society and the pressure that groups and
individuals bring to bear on the legislature. In modern societies, lobby groups are formed around
various interests to exert pressures relating to the enactment, repeal, and content of legislation. The
content of law may therefore vary from society to society to reflect the dynamics of social context
and power play. According to Lloyd (1987:187) “supreme legal power is purely theoretical since no
legislator that ever lived has been able in practice to pass any law he wished in disregard of the moral
values, traditions, sentiments and prejudices prevailing in the community”. Hence, Social
Interactionist criminologists point out that there is nothing inherently criminal or illegal in the
activities that the law criminalizes. Rather deviance and crime, as well as the laws defining them as
such, are relative to time, place, person, type, and are mere consequence of the application of rules
and sanctions to person so labelled, by a more powerful group (see Becker, 1963 and Lemert, 1972).

There is also an intertwined relation between the law, sovereignty, and the state. The discourse on
sovereignty usually centres on where the greatest state power resides. Early views of sovereignty as
the “supreme national legislator” remain extant. In modern societies, laws are made and changed by
legislative bodies. It is such bodies, and not the laws that possess sovereignty. The concept of
sovereignty has therefore, tended to undermine the notion of law as possessing autonomy and not

8
dependent on anything outside itself. The situation is further compounded by the fact that, in the
modern world, the sovereignty of the “supreme national legislator” is increasingly being subordinated
to international rules not derived from any superior state or authority, through the phenomenon of
international law. The related concept of the state is explained by Lloyd (1987:173) thus:

The state is a more general notion than the sovereign, representing, as it does, the
community as a legal organization, and thus symbolizing all the various manifestations
of the legally organized community. In this sense, all the wielders of official power in
the community are organs of the state… The state in other words is a personification,
for legal purposes, of all the ramifications of legal authority, and though particular parts
of that authority, including even the sovereign legislative power, may be reposed in
some particular person or body, ultimately that power is regarded as derived from the
state itself.

The Social Context of Law-Enforcement

Law enforcement officers can, and do employ extra-legal criteria in wielding their discretionary
powers. For example, Reiman (1979: 104-105) argues that:
The policeman who guard the access road to prison make sure that more lower class
people will make the trip than well-to-do people... The decision about whom to
investigate, arrest or charge is not made simply on the basis of the offence committed or
the danger posed, it is a decision that is distorted by a systematic economic bias that
works to the disadvantage of the poor.
The American Friends service Committee (AFSC, 1971), also argued that police discretion
provides protection for members of the dominant class by making it possible for the police to make
exceptions in cases involving them. Marenin (1983:28) similarly argued that the Nigerian
policeman's use of authority tends to reflect his perception of status and power. He avoids situations
that could expose him to possible repercussions by the powerful. Cicourel (1967) found that the
juvenile officers' decisions regarding delinquents are largely determined by the extent to which the
juvenile matches their preconceived notions of the typical delinquent. From the officers‟ viewpoint,
the typical delinquent comes from a poor broken home or slum. He might also be from an ethnic
minority, dressed in hippy fashion, lacking in grooming, and generally has no respect for constituted
authority. In other words, legally irrelevant variables or „cues‟ affect the juvenile officers decisions.

Interactionist Criminologists also argue that the police may step up or slow down its arrests or clear-
up rates depending on its interpretation of public temper at any particular time. As Cain (1978:4) puts
it; "if a war on crime is demanded, and bureaucratic evidence of success is in the form of arrest, or
clear-up rates, then infringement of the rules in order to achieve these objectives become an

9
occupational necessity". The 'criminal process' itself also generates crime. This is because the deviant
identity or stigma that a person acquires from being processed by the criminal justice machinery, bars
him from assuming normal societal roles and he may be denied access to legitimate means of
livelihood. He may as a result be propelled into secondary and more serious criminal acts to survive
(Lemart 1972).

Chambliss (1974:177) in his comparative study of crime in Ibadan (Nigeria) and Seattle (U.S.A)
found that corruption and extra-legal disposition were pervasive features of both legal systems. He
concluded that:

Law-enforcement systems are not organized to reduce crime or to enforce public

morality. They are rather organized to manage crime by cooperating with the most
criminal groups and enforcing laws against those whose crime are a minimal threat to
society. In so doing, the law enforcers end up as crime producers.
Maliki (1995) found that the character of police pre-trial activities in Kaduna state, and by extension
Nigeria, is shaped by the offering and acceptance of gratification or bribe. The police use the slightest
excuse to arrest and detain some people, just so that such people can pay money for release. Many of
such arrests do not enter into the police monthly returns of crime data. Police officers do not always
strictly follow legal procedures in handling members of the public. The prevalent methods of
handling cases are informal rather than formal. Complainants and accused alike had no confidence in
the formal justice process. Many complainants would rather be compensated by culprits at the
station, than undergo the tedious routines of a court trial. Most accused persons will rather pay off the
police, and have their cases dropped, than go to court.

Maliki (1995) also found that over 80% of all reported cases are disposed of at the police station
without being reflected in the monthly crime returns made to police headquarters Such a large
volume of unrecorded cases tend to circumvent the adjudicatory functions of trial judges and
undermines the usefulness of police crime records as the primary data base for overall criminal
justice evaluation and planning. Pre-trial disposition nevertheless helps to relieve the pressures on the
courts and even prisons. He noted, however, that the socially disadvantaged groups fare worse than
the socially advantaged, in the hands of the police. Arrestees of low socio-economic status,
youthfulness and masculine gender tend to be treated more harshly than their counterparts. The vague
and over generalized provisions of applicable procedural and substantive laws engender a wide use

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and abuse of discretion by the police. Hence it is difficult to ascertain where police powers stop and
citizen rights begin, while procedural safeguards are routinely infringed.

Maliki (1995:140) concluded, regarding police discretion in law enforcement, thus:

The lofty ideals of the „rule of law‟ as embodied in the principles of legality and due
process are not practically operative. Legally irrelevant criteria which in most cases
translate to the advantage of the well-to-do exert a major influence on police decisions.
The explanation for this is best situated within the larger social context in which the
police operate. The Nigerian society can be characterized predominantly in terms of its
capitalist socio-economic order.
He went on to argue that Nigerian capitalism is a mere caricature of western capitalism, which
dependent or peripheral nature stunt and distort national institutions like the police. Hence the
Nigerian Police being ill-equipped, ill-trained, and operating within a corrupt society cannot
epitomize a benevolent and impartial law enforcement agency. It suffers from the colonial
overhang of existing to protect the status quo and is further constrained by existing realities. It is
aware that other arms of the CJS, such as the courts and prisons cannot cope with the higher
referral rates that police strict adherence to due process will produce as a result of their personnel
and material inadequacies. Besides, individual officers find it difficult to resist the temptations to
receive unsolicited gratifications that members of the public regularly offer to them, especially
when viewed against the backdrop of their poor remunerations.

Regarding the gender character of law enforcement, Maliki (2007:301) found that members of the
Nigerian public are condescending in their dealings with policewomen, sceptical about their
professional competence, and prefer to deal with policemen, except when they are at the wrong end
of the law and need “sympathy”. Institutionally, the NPF‟s gender policies appear to explicitly
reproduce the patriarchal prejudices of the larger society, notwithstanding the constitutional
provisions against gender discrimination.

The Social Context of Judicial and Correctional Decisions

Judicial officers also exercise discretion that may not conform to the letter and spirit of the law.
Several studies have found that the prosecutor‟s „belief in the offenders‟ guilt‟ and assessment of his
chances of securing conviction are major determinants of his decision to prosecute. Factors that aid
him in such assessment include; the strength of available evidence, credibility of witness,

11
complainant's willingness to proceed/cooperate, due process problems and so on. Extra-legal
influences on the prosecutorial decision include considerations for other law enforcement agencies
(e.g. to aid police investigation or to lighten a judge's caseload) and evaluation of a judge‟s
temperament (e.g. too severe or too lenient).

The characteristics of offenders may also affect the prosecutorial decision. For example, domestic
quarrels involving spouses is an instance where prosecutors may not want to prosecute. Felony
charges may be reduced to misdemeanours because the offender is destitute, stupid or a first offender.
Offenders with prior records are more likely to be prosecuted. An offender is more likely to be
prosecuted if subjected to pre-trial detention. Older men are less likely to be prosecuted or to have
their charges reduced than younger ones. Other influential variables include: victim status (e.g. if he
provoked the attack, has a disreputable past, or is a community leader); pressure from the public,
especially the press; severity of available sanctions for the particular offence; need to nurture and
maintain the informant system; and whether laws violated are considered obsolete (see Gottfredson
and Gottfredson, 1980; Maliki, 1995).

Atkins and Pogrebin (1978) found that, prosecutors consider the cost of prosecuting in the face of
resource limitations and may set themselves priorities in terms of types of cases to prosecute.
Furthermore, cases in which there is much delay between commission of offence and eventual arrest
of offender, results in less prosecutions. Certain officers‟ arrests tend to result more in prosecutions
than others (e.g. older officers by virtue of their longer experience make more level-headed arrest
decisions and their arrests meet the criteria of most prosecutors and tend to result more in
prosecutions). Wilson (1968) found that some offences that are peculiar to and pervasive in certain
sub-cultural groupings tend to be overlooked by law enforcement agents, when committed by people
within such subcultures.

Court judges wield enormous discretion in conviction and sentencing. Since sentencing options are
usually couched in terms of maximum penalties, a judge can give less than the stipulated maximum,
use alternatives, and let an offender go free even after convicting him. In exercising this discretion,
criteria other than the strictly legal may affect judges‟ decisions (Atkins and Pogrebin, 1978). For
example, demeanour of accused person in the dock (e.g. well groomed having enjoyed bail or
unkempt from pre-trial detention) can predispose a judge to lenient or harsh judgment. A bad meal or
quarrel with spouse before leaving home may predispose a judge to wield his/her sentencing

12
discretion harshly. Female judges are known to give relative harsher punishment (than male judges)
to male sex offenders without consciously knowing they are doing so. The social position of judges,
relative to the accused, may also influence their exercise of discretion.

Maliki and Okeshola (2006) observed that while most Nigerian judges prefer imprisonment as a
sentencing option, many studies have found wide disparities in the way the sentence is given. Many
judges cannot even articulate which punishment ideal they aim to serve by their sentencing policy.
Ubwa (1994) found that there is wide disparity in the way the imprisonment term is varied to suit the
ingredients of an offence, the characteristics of an offender, and the penal objective, which the judge
explicitly commits himself. Such disparities were not just between judges of different courts but even
within same court. This point was most poignantly made by Adeyemi‟s (1972:56) documentation of a
particular magistrate with a bias for imposing a “six month” imprisonment term:

In one case of theft, he stressed that he would not show any leniency, and gave the
accused a six month term of imprisonment. In another case of theft, he emphasized that
he was going to show leniency because the accused was a first offender, and gave him
the same six months. He gave out a similar sentence to a theft because the money had
been recovered from the accused. He sought to deter another fraud who had vast
experience in defrauding people, still with six-month imprisonment term.
The same six-month term cannot serve the purpose of retribution, deterrence and reformation as these
penal philosophies rest on different assumptions. The situation is compounded by the fact that the
correctional officer, who takes custody of the prisoner, is also not very clear about which ideal of
punishment he is supposed to achieve with his handling of the offender. Maliki and Okeshola
(2006:91) had noted that other than the responsibility of taking “legal custody of prisoners” and
“producing suspects in court”, the Nigerian Prison Service (NPS) is “ill equipped in material and
personnel resources... and has failed woefully in those functions that border on reformation and
rehabilitation of inmates”.

Sentencing and correctional administration in Nigeria has remained most conservative and stagnant
since colonial times. The custodial or institutional means of correction favoured by the colonialists
continues to be dominant. The cruel and deplorable conditions of the prison indicate a reliance on a
retributive/deterrent justification for punishment. Many inmates are dehumanised while in prison, and
come out to confront a non-forgiving and stigmatising society. Some come out to meet a wife who
has since remarried, children who are ashamed to be associated with ex-convict fathers, employers

13
who do not want ex-convicts as employees, and a community that does everything to shun them.
Before long, they may drift back to bad companies of similarly stigmatised individuals, and it is not
long before they resume their careers in crime. Yet this stigma does not appear to extend to those
who commit elite or white collar crimes through “pen robbery” of massive public funds. In fact in the
latter cases they are seen as heroes and may be rewarded with chieftaincy titles upon release if ever
they went to prison, provided that while looting they benefitted community members through
patronage. Brazen examples in Nigeria‟s recent past are the cases of former PDP South-West
Chairman - Bode George, former IGP - Tafa Balogun, former Chief executive of Oceanic Bank -
Cecelia Ibru, and former Governors of Edo - Lucky Igbinedion, and Delta States - James Ibori (see
Agbo 2015). These “big shots” who were convicted felons for criminal breach of trust and stealing
millions of public funds, got only ” taps on the wrist” with very light jail terms and refunds of only a
small fraction of the amount they stole. In the case of Bode George, he came home from prison to a
tumultuous welcome with live television coverage of the welcoming concert and Church service.

Within correctional institutions (prisons, remand homes, borstal houses, etc.), the administrators have
less discretionary latitude when compared to law enforcement and judicial officers. Yet within the
narrow confines of their roles of taking custody and ascertaining the correctional needs of inmates
there is considerable influences of social context on their decisions. High profile or socially
advantaged inmates are treated more leniently. Prison administrators may even violate the law to
cater to the whims of such offenders. They may allocate them to furnished rooms rather than cells
and allow them access to friends and families at any time. For example, notwithstanding that Nigeria
does not have provision for “conjugal visits” in prison, the Kirikiri Maximum security prison made
an illegal exception for Fred Ajudua, a notorious “419” kingpin, when he was there as an inmate in
2001. His wife became pregnant and had babies for him during the period of his incarceration, to the
embarrassment of penal officials. James Ibori two-term Governor of oil-rich Delta state, (who
according to Agbo 2015, later proved too big for Nigerian courts to handle until England came to the
rescue), in his brief stints in Nigerian prisons as an “Awaiting Trial Person” (ATP), used to turn
prison life for officials and other inmates into a jamboree that prison officers and inmates looked
forward to. His sojourns, according to a staff of the Kaduna prison interviewed by this author, was
like that of “a visiting king to which we all look forward to as there will be noticeable positive
changes in meals of all inmates, as well as empowerment of prison officials with money and gift
items” from his personal pocket, during the period of his stay. The official also disclosed that inmates

14
who have relatives that come with gift items for prison officials on their visits, tend to receive
relatively more favourable treatment subsequently. The granting and withholding of rights and
privileges to inmates is also influenced by the administrator‟s subjective evaluation of inmates‟
attitude or amenability to control.

RECIPROCITY OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Auknotes (2011) argues that in its most concrete sense, social change means large numbers of people
are engaging in group activities and relationships that are different from those in which they or their
parents engaged in previously. Thus, social change means modifications in the way people go about
and seek ultimate meaning in life. Makhethe (2010) noted that the debate about which of the two
determines the other is now merely academic because in practice the pendulum has swung both ways.
In some instances, the changing ethos and mores in society have laid a basis for reforms in law, and
law lags behind changed circumstances in society. In others, law itself has taken a lead, laying a firm
basis for changed morality in society. There is, therefore, a noticeable degree of symbiotic relation
and interdependence between law and social change.

Friedman (1967), Minnow (1994), Grana et al (2002), and Maliki (2006) have also examined the
debate. Friedman noted that the formative sociological theorists were all concerned with social
change and in varying degrees with the ways in which law is implicated as both a product and a
catalyst of change. According to Minnow (1994), some people think the law basically lags behind
changes in society and gradually catches up. Some believe that law can occasionally prompt changes
in society. Some people believe that law's biggest impact on society comes in the form of symbols
that affect consciousness, human hopes and perhaps ultimately, conduct. Others argue that law does
not, or should not produce social change. Regardless of the position adopted, the law in the books
ultimately takes its meaning from the law in practice. Maliki (2006:54) observed that:

Each view has its own merits. Determining which comes first between law and social
change becomes as difficult as determining which come first between the egg and the
chicken... But what is incontrovertible is that they tend to consolidate and reinforce each
other. A change in one without a corresponding change in the other creates tension and
may in effect mean no change at all.
To Chantia (2007), social change is a continuous process, which may come through education and
acculturation. Many factors including natural, geographical, biological, demographic, technological,

15
economic, psychological, political, military, cultural, ideological, leadership and legal factors affect
it. The law making system in every society produces legislations, particularly social legislations,
which are framed to remove social evils and change conservative faiths and beliefs. Law becomes an
effective instrument of social change that be used to achieve income redistribution, nationalisation of
industries, land reforms, access to education, and socio-economic justice.

Chantia‟s (2007) study was on the impact of the Indian law against “untouchability” (Constitution
and Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1976) on the lives of a disadvantaged group, the Dhankut. He,
however, found that caste prejudice, continued to be practiced in spite of its prohibition. He
concluded that though law is a prime mover and powerful instrument of social change, this had not
been borne out by the Dhankut experience. They have not been able to reap the fruits of various
socio-economic legislations, government policies and programmes, “due to non- recognition of their
caste, poor level of education and meagre income” (Chantia, 2007:13).

Auknotes (2011) observed that changes in law may be induced by a voluntary and gradual shift in
community values and attitudes (e.g. People may think that poverty is bad, and laws should be
created to reduce it in some way). Changing social conditions, technology knowledge, values, and
attitudes may also induce legal change. In such cases, law is reactive. However, laws can also be
proactive in social change. Some of the more significant social changes in the lives of major nations
that were accomplished through law include: the conversion of Rome from republic to empire, the
conversion of former USSR from monarchism to socialism, the conversion of china to communism,
reform of agrarian labour and employment relations in Spain, inception and ending of colonialism in
Nigeria and several other colonies, the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, and so on.
All these were accomplished by explicit legal decrees. Social change through litigation is also
common (e.g. the various social changes relating to the status and rights of blacks, Native Americans,
and other minority groups in the USA).

According to Auknotes (2011), the major advantages of law as an instrument of social change lies in
the fact it is legitimate, rational, authoritative, institutionalized, generally not disruptive, and backed
by mechanisms of enforcement. It is legitimate in the sense that there is a general feeling in society
that legal commands or prohibitions ought to be observed. It is also rational because there is a belief
in the legally established impersonal order. The force and sanctions of law are based on legitimate
authority. The efficacy of law as an instrument of social change is, however, influenced by several

16
variables. It is most effective when; it emanates from an authoritative and prestigious source, its
rationale are compatible with existing values, its advocates make reference to other friendly
communities where the law is already in effect, it aims at making the change in a relatively short
time, its enforcers are committed to the change intended by the law, and the instrumentation of the
law includes positive as well as negative sanctions. Laws may also face resistance due to several
factors, including social factors (e.g. vested interest of individuals or groups who fear they will lose
their power, prestige or wealth), psychological factors (e.g. habits, custom, prejudices or behaviours
that people are accustomed to), cultural factors (e.g. fatalism), and economic factors (e.g. limited
economic resources).

LAW, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND SOCIAL CONTEXT IN NIGERIA

To Minnow (1994), the phenomena of African colonialisation and decolonialisation provide glaring
examples of the symbiotic nature of the relationship between law and social change. Colonial
territories were created by treaties and independence were given shape and reality by so called
“independence constitutions”. These legal instruments brought home with them new ethos and mores
in independent African states. Maliki (2006) also notes that the history of the Nigeria legal system
has been one of an intricate and closely linked relationship between law and social change. While it
is difficult to determine if social change provoked the 1861 Treaty of Cession or whether it was the
other way round, it is very easy to see that since 1861, law and social change have walked hand-in-
hand in Nigeria.

Prior to 1861, there was no country called Nigeria, talk less of a Nigerian legal system. There were
just relatively autonomous tribal societies with no sense of nationhood. The signing of the Treaty of
Cession by king Dosunmu of Lagos was a legal act which effectively ceded Lagos to Britain and
made it a colony. The subsequent creation of the Southern and Northern protectorates and their
amalgamation into Nigeria in 1914 were all legal acts whose effects are profound. Those events
illustrate in clear terms, how the law can effect, or at least give recognition to social change.

The capability of law to effect changes, however, depends on its social context. The customary rules
of pre-colonial societies were a by-product of the lived experiences of the people. As such, they
could not really create social change. For law to be at the forefront of social change, formal legal
machinery is needed. This is precisely what the colonialist did. Formal agencies, like the police, arose

17
to enforce law instead of the hitherto informal methods of enforcement by self-help, age-grades and
secret societies. The elders, family heads, priests, chiefs and others who handled dispute gave way to
courts and trained lawyers. Prisons were constructed, laws were written. By simple proclamations,
courts, laws, government agencies, protectorates, and several hitherto unknown relations and
institutions, including whole countries were created. New laws also emerged to regulate new
relations of commerce hitherto unknown to customary law.
As Oloruntimehin (1984:212) puts it:
The colonial authorities, realizing the importance of the legal system as an instrument of
social change, had used their powerful position as rulers to establish and operate a legal
system, which would function for the achievement of effective government, which was
considered a necessity for the derivation of maximum economic interests.
Nigerian‟s political independence was both a significant social change and an opportunity for using
the law to create compatible social changes in other spheres. However, the changes brought about by
political independence were not profound, probably, because the new indigenous masters had similar
interests with the erstwhile colonial masters and there was no economic independence. Nevertheless,
the law was needed to consolidate, reinforce and reproduce independence across the whole spectra of
social, economic and political institutions throughout the land. The Nigerian Independence Act of
1960 abolished the colonial laws Validity Act of 1865. No Act of the British parliament passed after
independence could extend to or be deemed to be applicable in Nigeria any more. Furthermore, the
British Crown lost power to legislate for Nigeria. The Nigerian parliament became empowered to
repeal or amend all the Acts of the British Parliament that had hitherto extended to Nigeria. Many
British laws were in fact, repealed or amended, though in reality most of these laws were simply re-
enacted as local legislation. Furthermore, the 1963 Republican Constitution of Nigeria removed the
British Queen as Nigeria‟s Head of State and abolished the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
in London as the highest court of the land.

Military incursion into Nigerian politics marked bolder attempts to use the legal system to effect
changes, as they were less constrained by principles of due process and legality. The first military
regime in January 1966 converted Nigeria, overnight, from a federation into a unitary state through a
decree. The second military regime, which came barely six months later, reverted the country back to
a federal structure by a decree. As part of efforts to forestall war, the existing four regions were
increased by decree to 12 states overnight in 1967. (Today Nigeria has 36 States, all them courtesy of
military decrees). Other areas in which the military used the law to effect changes included the

18
"Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972" which reserved certain small businesses
exclusively for Nigerians, and the Land Use Decree of 1978 designed to bring social justice in the
use of land.

As the world increasingly becomes a global village, there are also global influences on law and social
change in various countries. The United Nations Organisation (U.N.O) and its agencies have enacted
several Conventions and Treaties, which serve as models of laws for ratifying members to
domesticate. The issues range from human rights to gender discrimination, labour, environment, rare
animals, nuclear proliferation, drug trafficking, child and women trafficking, terrorism, arms
smuggling, corruption, money laundering, and several other transnational crimes. Nigeria has
domesticated many of such international instruments.

In conclusion, Nigeria‟s emergent legal system bears the bold imprint of its colonial past, the
influence of global developments, and the continuing attempt to weld its diverse peoples and cultures
into one. Its system of law subordinates indigenous law to foreign ones. In the arena of criminal law,
the criminal code borrowed from Australia during the colonial period is still the criminal code of
southern Nigeria, while the Penal Code borrowed from Sudan remains operational in the North. Since
customary law do not apply in the area of crime, it follows that virtually the whole of Nigerian
criminal law is imported. In the civil law arena, virtually all the extant statutes are mere verbatim re-
enactment of English statutes. The application of Nigerian customary and Islamic law is largely in
cases of marriage contract and dissolution, child custody, inheritance, etc. For law enforcement,
contemporary Nigeria relies mainly on formal agencies created during colonialism. Adjudication and
administration of justice is also formalised, though informal modes of arbitration, such as elders‟
council, workers union, family headship and village heads court continue to operate side by side.
Imprisonment is the most frequently pronounced sentence by the courts. There are other options such
as fines, canning and death penalty, which are less often used.

Several new laws and legislations have recently been enacted in Nigeria (most of them within the last
decade) to reflect, if not effect, social changes, which pre-existing laws either did not anticipate or
inadequately contemplated. For example increasing sophistication in drug trafficking, corruption,
economic crimes, women and child trafficking, Child abuse, money laundering, terrorism have led to
the emergence of the following corresponding new legislations: NDLEA, CPROA, EFCC, NAPTIP,
CRA, AML, (see full meanings of abbreviations under References: Statutes) and Anti-Terrorism laws

19
of Nigeria respectively. In most of these, Nigeria simply followed the global trend. The
Administration of justice Act is the latest a federal law on criminal procedure enacted to bring
criminal justice administration in Nigeria (hitherto governed by the CPA and CPC) in tune with
current realities.

The intricate relationship between law, social change, and social context in Nigeria, is most aptly
illustrated by the recent spate of national debate on whether early marriage is a violation of a child‟s
right to protection beginning in July, 2013. The debate was unwittingly sparked off by Senator
Ahmed Yerima‟s dissension on the floor of the Senate to a motion already passed by about 75
members on a voice vote, to delete what was considered an unnecessary provision in the law. The
innocuous provision in section 29(4) of the 1999 constitution had the effect of automatically
promoting a married woman to adulthood, irrespective of age at marriage, for the purpose of
renunciation of Nigerian citizenship. Senator Yerima opposed the deletion, and argued that the
provision be retained because under Islam, girls may marry before the legal age of 18years. Senator
Yerima‟s opposition later carried the day as most senators (preponderantly from the muslin north)
voted in support of him.

The whole Senate came under immediate verbal attack from enraged human rights and gender
activist, most of whom are Christians from the southern part of the country, for seeking to legalise
child marriage. They pointed at Yerima‟s antecedents as a “child abuser” (the ex-governor who was
over 50 years old, had in 2010 divorced his 17year old wife, whom he married at the age 15, only to
marry another girl of 13 years of age). Among the slogans of their campaign were “Pay their school
fees not their bride price”, “Child‟s right not Child bride”, “Take the girl child to the classroom not
labour room” etc. While the Christian commentators, especially form the southern part of the country
were virtually unanimous in condemnation of apparent Senate “support for child marriage”, Muslim
commentators were divided.

Eseke (2013), a reporter for TELL, a Nigerian news magazine, documents the various reactions. The
widely circulated comments of Stella Damasus, a Nigeria actress, typified the mass feelings of
outrage as she accused the senators of “wasting taxpayers money” and described them as “shameless
randy old men” trying to give legal backing to their predilection to marry underage children.
According to Eseke (05/08/2013:22), Akinyelure, a Senator from a southern, mainly Christian, State
who had voted in favour, came under threat of recall by his constituency, and immediately recanted

20
pleading that he had wanted to click the „No‟ button but mistakenly clicked the „Yes‟ button. Yerima
however remained defiant against all the verbal attacks (Eseke (05/08/2013:23), declaring: “For those
who wonder if I can give my daughters out at age of nine or 13, I tell you most honestly, I can give
her out at the age of six if I want to and it is not your business. This is because I am a Muslim and
follow the example of the best of mankind, Mohammed”.

Akinkuotu (2013:62), another reporter with TELL, observed that Senator Yerima remains defiant and
unrepentant in his “child abuse” because his constituency apparently sees nothing wrong in what he
does, since they still voted him after he was roundly vilified for marrying a 13-year-old girl just
before the 2011 elections. “If many Nigerians had their way, there was no way Yerima could have
retained his senate seat. He did. That goes to show that in this entity called Nigeria, one man‟s meat
is another man‟s poison”. He advised the senate to avoid the confusion of the constitutional provision
which “Yerima and others like him believe is an endorsement to marry, or give out in marriage,
underage girls”, and update the “Marriage” and “Child Rights” Acts to outlaw underage marriages.

It is noteworthy that the wordings of the Child Rights Act (2003) are already clear on the issue.
Section 277 of the Act defines a child as “a person under the age of eighteen years”. Section 23 of the
Act prescribes punishment for child marriage and betrothal thus: “a person-(a) who married a child;
or (b) to whom a child is betrothed; or (c) who promotes the marriage of a child; or (d) who betroths
a child, commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine of N500,000 or imprisonment for a
term of five years or both”. This is clearly a law that has failed to take social realities into cognisance
and will take a very long time to induce the desired social change. It will remain an unenforceable
dead letter, particularly in northern Nigeria, for a very long time to come.

Maliki (2013) also found that the vast majority of the residents of the preponderantly Muslim
inhabited Zaria-city, Kaduna State (between 92 to 99% of his respondents on the various issues),
accord superiority to Islamic precepts over statute. For example, marrying under the Marriage Act
does not prevent them marrying another wife (contrary to the provisions of the Act), nor they accept
that making a will under the Wills Act precludes the overriding application of Islamic rules on the
devolution of their property upon their death. Yet the supposedly superior provisions of the Acts
expressly oust the operation of the legally subordinate “customary” Islamic laws in such situations.
Even the courts are helpless in the face of such violations. For example not a single case of bigamy
has been successfully prosecuted in Nigeria, notwithstanding the rampancy of this crime that can

21
attract as many as five years imprisonment term (see Section 47 and 48 of the Marriage Act). The
new Kaduna State Wills Law recognizes the pre-eminence that Muslims accord religious
prescriptions and though still essentially a statutory law reflecting English principles on Wills, it has
moved quite close to the Islamic position by subjecting itself to Islamic Laws of testate succession in
Section 4 and going further in section 5 to enact the spirit of Islamic law of intestate succession.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that law cannot be fully understood outside its social context.
Its nature, content, and operation are influenced by the social and historical realities of its existence
even as it, in turn, influences these variables. Sometimes the law merely reacts to or reflect elements
in the social context. Sometimes law is the instrument that is used to induce desired social changes
(whether of the social whole or a section of it) by those in power. At other times, it is very difficult to
know which is influencing which, especially in a complex multi-cultural society like Nigeria where
there are sub-legal systems within the larger legal system catering to cultural peculiarities. For
example, drunkenness and adultery are criminal offences in the northern Nigeria but not so in the
south, where drunkenness can even be a defence against criminal liability. Bigamy is an offence
under the marriage Act but not so for marriage under customary law, especially under Islamic law,
which allows Muslims to marry up to four wives. A child under the CRA is protected from marriage
but that law may as well not exist for many Nigerians particularly in the North. Although the federal
Wills Act is legally and theoretically superior to Islamic law of succession, many Northern states in
re-enacting that Act, as State Law, have conceded grounds to religious reality by enacting Islamic
principles where there is conflict. It has also been demonstrated above that discretionary latitude in
decision making, sometimes not guided by strict legal criteria, is indeed a basic feature of the
operations of CJS agents. Understanding law in its social context is necessary for achieving the social
re-engineering role of law, as an instrument of social control and change. This fact has for long, been
appreciated by lobbyists of law-makers, custodians of morality and custom, international bodies and
above of all by Sociology of Law.
Towards a more symbiotic relation between law and social context that will translate to the
development of Nigeria, there is a need to educate the public and relevant policy actors to understand
the intricate and inextricable link between law and social context. The legislator needs to be trained
to appreciate this in making laws to bring about social change. such an exercise will ensure that
researches are conducted on the temperament and mind set of the populace, knowledge is elicited on

22
the relative merits of alternative control norms and policy intervention instruments, and mass
sensitization is undertaken, before change-inducing (or change-reflecting) laws are unleashed on the
people, no matter how well intentioned. The legal scholar and practitioner, the law enforcement
officer, the judicial officer, and the correctional officer must all be trained to understand and
appreciate that the law in books is not always the same as the law in action. In recognition of this,
training in Sociology of Law is a core requirement for the law school and law enforcement training
curricula in most advanced countries of the world. Nigeria needs to follow suit. The effectiveness of
legislation will ultimately depend on the cooperation, integration and effectiveness of the CJS
agencies. This is because laws do not enforce or interpret themselves.

Since public cooperation is necessary to make laws effective, it is necessary to enlighten, educate and
sway the populace to view prospective laws from the positive viewpoints of the policy makers.
Towards mobilizing the populace to support law reforms, it must be recognized by government that
major fetters on ability of law to effect social change in Nigeria include widespread: poverty,
illiteracy, religious bigotry, and weak governmental institutions. These issues must therefore be
addressed and the burden of tackling them need not rest on government alone. Non-Governmental,
Civil Society, Community-based, and Faith-based organisations, as well as significant social
institutions and public spirited individuals all have interventionist roles to play in this regard.

23
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STATUTES
ACJA: Administration of Criminal Justice Act
AML: Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004
Colonial laws Validity Act of 1865
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.
CPA: Criminal Procedure Act, Cap C41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004
CPC: Criminal Procedure Code Law, Cap 30, 1960
CPROA: Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000
CRA: Child Rights Act, 2003
Criminal Code Act (Cap 77). Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.
EFCC: Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004
Kaduna State Wills Law, Cap 163, Laws of Kaduna State. Vol. 2(2).
Marriage Act, cap 218, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004
NAPTIP: National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (Enforcement and Administration) Acts, 2003 and 2005.
NDLEA: National drug Law Enforcement Agency Act, 1989.
Republican Constitution of Nigeria, 1963.

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