Judicial Ethics Cases (March 12, 2024)

CASE: Bar Matter 1153, Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing reforms In the
bar Examinations Through Amendments to rule 138 of the rules of court, 9 March 2010

Bar Matter No. 1153

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 9,
2010

"B.M. No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar
Examinations Through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court).

- The Court Resolved to APPROVE the proposed amendments to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138,
to wit:

SEC. 5 Additional Requirement for Other Applicants — All applicants for admission other
than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the
examination, satisfactorily show that they have completed all the prescribed courses for the
degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree, in a law school or university officially
recognized by the Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction
where the degree has been granted.

No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be admitted to
the bar examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the following course in a law
school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial
law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social
legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.

A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar
examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing:

● (a) completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent
degree;
● (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and
● (c) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program
in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.

SEC. 6 Pre-Law — An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall present a certificate
issued by the proper government agency that, before commencing the study of law, he or she
had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of
study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences.

A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of Laws degree or its
equivalent in a foreign law school must present proof of having completed a separate
bachelor's degree course. The Clerk of Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, is
hereby directed to CIRCULARIZE this resolution among all law schools in the country."
CASE: In re: Bar examinee Haron S. Meling and for disciplinary action as a member of
the Philippine Shari’s Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendez, B.M. No. 1154, 8 June 2004

Facts: June 8, 2004 In the matter of disqualification of bar examinee Haron S. Meling in
the 2002 BAR Examinations and for disciplinary actions as a member of the Philippine
Shari’a BAR, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez, petitioner.

Whether Meling’s act of concealing his criminal cases upon filing for a petition to take the BAR
would bar his good moral character

Petitioner, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez, filed to the Office of the Bar Confidant a petition to
disqualify Haron Meling to take 2002 Bar examination and impose a disciplinary penalty as a
member of Philippine Shari’a Bar. On the ground that Meling concealed his 3 Pending Criminal
Cases and during one instance the respondent allegedly uttered derogatory words against to
the petitioner. In addition, Meling allegedly used the phrase “ attorney” in his communication.

However, his defense on the non-disclosure of the 3 pending criminal cases that filed
against him by the petitioner is hereby closed and terminated due to the reason that it is
already settled upon the opinion of the retired judge and their former professor. In this
regard, the court ordered that if Meling Passed the Bar he was not entitled thereto to take
oath and sign the rolls of Attorney

Kaso wala sya kapasa kaya naging moot and academic (We fully concur with the findings
and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the
Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.)

Issue:

WON, Meling’s concealment of his 3 pending criminal cases upon filing to the BAR, would allow
him to ascertain his good moral character

Held:

The court held that Meling is charged with non-disclosure by the reason of the concealment of
the three pending cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations. Because
only a competent court on his discretionary power to render judgment of whether or not a
certain case was dismissed or suspended, not the retired judge nor a law professor. Given that
the case is still pending it is a requirement to disclose the same for the court to ascertain of his
good moral character. The pending cases is not the merit of the case but, the act of
concealment constitutes dishonesty.

According to the Bar Matter 1209, it is been held that Good Moral Character is not a subject
term that constitute good reputation, but an object term who the person really is. The standard
of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a
person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty. The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also
answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a
lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.
In addition for the use of “Attorney” as to his communication Meling is engaged in the practice of
law, the fact is, he is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well
that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use
of the appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.

OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys dismissed by reason of moot and academic. Further Meling’s membership in the
Shari’a Bar is ripe which he shall suspended until further orders from the Court

FULL CASE REFERENCE

B. M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN

THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.

TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while
the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002
Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave
Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when
Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of
Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.

a. Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney"
in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact
that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter
which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been
received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

MELING ANSWER TO THE COURT

2
Pursuant to this Court’s R E S O L U T I O N dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer
with the OBC.

In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to
settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be
settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former
professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a
single incident and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling
denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude

- regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his
communications really contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him,
typed by the office clerk.

OBC: Charged of non-disclosure

In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge
of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition
to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact,
the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that
these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the
Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are
made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of
concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the
estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral
character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.
The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it
merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also
answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that
"a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.

As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of
Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid
reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he
is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not
entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the
appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court
Consequently, the OBC recommended :

1. that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations.

2. Further, it recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be

suspended until further orders from the Court

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did
not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to
prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and
academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate
sanctions upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be
acted upon

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but
merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who
are also known to possess good moral character.8 The requirement of good moral character
is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any
act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any
offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against
him/her." Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has
three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under
oath at that

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant.10 The nature of whatever cases are pending
against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral
fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then
flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient
to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.

Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him
speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the
privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.

persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence,
may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a
Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate
sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby
SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for
having become moot and academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL

BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

FACTS:

On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the crime of homicide
in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan stemmed from the
affliction of severe physical injuries uponhim in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the
university fraternity initiation rites. On February 11, 1993, the accused were consequently
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years.Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an
application for probation with the lower court. The application was granted on June 18 1993.
The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to
the probation officer assigned to supervise him. Less than a month later, Argosino filed a
petition to take the bar exam. He was allowed and he passed the exam, but was not allowed to
take the lawyer's oath of office.On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take
the attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of law. He averred that his probation period
had been terminated. It is noted that his probation period did not last for more than 10 months.

[The court stressed that the practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be
granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of
good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified…

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned,
than the possession of legal learning]
ISSUE:

Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be admitted to the practice
of law

HELD:

Since the original period of probation granted by the trial court had expired, the Court directed
Argosino to submit evidence demonstrating that he has purged himself of the deficiency in
moral character

He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless
student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. In short, he must
show evidence that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to
the profession of law.

He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names of
the parents or brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice.

NOTES: [from the statements of the court]

· The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of goodmoral character,
with special education qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.

· Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the general public
and proper administration of justice is concerned.

· All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar.

· Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to
the bar must be a necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of
the general public.

· Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan
constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was possessed of good moral character.

· Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated at the

time of the application for permission to take the bar examinations and more importantly at the
time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

DECISION:

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good
moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the
time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly,
at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter
alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show
to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the
family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other
words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become
morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers
and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this
Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant,

vs. ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON, respondents.

A. C. No. 4680 (august 29, 2000)

SUMMARY:

Lawyers accused of tampering with election votes are found guilty of

misconduct and breach of trust, resulting in a fine and a warning for future offenses.
Complaint for disbarment against lawyers Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon.
The allegation that the respondents tampered with the votes received by
complainant Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. in the May 8, 1995 elections. Respondents
were members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers. They are accused of violating
their lawyers' oath and breaching public trust. Complainant alleged that the respondents
manipulated the votes in favor of certain senatorial candidates and reduced his votes.
The irregularities included padding of votes, double recording of returns, and
discrepancies in the tabulation of votes.

Persons involved:

LLORENTE (respondent)- City Prosecutor of Pasig City (served as its ex oficio vice-
chairman as provided by law.)
SALAYON (respondent): Election officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
was designated chairman of said Board

PIMENTEL (complainant)- a Senator (also a candidate for the Senate election)

SENATORIAL CANDIDATES: Juan Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng,

Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon.

FACTS (full case):

This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente

and Ligaya P. Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and
violation of the lawyer's oath in connection with the discharge of their duties as
members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon,
then election officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was designated
chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig City,
served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law. Complainant, now a senator,
was also a candidate for the Senate in that election.

Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, 2 respondents

tampered with the votes received by him, with the result that, as shown in the
Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263
precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates Juan Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique
Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were
credited with votes which were above the number of votes they actually received while,
on the other hand, petitioner's votes were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts, Enrile's votes
were in excess of the total number of voters who actually voted therein; and (3) the
votes from 22 precincts were twice recorded in 18 SoVs. Complainant maintains that,
by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents' knowledge that some of the entries
therein were false, the latter committed a serious breach of public trust and of their
lawyers' oath.

Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation
of the SoVs was made by the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had
constituted to assist in the canvassing. They claimed that the errors pointed out by
complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.

In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be

held responsible for the illegal padding of the votes considering the nature and
extent of the irregularities and the fact that the canvassing of the election returns was
done under their control and supervision.

Important Dates:
December 4, 1998: the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had
been referred pursuant to Rule 139-B, §13, in relation to §20 of the Rules of Court,
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.

March 11, 1999: Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on , but his motion
was denied in a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated April 22, 1999.

On June 4, 1999: he filed this petition pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(c).

January 8, 1998: COMELEC dismissed complainant's charges for insufficiency of

evidence. However, on a petition for certiorari filed by complainant, this Court set aside
the resolution and directed the COMELEC to file appropriate criminal charges against
respondents.

August 15, 2000: Reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents are guilty of misconduct, serious breach of trust, and
violation of the lawyer's oath in connection with the discharge of their duties as
members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers.

RULING:

YES, respondents are guilty of misconduct serious breach of trust, and

violation of the lawyer's oath. The evidence presented by the complainant, as well as
the evidence taken judicial notice of by the court, was more convincing and worthy of
belief than that offered by the respondents. The irregularities in the canvassing of the
election returns were not mere mathematical errors but a systematic scheme to
pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of the
complainant.The respondents certified the Statements of Votes (SoVs) as true and
correct despite the apparent discrepancies and variations in the tabulation of votes. By
doing so, the respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and violated their oath of office as lawyers.

In legal proceedings involving members of the bar, establishing liability requires

only a clear preponderance of evidence. It is essential for lawyers to uphold honesty in
all aspects of their professional conduct, whether in private or public matters.
Government-employed lawyers bear a heightened responsibility to uphold the
fundamental principle of honesty due to the inherent trust placed in public office. The
court levied a fine of P10,000.00 on each respondent as punishment for their
misconduct, accompanied by a caution that future infractions would be met with more
severe consequences.
G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and

HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents.

Facts:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case for Grave Threats, where his father,
Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

Ferdinand A. Cruz is a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on
the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in
Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an
agent or friend of a party litigant.

The MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that
Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court
laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.

On February 13, 2002, petitioner Ferdinand filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration
seeking to reverse the order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does
not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule
is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.

The MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

Ferdinand filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the
public respondent MeTC.

The RTC, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of
Grave Threats, the subject of the mentioned Criminal Case, is one that can be prosecuted de
oficio (an attorney appointed by the court to defend an indigent defendant, in a criminal action) ,
there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not legally tenable.

Ferdinand filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. He argues that nowhere does the
law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar
Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-
lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the
supervision of a member of the bar.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Ferdinand then directly filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. (Petition for
certiorari refers to argue that a lower court has incorrectly decided an important question of law,
and that the mistake should be fixed to prevent confusion in similar cases.)

Issue:

Whether a third-year law student, like Ferdinand A. Cruz can appear as a private prosecutor
before an inferior court without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Ruling:

Yes, a third-year law student, like Ferdinand A. Cruz can appear as a private prosecutor before
an inferior court without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is
allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter
No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of
a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

In this case, Ferdinand expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138.

In Sec. 34 of Rule 138, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant,
is expressly allowed. While in Rule 138-A provides for conditions when a law student, not as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.

Therefore, a third-year law student, like Ferdinand A. Cruz can appear as a private prosecutor
before an inferior court without the supervision of a member of the bar as an agent or friend of a
party litigant.

Notes:

➔ Sec. 1 of Rule 138-A stated that a law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year
of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear
without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court,
tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law
school.
➔ However, in Resolution in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified that the rule in
inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a
lawyer if the issues and procedure are relatively simple.
➔ The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" is subsequently changed to "In the
court of a municipality"
➔ SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
➔ The term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.
Ratio:

o Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is
allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar
Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or
a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

o The Court's decision was based on the interpretation of Section 34 of Rule 138, which
allows non-lawyers to appear as agents or friends of a party litigant before inferior courts.

o The Court clarified that Rule 138-A, which governs the appearance of law students before
courts, should not be applied in this case because Cruz's appearance was based on Section
34 of Rule 138.

o The Court also emphasized that the civil aspect of the criminal case is deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless there is a reservation, waiver, or prior institution of the civil
aspect.

o Since none of these exceptions apply in this case, Cruz has the right to intervene and
prosecute the civil aspect as a private prosecutor.

Other Issue of Ferdinand:

Ferdinand further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may
flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is
not possible.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage,
violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation.

The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Ferdinand is correct in stating that there is no reservation, waiver, nor the prior institution of the civil
aspect in a Criminal Case, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed
instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to
prosecute the civil aspect.

Therefore, the Supreme Court also granted that Ferdinand may rightfully intervene to prosecute the
civil aspect of the case.

Atty. Julito Vitriolo, Precillana Honorica et al., v. Atty. Felina Dasig

A.C No. 4984 April 1, 2003

Facts: The administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, a Commission on
Higher Education (CHED) official primarily originating from key CHED figures.
 · In August 1998, while Atty. Felina S. Dasig held the position of Officer-in-Charge of the
Legal Affairs Service at CHED, she allegedly demanded P20,000 from Betty C. Mangohon,
a teacher, to expedite the processing of her application for a name correction. The amount
was later reduced to P5,000.

· Between July and August 1998, during Dasig's tenure as Officer-in-Charge of the Legal
Affairs Service at CHED, she purportedly demanded P18,000 to P20,000 from Rosalie B.
Dela Torre, a student, in exchange for expediting her name correction application.

· In September 1998, while Dasig held the position of Officer-in-Charge of the Legal
Affairs Service at CHED, she allegedly demanded P5,000 from Rocella G. Eje, a student, to
facilitate her application for a name correction. Additionally, Dasig suggested to Eje that she
should register her birth anew, despite a prior registration.

· Between August and September 1998, during Dasig's tenure as Officer-in-Charge of the
Legal Affairs Service at CHED, she purportedly demanded a substantial amount, later
confirmed to be P15,000, from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, to expedite her name correction
application. Additionally, Dasig suggested to Ng that she should hire a lawyer chosen by
Dasig to facilitate the application.

· Complainants accused Atty. Felina S. Dasig of violating her attorney-at-law oath by filing
eleven baseless suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, all of which
were subsequently dismissed. This alleged action undermines the integrity of Dasig's legal
practice.

· Additionally, complainants charged Dasig with violating subparagraph b (22), Section

365 of Presidential Decree No. 807, due to her intentional failure to settle just debts owed to
"Borela Tire Supply" and "Novas Lining Brake & Clutch." This failure was evidenced by
dishonored checks and other related documents.

· Further allegations were made against Dasig, claiming that she instigated a crime
against complainants Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr. It was
purported that Dasig ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology, to draw his gun and threaten the Coronacions on a specific
evening. This incident led to a complaint for grave threats against Dasig and her son.

· Lastly, complainants alleged that Dasig authored and sent a libelous report to then
President Joseph Estrada, which defamed the names and reputations of eleven CHED
Directors. This report was believed to be an attempt by Dasig to prevent their re-
appointment and potentially secure an appointment for herself.

After several attempts to notify Atty. Felina S. Dasig of the charges against her, including
sending notifications to her registered address and office address, which were either unclaimed
or received by her authorized agent, the case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline
for investigation. Despite multiple opportunities, Dasig failed to submit a response to the
charges. Based on the evidence on record, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline concluded
that Dasig unlawfully demanded money from individuals with pending applications before her
office at the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). Consequently, the IBP recommended a
three-year suspension from the practice of law. This recommendation was endorsed by the IBP
Board of Governors, citing Dasig's misuse of her public office for personal gain to the detriment
of CHED's reputation. As a result, Atty. Felina S. Dasig was suspended from practicing law for
three years.

Major issue: whether Atty. Felina S. Dasig, as an Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services at
the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), can be disciplined for misconduct while holding a
government position

Ruling: Yes. Firstly, the court scrutinized whether Dasig's actions as a government official could
be subject to disciplinary measures under the purview of legal professional standards. While it's
acknowledged that lawyers in public office may face different challenges compared to those in
private practice, they are still bound by the same ethical obligations as prescribed by the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The court emphasized that the legal profession's integrity should
not be compromised regardless of the practitioner's professional setting.

Secondly, Dasig's alleged misconduct, particularly the solicitation of financial payments in

exchange for favorable treatment of pending applications, was evaluated against the standards
set forth by the legal profession. The court took notice on the gravity of Dasig's actions, which
not only violated ethical principles but also undermined the integrity of CHED's processes. By
abusing her position for personal gain, Dasig breached the trust placed in her as a legal
professional and public servant.

Furthermore, the importance of upholding the Attorneys Oath, which mandates lawyers to delay
no one for money or malice must be upheld. Dasig's demands for financial consideration in
processing applications ran counter to this fundamental duty and violated the trust bestowed
upon her as a member of the legal community.

The decision to disbar Dasig was not taken lightly but was deemed necessary to uphold the
standards of the legal profession and safeguard the public's trust in the justice system.
Disbarment serves not only as a punitive measure against Dasig's misconduct but also as a
deterrent to other legal practitioners who may be tempted to abuse their positions for personal
gain.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and
dishonesty in violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.