Undp Africa Soldiers Citizens 2023 en

SOLDIERS
AND CITIZENS
M I L I TA R Y C O U P S A N D T H E N E E D F O R
D E M O C R AT I C R E N E WA L I N A F R I C A
SOLDIERS
AND CITIZENS
M I L I TA R Y C O U P S A N D T H E N E E D F O R
D E M O C R AT I C R E N E WA L I N A F R I C A
Download full report at
www.soldiersandcitizens.org
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All rights reserved.
United Nations Development Programme

www.undp.org/africa
[email protected]
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is

the leading United Nations organization fighting to end
the injustice of poverty, inequality, and climate change.
Working with our broad network of experts and partners
in 170 countries, we help nations to build integrated, lasting
solutions for people and planet. The views expressed in
this publication do not necessarily represent those of the
member countries of the UNDP Executive Board or of
those institutions of the United Nations system that are
mentioned herein.
The designations and terminology employed and the

presentation of material do not imply any expression
or opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations
concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city
or area, or of its authorities, or of its frontiers or boundaries.
Design by Studio Mnemonic

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F O R E WO R D
Military coups d’états, which involve the unconstitutional ascension to power

by the armed forces, have been on the rise over the past decade. I Between 2020
and 2022, the continent of Africa experienced six ‘successful’ military coups — of
which two were ‘coups within coups’ — and three attempted coups. This represents
an approximately 229% increase in coup incidence over the previous 20-year period. II
There has also been a growing number of so-called ‘constitutional coups’, in which
leaders revise constitutions to change term limits by allowing for third-, fourth- and
even fifth-term mandates. Coups, almost by definition, undermine constitutional
rule, entrench bad governance, and create conditions that undermine human rights
and civic freedom, including by encouraging future coups. There is an acute need
for new approaches and new thinking to tackle this “epidemic of coup d’états”, as so
aptly articulated by UN Secretary-General, António Guterres.
This new report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) analyses
the factors that have contributed to the recent wave of coups across Africa. These
include structural and institutional drivers; the immediate factors that may lead
to a violent conflict that can foment coups; and triggers such as one-off events that
can spark coups. The data shows clear correlations between heightened coup risk
and persistent insecurity, stagnant growth, exclusionary economic governance,
multidimensional poverty, inequality, manipulation of constitutional term
limits, limited youth and women’s participation, governance deficits and higher
levels of military expenditure. This report also explores difficult questions, such
as why there is apparent initial popular support for such coups including where
democratically elected leaders were ousted. It starkly shows that when citizens
have been disappointed with the delivery of democratically elected governments,
they are more likely to support non-democratic styles of governance, including
military rule. Crucially, the study combines the latest empirical data and literature
with human stories by engaging 5,000 citizens who lived through coups in Africa,
contrasting their experiences with those of 3,000 citizens from countries on a path
of democratic transition.
The report informs policy and programming options available to regional and
international actors to proactively prevent and address the consequences of
military coups. That includes feeding the findings into the Africa Facility to
Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT), a new initiative between UNDP and the
African Union Commission that will provide tailored programmatic support to
countries in Africa undergoing complex political transitions. In particular, the
report calls for a re-focus on development, including good governance, human
rights, and access to basic services such as education and healthcare as a critical
means to not only prevent coups, but also sustain peace. This is particularly crucial
in regions like the Sahel, which face a heightened risk of coups. That investment
will also drive game-changing progress in the 2030 Agenda and the African Union’s
Agenda 2063. In short, development is prevention, and prevention means peace.
This is a vital baseline that will help to ensure that people’s futures are not shaped
by an undemocratic few, but people everywhere across the continent can realize
the Africa that they want.
A H U N N A E Z I A KO N WA - U N A S S I S TA N T S E C R E TA R Y- G E N E R A L
UNDP Assistant Administrator and Director of the Regional Bureau for Africa
S O L D I E R S A N D C I T I Z E N S : M I L I TA R Y C O U P S A N D T H E N E E D F O R D E M O C R AT I C R E N E WA L I N A F R I C A
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P R E FAC E
In an era marked by profound transformation and multifaceted

challenges, democracies across the globe are encountering
significant pressures and strains on their constitutional order.
These trends are taking place

in an intricate and dynamic
international landscape, marked
by an unprecedented confluence
of geopolitical shifts, economic
challenges, digital advancements,
environmental concerns and
sociocultural dynamics.
Across Africa, pervasive and contemporary security threats and challenges,
particularly around terrorism and violent extremism, climate change and the
impact of a global economic downturn, are unfolding even as painful episodes from
our past re-emerge in new and alarming ways. The resurgence of unconstitutional
changes of government (UCG) depicted by military coups in some parts of Africa,
in particular, threatens to erode much of the gains we have witnessed in previous
decades. A recent resurgence of military coups took place between 2020 and 2022.
As this report is being finalized, fresh conflict has erupted in Sudan.
The African Union (AU) is contributing to and coordinating immense progress

being made by Member States and regional bodies through implementing strong
frameworks, tools and partnerships to achieve the prosperity we envision for
every African region, state and citizen. The Union is building resilience and
responsiveness to the shifts and the changes evident in climate variability,
digital transformation, defence and security governance systems in regional,
continental and global settings.
The AU Constitutive Act and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Governance, among many others, affirm our continent-wide commitment to shared
values and principles for peaceful changes of power through free, fair, credible and
peaceful election processes. Through the AU Continental Early Warning System
(CEWS), one of the most advanced intergovernmental systems of its kind, we
have the information to address conflict cycles in a comprehensive and proactive
manner. Channels for preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention exist in
mechanisms epitomized by the AU Panel of the Wise, FemWise and WiseYouth.
Many of the Regional Economic Communities and Mechanisms have developed
similar instruments that mirror these norms across the continent.
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Perhaps with greater urgency than ever before, we are forced to acknowledge the
intensity of complex causes that give rise to the phenomena that hamper our
progress towards the attainment of AU Agenda 2063 and the UN 2030 Agenda.
No single system, instrument or actor can remedy all of the structural drivers
of instability. As we assess these trends and take stock of the many tools we can
draw on to anticipate, prevent and respond to today’s pressures, identifying and
effectively addressing the gaps in our efforts becomes a topmost and urgent priority.
What angles are we overlooking? The voices of citizens — especially women and
youth — must be heard, loud enough to resonate with change and inspire impact.
What fabric of society is being excluded, and is thereby left behind in the political
sphere? How can we mobilize and empower all citizens to the national, regional
and continental renewal agenda?
As threats evolve and trends emerge, the narratives we rely on to understand these
happenings rarely capture the true perspectives and lived experiences of the people
whose livelihoods are most directly affected. In what is probably the most extensive
study of its kind, this report gathers the insights of 8,000 citizens across Africa.
It combines this vast collection of people-centred knowledge with a development
approach, and, in a series of actionable findings, begins to illuminate some of the
blind spots that have hitherto hampered how we make sense of UCG and — more
importantly — how we adequately respond to them and prevent them. The message
in these pages is clear: it is a call for AU Member States to build resilience against
undemocratic seizure of political power through smart and inclusive governance,
and progress towards the goals of The Africa We Want and the global Sustainable
Development Goals.
Collectively, we need targeted, harmonized and integrated people-oriented

policies and cross-country programmes that simultaneously address multiple
challenges. There are tried and tested ways to set at-risk countries back on a path of
meaningful development and consistent progress. This should start with a profound
recommitment to truly inclusive governance, which delivers for our people.
We are pleased that the release of this timely report forms part of the official launch
of the new Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT), a co-created
initiative by the AU Commission and the United Nations Development Programme.
The AFSIT provides integrated programmatic support to African countries under-
going complex political transitions, including those experiencing or at risk of UCG.
It is our hope that this report will serve as a catalyst for inspiring change,
reigniting our collective commitment to collaboratively building resilient,
democratic societies in Africa for the peace dividends of effective and
sustainable development.
A M B A S S A D O R B A N KO L E A D E O Y E
P O L I T I C A L A F FA I R S , P E A C E A N D S E C U R I T Y C O M M I S S I O N E R
African Union Commission (AUC)
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AC K N OW L E D G M E N T S
The Soldiers and Citizens report was prepared by Nations Development Coordination Office (UNDCO)
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Africa; Stan Nkwain, Former Director, UNDP Regional
under the leadership and guidance of Ahunna Service Centre for Africa (RSCA); Matthias Naab,
Eziakonwa, UN Assistant Secretary-General, Director, UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa
UNDP Assistant Administrator and Director of (RSCA); and Yacoub El-Hillo, Regional Director,
the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa. UNDCO Africa. Expert inputs were also provided by
the UNDP Resident Representatives and UN Resident
Jide Martyns Okeke, Coordinator of the UNDP Regional Coordinators in Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire,
Programme for Africa, directed the research project The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Sudan and
and was responsible for the overall conceptualization, Tanzania, namely (following the same order)
framing, and production of the research agenda, Elsie Laurence-Chounoune, Barbara Manzi, Carol
findings and recommendations. Flore, Christine Musisi, Kamil Kamaludden, Violet
Kakyomya, Aissata De, Seraphine Wakana, Angela
The core research team was composed of Lusigi, Charles Abani, Luc-Joel Gregoire, Gualbert
Fatma Ahmed, Issaka Souaré, Jessica Banfield, Gbehounou, Maleye Diop, Alain Noudehou, Yuri
Jago Salmon, Maia Gartland Hoff, Michelle Mendi Afanasiev, Abdou Dieng, and Zlatan Milisic.
Muita, Mark Gill and Prashanth Parthiban.
Regional and international stakeholder inputs
Additional research and guidance were provided and reflections were provided by the African Peer
by Alexander Wilde, Charmaine Rodrigues, Review Mechanism (APRM); the African Union’s
David Omozuafoh, Hafsa Maalim, Jago Salmon, Economic, Social and Cultural Council (AU ECOSOCC);
Joost Van Der Zwan, Kamissa Camara, Katie Amani Africa; the Geneva Centre for Security Sector
Thompson, Kholood Khair, Moses Kheisa, Nirina Governance (DCAF); the International Institute for
Kiplagat, Njoya Tikum, Noura Hamladji, Olawale Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International
Ismail, Ozonnia Ojielo, Pablo Reyes, Rania Hadra, IDEA); and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS).
Raymond Gilpin, Ricardo Fuentes, Sam Rizk, Sarah Enriching comments were provided by the African
Lister, Shewit Hailu Desta and Dr. Solomon Dersso. Development Bank (AfDB) under the leadership of
Yero Baleh, by Charles Nyukonge, Linguere M. Mbaye,
The interviews that formed the basis of this research Marcel Maglo and Riadh Ben Messadoud.
were conducted by the Geopoll research team, under
the leadership of Matthieu Sauvage-Mar. Qualitative The findings and recommendations of this report
research was conducted in Ghana and Burkina Faso by benefitted from extensive feedback from three
the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), high-level events. The first was a UNDP-Chatham
under the leadership of Chukwuemeka B. Eze and House side event during the Tana High-Level Forum
guided by Julien Ousseau. The qualitative research on Security in Africa under the leadership of Hanna
in Sudan was conducted by Infotrak, under the Tetteh, UN Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa;
leadership of Angela Ambitho and with guidance H.E. Ibn Chambas, AU High Representative on
from Raphael Mulwa. Silencing the Guns; and John Mahama, former
President of Ghana; with key messages provided on
Enriching comments, reviews and feedback were behalf of H.E. Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for
provided by technical teams from the Department Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) of the
of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), African Union Commission (AUC), as well as inputs
the United Nations Office for West Africa and the from H.E. Birgitte Markussen, Ambassador of the
Sahel (UNOWAS), the United Nations Office to the European Union Delegation to the African Union.
African Union (UNOAU), the United Nations Office The following experts contributed to the discussion
of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa and the titled Ephemeral populism? Restoring and sustaining
United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa constitutional order in the after-math of military
(UNOCA). Such inputs were also received from coups in Africa: Barney Afako, Expert Member of the
Eskedar Nega, Deputy Regional Director, United United Nations Commission on Human Rights in
2023
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South Sudan; Kholood Khair, Senior Advisor with (RECs/RMs). Under the leadership of the AUC
the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; and Lidet Commissioner for PAPS, H.E. Bankole Adeoye,
Tadesse, Associate Director in Peaceful Societies valuable efforts of collaboration were provided
and Accountable Governance, European Centre for by PAPS Directors Dr. Alhaji Sarjoh Bah (Conflict
Development Policy Management (ECDPM). Management Directorate) and Director Patience
Chiradza (Governance and Conflict Prevention
The second was the UNDP side event during the 2023 Directorate), and Ambassador Frederic Gateretse-
Munich Security Conference, Another Kind of Epidemic Ngoga, Isabela Warioba, John Gbodi, Kevina Otech,
– Military Coups and the Need for Democratic Renewal Limi Mohamed, Mayah Ngalla, Neema Chusi, and
in Africa, with a keynote address delivered by H.E. Ambassador William Azumah Awinador-Kanyirige.
Nana Akufo-Addo, President of Ghana, and attended
by senior officials including: Albert Kan-Dapaah, UNDP core development partners shared valuable
Minister of National Security, Republic of Ghana; insights throughout this process, especially during
Anne Beathe Tvinnereim, Minister of International three breakfast roundtables conducted in Addis
Development, Kingdom of Norway; Annette Weber, Ababa, Ethiopia. They include representatives from
EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa; the Governments of Denmark, Germany (The Federal
Comfort Ero, President and Chief Executive Officer, Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
International Crisis Group; Federico Borello, Executive [BMZ], as well as the German Agency for International
Director, Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC); Cooperation [GIZ]), Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Fonteh Akum, Executive Director, Institute for Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Security Studies; Ottilia Anna Maunganidze, Head of Kingdom, as well as the EU delegation to the African
Special Projects, Institute for Security Studies and Union. Valuable support was provided by consultants
Munich Young Leader 2017; Stefan Löfven, Chair of George Mukundi and Heldana Tekeste in engaging
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute with relevant stakeholders.
(SIPRI) Governing Board, co-chair of the UN High-
Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism Special thanks are extended to the members of the
and former Prime Minister of Sweden; Udo Jude Ilo, UNDP Editorial Board, chaired by Anjali Kwatra,
Senior Director for Advocacy, Centre for Civilians for their rigorous observations and endorsement
in Conflict (CIVIC); and Volker Perthes, UN Special of the report: Anna Ortubia; Brenda Wawa, Caroline
Representative for Sudan and Head of United Nations Hooper-Box; Heriberto Tapia; Janil Greenaway;
Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan Joost Van Der Zwan; Jose Cruz-Osorio; Laetitia
(UNITAMS). Ouoba; Laurel Patterson; Lucy Ocampo; Margretha
Kampulu; Niamh Collier; Oisika Chakrabarti;
The third was the AU Policy Conference on Peace, Samba Thiam; Tehmina Akhtar and Valdemar
Security and Development held under the leadership Satoshi Rojle Christensen.
of Commissioner Bankole Adeoye, with important
research insights provided by the following Communications, editorial support, design, operations
discussants: Dalmar Jama, Technical Advisor, APRM; and film production were coordinated by Adja Sy,
Julien Oussou, Regional Coordinator, WANEP; Kholood Alix Cho, Ayda Labassi, Betelihem Teklu, Gopi Kharel
Khair, Director of Confluence Advisory, Sudan; and Michelle Mendi Muita, with critical support
H.E. Michelle Ndiaye, Special Representative of the provided by consultants Jacqueline Cochrane,
Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) and Head Johan Tholson and Jon Rudberg (Film Tech), and
of Mission, AU Liaison Office in DRC; and H.E. Parfait Therese Severinsen Marques (Studio Mnemonic).
Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the UN
Secretary General to the AU and Head of the UNOAU. We extend our heartfelt gratitude to the many
individuals and organizations whose contributions
Further substantive inputs were provided by the AUC, made this research report possible.
its Peace and Security Council (PSC), and the Regional
Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms
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TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S
Table of figures......................................................................................................................................................10
List of boxes............................................................................................................................................................ 11
Acronyms................................................................................................................................................................ 12
Executive summary............................................................................................................................................. 14
I I NT RO DU CTIO N........................................................................................................................................ 32
I I ME THO DO LO GY....................................................................................................................................... 38
Conceptual anchor points
Research tools
Methodological caveats
SECT I ON 1.........................................................................................................................................................52
Africa’s resurgence of military coups in context
1.1 Triggers......................................................................................................................................................... 55
1.2 Proximate factors....................................................................................................................................... 56
Insecurity in the Sahel
Rising frustration with government performance
Democracy at an inflection point in Africa
1.3 Structural and institutional drivers....................................................................................................... 61
A history of military involvement in politics
State fragility, legitimacy and the social contract
Exclusionary patterns of economic development
SECT I O N 2....................................................................................................................................................... 70
Proximate and structural drivers of coups: citizens’ perspectives and experiences
2.1 Socio-economic factors and overall development consequences............................................. 71
Comparing citizen perspectives on economic circumstances
Citizen optimism about future development trajectories
2.2 Governance shortfalls...............................................................................................................................80
Belief in democracy
Confidence in government performance
2.3 Security and safety.................................................................................................................................... 92
Reformist military over civilian status quo
2.4 Perspectives on inclusion........................................................................................................................97
The inclusiveness and legitimacy of formal transition processes
Degree of individual participation in political transition processes
Role of civil society and other national actors
Spotlight on youth and women
2023
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SECTIO N 3...................................................................................................................................................... 116

The aftermath: assessing responses to military coups
3.1 Role of regional and international actors...........................................................................................117
Citizens’ confidence in the UN and AU
A typology of regional and international response mechanisms
S ECTIO N 4......................................................................................................................................................142
Policy and programming implications
4.1 Key messages.............................................................................................................................................144
4.2 Recommendations...................................................................................................................................148
Strengthening continental and regional response mechanisms
Preventing further coups
More effective responses when coups occur
Building long-term coup resilience by addressing structural and institutional drivers
Reorienting international engagement in the Sahel
A NNEX 1.
Soldiers and citizens perceptions survey questionnaire..................................................................... 160
ANNEX 2.
Comparing UCG- and DTS-category countries on global development indices............................164
Endnotes...............................................................................................................................................................170
References............................................................................................................................................................179
10
TA B L E O F F I G U R E S
Figure 1 Total number of successful military coups per year.......................................................................................33

Figure 2 Term-limit status across Africa, by country.......................................................................................................34
Figure 3 Geographic spread of survey respondents, by country..................................................................................44
Figure 4 Survey respondents’ profiles by gender, age, income and area (urban vs. rural)..................................44
Figure 5 Survey respondents’ profiles by education and employment......................................................................45
Figure 6 Structural, proximate and trigger factors contributing to contemporary military coups in Africa.53
Figure 7 Decreasing confidence in government, UCG average....................................................................................58
Figure 8 History of military rule in countries that recently experienced coups.......................................................61
Figure 9 Military expenditure as share of government spending, by UCG countries.............................................62
Figure 10 Fragility Index – political and cohesion indicators.........................................................................................64
Figure 11 Ibrahim Index of African Governance...................................................................................................................65
Figure 12 Satisfaction with the economy and finances.................................................................................................... 72
Figure 13 Loss of GDP caused by military coups................................................................................................................. 74
Figure 14 Optimism for the future............................................................................................................................................ 75
Figure 15 Impact of last transition on the country.............................................................................................................. 76
Figure 16 Impact of the last transition on the country, disaggregated by country....................................................77
Figure 17 Emotional feeling towards the country direction of travel............................................................................ 78
Figure 18 Preference for democracy or other kind of government.................................................................................81
Figure 19 Feelings in flux among respondents in UCG countries..................................................................................83
Figure 20 Reasons for support to non-democratic forms of government...................................................................84
Figure 21 Importance of who runs the country....................................................................................................................85
Figure 22 System of government needs improving............................................................................................................ 87
Figure 23 System of government is rigged to advantage the rich and the powerful............................................... 87
Figure 24 Satisfaction with the way the government is running the country............................................................88
Figure 25 Satisfaction with public services..........................................................................................................................89
Figure 26 Equal treatment of citizens before the law.........................................................................................................89
Figure 27 Violence against civilians in UCG-category countries...................................................................................92
Figure 28 Perceptions of safety and security in UCG and DTS countries, now and in the future.........................93
Figure 29 Separation between the military and government..........................................................................................94
Figure 30 Citizens’ sense of being listened to in most recent transition..................................................................100
Figure 31 Concerns raised for better inclusion during transition................................................................................101
Figure 32 Supported or opposed the last change of government................................................................................ 102
Figure 33 Reasons for supporting the last political transition — UCG........................................................................103
Figure 34 Reasons for supporting the last political transition — DTS........................................................................103
Figure 35 Role of institutions during transitions..............................................................................................................105
Figure 36 Perceptions on gender equality........................................................................................................................... 107
Figure 37 Young people in leadership positions...............................................................................................................108
Figure 38 Confidence in institutions.....................................................................................................................................119
Figure 39 The role of the AU and the UN during the last transition.............................................................................. 120
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L I S T O F B OX E S
Box 1 Key AU legal instruments pertaining to UCG..........................................................................................................40

Box 2 Attempted coup in The Gambia..................................................................................................................................43
Box 3 Complexity of coup occurrence..................................................................................................................................54
Box 4 Societal discontent a common thread.....................................................................................................................58
Box 5 Democratic transition theory viewed against Africa’s recent experience................................................... 60
Box 6 Coup risk and the exclusion of women and youth................................................................................................66
Box 7 Resource windfalls and coup risk.............................................................................................................................. 67
Box 8 The economic cost of coups........................................................................................................................................ 73
Box 9 Sudan’s development recovery disrupted............................................................................................................... 74
Box 10 A legacy of developmental leadership......................................................................................................................86
Box 11 Civilian and democratic control over the military as a source of coup resilience......................................95
Box 12 Inclusivity in Guinea’s transition................................................................................................................................99
Box 13 Civil society in political transitions.........................................................................................................................104
Box 14 The African Union Continental Early Warning System.......................................................................................127
Box 15 Governance deprioritized in Mali............................................................................................................................. 128
Box 16 ECOWAS tightening term-limit rules.......................................................................................................................130
Box 17 Working with de facto authorities............................................................................................................................. 131
Box 18 UN responses to coups — stay and deliver............................................................................................................ 132
Box 19 Persistent constraints impacting governance assistance.............................................................................. 135
Box 20 UNDP-AU Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions................................................................................ 151
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AC R O N Y M S
ACLED Armed Conflict Location IDP internally displaced person

and Event Data Project
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority
AfDB African Development Bank on Development
AFSIT Africa Facility to Support MINUSMA UN Multidimensional Integrated

Inclusive Transitions Stabilization Mission in Mali
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism MNJTF Multinational Joint Task Force
AU African Union MPI Multidimensional Poverty Index
AUC African Union Commission MYA Multi-Year Appeal (UN DPPA)
AUC-PAPS African Union Commission NDICI Neighbourhood, Development

Department of Political Affairs, and International Cooperation
Peace and Security Instrument (EU)
CEWS Continental Early Warning System NGO non-governmental organization

(AU)
NPC National Peace Council
CMAG Commonwealth Ministerial
OCHA United Nations Office for the
Action Group
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
CNT National Transitional Council
ODA official development assistance
CMT Transitional Military Council
OECD Organisation for Economic
CSO civil society organization Co-operation and Development
DAC Development Assistance OIF Organisation Internationale

Committee (OECD) de la Francophonie
DPPA Department of Political and PBF Peacebuilding Fund (UN)

Peacebuilding Affairs (UN)
PPP purchasing power parity
DTS democratic transition state
PSC Peace and Security Council (AU)
ECCAS Economic Community of
RC Resident Coordinator
Central African States
REC regional economic community
ECOWAS Economic Community of
West African States RM regional mechanism
EMB electoral management body SADC Southern African Development

Community
EU European Union
SCM Synthetic Control Method
EWRS early warning and response system
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
FCV Fragility, Conflict and Violence
(World Bank) SRSG Special Representative of the
Secretary-General (UN)
FGD focus group discussion
SSR security-sector reform
FNDC National Front for the Defence
of the Constitution TSF Transition Support Facility (AfDB)
GDP gross domestic product UCG unconstitutional changes of

government
GovNet Governance Network of the
Development Assistance UN United Nations
Committee (OECD)
UNDP United Nations Development
HDI Human Development Index Programme
2023
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E X E C U T I V E S U M M A RY
Democracies across the

globe have faced multiple
challenges over the past
decade, and Africa has
been no exception.
Constitutional manipulation has increased on the continent as

some leaders attempt to extend their time in power.1 But perhaps
the most striking factor has been a sudden uptick in military
coups. Between 2020 and 2022, Africa experienced six coups
and three coup attempts: a sharp rise from the previous two
decades. 2,3 Popular support for coup leadership has been
prominent, albeit short lived.
While coups and military rule were common earlier in Africa’s

post-colonial history, a wave of democratization spread across the
continent since the early 1990s. This yielded progress in favour of
constitutional order. In many countries, democratic governments
were established, and the peaceful change of political power through
elections grew.4 Democratic governance became a continent-wide
norm projected by the African Union (AU) through, for instance, the
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.
Against this backdrop, the recent resurgence in coups has sounded

a warning note. It raises the spectre of democratic backsliding,
turbulence and the close involvement of the military in political life.
When power is seized through military means, it represents a
critical risk for peace and democratic progress in each affected
country, along with potential spill-over effects and wider
destabilization.
The AU has denounced the trend, with high-level statements and

communiqués signalling renewed effort to tackle what it terms
unconstitutional changes of government (UCG). Similarly,
United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres lamented
the “epidemic of coups d’états” unfolding on the world stage and
urged “effective deterrence” from the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC).5
2023
15
Key research questions As part of UNDP’s efforts to address these events, this study adopts primarily
a development-focused approach, in line with our organizational mandate.
• What are the
Produced as part of UNDP’s partnership with the AU Commission (AUC), the report
development drivers of
supports continental leadership efforts in tackling UCG. It offers a forward-looking
military coups, as a form
perspective — both for preventing further coups and for harnessing opportunities
of UCG, in Africa?
for transformative change and sustained constitutional order.
• What explains apparent
The research findings are based on a vast perceptions survey, which captured the
popular support for such
views of 8,000 citizens across Africa. Among the respondents, 5,000 are African
coups ‘in the moment’
citizens who lived through coups or equivalent UCG events, in Burkina Faso, Chad,
— including in contexts
Guinea, Mali and Sudan. Their views were contrasted with those of 3,000 citizens
where democratically
from countries on a path of democratic transition or consolidation, namely
elected leaders were
The Gambia, Ghana and Tanzania. In the report, we refer to the former countries
ousted?
throughout as UCG settings, and the latter as democratic transition states (DTS).6
As a result of this extensive survey, we have been able to interpret issues and
• What policy and
trends through a uniquely people-centred dataset.
programming options
should regional and
international actors
consider to effectively
CONTE X TUAL L ANDSCAPE
prevent military coups?
Prior to the coup event, each of the five UCG countries experienced unique
dynamics. Yet, combining these factors to gain a regional perspective suggests that
• What can these actors
coup risk is influenced by a multitude of shared factors. Africa’s recent military
do to restore and sustain
coups have also unfolded in an age marked by interdependence and complexity.
constitutional order,
Across the globe, geopolitical, economic, digital, environmental and sociocultural
reset the social contract
spheres are fusing to create an increasingly dynamic landscape. This makes
and boost inclusive
reductive, single-factor explanations or overly simplistic solutions futile.
democratic governance
in UCG-affected
To untangle critical factors, the Soldiers and citizens research used a conflict
countries?
analysis approach, which distinguishes between structural and institutional
drivers (or root causes), proximate causes and triggers. This provided a contextual
frame for analysing the findings of the perceptions dataset.
S T R U C T U R A L , P R O X I M AT E A N D T R I G G E R FA C T O R S O F M I L I TA R Y C O U P S
Trigger factors
• In some cases, the immediate factors triggering UCG events were clearly
identifiable. In Chad, the death of long-standing president Idriss Déby led
to a transfer of power to his son. In Burkina Faso, incidents involving fatal
attacks on security personnel allegedly prompted both coups. However,
elsewhere, immediate triggers were obscured by behind-the-scenes
political dynamics. This highlights the crucial role of individual political
agency in making coups possible.
Proximate factors
• Insecurity in the Sahel. Most recent coups and coup attempts have
occurred in West Africa. Seven out of nine played out in the greater Sahel.
16
The Sahel has experienced significant insecurity in the past decade as a

result of deeper structural and historic issues, contributing to the conditions
that shaped the recent UCG uptick. Meanwhile, international actors have
begun to engage in a complex pattern of security-driven interventions,
linked to the Sahel’s geostrategic relevance. This trend has had counter-
productive effects.
• Rising frustration with government performance. Longitudinal data

studies, such as those by Afrobarometer, reveal a decline of civic trust in
governments’ capacity and commitment to provide inclusive development
and economic opportunities.7 This is especially true for younger generations.
In many contexts, this is coupled with anger at issues ranging from
corruption and insecurity to economic difficulty amid a global downturn.
Another factor has been disappointment over incumbents’ manipulation
of constitutional rules to extend their power. The result is a grievance base,
which military juntas have readily exploited.
• Democracy at an inflection point. The rise in military coups and

constitutional manipulation across the continent reflect democratic
dysfunctions that appear hardwired into some political systems. These
trends signal new appetite to question the status of democracy as an optimal
form of government. This trend, along with the failure of leaders (including
some who had been democratically elected) to provide for citizens’ needs
and aspirations, is a critical proximate factor.
Structural and institutional factors

• History of military involvement in politics. State formation in Africa often
followed a violent trajectory, particularly in the context of colonialism.
In many countries, this distorted both the role and character of militaries.
The coup-affected countries under review all experienced protracted
military rule beyond their independence. Burkina Faso, Chad and Sudan
were led by military regimes for three quarters or more of their post-colonial
histories. In affected countries, state expenditure on military costs is also
particularly significant. These trends reflect a failure to fully reform and
differentiate the military within the contemporary state architecture.
At the same time, clear checks and balances are often lacking.
• State fragility and questions of legitimacy. Coup risk can be seen as a

specific subset of state fragility. Since 2019, 12 out of 17 coup events globally
have taken place in fragile contexts.8 Coup-affected countries score among
the lowest on governance and fragility indices. This suggests a strong
correlation between coup resilience and robust political, cohesion and
governance conditions.
• A lack of inclusive economic growth. In four out of the five UCG countries
under review (Chad, Guinea, Sudan and, to a lesser extent, Mali), politics and
development have been significantly shaped by natural resource wealth.
This recalls extensive evidence of the so-called resource curse, where
mineral wealth is exploited in a way that leads to pernicious development
outcomes. The ranking of these countries on global development indices
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confirms the relevance of viewing military coups from a development

perspective. Correlations between coup risk and stagnant growth, inequality,
the exclusion of youth and women, as well as governance deficits and higher
levels of state military expenditure, are all apparent. Exclusionary patterns
of economic growth should thus be viewed as a key contributing, although
not causal, structural factor.
Citizens’ perspectives: insights from

the Soldiers and citizens survey
A significantly greater Hope for a new future

number of respondents The citizens who recently lived through a UCG event expressed a heightened
living in UCG countries appetite for change and positive transformation from the recent turmoil.
believed that safety Overall optimism was measured across several indicators. These included
would improve in the whether respondents thought the recent political transition had a positive
two years following the impact on their country; optimism that service delivery, security and
event (68 percent). economic circumstances would soon improve; feeling ‘heard’ in the recent
Only 55 percent of DTS- political events; and reporting positive emotions, such as ‘excitement’ and
country respondents ‘optimism’, at the time of the event in question. Some 24 percent more
expressed the same UCG respondents felt excited about their country’s direction of travel than
confidence in relation
DTS participants.
to a recent election.
UCG-country respondents showed greater optimism and less scepticism than

counterparts in DTS-category countries, indicating that they are willing to take
a leap of faith. Yet the findings also conveyed the personal turmoil of living
through a coup. More UCG-country respondents selected both positive and
negative adjectives to describe their emotional state at the time of the event.
Ephemeral optimism
The Soldiers and citizens data also reflects the ephemerality of this optimism,
and related popular support for the military coups. Positive feelings were found
to be in flux when respondents were asked how they felt ‘now’ (at the time of
the research), as opposed to ‘then’ (during the political transition). This echoes
trends from other settings where coups were popular at first, and suggests that
support for coup leaders may be interpreted as a reaction against the status
quo, rather than a wholehearted endorsement of incoming military rule.
Indeed, in Guinea and Burkina Faso, crowds turned against the same leaders
they had cheered into power less than a year earlier. This sensitive interplay
between hope, delivery and expectation contributes to the risk of prolonged
turbulence in transitional contexts.
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Limited delivery of inclusivity The Soldiers and citizens

Declining civic confidence in transitional governments is partly explained data revealed a strong
by limitations in the delivery of promised inclusivity. Except for Sudan appetite for greater women
(following the coup that pre-dates the current war between armed factions), and youth inclusivity
all the UCG-category countries installed a body acting as the transitional in political leadership.
legislative council that, to some degree, reflected the countries’ diversity. Overall, 71 percent of all
All engaged in at least some dialogue with socio-political forces in their respondents agreed that
respective countries to reach consensus about the management of the transition. more young people are
It was clear in all five cases that inclusive and consultative processes were to needed in leadership
guide the drafting and execution of transition plans. All contexts, however, positions. Among
subsequently saw increasing criticism from political and civic actors precisely respondents aged between
on the issue of inclusivity. There has also been a general sharpening of hostility 15 and 24, this increased
between junta leadership and opposition voices. to 78 percent.
Divergent views on democracy and the military

In DTS countries, over two thirds of respondents said that democracy is
preferable to any other kind of government. In UCG contexts, just over half
shared this view. The remainder were split between saying that a non-democratic
government can sometimes be preferable (17 percent) or that, for them, the type
of government system does not really matter (20 percent).
These findings reflect disappointment with the delivery of democratically

elected governments. This dissatisfaction further fuels a sense that non-
democratic governance may present a legitimate alternative: an attitude that
was more prevalent in the UCG countries. However, in both categories, fewer
women than men indicated that a non-democratic system could be preferable.
(A difference of 7 percentage points in UCG-category countries, and 4 percent in
DTS-category settings.) Further analysis of the Soldiers and citizens data found
that men were 55 percent more likely than women to say that a non-democratic
government may be preferable in some circumstances. This finding suggests
that improved gender parity and women’s rights are better achieved via
democracy than without it.
The UCG events explored in this study are recent, and longer-term development consequences remain
unknown. However, using methods based on counter-factual enquiry, UNDP background research
analysed impacts of earlier coups in Guinea (2008) and Mali (2012). The findings indicate that five
years after the event, Guinea and Mali had lost an accumulated sum of $12.13 billion and $13.52 billion
in total gross domestic product (GDP) respectively, based on purchasing power parity (PPP).
Research also confirmed that the coups under review had caused political responses that discouraged
investors and curtailed economic activities. Food and essential commodity prices — already under
pressure due to COVID-19 and, more recently, conflict in Ukraine — have been affected by the instability
in all settings. Humanitarian needs have spiked.
Despite this, a greater number of UCG-country respondents viewed the impact of their recent political
transition as positive overall when compared with DTS respondents. This was particularly true for
respondents from Chad, Guinea and Mali.
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Some 22 percent more Attitudes to the role of the military in government were also divergent. UCG-
UCG- than DTS-category country respondents expressed greater tolerance for military engagement in
respondents said that when government affairs, including stepping in when the state shows itself to be
a democratic government incompetent.
is incompetent, the
military should intervene. Time for change
A desire for change was a recurring theme across the data, particularly among
those supporting the recent coup. ‘Time for change’ was cited as the most important
reason for supporting a military takeover (44 percent). Other priorities were ‘better
governance’ (15 percent) and ‘security’ (21 percent), while 8 percent selected
‘don’t know’. DTS-category respondents selected three prominent reasons for
supporting the results of the last election, namely ‘better governance’ (21 percent),
‘constitutional mandate’ (21 percent) and ‘time for change’ (16 percent).
When asked to elaborate on why alternatives to democracy may be justified, most

respondents pointed to instances where democracy was ‘abused’ or ‘not working’.
In UCG-category countries, more than half (63 percent) said this would warrant
alternatives, while in DTS-category countries, 48 percent of respondents selected
this answer. For these countries, a larger share pin-pointed ‘corruption’ as the
second highest reason (29 percent).
Disappointment with democratically elected leaders may therefore inspire

readiness to consider alternative systems of government. This attitude was more
pronounced in the countries that recently experienced a coup. When asked to
rank government performance, similar numbers across both settings felt that
improvement was necessary. However, scepticism was again higher among
those in DTS-category countries.
Coup risk may spread

Lastly, the findings of the Soldiers and citizens study suggest that coup risk may
spread. In coup-affected countries, there is a clear risk for volatility to persist
and constitutional order to continue eroding beyond transition timelines. (This is
evidenced by the warfare between coup instigators in Sudan, which broke out in
April 2023.) Coup leaders may also take inspiration from one another, increasingly
bypassing the normative frameworks and efforts of regional institutions.
The five recently affected UCG countries are not the only states to experience
this particular confluence of structural and proximate factors. This points to the
potential for other cases to emerge. The research — and real-time events unfolding
in Ghana, The Gambia and Senegal during the study — highlighted vulnerabilities
even in states on a path of democratic transition or consolidation.
It is notable that citizens from some of the DTS countries, which are compara-
tively stable and developmentally advanced, cited higher levels of frustration
and scepticism about government than were reported in the coup-affected
countries. This discrepancy seems to suggest both higher expectations in
these settings, as well as challenges that persist even in contexts with relative
development progress. The research shows in a compelling manner that tolerance
for ongoing inequality, government under-performance and elite self-enrichment
is sharply waning across the continent.
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KEY MES SAGES
1. To mitigate coup risk,

a development lens is essential
The study found that among the hybrid circumstances that shape
vulnerability to coup risk, underdevelopment is prominent. Counter-
factual analysis of the cost of coups further highlights that these
events significantly slow down development. These findings confirm
that development perspectives should be at the centre of UCG response
strategies. While coups are neither inevitable, nor necessarily likely, in all
low-development contexts, secondary data shows clear correlations between
heightened coup risk and stagnant growth, exclusionary economic governance,
multidimensional poverty, inequality, limited youth and women’s participation,
governance deficits and higher levels of state military expenditure. The findings
confirm that coup risk can be viewed as a subset of state fragility.
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Countries that experience contemporary coups perform poorly on global

development indices. These rankings are not abstract, but represent millions of
lives marred by exclusion, infringement of rights, restriction of opportunity, and
frustration. These grievances create a base of frustration that coup leaders can
readily exploit. The Soldiers and citizens data reveals optimism and a heightened
appetite for change among those who recently experienced a military coup —
as if willing for positive transformation to emerge from the turmoil.
Coup leaders have explicitly invoked the giants of Africa’s post-colonial history
in their rhetoric of revolution and transformation. In so doing, they have captured
the popular imagination. This appeal suggests a yearning for a better quality of
political leadership, which strives to meet civilians’ needs and aspirations.
The base of exploitable grievances mentioned above, linked to leaders’ failures
to deliver inclusive development, creates fertile ground for coups to be staged. It
is therefore critical to scale up development-oriented investment that will yield
results and boost citizens’ confidence in a better future.
2. States must deepen democracy

and reset their social contract
with citizens
For states across Africa to build coup resilience, deeper democracy, better
governance, and inclusive development progress should be a guiding star.
The quality of democracy and the prevalence of wider dysfunction in governance
systems have been brought to the forefront. For too long, some states in
the region have ruled behind a façade of democracy while deploying
innately exclusionary models of governance. Recent coups in Africa have
been more common in countries with a high number of previous coups, and
governments that are “neither democratic nor authoritarian, but [...] share some
characteristics of both”.9 Democracy is at an inflection point on the continent,
confronted by its own shortcomings and incompleteness.
A reset of the social contract is needed both to assist coup-affected states in

moving forward and to help prevent future coups. To achieve this, governments
should shift their focus to practical delivery that directly improves quality of life
and opportunity for all segments of society. The initial popularity of coup leaders
should serve as a rallying call for governments to do better in demonstrating
inclusive and principled governance.
The question of how the social contract is best renewed goes to the heart of the
governance agenda of today — in Africa, as elsewhere. It emphasizes the need for
processes such as national dialogue, which help people to hear and understand
each other, and new frameworks for managing differences collectively. The UN
Secretary-General’s recent Our Common Agenda report highlights key policy
22
areas for transforming lives and building trust. These include universal social
protection, health coverage, education, skills, decent work and housing, as well
as universal access to the Internet by 2030 as a basic human right. 10
Limited inclusivity could create a crisis of legitimacy of governments and

governance institutions. These include traditional institutions (which may shape
an individual’s choices more than the government itself), the private sector and
other economic actors, and social media influencers. Lived experience happens
at grassroots and localized levels, whether in cities or villages. This demands a
multi-level framing of the social contract that ties the local to the national,
regional and global.
Deepening democracy and rebuilding the social contract are long-term endeavours.
Key processes should be identified to signal to the population that inclusive
development has been made a priority of the state. This can include setting
up complaint mechanisms and clear service delivery standards with realistic
implementation roadmaps.
3. International and regional partners

should reaffirm their commitment
to constitutional norms, democratic
principles and human rights
Regional and international partners such as the AU, as well as regional economic
communities (RECs) like the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), have played a key role in projecting democratic and constitutional
order, responding to coups and helping to prevent further instances. Nonetheless,
critical questions have arisen regarding the implementation of norms and
incentives for AU member states to comply. Prevarication and inconsistency in
upholding continental norms risk undermining their relevance. Efforts by the
AU and RECs to uphold norms are, at times, hampered by insufficient political
will among member states, creating tensions between normative principle and
political interests. The very credibility of these institutions is at stake, should
their legitimacy be further eroded in the eyes of African citizens.
In turn, international partners must demonstrate solidarity by encouraging

a deepening of Africa’s democratic process, while resolving contradictions in
their engagement. In recent decades, investment in governance has
declined while security and other pillars of international cooperation
have been favoured. Security priorities have in effect, served to
undermine principle.
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Some of these at-risk contexts have seen international partners pursue security
and political objectives, with scant attention paid to the accountability of
government partners. In some scenarios, geopolitically driven interventions have
compounded the very factors that heighten coup risk. The recent coups and further
risks point to a moment of reckoning. A change of direction is needed.
A FR AMEWORK FOR POLICY AND PROGR AMMING ACTION
Regional and international actors face a momentous responsibility. Coups

represent a moment of disruptive change. This also brings opportunities that can be
harnessed to contribute to transformative and sustainable outcomes. Yet through
failing to do so, actors may instead help to enable a downward spiral — potentially
engendering long-term instability and persistent stagnation in a ‘coup trap’.
As international actors consider options and tools for responding to UCG events,
several gaps and challenges emerge. These include:
• Responses to UCG events have tended to be reactive rather than proactive,

even where political risk analysis may have anticipated coup vulnerability;
• Normative and development priorities have been subordinated to security

priorities, with deleterious effects — especially in the Sahel region;
• Regional and international actors have been inconsistent in calling out

constitutional manipulation, which risks undermining credibility;
• Clearer frameworks are needed to navigate between pragmatism and

principle in working with de facto authorities;
• Effective and strategic responses to UCG events require greater coordination

across sectors and actors;
• A gap in dedicated funding windows undermines the effectiveness of early

response; and
• There is a pressing need for more investment (both quantitatively and

qualitatively) to consolidate democratic governance in Africa over the
longer term.
The Soldiers and citizens research suggests a blend of both short- and long-term
priorities for coup prevention, risk mitigation and transitions where coups
have occurred.
From the findings, five sets of specific priorities emerge to shape a framework for
policy and programming action. In a time when competing global priorities are
draining resources and diverting attention away from the continent, regional
and international actors need to apply fresh focus and creativity — both in their
engagement with coup-affected countries, and to prevent further instances.
24
Additionally, new approaches are urgently needed to examine how international

partnership and intervention in Africa affect the checks and balances between
people and governments. Priorities are:
(i) Strengthening continental and regional response mechanisms

The Soldiers and citizens research highlights that leaders across Africa must
redouble efforts to ensure effective and consistent responses to contemporary
coup risk. This calls for improved governance to help reset the social contract
with citizens. The political will needed to uphold related norms and principles at
regional and continental levels must also be mutually incentivized.
Enhancing AU and REC norms and principles as they relate to UCG, as well as
constitutional manipulation to extend power, must be a priority. The ongoing
review of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, including
clauses related to presidential term limits, is encouraging. A similar review at the
continental level would be timely and should be supported.
The capacity of the AU and RECs to uphold norms in member states represents a
further challenge. This relates both to having in place relevant structures and
mechanisms, such as special envoys, as well as the resources needed to implement
such support.
Recent events underscore the necessity for the AU and ECOWAS to enhance their
capacities in preventive diplomacy through mechanisms such as the ECOWAS
Council of Elders and the AU Panel of the Wise. Effective coordination between
the AU and RECs is critical for advancing normative coherence. A further gap
in the overall AU architecture is the lack of specific frameworks for planning,
establishing, deploying and implementing the necessary support in the event
of a coup. The capacity of the AU and RECs to provide technical support for
constitutional review and amendment processes is also crucial.
(ii) Preventing further coups

The need for more proactive approaches to coup prevention is clear. Though
possibly pre-empted in political risk assessments, the recent coups caught many
off guard. Responses were stymied by delays and other challenges, while the risk of
multiple coups in the same state became evident. Yet the gains of preventing crises
and conflict, rather than reacting when they occur, have been recognized at the
highest levels of international policy and decision-making for decades. This was
also reasserted in the 2017 twin Sustaining Peace UN resolutions, and explored in
detail in the recent UN-World Bank Pathways to Peace report. 11
While the practice of prevention lags behind principle, several actions can
be identified to remedy this. Continental norms that prohibit UCG and
discourage constitutional manipulation should be projected in a more
consistent and robust manner. Complemented with sharper AU- and REC-
deployable capacities, as mentioned above, this is key for assisting a coup-
prevention agenda. Regional and international actors should engage proactively
with countries where presidents are nearing the end of their term limits to secure
public assurances that they will resign and allow for a peaceful transfer of power.
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Additional short- and medium-term priorities are:

• Boost early warning and response system (EWRS) capacity (monitoring and
analysis, as well as response). Well-developed global and regional EWRS
capacities are already in place, housed by different partners and institutions.
However, their efficacy has been questioned and barriers debated. Among
these, EWRS are typically designed to monitor and respond to a wider
categorization of violence than military coups alone, even though such
events feature in their analysis. It is urgent to include greater specificity
related to the drivers and triggers of coups, as well as appropriate responses.
• Support problem-solving dialogue processes between political and military

elites. To mount a coup, military factions require sufficient political
agency. In countries identified as at risk, early action to facilitate dialogue
between political and military factions may represent a fruitful direction
for diplomacy. These processes must produce jointly owned solutions
that diffuse and respond to substantive issues. Both sides should be held
accountable through a structured dialogue process.
• Prioritize programmatic investment in national infrastructures for peace.

Interim leaders in all the UCG focal countries attempted to engage diverse
stakeholders and voices in shaping transition processes. Yet over time, this
became more contested. Preventive action in at-risk countries should include
proactive efforts to support coalition building, inclusivity in the political
process, and wider societal capacity for conflict prevention and mediation.
(iii) More effective responses when coups occur

Regional and international partners, including development agencies and financial
institutions, play a critical role in shaping the trajectory of coups. Partners need
to support and sustain post-coup transition processes by investing in strategic
entry points that boost inclusivity and effectiveness. In this way, the foundations
for long-term renewal may be established. For example, UNDP’s approach in
recent coup-affected contexts has been to ‘stay and deliver’, and to prevent the
development agenda from being jeopardized. Prospects for positive transformation
can be optimized by aligning transition plans with inclusive and ongoing national
dialogue processes. Addressing grievances across stakeholder groups is vital.
Specific priorities are:
• Strategic coordination across sectors and partners. No mechanism currently

exists for converging diverse actors into a coordinated strategic response in
the event of a military coup, whether at country, regional or global level. Nor
is there an accepted protocol around the division of roles and responsibilities,
coordination across sectors, or the sequencing of political and development
levers. Clarity on these issues is required. It is partly in response to this
coordination gap that UNDP and the AUC Department of Political Affairs,
Peace and Security (AUC-PAPS) have jointly developed the new Africa
Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions. The facility aims to provide a
platform for coordination, as well as responses to other gaps and priorities
identified in this research.
26
• Continued assistance to vulnerable populations, with higher levels of

risk management and mitigation. It is a priority to identify mechanisms,
economic or otherwise, that can motivate political and military actors to
engage meaningfully with citizens, and to honour transition timeframes and
commitments. There is a risk, however, that ‘carrot and stick’ approaches
marked by sanctions and aid disruptions may be counterproductive where
populations are most vulnerable. Coup responses should include a sustained
commitment to reaching populations, even amid executive-level political
crises. This can prevent compounded vulnerability, isolation and grievances
that, in turn, may be readily exploited for political gain. Finding creative
operational modalities is a necessary corollary to this principle.
• Advocate for meaningfully inclusive transition processes. The only way to

achieve lasting transformative change, democratic renewal and a reset of the
social contract is to facilitate deep conversations exploring national issues,
sources of division and drivers of alienation. Transitional justice processes
are critical, and should work to resolve all alleged human rights violations.
Regional and international actors must sustain pressure on military juntas
and interim leadership to meaningfully and continuously engage a full
spectrum of representative groups. Performance milestones are critical to
track citizen inclusion in the transition, as well as related national dialogue
processes. All key groups should be included, such as youth, women, rural
communities, civil society and the private sector. This priority should be as,
if not more important, than the timing of an eventual election.
• Support transition processes towards restoring legitimate and inclusive

constitutional order. Regional and international actors should prioritize and
coordinate support to the key institutions processes aimed at advancing
transition milestones, complementing and providing oversight to the de facto
executive role. These may include the efforts of constitutional reform bodies;
transitional legislatures, oversight committees and their secretariats;
electoral management bodies; parliament; anti-corruption authorities;
human rights institutions and ombudspersons. Core government functions
and ministries — such as those responsible for critical policy areas like
justice, decentralization or reconciliation, and others charged with managing
the economy and restoring critical service delivery — also require focused
and targeted support.
(iv) Building long-term coup resilience by addressing structural and

institutional drivers
Addressing the structural and institutional factors that feed into grievances
and which, in turn, create readily triggered proximate factors, is a critical
pathway for longer-term coup prevention, or ‘coup-proofing’. Long-term
responses to the structural drivers of coup vulnerability should emphasize:
Deepening democratic governance

The recent coups have cast a spotlight on the incompleteness of democratic
transition in some parts of Africa against a backdrop of global erosion
— while paradoxically pointing to a new wave of democratic aspiration across
the continent. There is a clear need to make better sense of barriers to democratic
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consolidation, and to deepen the quality of democratic governance.

Specific priorities are:
• Elections in a broader democracy ecosystem. Closing the gap between

procedural and substantive democracy requires urgent and continuous
efforts. Elections are easily manipulated, and the power of elites becomes
entrenched when polls are rushed or held without functional accountability
systems. Soldiers and citizens research participants identified a range of
recommendations for improving the integrity and inclusiveness of the
electoral process, as detailed in other sections of this report.
• Support to developmental political leadership. The experiences of countries

on a path toward democratic transition highlight that developmental political
leadership is a significant source of resilience. Programming that fosters a new
generation of political leaders on the continent is important, as are initiatives
that encourage enhanced leadership from current heads of state in full respect
of existing democratic norms and civic rights.
• Adjust governance programming to invigorate accountability oversight.

International development partners should review and adapt interventions
designed to promote democratic governance, rule of law, security, justice and
human rights. While they should avoid overly state-centric conceptions of
state building, partners must project a readiness for robust discourse where
commitment to good governance may be in question. Supporting institutional
development, championing representative and accountable institutions, and
providing platforms for citizens to hold state actors accountable should be top
priorities. Local organizations need flexible, sustained and predictable access
to funding. These entities should be supported to identify their own priority
needs, encourage political participation and advocate for responsive and
inclusive services.
Civil-military relations: a strategic reset

It is imperative to recalibrate the civil-military relationship to respond to recent
coups, as well as contribute to long-term prevention. Wider efforts are needed
to deepen the effectiveness and accountability of security actors. Gains in the
security sector can significantly help to reinvigorate the social contract between
states and citizens. Specific priorities are:
• Civil-military reset through reform and dialogue. African states that have
invested in processes to reframe this relationship show greater resilience to
coups. Governments, with support from regional and international partners,
should identify and replicate such successes through peer-to-peer exchange.
Senior personnel leaving the military should have career pathways beyond
the security sphere, and reform processes must be expedited to separate
the influence of military actors from politics. Educating citizens about the
appropriate separation of duties in a democratic state is another priority.
At the same time, governments should address grievances within the military,
including matters of remuneration, equipment, living conditions, career
progression and opportunities for serving staff.
28
• Improved security-sector reform (SSR). In some contexts, security forces

have been complicit in abuses against citizens — further fuelling insecurity.
Ensuring that security forces observe human rights principles, best practices
in community engagement and anti-corruption measures in executing their
mandates is critical. Lessons from decades of SSR programming suggest that
countries confronted by coup risk require new approaches. There needs to be
a clear rationalization of the mandates and functions of different forces in
relation to each other, while budgeting and expenditures should be transparent.
Many interventions are overly focused on working with security forces, without
ensuring accountability for malfeasance. Communities, civil society and
the media must be supported to play a watchdog role regarding security force
conduct. Partners supporting SSR should be ready to challenge and consider
withholding support where reform stalls.
• Local-level, inclusive security-sector governance. Platforms that convene

communities alongside state security actors and local government actors are
essential. These platforms should enable participants to identify resources
and avenues for jointly owned security solutions, including ensuring forces’
accountability, while building a shared understanding of sources of insecurity.
Local-level, inclusive security-sector governance must be recognized as a key
programming area for enhancing resilience in at-risk countries.
Inclusive economic development and poverty reduction

Finally, in addressing structural drivers, it is vital to place greater emphasis
on strengthening and expanding inclusive development gains and progress
towards Agendas 2030 and 2063. Such gains must be felt across at-risk countries.
Considering the structural drivers of coup risk from a development perspective
has significant implications for policy, planning and programming. It suggests
that governments across the continent should take demonstrable steps to
build societies where citizens feel included in national development. Interna-
tional partners must double down on inclusive economic development, while
aligning global trade relations with positive development outcomes.
Specific priorities include:
• Reducing multidimensional post-pandemic poverty. The most recent

Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) also assesses deprivation related to
nutrition, cooking fuel, sanitation and housing across Africa. Large numbers
of people (250 million) across the continent face these and other burdens,
including a lack of water and electricity. 12 This aggregate regional perspective
masks specific ‘deprivation bundles’ at national and sub-national levels. For
states to progress towards the goals of Agendas 2063 and 2030, targeted and
integrated policies are needed to simultaneously address multiple challenges.
Heeding this call across the continent will reduce vulnerability and build
resilience to coup risk.
• Building inclusive economies and improving economic governance.

Governments across Africa should pursue a deliberately inclusive growth
trajectory. Continued efforts in economic diversification are also implied by the
research findings. The governance and management of extractives and other
natural resources should be strengthened to occur in an effective, transparent,
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and accountable manner, including by the private sector and civilian oversight
modalities. A stronger social contract can be achieved by enhancing domestic
resource mobilization and taxation regimes, and anti-corruption measures
should be integrated across all sectors. Accelerated support for Africa’s
domestic private sector can boost structural transformation. This would drive
productivity and competitivity, allowing the sector to better serve and provide
for its expanding markets. Creating new and sustainable job opportunities is
another priority pathway. It is critical to focus on the informal sector, which
provides livelihoods and opportunities for many low-income populations
(especially youth and women). 13 Africa’s growth must boost local employment
opportunities and benefit a majority, enabling sustained wealth creation.
Investing in domestic value-addition manufacturing, upgrading infrastructure,
providing access to markets and creating enabling environments for
entrepreneurs and small businesses are all steps to be taken with greater
purpose. Such investment should occur at both the national and local level.
• Tackling external constraints. While the onus is on African states to orchestrate

inclusive economic development, relationships with regional and international
partners can both help and hinder. Global, regional and national inequalities are
exacerbated by asymmetrical and constrained trade relations, which hamper
the distribution of economic opportunities. At the regional and international
level, much needs to be done to intensify progress under the Africa Continental
Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement. The goal must be to expand regional
economic opportunities for citizens and new labour-market entrants. Further
afield, trade relationships between Africa, Europe and other parts of the world
should be reframed to optimize development prospects.
(v) Reorienting international engagement in the Sahel

Although the findings and recommendations of this study are relevant in contexts
across the continent, the concentration of recent coups in the Sahel subregion has
direct implications for regional and international engagement.
During the past decade, the Sahel has experienced increasing insecurity and
turmoil. The recent coups are an expression of that turmoil — and a forewarning
of what may yet follow.
Security deployment and assistance has been extensive and complex, often
occurring at the expense of attention to root causes. In this way, various
international actors have contributed, albeit unwittingly, to deepening fragility.
The Sahel may be one of the most analysed and strategized subregions of Africa.
Due to its geopolitical importance, its mineral wealth and ongoing struggles against
violent extremism, the region features prominently on international agendas.
However, in a context of shifting geopolitical brinkmanship, attention to the region
should urgently be renewed and refocused.
Such a recalibration demands a new development response focused on governance

priorities and a reset of the social contract between the states and citizens of the
subregion. Limited access to justice and basic public services are key drivers of
insecurity, and provide opportunities for violent extremist groups to co-opt local
populations. Building inclusive local governance should become a cornerstone of
30
fresh efforts that extend beyond securitized approaches, and both recognize and
draw on informal and local governance mechanisms and sources of resilience.
Tackling corruption at all levels of government is essential if investment in

state service provision is to succeed. This includes the need for malpractices to
be called out more vociferously. It is also crucial to monitor the human rights
conduct of security actors. Early results of the ongoing stabilization activities
by UNDP and partners in the Lake Chad Basin region — which contribute to the
peace-development nexus — provide inspiration. Forging new narratives about
the Sahel, which emphasize positive opportunities for growth and prosperity
for its peoples, can also contribute to new pathways.
2023
KHARTOUM, SUDAN
30 OCTOBER 2021
T H O U S A N D S P R O T E S T M I L I TA R Y
TA K E O V E R I N S U D A N
Sudanese people
stage a demonstration
demanding the
end of the military
intervention and
the transfer of
administration to
civilians in Khartoum.
PHOTO BY MAHMOUD HJAJ

/A N A D O L U A G E N C Y
VIA GETT Y IMAGES
I IN T RODUC T I ON
Between 2020 and 2022,

Africa experienced six
military coups and three
coup attempts.
2023
33
INTRODUC TION
Between 2020 and 2022, Africa experienced six ‘successful’ military

coups (of which two were ‘coups within coups’) and three attempted
coups.14 This represents a sharp rise in coup incidence over the
previous 20-year period, as illustrated in Figure 1.15 The AU denounced
these developments in a series of high-level political statements and
communiqués, signalling renewed effort towards tackling the resurgence
of what it terms ‘unconstitutional changes of government’ (UCG) on the
continent.16 Similarly, UN Secretary-General António Guterres urged
the Security Council to act in response to an “epidemic of coups d’états”
unfolding on the world stage.17
FIGURE 1
T O TA L N U M B E R O F S U C C E S S F U L M I L I TA R Y C O U P S P E R Y E A R
Number of coups per year
1952 1962 1972 1982 1992 2002 2012 2022
Source: Based on Souaré, I. (2022a). ‘Are coups back in Africa?’, dataset, updated as of October 2022.18
Source: Based on Souare, I.S. (2022a). ‘Are coups back in Africa?’, dataset, updated as of October 2022.21
Number of coups per year
6
Total number of years, over a Average
5
military coups 70-year period, number of
in 70 years with no successful
4
(1952-2022) successful coups coups per year
1
34
A rise in ‘constitutional coups’ has also been observed, in which leaders attempt
to revise constitutions to allow for third-, fourth- and even fifth-term mandates. 19
This practice has intensified since 2014. 20 Figure 2 shows the geographic spread of
constitutional manipulation (across different types and approaches to it); countries
that have no term-limit provision (and those that have never had one); and those
which had term limits in place at the end of 2022. 21
FIGURE 2
T E R M - L I M I T S TAT U S A C R O S S A F R I C A , B Y C O U N T R Y
 No term limits
 Successful or
effective attempt
at constitutional
revisionism
TUNISIA**  Term limits in place

2002/2014 and observed to date
MOROCCO
* Failed attempt at
constitutional
revisionism
ALGERIA**
20O8/2016
LIBYA EGYPT ** Term limit removed
WESTERN 2019
SAHARA*** and reintroduced
MAURITANIA
MALI NIGER**
2009/2010 CHAD** SUDAN
CABO 2005/2018 ERITREA
SENEGAL 2016
VERDE
THE GAMBIA
DJIBOUTI 2010
GUINEA-BISSAU
GUINEA** 2001-2010, 2020 NIGERIA*
SOMALIA
2007
SIERRA LEONE SOUTH ETHIOPIA
CENTRAL AFRICAN SUDAN
LIBERIA REPUBLIC
CAMEROON
2008
CÔTE D’IVOIRE 2016
EQUATORIAL UGANDA
BURKINA FASO*, ** 1997/2000, 2014 GUINEA 2005/2017
KENYA
GHANA DEMOCRATIC
SAO TOME
TOGO** 2002/2019 & PRINCIPE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA 2015
BENIN THE CONGO
GABON 2003 BURUNDI 2015
CONGO SEYCHELLES
2015 TANZANIA
COMOROS
ANGOLA
MALAWI
ZAMBIA
MOZAMBIQUE
ZIMBABWE
MADAGASCAR
NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA MAURITIUS
ESWATINI
SOUTH LESOTHO
AFRICA
Source: Presidential term-limit provisions in African constitutions (Souaré, I. [2022a])

The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion
whatsoever on the part of the UNDP concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities
or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used
on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of
Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.
*** Western Sahara is a Non-Self-Governing Territory
2023
35
Military coups and rule featured prominently in much of Africa’s post-colonial

history, but from 1990, a wave of democratization yielded progress in favour of
constitutional order. Every African country now has a constitution — whether active
or suspended in cases of military coups and transitions. Democratic governments
have been established in many countries. The AU considers democratic governance
as a continent-wide norm through instruments such as the African Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Governance. A track record of peaceful alternance of
political power through electoral process has been well established and appears
to intensify slowly but surely. From 1990–2010, 16 percent of all general elections
in sub-Saharan Africa resulted in an opposition victory. 22 From 2011–2022, this
proportion had climbed to 28 percent.
Against this backdrop of democratic momentum, the sudden uptick in military

coups since 2020 conjures the spectre of democratic backsliding, earlier chapters
of turbulence, a disregard for constitutional order, and a close re-involvement of
the military in political life. Viewed alongside constitutional manipulation
(which can pave the way for military coups), the resilience of democracy
in Africa is clearly being stress-tested. 23
Popular support for new leaders assuming power through military coups has
featured prominently as these contemporary coups have unfolded, seemingly
constituting a further blow against democracy. Yet this support has been transient.
As this report shows, people have taken to the streets to cheer for change in a context
of deeply felt, expanding and yet frustrated democratic yearning. Where confidence
in existing governments has been eroded, this has expressed itself — in the short
term, in some settings — as support for military rule.
Paradoxically, interim popular support for military coups can be understood as

symptomatic of a new wave of democratic aspiration that is expanding across the
continent. However, if left unchecked, counter-vailing trends may compromise
democratic consolidation and fuel further political turbulence. 24 The recent UCG
events highlight the importance of improving the quality of democracy experienced
by citizens, and its delivery against inclusive development priorities.
Coups, almost by definition, undermine constitutional rule, entrench bad

governance and create conditions that undermine civic freedom — including by
encouraging future coups. 25 When power is seized through military means, it
represents a moment of profound risk. The future trajectory of each affected
country is jeopardized, with potential for spill-over effects to immediate neighbours.
Overall progress towards peace and democratic governance is also threatened.
Political risk analyses may have anticipated aspects of the coup events that
unfolded between 2020 and 2022. Yet regional and international observers were
seemingly unprepared to respond proactively and swiftly. This highlights a need
to incentivize political will to act and to scale up prevention.
Dangerous and fraught as they may be, military coups and their aftermath also
present opportunities to harness current turbulence for positive longer-term change.
36 CHAD,
E L E C T I O N C A M PA I G N
CHAD’S CITIZENS WERE SET TO

GO TO THE POLLS FOR THE FIRST
ROUND OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION ON 11 APRIL 2021
A member of the
Presidential Guard
keeps watch during
an election campaign
rally for Chadian
President Idriss Déby
Itno in N’Djamena on
9 April ahead of the
presidential election.
PHOTO BY MARCO LONGARI

/A F P V I A G E T T Y I M A G E S
37
Tapping into popular grievances and understanding structural drivers can yield
inclusive and potentially transformational transition agendas and outcomes.
This report is part of UNDP’s response to the recent UCG events and is one of several
major studies on contemporary features of the development landscape in Africa. 26
It applies a forward-looking approach both to preventing further coups from
occurring, and to harnessing opportunities for transformative change where
crises have unfolded.
The analysis is based on the findings of a perceptions survey that gathered insights
from approximately 5,000 citizens who had recently lived through military coups
or equivalent UCG events. Their inputs are contrasted with the perspectives of a
further 3,000 citizens whose countries are on a path to democratic transition
or consolidation.
The methodology used in Soldiers and citizens is presented in further detail after
this introduction. Section 1 of the report reflects on the multiplicity of factors
that may have contributed to recent coup incidence, informed by secondary data
and literature sources. Sections 2 and 3 present the findings from the Soldiers and
citizens perceptions survey and related qualitative research.
Section 2 unpacks the study’s development lens on the structural and proximate
factors shaping military coups through the prism of citizens’ perspectives. The
four chapters in this section respectively focus on socio-economic factors and
overall development consequences; governance shortfalls; security and safety;
and perspectives on inclusion.
Section 3 considers the aftermath of military coups, providing a people-centred

assessment of responses by regional and international actors. Finally, Section 4
draws together the findings to present key messages and a framework for policy
and programming action. The report’s recommendations are intended to support
the efforts of regional and international actors seeking to constructively prevent
and respond to military coups as a form of UCG, and the related threat to
democratic governance and peace across Africa.
II METHODOLOGY
The Soldiers and citizens

study set out to answer
the following research
questions:
• What are the development drivers of military coups,
as a form of UCG, in Africa?
• What explains the apparent popular support for such

coups ‘in the moment’ — including in contexts where
democratically elected leaders were ousted?
• What policy and programming options should regional

and international actors consider to effectively prevent
military coups?
• What can these actors do to restore and sustain

constitutional order, reset the social contract and
achieve more inclusive democratic governance in
UCG-affected countries?
Given the complexity of the issues and dynamics at play, the

research team established a set of conceptual anchor points
to guide the process. These, in turn, informed the development
of research methods and approaches. Key elements of the
methodology are presented in the following pages.
39
ME THODOLOGY
CONCEP TUAL ANCHOR POINTS
The study adopted three conceptual anchor points that are closely aligned with
UNDP’s mandate and working approach, including its partnerships with regional
organizations. These are:
1. The evolution and implementation of AU norms on UCG;
2. An explicit development lens on military coups as a form of UCG; and
3. Envisaging more inclusive political processes in the quest for sustaining

constitutional order on the continent.
1. The evolution and implementation of AU norms on UCG
Over the past two decades, one of the most notable developments in African
governance and diplomacy has been the emergence of the AU and some of the
regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms (RMs) as
impactful players in the political transition processes of some member states.
Recent experiences in countries such as Burkina Faso, Central African Republic,
The Gambia, Lesotho, Mali and South Sudan have highlighted the potential
influence of the AU and organizations such as the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
(IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 27
This study is situated within the evolving AU normative frameworks on UCG.

These began to take shape in the 1990s (under the direction of the then-
Organization of African Unity), alongside a commitment to elections as forming
the only legitimate basis for assuming and retaining government power.
Norms against UCG are enshrined in various legal instruments. These include
the 2000 Lomé Declaration; the AU Constitutive Act; the African Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Governance (the African Charter); as well as various
declarations and decisions of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). 28
Some RECs/RMs have developed regional instruments that mirror these

continental norms. The intention to inhibit and prevent UCG is strongly rooted
in evolving interpretations of threats to global peace and security within
international law. It further aligns with the post-Cold War normative interest of
international law and international organizations in the defence of constitutional
order and the promotion of democratic governance. 29
As articulated in AU instruments, UCG can take different forms (see Box 1).
The first of this type of UCG is presently the most prominent of the four, and
is the primary focus of this report.
40
BOX 1
K E Y A U L E G A L I N S T R U M E N T S P E R TA I N I N G T O U C G
The Lomé Declaration of 2000 establishes a framework for an AU response to UCG on the continent.
It defines UCG events as:
i Military coups;
ii Intervention by mercenaries;
iii Removal of democratic governments by armed rebels; and
iv Refusal of a losing incumbent to relinquish power to the winning opposition candidate.
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance further introduced AU sanctions when UCG were
observed, based on the Lomé definitions, as well as further specifications defining UCG to include an amendment
or revision of the constitution that infringes on the principles of democratic change of government.
The Accra Declaration on UCG of March 2022 stressed the need for AU/REC synergies in addressing UCG, and the
full implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture, the African Governance Architecture as well
as the African Peer Review Mechanism. It further noted, with concern, increasing eliminations and modifications
of constitutional term limits as manipulations of democratic processes in AU member states.
The Malabo Declaration of May 2022 further endorsed the Accra Declaration. It re-asserted the importance of
enhanced effectiveness and sustainability in AU support to member states in responses to UCG.
Analysts have identified several gaps in this policy architecture — including

a need for clearer provision in response to attempts to extend power through
constitutional amendment.30 The March 2022 Accra Declaration reiterated a
continent-level commitment to these principles, along with the AU’s intention
to take further actions to strengthen responses at all levels.31
Urgent questions regarding both the implementation of these norms, and

incentives of AU member states to adhere to them, require continued attention.32
The normative framework on UCG is thus both still evolving, and in need of
renewed commitment. Yet it remains a pertinent, useful and opportune frame
through which to view recent developments and shape response strategies,
while further strengthening regional leadership and influence. UNDP’s own deep
partnership with the AU Commission and its various specialized agencies has
been a further inspiration.
2. An explicit development lens on coups as a form of UCG
Experience suggests that military coups negatively impact development

progress.33 Abrupt changes in government impede regular policy and programme
implementation and stall much-needed investment. Diverse stakeholders,
including development actors, need to identify options and pathways to mitigate
the profound risks associated with military coups as a form of UCG. Opportunities
for positive transformation must be sought and harnessed. UNDP has produced this
report to respond to this need. This reflects its mandate as the lead development
2023
41
actor in the UN system, engaging at multiple levels in supporting African states

and citizens, as well as the AU and regional organizations, to work towards Agenda
2030 (in this, its final ‘Decade of Action’) and Agenda 2063.
The study’s starting point posits that a development lens can help yield effective
responses to prevent military coups, while complementing political perspectives
and instruments to protect and advance development gains. This approach
highlights how different aspects of a country’s development context
may influence the occurrence of military coups. It also sheds light on the
development consequences that are likely to accrue when coups take place.
These may well be destructive, but the development lens also looks to identify
opportunities for securing positive outcomes towards future progress.
This lens derives from Agenda 2030, which, in Sustainable Development Goal 16,
emphasizes the centrality of achieving peaceful, just and inclusive societies for
delivering and safe-guarding development outcomes across all other areas. Agenda
2063 articulates related priorities in its Aspiration 3 (envisaging an Africa where
good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law
thrive), and Aspiration 4 (envisaging a peaceful and secure Africa). In the Our
Common Agenda initiative, the UN Secretary-General places renewed emphasis
on building fresh social contracts to deepen trust and accountability.34 This study
reaffirms the critical and timely importance of governance-focused dimensions of
international development.
Development perspectives also draw attention to citizens’ lived experience of

national political events (across different demographic, gender and identity vectors),
in ways that political analysis may overlook. The respective and differentiated
views of women and youth are key. It is well recognized that these groups are central
to development progress, as reflected in Agenda 2063. The people-centred dimension
is closely aligned to the UN human security approach and commitment to ‘leave no
one behind’, and represents a unique contribution to the discourse. It is embedded
into the report’s methodology, as discussed below.
3. Envisaging inclusive political transitions
UNDP produced this report as part of its Supporting Inclusive Transitions in

Africa project, reflecting the organization’s commitment to fostering platforms of
development that engage the widest range of stakeholders.35 In addition, the report
considers the quality and depth of inclusion during the complex political transitions
signalled by military coups and during the electoral process.
The research has sought to understand to what extent people feel heard; whether
a new social contract can be created after a military coup; and whether elections
succeed in renewing citizens’ confidence in the state. The study thus pays close
attention to the inclusiveness of political processes. This dimension is presented
as a key factor whereby a perilous moment of UCG might be pivoted towards
transformative, longer-term outcomes.
42
The trajectory linking inclusive processes to inclusive outcomes is non-linear and

complex. Yet states and societies that are more open and inclusive display greater
prosperity, effectiveness and resilience in the long term.36 A substantial body of
research demonstrates how the exclusion of marginalized and minority groups
from political decision-making, whether quantified or informally perceived,
constitutes a key factor in conflict and instability — while also affecting prospects
for democratic consolidation.37
Experience in peacemaking highlights the importance of inclusive national

dialogue processes for establishing trust and establishing a shared sense of a
future, supported and sustained by national infrastructures for peace. These
lessons are pertinent in considering post-coup transition processes and priorities.
Women and young people’s contributions are key to sustainable peace, for
instance. As a result, critical policy norms and processes have been generated
around women, peace and security; as well as youth, peace and security.
In order for democracy to work, all citizens must have access to participation and
representation in institutions and processes — from election management and
constitutional bodies to political parties and parliaments. The concept of political
inclusion signifies that every citizen should have an equal right and opportunity
to engage with, and contribute to, the functioning of these institutions and
processes.38 Levels of inclusiveness and representativeness are critical indicators
of the overall legitimacy of a given political process, including transitions,
whether resulting from elections or following UCG events.
RESE ARCH TOOL S
The research process was shaped by the conceptual anchor points mentioned
above. The study combined both qualitative and quantitative methods, which
are described in further detail below. The methods were designed to triangulate
findings across the sources of data, recognizing the complexity of the issues
at hand.
Country case selection

The overall methodological approach has been to gather evidence and data for
two contrasting types of recent political transitions in Africa. This is based on a
working hypothesis that comparative analysis would yield insights. Specifically,
the study contrasts UCG-category countries, which have recently experienced a
military coup or equivalent event, with democratic transitioning states (DTS),
which appear to be on a path of democratic consolidation or transition.
These two categories do not represent a comprehensive typology of

contemporary political transitions in Africa. However, they reflect
the polarity between two prominent trends: either towards deepened
democracy on the continent, as seen since the 1990s — or, seemingly,
towards its disruption.
2023
43
The study’s UCG focal countries are Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan,
while the DTS countries are The Gambia, Ghana and Tanzania. The emphasis
of the analysis is on the first group of five countries that recently experienced a
military coup (noting Chad’s case is particular in this frame).39 The states in the
second list have either experienced a substantial period of democratic transition
(Ghana and Tanzania — the latter also being the only country included with no
history of military coups), or they have, if only recently, embarked on a path towards
democratic transition (The Gambia).
In addition to generating comparative lessons and insights, the inclusion of DTS

countries revealed potential limitations of government performance against
citizens’ expectations, even in apparently functioning democracies.
BOX 2
AT T E M P T E D C O U P I N T H E G A M B I A
In December 2022, as the drafting of this report was in its final stages, an attempted military coup was announced
in The Gambia. Four soldiers reportedly attempted to overthrow the government of President Adama Barrow,
but were soon arrested. The attempt was condemned by a cross-section of national actors, including the main
opposition United Democratic Party, the National Human Rights Commission and citizens, who in news reports,
called for a more robust democratic system.40 Both ECOWAS and the AU issued statements condemning the coup
plot, rejecting all UCG in member states, and congratulating national security services for foiling the attempt.
The events underscore the challenges faced by states undergoing democratic transition, and the ever-present
potential for reversals. Mali, for instance, had been heralded as a democratic success story for many years,
experiencing three successful elections. This included a peaceful leadership turnover prior to its March 2012
coup and subsequent events.
For the purposes of this study, The Gambia has been retained as an example of a country on a path towards
democratic transition, given that the coup attempt was successfully repelled.
Quantitative research instruments

The study captures the perspectives of approximately 8,000 African citizens from
eight focal countries, comparing and contrasting experiences across their locations.
The report places these perspectives at its centre — ‘listening’ to them, while
triangulating findings against other data and literature. To allow for a sufficient
sample size, 1,000 survey responses were collected in each of the countries, using
computer assisted telephone interviewing (CATI).41 This generated a set of 5,000
respondents from UCG-category countries, and 3,000 from DTS-category countries.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 present a demographic profile of this vast sample. Participants

from both settings reflected an even representation of women and men (women
comprised 51 percent of respondents in UCG countries, and 50 percent from DTS
settings), and the average age of respondents was 35. Respondents were mostly
located in urban settings (70 percent UCG, and 58 percent in DTS countries), and
across both contexts, just over half of the interviewees were employed.
44
FIGURE 3
 UCG
GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD OF SURVEY
RESPONDENTS, BY COUNTRY*
 DTS
MALI
CHAD SUDAN
THE GAMBIA
GUINEA
GHANA
BURKINA
FASO
TANZANIA
G EO G RA PHIC SPREAD
5 UCG COUNTRIES
3 DTS COUNTRIES
FIGURE 4
 UCG
SURVEY RESPONDENTS’ PROFILES, BY GENDER, AGE, INCOME AND AREA (URBAN VS. RURAL)
 DTS
A RE A B RE A K D OWN GEN DER BR E A KD OW N I NCOM E BR E A KD OW N
RURAL 29% URBAN 70% 17%

Upper income
16%
RURAL 41% URBAN 58%
51% 49% 50% 50%
40%
Middle income
AGE BREAKD OWN 38%
39%
50% 49%
Lower income
Average 42%
35
29% 31% age
21% 20%
4%
Don’t know
4%
15-24 25-39 40+
years old years old years old
Percentages might not add up to a 100% in some charts, as they are rounded to the nearest percentage
* The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the UNDP
concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary
between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.
2023
45
FIGURE 5
 UCG
SURVEY RESPONDENTS’ PROFILES,
B Y E D U C AT I O N A N D E M P L O Y M E N T
 DTS
E D U CAT I ON BR E A KD OW N
Informal schooling only 9%

(including Koranic schooling) 7%
18%
No formal schooling
11%
18%
Primary school completed
24%
26%
Secondary school completed 33%
Post-secondary qualifications 8%
other than university
(polytechnic or college) 11%
18%
University completed
12%
3%
Post-graduate
1%
EMP LOY M E NT BR E A KD OW N
EMPLOYED UNEMPLOYED EMPLOYED UNEMPLOYED
56% 31% 62% 27%

RETIRED
RETIRED
STUDENT 2% STUDENT
2%
10% 8%
1%
DON’T KNOW
Note: The employment category includes all respondents who indicated that they were working, whereas the unemployment category includes all non-working
respondents. The student category includes both pupils and students. For descriptive analysis, the education category is averaged to those with no formal
education and those with formal education, where each category carries equal weight. The income category is based on the basic needs question.
The upper income category refers to the “I make enough money to buy basics and save the surplus”. The middle income category refers to “I make enough
money only to buy basics”, and the low income category refers to “I do not make enough money to buy basics”.
46
The respondents from the eight focal countries were asked to think back to
the time of the last national-level political event (whether UCG or election),
and answer questions related to their experiences and perspectives, as well
as supplementary questions related to their attitudes to different forms of
government and government performance. Respondents were also asked
how they viewed the future based on their assessment of, and confidence in,
government performance and the overall direction of travel. The questionnaire
instrument is included in Annex 1.
The specific political events discussed in the UCG-category countries were:

• Burkina Faso: Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba becoming president through
a military coup in February 2022;
• Chad: Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno (also known as Mahamat Kaka) became
acting president when appointed by the Transitional Military Council in
April 2021, following the death of his predecessor (and father) Idriss Déby;
• Guinea: Mamady Doumbouya became the transitional head of state through

a military coup in September 2021;
• Mali: Assimi Goïta became the transitional head of state through a military
coup in May 2021; and
• Sudan: Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman al-Burhan, chairman of the Transitional

Sovereignty Council, removed the civilian prime minister — effectively
becoming the transitional head of state of Sudan in October 2021.
The specific electoral events discussed with the respondents from DTS-category
countries were:
• The Gambia: the re-election of Adama Barrow as president in
December 2021;
• Ghana: the re-election of Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo as

president in December 2020; and
• Tanzania: Samia Suluhu Hassan becoming president in

March 2021, following the death of her predecessor.
Descriptive analysis of findings from the survey forms the basis of the primary
data shared in this report. In addition, a second analysis of the dataset was
conducted using multinominal logistic regression and statistical modelling
to further test emerging findings.42 Findings are summarized throughout the
report, with a fuller description available as a background paper arising from
this project.43
Lastly, a brief exercise probing the economic costs of previous coups in

Guinea and Mali was also undertaken, using the synthetic control method
(SCM) — introduced in Chapter 2.1.
2023
47
Qualitative research instruments

The primary Soldiers and citizens dataset was supplemented by a range of
qualitative research activities. Focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant
interviews (KII) were conducted in two UCG-category focal countries (Burkina
Faso, June 2022, and Sudan, February 2023), and one DTS-category country
(Ghana, June 2022). The FGDs took place with four different groups in each
country, of which one was limited to women only and one youth.
The discussions took place in different locations within each country to explore
the varied views and experiences of the sample population: Manga, Ouagadougou,
Koudougou (Burkina Faso), Accra, Tamale and Kasoa (Ghana), and Khartoum
and Nyala (Sudan). The discussions revolved around living conditions, the
current government, the last change of government, the role of regional and
international actors, and the inclusivity of political transitions. Twelve key
informant interviews were also conducted in the same countries to further explore
the issues raised, through the perspectives of community leaders, CSOs, women’s
organizations and religious leaders. In total, 132 people participated in the
qualitative research activities.
Broader case studies and literature reviews were commissioned for each of the
eight focal countries. These aimed to assess historical contexts and developments
leading up to, and informing, the political events in question, as framed by the key
research questions. A review was also undertaken of selected academic literature
on democratization in Africa, military coups and political transition more broadly.
The analysis was further informed by position papers that were commissioned
on the role of the AU and RECs in relation to political transition, the role of the
international development system responding to UCG, and a deep dive into the
Sahel’s specific experiences in recent years.44
The study also draws on the expertise of UNDP, with country offices providing
significant support in the data-collection phase within each of the selected
countries, and wider staff expertise engaged throughout the process. The research
team collaborated closely with a range of other institutions, including the AU,
RECs/RMs, the African Development Bank (AfDB), African academic institutions,
think tanks and civil society organizations. Multiple consultations across these
and other stakeholders, and through a continual peer review process, generated a
further essential dimension of the project.
METHODOLOGICAL CAVE ATS
Every research project has limitations, and this study is no exception.

Key caveats to its methodology are:
Country case selection

Of the 55 member states of the AU, several countries would have made excellent
alternative focal cases, particularly in the DTS category.45 There are also
conceptual challenges in defining and categorizing ‘democratic transition’,
48
as events unfolding in The Gambia during the finalization of this report also
underscore.46 The countries included are indicative rather than comprehensive,
illustrating examples of UCG and DTS experiences. The research has intended to
look for patterns and correlations, rather than to generalize the eight countries’
experiences. Its geographic spread was kept as broad as possible to allow
for continent-level relevance (yet noting that military coup occurrence has
concentrated in West Africa). All the focal countries were selected based on their
relevance to the study, and the availability of both primary and secondary data.
CATI perceptions survey data

The survey was based on the non-random sampling of approximately 1,000 citizens
in each focal country, designed to provide reasonably representative data for
each population through using a quota approach for key demographic variables.
Telephone interviews, as with all forms of survey research, are subject to design
and method limitations. This includes coverage bias, the exclusion of individuals
without telephone access, and differential response rates. Asking people to
recall how they felt about an event that has passed raises issues of reliability
in memory. The data presented here should be interpreted within the context of
these limitations. Further, data disaggregation by age, gender, geography, level of
education and income yielded limited differences when analysing results, with
the exception of the age and gender categories. These are discussed in relevant
sections of the report.
Open-source data
The report also makes use of open-source data to inform its comparison between
country categories. Indices data can be collected over varying timeframes,
and caution should therefore be taken when making comparisons to a specific
timeframe. The indices shown in this study have used the latest available data,
primarily as of April 2023.
Focus group discussions and key informant interviews

These are qualitative in nature and useful in explaining why people hold certain
attitudes — giving people more opportunity to share their attitudes and experience
in their own words. Findings cannot be generalized.
2023
B A M A KO , M A L I
14 JANUARY 2022
A D E M O N S T R AT O R H O L D S H I S
HAND TO SHOW THE NUMBER
FIVE, DEMANDING FIVE MORE
YEARS FOR THE CURRENT
G O V E R N M E N T, D U R I N G A M A S S
PROTEST AGAINST SANCTIONS
IMPOSED ON MALI AND THE
J U N TA B Y E C O W A S .
Malians took to the

streets after the
military junta called
for protests against
stringent sanctions
imposed by ECOWAS
over delayed elections.
PHOTO BY FLORENT VERGNES

“ We are tired of coups.
People have suffered, lost
dear ones, were humiliated,
impoverished and even killed.
This is the only country we have
and this is why we have become
so tolerant. We don’t want coups
and we have experienced
military coups and rule […]
we don’t want it.”
FEM A LE FOCUS GROUP DIS CUS SA NT, ACCR A , GH A N A (JUNE 202 2)
01 SECTION 1
Africa’s
resurgence of
military coups
in context
This preliminary section of the Soldiers and citizens
report precedes the presentation of its primary data
in Sections 2 and 3. In addition to secondary data
— in particular global development indices — it draws
insights from the broader research literature on
democratization in Africa, military coups and political
transition. It sketches a broad contextual and conceptual
canvas for probing the resurgence of military coups
in Africa, and to better interpret the citizens’ views
gathered through the perceptions survey.
53
A FRICA’S RE SURGENCE OF MIL ITA RY C OUP S IN C ONTE X T
Approaches to the analysis of violent conflict have long found it helpful to

differen-tiate between types of causes that contribute to the grievances and
interests that fuel conflict, and the dynamics that may unfold — while at the same
time recognizing that interlinkages exist among these. A common categorization is:
• Structural and institutional (or root) drivers: pervasive factors

that have become built into the policies, structures and fabric of a
society, and which may create the pre-conditions for violent conflict;
• Proximate (or intermediate) factors: these factors contribute to a

climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation, and
are sometimes symptomatic of a deeper problem; and
• Triggers: key one-off acts or events, or their anticipation, that can set
off or escalate violent conflict.47
The schema is sometimes illustrated using an iceberg metaphor, whereby

structural drivers are submerged, proximate factors emerge into view above
the surface, and trigger events form the tip (Figure 6).48 This frame is useful for
plotting the plethora of dynamics at play in relation to recent military coups
in Africa.
FIGURE 6
S T R U C T U R A L , P R O X I M AT E A N D T R I G G E R FA C T O R S
C O N T R I B U T I N G T O C O N T E M P O R A R Y M I L I TA R Y C O U P S I N A F R I C A
TRIGGERS
In some cases, these are clearly identifiable

— such as the death of former Chadian president or
security attacks in Burkina Faso — or shrouded in
the opacity of behind-the-scenes political dynamics
P R O X I M AT E FA C T O R S
These include the past decade of insecurity

and securitization in the Sahel; mounting
popular grievances against governments on
corruption,constitutional manipulation and responses
to a global context of economic downturn; and the
incompleteness of Africa’s democratization
STRUCTURAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL
Such factors include a history of military

involvement in politics; state fragility and
questions of legitimacy; and exclusionary
patterns of economic growth
54
Using this frame, the remainder of this section reflects on key features of the
continental context within which the recent coups took place. In so doing, it
attempts to offer a synthesis perspective, while recognizing that each of the five
countries under review faced unique dynamics and experiences.
BOX 3
COMPLEXITY OF COUP OCCURRENCE
Africa’s recent military coups have unfolded in a Approaches that emphasize multiplicity in the causes
contemporary age of interdependence and complexity. and effects shaping political transition trajectories also
The current global fusion of the geopolitical, feature prominently. Blended approaches resonate in
economic, digital, environmental and socio-cultural considering recent events in Africa. For example, one
spheres means that political transitions of all types study, based on historical analysis from 1970–2019,
take place in an increasingly dynamic landscape, contends that three factors are central in assessing the
including coups as a form of UCG.49 This underscores likelihood of military coups in developing democracies.54
the futility of reductive, single-factor or linear It finds they are more likely to occur when the ruling
explanations, or overly simplistic solutions. administration is increasingly viewed by the public as
being corrupt; when it is unpopular with large portions
The academic literature on political transitions of society and key factions within the state; and when
of various types (including military coups and segments of the military perceive their position within
democratization) can be understood as belonging to the state as being threatened by the current regime.
three camps — proposing explanations that are not A useful review of the recent military coups in Africa
necessarily mutually exclusive. These respectively concludes: “… coups are more likely to happen in
emphasize structural factors, the role of institutions countries with high levels of previous coups, low levels
and individual agency.50 of economic development and anocratic regime types
— that is, governments that are neither democratic nor
Structural and institutional enquiry pays attention authoritarian, but that share some characteristics
to the potential correlation between regime types of both”.55
(the nature of pre-existing regimes shaping future
regimes, institutional legacies and state capacity). The explanatory factors highlighted in these studies are
This category highlights the salience of economic echoed in the Soldiers and citizens findings. However,
factors, in particular economic wealth and social even here, when focusing on the combination of features
class (including the emergence of a middle class); and according to the structural, institutional and individual
other ‘pre-conditions’ of democracy.51 Some academic agency framings, a multitude of other relevant factors
research points to a strong correlation between levels are omitted.
of poverty and coup incidence. One study analysed
data from 121 counties from 1950–1982, and found The political, economic and social consequences of
that the likelihood of a government being overthrown health pandemics (COVID-19, but also the 2014–2015
by a coup is significantly influenced by the country’s Ebola outbreak, which particularly affected Guinea
level of economic well-being.52 and, to a lesser extent, Mali),W as well as fallout of the
war in Ukraine, have added to this complexity. African
However, the counter trend in political science regional economic and political integration constitutes
emphasizes the agency of political actors, as well a further external factor with impacts on dynamics.
as the unpredictable momentum and turbulence UCG events thus intersect with, and are shaped by, global
that political dynamics can themselves generate, as and regional dynamics affecting socio-political and
factors that shape outcomes. 53
development processes on the continent.
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55
CHAP TER 1.1 TRIGGERS
Certain iconic global events have come to be understood as single, decisive

occurrences that tipped a country or even the world’s fortunes in a particular
direction, even while deeper causes and dynamics surrounding these events
continue to be debated.56 Some analysts maintain that in certain coup instances,
elections heightened tensions and served as trigger events — as have sudden
economic shocks in others.57 In Africa, during the Cold War era, geopolitics weighed
heavily. Some coups occurred as the result of countervailing efforts by either the
East or West to maintain influence, triggered by events that signalled apparent
gains on the other side.58
In some of the contemporary coup cases, such factors are salient — yet they do
not appear to have been decisive. Geopolitical dynamics are believed to have
emboldened certain coup leaders. Elections — or more specifically, the president’s
decision to stand for a third term — paved the way for the coup in Guinea, for
example, though over a period of nine months.
The key triggers of recent coups, and the precise moment of their occurrence,
have been highly political, context-specific and localized. Indeed, reaching a full
understanding of triggers requires a granular analysis of the intimate dynamics
unfolding between political actors, military factions and individuals. This is
beyond the purview of this report, noting its emphasis on the development lens.
Such granularity may also remain obscured from public view for years to come. It
has manifestly been at play across focal settings, with factional competition and
in-fighting violently erupting into open warfare in the case of Sudan’s coup leaders
from April 2023.
In some countries, a chain of cause and effect can be readily traced, at least in
headline form. In Chad, for instance, the 2021 events that have been likened to
a UCG — whereby succession did not follow constitutional rules — were clearly
triggered by the president’s death. In Burkina Faso, relationships between the
military and government were already under pressure in the face of deepening
insecurity and armed violence at large, with the government seeking at times to
blame defence and security forces in signalling its own authority to the public.
A series of specific attacks and incidences, in which both the army and local
gendarmes suffered significant losses, identifiably served to tip coup leaders into
launching the first coup. Similarly, the more recent coup appears to have been
triggered — at least in the narrative of the new coup leaders — by an instance of
armed violence that took place a few days prior.
Elsewhere, precise triggers are shrouded in the mysteries of behind-the-scenes

politics. In Sudan, the October 2021 coup is seen by some as a final, if not inevitable,
reassertion of military control that had already been operating behind the scenes
of the transitional government for some time. It followed months of civilian
military in-fighting amid street protests.
In Guinea, the president’s resetting of the constitutional term limit and

controversial re-election for a third term in October 2020 can be seen to have
56
paved the way for the coup in September 2021, yet subsequent political manoeuvring
provided the more immediate trigger. In Mali, the 2020 coup followed months of
popular protests against alleged government corruption, manipulation of legislative
elections and the deteriorating state of the economy hit by COVID-19 and other
factors. However, the immediate trigger remains unclear. Meanwhile, the 2022
coup may have been immediately triggered by the proposed removal of two military
figures from the transitional cabinet in a reshuffle. These dynamics again point to
the salience of power and politics in shaping events.59
In conclusion, borrowing from the differing theoretical approaches used to explain

the political transition trajectory detailed in Box 3, political agency is a key factor
shaping coups. This, in turn, is informed by a range of specific dynamics and issues
incentivizing coup leaders in each case — often rendering coup triggers oblique to
outside observers.
What is clear is that coup leaders make strategic calculations informed by a range
of considerations. These include assessing likely support for their actions, often
related to the extent of discontent with the incumbent government across society.
The dynamics and issues informing political actors’ behaviour in turn thus relate
to the deeper proximate and structural factors that resonate more explicitly with
the development lens put forward by this report. These are discussed in further
detail below.
CHAP TER 1. 2 PROXIMATE FACTORS
1.2.1 Insecurity in the Sahel

The majority of the recent or attempted coups have taken place in West Africa, while
seven out of nine events have played out in the greater Sahel.60 Experts have rightly
underlined the country-context specificity shaping respective events, critiquing the
notion of ‘coup contagion’ as limiting.61 Still, this geographic concentration points
to a need to consider features of the Sahel subregion that may have shaped current
dynamics. While itself driven by deeper structural and historic issues, the past
decade of insecurity in the Sahel manifests as a cluster of proximate or intermediate
factors (the visible part of the iceberg), contributing to the conditions that have
shaped the uptick in military coups.
The Sahel has emerged as a major source of instability in Africa since 2011 (with the
fall of Colonel Gaddafi in Libya a critical factor in turn impacting this trajectory),
when a coalition of secessionist and other armed groups attempted to declare an
independent state in northern Mali. Its porous borders and related long history
of smuggling networks have been increasingly captured by organized criminal
networks and trade, including in people and illicit drugs. Expansive ‘ungoverned’
spaces (with identity groups and networks straddling national borders), weak state
institutions and low human-development indicators have further challenged goals
of national unity and political inclusion.62 The effects of climate change have played
an aggravating role in this timeframe, drying out livelihoods in a region facing both
demographic expansion and a high dependence on natural resources.63 A cycle of
intercommunal violence has become increasingly militarized, with violent
2023
57
extremist groups intensifying dynamics. These proximate factors create a basis for
instability and vulnerability that has both shaped, and in turn been informed by,
regional states’ capacities and approaches to governing.
The insecurity has been exacerbated by a complex pattern of security-

driven interventions by international actors, closely linked to the Sahel’s
geostrategic relevance to global security priorities. Over the past decade, a
plethora of external forces has engaged in efforts to contain the perceived threat of a
violent extremist takeover of Mali and the wider Sahel.64 International interest has
been incentivized further by the region’s significance in the irregular migration and
smuggling of people to Europe, as well as its mineral wealth.
A “unique ecosystem” of forces (or what has also been termed a “security traffic jam”)
has seen over 21,000 uniformed personnel deployed across the Sahel to address
multiple and intersecting political, economic, security, humanitarian and environ-
mental crises.65 These include international actors from the UN, European Union
(EU), France and US. Ad hoc security initiatives have also been formed. Among these
are the Joint Forces of the Group of Five (G5) regional states (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali,
Mauritania and Niger) and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF, consisting of
Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon) to tackle Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin.
Despite these missions, security and governance indicators have continued to

deteriorate across the region, with frequent large-scale attacks against both civilians
and defence and security forces. The presence of the Russian military company
Wagner Group, for instance in Mali, has further complicated these trends and is itself
a manifestation of mounting resentment, particularly against former colonial power
France.66 These dynamics have made tangible the spectre of external power
competition as a further destabilizing factor in an already complex situation.67
Researchers have identified limitations curtailing the efficacy of the international

security presence, which is compromised by a series of ‘disconnects’.68 These
refer to a fragmentation of objectives (straddling counterterrorism, migration and
stabilization, to name a few); and a gap between discourse and practice (for example,
on rights, as well as between ambition and actual ability to effectively deploy.69
According to this view, competing mandates, rationales, priorities and directions
have stymied the possibility of success.
The need to refocus on governance priorities, rather than only security, has also
been stressed.70 Analysts indicate that, at worst, these missions may have added to
rising levels of regional violence and political instability, particularly by fuelling the
narratives used by non-state armed groups to attract recruits. As found by one group
of international experts, actors have focused too narrowly on “… bolstering armies or
police who then use indiscriminate force, harming civilians, undermining elected
governments and setting the stage for coups”.71
The widening insecurity and governance deficits have impacted on the region’s
political culture, creating a further intermediate factor contributing to coup risk.
Since the 2012 military coup in Mali, political campaigns, victories, elections and
other coup occurrences across the Sahel have been justified with explicit reference
to a leader’s ability or inability to provide security.
58
1.2.2 Rising frustration with FIGURE 7
government performance D E C R E A S I N G C O N F I D E N C E I N G OV E R N M E N T, U C G AV E R A G E
The notion that mounting frustration with

government performance serves as a proximate P E R C E N TA G E O F P O P U L AT I O N R E P O R T I N G
factor in the recent coups finds further weight in a T H AT L E V E L S O F C O R R U P T I O N H AV E
I N C R E A S E D , A L O T, O R S O M E W H AT,
review of data from leading polling organisation, OVER THE PAST YEARS
Afrobarometer. A substantially higher number
of people from coup-affected countries said they
perceived levels of corruption to have increased
in Afrobarometer’s 2019–2021 polls, as compared
with its 2014–2016 round of data collection.
Perceptions of governments’ ability to handle
2014 / 2015 2019 / 2021
violent conflict also deteriorated since 2016, as
shown in Figure 7.72 Source: Afrobarometer data (round 6, round 8)
(http://www.afrobarometer.org).
In some African countries, largely unarmed and

peaceful popular protest has emerged in recent P E R C E N TA G E O F P O P U L AT I O N
R E P O R T I N G T H AT T H E C U R R E N T
years as a force for political change. This is marked
GOVERNMENT IS HANDLING
by increased participation of women and young R E S O LV I N G V I O L E N T
people and is both enabled and amplified by CONFLICT VERY
B A D LY
41%
deepening digitalization. Citizens increasingly 19%
challenge injustice and inequality, advancing a
2016 / 2018 2019 / 2021
deeper organic democratic momentum than
Africa has hitherto seen.73 Source: Afrobarometer data (round 7, round 8)
(http://www.afrobarometer.org).
BOX 4
S O C I E TA L D I S C O N T E N T A C O M M O N T H R E A D
Popular frustration at government underperformance has driven coup risk, and in part fuelled (at least
temporary) support of incoming military juntas.
Analysts recognize that different circumstances and issues influence popular mobilization in each country.
Key rallying points range from the management of mining revenues and the March 2020 term-limit amendment
in Guinea; to the alleged embezzlement of state funds and rigging of legislative elections in Mali; to perceived
corruption of the army’s old guard in Burkina Faso.74
Yet across these, a shared experience of increasing societal discontent shaped by long-term systemic issues
can be identified. Citizens have, at the same time, accused former colonial power, France, of complicity in
government malfeasance. This perception has undermined regional and international efforts to deter coup
instigators. The Russian flag has become a popular emblem of opposition to France’s perceived influence.
At other times, in these same countries’ recent history, there have also been instances where popular protest
specifically focused on upholding democratic and constitutional plural - principles when political leaders
were seen to be subverting these. In Burkina Faso, protest movements led the then-president to reintroduce the
presidential term limit, reduced from seven to five years, in 2001. In October 2014, popular uprisings led to the
forceful departure of the same regime.
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59
In Mali, the protests that eventually led to the overthrow of then-president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta were rallied against
a perceived attempt to confiscate power and deny people their choice of representatives in the National Assembly.
Guinean populations have also taken to the streets in defence of democracy, at the cost of many lives. Protests in
2006–2007 resulted in various constitutional and political reforms. The president’s effort to prolong his term through
a controversial constitutional change in March 2020 also invoked stern opposition. A National Front for the Defence
of the Constitution (FNDC) was established in 2019. Composed of civil society organizations (CSOs) and opposition
political parties, the FNDC staged protest movements across the country and abroad, despite brutal police repression.
In Sudan, spontaneous protests against the regime of Omar al-Bashir began in December 2018. Several towns saw
small street protests over the cost of living. The demonstrations reflected a broad cross section of Sudanese society,
led by lawyers, doctors, women’s organizations, activists, members of the diaspora and youth — making up a united
force never seen before. Issues fuelling the protests included exclusive and corrupt fiscal management; the role of
the military elite in politics and business; safety, justice and accountability concerning rights abuses; and the
exclusion from decision-making particularly of youth and women, as well as citizens from outside of the capital,
among many others.
The erosion of civic confidence in governments’ capacity or will to provide

inclusive security, development and economic opportunities is a critical
proximate factor contributing to the rise in military coups. This has created a
grievance base that military juntas have readily been able to exploit.
1.2.3 Democracy at an inflection point in Africa

The wave of democratization across Africa from 1990 yielded a seismic shift in
the political culture of the continent, as discussed in the introduction.75 Yet, in
a context of global backsliding, the limitations of democratic progress have also
been increasingly apparent. In 2017, a regional dialogue was conducted to take
stock of three decades of democratic transition in Africa. Participants concluded
that in all democratic settings on the continent, continued efforts are urgently
needed to reconcile the gap between what they called “procedural/formal” and
“substantial/real” democracy.76 In considering the recent coups, the relevance of
this perspective cannot be over-emphasized.
Elections have served as triggers for conflict as ‘zero-sum’ political and identity
politics fuse, and rivalries are readily instrumentalized by actors who harness
factionalized discontent related to political, economic and/or social grievances.
Perceptions of overly politicized electoral management bodies (EMBs) have also
led to electoral results being contested. This, again, has morphed into widespread
social protests in multiple countries. The capture of the electoral process by long-
standing incumbent regimes is well documented.77
While the study of democratic transition is rich and varied, it often supposes a
linear trajectory — starting with liberation from authoritarianism, and
progressing to the establishment of a framework for new institutions (including a
constitution and other political institutions), and reaching a state of democratic
consolidation.78 In the 1990s, a majority of African states reached the second
phase of transition. However, recent events highlight an incompleteness in
overall progress that has become a proximate circumstance contributing to the
recent rise in military coups. Meanwhile, unfulfilled appetite for more substantive
60
progress towards meaningful democracy swells and ebbs across the continent,
even manifesting perilously, as described, as at least initial support of the
military coups.
BOX 5
D E M O C R AT I C T R A N S I T I O N T H E O R Y V I E W E D A G A I N S T A F R I C A’ S R E C E N T E X P E R I E N C E S
A dominant paradigm on political transition informed the work of development assistance agencies
for much of the latter half of the 20th Century. This paradigm tended to project a normative and linear
belief in the democratization processes, which often assumed that a move away from authoritarian
rule would see the collapse of such regimes, to be followed by political liberalization and the
establishment of democratic institutions.79
This perspective reflected a wider worldview, which had in turn been shaped by waves of
democratization that occurred globally when the Cold War came to an end. Its concern with
advancement towards democracy viewed the transitional period to be typically timebound,
with the conduct of multi-party elections seen to signify, in effect, its end.
The school of political science referred to as ‘transitology’ has provided richer nuance embracing
a wider range of trajectories. One seminal work analysed the wave of transition that swept Latin
America and Eastern Europe during the 1980s, from primarily authoritarian regimes towards an
uncertain ‘something else’. This resonates more convincingly with Africa’s experiences.80 A recent
study concurs with the notion of complexity and uncertainty characterizing political transition
towards democracy, describing how “… once they begin, transitions proceed at different speeds,
with advances and retreats, and often with zig-zags”.81
The formal system of democracy was seemingly symbolically and

‘democratically’ rejected by citizens as some of the recent military
coups unfolded, with military rule presenting — at least in the moment,
a popularly viable alternative. Some analysts describe that these developments
risk legitimizing attempts for militaries to be re-embedded into politics.82 Democratic
leaders should be spurred to address civic priorities and grievances at all costs.
The sense of democracy failing with an ‘own goal’ and fuelling Africa’s recent
experience of military coups chimes with the global rise of ‘authoritarian populism’
— whereby populist leaders worldwide have exploited poverty, inequalities,
resentment and uncertainty to attract support and take power.83
Evidence has shown that functioning democracy is effective in reducing poverty

and enabling growth, above all through its emphasis on choice and inclusive human
development.84 However it has, in many settings, failed to live up to these promises.
Experts indicate that against such a backdrop, it may be expected that citizens
would support groups that represent a break from “corrupt, inept, and ageing”
regimes.85 Paradoxically, the rallying behind military coups is therefore driven by
a profoundly democratic impulse in favour of positive change. Section 2 of this
report evaluates these issues through the prism of its primary data.
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61
CHAP TER 1.3 STRUCTUR AL AND INSTITUTIONAL DRIVERS
The incompleteness of Africa’s democratic

transition as a proximate factor contributing
to coup risk suggests a need to address the
barriers to its fuller consolidation.
Doing so draws attention to deeper drivers
pertaining to the robustness of state legitimacy,
and the wider social contract between state and
citizens. These dynamics, in turn, are intimately
meshed with the governance of the economy and
other structural factors. This section of the report
concludes by reflecting on the ‘roots’ of the iceberg:
the deeper characteristics and drivers that will
be critical to resolve if long-term coup resilience,
FIGURE 8
complete democratic transition and lasting peace
H I S T O R Y O F M I L I TA R Y R U L E I N C O U N T R I E S T H AT
R E C E N T LY E X P E R I E N C E D C O U P S , B Y U C G C O U N T R I E S are to be achieved.
 Years of military rule

 Years of elected military rule 1.3.1 A history of military involvement in politics
 Years since independence Coups often signal the start of prolonged political
turbulence and associated insecurity, including
Military rule represents
82% of years since independence further coups.86 With the exception of Tanzania,
25 YEARS 26 YEARS
this study’s focal countries have a combined record
BURKINA
FASO
of 31 successful military coups. Burkina Faso has
62 YEARS experienced seven cases, followed by Ghana, Mali
and Sudan with five cases each, three in Guinea, two
73% of years since independence in Chad and one in The Gambia.87 As illustrated in
21 YEARS 24 YEARS
Figure 1 in the introduction, 98 successful military
CHAD coups have so far been registered in Africa.88 Many
62 YEARS of these occurred prior to the establishment of AU
norms designed to inhibit UCG, including military
45% of years since independence coups. This broad experience nonetheless provides
14 YEARS 15 YEARS
an insightful historic context for reflecting on the
GUINEA contemporary phenomenon.
64 YEARS
When evaluating the role of the military in socio-

40% of years since independence political life, response strategies should include
open reflection on the violent nature of African state
25 YEARS
MALI formation in the context of colonialism. A distorted
62 YEARS military role and character was often its legacy.89
Figure 8 shows that, while varied, the UCG countries
82% of years since independence all experienced a significant proportion of their post-
independence years under some sort of military rule:
31 YEARS 23 YEARS
SUDAN three quarters or more of the post-colonial period
66 YEARS
each for Burkina Faso, Chad and Sudan.
Source: UNDP-collected data, 2022.
62
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has collected data that
compares countries’ respective military spending as a proportion of public
expenditure. This data indicates that the five UCG-category countries rank among
the highest among sub-Saharan African states (Figure 9).
FIGURE 9
M I L I TA R Y S P E N D I N G A S S H A R E O F G O V E R N M E N T S P E N D I N G
 UCG
 DTS
Less spending
M AU R I T I U S 0.59 %
GHANA 1.54%
CA BO V ERD E 1.57%
LIBERIA 1.61%
S O U T H A F RICA 2.25%
L ES OT H O 2.6 0%
S I E R R A L EO NE 2.71%
M A L AW I 2.86 %
T H E GA MB I A 2.96 %
BE N I N 3.03%
M A DAGASCA R 3.15%
S E YC H EL L E S 3.20%
ZAMBIA 3.96 %
K E N YA 4.08%
N I G ER I A 4.22%
EGY P T 4.34%
RWA N DA 4.48%
M OZ A M B IQ U E 4.73%
Z I M BA BW E 5.26 %
S O U T H S U DA N 5.47%
CA M ERO O N 5.57%
TA N Z A NI A 5.80%
E T H I OP I A 6 .15%
S E N EGA L 6 .37% WORLD AVERAGE 6.4%
A N G OL A 6 .9 0%
TUNISIA 6 .9 7% AFRICAN AVERAGE 7%
N I G ER 7.21%
BU R U N DI 7.22%
G U I N EA-BISSAU 7.24%
EQ UATORIA L GU INE A 8.03%
BOTSWA NA 8.07%
NAMIBIA 8.34%
GA BO N 8.48%
C E N T R A L A F RICA N RE PU BL IC 8.96%
S U DA N 9.50%
U GA N DA 10.06 %
CONGO 10.13%
GUINEA 11.33%
MALI 11.43%
M ORO C C O 12.06 %
M AU R I TA NIA 12.20%
B U R K I NA FAS O 12.43%
A LG E R I A 13.30%
TO G O 17.51%
CHAD 17.52%
SOMALIA 20.37%
More spending
Missing data: Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Eswatini, Libya, Sao Tome and Principe.
Sudan value from 2021.
Missing
Source: data: Comoros,
Stockholm Democratic
International Republic
Peace of the
Research Congo, (SIPRI)
Institute Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti,
Military Eritrea,
Expenditure, Eswatini,
2022, Libya, Sao Tome and Principe.
(https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex).
Sudan value from 2021.
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure, 2022, (https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex).
2023
63
The five UCG-category states are not alone in Africa in having experienced a long
period of military rule; or in having a significant share of military spending.
However, failure to fully reform, create appropriate checks and balances and define
a meaningful role for the military as part of the contemporary state architecture,
represents a critical institutional factor. Over time, it becomes a clear structural
driver underlying coup incidence in each of the affected countries. Conversely,
strategically recalibrating the role of the military in political life has become a
source of coup resilience in countries previously afflicted by UCG occurrences,
such as Nigeria. These factors have also been highlighted by commentators in
considering the recent coup attempt in The Gambia.90
Attention to structural drivers of coup risk emphasizes the importance of

understanding the influence of broader civil-military dynamics. The notion of
‘coup-proofing’, referring to tactics employed to forestall future coup attempts,
has attracted interest in the academic literature.91 The term refers to ways in which
leadership may leverage resources at their disposal (whether international aid,
natural resource revenue or other) to co-opt potential sources of opposition, and
build alliances aimed at maintaining their own hold on power. This has often
included yielding political and other forms of privilege and power, as well as
alternative career paths, to military figures and factions.
1.3.2 State fragility, legitimacy and the social contract

Academic study of African statehood has extensively explored dimensions of
state fragility and questions of legitimacy. The exogenous, colonial grafting of
contemporary state structures is highlighted, along with associated disconnects
from indigenous networks, power and decision-making practices (vertical
legitimacy), and particular social groups’ inclusion or exclusion from decisions
around ‘who should participate in the social contract’ (horizontal legitimacy).92
Enquiry into the nature of legitimacy has been foundational in shaping thinking
about conflict prevention and peacebuilding, as well as development, with
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16’s ‘peace, justice and inclusion’ a signature
concept at the heart of Agenda 2030.
Coup risk can, to a certain extent, be understood as a specific subset of state

fragility. While contested, the fragile states concept has continued to evolve, with
contemporary notions underscoring its multidimensional nature and profile in
both lower- and middle-income settings.93 The Commission on State Fragility,
Growth and Development describes the ‘fragility trap’ as “… a syndrome of
characteristics: fractured identities, a lack of state legitimacy and capacity,
insecurity, a dearth of formal enterprises, and proneness to shocks. These reinforce
each other, creating a trap.”94 The indicators developed by the Fragile States Index
to monitor fragility and help in predicting and preventing intra-state crises, conflict
and coups are also salient.95 The 2022 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) States of Fragility report concurs, noting that “… fragility is an
explanatory factor in the recent increase in coup events”, while calculating that 12
out of 17 coup events globally, since 2019, took place in fragile contexts.96
The political and cohesion indicators of the State Fragility Index are state legitimacy;
public services; human rights and rule of law; security apparatus; factionalized
elites and group grievance. Together, these constitute the critical governance
64
dimensions of the underlying development context. Honing in on them suggests that these
features are key sources of resilience to military coups. A comparison of UCG- and DTS-category
states using 2022 data showed clear divergence between the countries that recently experienced
a military coup, and those on a path to democratic transition. All five UCG countries are below, and
predominantly well below, the African average, while DTS-category countries are securely above.
Ghana, which emerges as the highest performer among the study’s focal countries (even above the
world average), is a full 28 points ahead of Guinea, the lowest.
FIGURE 10
F R A G I L I T Y I N D E X - P O L I T I C A L A N D C O H E S I O N I N D I C AT O R S
 UCG
 DTS
Less fragile
M AU R IT IU S 1 7.6
B OTSWA N A 24.4
CA B O VE R D E 24.9
N A M IB IA 2 5. 2
S E YCHE L L E S 2 6 .0
G H AN A 2 7.9
SAO TO M E A N D P R I N C I P E 2 8. 2
S E N EGA L 3 2 .9
B E N IN 3 3 .1
WORLD AVERAGE 34.1
L E S OT H O 33.2
GA B O N 3 6 .0
S IE R R A L EO N E 36.2
M O RO CC O 3 7. 3
S O U T H A F R I CA 3 7.4
E SWATIN I 3 7. 5
TU N IS IA 3 7.7
T H E GA M B I A 37.7
ZA M B IA 3 7.9
TA N Z AN I A 3 8. 2
M A L AW I 3 8. 5
M A DAGAS CA R 3 9.1
C O M O RO S 3 9.9
A LG E R IA 4 0.0
D J IB O U T I 4 0.6
AFRICAN AVERAGE 42.3
L IB E R IA 4 2 .0
TO G O 4 2 .6
RWA N DA 4 2 .6
B UR K I N A FAS O 4 3 .7
M OZ A M B IQ U E 4 4.4
M AU R ITA NI A 4 5. 2
G U IN E A-B I S SAU 4 5.4
KE N YA 4 5. 5
ANGOLA 4 6 .0
C ÔTE D ’ IVO I R E 47.1
U GA N DA 47. 3
EGY P T 47. 5
EQ UATO R I A L G U I N E A 47.7
CONGO 47.7
N IG E R 49. 2
BURUNDI 49.4
M AL I 49.7
E R ITR E A 49.8
ZIM BA BW E 5 0.1
CA M E RO O N 5 0.7
L IBYA 51 . 5
E T H IO P IA 5 2 .7
N IG E R IA 5 3 .1
CHAD 5 3 .9
S UDA N 54.7
C E N TR A L A F R I CA N R EP U B L I C 5 5.0
G UI N E A 5 5.4
S O U T H S U DA N 5 5. 5
D E M O CR AT I C R E P U B L I C O F T H E C O N G O 5 5.7
S O M A L IA 5 6 .0
More fragile
Source: Fragility Index, 2022. (https://fragilestatesindex.org/)
Source: Fragility Index, 2022. (https://fragilestatesindex.org/)
2023
65
The 2021 Ibrahim Index of African Governance confirms this differentiation

between UCG and DTS country types. States that have recently experienced
military coups ranked significantly lower, with a difference of 30 points between
the highest performer (Ghana) and the lowest (this time, Sudan and Chad).97
All three DTS countries are securely above the African average, while most in
the UCG category are well below.98
FIGURE 11
IBRAHIM INDEX OF AFRICAN GOVERNANCE

 UCG
 DTS
4 8.8
48.4
48.4
40.4
4 6.0
4 6.0
4 8.6
64.8
50.0
4 0. 2
4 4. 2
30.6
50. 5
43.2
42.5
54. 3
53 .4
3 4. 5
3 4. 5
62 .4
42.2
54.6
54.6
55. 3
23.2
55.6
4 3 .9
52 . 2
54.9
2 5.9
7 3 .4
59. 5
58.7
7 0.9
35.7
3 2 .7
1 8. 5
47. 5
2 7. 3
74.9
41 . 3
41 . 5
7 0.7
41 . 2
4 8.1
61 . 5
68.1
4 3 .1
64.1
56.1
35.1
47.7
67.7
59.1
BOTSWA NA
SO U TH A FRICA
NA MIBIA
SENEGA L
RWA NDA
K ENYA
A LGERIA
U GA NDA
Z A MBIA
L IBERIA
NIGERIA
TU NISIA
ETH IO P IA
A NGO L A
MAU RITA NIA
L IBYA
EQUATO RIA L GU INEA

ERITREA
SO MA L IA
EGY P T
MAU RITIU S
SEYC H EL L ES
TO GO
CA BO V ERDE
GHA NA
MO RO C C O
SAO TO ME A ND P RINC IP E
BENIN
T HE GA M B I A
L ESOTH O
MA L AW I
B UR K I NA FASO
C ÔTE D ’IVO IRE
SIERRA L EO NE
TA NZ A NI A
MOZ A MBIQ U E
GA BO N
Z IMBA BW E
NIGER
MA DAGASCA R
ESWATINI
CA MERO O N
M A LI
C O MO RO S
DE MOCRATI C RE PU BLIC O F T HE CO N GO
GUI NEA
BU RU NDI
G U INEA-BISSAU
C O NGO
SUDA N
CHA D
DJIBO U TI
CE NTR AL A FRICA N REP U BL IC
SO U TH SU DA N
Better governance performance Lower governance performance
Source: Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 2021, (https://iiag.online/downloads.html)
Source: Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 2022, (https://iiag.online/downloads.html).
The above indicators suggest a strong correlation between robust and improving
political, cohesion and governance conditions, and resilience to coup risk. While
this may appear logical to the point of verging on tautology (countries that have
stronger governance systems are less likely to experience un-constitutionalism),
it has profound implications for the prioritization of response interventions.
66
The prominence of the quality of governance as a

development driver correlating with coup resilience
underscores that strengthening the social contract
between states and citizens must be a key focus in
response strategies.
1.3.3 Exclusionary patterns of

economic development
To further assess potential structural drivers of
coup risk, research for this study scanned other
leading global indices to compare its two country
categories (UCG and DTS).99 Considering most recent
available gross domestic product (GDP) per capita,
only Ghana sits above the sub-Saharan average of
US$1,633. Each of the five UCG countries appear at
BOX 6
the lower ends of continent-wide ranking — despite
slow and steady progress. (GDP and all other indices COUP RISK AND THE EXCLUSION OF WOMEN AND YOUTH
referred to are shown in Annex 2). On UNDP’s Human
Development Index (HDI), these five countries again The study also considered gender and age vectors of
sit well below the Africa average, despite sharing in inequality to assess potential linkages between UCG
continent-wide advances. Honing in on the economic countries and their respective socio-economic and
and cross-cutting indicators of the State Fragility political inclusion of women and youth — recognizing
Index (which measure economic decline; uneven each group’s critical significance to development
economic development, human flight and brain drain; progress. Africa remains one of the most unequal
demographic pressures, refugees and internally regions globally in terms of income distribution by age
displaced persons [IDPs]; and types of external and gender. Yet substantial development gains are to
intervention), a clear divergence emerges between be anticipated, should the dynamism of its burgeoning
the countries that have experienced military coups, youth population be harnessed, and greater socio-
and those in the DTS category. 100 While the latter economic parity achieved for women and girls. 101
countries perform above the African average, Guinea,
Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad and Sudan all sit towards Among the focal countries for which data is available,
the lower scores on the scale, in descending order. Chad ranked as the most unequal performer on the
Rankings on both the Economic Freedom Index and Gender Inequality Index, scoring at 0.65, followed
the Multidimensional Poverty Index similarly seem closely by Guinea and Mali. 102 It is notable that Ghana
to suggest that higher performance points to greater and Tanzania, the most established democracies in
resilience — with the study’s five UCG countries the list, are above the sub-Saharan average — but so is
among the continent’s lowest performers. Sudan. Here, the active role of professional and student
women in the recent revolution pitted against the
The overall economic governance context, which ultra-conservative and patriarchal status quo of the
comprises the model of development, political Bashir regime hints at a profound mismatch between
economy, and degree of equality in sharing economic old and new gender norms as one driver of change.
wealth and opportunity, emerges as a key structural However, taken alone, the data does not yield clear
factor. A final feature that stands out, and which correlations between gender equality and coup
has played a critical role in influencing governance resilience. Comparing focal countries’ scoring on the
outcomes, is the abundance of natural resource Youth Progress Index, however, does seem to suggest
wealth present in many of the coup-affected countries. clearly that higher levels of youth progress may provide
some resilience. The five UCG focal countries were
among the lower performers, and those in the DTS
category among the highest. 103
2023
67
This factor has shaped both the political context and the development
trajectory of four out of five of the focal countries that recently experienced
military coups (Chad, Guinea, Sudan and, to a lesser extent, Mali). While
noting that many states with equivalent or higher proportions of GDP natural
resource dependence have not experienced coups, mineral wealth is important
in shaping political trajectories. 104 Typically, such states are vulnerable to
elite capture of natural resource revenues, poor economic diversification and
corruption. Natural resource wealth represents a structural feature of the
development landscape that has had direct consequences for the distribution
of economic growth and resultant inequalities.
Reviewing leading global development indices to explore whether patterns and

contrasts across the focal countries might be identified may be an imperfect
science. Yet it nonetheless suggests that socio-economic conditions which
result in lower scores do contribute to vulnerability to coup risk, with some
inconsistencies and variations. Inequality and exclusion appear to be
particularly relevant. 105 However, there are countries that show weak
performance, or that also suffer the ‘resource curse’, which have not
experienced coups. Unequal economic development is best understood as
contributing to the structural factors that shape coup risk, rather than being
definitive or causal. Recalling the multiplicity of factors involved described in
the opening of this section, it creates a base of risk that has fused with a raft of
other dynamics in leading to the events under review.
BOX 7
RESOURCE WINDFALLS AND COUP RISK
Guinea’s mining sector is the country’s main engine for economic growth and development, with
bauxite reserves estimated at 40 billion tonnes, or two thirds of the world’s reserves. 106 It is also rich
in gold, estimated at around 1,000 tonnes, and its diamonds are between 25 and 30 million carats. It
boasts one of the highest qualities of iron ore in the world, with reserves at around 15 billion tonnes. 107
This non-exhaustive list of resources testifies to the mining sector’s strategic importance for the
national economy. It accounts for more than 90 percent of the country’s total exports, 25 percent of
GDP and 60 percent of state revenues. It is also the largest employer in the country after the civil
service, providing more than 10,000 permanent jobs and nearly 100,000 casual work opportunities
annually. 108 Yet the country’s development trajectory has stagnated. The disconnect between its
significant natural wealth and widespread poverty is the result of poor governance, widespread
corruption and nepotism of successive regimes. It reflects a classic pattern of elite insulation and
enrichment through windfall revenues linked to the extractive industries. The trend is seen to
have contributed to popular acceptance of the military junta (as well as opposition to the former
president’s third-term bid), with its promises to fight corruption.
68 S O L D I E R S A N D C I T IZE N S : MIL I TA RY C OUP S A ND T HE NEED F O R DEM O CR AT I C R ENE WA L IN A F R I C A
“There is no
confidence and
trust between the
military and citizens.
We do not believe
that they
[the military]
can protect us if
something happens.”
FEM A LE FOCUS GROUP DIS CUS SA NT, K H A R TOUM, SUDA N (FEBRUA RY 2023)
U N D P 202 3 69
02 SECTION 2
Proximate
and structural
drivers of
coups: citizens’
perspectives
and experiences
71
PROX IM ATE A ND S TRUC T UR A L DRIVERS OF C OUP S:
CITIZENS’ PERSPEC TIVE S A ND E X PERIENCE S
The Soldiers and citizens perceptions survey data and wider research
provide insight into citizens’ views of the plethora of factors at play in
shaping coup occurrence. It also sharpens an understanding of people’s
lived experiences of events. The following four chapters revisit some of
the structural and proximate factors identified in Section 1 through the
prism of popular perceptions. The first chapter explores perspectives
on the socio-economic dimensions of development, consequences
of the coups and optimism for the future. The second considers
governance issues and aspects of the social contract through citizens’
perspectives on democracy and government performance. Chapter 3
hones in on perspectives of security and safety, and lastly, Chapter 4
explores perspectives on inclusion and the extent to which citizens felt
their priorities were heard during the recent events. This is a crucial
dimension for measuring confidence in political processes and the
potential for regenerating the social contract.
CHAP TER 2 .1
SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS AND OVER ALL DEVELOPMENT CONSEQUENCES
A major motivation for this study has been its concern to understand the
development drivers and consequences of military coups. The broad review of
secondary data comparing focal countries across global development indices
(discussed in Section 1) underscored the relevance of development progress to
reducing coup likelihood. Correlations between coup risk and stagnant growth,
inequality, and the exclusion of youth and women are confirmed — as are linkages
between low performance on governance indices and the prevalence of natural
resource-based economic growth. However, these factors are contributary, not
causal. Other countries that share similar features have not experienced coups.
In addition to highlighting linkages between a country’s development context

and coup risk, the development lens also emphasizes the development
consequences likely to be associated with military coups. Periods of instability
resulting from incomplete or contested transitions have historically affected
development progress, sometimes catastrophically. Previous coup occurrence
is a key variable influencing coup likelihood. Once triggered, a potential long-
term path of turbulence may be implied, with associated negative impacts on
development progress. However, opportunities to wrest positive development
outcomes and state-society transformation may also be presented. Citizens’
own hopes and fears underscore both these risks and opportunities.
72
2.1.1 Comparing citizen perspectives on economic circumstances Soldiers and citizens

The Soldiers and citizens perceptions survey highlights some notable differences qualitative research in
in attitudes to their economic situations between respondents living in countries Burkina Faso, Ghana and
Sudan confirmed high
that have recently experienced military coups, and those classified here as
levels of frustration with
democratically transitioned.
the economic situation in
each country. Participants
Figure 12 shows that in UCG-category countries significantly more people said expressed sentiments like
they were dissatisfied with their personal financial situation and the economic “we are fed up”, “we are
opportunities available to them (51 percent dissatisfied) versus those who tired of this country” and
said they were satisfied (33 percent). Negativity about the state of the economy “things are hard”.
revealed a similar trend (54 percent versus 28 percent).
Almost all participants
complained about the high
However, overall, the DTS-category participants reported significantly greater cost of living and high
dissatisfaction. In these countries, 70 percent of respondents were dissatisfied inflation leading to hikes
both with their personal financial situation and the wider state of the economy. in the prices of petrol,
This result is particularly striking given that these countries score relatively diesel and food products.
higher on global development indices, with somewhat less exclusionary patterns Along with rising poverty,
of economic development than those that have experienced military coups. It youth unemployment and
economic mismanagement,
suggests that while the external environment may empirically reflect higher
these factors have made
levels of development progress, people’s expectations may similarly be higher in
living conditions intolerable.
these settings, day-to-day challenges plentiful, and aspirations left unmet despite
the overall development gains registered. Participants noted how
their countries’ economies
are struggling to overcome
the effects of the pandemic,
FIGURE 12 UCG DTS along with other external
S AT I S FA C T I O N W I T H T H E E C O N O M Y A N D F I N A N C E S
  Dissatisfied shocks — including the war
  Neither in Ukraine. Others pointed
A R E Y O U S AT I S F I E D O R D I S S AT I S F I E D   Satisfied
to the government’s poor
WITH THE FOLLOWING?   Don’t know
management of the economy,
which is causing persistent
currency depreciation and
escalating prices.
YOUR PERSONAL
F I N A N C I A L S I T U AT I O N DISSATISFIED
DISSATISFIED
AND ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY? 5%
51% 70%
2%
33% 11%
20% 7%
DISSATISFIED
S TAT E O F T H E E C O N O M Y ?
9% 54% DISSATISFIED
70%
4%
28% 10%
20% 6%
2023
73
In Burkina Faso, Soldiers As suggested in the insights from the supplementary qualitative research
and citizens qualitative conducted for this report, frustration about economic living conditions is shared
research participants across diverse settings. In other words, correlation between underdevelopment
maintained that the coup
and overall coup risk can be evidenced. However, popular perception about socio-
tarnished the country’s
economic development performance may run counter to indicators and cannot be
international image and
disrupted the rebuilding taken as a straightforward or direct contributing factor to coup risk.
process that had been
underway since 2014. One 2.1.2 Citizen optimism about future development trajectories
respondent noted that the The military coups explored in this study are recent, and their longer-term
coup “… has undermined development consequences remain unknown. However, additional UNDP
the democratic status of the research on the impact of earlier coups in Guinea and Mali suggested major
country and sent Burkina
negative economic consequences accruing over time (see Box 8).
Faso 10 years backwards, if
not more”.
BOX 8
Respondents also expressed
prescient concerns of THE ECONOMIC COST OF COUPS
possible countercoups
and a tendency towards UNDP conducted analysis to assess the economic cost of military
authoritarianism if the
coups as background research to inform the Soldiers and citizens report.
transition process were
The analysis used the synthetic control method (SCM). 109 The core idea
prolonged.
of SCM is to create a counter-factual analysis, asking: “What would a
Discussants underlined given context be like if x event hadn’t occurred?” 110
that ordinary people were
yet to reap the dividends This method relies heavily on data availability to be a good fit for the
of the coup, because the model. The results presented below for earlier coups in Guinea (2008)
transition government had and Mali (2012) (Figure 13) met these statistical requirements. The
been in power for less than
analysis found that these recent coups had a negative effect on both
six months (at the time of
countries, lasting for at least five years.
the research). People were
expecting the government
to address major challenges The model indicates that five years after the event, Guinea and Mali
such as the fight against had lost an accumulated sum of $12.13 billion and $13.52 billion in
terrorism, the return of purchasing power parity (PPP) respectively. This represents for Guinea
IDPs and the organization 76 percent of the total GDP (PPP) in 2008 (the year of the coup), and
of inclusive elections at the
48 percent of the GDP (PPP) in 2012 for Mali.
end of the transition.
In other words, in the five years following the event, Guinea and Mali
respectively lost $2.43 billion and $2.7 billion as a yearly average due
to the coup. In per capita terms, the figures represent an accumulated
loss during the five years after the coup of $1,150 (PPP) for Guinea,
and $780 (PPP) for Mali.
Research across the five contexts under review confirmed that events had already
discouraged investors and curtailed economic activities in the main urban centres,
where prolonged periods of street protests have occurred. Food and essential
commodity prices — already under pressure due to COVID-19 and, more recently,
the war in Ukraine — were affected by the instability in all settings.
Humanitarian needs have also spiked in the countries that experienced coups since
2020. In June 2022, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
74
FIGURE 13
GDP
L O S S O F G D P C A U S E D B Y M I L I TA R Y C O U P S Synthetic GDP
GUINEA
12.1
BILLION USD MALI
13.5
BILLION USD
accumulated GDP accumulated GDP
loss over five years loss over five years
post coup post coup
2500 2500
G D P P P P P E R C A P I TA
2000 2000
(const ant 2017)
1500 1500
1000 Coup 1000 Coup

took place took place
2008 2012
500 500
0 0
1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 2017
Affairs (OCHA) released an updated humanitarian needs assessment for the Sahel
region. The report estimated that over 30 million people across the region would
need humanitarian assistance in 2022; at least two million more than the previous
year. 111 This included 7.5 million people in Mali, 3.5 million in Burkina Faso and
3.6 million in Chad. In Sudan meanwhile, at least 11.7 million people are severely
food insecure. The economic collapse following the 2021 coup has exacerbated
the dire humanitarian situation across the country. Only 21 percent of anticipated
humanitarian funding needs have so far been secured. 112 Each country has an
active Humanitarian Response Plan, although pledged resources remain far short
of meeting needs. While the drivers of the humanitarian crises predate the coup
events in each country, uncertainties have been significantly compounded.
Other major immediate development consequences relate to the economic

impact of sanctions and other measures imposed by regional and international
organizations, including the suspension of development assistance by
international partners and related disruption to aid and trade. These measures
(reviewed in more detail in Section 3) have had a direct impact, with a deterrent
ripple effect felt across business environments (see Box 9).
BOX 9
SUDAN’S DEVELOPMENT RECOVERY DISRUPTED
The 2018 revolution and subsequent installation of a civilian-led government significantly increased
development assistance flows and debt relief into Sudan, as donors sought to consolidate the emergence of a
potentially more democratic regime. A commitment of $700 million in development aid aimed at supporting
the transitional government was made after the US removed Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terror.
The EU, Germany, France, World Bank and others all announced new funding aimed at consolidating the
position of the new government.
2023
75
Several programmes were announced with a view to addressing historic and structural economic distortions.
This included launching a social protection programme that targeted poor and marginalized families.
Despite challenges, debt relief and international aid enabled the civilian government to achieve greater
microeconomic stability, as evidenced by lowered inflation rates and the stabilization of currency exchange.
Following the October 2021 coup, international partners suspended both assistance and debt relief, pending
an immediate return to a civilian-led government.
The country’s economic crisis was compounded as a direct result. The military coup and subsequent cut in
international support has also affected water supply, electricity, agriculture, health and transport. Inflation
hit 260 percent and the local currency plunged. The military-led government cut wheat and fuel subsidies.
By March 2022, the price of wheat had risen by 180 percent from the previous year. 113
In contrast to their relatively high levels of dissatisfaction with current

economic indicators, survey respondents were considerably more optimistic
about the future across both categories of countries. However, it is striking that
participants whose countries had recently experienced military coups were
more optimistic than their counterparts living in DTS-category countries.
For example, Figure 14 shows that 64 percent of UCG-category respondents
expected that the economic opportunities available to them would get better
in the next two years, as compared to 47 percent in DTS focal countries: a gap of
17 percentage points. Meanwhile, 65 percent felt it likely that the quality of key
services would improve, compared to 52 percent in DTS-category countries: a
gap of 13 percentage points. These findings reflect the different baseline against
which improvements are anticipated, as well as the sense of disruption and
possible renewal that UCG events may signal.
FIGURE 14 UCG DTS

  Get better
OPTIMISM FOR THE FUTURE
  Stay about the same
DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING WILL GET BETTER, GET WORSE

  Get worse
O R S TAY A B O U T T H E S A M E O V E R T H E N E X T T W O Y E A R S ?   Don’t know
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES THE QUALITY OF

AVA I L A B L E TO YO U KEY PUBLIC SERVICES
11%
14% 14% 12%
GET GET GET GET
13% BETTER BETTER
15% BETTER BETTER
23%
64% 24% 47% 65% 52%
9% 8%
14% 14%
76
Respondents were also asked to share their views about the impact of the last polit-
ical transition on their country (for UCG-category countries) or the most recent na-
tional electoral event (for DTS settings). Across the former, 47 percent said that the
change of government had had a positive impact on the country as a whole, while
35 percent reported a negative impact. A significant percentage answered ‘neither
positive nor negative’ or ‘don’t know’ (19 percent). In DTS-category countries, fewer
respondents felt that the recent election had had a positive impact on their country:
down 10 percentage points from respondents in UCG-category countries (Figure 15).
When considering these results by demographic breakdown, there was little

difference in attitudes to impact by age group. However, it is notable that fewer
women than men (by 7 percentage points) in UCG-category countries felt that the
recent change of government had had a positive impact. There was little difference
by gender in attitudes on this same question among the DTS-category respondents.
Despite higher levels of exclusion of women among UCG-category
countries according to global indices, appetite for radical change, or for
faith in incoming military juntas, was somewhat muted among women
in these settings.
While more respondents felt the impact had been positive in UCG countries on
average, it is significant to note that these results mask wide differences between
countries (Figure 16). A sense that events were positive was highest in Mali
(84 percent), followed by Guinea (66 percent) and Chad (49 percent) — at or well
above half of respondents — whereas significantly fewer respondents in either
Burkina Faso or Sudan felt so (61 percent of Sudanese respondents saw the military
coup as a negative development). The highest percentage of DTS respondents to
view the last election result as having a positive impact was in Tanzania, with 56
percent of respondents there agreeing to the statement.
FIGURE 15
I M PAC T O F L AST T R A N S I T I O N O N T H E C O U N T RY
 UCG
 DTS
SO FAR, HAS THIS CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT
H A D A P O S I T I V E O R N E G AT I V E I M PA C T ?
47% T H E C H A N G E O F G O V E R N M E N T H AV E H A D A P O S I T I V E I M PA C T,
BY DEMOGRAPHIC BREAKDOWN
41%
37%
35%
47% 46% 48%
38% 37%
36%
13% 12%
10%
15-24
25-39
40+
15-24
25-39
40+
43% 50% 36% 37%

6%
By gender By age By gender By age
Negative Neither Positive Don’t know
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77
In Sudan, Soldiers and citizens qualitative research participants spoke of ‘insecurity’

and the ‘prevalence of fear’ to describe the post-coup situation. Most of the participants
(presciently) indicated that they did not expect anything positive from the coup.
Youth representatives described how the coup constituted a deep shock to young people in
particular. They said events plunged many into a state of fear and depression, shattering their
dreams of building a modern national state after the overthrow of the previous regime.
FIGURE 16 UCG DTS

  Negative
I M PA C T O F T H E L A S T T R A N S I T I O N O N T H E C O U N T R Y,
D I S A G G R E G AT E D B Y C O U N T R Y
  Neither
  Positive
SO FAR, HAS THIS CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT HAD A   Don’t know
P O S I T I V E O R N E G AT I V E I M PA C T O N T H E C O U N T R Y ?
SUDAN 61% 14% 18% 7%
BURKINA
48% 27% 17% 8%
FASO
CHAD 35% 7% 49% 9%
GUINEA 20% 12% 66% 2%
MALI 9% 6% 84% 1%
GHANA 57% 18% 18% 6%
THE GAMBIA 40% 11% 35% 14%
TA N Z A N I A 28% 8% 56% 9%
Among the sharpest differences between UCG and DTS countries emerged in
the emotional realm, as shown in Figure 17. When asked to select adjectives that
describe how they felt about the direction their country was moving in, people
across both categories were most likely to say they felt ‘optimistic’ (62 percent
overall). The biggest difference between the two country types was between
those who selected feeling ‘excited’ (49 percent in UCG countries, versus 25
percent in DTS countries). The data suggests that living through a military
coup seems to produce extreme emotional responses. Many people
reported equal measures of excitement and worry, feeling scared but
also experiencing optimism. These emotions were notably less intense
or prominent among those who had recently lived the routine of an
established political pathway (an election).
78
FIGURE 17
 UCG
E M O T I O N A L F E E L I N G T O WA R D S T H E C O U N T RY ’ S D I R E C T I O N O F T R AV E L
 DTS
W H I C H W O R D S D E C R I B E H O W Y O U F E LT A B O U T Y O U R
COUNTRY DURING THE LAST CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT?
POSITIVE FEELINGS N E G AT I V E F E E L I N G S
E XC ITE D OPT IMIST IC WOR R I E D SCA R E D
49% 25% 66% 58% 63% 56% 57% 43%
OPT IMIST IC WOR R I E D
66% 66% 60% 56% 65% 62% 56% 56%
By gender By gender By gender By gender
OPT IMIST IC WOR R I E D
68%
65% 65%
63% 62% 62% 62%
57% 56% 58%
55% 54%
15-24
25-39
40+
15-24
25-39
40+
15-24
25-39
40+
15-24
25-39
40+
By age By age By age By age
2023
79
CH A P TER 2 .1
Key findings
A review of the focal countries’ positioning on global indices confirmed the

relevance of the study’s development lens on military coups. Correlations
between coup risk and stagnant growth, inequality, the exclusion of youth and
women, governance deficits and higher levels of military spend as a share of
government budget, were apparent.
However, through the prism of the Soldiers Despite these realities, a greater number of
and citizens respondents’ perspectives, it UCG respondents reported the impact of the
appears that despite living in countries with coup event as being ‘positive’ when compared
relatively less development progress, citizens to perceptions of elections shared by DTS-
who had recently experienced a military country category respondents. Respondents
coup reported higher levels of satisfaction were most disposed to such views in Chad,
with their living circumstances than Guinea and Mali.
those in DTS-type settings. These findings
suggest that while an external environment The emotional extremes that accompany
may empirically reflect higher levels of an experience of living through a coup were
development progress, people’s expectations also reflected. Many respondents described
may be augmented in these settings. In such experiencing equal measures of feeling
contexts, a multitude of day-to-day challenges excited, worried, scared and optimistic. More
continue to exist, and aspirations may be left UCG- than DTS-category respondents selected
unmet despite overall development gains. both positive and negative adjectives. The
biggest difference comparing the two emerged
All the cases of UCG events explored in among respondents who selected feeling
this study are recent, and therefore longer- excited (49 percent of UCG respondents,
term development consequences remain versus 25 percent of DTS respondents).
unknown. The findings indicate that five
years after the event, Guinea and Mali had The findings reveal an appetite for change
lost an accumulated sum of $12.13 billion and among UCG-country respondents, and a
$13.52 billion in total gross domestic product perspective of willing positive transformation
(GDP) respectively, based on purchasing to materialize from the recent turmoil —
power parity (PPP). Research across the five despite feelings of fear and anxiety. They also
contemporary UCG contexts confirmed that point to significant levels of frustration and
subsequent political responses have had scepticism among citizens in comparatively
an economic impact, discouraged investors stable and developmentally advanced states.
and curtailed economic activities. Food and While these states may appear relatively
essential commodity prices — already under successful, the data shows that living
pressure due to COVID-19 and, more recently, conditions remain deeply unsatisfactory
the war in Ukraine — have been affected by and worsening amid a globally turbulent
instability in all settings. Humanitarian economy. Tolerance for government under-
needs have spiked. performance is waning.
80
CHAP TER 2 . 2
GOVERNANCE SHORTFALL S
Section 1 reflected on the state of democracy in Africa in an overall context of

significant progress, but also rising un-constitutionalism, authoritarianism
and risk of reversals. It identified an inflection point, posing a critical need for
all stakeholders to prioritize deepening the quality, development, delivery and
sustainability of democracy on the continent. The secondary data reviewed also
showed a stark correlation between coup risk and lower performance across
governance-focused indices.
This chapter shares findings from the Soldiers and citizens research to further
illuminate how governance shortfalls may impact and shape military coup
occurrence. It considers two related sets of issues: belief in democracy, and
confidence in government performance.
To understand how participants view the hallmarks of effective governance,

respondents were asked to identify the key characteristics of democracy. Five key
traits emerged across both DTS and UCG settings. The majority of participants
across both contexts (74 and 64 percent in DTS and UCG countries, respectively)
identified ‘free and fair elections’ as the top characteristic of democracy, while
the second key trait was ‘women have the same rights as men’ (61 percent DTS,
and 55 percent UCG respondents), followed by ‘civil rights protect people against
state oppression’ (50 percent DTS, and 51 percent UCG participants). Responses
for the fourth characteristic, namely ‘people obey their rulers’ was rated slightly
higher in DTS countries (55 percent, versus 50 percent in UCG countries), while the
fifth most cited trait was ‘the media are free from government control’, (46 percent
DTS-country respondents, and 49 percent in UCG settings).
2.2.1 Belief in democracy

Democratic momentum that has swept across the continent since the 1990s has
led to significant progress. Data from Afrobarometer illustrates that a preference
for democracy over any other system of government has been more or less
consistently high for the past decade in most African countries. 114 Interestingly,
however, Afrobarometer data also shows that respondents from this study’s five
UCG-category countries are among the most dissatisfied with democracy, with
an increased belief that a non-democratic system may in some circumstances be
preferable emerging from 2014 data forward. 115
Without being able to corroborate the longitudinal perspective, the Soldiers and
citizens survey findings do identify a similar divergence in attitudes between
its UCG- and DTS-category focal countries. As Figure 18 illustrates, survey
respondents were asked to select one of three options that best described their
attitude towards democracy. While over two thirds (67 percent) of people living in
DTS-category countries indicated that democracy is preferable to any other kind
of government, a smaller proportion (just over half) of those in the UCG category
shared this view.
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81
FIGURE 18
UCG DTS
PREFERENCE FOR DEMOCRACY OR OTHER KIND OF GOVERNMENT
  Democracy is preferable
W H I C H O F T H E S E T H R E E S TAT E M E N T S I S C L O S E S T T O Y O U R O W N O P I N I O N ?   It doesn’t matter for someone like me

  Non-democratic governance may
be preferable
  Don’t know
55%
67%
IN THE UCG COUNTRIES
B E L I E V E T H AT D E M O C R A C Y
IS PREFERABLE
IN THE DTS COUNTRIES
8% B E L I E V E T H AT D E M O C R A C Y
IS PREFERABLE
Don’t know
20%
17% Don’t know
It doesn’t matter for
someone like me
16%
Non-democratic
11%
16%
governance may
be preferable Non-democratic It doesn’t matter for
governance may someone like me
be preferable
DEMOGRAPHIC BREAKDOWN, BY AGE AND GENDER
By gender By age
15-24 55%
25-39 53%
40+ 57%
DEMOCRACY IS PREFERABLE
15-24 66%
25-39 64%
55% 55% 65% 68%
40+ 71%
15-24 20%
25-39 20%
40+ 17%
I T D O E S N ’ T M AT T E R
FOR SOMEONE LIKE ME
15-24 16%
21% 18% 18% 14%
25-39
16%
40+ 16%
15-24 16%
25-39 19%
40+ 15%
N O N - D E M O C R AT I C G O V E R N A N C E
M AY B E P R E F E R A B L E
15-24 12%
14% 21% 9% 13%
25-39 13%
40+ 8%
82
The remainder in UCG countries were broadly split between saying a non- Statistical analysis of
democratic government can sometimes be preferable (17 percent) or that, for them, the Soldiers and citizens
the type of system does not really matter (20 percent). These findings seem to data found that men were
55 percent more likely than
demonstrate that people do not necessarily value democracy absolutely in either
women to say that a non-
setting, and that significant numbers of citizens view non-democratic forms of
democratic government
government as a necessary option in some circumstances. 116 This attitude is more can be preferable in some
likely in countries that recently experienced a coup. circumstances.
Interestingly, fewer women than men in both categories felt that a non-democrat-
ic system may be preferable in some circumstances (by 7 percentage points in
UCG-category countries, and 4 percentage points in DTS-category countries). These
findings correlate with the similarly lower percentage of women in UCG countries
who felt the impact of the coup was positive, compared to men — as discussed in
the previous chapter. 117 They may be taken to imply recognition that gender parity
and women’s rights may be better pursued through democracy than in its absence.
Women were also slightly more likely to choose ‘it doesn’t matter for someone like
me’, as an answer. Considering results by age, ‘democracy is preferable’ was a more
common response by 7 percentage points among 40+ respondents than with those
in the 24–39 bracket in DTS contexts. In other words, older respondents were more
consistent in their support for democracy. However, variation by age was marginal
among respondents in UCG-category countries.
In building an understanding of the drivers of Africa’s recent military coups, it is

pertinent to note the relatively lower levels of belief in democracy in the UCG focal
countries — while recognizing that the data also shows this group of democracy
sceptics to be a minority.
Case study research underscores the readiness of citizens to take to the streets
to express grievances in all five UCG countries, both recently and further back in
contemporary history. Often, such protests were clearly in support of democratic
principle, as highlighted in Section 1. However, popular demonstrations in support
of military coup leaders have also featured prominently in recent events. The
popularity of the contemporary military coups in the immediate timeframe of
their occurrence is also reflected in the Soldiers and citizens data — for example, in
the higher levels of optimism about the countries’ direction of travel discussed in
the previous chapter. However, popular support for these dramatic changes
has been widely interpreted by commentators as a reaction against the
status quo, and, as such, constitute an expression of democratic demand
for better governance, rather than for military rule per se.118
Hints of this dynamic — and of citizens’ disappointment when hoped-for outcomes

have failed to materialize — also appear when comparing respondents’ answers
about ‘feelings during the transition’ and ‘feelings about country’s direction of
travel now’, as shown in Figure 19. Positive feelings have declined: ‘excitement’
by 10 percentage points; feeling ‘proud’ by 9 percentage points; while optimism
remains at similar levels. Negative feelings have shown smaller changes, but an
intensification is discernible: ‘worried’ is up by 5 percentage points — and more so
among men.
2023
83
FIGURE 19
FEELINGS IN FLUX AMONGST RESPONDENTS IN UCG COUNTRIES
POSITIVE FEELINGS N E G AT I V E F E E L I N G S
 Feeling during transition  Feeling during transition

 Feeling with the current direction  Feeling with the current direction
67%
66% 63%
59% 58% 57% 56% 58%
57%
54%
49% 49%
Excited Proud Optimistic Scared Confused Worried
DEMOCRAPHIC BREAKDOWN
EXCITEMENT AMONGST WORRY AMONGST

RESPONDENTS THEN AND NOW RESPONDENTS THEN AND NOW
BY GENDER BY GENDER
57% 60% 49% 49% 62% 54% 65% 62%
Excited then Excited now Worried then Worried now
BY COUNTRY BY COUNTRY 87%

82%
77%
75%
72%
69%
64%
59%
51% 52% 53% 52% 56%

50%
51%
45%
39% 41%
36% 35%
Sudan Burkina Chad Guinea Mali Mali Chad Guinea Burkina Sudan
Faso Faso
News sources and secondary analysis of events highlight the ultimately

ephemeral nature of popular support for military coups in the recent cases in
Africa. In Guinea, a year after Colonel Mamady Doumbouya took power amid
popular demonstrations in his favour, sporadic clashes between protesters and
security forces broke out in September 2022. These occurred alongside calls by a
coalition of opposition and civil society actors for a swifter return to constitutional
order, objecting to the repression of dissent and a perceived manipulation of
judicial institutions and processes. 119
84
In post-coup Burkina Faso, insecurity related to

violent extremism has intensified, despite the
junta promising to improve security. As a result,
a worsening humanitarian crisis has already
displaced millions and public confidence is
reportedly being drained. 120 The changeable nature
of popular support was particularly evident when,
less than eight months after being cheered into
power, Lieutenant Colonel Damiba was forced to step
down in a counter-coup, accused of failure to live up
to expectations and deliver on his initial promises
of restoring security in the country. Turbulent
scenes unfolded outside the French embassy, with
protesters reacting to rumours that he was being
protected there.
The Soldiers and citizens survey highlights

FIGURE 20
the relevance of perceived underperformance  UCG
R
REEA
ASSO
ONNS
S F
FO OR R S
SUUP
PPPO
ORRT
T T
TOO N
NOON
N --
of previous governments — including those D
DEEM
MOOC
CRRA
ATT II C
C FFO
ORRM
MSS OOF
F G
GOOV
VEER
RNNM ME
ENNT
T ? 121
 DTS
that were democratically elected — in shaping

U N D E R W H AT C I R C U M S TA N C E S D O Y O U M E A N
an appetite for change, fuelling bursts of A N O N - D E M O C R AT I C F O R M O F G O V E R N M E N T
M AY B E P R E F E R A B L E ?
popular support in favour of coup events
as they unfold. Respondents who said that a
‘non-democratic government can sometimes Don’t know
be preferable’ were prompted to unpack the Economic

circumstances in which they felt this may apply. /jobs 14%
This was asked as an open question, allowing 2%

Democracy
respondents to provide answers in their own words. Security 11% abused
63% /not working
The combined responses were then analysed and

Corruption 10%
coded to identify patterns of views. As shown in
Figure 20, by far the most common reason given
was that democracy was ‘abused’ or ‘not working’.
In UCG-category countries, almost two in three
respondents (63 percent) said this was one of the
reasons. It was far more important than issues of Don’t know
security (11 percent) or the economy (2 percent).

Economic 15%
/jobs
Similarly, in DTS-category countries, democracy 6% Democracy
Security abused
‘not working / being abused’ was the most significant 4%
48% /not working
reason (48 percent). But for these countries, the
second-highest reason was corruption (29 percent).
These findings show that people are most ready Corruption 29%
to consider alternatives — even in democratically
transitioned settings — where they perceive
democracy to be dysfunctional, often linked
to corruption. Percentages might not add up to a 100% in some charts,
as they are rounded to the nearest percentage
2023
85
2.2.2 Confidence in government performance

The legitimacy of governments in the eyes of citizens (or lack thereof) is clearly
a critical feature of the landscape shaping popular support for military coups.
Disappointment in the performance of leadership, including where it has been
democratically elected, has shaped a readiness to consider alternative systems to
democracy in some circumstances. This attitude is more marked in countries that
recently experienced military coups, but is also prominent in DTS-category countries.
The positioning on global governance indices cited in Section 1 reduces to a numer-

ical score the lived experiences of millions of citizens: lives marred by exclusion,
infringement of rights, deprivation, restriction of opportunity and frustration. Case
study analysis across the five UCG countries depicts inadequate service delivery
across security, health and education, as well as horizontal inequalities and
risks. Political economies have generated entrenched patronage systems whereby
economic opportunities are dominated by close connections to governing elites.
The Soldiers and citizens perceptions survey explored people’s attitudes to different
dimensions of state performance, which are discussed in the remainder of this
chapter. The first area relates to effective leadership. Findings suggest that people
feel strongly about who runs their country. Across all eight countries, 80 percent
of respondents described ‘who runs the country’ as being very important to them,
although this number was 5 percentage points lower among UCG respondents than
those in DTS-category countries (Figure 21).
FIGURE 21
I M P O R TA N C E O F W H O R U N S T H E C O U N T R Y
 UCG
I S I T I M P O R TA N T T O Y O U W H O R U N S T H E C O U N T R Y ?
 DTS
Don’t know Don’t know

6% 3%
Not
Not important
important
16% 14%
IMPORTANT IMPORTANT
78% 83%
The importance ascribed to leadership in the eyes of the public is poignant. A factor
that stands out in the case study analysis as key in building resilient constitutional
order is the historic role of transformational and developmental leaders, who
focused on building a strong institutional legacy. The quality of leadership has been
a significant factor and source of resilience in shaping the political trajectories
of the eight focal countries. This factor is highlighted in other analysis reviewed
for this report. For instance, a study by the International Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance concluded that leaders of successful transitions, among
other characteristics, tended to have had a strategic sense of direction toward more
inclusive and accountable governance. The study also ascribed to these leaders
a fundamental preference for peaceful and incremental transformation, while
capturing the mood and spirit of citizens and reinforcing the efforts of political
parties and social organizations to move toward democracy. 122
86
BOX 10
A L E G A C Y O F D E V E L O P M E N TA L L E A D E R S H I P
Julius Nyerere in Tanzania and Jerry John Rawlings in

Ghana are leaders who played decisive roles in defining
the democratic trajectory of their respective countries,
both of which have been on a democratic transition
course since the 1990s, notwithstanding ongoing
challenges in each country. Both leaders are credited
with visionary legacies that created a strong foundation
for future development progress.
Despite, in Rawlings’ case, coming into power through

a military coup, both voluntarily left office. This
inspired a new political culture and tradition for the
medium and longer term. When a strong and influential
leader sets a precedent for stepping down peacefully,
it becomes difficult to break the trend and reverse the
path. Power transitions can create a new and positive
path dependence. No successor managed to overstay
their term in any of the 21 countries in Africa where one
president had left office in accordance with term-limit
provisions, as of 2022. 123
As some analysts have observed, the new generation of military leaders that has
come into power through coups in West Africa “… has wooed disenfranchised youth
with the same populist leftist rhetoric [that] West African military leaders used
in the 1970s and 1980s”. 124 Each has consciously invoked the spirit and message
of previous revolutionary leaders to inspire a sense of historic opportunity and
change among young supporters. 125 Whether they will live up to these references
to earlier ‘giants’ remains an open question. But the rhetoric perhaps speaks to
a yearning on the continent for effective leadership, after decades of rule
by patrimonial and exclusionary elites. Its apparent resonance should
be taken as a rallying call to principled and purposeful leadership for
all serving presidents.
Turning from the quality of political leadership to other aspects of state legitimacy
in the eyes of citizens, the data found that more than half of people in both country
categories believed that their system of government needs to improve a great
deal. Findings were similar across UCG and DTS settings, as shown in Figure 22.
In UCG-category countries, 55 percent agreed, and 33 percent disagreed with the
statement that their country’s system of government is rigged to advantage the
rich and powerful. These views are broadly consistent with the results reported
in DTS-category countries, where 50 percent agreed, and 36 percent disagreed, as
shown in Figure 23.
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87
FIGURE 22
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT NEEDS IMPROVING

 UCG
 DTS
WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING BEST

DESCRIBES YOUR OPINION OF THE SYSTEM
OF GOVERNMENT IN YOUR COUNTRY?
It could be improved
It could be improved in small ways but
in small ways but mainly works well
mainly works well
24%
16%
It works extremely It could be It could be
well and could not It works extremely
12% 15% improved improved
be improved quite a lot
well and could not 7% 16% quite a lot
be improved
4%
Don’t know
3%
Don’t know
IT NEEDS A IT NEEDS A
GREAT DEAL OF GREAT DEAL OF
IMPROVEMENT IMPROVEMENT
53% 50%
FIGURE 23
S Y S T E M O F G O V E R N M E N T I S R I G G E D T O A D VA N TA G E T H E R I C H A N D T H E P O W E R F U L
 UCG
 DTS
D O Y O U A G R E E T H AT T H E S Y S T E M O F G O V E R N M E N T
I S R I G G E D T O A D VA N TA G E T H E R I C H A N D P O W E R F U L?
Neither / Neither /
12% 14%
DISAGREE
DISAGREE
33% 36%
AGREE AGREE
55% 50%
88
Despite the similarities between the two country categories, differences emerged in
other areas related to confidence in government performance. The survey revealed
again that, despite conditions being worse in UCG countries (as extrapolated from
global indices and case study analysis), levels of scepticism were lower overall
than in DTS-category countries. As shown in Figure 24, across the eight countries
surveyed, more people on average reported being dissatisfied than satisfied with
the way their government is running the country. However, those in DTS-category
countries were 9 percentage points more likely to report dissatisfaction than
counterparts in UCG-category countries. Dissatisfaction was more pronounced
among lower-income bracket respondents in both category countries, but
substantially more so in the DTS focal countries.
FIGURE 24
S AT I S F A C T I O N W I T H T H E W AY T H E G O V E R N M E N T I S R U N N I N G T H E C O U N T R Y
 UCG
 DTS
H O W S AT I S F I E D O R D I S S AT I S F I E D A R E Y O U W I T H T H E W AY T H E G O V E R N M E N T I S R U N N I N G T H E C O U N T R Y ?
55% 31%
14%
46% 38%
16%
Dissatisfied Neither/don’t know Satisfied
D I S S AT I S FA C T I O N W I T H T H E G O V E R M E N T
BY DEMOCRAPHIC BREAKDOWN
62%
55% 56%
53%
48% 47% 49% 49%
43% 44%
Lower Upper Lower Upper

15-24
25-39
40+
15-24
25-39
40+
47% 45% 54% 56% income /middle income /middle

income income
By gender By age By income
People were more dissatisfied than satisfied with public services in both settings.
However, they were more dissatisfied in DTS- than UCG-category countries by 9
percentage points, as shown in Figure 25. Feedback on rule-of-law indicators also
points to greater public scepticism (or higher levels of expectation) in DTS than
UCG-category countries. In the former, just 10 percent of the public thought that
the law was fairly applied to all citizens ‘all of the time’, as compared to 28 percent
in UCG-category countries. This point revealed limited differences in attitude by
gender, as shown in Figure 26.
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89
FIGURE 25
S AT I S FA C T I O N W I T H P U B L I C S E R V I C E S
 UCG
 DTS
A R E Y O U S AT I S F I E D O R D I S S AT I S F I E D W I T H T H E Q U A L I T Y
O F K E Y P U B L I C S E R V I C E S , E . G . E D U C A T I O N A N D H E A LT H ?
DISSATISFIED SATISFIED DISSATISFIED SATISFIED

45% 43% 56% 34%
NEITHER / DON’T KNOW NEITHER / DON’T KNOW

12% 10%
FIGURE 26
UCG DTS
E Q U A L T R E AT M E N T O F C I T I Z E N S B E F O R E T H E L A W
  Always
H O W O F T E N , I F A T A L L , D O Y O U T H I N K T H E L A W I S F A I R LY
  Most of the time
APPLIED TO ALL CITIZENS IN YOUR COUNTRY?

  Sometimes
  Rarely
  Never
MOST OF
ALWAYS THE TIME SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER DON’T KNOW
28% 11% 21% 17% 17% 5%
MOST OF
ALWAYS THE TIME SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER DON’T KNOW
10% 20% 36% 18% 9% 7%
BY GENDER
7% 9% 4% 5%
9%
11%
8% 10%
17% 28% 18% 29%
20%
20%
18% 18%
16% 18%
11% 11%
22% 36% 20% 36%
Women Men
90
The need to reframe social contracts emerges

as a critical vehicle for delivering improved The qualitative research in Burkina Faso and Ghana
state performance and development indicated that across these diverse settings, participants
outcomes, while enabling resilience to have reportedly lost trust in the capabilities of either the
incumbent government or opposition to change the status
coups.126 The heightened levels of scepticism and
quo and deliver improved outcomes on good governance,
disappointment in the delivery of democratically
justice or socio-economic development priorities.
elected governments across DTS countries warns
against complacency among relatively high Participants viewed opposition parties as a replica of the
performers. Questions of state legitimacy in the government in power, “just waiting for their turn to loot the
eyes of citizens, and the importance of improving nation’s resources”. While some think the political system
levels of civic trust and confidence, have of governance needs to change, others contend that liberal
continent-wide pertinence. democracy as it is currently practiced is not the best political
system. These sentiments were particularly pronounced
among participants from Burkina Faso.
These priorities should not be seen as the sole
concern of countries that have shown themselves It was felt that general disappointment in political leadership
most vulnerable to coup risk. Macro stressors could lead to voter apathy. Some participants indicated
such as the pandemic, climate change and war in they planned to abstain from voting in elections until major
Ukraine contribute to mounting risk across Africa’s constitutional reforms have taken place.
development landscape.
“People have lost confidence in the government and
opposition. They think that they are the same, so voter
apathy may set in during the next elections. People are
beginning to check out of the system, and that will affect
participation. People will not be willing to get involved in
the next election process.” Female key informant, Ghana
However, some participants in Ghana see the current

situation as an opportunity for change. In particular,
they critiqued the government for failing to address
economic hardship.
CH A P TER 2 . 2
Key findings
Democratic momentum that has spread across the continent since the 1990s has led to
significant progress. Many countries, including three of this study’s focal countries, are
on a path of democratic transition in spite of challenges and countervailing influences.
Differences in attitudes to democracy are apparent between the UCG- and DTS-category focal
countries, reflecting their countries’ respective experiences. While over two thirds of people
in DTS countries indicated that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, just
over half of those in the UCG category shared this view. The remainder in UCG countries were
broadly split between saying a non-democratic government can sometimes be preferable
(17 percent) or that, for them, the type of system does not really matter (20 percent).
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91
CH A P TER 2 . 2 K E Y FINDING S
These findings illustrate people’s The perceived underperformance of previous

disappointment with the delivery of governments, including those that have
democratically elected governments to date, been democratically elected, appears highly
fuelling a sense that significant numbers of relevant in shaping both a broader appetite for
citizens view non-democratic government change and the fleeting popularity of military
as presenting a legitimate alternative in coups ‘in the moment’. Equally relevant
some circumstances. This attitude was is mounting scepticism about democratic
more prevalent in the countries that had delivery — even in DTS-type settings.
recently experienced a coup. Respondents who indicated that alternatives
to democracy might be acceptable were
Fewer women than men, in both asked to elaborate on the circumstances that
categories of countries, felt that a would justify such a change. By far the most
common reason provided was that democracy
non-democratic system could be
was being ‘abused’ or ‘not working’. In
preferable in some circumstances
UCG-category countries, more than half
(a difference of 7 percentage points in UCG
(63 percent) cited this reason. In DTS-
countries, and 4 percentage points in DTS-
category focal countries, 48 percent also
category countries). This seems to imply
gave this reason. But for the latter countries,
recognition that gender parity and women’s
a larger share of respondents identified
rights may be better pursued through
corruption as the second-highest reason
democracy than in its absence.
(29 percent).
A preparedness to challenge democracy From these findings it emerges that people

appears to be propelled by a profound are most ready to consider alternatives (even
yearning for better governance. Popular in democratically transitioned settings)
support for dramatic changes of the political where they perceive democracy, as
guard may be understood as a reaction constituted, to be dysfunctional or abused,
against the status quo. That people are often linked to corruption.
cheering for change, rather than offering
their wholehearted endorsement of the In ranking government performance, similar
incoming leadership, is also apparent in numbers across settings felt their system
comparing respondents’ ‘feelings during of government needed improving. However,
transition’ with their ‘feelings about the scepticism was again higher among those
country’s current direction’. Positive feelings living in DTS-category countries. More of
declined: ‘excitement’ by 10 percentage points these respondents (by 9 percentage points)
and feeling ‘proud’ by 9 percentage points. said they were dissatisfied with the way the
Feelings of optimism, however, remained at government was running the country; while
similar levels. 11 percent more DTS respondents expressed
dissatisfaction with public services. These
The ephemeral nature of the popularity of respondents were 18 percent less disposed to
the recent military coups in the immediate think that rule of law was applied fairly all
timeframe of their occurrence is thus of the time than counterparts in UCG-type
reflected in the data. Such support is likely to settings. These findings place significant
evaporate when change is not forthcoming — emphasis on the importance of reviving
as subsequent events on the streets in Guinea trust between citizens and the state across
and Burkina Faso have underlined. all settings in Africa.
92
CHAP TER 2 .3
SECURIT Y AND SAFET Y
This report casts a development lens on recent military coups in Africa, which Soldiers and citizens
recalls the centrality of ‘peaceful, just and inclusive’ societies as articulated in qualitative research
Agenda 2030 and similarly in Agenda 2063, as a crucial goal and enabler of other participants in Burkina
Faso indicated that the
development gains and priorities.
political and security
situation in the country
A state’s ability to provide inclusive security is partly determined by the created uncertainty and
functionality and accountability of its security sector, along with the overall state a humanitarian crisis,
of civil-military relations. This chapter focuses on survey respondents’ attitudes to resulting in the death
the military and wider issues related to security and safety. of millions of people —
especially women and
children. Citizens felt
2.3.1 Reformist military over civilian status quo
unsafe, economically dis-
As has been noted, military coup leaders, especially in Burkina Faso and Mali,
empowered and unable to
leveraged concerns around ineffective state responses to insecurity in galvanizing have their basic needs met.
initial popular support. The impacts of deepening insecurity on daily life in the
region are indeed bleak — as illustrated in the stark data from the Armed Conflict
Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), shown in Figure 27. ACLED defines
‘violence against civilians’ as events where an organized armed group deliberately
inflicts violence on unarmed non-combatants. By definition, civilians are unarmed
and cannot engage in political violence. Perpetrators include state forces and their
affiliates, rebels, militias and external/other forces.
FIGURE 27
V I O L E N C E A G A I N S T C I V I L I A N S I N U C G - C AT E G O R Y C O U N T R I E S
 UCG
 DTS
Number of violent events against civilians
300
250
200
150
100
50
2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021

2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
Source: ACLED, October 2022
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93
In some countries, the weak state legitimacy highlighted in the previous chapter
is both a cause of, and compounded by, aggravated levels of violence perpetrated
both by armed groups and state security forces in the name of combatting
terrorism. Studies have repeatedly found mistreatment by security forces and state
institutions to be one of the most powerful drivers of armed-group recruitment in
the region. 127
The general optimism that UCG-country respondents experienced at the time of the
coup event extends to perceptions of safety and security. In both types of settings,
41 percent of respondents reported being dissatisfied with current levels of safety
in their countries (see Figure 28). Yet significantly more respondents living in
UCG-category countries believed that safety would improve in the coming
two years (by 13 percentage points) when compared to DTS-category
country respondents (with 68 percent optimistic that safety would
improve, compared to 55 percent). Across DTS-category country respondents,
6 percent more respondents anticipated deteriorating safety than UCG respondents
(20 percent versus 14 percent).
FIGURE 28
PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY AND SECURITY IN UCG AND DTS COUNTRIES,

 UCG
NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  DTS
E X P ECTAT I ONS FOR F U T U RE

SAT ISFACT ION WIT H C UR R ENT I M PROVE M E NT OF SA F E T Y M E ASU R E S
LEVELS OF SAF ET Y MEASU RES OVE R T H E NE X T T WO Y E A R S
Satisfied 68% Get better 55%

49% 51%
Dissatisfied Get worse 20%

41% 41%
14%
8% Stay about the same 14%

Neither
7% 7% 11% Don’t know 12%
Don’t know
2% 1%
94
Meanwhile, attitudes towards the role of the military represented one of the most Statistical analysis of the
significant areas of difference between UCG- and DTS-category countries. Soldiers and citizens data
found that people who felt
dissatisfied with levels of
When asked whether there is a clear separation between the military and the
security and public safety
government in their country, half of UCG respondents (52 percent) agreed and
were more likely to state
32 percent disagreed, as shown in Figure 29. that in some circumstances,
a non-democratic form
However, in DTS-category countries, almost the reverse was true: 32 percent agreed, of government can be
while 47 percent disagreed. In other words, more respondents in UCG- than DTS- preferrable — rather than
category countries believed that there was a clear separation between military and fully supporting democracy.
government, despite having recently experienced direct military intervention,
Those who reported
by 20 percentage points.
having seen no change in
satisfaction on safety until
These results may indicate a higher degree of tolerance toward military the present moment, were
involvement in politics that directly reflect the recent coup experiences, 43 percent less likely to
while people in DTS-category countries maintain a watchful vigilance on this prefer non-democratic
relationship. Further, more people in UCG-category than DTS-category forms of government
compared to those who
countries (by 22 percentage points) responded that it is essential in a were disappointed.
democracy for the army to take over when the government is incompetent,
as also shown in Figure 29. (These results resonate with Afrobarometer findings
on rejection versus support for military rule, which also found the UCG-category
countries to report among the highest levels of support among countries. 128)
FIGURE 29
S E PA R AT I O N B E T W E E N T H E M I L I TA R Y A N D G O V E R N M E N T
 UCG
 DTS
T O W H AT E X T E N T D O Y O U A G R E E O R D I S A G R E E T H AT T H E R E I S A
C L E A R S E PA R AT I O N B E T W E E N T H E M I L I TA R Y A N D T H E G O V E R N M E N T ?
��
10% 10%
Agree
32%
Disagree 52% Agree

32%
Disagree 47%
10% Neither
6%
Neither
I S I T A N E S S E N T I A L F E AT U R E O F D E M O C R A C Y T H AT
T H E A R M Y TA K E S O V E R W H E N T H E G O V E R N M E N T I S I N C O M P E T E N T ?
YES
49% YES
27%
NO NO
51% 73%
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95
Sudan was once again a clear exception, with the military coup in question
representing a reversal of hope, and respondents rejecting the recent military
intervention. The responses in the other UCG settings, however, reflected a more
prominent notion that a reformist faction of the military may be better equipped
and more effective than civilian governments to tackle prevailing insecurity,
corruption and abuses.
It is interesting to note that throughout history, the role of the military in

supporting democratic revolution has proven crucial to the success of some
transitions. 129 People may be inclined to put their faith in military actors when
gravely disappointed by civilian rule, as shown in many of the UCG-country
responses. Yet the long-term sustainability of a close military involvement has
also been documented to pose negative effects for development and governance
outcomes — as also noted by research participants in Sudan. Indeed, the case study
analysis conducted for this report found that proactive efforts to reform civil-
military relations formed a key contributor to the DTS countries’ relative success
in deepening democracy.
BOX 11
C I V I L I A N A N D D E M O C R AT I C C O N T R O L O V E R T H E
M I L I TA R Y A S A S O U R C E O F C O U P R E S I L I E N C E
In Ghana, considerable progress has been achieved in bringing the military under
civilian control and promoting the reform of civil-military relations. Parliament
exercises a strong degree of oversight. Efforts have been made to improve equipment
supplies, accommodation and conditions of service for uniformed personnel —
although challenges persist. These include deployment during national elections,
the use of excessive force against civilians, as well as political interference in
appointments. The civil-military relationship represents a long-term work in
progress, and a critical priority in the overall effort to ensure continued stability
and sustainable gains. 130
According to participants in the
“Dealing with arms

Soldiers and citizens qualitative
research in Sudan, one of the
reasons the military gets involved
doesn’t establish schools,

in running the country is to serve
its members’ interests, privileges
institutes or provide
and social status. These incentives
were unanimously described in
FGDs in Sudan as key causes of
services. We just want

the October 2021 coup.
a civil government.”
M A L E FOCUS GROUP DIS CUS S A NT, NYA L A , SUDA N (FEBRUA RY 2023)
96
CH A P TER 2 . 3
Key findings
The general optimism that UCG respondents reported feeling at the time of the coup
extends to perceptions of safety and security. While 41 percent of respondents in both
types of settings were dissatisfied with current levels of safety, significantly more
respondents living in UCG-category countries believed that it would improve in the
coming two years (13 percentage points more than DTS-category country respondents, at
68 percent compared to 55 percent). Statistical analysis of the data also shows that people
who felt dissatisfied with levels of security and public safety were more likely to state
that in some circumstances, a non-democratic form of government can be preferrable
— confirming the pertinence of security to government legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
Attitudes towards the role of the military mark one of the most
significant areas of difference between UCG- and DTS-category
countries to emerge from the data, though with variances that
are consistent with differences in attitudes to democracy.
When asked whether there is a clear separation between the

military and the government in their country, half of UCG-country
respondents (52 percent) agreed, and 32 percent disagreed.
However, in DTS-category countries, almost the reverse was true:
32 percent agreed, and 47 percent disagreed. In other words, more
respondents in UCG- than DTS-category countries believed there
to be a clear separation between military and government, despite
recent events, by 20 percentage points.
People living in UCG-category countries, despite having recently

experienced direct military intervention, were more likely to
believe that separation is at appropriate levels. This perhaps
suggests a far higher degree of tolerance for military involvement
in those countries, while people in DTS-category countries
maintain a watchful vigilance on this relationship.
Similarly, more people in UCG-category than DTS-category

countries responded that it is essential in a democracy for the army
to take over when the government is incompetent (by 22 percentage
points). These findings highlight the risk of a return to an era of
close military involvement in African politics, while emphasizing
the critical need to reset the role of the military in political life, and
wider civil-military relations, as a source of resilience.
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97
CHAP TER 2 .4
PERSPECTIVES ON INCLUSION
This chapter focuses on impressions drawn from the case studies on the nature and
quality of inclusiveness of the formal transition processes in the UCG countries,
as well as perceptions arising from the Soldiers and citizens survey. 131 The report
turns to different dimensions of inclusivity, comparing the two categories of focal
countries’ experiences. In doing so, it considers not only the involvement of citizens,
but also different civic institutions and actors — as well as specific gains and
challenges in relation to young people and women.
2.4.1 The inclusiveness and legitimacy of formal transition processes

All five military transitions established a guiding transition charter, which
serves as the legal reference document for the transition. With the constitutionally
established legislature suspended, each country bar Sudan appointed a body acting
as a transitional legislative council. In all cases, the council was, to some degree,
reflective of the country’s diversity. In Guinea and Chad, this element has since
been increasingly contested. All UCG countries engaged in some sort of dialogue
with socio-political stakeholders to build consensus around the management
of the transition (though in Sudan, this was ruptured first in October 2021, and
subsequently by the outbreak of war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the
paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in April 2023. It was also temporarily disrupted
in Burkina Faso from September 2022). Each also flagged the need to review and
update the existing constitutional framework as a critical dimension of agreeing
a new democratic settlement. At the same time, each country has encountered
difficulties regarding the initial timelines set for restoring constitutional order.
Across the five cases, there has been prominent signalling towards
inclusive and consultative process as a principle to guide the drafting
and execution of the respective transition plans. This may have reflected
influence from the AU, UN and other international partners to some extent, as well
as political astuteness on the part of coup leaders in Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea,
and interim leadership in Chad.
Soldiers and citizens In Chad, the first declarations and actions of the Transitional Military Council
qualitative research (CMT), in calling for inclusive national dialogue and reaching out to armed
participants in Burkina opposition groups, seemed to have resonated with a high number of citizens.
Faso expressed anxiety Initiated in mid-March 2022, the Doha Process experienced a series of delays
that the military junta may
before its conclusion in August of the same year. Various political actors and civil
seek to hang on to power,
society activists were provoked by the delays, expressing waning confidence in
using “excuses” of engaging
in social dialogue and the inclusivity of Chad’s transition. 132 The civil society platform Wakit Tama was
political reconciliation, the at the fore among these, and subsequently announced its non-association with the
constitutional referendum national dialogue process, alongside a number of other groups. At the end of this
and reforms, as a means to process in early October 2022, violent crackdowns were witnessed against citizens,
prolong the transition. opposition and civil society leaders protesting the CMT’s announcement of a two-
year extension to the transition period. The violence signalled deep shortfalls in
achieving inclusivity, and a rupture in popular confidence in the process. 133
98
The popular revolution that initially triggered Sudan’s transition plan was
already imbued with demand for inclusion across citizens’ groups, often
organized as resistance committees. The counter-revolutionary coup in
October 2021 clearly shifted the prominence and spirit of inclusivity, with
ever-deteriorating levels of trust between government, security forces and
citizens. (As subsequent events have witnessed, trust between the coup
instigators themselves also spiralled, resulting in all-out war between them
from April 2023.) In Mali, the appointment of the civilian interim president and
prime minister in September 2020 was preceded by consultations with various
stakeholders. However, principal political parties and former armed group
signatories of the 2015 peace agreement were absent from the December 2021
Assises nationales pour la refondation. 134
In Burkina Faso, the junta initially established a technical committee tasked

with proposing measures to ensure consensus around the ‘existential priorities
of the nation’, elaborating a draft agenda and timeline for the duration of the
transition, and drawing up of a draft charter. The committee was asked to consult
widely and draw on the country’s recent history. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel
Damiba submitted himself to the requirements of the country’s anti-corruption
legislation by declaring his assets to the Constitutional Court as early as
24 February 2022, on the margins of his inauguration ceremony. He is the only
one of the region’s incoming coup leaders to have made such a declaration.
Despite these efforts to project inclusivity and accountability, scepticism was
voiced from the outset about the appointment of military officers and former
regime loyalists into strategic positions. Low representation of political parties
in the transitional legislative assembly, with only eight members out of 71, was
a further source of contention. Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who toppled Lieutenant
Colonel Damiba in September 2022, proceeded with a similar consultative
process in the formation of his government and review of transition priorities.
The inclusivity of Guinea’s transition follows a similar trajectory (see Box 12).
Both Burkina Faso and Guinea’s transitional military leadership fell out of favour
with segments of the public and key constituencies in less than 12 months, as
flagged in the previous chapter. The challenges of managing political dynamics
both within the junta and between the junta and other political forces at large in
society are revealed ever more sharply with every passing month. Soldiers and
citizens, though momentary allies while UCG events are unfolding, may
readily become alienated as the complexity and interests bound up in
the political transition assert themselves.
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99
BOX 12
I N C L U S I V I T Y I N G U I N E A’ S T R A N S I T I O N
The ruling National Committee of Recovery and Development (CNRD) junta in Guinea took several
robust steps to indicate a clear break from the previous regime. This included the indictment of top-
level officials, among others in pursuit of corruption cases and the release of political prisoners.
There was a high degree of confidence as to the inclusive nature of the transition up until January 2022.
The junta reached out to a multitude of stakeholders. Colonel Doumbouya visited the graveyards of the
two late former presidents and their respective families. The junta also organized public consultations
during September 2021, where delegations from almost all political parties, several CSOs, religious and
traditional leaders, artists, farmers and other groups were received.
Guinea’s Transitional Charter provides for a National Transitional Council (CNT) of 81 members,
appointed to act as legislators until the election of a new national assembly. The 81 members of the CNT
were seemingly carefully selected to represent various segments of society and included a reasonable
representation of women and youth (even though political parties complained that their share of 15
seats was insufficient). Government posts were also allocated to represent various ethnic groups and
regions of the country, including members of some political parties.
In March 2022, the junta launched national consultations for reconciliation called assises nationales,
co-chaired by the grand imam of Conakry and the head of the Catholic Church. This dialogue process
aimed at listening to Guineans across the country and in select countries abroad, with a view to reaching
reconciliation over divisive issues from the past. The committee facilitating the proceedings presented
its provisional report to the leader of the junta at the end of April 2022.
Likewise, in early April 2022, in response to political actors calling for a specific mechanism for
dialogue, the junta launched what it called the Inclusive Framework of Concertation (Cadre de
concertation inclusif), facilitated by the minister in charge of decentralization and territorial
administration. All political parties and interested CSOs were invited to attend and make recommen-
dations about the management of the transition period, including its duration and timeline. With
reference to these two mechanisms, Colonel Doumbouya, in a televised address on 30 April, proposed a
39-month transitional timeline. The CNT reduced this to 36 months in a vote on 11 May 2022. In August
2022, a national dialogue process was organized, led by three female facilitators. On 21 October 2022,
the junta finally reached an agreement with ECOWAS on a 24-month transitional period starting
in December.
All this seemed to indicate strong inclusivity in the post-coup process in Guinea. However, from early
2022, some political parties — particularly the three largest ones under the former regime — began
criticizing the transition. They boycotted the national consultations and framework and the August
national dialogue, arguing that these were not genuine or that other actors had been invited to dilute
their contribution. 135
Following increasingly vocal and organized criticism of the 36-month timeline, the junta banned the
FNDC — a coalition of political parties, trade unions and CSOs. It also banned all public demonstrations.
Sporadic clashes have turned increasingly violent since mid-2022. Confidence in the transition process
and efforts at ensuring its inclusiveness have been compromised by these developments.
100
2.4.2 Degree of individual participation in political transition processes

Charting electoral turnout offers a way to assess individual inclusion in political
processes. According to secondary data, this is subject to significant variation,
looking across this study’s focal countries. Ghana takes the lead with 69 percent
eligible voter turnout in the 2016 elections (and close to 80 percent in the 2012
and 2020 elections). 136 It is followed by Mali, with 43 percent in the country’s 2018
elections. 137 Deepening participation in elections remains an important focus of
governance and democracy promotion. However, even with relatively high levels of
voter participation, voting may not always generate a straight path to meaningful
inclusion in political transitions.
The Soldiers and citizens perceptions survey indicates varied success regarding the
extent to which individual citizens felt that they were heard or included in the last
national-level political event (UCG or election) in each country (as shown in Figure
30). As many as 77 percent of respondents in Guinea and 84 percent in Mali felt they
had been ‘listened to’ at the time of the coup. On average, more urban and lower-
income bracket respondents were among the group that reported such perspectives.
FIGURE 30
 UCG
CITIZENS’ SENSE OF BEING LISTENED TO IN MOST RECENT POLITICAL EVENT
 DTS
P E R C E N T A G E O F P E O P L E W H O F E LT L I S T E N E D T O “ F U L LY ” O R “ T O S O M E E X T E N T ”
BY COUNTRY BY DEMOGRAPHIC BREAKDOWN
BY GENDER BY AGE
MALI 84% 57% 56% 56%
GUINEA 77% 48% 46% 45%

GHANA 50%
BURKINA FASO 45%
TANZANIA 44%
THE GAMBIA 44%
CHAD 42%
55% 57% 48% 44%
SUDAN 34%
15-24 25-39 40+
BY INCOME BY AREA
56% 58%
49%
43% 51% 59%
49%
44%
UCG DTS
AVERAGE AVERAGE
56% 46%
Lower income Upper Rural Urban
/middle income
2023
10 1
Respondents in Sudan expressed the least sense of individual engagement out of

all eight countries (with the question being posed to reflect on the military coup,
as opposed to the revolution). However, it is particularly striking to note that
despite living in a democratic transition context, no more than half of respondents
in The Gambia, Ghana or Tanzania felt like their opinions or concerns were listened
to as part of the last electoral cycle.
While more respondents, on average, felt heard in UCG-category countries, this

is varied by country and still leaves a significant number who did not select this
answer. When asked why they had not felt heard, the most prominent response
offered was concern about security issues. This echoes findings from the previous
chapter as to the salience of safety and security to government legitimacy in
the eyes of the public. The prominence of security concerns in UCG- versus
DTS-category countries is stark, as shown in Figure 31.
FIGURE 31
 UCG
CCO
ONNCCEERRN
NSS RRA
AIISSEED
D FFO
ORR B
BEETTTTEERR IIN
NCCLLU
USSIIO
ONN D
DUURRIIN
NGG TTRRA
ANNSSIITTIIO
ONN
 DTS
W
WHHAATT IISSSSUUEESS SSH
HOOUULLDD H
HAAVVEE BBEEEENN BBEETTTTEERR AADDDDRREESSSSEEDD FFOORR YYOOUU TTOO H
HAAVVEE FFEELT
LT M
MOORREE IINNCCLLUUDDEEDD?? 138
U CG DTS
SECURITY 1 IMPROVED
AND STABILITY 35% 34% ECONOMY AND JOBS
2
CORRUPTION AND 12% LISTEN TO PEOPLE
BAD GOVERNANCE 15%
3
IMPROVED CORRUPTION AND
ECONOMY AND JOBS 14% 10% BAD GOVERNANCE
4
LISTEN TO PEOPLE 11% 6% EDUCATION
NEED FOR SECURITY

CHANGE 6% 5 4% AND STABILITY
102
It is telling that a significant percentage of respondents in both UCG- and DTS- Statistical analysis of
category focal countries (28 percent on average) reported neither supporting, the Soldiers and citizens
nor opposing incoming political leadership. data found women to be
26 percent more likely to say
that they neither supported
More women than men, by 7 percentage points, said they neither supported nor
nor opposed the last change
opposed the change (35 percent versus 28 percent). Statistical analysis found of government, compared
an even greater variation by gender. The percentages remain consistent across to men. For women in
age groups, as shown in Figure 32. It can be inferred that this same percentage UCG-category countries,
of respondents (with a small but significant gender imbalance) was at least this rises to 32 percent
disengaged, if not experiencing a sense of exclusion, from the process. more likely than male
counterparts to indicate a
neutral attitude, rather than
Active support for the last change of government ranges from 79 percent in
having supported the coup.
Mali to 23 percent in Sudan — echoing sentiments of ‘feeling heard’. Sudan is
also the only country where more people say they opposed, rather than
supported, the last transition.
FIGURE 32
UCG DTS
SUPPORTED OR OPPOSED THE LAST CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT   Supported
  Neither
DID YOU SUPPORT OR OPPOSE THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT?
  Opposed
79% 14% 4% 3% 62% 26% 8% 4%
MALI TANZANIA
64% 25% 9% 2% 44% 23% 28% 6%
GUINEA THE GAMBIA
42% 31% 15% 12% 36% 36% 17% 11%
CHAD GHANA
33% 51% 11% 5%
BURKINA SUPPORT FOR

FASO THE LAST
POLITICAL
TRANSITION,
23% 37% 33% 7% BY GENDER
SUDAN 45% 52% 47% 47%
2023
103
When asked about their motivations, those who supported the last
change of government in UCG settings gave ‘time for change’ as the
most important reason for doing so (44 percent), as shown in Figure 33.
Other priorities were ‘security and stability’ (21 percent) and ‘better governance’
(15 percent), with 7 percent stating ‘preference’ as the reason. In the DTS-
category countries, three reasons stood out in explaining people’s support for
the results of the last election: ‘better governance’ (21 percent); ‘constitutional
mandate’ (21 percent) and ‘time for change’ (16 percent).
FIGURE 33 FIGURE 34
REASONS FOR SUPPORTING THE LAST POLITICAL REASONS FOR SUPPORTING THE LAST POLITICAL
T R A N S I T I O N , B Y U C G 139 T R A N S I T I O N , B Y D T S 140
WHY DID YOU SUPPORT THE LAST WHY DID YOU SUPPORT THE LAST
CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT? CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT?
TIME FOR
16% CHANGE
SECURITY
21% A N D S TA B I L I T Y
7%
6%
6%
6%
7%
BETTER 6%
15% GOVERNANCE BETTER
21% GOVERNANCE
7%
8%
10%
BETTER
G O8%
VERNANCE
15%
44%
21% CONSTITUTIONAL
M A N D AT E
44%
TIME FOR
CHANGE
TIME FOR CHANGE (44%) C O N S T I T U T I O N A L M A N D AT E ( 2 1 % )
S E C U R I T Y A N D S TA B I L I T Y ( 2 1 % ) BETTER GOVERNANCE (21%)
B E T T E R G OV E R N A N C E (1 5 % ) T I M E FO R C H A N G E (1 6 % )
Preference (7%) Fulfilled last campaign (6%)
Economic/jobs (6%) Transparency in election (6%)
Other (8%) He was chosen (6%)
Don’t know (8%) Improved education (5%)
Economic/jobs (5%)
Other (10%)
Don’t know (7%)
104
2.4.3 Role of civil society and other national actors

Civil society and other national actors played an active role in the last national-
level political event across all focal countries. Research participants mentioned
the varied roles played by CSOs, security forces, EMBs, the judiciary, religious and
traditional leaders, national peace councils, traditional media and social media in
impacting the different transitions.
BOX 13
CIVIL SOCIETY IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS
The ‘civil society’ term is often used as shorthand for referring to non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). Other uses encompass a wider array of formal and informal institutions where people
come together to advance common interests. These may include women’s organizations, youth
organizations, trader associations, trade unions, faith-based organizations, students’ organizations
and the media, among others. 141 Civil society’s role in democratic governance is often seen to have
four major functions: as an advocate representing interests of its constituencies; in service delivery
pertaining to education, health and other sectors; as a partner with government in development
planning; and as a watchdog over government.
Africa’s civil society demonstrates significant development in various aspects, despite encountering
limitations and challenges along the way. These include the threat of political capture and polariza-
tion; restrictions to operating space; the representativeness (or lack thereof) of NGOs as compared
with other sectors of civil society, and connections to grassroots society; knowledge and technical
skills base to project influence; funding constraints; internal governance challenges and others.
The CSOs active during recent political transitions in focal countries generally provided voter
education, peace education, capacity building of electoral actors, policy advocacy, election
monitoring and observation. The research also highlighted the important roles of regional networks
such as the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding,
Institute for Democratic Governance and the Centre for Democratic Development.
Some political analysts recognize that the popular mobilization and civil society-led revolution
created a potentially lasting shift in Sudanese politics. Partisan politics dominated by the traditional
political parties became more broad-based, possibly paving the way for enduring political change.
In Ghana’s recent electoral cycles (especially in 2008 and 2016) sections of civil society at large,
including faith actors and chieftaincy institutions, contributed to averting possible disorder
and democratic breakdown. In particular, the Christian Council of Ghana, the Pentecostal and
Charismatic Council, and the office of the National Chief Imam actively participated by providing
civic and voter education, promoting free and fair polls through election observation and monitoring,
as well as peacebuilding and national reconciliation initiatives.
In terms of religious and traditional authorities, research participants emphasized the role of
Ghana’s National Peace Council (NPC) in building tolerance, consensus and confidence in key state
institutions, as well as promoting inter and intra-party dialogues throughout the election period.
For example, ahead of the 2020 elections, the NPC — in collaboration with some civil society
groups — persuaded political leaders to sign a Presidential Peace Pact on eradicating vigilantism
and ensuring peaceful elections.
2023
105
Although the NPC is seen to have contributed to relatively peaceful outcomes, the main opposition
party accused it of supporting the ruling government, leading to physical attacks on the members of
the council and damage to their vehicles. Active engagement, without being caught up in polarizing
political dynamics, is a continual struggle for civil society actors.
The Soldiers and citizens perceptions survey asked respondents to reflect on what
role, if any, different institutions played in the UCG event or election in each
country, and whether that role was positive or negative. The results are shown
in Figure 35. In some respects, this perceived role is similar across the different
types of countries. Social media, police, religious bodies and national-level busi-
ness leaders are consistently seen to have played a positive role by roughly the
same proportion of the public on average. Yet small but significant differences in
attitudes between UCG and DTS countries are clear with respect to some institu-
tions. Participants in UCG contexts were more likely to view CSOs as having had
a positive role than in DTS elections (55 percent versus 49 percent). Differences
were also apparent (echoing responses to other areas of questioning cited in
previous chapters), in relation to attitudes towards the military, with respondents
in UCG-category countries reporting a ‘positive role’ at 6 percentage points higher
than those in DTS-category countries (63 percent versus 57 percent).
FIGURE 35
ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS DURING TRANSITIONS

 UCG
 DTS
P E R C E N TA G E O F P E O P L E S AY I N G T H E I N S T I T U T I O N P L AY E D A “ P O S I T I V E R O L E ” D U R I N G T H E L A S T T R A N S I T I O N
��
63% 60% 56% 55% 54% 52% 45%
��
57% 60% 58% 49% 58% 50% 44%
Military Religious Police Civil society Traditional Social media National-level

bodies organisations media business leaders
106
2.4.4 Spotlight on youth and women

Youth are often excluded from economic opportunity in many African countries,
yet the continent has the youngest population in the world — with 75 percent made
up of people under the age of 35. 144 The UN Department of Economic and Social
Affairs predicts the continent’s youth will double from present levels by 2055. 145
Thirty million youth will enter the labour market each year by 2030. This demo-
graphic situation presents opportunities, but it also presents risks where the
aspirations and choices of young people are constrained.
Meanwhile, a more inclusive environment for women is developing across the

continent, as illustrated by advancements in education, health and political
representation. The links between increasing gender equality and positive
development outcomes are well established. 146 Women in Africa suffer some of
the highest levels of sexual and gender-based violence globally. Some African
countries feature among the top 15 performers on gender parity globally. 147
However, significant gaps between men and women’s opportunities remain a
severe impediment to structural economic and social transformation. 148 It has
been estimated that $316 billion could be added to Africa’s GDP by 2025 if all
countries matched this progress. 149 Understanding and addressing the barriers
and constraints to inclusion facing these two diverse but overlapping identity
groups represents a fundamental challenge in building pathways to peaceful and
inclusive political systems.
The Soldiers and citizens perceptions survey instrument included three specific
questions designed to assess people’s views on gender and politics. These consid-
ered whether the public believes men make better political leaders than women;
if the country needs more women in leadership positions; and whether women have
the same rights as men.
Across all eight countries, 62 percent versus 29 percent of all respondents agreed
that the country needs more women in leadership positions (Figure 36). More
women than men felt that the country needs more women in leadership positions
by 15 percentage points in UCG-category countries; and 16 percentage points in
DTS-category countries.
More men than women agreed with the statement that ‘men make better political
leaders than women’ by 9 percentage points in UCG-category countries and 14
percentage points in DTS-category countries. Interestingly more respondents in the
youngest age range (15–25) in both country categories agreed with this statement.
In UCG-category countries, more respondents with no formal education agreed
(by 15 percentage points) than those with formal education, whereas a smaller
increment (by 5 percentage points) of those with formal education, as compared
to those without, agreed in the DTS-category countries.
2023
107
Understanding and addressing the

barriers and constraints to inclusion
facing women and youth represents
a fundamental challenge in building
pathways to peaceful and inclusive
political systems.
FIGURE 36
UCG DTS
PERCEPTIONS ON GENDER EQUALITY   Agree
  Disagree
  Neither
WO M E N HAVE T H E SAME
66% Agree 64%
RIG HTS AS M EN :
Disagree
28% 29%
3% Neither 5%
3% Don’t know 2%
THE C O UNTRY N EED S MORE WOMEN IN LEADERSH IP P OSI T I ONS
��
BY GE ND E R BY AGE
3% 2%
6% 8%
yes
yes
69% 67% 69%
58% 58%
54%
23% 56%
68% 34% AGREE
AGREE
75% 60% 64% 48% 15-24 25-39 40+
M E N M A K E B ET T ER POLIT ICAL LEAD ERS T HAN WOMEN
��
BY GE ND E R BY AGE
4% 2%
7% 7%
yes
yes
41% 54% 52%

49%
51% AGREE 44% 42%
39%
AGREE
38% 49%
47% 56% 34% 48% 15-24 25-39 40+
108
There was strong public support across both types of countries for greater
youth involvement in leadership positions (Figure 37). Overall, 71 percent of all
respondents agreed that more young people are needed in leadership positions.
Just 21 percent disagreed. Support for this proposition was highest among the
youngest cohort — aged 15–24 years (78 percent agreed). This level of support
slightly decreased with age, but even among respondents in the 40+ category,
as many as 65 percent agreed.
Interestingly, there were clear differences in views between UCG- and DTS-
category countries on this indicator, with people in the former being much more
likely (by 18 percentage points) to agree on the need for greater youth participation
in leadership positions. Together, the findings on attitudes to gender and youth in
leadership perhaps reflect the greater levels of progress and inclusion of both in
the DTS-category countries, as compared to the UCG-category countries. Recalling
the secondary data included in Section 1 of this report, levels of participation and
inequality of women and youth are, on average, among the worst on the continent
among the countries that recently experienced coups. Appetite for progress and
greater inclusion is thus higher and starts from a lower baseline — particularly at
the moment of potential transformation that the coups may have signified.
FIGURE 37
UCG DTS
YOUNG PEOPLE IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS
  Agree
  Disagree
D O Y O U A G R E E T H AT T H I S C O U N T R Y N E E D S M O R E Y O U N G
  Neither
P E O P L E (1 8 - T O 3 0 -Y E A R - O L D S) I N L E A D E R S H I P P O S I T I O N S ?
2% 2%
4% 7%
13%
29%
80% 62%
AGREE AGREE
BY GENDER (% in agreement) BY AGE (% in agreement)
agree 85% 81%

agree 76%
70%
63%
54%
81%
79%
64% 59%
15-24 25-39 40+
2023
109
Discussions in the qualitative research emphasized youth alienation as a

critical factor of concern — shared across settings. The discrepancy between
Africa being the world’s youngest region (with an average age of 19 years
among its populations) while having, on average, the oldest presidents (with
10 presidents in or fast approaching their 80s) has been widely noted. 150 The
gerontocratic nature of African statehood should be considered a relevant factor
in understanding the recent coups, as is suggested by the populist support seen
for incoming military authorities with relatively youthful leaders (ranging from
39 to 41 years at the time of coming into power).
The findings of the Soldiers and citizens qualitative research where

responses were compared by age revealed strong youth perspectives.
The responses from the youth showed great frustration with political
leadership regarding the low representation of young people in decision-
making structures, as well as the lack of economic opportunities.
In Ghana, for instance, young respondents appeared to have little

confidence that the current system offers opportunities for them to
realize their full potential.
One youth leader said: “We have gotten to a point where

the youth have given up on the country… most of us have
left to seek greener pastures outside, because there is no
solid plan for the youth. We believe the system has been
made to choke us.”
Ghanaian youth have grown dissatisfied with the political status

quo. In recent years, new youth movements have emerged, such as
#FixTheCountry. Active on social media, the initiative mounts pressure
on the government to tackle the country’s problems. Earlier, in the mid- to
late-2010s, #OccupyGhana similarly emerged as a youth social movement
fighting corruption and the abuse of public resources using tools such as
litigation and media activism. During the Soldiers and citizens qualitative
research, fears were voiced that coups in neighbouring countries could
prompt young people to back similar developments.
Most research participants saw elections as the only legitimate means

for the next government transition in Ghana. Yet some younger
participants did not rule out the possibility of a coup or possible civil
revolt, considering the country’s worsening economic situation and its
grievous impact on living conditions. The period leading up to the next
election is seen as a critical litmus test of the country’s democracy.
110
CH A P TER 2 . 4
Key findings
With the exception of Sudan, the UCG-category countries studied in this report have
all installed a legislative body of the transition that is, to some degree, reflective of the
diversity of the country. All have engaged in some degree of dialogue with socio-political
forces in their respective countries, with a view to achieving consensus about the
management of the transition. Across the five cases, there has been prominent signalling
towards inclusive and consultative process, as a principle to guide the drafting and
execution of the respective transition plans.
However, as time has gone by, criticism and challenge from some political and civic actors
has emerged in all cases precisely on the issue of inclusivity. (In Sudan, this was marked by
a more rapid onset of popular critique, as the coup displaced a nascent civilian government
that had emerged following the popular revolution.) Confidence has deteriorated, and
hostilities sharpened between military leadership and coalitions of opposition voices
across settings. The challenges of generating a real sense of political inclusion among
citizens, and maintaining an inclusive process in the face of complex interests being
asserted, are underscored in the Soldiers and citizens data in both settings.
Despite a loss of confidence in national dialogue processes from political and civil
society actors, more UCG respondents felt ‘heard’ during events than counterparts
in DTS-category countries during recent elections: as many as 84 percent in
Mali and 77 percent in Guinea. This reflects the higher sense of optimism noted
elsewhere in the data, with people willing meaningful change to materialize after
the turbulence. On average, more urban and lower-income bracket respondents
were among the group who felt ‘listened to’ during the UCG. Among those who did
not, security was cited as the overwhelming issue of concern that could have made
them feel more included in the process and its outcomes — at 35% of all respondents.
Meanwhile, just 46 percent of DTS-category country respondents felt they had

been listened to in the recent election — though this is the same proportion of
respondents in Burkina Faso and Chad. Sudanese respondents felt the least listened
to at 34 percent — a reflection of the unpopularity of the coup in that country.
The theme of desiring change emerges across the data and is underlined explicitly
in answers about motivations among those who supported the recent coup.
‘Time for change’ was cited as the most important reason for doing so (44 percent).
Other priorities were better governance (15 percent) and security (21 percent)
— with 8 percent saying ‘don’t know’. In the DTS-category countries, three reasons
stand out regarding people’s support for the results of the last election, namely
‘better governance’ (21 percent), ‘constitutional mandate’ (21 percent) and ‘time
for change’ (16 percent).
2023
111
CH A P TER 2 . 4 K E Y FINDING S
Beyond ‘feeling heard’, it is telling that a significant percentage of respondents in

both UCG- and DTS-category countries (28 percent) reported neither supporting
nor opposing the incoming political leadership. Women were more likely than
men, by 7 percentage points, to say they neither supported nor opposed the change
(35 percent versus 28 percent). The percentages remain consistent across age
groups. It can be inferred that this same percentage of respondents (with a small
but significant gender imbalance) felt at least disengaged, if not experiencing a
sense of exclusion, from the process.
Civil society and other national actors played an active role in the last political
transition in all focal countries, representing diverse interests and groups.
Research participants mentioned the varied roles played by CSOs, security forces,
EMBs, the judiciary, religious and traditional leaders, national peace councils,
traditional media and social media in impacting the different transitions. The
perceived role of institutions was similar in the different types of countries.
Social media, police, religious bodies and national-level business leaders were
consistently seen to have played a positive role by roughly the same proportion of
the public on average. Small but significant differences in attitudes between
UCG and DTS countries were clear with respect to particular institutions, however
— specifically, CSOs and the military were both seen as positive by slightly more
UGG respondents.
Across all eight countries, 62 percent (versus 29 percent) of all respondents agreed
that the country needs more women in leadership positions. More women than men
held this view: by 15 percentage points in UCG countries and 16 percentage points
in DTS settings. More men than women agreed with the statement ‘men make better
political leaders than women’: by 9 percentage points in UCG-category countries
and 14 percentage points in DTS-category countries.
Overall, 71 percent of all respondents agreed that more young people are needed in
leadership positions. Just 21 percent disagreed. Support for this proposition was
highest among the youngest cohort surveyed. Among those aged 15–24 years,
78 percent agreed. This level of support decreased slightly with age, but even
among respondents aged 40 and over, as many as 65 percent agreed.
Interestingly, there was a significant difference in views between UCG- and

DTS-category countries on this indicator. People in the former were much more
likely to agree on the need for greater youth participation in leadership positions
— by 18 percentage points. These findings may reflect the lower baseline of gender
and youth inclusion identified in secondary data, and hence a higher appetite for
progress in inclusiveness — particularly against the backdrop of wider potential
transformation that the coups seemed to signify.
B U R K I N A FA S O 113
3 OCTOBER 2022
A M A N R E A D S A N E W S PA P E R
F E AT U R I N G , O N I T S C O V E R ,
A P I C T U R E O F C A P I TA I N
IBRAHIM TRAORÉ, THE
L E A D E R O F T H E M I L I TA R Y
J U N TA , I N O U A G A D O U G O U .
Burkina Faso’s junta

leader agreed to
step down, religious
and community
leaders said, two days
after army officers
announced his ouster
in a coup that sparked
internal unrest
and international
condemnation.
Lieutenant Colonel
Paul-Henri Sandaogo
Damiba “himself
offered his resignation
in order to avoid
confrontations
with serious human
and material
consequences,”
the religious and
community leaders
said in a statement.
P H O T O B Y O LY M P I A D E M A I S M O N T
“The harm [of
sanctions are] mostly
on the masses, more
than the ‘obstructors’.
The coup makers
are not affected.
There should be
individual penalties.”
M A L E FOCUS GROUP DIS CUS S A NT, K H A RTOUM, SUDA N (FEBRUA RY 2023)
U N D P 202 3 115
03 SECTION 3
The aftermath:
assessing
responses to
military coups
What role have external actors played in the aftermath
of Africa’s recent coups? More specifically, recalling the
development focus put forward by this study, what role
can regional and international development actors play
in responding to military coups as a form of UCG in Africa,
operating in concert with political counterparts, tools and
mechanisms? This chapter maps out and assesses regional
and international responses to date to further inform the
report’s final conclusions and recommendations.
117
THE A F TERM ATH: A S SE S SING RE SP ONSE S TO MILITA RY C OUP S
CHAP TER 3.1

ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
The literature on patterns of international engagement in coup responses

emphasizes that military coups do not happen in a ‘domestic silo’. 151 In the words
of one analyst: “What is a coup, after all, but some military actors claiming that
they are the sovereign representatives of that state? To be sustained, coups need
to be recognized.” 152
Coup-makers will typically evaluate foreign leverage before conducting a coup.

The international community represents a key constituency alongside domestic
stakeholders. 153 External and international reactions to coups have been shown
to affect both trajectories towards democratization and the duration of coup-
born regimes. 154 Despite the existence of strong norms and principles against
military coups in the international system — some of which are summarized
in Table 1 — two-way dialogue between coup leaders and different parts of the
international community is invariably and necessarily a prominent feature
shaping coup outcomes.
TA B L E 1
SUMMARIZED NORMS AND INSTRUMENTS AGAINST COUPS
Organization Relevant normative instrument on UCG
Lomé Declaration, July 2000; Constitutive Act, 2001 (Art. 30); Protocol relating to the
establishment of the Peace and Security Council, 2003; African Charter on Democracy,
AU Elections and Governance, 2007 (Ch. VIII); Ezulwini Framework for the Enhancement
of the Implementation of Measures in Situations of Unconstitutional Changes of
Government, December 2009.
The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) focuses on UCG including

Commonwealth military coups. In 2011, Commonwealth leaders broadened the mandate of CMAG so it
Secretariat could engage more proactively and constructively with countries where fundamental
political values of the Commonwealth are at risk.
Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Governance, December 2001,

ECOWAS
(currently under review).
Political and democratic principles of the Cotonou (2000) and post-Cotonou (2021)
EU/Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (EU-ACP) Partnership Agreement. Relevant provisions
EU
of EU Global Strategy for foreign and security assistance (2016) and the EU Action Plan
on Democracy and Human Rights (2020–2024).
118
Organisation The Bamako Declaration on Democratic Governance, November 2000, imposes sanctions
Internationale de la
in case of UCG.
Francophonie (OIF)
SADC Not explicit, but relevant provisions of the SADC Treaty.
Can act in cases deemed to constitute a threat to regional or international peace and
UN
security under Chapters VI or VII of the UN Charter.
Section 7008 of the US 1985 Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations
Act. As of October 2022, this provision had been put into effect in five countries: Burkina
US Faso (following 2022 coup); Guinea (since 2021); Myanmar (2021); Mali (2020) and
Sudan (since 1989). It has been temporarily applied in a further five (including Mali from
2012–2013, Madagascar 2009–2014 and Guinea-Bissau 2012–2014).
Operational Policy (OP) 7.30 of July 2001. When OP 7.30 is triggered in case of coming to
power of a de facto government, such as one ushered in by a military coup, disbursements
World Bank on projects under implementation may be suspended, and new funds put on hold. This
suspension may remain in place until the Bank determines that a proper legal framework
is in place and that authorities are willing to respect previously agreed commitments.
In responding to the instances of UCG events under review, regional

and international actors continue to face a momentous responsibility.
They may collectively help to harness the moment of disruptive change
to contribute to transformative and sustainable outcomes. Or, through
failing to do so, they may instead come to inadvertently enable a
downward spiral. This, in turn, may potentially engender long-term instability
and persistent stagnation in a ‘coup trap’ — or other manifestations of instability.
Regional and international engagement around other forms of political transition

— including elections, or constitutional manipulation enabling term extension
— is also impactful. By conferring aspects of legitimacy, or otherwise, to these
political processes, external actors become key players in domestic dynamics
and history, notwithstanding the principle of sovereignty at the heart of the
international system.
In principle, all five cases reviewed in this study presented opportunities to pivot
to deeper progress towards Agendas 2030 and 2063, and renewed levels of trust
between citizens and the state. However, outcomes are far from certain. Best-case
scenarios have already been overtaken by events. These may have envisaged
the respective juntas being incentivized to adhere to transition plan timelines,
leading to the timely restoration of constitutional order, and bringing into power
forces that, in turn, were able and mandated to bring in transformative new
governance approaches.
2023
119
Less positive scenarios, whereby military transitional authorities impose either

themselves or others outside of the scope of the transitional charter, pose a real
threat of deteriorating security — and even armed conflict over time.
Meanwhile, the credibility of regional norms and organizations is at stake. A

possible regional-level scenario might see the military juntas in Mali, Guinea and
Burkina Faso team up to challenge regional normative frameworks against UCG —
defying sanctions and putting themselves forward for elections, further aided by
new international alliances in the geopolitical arena.
This chapter presents findings from the Soldiers and citizens perceptions survey
and qualitative research as they relate to respondents’ perspectives on regional
and international actors, and their role during the recent transitions. The
survey specifically focused on attitudes towards the UN and the AU. The chapter
then proceeds to present a summary typology of the different responses and
engagement on and around UCG, as they have played out, on the part of diverse
regional and international actors. The final section presents an analysis of this
engagement, identifying some key gaps and issues for the further enhancement of
regional and international action. These provide a basis for the recommendations
presented in Section 4.
3.1.1 Citizens’ confidence in the UN and AU

The Soldiers and citizens perceptions survey revealed a reasonable level of
confidence in the UN and the AU ‘to act in the best interest of the public’. As
shown in Figure 38, which combines ‘complete confidence’ and ‘a fair amount
of confidence’ responses, 45 percent and 63 percent of UCG- and DTS-country
category respondents respectively had some degree of confidence in the
UN. Similarly, 45 percent and 59 percent of UCG- and DTS-country category
respondents, respectively, had some degree of confidence in the AU.
FIGURE 38
CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS
 UCG
 DTS
P E R C E N TA G E O F P E O P L E W I T H C O M P L E T E O R F A I R C O N F I D E N C E I N T H E
FOLLOWING INSTITUTIONS TO ACT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC
75% 70% 66% 58% 58% 58% 57%
76% 75% 73% 67% 55% 60% 68%
Religious bodies Military Traditional media CSOs Government Police Banks
53% 53% 47% 47% 45% 45%

56% 53% 49% 52% 63% 59%
Social media Judges National business Trade unions United Nations African Union
120
Two aspects of these responses stand out. First, overall confidence in these
institutions, while at a fair level, is notably lower than confidence reported in
other types of institutions — at least well behind confidence in religious bodies,
the military and traditional media in both settings.
Second, there are significant differences when comparing the two categories of
countries. People living in DTS-category countries reported significantly greater
levels of confidence than counterparts living in UCG-category countries: up by
18 percentage points in the case of the UN; and 14 percentage points with respect
to the AU. Given the amplified engagement of the AU and the UN in the UCG-, as
compared to DTS-category countries, the relative scepticism reflected in this
result can be taken as an indictment of effectiveness in the eyes of citizens.
As shown further in Figure 39, when respondents were asked to assess the role
these two institutions played during the last transitions, just 34 percent and
37 percent of UCG-category country respondents felt the AU and UN had played a
positive role. In DTS-category countries, impressions were more favourable, with
around half of respondents believing both the AU and the UN played a positive role.
FIGURE 39
THE ROLE OF THE AU AND THE UN DURING THE LAST TRANSITION

 UCG
 DTS
AF RICAN U N ION U NI T E D NAT I ONS

DID THE AU
A N D U N P L AY A
POSITIVE OR A
N E G AT I V E R O L E Positive
DURING THE LAST 34% 49% Positive
37% 50%
TRANSITION?
Negative Negative
31% 28%
9% 8%
Did not make Did not make

much difference 19% much difference 19%
16% 16%
Don’t know 22% Don’t know 23%

19% 19%
41%
BY GEN DER BY AGE

P O S I T I V E I M PAC T O F T H E AU
AND UN DURING TRANSITION,
BY DEMOGRAPHIC BREAKDOWN agree 53%
48% 49%
agree
41%
34%
33%
37% 34% 48% 51% 15-24 25-39 40+

years old years old years old
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12 1
More than three times as many people in UCG countries than in DTS-category
countries felt the AU and UN played a negative role during the last transition or
national election. Yet a significant number in both settings said they either ‘did
not know’, or that neither institution made ‘much difference’: 35 percent of UCG
respondents, and 41 to 42 percent in DTS-category countries.
This high number of agnostic responses suggests that regional and international
engagement is far from being front and centre in people’s lived experience of
political transition in Africa. Women were slightly more positive than men in
UCG settings, while the reverse was true among respondents in DTS settings.
In both types of countries, the youngest age group was also more disposed to report
a positive impression — perhaps in line with the relatively high numbers of ‘don’t
know’ responses among these two groups.
3.1.2 A typology of regional and international response mechanisms

It emerges that citizens may not always see the AU or the UN as either relevant
or positive in terms of their respective in-country engagements during national
moments of critical political import. These findings emphasize the need for
humility and realism on the part of regional and international stakeholders in
supporting such processes.
Nonetheless, as discussed above, and as is clear from wider case study analysis,
the AU and UN (through their multiple constituent departments, funds,
programmes and agencies), alongside other regional and international partners,
clearly have a significant influence and role to play — and the stakes are high.
The following discussion provides a brief typology of the tools and instruments
that regional and international organizations, as well as multilateral development
actors, have at their disposal for preventing and responding to military coups as
a form of UCG.
(i) Sanctions/regional bloc suspension, and deployment of diplomatic channels

While this study focuses on development tools and approaches, the primary and
most prominent tools leveraged in the event of a military coup are essentially
political. These include sanctions, suspension of membership from regional blocs,
the deployment of special envoys and other mediation capacities — such as the
AU Panel of the Wise, and related diplomatic pressure from partners and states.
Reflecting the increasing influence of the AU and RECs in projecting constitutional
order on the continent, these tools have been used to respond to political events in
member states — at times with decisive positive effects. 155
Turning to the recent coups reviewed in this study, and with the clear exception
of the particular events unfolding in Chad, both the AU and ECOWAS rejected the
coups and suspended affected states within a few days. 156 As a result, ECOWAS
— as the regional bloc most directly affected — is now operating without 20 percent
of its membership (at time of writing). Continent-level leadership has been tacitly
underscored by the UN across these cases.
Neither the AU nor IGAD suspended or sanctioned Sudan following the removal of
then-president Bashir in April 2019, even though a military-led Sovereign Council
was established to run the country. Both organizations recognized the change to be
122
the result of a popular uprising, a distinction that raises important considerations

from the perspective of the norms on UCG when compared to military coups. 157
A mediation team was instead deployed. Under its facilitation, the military and
civilian forces reached an agreement on the establishment of a power-sharing
transitional government for a period of three years. 158 However, the AU suspended
Sudan following the military coup in October 2021, and subsequent violence
against protestors as well as the transitional military council’s unilateral move to
end talks with the civilian opposition.
Only Chad has been treated exceptionally, as the AU did not consider the military
council’s takeover as a case of UCG. The continental body did, however, call for the
military to hold elections within 18 months and for members of the junta to exclude
themselves from the elections. The Economic Community of Central African
States (ECCAS) followed a similar path in supporting the transition in Chad. The
apparent inconsistency in the treatment of Chad, as opposed to the other countries
experiencing UCG events in this timeframe, is discussed further below.
Development partners spoke out strongly in support of regional sanctions in some

cases. For example, following the second coup in Mali, France backed ECOWAS
sanctions, while the EU introduced new sanctions and asset freezes on individual
Malian officials deemed to be obstructing the transition to civilian rule. This
included the transitional prime minister and members of the interim president’s
inner circle. 159
(ii) Aid, trade and security cooperation adjustments, enhancements and suspensions
The role of development actors in supporting transition processes has been
prominent. UNDP, for example, remained engaged in Chad through the Basket Fund
in Support of the Transition in Chad, which pools resources of development actors
in support of key transition milestones. UNDP has also provided continual techni-
cal and financial assistance towards the restoration of constitutional order. 160
Various development partners have provisions in place to determine how

development and trade assistance should be adapted in response to military
coups. Some of these are listed at the opening of this chapter in Table 1. These
clauses have been exercised in response to the recent military coups in Africa.
For example, following the February 2022 coup in Burkina Faso, the EU halted
discussions on future programmes, including on budget support, due to a perceived
lack of progress towards the restoration of constitutional order. 161
The US triggered Section 7008, pausing its aid programmes, and suspended
access to programmes through its Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, in Guinea
and Mali. 162 The release of new World Bank projects was also put on hold in the
immediate aftermath of the coups in Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso based on OP
7.30. 163 Some EU security assistance support was redirected to other uses, and
the EU Training Mission was briefly suspended — although the EU did continue
some work with Malian armed forces. 164 France significantly reduced its security
engagement, although this should also be seen in the context of more complex
bilateral relationships and mounting geopolitical concern about the role of Russia.
In Guinea, several partners suspended development projects in the months
following the coup.
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Disruptions of this nature raise significant dilemmas for development partners.

Confronted with mounting humanitarian needs in many cases, this often leads to a
mixed approach. New projects may be put on hold, while disbursements of existing
projects may continue in particular areas, such as the health sector. 165
As a further example of a partner seeking to navigate these issues, the African

Development Bank (AfDB) suspended direct support to the Malian government
following the 2020 coup and embarked on a fresh review of its new country
strategy for Mali. A decision was subsequently taken to concentrate operational
engagement around agricultural value chains. Programmes that reached the most
vulnerable groups were also prioritized, especially youth and women, working at
the community level. Disbursements to Mali were unfrozen in 2022, allowing for
AfDB to fully re-engage.
The leveraging of aid and trade instruments as both the proverbial ‘carrot’ and
‘stick’ in coup responses is perhaps most starkly evident in the case of Sudan (see
Box 9, Section 2). International development partners rallied with a significant
package of commitments in support of the pro-democracy civilian leadership that
came into power following Bashir’s ousting in April 2019. The same assistance was
suspended following the military coup of October 2021.
As indicated, Chad was largely spared such measures regarding aid, trade and
security cooperation, as well as in the political realm. Some partners introduced
new development programmes and increased funding despite the executive-level
dynamics. 166
(iii) Funding instruments for targeted responses to UCG, coups or political transitions
In mapping out the range of response mechanisms, it emerges that no single
targeted funding instrument has yet been created to enable constructive or timely
responses to instances of military coups in Africa. Nonetheless, a handful of
disparate windows among the programming ecosystem of different partners have
been leveraged to do so. Despite different approaches, the funding mechanisms
summarized in Table 2 below can be identified as relevant.
It should be noted that the framing around military coups is varied across the
international system. This compounds the scattered nature of accessible funding.
The UCG terminology is particular to the AU, as well as OIF and the Commonwealth
Secretariat. Others have provisions specific to military coups, while some refer
more indirectly to threats to democratic order.
Meanwhile, different agencies use the term ‘transition’ to refer to various contexts;
whether transitioning from a peacekeeping period back to national leadership; or
transitioning out of conflict and fragility. It rarely features across funding tools
to relate specifically to the period of transition from military junta rule back to
constitutional order.
12 4
TA B L E 2
F U N D I N G M E C H A N I S M S R E L E VA N T T O M I L I TA R Y C O U P R E S P O N S E
Funding instru-
Key features
ment
Set up in 2008, the TSF is AfDB’s dedicated facility for supporting member states’ transition
out of fragility. The TSF allows for the flexible disbursal of financial support to countries that
are otherwise unable to access it. 167
TSF allows AfDB to continue flexible funding and engagement with countries going through
crisis, including those that have experienced a military coup, and which might not be able
AfDB Transition to access funds from other bank offerings. A core aim is to protect development gains when
Support Facility funding dries up during such times, while allowing the bank to maintain relationships with
(TSF) key interlocutors in-country.
The TSF was a particularly important mechanism in helping the 2019–2021 transitional
government in Sudan to qualify for debt relief in 2021. Following the October 2021 coup, TSF
allowed AfDB to continue providing technical support and capacity development to state
structures. It also allowed for continued funding to Côte d’Ivoire during the 2002–2011 conflict
and supported improved public financial management systems in Mali and Chad.
In 2021, the EU sought to simplify and streamline development and crisis response processes
by integrating 11 former financial instruments into a single tool. The 2021–2027 Multi-Annual
EU Framework includes almost €80 billion, of which 75 percent is earmarked for country-focused
Neighbourhood, programming. NDICI is structured around three pillars: geographic, thematic, and rapid
Development and response — with an ‘emerging challenges and priorities’ cushion.
International
Cooperation NDICI does not include any specific provision to release funds to support EU response to
Instrument coups. The thematic pillar includes a strong focus on human rights and democracy and peace,
stability and conflict prevention, although programme documents make no reference UCG.
(NDICI)
Programme documents include examples of the rapid response pillar, which has allowed the
EU to respond to UCG events — including in Chad. 168
The MYA is DPPA’s primary extra-budgetary instrument to fund and support UN political
capacities and interventions to prevent and resolve conflicts. It allows DPPA to be more
operational, complementing the regular budget and funding staff and activities at
headquarters and in the field.
The MYA does not include any explicit commitment to coup prevention or response within its
UN Department strategic framing. It is, however, the primary funding mechanism for DPPA’s crisis-response
system. As such, it is widely used to facilitate the UN’s immediate preventative diplomacy as
of Political and
well as mediation efforts following UCG events, such as the deployment of senior mediation
Peacebuilding
advisors, including to Burkina Faso and Sudan in the first half of 2022.
Affairs (DPPA)
Multi-Year The MYA has also been used to support broader political transition processes following recent
Appeal (MYA) coups. In Sudan, it was used to strengthen women’s participation in the UN-AU-IGAD inclusive
political dialogue process aimed at facilitating a return to a civilian-led government. In
Guinea, MYA was used to support the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel
‘peace caravans’. These social cohesion and inclusive dialogue initiatives complement wider
UN preventive diplomacy efforts, focusing on preventing local conflict in the context of
increased tensions following the 2021 coup.
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The PBF is a programmatic instrument to finance sustaining peace activities in countries

or situations at risk of, or affected by, violent conflict. It invests in four priority areas: the
implementation of peace agreements; peace dividends; dialogue and coexistence; and
re-establishment of basic services. It has a particular focus on facilitating transitions
between UN missions and country teams; fostering inclusion of women and youth in
peacebuilding processes; and on regional and cross-border activities.
UN
Peacebuilding The PBF does not have an explicit commitment to preventing or responding to military coups
Fund (PBF) within the current strategy (2020–2024). It is, however, a source of funding for UN and civil
society initiatives working to support political transition processes following UCG events.
The PBF is supporting projects in Chad, Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso. These include support
to early warning to anticipate local-level conflicts, as well as initiatives to prevent electoral
violence in Guinea, boost access to legal services in Mali and Burkina Faso, and the creation
of more youth-responsive local development plans. They are implemented through a range
of different partners, including civil society as well as UN agencies.
The FCV Envelope, introduced in the most recent IDA replenishment round, is designed for the
World Bank to respond more flexibly and effectively in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.
It comprises three pillars:
• The Prevention and Resilience Allocation, providing enhanced support for countries at
risk of escalating into high-intensity conflict or large-scale violence;
World Bank • A Remaining Engaged during Conflict Allocation (RECA), enabling the Bank to continue
IDA19 Fragility, its engagement in countries that experience high-intensity conflict and have extremely
limited government capacity; and
Conflict and
Violence (FCV)
• The Turn Around Allocation (TAA), to support countries emerging from conflict, social
Envelope and political crisis or disengagement, where there is an opportunity to support reforms to
accelerate transitions out of fragility.
Similar to other funding modalities listed here, the FCV Envelope does not include a specific
provision for responding to military coups. The RECA, however, provides greater flexibility
in direct funding, including to non-state parties, while the TAA provides a potential vehicle
allowing the Bank to support political transition plans.
126
(iv) Broader spectrum of peace-, governance- and democracy-related support

Most international development partners have strong rhetorical commitments to
the importance of democratic and inclusive governance, aligned with SDG 16 and
the overall Agenda 2030 frame, and direct significant quantities of aid to support
related objectives.
At the 2020 High-Level Meeting of the OECD Development Assistance Committee

(DAC), states confirmed a commitment to “… continue to use our development
co-operation to support democracy, the rule of law and human rights, including
freedom of expression and peaceful assembly and association, as essential elements
of sustainable development for any society”. 169 Conflict prevention and peace-
building are similarly well established as development priorities.
The peace, governance and democracy interventions of the EU, UN and bilateral
partners cover a wide spectrum of programming areas, many of which have become
well-established fields of cooperation between partners and African states over the
past 30 years. They typically include capacity support to core and local government
functions and service delivery; anti-corruption, transparency and accountability
work (both public and private sector); support to all aspects of the electoral process,
functioning of parliament working of the constitution; rule of law; support to
security, justice and human rights institutions and functions; conflict prevention,
reconciliation and peacebuilding activities; and advancing the inclusive participation
of non-state actors — particularly civil society, women and youth — across all of these.
Many of the biggest development finance institutions have also begun to recognize
that they can play an important role in supporting governance reforms. This includes
supporting the embedding of democratic norms. Several of these have developed
significant organizational capacities around fragility, conflict and violence. 170
‘Democracy aid’ is seen to have been an important factor in Africa’s democratization,

and in supporting the evolution of government and institutional capacity and
effectiveness in many areas — as well as boosting citizens’ engagement in governance
processes. 171 However, critical questions related to the resourcing, depth and reach of
these important portfolios of work need to be addressed, as discussed further below.
3.1.3 Challenges, constraints and opportunities

Participants in the Soldiers
(i) Reactive rather than proactive and citizens qualitative
Regional and international organizations face various challenges and constraints in research criticized
seeking to respond to military coups as a form of UCG. It is clear from recent events ECOWAS for “failing” to
that stakeholders need to become better at anticipating and, to the greatest extent prevent the coup in Burkina
possible, proactively preventing such developments. Faso, arguing that early
warning signs were visible.
Others suggested that
As has been noted, the recent cases may have been foreseen in risk analysis, and yet
ECOWAS is always reactive
delays and other challenges stymied response strategies. The manifest and self- to situations, instead of
evident gains of preventing crises and conflict, rather than waiting for them to proactively addressing the
unfold and then seeking to respond, have been asserted and recognized at the governance problems in
highest levels of international policy and decision-making for decades. It was also member states which, in
reasserted in the UN’s 2017 twin Sustaining Peace resolutions and explored in their view, spur coups and
detail in the important UN-World Bank Pathways for Peace 2018 report. 172 other forms of UCG.
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However, translating intention into practice remains elusive, as a result of a

confluence of factors, chief among which may be political will. Well-established
early warning instruments and mechanisms exist — including at a regional level
(see Box 14) — precisely to better inform regional and international actors for the
purposes of crisis prevention. While these are broader in their focus, an elevated
risk of military coups ought to feature. The need to strengthen the anticipatory
capacity of regional and international actors in relation to military coups and
willingness and readiness to respond has been underscored by recent events.
Clear legal instruments and response capacities, beyond norms and principles,
are needed to equip and incentivize regional actors to engage when early warning
risks are flagged.
BOX 14
T H E A F R I C A N U N I O N C O N T I N E N TA L E A R LY W A R N I N G S Y S T E M
The AU’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) seeks to address conflict cycles comprehensively.
Its operations are coordinated between the AU and eight Regional Commissions. Its situation room in
Addis Ababa is responsible for data collection, analysis and the production of daily news highlights,
field reports, weekly updates and flash reports for emerging crises. The observation and monitoring
units of the Regional Commissions collect data, which is then relayed to the situation room.
The CEWS methodology consists of three sequential steps:

1) Information collection and monitoring (collecting structural and dynamic
time-specific indicators, using software for analysis and geocoding);
2) Conflict and cooperation analysis (providing an assessment of structures, actors

and dynamics); and
3) Policy and response formulation (through scenario planning and a process of

reverse engineering to identify critical moments).
CEWS also addresses structural factors for the longer-term prevention of violent conflict, using a
country structural vulnerability and resilience assessment and country structural vulnerability
mitigation strategies.
While CEWS represents one of the most advanced EWRS systems and addresses the entire conflict
cycle, capacity gaps hinder its functionality. 173 Crucially, though it has the capacity to provide
recommendations, the response component of the system is confined within the mandate of the AU
PSC, where the national interests and autonomy of individual states can make it difficult to respond
quickly.
A recent review found that the AU could improve responses by further developing its own structures,
such as CEWS, to decide when a situation merits early preventive action. 174 Response coherence is
also affected by a lack of systemic collaboration between the AU CEWS and the RECs’ EWRS. Roles and
responsibilities are not clear, and overlapping state membership further undermines efficacy.
128
(ii) Subordination of normative and development priorities to security priorities

The various agencies that make up the international development system have
different capacities, incentives and mechanisms to respond to coups. Moreover,
these are located within the broader strategic and geopolitical priorities of
particular states, or governing bodies of particular organizations. At times,
competing priorities have led to inconsistency in engagement. The pre-eminence
of security goals has muted readiness to adhere to norms and principles
related to UCG. An example is the apparent special treatment enjoyed by Chad’s
transitional military council. This has been widely attributed to the state’s critical
role in subregional counterterrorism efforts, among other factors. 175
Responses to the situation in Chad prioritized maintaining positive relations with

the new regime, and ensuring continued cooperation in regional stabilization,
security and migration management initiatives. Unlike the processes in Mali,
Guinea and Burkina Faso, Chad’s Transitional Charter does not prevent anyone —
even the transitional head of state — from standing in elections aimed at putting
an end to the transition. This is in spite of the AU’s insistence on this latter point
(that members of the military council would not have candidacy in upcoming
presidential elections) in all its pronouncements on Chad. The stark contrast
between the regional and international response to events in Chad and events
elsewhere may have served to undermine norms and principles, as well as the
legitimacy of regional and international actors in the eyes of political actors
and citizens alike. Several analysts have suggested that the weak international
response seen in Chad may have emboldened the military to strike in Mali, Burkina
Faso and Guinea. 176
The linkages seen between Chad’s inconsistent treatment and the prioritization
of security concerns are echoed in wider patterns of security cooperation around
counterterrorism, irregular migration as well as organized crime in the Sahel
region. As discussed in Section 1, these dynamics may have directly contributed
to the governance crisis that underpins recent events, representing an important
proximate factor explaining coup occurrence.
BOX 15
GOVERNANCE DEPRIORITIZED IN MALI
The Malian military budget more than doubled, as a proportion of GDP, between 2012 and 2020, while
parliamentary oversight remained weak and civil society lacked the access and expertise to serve as an effective
watchdog. Despite strong rhetorical commitment to democracy, rights and governance, only 1 percent of the
US Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) programme allocation to Mali in 2020 focused on this
area. 177 The EU’s Integrated Strategy in the Sahel is committed to “addressing regional challenges through better
governance”, and seeks to support more transparent, accountable and democratic institutions and expanded state
presence. It further aims to step up developmental action aimed at addressing root drivers of conflict, such as
climate change and economic stagnation. However, reference to democracy support is limited to a commitment
to election observation missions in this region. 178 Some have argued that the subordination of development
objectives to security priorities has skewed power between civilian and military actors, while doing little to
address key drivers of fragility and grievances in the country. 179
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Development partners are beginning to adapt their strategies in response to

the recent coups and broader instability in the Sahel. In the case of the US,
congressional leaders have been applying pressure on the Department of State to
adopt a more holistic strategy that prioritizes “robust support for good governance
and institution strengthening” as a means of reversing the “alarming trend of
coups” in the Sahel. 180
The EU, meanwhile, has expressed an intention to rebalance investments,

focusing more on action at the political level, specifically on governance, human
rights and collaboration with civil society, while maintaining security cooperation
with regional forces. 181 The UN and AU are collaborating in a high-level review of
governance priorities for the region. As discussed in Section 4, new approaches to
intervention in the region are a critical priority in preventing further UCG events.
Actors must recognize how the lowered prioritization of governance objectives in
favour of security interventions contributed to coup risk in the region and ensure
that these patterns do not recur elsewhere on the continent.
(iii) Inconsistency on constitutional manipulation to extend term limits

This chapter has mostly focused on regional and international responses to
military coups as a form of UCG according to AU norms. However, regional
organizations have also been criticized for what observers view as their
failure to take a firm stance on constitutional manipulation across
a number of member states. It is notable that Article 23 (5) of the African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance envisages penalties for the
“infringement of the principles of democratic change”. As with UCG responses,
inconsistency or inaction in upholding norms on constitutional manipulation to
extend power often stems from a lack of political will, linked to wider geostrategic
considerations. However, it only serves to erode the legitimacy of those norms and
their custodian institutions. There is also clear evidence that such practices can
pave the way for military coups and other forms of instability over time.
The lack of strong action enforcing this provision can, in part, be attributed to a
lack of legal clarity in determining when a constitutional amendment represents
such an infringement. This ambiguity has been readily leveraged by incumbent
leaders to secure their own objectives. The move by ECOWAS to explore options
for tightening its own norms and practice in this area, through a reform of its 2001
Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Governance, could, if sustained and
respected, augur a new era of norm adherence (see Box 16).
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BOX 16
ECOWAS TIGHTENING TERM-LIMIT RULES
In response to deteriorating trends, ECOWAS has initiated a revision of its 2001 Supplementary
Protocol on Democracy and Governance. In its original form, this regional instrument prohibits
any substantive changes to the laws related to elections within six months before elections
take place, unless based on clear consensus among the country’s socio-political forces. It was
on account of this provision that ECOWAS suspended Niger from its decision-making organs
in August 2009. Then-president Mamadou Tanda changed his country’s constitution to give
himself additional years in office while his last constitutional term was ending in December of
the same year. Since then, however, leaders in West Africa have carried out their substantive
constitutional changes well clear of the six-month parameter of this provision.
The current initiative of reforming the Supplementary Protocol seeks, among others, to protect
the term-limit provision from any constitutional reform, thereby prohibiting third consecutive
terms altogether in the region — regardless of when a leader tries to modify the constitution.
The review of this protocol was on the agenda of the ECOWAS summits during 2021 and 2022 on
the situations in Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali. If successful, the initiative might encourage a
similar effort at the continental level. While term limits are not a panacea for democracy, there
is a clear correlation between adherence to term limits and peaceful leadership transfer. This
represents a strong argument for further investment in strengthening these rules of engagement
through every means possible.
(iv) Apparent tension between principle

and pragmatism in dealing with de facto leadership
Once underway, regional and international actors have encouraged a set of
constitutional reforms in response to UCG events. This includes establishing
transition plans, which typically consist of a national dialogue, redrafting of
the constitution and restoration of constitutional order in the swiftest possible
timeframe. Some see this engagement of the AU and RECs with coup-born
authorities as amounting to tacit acceptance of the coup or, as one analyst
described, to “inadvertently provide coup leaders a helping hand across the finish
line to consolidate their putsch”. 182 Analysts thus see a contradiction between
the principle of condemning coups and UCG in general, and the pragmatism that
appears to accept events as a fait accompli.
However, the apparently contradictory position is based on the accepted reality

that military coups are sometimes driven by the failings of overthrown
governments, as well as manifestations of deeper fragilities within the socio-
political order. Therefore, while not condoning the UCG event — which is swiftly
condemned — diplomatic engagement is activated to help de facto regimes restore
constitutional order. The transformational momentum may also be harnessed
towards delivering a new social contract that may be better than what existed
under the overthrown regime.
The foundational AU instrument banning UCG, the Lomé Declaration, stipulates

a six-month grace period for coup-born regimes to establish a concrete plan for
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BOX 17 transition back to constitutional order. As one

analyst put it before a meeting of the AU PSC, by
WORKING WITH DE FACTO AUTHORITIES
not cutting a country loose when sanctioned or
Development actors recognize that working in coup- suspended, the AU “plays the proverbial African
affected countries requires engaging with actors who mother who spanks an erring child with the right
control the state apparatus: in other words, the de hand and draws the same child closer with the left”
facto authorities. Most accept that this carries risks of — to warn him or her not to do the mischief again. 183
conferring legitimacy to those authorities; potentially (However, as noted above, this approach, which is
allowing them to entrench power or further subvert hardwired into the regional normative framework,
democratic processes. is readily undermined through instances of
inconsistency noted above — whereby the AU
Many have policies to guide decisions on when and how [as the guardian of the norms, or parent, to extend
to engage. These typically state that engagement does the analogy] — reveals itself to be flawed and subject
not imply recognition or infer legitimacy upon them. to its own transgressions.)
Organizations such as the World Bank, AfDB and the (v) Disrupted engagement exacerbating harmful
UN invariably find themselves responding to UCG effects to populations
events in countries whose governments are themselves One of the most pressing dilemmas confronting
members. The government is also typically the ‘client’, international partners following a military
and support must be either directed via government coup is the need to find modalities for staying
systems or to government-approved partners. Many engaged so that assistance reaches populations,
agencies have clauses in their core charters stipulating even as efforts unfold to incentivize military
that decision making must not be guided by the political juntas’ adherence to transition plans and a return
nature of the host government. Decisions about whether to constitutional order. Ensuring that transition
and how to engage are therefore driven by ‘apolitical’ processes are fully supported is a further issue —
considerations, such as whether authorities are willing with significant gaps in concretizing pledges. 184
to respect contractual agreements signed by previous
incumbents. As part of the World Bank’s reorientation to working
more effectively in fragile contexts, it has expanded
The UN is in a unique position. It is able to engage with the range of funding modalities available to support
state officials at all levels — including through direct state capacity without putting resources directly
support to local government systems, as well as non- through state systems. In Burundi (2015) and
governmental actors. It has practical tools at its disposal Guinea-Bissau (2012), for example, the Bank ceased
for maintaining engagement while monitoring and direct budget support to each government following
managing risks. political crisis, instead directing funds to specific
projects. Trust funds have allowed the Bank to work
outside of state systems in South Sudan, Sudan and
Somalia. The Bank can also provide direct support
to other partners when authorities are not viable
partners. 185 This provision has allowed the Bank to
directly support UN agencies that are well positioned
to engage with governmental and non-governmental
actors and to continue financing critical services,
even when there is no universally recognized central
government. This has been the case, at different
times, in Sudan, South Sudan and Yemen.
132
Some partners have greater flexibility in terms of who they can engage with and
modalities for support in countries following coups. Many can direct resources
to non-state actors in civil society. Some have established headquarter-level
mechanisms that allow for rapid support to pro-democracy movements or bodies
that cannot be supported through country programmes. These can allow partners
to remain engaged without directly working with authorities, although not without
challenges. It can be difficult to assess the political affiliations of civil society
actors. Additionally, supporting non-state service provision can further undermine
state capacities in the long term.
BOX 18
U N R E S P O N S E S T O C O U P S — S TAY A N D D E L I V E R
The UN has continued its engagement following the recent coups, particularly through its support to
dialogue and governance-related processes linked to the transition to constitutional order, and usually
led by the Resident Coordinator (RC) or Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) office
in mission settings. For example, in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea and Mali, UNDP, together with the
RC and related staff, such as the Peace and Development Advisor, have offered technical support for
the implementation of transition workplans, as developed by transitional authorities. In the case of
Mali, where there is a UN peacekeeping mission (the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali, or MINUSMA), a UN Integrated Transition Support Plan for Political Transition in
Mali was adopted by MINUSMA and the UN country team to guide work during the transitional period.
This was subsequently updated following changes to the timeline.
In Sudan, the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan teamed up with missions of the
AU and IGAD to establish a trilateral mechanism which assists national actors to find solutions for
the consensual management of the transition.
UNDP has maintained full engagement with the governments in Chad, Guinea and Mali, despite recent
UCG events. Across all three countries, existing programmes have continued, including many with a
focus on supporting key governance processes. In all three countries, new support has been agreed.
In Mali and Chad, this has included setting up basket funds that allow UN and other partners to support
the implementation of transition plans. These funds also allow assistance to be directed to long-term
institutional reform and capacity-strengthening programmes, many with a strong focus on engagement
and the inclusion of women and youth in governance processes.
Despite these practices, and creativity in finding operational modalities amid

turbulent circumstances, the recent coups have brought about disruptions to aid
and development programmes — in turn exacerbating vulnerabilities faced by
populations. Better understanding on the part of humanitarian and development
actors of how these consequences may be mitigated, while still supporting political
processes, is required.
(vi) Coordination across partners

Coordination across regional and international actors in shaping
responses to military coups is a further area of challenge. This is perhaps
unsurprising, given the range of actors and institutional dynamics at play.
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The US convened global democracy summits in 2021 and 2023, seeking to facilitate
a more coordinated response among international actors in addressing the root
causes of democratic decline. 186
The Pathways for Peace report included strong recommendations concerning

the importance of aligning peace, security and development interventions for
prevention. 187 A recent review found that at country level, increased efforts to
coordinate across humanitarian, development and peace actors through a nexus
approach has seen considerable advances in recent years — at least in process
terms, and through working towards ‘collective outcomes’. 188 The stabilization
space has also afforded new platforms for security, development and humanitarian
priorities to be blended into joint programming in response to specific crises.
Globally, the UN system’s agenda to represent and operate as ‘one UN’ has
also advanced.
The goal of better coordination to ensure strategic and efficient international

responses to the world’s most pressing crises is well recognized. Given the array
of systemic, structural and, at times, political obstacles, attaining this objective
is likely to remain elusive, even as incremental progress is achieved. The case
studies produced to inform this report confirm that across the typology of regional
and international responses to military coups summarized above, coordination
between different sectors (security and development have been highlighted in
particular), as well as different actors, has been an obstacle.
There is currently no mechanism that encourages diverse actors to converge

towards a coordinated strategic response in the event of a military coup — whether
at country, regional or global level. Nor is there an accepted protocol around the
division of roles and responsibilities among partners, or the sequencing of political
and development levers. As noted above, the international community does not
share a common language for framing such events (for instance, in reference to
‘transitions’, ‘UCG’ or ‘coups’) — an issue that itself may present barriers.
(vi) Need for a reset of longer-term democracy and governance assistance

As highlighted throughout this report, governance shortfalls and democratic
incompleteness represent both proximate and deeper structural contributors to
the rise in coup incidence. This suggests a reset of longer-term democracy, and
governance assistance must stand at the fore of response interventions. This
conclusion is confirmed by a growing number of other analyses, with one positing:
“The most significant action the international democratic community can take to
reverse the trend of coups in Africa is to incentivize democracy.” 189
Questions have been raised about both the quantity and quality of international
partners’ democracy and governance assistance programmes. There is a strong
rhetorical commitment to these areas across OECD DAC partners. Yet between
2010 and 2019, only 10 percent of overall Official Development Assistance
(ODA) flows from DAC donors was directed towards improving governance and
supporting democracy, of which roughly one quarter was primarily directed
towards supporting democracy. 190 ODA for conflict prevention and peacebuilding is
even more constrained, representing only a fraction of the amount spent on crisis
response and reconstruction. 191
13 4
Clauses have been triggered leading to adjustments and disruptions to aid, Soldiers and citizens
trade and security cooperation in many of the affected UCG-category countries qualitative research
under review, as has been discussed above. This approach illustrates the participants in Sudan
suggested the international
potential for development assistance to position normatively around democratic
community should expand
and constitutional principles. However, taking a broader view underscores a
support to the transition by
functional neutrality in attitude to regime type that amounts to imperviousness. focusing on civic culture
programs, capacity building
Recent quantitative research by GovNet indicates that the nature of a political and democratic awareness,
regime does not have a significant impact on DAC donor development strategies. 192 providing funding for
An analysis of ODA flows into countries disaggregated by regime type between these priorities.
2010 and 2019 finds few significant differences in the amounts, sectors and
delivery modalities used by donors in autocracies or democracies.
The composition of ODA focused on governance is stable across regime types.

Roughly three quarters of governance support is focused on state building,
while the remaining quarter focused on democracy support. The composition of
democracy support is also very similar across regime types. There is a clear trend
for donors to increase ODA to countries embarking on democratic transitions,
including with support to governance. However, according to the same study,
there was no discernible trend following autocratic junctures — such as flawed
elections, a sharp deterioration of human rights, or military coups.
This reveals a need for greater nuance, political astuteness and boldness
in engaging across different settings, and both incentivising and
ensuring that governments are genuine partners in agendas to deepen
democracy. The typical modus operandi of international democracy promotion
and governance programming must also be scrutinized. The events studied in
this report, and the perceptions that emerge from its data in both UCG- and DTS-
country contexts, underline that new approaches are needed.
As highlighted in Section 1, there appears to be an over-concentration on the

formal and procedural trappings of democracy over substantive aspects. One
think tank points to eight factors to explain why donor enthusiasm for governance
support as a major area of global aid may have “… run aground on the shoals of
countervailing realities” (see Box 19). 194 A more recent review of democracy aid
committed by Sweden (which has, at times, contributed as much as 30 percent
of its total ODA to this area, well above OECD DAC averages), found that the
contribution of democracy aid to democracy is small, but positive and statistically
significant. 195 However, the strongest correlations between international
democracy aid and intended impacts were evidenced where it targeted core areas:
civil society, the free media and human rights; as well as placing strong emphasis
on distribution to non-state actors, among other features. This confirms the
‘supply side’ bias as a fundamental problem to be overcome. 186
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BOX 19
P E R S I S T E N T C O N S T R A I N T S I M PA C T I N G G O V E R N A N C E A S S I S TA N C E
(i) Governance deficiencies are often primarily political and cannot be resolved through
technical assistance alone;
(ii) Fostering citizen demand for better governance is as important as top-down efforts aimed
at improving the ‘supply’ of governance;
(iii) Governance aid may be more effective at the local level than at the national level;
(iv) Despite the intuitive appeal of governance best practices, concentrating on locally
determined ‘best fit’ may be more productive;
(v) Informal institutions are a central part of the governance puzzle and cannot be treated as
developmental marginalia;
(vi) Governance concerns should be integrated into the full range of assistance programming;
(vii) Donor countries should address international drivers of poor governance; and
(viii) Aiding governance effectively requires development agencies to rethink their own
internal governance.
Source: Carnegie Endowment for Peace (2011).
13 6
CH A P TER 3
Key findings
Among Soldiers and citizens survey respondents, overall confidence in regional and
international institutions (specifically, the AU and the UN), while at a reasonable level,
is notably lower than confidence levels reported in other types of institutions. It ranks
well behind confidence in religious bodies, the military and traditional media in both
settings. People in DTS countries reported significantly greater levels of confidence in both
institutions than counterparts in UCG-category countries: a difference of 18 percentage
points in the case of the UN; and 14 percentage points in the case of the AU.
Given the amplified engagement of the AU and the UN in the UCG focal countries (as
compared to DTS settings), the relative scepticism reflected in this result suggests
an indictment of effectiveness in the eyes of citizens. Just 34 percent and 37 percent
of UCG-category country respondents felt the AU and UN had, respectively, played
a positive role in the recent political transition. Many more people in UCG-category
countries than in DTS countries perceived the AU and UN to have had a negative role.
A significant number in both settings also said they either ‘did not know’, or they felt
that neither institution made ‘much difference’. This volume of agnostic responses
suggests regional and international engagement is far from front and centre in
people’s lived experience of political transition in Africa. The findings highlight a
need for regional and international stakeholders to employ a perspective of humility
and realism when intervening in support of national processes.
Nonetheless, it remains clear that both the AU and the UN (through their multiple
constituent departments, funds, programmes and agencies), alongside other regional
and international partners, do have significant influence and an important role to
play — and the stakes are high. Two-way dialogue between coup leaders and different
parts of the international community is invariably and necessarily a prominent
feature shaping coup trajectory. Regional and international actors face a momentous
responsibility.
This chapter identified four sets of tools and instruments at the disposal of regional
and international actors in responding to events. While the study set out to better
understand development sector responses, clearly the most prominent of these are
political: sanctions, suspension of membership from regional blocs, the deployment
of special envoys and other mediation capacities, and related diplomatic pressure
from partners and states.
These have been variously deployed in the five countries under review by both the
AU and RECs, notably ECOWAS and IGAD, however with some inconsistencies. In
addition, the typology of responses includes adjustments made to aid, trade and
security cooperation on the part of key bilateral and multilateral development
partners. These may be triggered by governance rules, but have been variously
applied in the different cases under review. Thirdly, a handful of diverse funding
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CH A P TER 3 K E Y FINDING S
instruments follow parameters that allow for targeted responses to UCG, coups
or political transitions — though none are explicitly set up for this purpose.
Fourth, the broader spectrum of peace, governance and democracy support
offered by international partners is directly relevant to addressing drivers and
building the long-term resilience of constitutional order.
In assessing this response terrain as it has been leveraged in the affected

countries under review, several gaps and challenges emerge. Responses have
been reactive rather than proactive, underscoring a dearth of political will and
readiness to act preventively. Regional and international partners have, at
times, subordinated normative and development priorities in favour of security
priorities. This is illustrated clearly in the apparent special treatment of Chad,
but is also apparent in the wider pattern of international engagement in the
Sahel region.
Inconsistency is also apparent in relation to the trend of constitutional

manipulation. There is an apparent tension between principle and pragmatism
in dealing with de facto leadership. The issue is highly nuanced. International
partners attempt to remain engaged so that harmful effects to populations are
minimized and transition processes are effectively resourced — yet without
unduly conferring legitimacy to coup leadership.
Coordination across partners in responding to military coups has been a

challenge. There is currently no mechanism for converging the efforts of
diverse actors into a strategic response in the event of a military coup — whether
at country, regional or global level. Nor is there an accepted protocol around the
division of roles and responsibilities among partners, or sequencing of political
and development levers.
Lastly, the need for a reset of longer-term democracy and governance assistance
is underscored. This demands recognizing how shortfalls in governance and
the incompleteness of democracy on the continent have contributed to the rise
in coup incidence. Questions about both the quantity and quality, in turn, of
international partners’ democracy and governance-assistance programmes
need to come to the fore.
F I R S T A L L- W O M E N M E D I A
O U T L E T, B I L A N , B R E A K S
NEW GROUND IN SOMALIA
SOMALI REPORTER KIIN

H A S A N F A K AT ( L E F T ) ,
A CORRESPONDENT FOR
S O M A L I A S F I R S T- E V E R ,
A L L- W O M E N N E W S O U T L E T,
CALLED BIL AN, INTERVIEWS
SIRAD MOHAMED NUR,
DIRECTOR OF THE MAMA
U G A A S O F O U N D AT I O N , AT A
W E E K LY V O L U N T E E R C L E A N U P
OF THE POPUL AR LIDO BEACH
ON 11 NOVEMBER 2022 IN
MOGADISHU, SOMALIA .
Supported by the
UNDP and launched
in April 2022, the six
female journalists of
Bilan, which means
bright and clear,
aim to empower
professional women
in Somali society, as
well as tell stories on
radio, television and
in print.
PHOTO BY SCOT T PETERSON

/G E T T Y I M A G E S
“Since the elections
will be conducted for
the first time, some
people don’t know how
to even cast a vote.
The government needs
to inform the people on
how the elections will
be conducted.”
FEM A LE FOCUS GROUP DIS CUS SA NT, K H A R TOUM, SUDA N (FEBRUA RY 202 2)
U N D P 202 3 1 41
04 SECTION 4
Policy and
programming
implications
14 3
P OLICY A ND PROGR A MMING IMPLICATIONS
Contemporary military coups in Africa can be attributed to multiple highly context-

specific factors. Triggers, proximate dynamics and deeper structural drivers all
inform each other within a complex and interdependent global environment.
Reflecting UNDP’s mandate in the international system, the Soldiers and citizens
report’s focus has been to better understand these factors through a development
lens. Its dataset of the perspectives of 5,000 African citizens who had lived through
coups or equivalent UCG events, contrasted with 3,000 whose countries are on a
path to democratic transition or consolidation, yielded a uniquely people-centred
body of evidence through which to interpret these issues and trends.
The findings suggest that coup risk may yet spread. In UCG contexts, the potential
for the erosion of constitutional order to persist beyond transition timelines, and
for further volatility, is clearly apparent. (This is evidenced by fresh conflict that
broke out in Sudan in April 2023.) In a scenario where coup leaders take inspiration
from one another, regional institutions’ normative frameworks and efforts may
increasingly stand to be bypassed and undermined.
The five recently affected UCG countries are not the only ones to experience
this confluence of structural and proximate factors. This points to the potential
for other cases to emerge on the continent. The research — and real-time events
unfolding in Ghana and The Gambia during the study — have highlighted
vulnerabilities even in states on a path of democratic transition or consolidation.
Notably, DTS-country respondents, who are citizens of comparatively stable and

developmentally advanced states, cited higher levels of frustration and scepticism
about government than were reported in the five coup-affected countries.
This discrepancy reflects higher expectations in these settings, as well as the
challenges that persist even in contexts with relative development progress.
The research revealed that tolerance for persistent inequality, government

under-performance across a spectrum of functions, corruption and elite self-
enrichment is sharply waning across the continent. Development drivers of
coup risk in the UCG-affected countries, and citizen frustration elsewhere,
are exacerbated by the impacts of COVID-19 and ongoing conflict in Ukraine,
compounding vulnerability.
In responding to this perilous confluence of factors and the alarm bell that has
been sounded by the increase in coup incidence since 2020, the research suggests
a blend of both short- and long-term priorities for coup prevention, risk mitigation
and transitions where coups have occurred. It underlines that well-established
prevention priorities must be implemented to immediate effect. Further, it points
to the urgency of renewing confidence in government efforts to tackle development
challenges in the interests of their citizens.
14 4
Indeed, this research has shown a crisis in governance to be at the heart of the recent
uptick in military coups in Africa. The relevance of mounting global interest in
resetting the social contract, as signalled in the UN Secretary-General’s Our Common
Agenda report, is brought into clear focus. The social contract that exists between
states and citizens demands to be reframed, necessitating a sharp pivot towards
building trust through inclusive, responsive and accountable government.
Trust and solidarity in the international system is also critical. 197 In a time when
competing global priorities are draining resources and diverting attention
away from the continent, regional and international actors need to apply
fresh focus and creativity — both in their engagement with coup-affected
countries, and to prevent further instances. New types of international
partnership, which are grounded first and foremost in deepening the checks and
balances between people and their governments, are needed.
This final section of the Soldiers and citizens report draws together the key strategic
messages arising from its analysis. Finally, it offers a set of recommendations that
constitute a proposed framework for policy and programming action.
4.1 KEY MES SAGES
1. To mitigate coup risk, a

development lens is essential
The study found that among the hybrid circumstances that shape vulnerability to
coup risk, underdevelopment is prominent. Counter-factual analysis of the cost of
coups further highlights that these events significantly slow down development.
These findings confirm that development perspectives should be at the centre
of UCG response strategies. While coups are neither inevitable, nor necessarily
likely, in all low-development contexts, secondary data shows clear correlations
between heightened coup risk and stagnant growth, exclusionary economic
governance, multidimensional poverty, inequality, reduced youth and women’s
participation, governance deficits and higher levels of military spend as a share
of government budget. The findings confirm that coup risk can be viewed as a
subset of state fragility.
Countries that experience contemporary coups perform poorly on global

development indices. These rankings are not abstract, but represent millions of
lives marred by exclusion, infringement of rights, restriction of opportunity and
frustration. These grievances create a base of frustration that coup leaders can
readily exploit. The Soldiers and citizens data reveals optimism and a heightened
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appetite for change among those who recently experienced a military coup, as if
willing for positive transformation to materialize from the turmoil. Poor government
performance, corruption and failure to deliver security, inclusive development gains
and related opportunities for populations all appear to create an appetite for change
in any guise.
Coup leaders have explicitly invoked the giants of Africa’s post-colonial history
in their rhetoric of revolution and transformation. In so doing they have captured
the popular imagination. This appeal points to a yearning for a better quality of
political leadership, which strives to meet civilians’ needs and aspirations. The
base of readily exploitable grievances, linked to leaders’ failures to deliver
inclusive development, creates fertile ground for coups to be staged. It is
therefore critical to scale up development-oriented investment that will
yield results and boost citizens’ confidence in a better future.
2. States must deepen democracy

and reset their social
contract with citizens
For African governments to build coup resilience, better governance, deeper
democracy and inclusive development progress should be a guiding star. The
quality of democracy and the prevalence of wider dysfunction in governance
systems have been brought to the forefront. For too long, some states in the region
have ruled behind a façade of democracy while deploying innately exclusionary
models of governance. Recent coups in Africa have been more common in
countries with a high number of previous coups, and governments that are
“neither democratic nor authoritarian, but [...] share some characteristics of
both”. 198 Democracy is at an inflection point on the continent, confronted by its
own shortcomings and incompleteness.
A reset of the social contract is needed both to assist coup-affected states in

moving forward and to help prevent future coups. To achieve this, governments
should shift their focus to practical delivery that directly improves quality of
life and opportunity for all segments of society. The initial popularity of coup
leaders should serve as a rallying call for governments to do better in
demonstrating inclusive and principled governance.
The question of how the social contract is best renewed goes to the heart of the
governance agenda of today — in Africa, as elsewhere. This emphasizes the need
for processes such as national dialogue, which help people to hear and understand
each other, and new frameworks for managing differences collectively. The UN
Secretary-General’s recent Our Common Agenda report highlights key policy areas
14 6
for transforming lives and building trust. These include universal social protection,
health coverage, education, skills, decent work and housing, as well as universal
access to the Internet by 2030 as a basic human right. 199
Governments often fail to project legitimate governance institutions when

engagement with local constituencies, informal leaders and non-state actors is
insufficient. These include traditional institutions (which may shape an individual’s
choices more than the government itself), the private sector and other economic
actors, and social media influencers. Lived experience happens at grassroots and
localized levels, whether in cities or villages. This demands a multi-level framing of
the social contract that ties the local to the national, regional and global.
Deepening democracy and rebuilding the social contract are long-term endeavours.
Key processes should be identified to signal to the population that inclusive
development has been made a priority of the state. This can include setting up
complaint mechanisms and clear service delivery standards with realistic
implementation roadmaps.
3. International and regional

partners should reaffirm their
commitment to constitutional
norms, democratic principles
and human rights
Regional and international partners such as the AU, as well as RECs like ECOWAS,
have played a key role in projecting democratic and constitutional order,
responding to coups, and helping to prevent further instances. Nonetheless, critical
questions have arisen regarding the implementation of norms and the incentives
for AU member states to comply. Prevarication and inconsistency in upholding
continental norms risk undermining their relevance. Efforts by the AU and RECs to
uphold norms are, at times, hampered by insufficient political will among member
states, creating tensions between normative principle and political interests. The
very credibility of these institutions is at stake, should their legitimacy be further
eroded in the eyes of African citizens.
For their part, international partners must demonstrate solidarity by encouraging

a deepening of Africa’s democratic process, while resolving contradictions in
their engagement. In recent decades, investment in governance has declined
while security and other pillars of international cooperation have been favoured.
Security priorities have in effect, served to undermine principle. Some of these
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at-risk contexts have seen international partners pursue security and political
objectives, with scant attention to the accountability of government partners. In
some scenarios, these geopolitically driven interventions have compounded the
very factors that heighten coup risk. The recent coups and further risks point to a
moment of reckoning. A change of direction is needed.
Taking the above key messages into account, the findings of this report suggest five
sets of specific priorities as the basis for a framework for policy and programming
action in responding to contemporary coup risk in Africa. They are:
(i) Strengthening continental and regional response mechanisms;
(ii) Preventing further coups;
(iii) More effective responses when coups occur;
(iv) Building long-term coup resilience by addressing structural

and institutional drivers; and
(v) Reorienting international engagement in the Sahel.
14 8
4. 2 RECOMMENDATIONS
Strengthening continental and

regional response mechanisms
The Soldiers and citizens research highlights that AU Member States must redouble
efforts to ensure effective and consistent responses to contemporary coup risk.
As discussed above, this calls for improved governance to help reset the social
contract with citizens. The political will needed to uphold related norms and
principles at regional and continental levels must also be mutually incentivized.
A series of actions, if taken together, can enable better continental and regional-
level leadership in responding to coup risk. Enhancing AU and REC norms and
principles as they relate to UCG, as well as constitutional manipulation to extend
power, must be a priority. The ongoing review of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy
and Good Governance including clauses related to presidential term limits is
encouraging. A similar review at the continental level through the African Charter
on Democracy, Governance and Elections would be timely and should be supported.
The capacity of the AU and RECs to uphold norms in member states represents a
further challenge. This relates both to having in place relevant structures and
mechanisms, such as special envoys, as well as the resources needed to implement
such support.
Recent events underscore the necessity for the AU, ECCAS and ECOWAS to enhance
their capacities in preventive diplomacy through mechanisms such as the
ECOWAS Council of Elders and the AU Panel of the Wise. Effective coordination
between the AU and RECs is critical for advancing normative coherence. A
further gap in the overall AU architecture is the lack of specific frameworks for
planning, establishing, deploying and implementing the necessary support in the
event of a coup. The capacity of the AU and RECs to provide technical support for
constitutional review and amendment processes is also crucial.
Preventing further coups

The need for more proactive approaches to coup prevention is clear. Though
possibly pre-empted in political risk assessments, the recent coups caught many
off guard. Responses were stymied by delays and other challenges, while the risk of
multiple coups in the same state became evident. Yet the gains of preventing crises
and conflict, rather than reacting when they occur, have been recognized at the
highest levels of international policy and decision-making for decades. 200
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While the practice of prevention lags behind principle, several actions can be
identified to remedy this. Continental norms that prohibit UCG and discourage
constitutional manipulation should be projected in a more consistent and robust
manner. Complemented with sharper AU- and REC-deployable capacities, as
mentioned above, this is a key avenue for assisting a coup-prevention agenda.
Regional and international actors must engage proactively with countries where
presidents are nearing the end of their term limits to secure public assurances that
they will resign and allow for a peaceful transfer of power.
Additional short- and medium-term priorities are:
• Boost early warning and response system (EWRS) capacity (monitoring and
analysis, as well as response). Well-developed global and regional EWRS
capacities are already in place, housed by different partners and institutions.
However, their efficacy has been questioned and barriers debated. Several
specific priorities can be identified. These include the need to shift from early
warning of imminent violence to a wider awareness of risk that is sensitive to
real and perceived exclusion and inequality in societies. Response capacities
merit greater investment; and citizens’ networks should be more actively
engaged in analysing trends.
Other priority areas include linking spheres of conflict (grassroots, local,

national, regional and global) into systemic approaches that dynamically plot
interdependence; and better harnessing technology to improve monitoring
and harmonization across regional and international EWRS platforms. It
is apparent EWRS are typically designed to monitor and respond to a wider
categorization of violence than military coups alone, even though such events
feature in their analysis. It is urgent to include greater specificity related
to the drivers and triggers of coups, as well as appropriate responses.
• Support problem-solving dialogue processes between political and military

elites. To mount a coup, military factions require sufficient political agency.
In countries identified as at risk, early action to facilitate dialogue between
political and military factions may represent a fruitful direction for diplomacy.
These processes must produce jointly owned solutions that diffuse and respond
to substantive issues. Both sides should be held accountable through a struc-
tured dialogue process. While framed as short-term preventive intervention,
such investment should ideally form part of a wider strategic efforts around
civil-miliary relations, responding to structural drivers in the long term.
• Prioritize programmatic investment in national infrastructures for peace.

Interim leaders in all the UCG focal countries attempted to engage diverse
stakeholders and voices in shaping transition processes. Yet over time, this
became more contested. Preventive action in at-risk countries should include
proactive efforts to support coalition building, inclusivity in the political
process, and wider societal capacity for conflict prevention and mediation.
Active networks create entry points for advancing peace messages and
informing citizens when coup-related turbulence occurs. Such capacities can
help to quell and diffuse knock-on social unrest and violence and can usefully
be thought of as ‘national infrastructures for peace’. 201
150
Preventive investment in relevant networks of young people, women, the

private sector, CSOs, as well as faith-based and other identity group actors is
needed to support ongoing work and platforms to advance social cohesion and
address legacies of conflict. Including historically marginalized groups is
critical to rebuild trust and foster consensus around shared future priorities.
The deployment of resources such as the UN Peace and Development Adviser
function should be closely targeted at preventive programming, which is vital
for nurturing national infrastructures for peace in at-risk countries.
More effective responses

when coups occur
Regional and international partners, including development agencies and financial
institutions, play a critical role in shaping the trajectory of coups. Partners need
to support and sustain post-coup transition processes by investing in strategic
entry points that boost inclusivity and effectiveness. In this way, the foundations
for long-term renewal may be established. For example, UNDP’s approach in
recent coup-affected contexts has been to ‘stay and deliver’ and to prevent the
development agenda from being jeopardized.
Partners must also improve response mechanisms in the event of future

occurrences where prevention has failed. Transition plans can harness
opportunities for positive transformation where they are based on, and
run alongside, continuous and inclusive national dialogue processes, and
are characterized by a readiness to address grievances across stakeholder
groups. Specific priorities are:
• Strategic coordination across sectors (political, development, humanitarian,

security) and partners. The goal of improving coordination to ensure more
strategic and efficient international responses to the world’s most pressing
crises is well recognized. Increasing efforts to coordinate across humanitarian,
development and peace actors through a nexus approach in the stabilization
space has seen advances in recent years. However, strategic coordination
between different sectors (for example, security and development), as well as
between different actors in streamlining responses as coups unfold, has been
an obstacle. Partners and priorities often appear to work in tension with each
other. As highlighted in Section 3, no mechanism currently exists for
converging diverse actors into a coordinated strategic response in the event
of a military coup, whether at country, regional or global level. Nor is there an
accepted protocol around the division of roles and responsibilities, coordination
across sectors, or the sequencing of political and development levers. Clarity
on these issues is required. It is partly in response to this coordination gap
that UNDP and the AUC Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security
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151
(AUC-PAPS) have jointly developed the new Africa Facility to Support

Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT). The facility aims to provide a platform for
coordination, as well as responses to other gaps and priorities identified here.
• Continued assistance to vulnerable populations, with higher levels of

risk management and mitigation. It is a priority to identify mechanisms,
economic or otherwise, that can motivate political and military actors to
engage meaningfully with citizens, and to honour transition timeframes and
commitments. There is a risk, however, that ‘carrot and stick’ approaches
marked by sanctions and aid disruptions may be counterproductive where
populations are most vulnerable. Just as humanitarian actors’ access is
understood to be paramount in the aftermath of crises, the development
spend pipeline should also not simply be turned off.
BOX 20
UNDP-AU AFRICA FACILITY TO SUPPORT INCLUSIVE TRANSITIONS
UNDP and the AU Commission have been working together from 2022 to advance the concept of a new
Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT), underpinned by the present research study.
AFSIT provides integrated programmatic support to countries in transition. Its overall objective is
to support credible, inclusive and legitimate transition roadmaps, mechanisms and institutions
toward democracy and stability in relevant AU Member States in anticipation of, and during, complex
political transitions.
AFSIT is a response to the call by the AU in the Malabo Declaration on UCG for collective action and
solidarity in developing a robust response, deepening democracy and fostering collective security.
The Facility will coordinate and complement (and not duplicate, replace or consolidate) AU, RECs
and UN instruments, as well as other development partners’ instruments and initiatives, in support
of inclusive transitions. It seeks to swiftly pre-empt, respond to, and address complex political crisis
and UCG. The facility will further provide and deploy rapid technical, human, financial and resource
support to the AU, RECs and affected AU Member States to prevent, respond to and mitigate risks
associated with complex political transitions.
The co-design process of AFSIT has proactively engaged RECs/RMs, the AfDB, international financial
institutions, research institutions, civil society, development partners and national partners. Its
design prioritizes sufficient capacity to follow up on commitments made through the March 2022
Accra Declaration and May 2022 Malabo Declaration. In this context, it aims to strengthen both the
continental institutions and mechanisms responsible for responding to complex political transitions,
and the One UN response — with a particular focus on promoting inclusion.
A sustained commitment to reaching populations, even in the

face of executive-level political crisis, should be a key principle
in shaping coup response. Sudden or complete disruptions in support
may compound vulnerability, isolation and grievances, which in turn
may be readily exploited for political gain. Finding creative modalities is
152
a necessary corollary to this principle. Models such as World Bank and UN

partnerships in conflict-affected settings, as well as working through non-
state partner networks — including international and national civil society
groups — are at the forefront of options for achieving this. However, events
also suggest that institutional capabilities should be reviewed to ensure
that principled opportunities for agencies to remain engaged are harnessed.
Development partners should be prepared to codify rules of engagement
that safeguard development programming, even where state partnerships
are in disarray. The level of risk that they are willing to accept should
be reassessed, security protocols reviewed, and adaptive programme
management encouraged.
• Advocate for meaningfully inclusive transition processes. Transition

processes can yield lasting transformative change and pave the way for
democratic renewal and a reset of the social contract. This potential will
only be realized where new conversations are enabled and used to dig deep
into national issues and sources of division and alienation. Transitional
justice processes are critical in for resolving allegations of human rights
violations where these occur. Sustaining pressure on military juntas
and interim leadership, and identifying platforms for meaningful and
continuous engagement of the full spectrum of representative groups
in society, is a key area for regional and international actors’ attention.
Performance milestones are critical to measure the level and depth of citizen
inclusion and engagement in the transition and related national dialogue
processes — including through key groups such as young people, women,
rural communities, civil society and the private sector. The process should
be tracked in an ongoing two-way dialogue between military junta and
international community. This priority should be as, if not more important,
than the timing of an eventual election.
• Support transition processes towards restoring legitimate and inclusive

constitutional order. A further priority for supporting effective transition
processes is for regional and international actors to prioritize and coordinate
support to the delivery of transition milestones, complementing and
providing oversight to the de facto executive role. These may include the
efforts of constitutional reform bodies; transitional legislatures, oversight
committees and their secretariats; EMBs; parliament, anti-corruption
authorities and national human rights institutions, and ombudspersons.
The role and functioning of core government functions and ministries — such
as those responsible for critical policy areas like justice, decentralization or
reconciliation, and others charged with managing the economy and restoring
critical areas of service delivery — also require focused and targeted support.
2023
15 3
Long-term coup resilience

through addressing structural
and institutional drivers
Structural factors feed into grievances which, in turn, represent proximate factors
that are readily triggered in support of military coups. Addressing these root
causes is critical for longer-term coup prevention, or ‘coup-proofing’. 202 Responding
to the key structural drivers that contributed to coup vulnerability identified in
this research (as summarized in Section 1) suggests the following priorities:
Deepening democratic governance
The recent coups have cast a spotlight on the incompleteness of democratic

transition in some parts of Africa against a backdrop of global erosion — while
The Soldiers and citizens paradoxically pointing to a new yearning for democracy as service delivery,
qualitative research transparency and responsive institutions across Africa. There is a clear need
participants offered to make better sense of barriers to democratic consolidation, and to deepen the
recommendations on how
quality of democratic governance. Regional and international actors need to
the inclusivity and integrity
of electoral processes could
focus on incentivizing such a deepening of democratization across the continent.
be ensured. These included: Specific priorities are:
• Encouraging electoral • Elections in a broader democracy ecosystem. Closing the gap between
reforms before the next procedural and substantive democracy requires urgent and continuous
election cycle to reduce the efforts. Elections are easily manipulated, and the power of elites becomes
government/ruling party’s
entrenched when polls are rushed or held without functional accountability
influence on the process;
systems. Soldiers and citizens research participants identified a range of
• Engaging key opposition recommendations for improving the integrity and inclusiveness of the
parties and CSOs in the electoral process. Enabling national governments (whether as the UN Electoral
restructuring of electoral Assistance Division, UNDP, AU, RECs or other international partners) to
commissions to make implement the legislative and institutional reform needed to create conditions
them more inclusive and for free, fair and credible elections is essential. This also concerns the
independent;
technical assistance that regional and international actors provide through
their electoral support mechanisms, as well as diplomatic and political
• Policy reforms to address
the increasing monetization aspects of mediation and electoral dispute resolution. Sharpening the
of politics and elections, critical voice of electoral observation is also required to ensure meaningful
which is a major engagement that upholds norms and good practices, rather than lending
impediment — especially legitimacy where it is not deserved.
for women and youth
participation in elections; • Support to developmental political leadership. The experiences of countries
on a path toward democratic transition highlight that developmental political
• Policy reforms to address
‘winner-takes-all’ systems
leadership is an important source of resilience. Programming that fosters
of political competition, a new generation of political leaders on the continent is important, as are
encouraging consensus or initiatives that encourage enhanced leadership from current heads of state in
coalition-based politics; full respect of existing democratic norms and civic rights.
15 4
• Investing in voter • Adjust democratic governance programming and assistance to invigorate

education well in advance accountability oversight. International development partners should review
of the next elections; and adapt interventions designed to promote democratic governance, rule
of law, security, justice and human rights. While they should avoid
• Providing EMBs
overly state-centric conceptions of state building, partners must
with clear processes,
requirements and project a readiness for robust discourse where commitment to
methods of identification, good governance is in question . Supporting institutional development,
with the consensus of all championing representative and accountable institutions, and providing
political parties, for voter
platforms for citizens to hold state actors accountable should be top priorities.
registration in compiling
Local organizations need flexible, sustained and predictable access to
a new electoral register
prior to elections to funding. These entities should be supported to identify their own priority
increase participation needs, encourage political participation and advocate for responsive and
and inclusivity; inclusive services.
• Targeted efforts to
empower and increase
Civil-military relations: a strategic reset
women and youth
representation within A history of often-violent state formation processes, which date back to the
government, legislature, colonial era, left a legacy of military interdependence and influence on political
EMBs and political life in many African countries. This has been identified as a further structural
parties. (This includes driver of coup risk, along with higher proportions of state expenditure on the
the provision of financial
military. It is imperative to recalibrate the civil-military relationship to respond to
support; capacity-building
recent coups and contribute to long-term prevention. In addition, wider efforts are
support in areas such as
resource mobilization, needed to deepen the effectiveness and accountability of security actors. Gains
leadership skills, political in the security sector can significantly help to reinvigorate the social contract
communication and between states and citizens. Specific priorities are:
campaign strategies; and
advocating for affirmative • Civil-military reset through reform and dialogue. African states that have
action by election
invested in processes to reframe this relationship show greater resilience
stakeholders to reserve
to coups. Governments, with support from regional and international
some positions for women
and the youth); and partners, should replicate such successes through peer-to-peer exchange.
Senior personnel leaving the military should have career pathways beyond
• Making alternative the security sphere, and reform processes should be expedited to separate
arrangements for IDPs the influence of military actors from politics. Educating citizens about the
as well as people with appropriate separation of duties in a democratic state is another priority. At
disabilities to participate the same time, governments should address grievances within the military,
in voting.
including matters of remuneration, equipment, living conditions, career
progression and opportunities for serving staff.
• Improved SSR interventions. Ensuring the operational effectiveness of

security forces in delivering security for populations, while also observing
human rights principles, implementing best practices in community
engagement and combatting corruption, is also key. Complicity in abuses
against citizens has, itself, fuelled insecurity in some countries. Lessons
from decades of SSR programming suggest that countries confronted by coup
risk need new approaches. There needs to be a clear rationalization of the
mandates and functions of different forces in relation to each other, while
budgeting and expenditures must to be transparent. Many interventions are
overly focused on working with the forces, without ensuring accountability for
malfeasance. Communities, civil society and the media should be supported
2023
15 5
to play a watchdog role regarding security force conduct. Partners supporting

SSR should be ready to challenge and consider withholding support where
reform stalls.
• Local-level, inclusive security-sector governance. Platforms that convene

communities alongside state security actors and local government actors are
essential. These platforms should enable participants to identify resources
and avenues for jointly owned security solutions, including ensuring security
forces’ accountability, while building a shared understanding of sources
of insecurity. Local-level, inclusive security-sector governance can itself
strengthen the social contract. This presents a key programming avenue for
enhancing resilience in countries at risk of coups. This type of programming
should be informed by clear political economic and conflict analysis to
understand the roles that different actors have played in insecurity. Further,
it can be linked to community- and local-level mediation, carried out by
traditional, government or community actors.
When asked how Inclusive economic development and poverty reduction

further coups could
be prevented, research In addressing structural drivers, it is vital to place greater emphasis on
participants strongly strengthening and expanding inclusive development gains and progress towards
urged that governments Agendas 2030 and 2063. Such gains must be felt across at-risk countries. Casting
should implement robust
the perspective more broadly around this structural driver of coup risk raises a
policy actions to improve
economic growth and
large scope of development policy, planning and programming, reaching towards
address worsening economic structural transformation. It suggests that governments across the continent
conditions and associated should take demonstrable steps to build societies where citizens feel included
impacts on the living in national development. International partners must double down on inclusive
conditions of the ordinary economic development, while aligning global trade relations with positive
people — with the support of development outcomes. Specific priorities include:
international partners.
• Reducing multidimensional poverty post-pandemic. Africa’s deprivation profile

Policy actions can include
promoting macroeconomic was assessed in the most recent MPI to include deprivation in nutrition, cooking
stability; having an efficient fuel, sanitation and housing, with large numbers of people facing these burdens
tax system to boost domestic (250 million) — as well as others, such as a lack of water and electricity. 203
revenue mobilization; This aggregate perspective on the region clearly masks specific ‘deprivation
cutting government bundles’ at national and sub-national levels. For states to progress towards the
expenditure as part of
goals of Agendas 2063 and 2030, targeted and integrated policies are needed
fiscal stabilization and debt
to simultaneously address multiple challenges. Heeding this call across the
sustainability measures;
robust measures to eliminate continent will reduce vulnerability and build resilience to coup risk.
corruption; creating more
sustainable jobs for the • Building inclusive economies and improving economic governance.
youth and supporting Governments across Africa should pursue a deliberately inclusive growth
entrepreneurship; promoting trajectory. Continued efforts in economic diversification are also implied by the
private investments; research findings. The governance and management of extractives and other
and promoting social
natural resources should be strengthened to occur in an effective, transparent,
intervention programmes to
support the most vulnerable
and accountable manner, including by the private sector and civilian oversight
in society to “alleviate their modalities. A stronger social contract can be achieved by enhancing domestic
sufferings”. resource mobilization and taxation regimes, and anti-corruption measures
should be integrated across all sectors. Accelerated support for Africa’s
domestic private sector can boost structural transformation. This would drive
15 6
productivity and competitivity, allowing the sector to better serve and provide
for its expanding markets. Creating new and sustainable job opportunities
is another priority pathway. It is equally critical to focus on the informal
sector, which provides livelihoods and opportunities for many low-income
populations (especially youth and women). 204 Africa’s growth must boost
local employment prospects and benefit a majority, enabling sustained
wealth creation. Investing in domestic value-addition manufacturing,
upgrading infrastructure, providing access to markets and creating enabling
environments for entrepreneurs and small businesses are all steps to be taken
with greater purpose. Such investment should occur at both the national and
local level — involving not just the private sector, but also evaluating whether
local and national government bodies contribute to an enabling environment.
• Tackling external constraints. While the onus is on African states to orchestrate

inclusive economic development, relationships with regional and internation-
al partners can both help and hinder. Global, regional and national inequalities
are exacerbated by asymmetrical and constrained trade relations, which
hamper the distribution of economic opportunities. At the regional and inter-
national level, much needs to be done to intensify progress under the Africa
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement. The goal must be to further
expand regional economic opportunities for citizens and new labour-market
entrants. Further afield, trade relationships between Africa, Europe and other
parts of the world should be reframed to optimize development prospects.
Reorienting international
engagement in the Sahel
Although the findings and recommendations of this study are relevant across
the continent, the concentration of recent coups in the Sahel subregion has direct
implications for regional and international engagement.
During the past decade, the Sahel has experienced increasing insecurity and
turmoil. The recent coups are an expression of that turmoil — and a forewarning of
what may yet follow. Despite (or, according to some analyses, because of) intensive
and complex security deployment and assistance at the expense of attention to
root causes, various international actors have contributed, albeit unwittingly,
to deepening fragility. Due to its geopolitical importance, mineral wealth and
ongoing struggles against violent extremism, the Sahel features prominently on
international agendas. However, in a context of shifting geopolitical brinkmanship,
attention to the region should urgently be renewed and refocused.
Drawing together the above framework for action in responding to coup risk, such a
recalibration in the Sahel demands a reinvigorated development response that puts
governance priorities and a reset of the social contract between states and citizens
at its fore. Limited access to justice and basic public services are key drivers of
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157
insecurity, and provide opportunities for violent extremist groups to co-opt local
populations. Building inclusive local governance should become a cornerstone of
fresh efforts that extend beyond securitized approaches, and both recognize and
draw on informal and local governance mechanisms and sources of resilience.
Tackling corruption at all levels of government is essential if investment in

state service provision is to succeed. This includes the need for malpractices to
be called out more vociferously. It is also crucial to monitor the human rights
conduct of security actors. Early results of the ongoing stabilization activities
by UNDP and partners in the Lake Chad Basin region — which contribute to the
peace-development nexus — provide inspiration. Forging new narratives about
the Sahel, which emphasize positive opportunities for growth and prosperity for
its peoples, can also contribute to new pathways.
Recent events have prompted a rethink on the part of several actors, including the
AU, UN and EU as well as bilateral partners and stakeholders. A clear emerging
direction is to place a governance perspective at the centre of all areas of
cooperation, including in relation to the security sector and security issues.
This has been unanimously called for by analysts of the region and is
underscored by the findings of this research. 205
The UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel and the AU Sahel strategy have been
in place, respectively, since 2013 and 2014. Both place significant emphasis on
conflict prevention and governance priorities. The AU and the UN have jointly
tasked an independent high-level panel to lead a consultative process, under the
stewardship of the former president of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, to critically
assess and eventually recalibrate the governance, security and development
agenda for the region.
This process offers an opportunity to reimagine collective international support

to the region’s national and local efforts for sustainable peace and development.
A rethink of the EU strategy for the region similarly appears likely to place new
emphasis on governance issues and building trust between citizens and the
state. Realignment that moves beyond short-term security priorities, towards
meaningful and long-term governance progress, will be critical.
GUINEA
14 SEPTEMBER 2021
A WOMAN LOOKS ON IN A
R E S TA U R A N T A S T H E F I R S T
S E S S I O N O F TA L K S TA K E P L A C E
BE T WEEN COLONEL MAMADY
D O U M B O U YA A N D C U R R E N T
G U I N E A N P O L I T I C A L PA R T I E S
IN CONAKRY
On 5 September 2021,
Colonel Mamady
Doumbouya’s special
forces seized power
from Alpha Condé in
a coup, taking over
from the West African
state’s 83-year-old
president.
PHOTO BY JOHN WESSELS

2023
160
SOLDIERS AND CITIZENS

PERCEPTIONS SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
ANNEX
A. AT TITUDES TO THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT
1
A1. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way the
government is running the country?
1 Satisfied
2 Dissatisfied
98 Don’t know
99 Refused
A2. Do you trust the current government to run

the country in the interests of people like you?
1 Yes, definitely
2 Yes, probably
3 No, definitely not
98 Don’t know
99 Refused
A3. How important is it to you who runs the country?

1 Very important
2 Fairly important
3 Not very important
4 Not at all important
98 Don’t know
99 Refused
A4. Which of the following best describes your opinion of

the system of government in [COUNTRY]?
1 It works extremely well and could not be improved
2 It could be improved in small ways but mainly works well
3 It could be improved quite a lot
4 It needs a great deal of improvement
98 Don’t know
99 Refused
B. DELIVERY A ND OUTCOMES
B1. Please tell me which of these words describes how you feel
about the direction your country is moving in today?
a. Happy
b. Excited
c. Worried
d. Proud
e. Scared
f. Confused
g. Optimistic
1 Yes
2 No
Q. Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the following?

B2. The state of the economy
B3. Your personal financial situation
B4. Economic opportunities available to you
A NNE X 1 161
B5. The quality of key public services, C2. Which of these three statements is closest to
e.g. education and health your own opinion?
B6. Your level of safety living here Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other
1 Satisfied kind of government
2 Dissatisfied Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic
3 Neither government can be preferable
98 Don’t know Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter
99 Refused what kind of government we have
98 Don’t know
Q. Do you think the following will get better, get worse 99 Refused
or stay about the same over the next two years?
B7. The state of the economy C3. You said that in some circumstance a non-democratic
B8. Your personal financial situation government can be preferable. In what circumstances
B9. Economic opportunities available to you do you mean?
B10. The quality of key public services, Probe fully, write in
e.g. education and health 98 Don’t know
B11. Your level of safety living here 99 Refused
1 Get better
2 Get worse C4.
Many things may be desirable, but not all of them
3 Stay about the same are essential characteristics of democracy. For each
98 Don’t know of the following things I read out, please tell me if you
99 Refused think it is an essential feature of democracy.
1 Governments tax the rich and
Q. How much confidence, if any, do you have in each of subsidize the poor
the following to act in the best interests of the public? 2 Religious authorities interpret the laws
B12. The military / armed forces 3 People choose their leaders in free elections
B13. The police 4 People receive state aid for unemployment
B14. Banks 5 The army takes over when government is
B15. Judges / courts incompetent
B16. National-level business leaders 6 Civil rights protect people against state
B17. The government oppression
B18. Trade unions 7 The state makes people’s incomes equal
B19. Traditional media like newspapers 8 People obey their rulers
and radio 9 Women have the same rights as men
B20. Social media companies 10 The media are free from government control
B21. African Union 98 Don’t know
B22. United Nations 99 Refused
B23. Religious bodies
B24. Civil society organizations C5. Which of these two statements is closest to your
1 Complete confidence own opinion?
2 A fair amount of confidence Statement 1: The constitution should limit the
3 Not very much confidence president to serving a maximum of two terms in office
4 No confidence at all Statement 2: There should be no constitutional limit on
98 Don’t know how long the president can serve
99 Refused 98 Don’t know
99 Refused
C. P OLITICA L INTEREST A ND EFFICACY
C1. How interested are you in national politics, Q. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the
would you say you are? following statements?
1 Very interested C6. [COUNTRY] system of government is rigged
2 Somewhat interested to advantage the rich and powerful
3 Not very interested C7. Men make better political leaders than women
4 Not at all interested C8. This country needs more women
98 Don’t know in leadership positions
99 Refused
162 A NNE X 1
C9. This country needs more young people D2 Did you support or oppose X becoming president
(18- to 30-year-olds) in leadership positions /the change in government?
C10. There is a clear separation between the 1 Supported
military and the government 2 Opposed
C11. Women have the same rights as men 3 Neither supported nor opposed
1 Agree 98 Don’t know / can’t remember
2 Disagree 99 Refused
3 Neither agree nor disagree
98 Don’t know ASK IF SUPPORTED
99 Refused D3 Why did you support…? (Write in)
C12 How often, if at all, do you think the law is ASK IF OPPOSED
fairly applied to all citizens in your country? D4 Why did you oppose…? (Write in)
1 Always
2 Most of the time D5 Did you feel your opinions and concerns were listened
3 Sometimes to as part of his change of government?
4 Rarely 1 Yes, fully
5 Never 2 Yes, to some extent
98 Don’t know 3 No
99 Refused 98 Don’t know
99 Refused
C13 How often, if at all, do you think the law is
fairly applied to politicians in your country? IF CODE 2 OR 3 AT D5, ASK
1 Always D6 What would you like to have happened differently
2 Most of the time in order to feel better included in the change of
3 Sometimes government? (Write in)
4 Rarely
5 Never D7 So far, has this change of government had a positive
98 Don’t know or negative impact on the country as a whole?
99 Refused 1 Positive
2 Negative
D. THE L A ST CH A NGE OF GOVERNMENT IN 3 Neither
[DE TA IL S] 98 Don’t know
I would now like to ask you some questions about the 99 Refused
last change of government in [ADD DETAILS].
D8 So far, has this change of government had a positive
D1 I am going to read out some words that some or negative impact on you and your family?
people felt about this country during the last 1 Positive
transition in [DETAILS]. As I read them out, please 2 Negative
tell me if you felt like this about your country at 3 Neither
that time? 98 Don’t know
a. Happy 99 Refused
b. Excited
c. Worried Q. From what you remember, did the following types
d. Proud of organizations play a positive or a negative role in
e. Scared [add details about process of change of government ],
f. Confused or did they not make much difference?
g. Optimistic D9 Traditional media, e.g. radio and television
1 Yes D10 Social media
2 No D11 Military / armed forces
D12 The police
D13 Religious bodies
D14 National-level business leaders
D15 Civil society organisations
D16 Neighbouring countries
A NNE X 1 16 3
D17 African Union E7Which one of these bests applies to you?

D18 United Nations 1 I make enough money to buy basics and
1 Positive save the surplus
2 Negative 2 I make enough money only to buy basics
3 Not made much difference 3 I do not make enough money to buy basics
98 Don’t know 98 Don’t know
99 Refused 99 Refused
E . DEMOGR A PHIC S E8 In a typical week, approximately how

(Some of these will need to be asked at the start much money do you make / earn?
of the survey for sampling / quota control) E9 Do you have a disability or long-term health
condition that impacts your daily life?
E1 Location of respondent 1 Yes
2 No
E2 Respondent’s gender 98 Don’t know
1 Male 99 Refused
2 Female
98 Don’t know/prefer not to say E10 Do you live in an urban or rural area?
1 Urban
E3What is your highest level of education? 2 Rural
1 No formal schooling 98 Don’t know
2 Informal schooling only 99 Refused
(including Koranic schooling)
3 Primary school completed E11 People are not always able to vote in elections,
4 Secondary school / high school completed for example, because they weren’t registered,
5 Post-secondary qualifications other than they were unable to go, or someone prevented
university, e.g. a diploma or degree from a them from voting. How about you? In the last
polytechnic or college, some university national election held in [DETAILS], did you
6 University completed vote, or not, or were you too young to vote? Or
7 Post-graduate can’t you remember whether you voted?
99 Don’t know [Do not read] 1 I did not vote
2 I was too young to vote
E4 What is your age? 3 I can’t remember whether I voted
(write in) 4 I voted in the election
98 Don’t know
E5 Ethnicity 99 Refused
E6 What is your current employment status?

1 Full-time employment
2 Part-time employment
3 Unemployed / Looking for work
4 Unemployed / Not looking for work
5 Student
6 Retired
7 Other: WRITE IN
98 Don’t know
99 Refused
16 4
COMPARING UCG- AND DTS-CATEGORY

COUNTRIES ON GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT INDICES
ANNEX
FIGURE I
2
 UCG
G D P P E R C A P I TA I N U S $
 DTS
Higher GDP
S EYCHELLES 14,653
MAURITIUS 9,106 WORLD AVERAGE $12,237
GAB ON 8,635
EQUATORIAL GUIN EA 7, 507
S OUTH AFRICA 7,055
B OTSWAN A 6,805
LIBYA 6, 357
N AMIB IA 4,866
ESWATIN I 3,978
TUN IS IA 3,807
MOROCCO 3,795
EGYP T 3,699
ALG ERIA 3,691
CAB O VERDE 3, 293
DJ IB OUTI 3,150
CÔTE D’IVOIRE 2, 549
GHA NA 2, 363
SAO TOME AN D P RIN CIP E 2, 361
CON GO 2, 290
MAURITAN IA 2,166
KEN YA 2,082
N IGERIA 2,066
AN GOLA 1,954
ZIMBABWE 1,774
CAMEROON 1,667
S EN EGAL 1,637 SUB-SAHARA AVERAGE $1,633
COMOROS 1, 577
B EN IN 1, 319
GU INEA 1,189
ZAMB IA 1,137
TA NZ ANIA 1,099
LES OTHO 1,094
TOG O 973
ETHIOP IA 925
BU RKINA FASO 893
UGAN DA 884
MAL I 874
RWAN DA 822
G UIN EA-B IS SAU 795
T HE GAMBIA 772
SU DAN 752
CHA D 686
LIB ERIA 676
MALAWI 635
N IGER 591
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 577
MADAGAS CAR 501
MOZAMB IQUE 492
S IERRA LEON E 480
CEN TRAL AFRICAN REP UB LIC 461
S OMALIA 447
B URUN DI 221
Lower GDP
Missing data: Eritrea and South Sudan

Source: World Bank Group, 2021, (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD).
A NNE X 2 16 5
FIGURE II
 UCG
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX
 DTS
Higher human development
M AU RIT IU S 0.802
SE YC HE L L E S 0.785
A LGE RIA 0.745 WORLD AVERAGE 0.732
T U NISIA 0.731
EGYPT 0.731
L IBYA 0.718
SO U T H A F RICA 0.713
GA BO N 0.706
BOTSWA NA 0.693
M O RO C C O 0.6 83
CA BO V E RD E 0.6 6 2
G H A NA 0.6 32
SAO TO M E A ND PRINCIP E 0.618
NA M IBIA 0.615
E SWAT INI 0.59 7
EQ UATO RIA L GU INE A 0.596
Z IM BA BW E 0.593
A NG O L A 0.586
CA M E RO O N 0.576
K E NYA 0.575
C O NGO 0.571
Z A M BIA 0.56 5 AFRICAN AVERAGE 0.559
C O M O RO S 0.558
M AU RITA NIA 0.556
C ÔT E D ’ IVO IRE 0.550
TANZANI A 0.549
TO G O 0.539
NIG E RIA 0.535
RWA NDA 0.534
U GA NDA 0.525
BE NIN 0.525
L E SOT HO 0.514
M A L AW I 0.512
SE NEGA L 0.511
D JIBO U T I 0.509
S U DAN 0.508
M A DAGASCA R 0.501
TH E GA M B I A 0.500
E T HIO PIA 0.498
E RIT RE A 0.492
GU INE A-BISSAU 0.483
L IBE RIA 0.481
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 0.479
SIE RRA L EO NE 0.477
G UI NEA 0.465
B U RK I NA FAS O 0.449
M OZ A M BIQ U E 0.446
M ALI 0.428
BU RU ND I 0.426
C E NT RA L A F RICA N REP UB LIC 0.404
NIG E R 0.400
CHAD 0.394
SO U T H SU DA N 0.385
Lower human development

Missing data: Somalia
Source: Human Development Index, 2021, (https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI).
16 6 A NNE X 2
FIGURE III
 UCG
ECONOMIC FREEDOM INDEX
 DTS
More economic freedom
M AU R I T I U S 70.6
CA BO V ER D E 65.8
B OTSWA N A 64.9
SAO TO M E AND PRINC IPE 61.5
C OT E D ’ I VOIRE 60.4
TA N Z A N I A 60.0
B EN I N 59.8
S E YC H EL L E S 59.5 WORLD AVERAGE 59.3
M A DAGAS CAR 58.9
M O RO C C O 58.4
GHANA 58.0
T H E GA M B IA 57.9
S E N EGA L 57.7
N A M I BI A 57.7
B U R K I N A FAS O 56 .2
GA BO N 56 .1
D JI BO U T I 56 .1
S O U T H A F R ICA 55.7
TOG O 55.3
M AU R I TA N I A 55.3
E SWAT I N I 54.9
MALI 54.5
NIGERIA 53.9
NIGER 53.7
C O M ORO S 53.5
GUINEA 53.2
ANGOLA 53.0
TU N I S I A 52.9 AFRICAN AVERAGE 53.1
M A L AW I 52.8
K E N YA 52.5
M OZ A M B I Q U E 52.5
RWA N DA 52.2
CH A D 52.0
CA M ERO O N 51.9
L E S OT H O 51.6
U GA N DA 51.4
S I ER R A L EO NE 50.2
EGY P T 49.6
L I BE R I A 49.6
E T H I OP I A 48.3
EQ UATOR I A L GU INE A 48.3
CONGO 48.1
ZAMBIA 47.8
G U I N EA B I S SAU 44.6
C E N T R A L A F RICA N RE PU BL IC 43.8
A LG ER I A 43.2
BURUNDI 41.9
E R I T R EA 39.5
Z I M BA BW E 39.0
S U DA N 32.8
Less economic freedom
Missing data: Libya, Somalia, South Sudan

Source: Economic Freedom Index, 2023, (https://www.heritage.org/index/download).
A NNE X 2 167
FIGURE IV
 UCG
F R A G I L I T Y I N D E X E C O N O M I C A N D C R O S S - C U T T I N G D E V E L O P M E N T I N D I C AT O R S
 DTS
Less fragile
M AU RIT IU S 20.3
SE YC HE L L E S 28.2
T U NISIA 30.5
GA BO N 30.7
BOTSWA NA 31.7 WORLD AVERAGE 32.0
A LG E RIA 32.2
M O RO C C O 32.8
SO U T H A F RICA 34.6
G H ANA 35.1
EGYPT 36 .1
EQ UATO RIA L G U INE A 36 .4
CA BO V E RD E 36 .5
NA M IBIA 37.7
SE NEGA L 39.2
BE NIN 39.4
TA NZANI A 40.0
D JIBO U T I 40.7
TH E GAM B I A 40.9
TO GO 41.0
RWA NDA 41.1
M A DAGASCA R 41.3
A NGO L A 42.1
SAO TO M E A ND PRINCIP E 42.2 AFRICAN AVERAGE 42.2
C O M O RO S 42.4
C ÔT E D ’ IVO IRE 42.5
M AU RITA NIA 42.7
KE NYA 42.7
L IBYA 42.8
E SWAT INI 42.9
NIGE RIA 44.1
L E SOT HO 44.2
G U I NEA 44.2
M A L AW I 44.5
C O NG O 44.5
U GA NDA 44.8
CA M E RO O N 45.3
ZA M BIA 45.7
G U INE A-BISSAU 45.9
BU RU ND I 46 .0
NIGE R 46 .0
E RIT RE A 46 .1
L IBE RIA 46 .2
SIE RRA L EO NE 46 .2
E T HIO PIA 46 .6
B URK I NA FAS O 46 .8
ZIM BA BW E 47.7
M A LI 48.9
M OZA M BIQ U E 49.9
C H AD 51.8
S UDA N 52.4
SO U T H SU DA N 52.9
C E NT RA L A F RICA N REP UB LIC 53.1
SO M A L IA 54.5
More fragile
Source: Fragility Index, 2022, (https://fragilestatesindex.org/).

16 8 A NNE X 2
FIGURE V
 UCG
M U LT I D I M E N S I O N A L P O V E R T Y , B Y P E R C E N T A G E O F P O P U L A T I O N
 DTS
Lower percentage of poverty
TU N I S I A 0.8
S E YC H EL L E S 0.9
A LG ER I A 1.4
L I BYA 2.0
EGY P T 5.2
S O U T H A F R ICA 6 .3
M O RO C C O 6.4
SAO TO M E AND PRINC IPE 11.7
GA BO N 15.6
B OTSWA N A 17.2
E SWAT I N I 19.2
L E S OT H O 19.6
CONGO 24.3
GHANA 24.6
Z I M BA BW E 25.8
C O M ORO S 37.3
K E N YA 37.5
TOG O 37.6
NAMIBIA 40.9
T H E GA M B IA 41.7
CA M ERO O N 43.6
C ÔT E D ’ I VOIRE 46 .1
NIGERIA 46 .4
ZAMBIA 47.9
RWA N DA 48.8
M A L AW I 49.9
S E N EGA L 50.8
ANGOLA 51.1
L I BE R I A 52.3
S U DA N 52.3 SUB-SAHARA AVERAGE 53.4%
TA N Z A N I A 57.1
U GA N DA 57.2
M AU R I TA N I A 58.4
S I ER R A L EO NE 59.2
G U I N EA-BI SSAU 64.4
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 6 4.5
GUINEA 6 6 .2
B EN I N 6 6 .8
MALI 6 8.3
E T H I OP I A 68.7
M A DAGAS CAR 6 9.1
M OZ A M B I Q U E 73.1
BURUNDI 75.1
C E N T R A L A F RICA N RE PU BL IC 80.4
CH A D 84.2
B U R K I N A FAS O 84.2
NIGER 9 1.0
S O U T H S U DA N 9 1.9
Higher percentage of poverty
Missing data: Cabo Verde, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Mauritius, Somalia.
* Estimated values range from latest collected data between 2010 and 2020.
Source: Multidimensional Poverty Index, 2022, (https://hdr.undp.org/content/2022-global-multidimensional-poverty-index-mpi#/indicies/MPI).
Lower
Higher
people
people
of life
of life
quality
quality
for young
for young
FIGURE VI
FIGURE VII
0 = equal
1 = unequal
SO U TH S U DA N 2 0.0 LI BYA
C E NT RA L AF R ICA N R EP U BLIC 2 2.0 TUN I SI A
C HAD 2 6 .4 MAURI TI US
G U IN EA 3 4. 3 CABO VE RDE
BU RU N DI 3 4. 5 RWAN DA
NI GER 3 4.7 SOUTH AFRI CA
WORLD AVERAGE 0.47
WORLD AVERAGE 65.8

YOUTH PROGRESS INDEX

SO M A LIA 3 5.4 MORO CCO
GENDER INEQUALITY INDEX
SUB-SAHARA AVERAGE 0.57
DEMOCR ATIC REPUBL IC OF THE CONGO 3 5.4 EGY P T

A NG OL A 3 9.4 NAMI BI A
MA DAGAS CAR 3 9.6 BOTSWAN A
LIB ER IA 4 0.0 SAO TOME AND PRI N CI P E
MAL I 41 .0 ALGE RI A
M AUR ITA NIA 41 .2 BURUN DI
S IE RR A LEO NE 4 2.1 KE N YA
LE SOTH O 4 2.6 ETHI O P I A
M OZ A M BIQ U E 4 2.7 GHAN A 0. 53
Source: Youth Progress Index, 2021 (https://youthprogressindex.org/).

B U R KIN A FASO 4 3.0 SEN EGAL
C O N GO 4 3.6 UGAN DA
E T HIO P I A 4 4.8 ZI MBABWE
E SWAT INI 4 5.0 AN GO LA
Missing data: Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Seychelles, Somalia.

TO GO 4 5.1 MOZAMBI Q UE
U GA NDA 4 5. 3 ESWATI N I
CA M EROO N 4 5.8 ZAMBI A
NI GE RI A 4 5.9 GABO N
T HE GAM BIA 4 6 .0 SU DAN 0. 55
C ÔT E D ’IVO IRE 4 6 .1 MALAWI
ZA M BI A 4 6 .7 MADAGASCAR
BE N IN 47.0 LESOTHO
M A LAWI 47.2 TAN ZAN IA 0. 56
Z IM BA BWE 4 8.7 CO N GO
RWA NDA 4 8.8 CAMERO O N
TAN ZAN IA 51 . 3 TO GO
S E NEGA L 51 . 3 SOUTH SUDAN
LI BYA 52 . 5 DEMOCRATIC REPUB LIC OF TH E C O N GO
K EN YA 53 .1 BE N I N
Missing data: Cabo Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sudan.
GA BO N 55. 3 THE GAMBIA 0.61
NA M IBI A 55. 5 N I GE R
Source: Gender Inequality Index, 2021, (https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/thematic-composite-indices/gender-inequality-index#/indicies/GII).
G H AN A 58. 3 CÔTE D’I VO I RE

ALGE RI A 58. 3 MAL I 0.61
BOTSWA NA 58.6 BURKIN A FASO 0.6 2
EGY P T 58.7 GU IN EA 0.6 2
A NNE X 2
S O UT H A F RI CA 6 0.9 GUI NEA-BI SSAU

M O RO C C O 61.0 MAURI TAN I A
TU N ISI A 6 5.8 SI ERRA LEO N E




M AU RI TI US 74.3 LI BE RI A
DTS
UCG
DTS
UCG
CHAD 0.6 5
CENTRAL AFRI CAN REPUBLI C
169
NI GE RI A
170
FOREWORD
I. There is no explicit definition of military coups in the literature.

ENDNOTES The only reference document that provides this description is
the 2000 Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) Declaration on
Unconstitutional Changes of Government, which provides four
variants of unconstitutionality, including military coups.
II. Between 2000 and 2019, a total of 13 successful coups took

place (average of 0.7 coups per year), compared to 7 coups
between 2020 and 2022 (2.3 coups per year), representing
an increase on the average coup per year of 229% this decade,
compared to the past two decades.
E XECUTIVE SUMM A RY
1. Nordic Institute (2021). In some cases, such revisions have

been linked to coup occurrence.
2. Among these, two were ‘coups within coups’. Affected

countries have been Burkina Faso and Mali (both of which
have experienced two coups in this timeframe), Guinea and
Sudan. Events in Chad, whereby power was transferred to
the late president’s son outside of constitutional process
soon after his death, have also been likened to a coup. Coups
were attempted, but failed, in Niger, Guinea-Bissau and, as
this report was being finalized, The Gambia. The ‘coup within
a coup’ phrase was coined by the International Crisis Group
(ICG) after Mali’s second coup. See ICG (2021a).
3. Souaré (2022a).
4. From 1990–2010 16 percent of all general elections in

sub-Saharan Africa resulted in an opposition victory. From
2011–2022, the proportion had climbed to 28 percent, based
on data extracted from the Brookings dataset of electoral
processes. Data extrapolated from Brookings leadership
tracker data set from 1990-2019, and UNDP-collected data
from 2019- 2022. Opposition victories include independent
candidates but exclude victories of leaders of transitional
periods where they were allowed to stand in the election.
5. See Reuters (2021) and Security Council Report (2022).
6. In December 2022, as the drafting of this report was in its final

stages, an attempted military coup attempt was announced in
The Gambia. This underscored the challenges faced by states
undergoing democratic transition, and the ever-present
potential for reversals. For the purposes of this study, The
Gambia has been retained as an example of a country on
a path towards democratic transition given that the coup
attempt was successfully repelled.
2023
ENDNOTE S 17 1
7. Afrobarometer, round 6, round 7 and round 8 (2014-2015, 16. AU (2022a), AU (2022c) and AU PSC (2022).
2016/2018, and 2019/2021). Indicator: Levels of corruption
(R6 and R8), percentage of respondents who answered, 17. See Reuters (2021) and Security Council Report (2022).
‘increased a lot’ or ‘increased somewhat’. Indicator:
Handling preventing or resolving violent conflict (R7 and 18. The dataset includes only successful coups, defined as
R8), percentage of respondents who answered, ‘very badly’. instances when perpetrators seize and hold power for at least
It should be noted that several of the DTS focal countries seven days. See Souaré (2022a) and (2014).
reported declining confidence in this indicator over the
same time period, though starting from a lower baseline.
19. Approaches to this practice varies across at least three
For instance, on government handling and prevention of
broad types of amendment: outright removal of term limits;
violent conflict, the average across the three countries
personalized derogation of term limits (applicable only to
increased from 9 to 18 percent.
the one leader introducing them); and general constitutional
amendments that lead to a new political
8. OECD (2022c). dispensation that enables the incumbent to reinstate
themselves. See Souaré (2022b).
9. Faulkner et al (2022).
20. Souaré (2022b).
10. UN (2021). These issues are also highlighted in UNDP
(2022b). 21. A multi-dimensional historical perspective would reveal
that some countries can be found in different categories at
11. UN-World Bank (2018). It is also at the foundation of UNDP’s different times. For example, Burkina Faso instituted a term
Crisis Offer: A Framework for Development Solutions to limit in its 1991 constitution; removed it in 1997, restored it
Crisis and Fragility. See UNDP (2022a). in 2000, and wanted to remove it in October 2014 but failed,
as protesters attacked parliament a few hours before the
12. The COVID-19 pandemic has set progress in reducing MPI vote. Also, in Guinea, the 1990 constitution provided for term
values back by 3–10 years (likely the high end of those limits. This was removed in 2001, but again restored in 2010.
projections). See OPHI and UNDP (2022). The constitution was then changed in 2020 to claim a new
republic while keeping the term-limit provision, but set the
13. ILO (2018). clock to zero terms limits for Alpha Condé.
22. Opposition victory is defined as cases where the winning

INTRODUC TION candidate in a presidential or parliamentary election belonged
either to a recognized political party, a coalition of political
14. Affected countries were: Burkina Faso and Mali (both of parties, or is presented as an independent candidate. Number
which experienced two coups in this timeframe), Guinea of elections is extrapolated from the Brookings dataset of
and Sudan. Events in Chad, whereby power was transferred electoral processes. Available at: https://brookings.edu/
to the late president’s son outside of constitutional process interactives/african-leadership-transitions-tracker.
soon after his death, have also been likened to a coup.
Coups were attempted but failed in Niger, Guinea-Bissau 23. Nordic Institute (2021).
and, as this report was in the final stages of preparation,
The Gambia. The report’s primary phase of research and 24. Depagne (2022) warned that “Whatever happens in Mali,
analysis pre-dates unfolding events in Sudan which have Burkina Faso, Guinea and other African nations that have
been the outbreak of armed conflict between military actors experienced coups in recent times, if the continent’s
involved in the coup. The ‘coup within a coup’ phrase was democratic leaders and multilateral bodies continue to
coined by the International Crisis Group (ICG) after Mali’s ignore the conditions that triggered this new wave of military
second coup. See ICG (2021a). interventions, what we have witnessed so far might very well
be a foretaste of what is to come.” See also CFR (2021).
15. It should be noted that military coups are, in statistical
terms, rare events and thus tend to behave differently 25. Dersso (2016).
than pure random events. One of the characteristics of
rare events is that sometimes they occur in clusters, giving 26. UNDP (2017b) and (2019).
the impression of a change in trend when there is not
enough evidence to confirm one. The recent spate of
coups is most accurately described as a concerning
cluster that could herald an ongoing trend.
172 ENDNOTE S
ME THODOLOGY the president of the senate should have ascended to the

presidency and organized elections in three months. Given
27. UNDP (2022c). that the senate, though provided for in the new constitution,
had not been operationalized, it was the speaker of the
28. Dersso (2016). national assembly, the lower house (and the only operational
chamber) of parliament who was supposed to play this role.
29. Ibid. This constitutional path of succession was not followed. The
CMT justified this by arguing that the speaker “voluntarily
renounced” his right to become interim president. In this case,
30. As argued by Ambassador Said Djinnit in ACCORD (2021).
they should have gone to the vice-speakers in their order of
Other gaps identified include the need to further clarify
hierarchy, but there is nothing publicly available that proves
the status of changes of government that occur as a result
the latter were consulted and that they, too, renounced their
of popular uprising, a need to further elaborate the list of
right. In short, the mode of the CMT’s coming to power can
measures to be applied in case of different types of UCG,
accurately be classified as a case of UCG, as per relevant
and others. Various declarations of the AU call for the
AU instruments. The announcement in October 2022 that
establishment of a related Sanctions Committee and a
Mahamat Déby would stay in power for a further two years
Sanctions Framework.
beyond the original transition timeline further confirms the
validity of this characterization.
31. See AU (2022b). The Declaration places particular
emphasis on “… the increase in the number of member
40. Deutsche Welle (2022b) and Modern Diplomacy (2023).
states which modify and eliminate constitutional term
limits, while others resist efforts to institute term limits in
their constitutions”, urging political commitment and active 41. Public opinion research has been conducted by the
engagement of all stakeholders to ensure that root causes independent polling company Geopoll in each of the eight
are addressed as means to prevent conflicts, including focal countries, by utilizing a computer-assisted telephone
tackling the resurgence of military coups as a form of UCG. interview method, based on a survey questionnaire of 61
questions. The survey generated an evidence base on the
public’s knowledge, experience, attitudes and expectations
32. To strengthen the role of the AU in this space, the
of political transitions. An initial pilot was rolled out in two
Declaration also includes provision on review and
countries (Chad and Ghana) to assess the responsiveness of
strengthening of all relevant protocols, the creation of a
the public in discussing political transitions. It was designed
Constitutional Assistance Unit within the AU Department
with nationally representative quotas to ensure proper
of Political Affairs, as well as a Continental Working Group
representation of different demographics, including by
on Democracy, Election and Constitution Building in Africa.
age, gender and geography. Once each of the datasets was
completed, the data was weighted by age, gender and using
33. Meyerrson (2015).
statistics from the United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
34. UN (2021).
42. Multinominal logistic regression allows for modelling different

35. UNDP (2021). possible outcomes of a categorically distributed dependent
variable, (such as the survey questions), given a set of
36. OECD (2020). independent variables (which can be numerical, ordinal or
categorical).
37. International IDEA (2013).
43. Fuentes-Nieva and Reyes (2022).
38. Ibid.
44. See Dersso (2022), Midgley (2022) and Camara (2022).
39. Following the death of Idriss Déby, a Transitional Military
Council (CMT) took power, with one of the sons of the late 45. The African Union has 55 member states, including Sahrawi
president, Mahamat (Kaka) Idriss Déby, as its head — and Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).
thus as head of state. The coming to power of Mahamat
Déby may be considered as a UCG given the role of CMT in
46. Definitions of states that qualify as having democratically
the process, but also because the constitutional process
transitioned differ. A recent review by Sweden provides the
was not followed. According to the Chadian constitution
definition: “Democratic transition refers to the adoption of
of May 2018 (Article 82), as amended in December 2020,
democratic institutions in place of authoritarian ones, marked
ENDNOTE S 173
for instance by constitutional change and the holding of 59. ICG (2021a).
‘free and fair’ elections.” See Niño-Zarazúa, et al. (2022).
Others set the bar of consolidation higher, whereby it is 60. UN and AU definitions of the Sahel include Burkina Faso,
often understood that at least two consecutive cycles of Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Mali,
democratic elections must be held in which losers accept Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. See Africa Renewal (nd). From an
the outcomes of the elections and recognize the victory environmental perspective, the Sahel reaches all the way to
of the winners. See Huntington (1991). Accordingly, Sudan, however Sudan is not always included in consideration
none of the three focal countries would qualify. Others of the Sahel as a geopolitical subregion (although it is part of
question the focus on electoral results as the sole proxy the Sahel in the AU Sahel Strategy).
for successful democratic transition; the literature
for which is extensive. While observers may highlight 61. Miller et al. (2016).
deteriorating trends and risks within some of the three
countries included as DTS-category examples in this
62. Noting that there are multiple alternate sources of authority
study, their relatively successful democratic transition (as
governing outside of the reach of the state in these areas.
compared to the countries that recently experienced UCG
See Raleigh and Dowd (2013).
events) stands.
63. Brookings (2022).

SEC TION 1
64. Cold-Ravnkilde and Jacobsen (2020).
47. Saferworld at al. (2004).
65. Wilén and Williams (2022). See also Cold-Ravnkilde
48. UNSDG (2016). and Jacobsen (2020).
49. Features of what the UNDP 2022–2025 Strategic Plan 66. Wilén and Williams (2022).
terms the “… interconnected puzzles of multidimensional
risk that require systemic solutions”. (See UNDP 2021). 67. Ibid.
50. See Niño-Zarazúa et al. (2022); Lowenthal and Bitar 68. Cold-Ravnkilde and Jacobsen (2020).
(2015); Fink-Hafner and Hafner-Fink (2009); Przeworski
et al. (1996); Beetham (1994) and Linz (1990).
69. Ibid. Ultimately these authors argue the coexistence of
diverse justifications and rationales is indicative of broader
51. See Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), Collier (1999), challenges confronting contemporary liberal interventionism.
Przeworksi and Limongi (1993) and Geddes et al. (2014).
70. ICG (2021b).

52. Londregan and Poole (1990). Others have focused on
examining the links between poverty and democracy.
71. USIP (2022).
See Przeworski et al. (2019), Frank-Borge (2019),
Diamond (2004), Dodsworth and Ramshaw (2021).
72. It should be noted that several of the DTS focal countries
reported declining confidence across these indicators over
53. Osaghae (2004).
the same time period, though starting from a higher baseline.
The average across the three on government handling of
54. Hunter et al. (2020). security rose from 9 percent to 18 percent, for instance.
55. Faulkner et al. (2022). 73. Branch and Mampilly (2015). See also Foreign Affairs (2019).
56. Infamous examples include the assassination of the 74. Al Jazeera (2022).
Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and the First World
War and the September 11 attacks against the US and
75. Carothers (2015). For wider context on the wave of
new era of international insecurity that followed.
democratization, see for instance Essuman-Johnson (2006),
Huntington (1991), Ake (1991) and (1993), Gibson and Gouws
57. Wig, Tore and Espen Geelmuyden Rød (2016). (2010) and Nzongola-Ntalaja (2006).
58. Kim (2014).

174 ENDNOTE S
76. As formulated by participants to a 2017 regional dialogue the ranking. The average score of the continent on this scale
taking stock of three decades of democratic transition in in 2021 was 48.9 out of 100.
Africa, organized by International IDEA. See International
IDEA (2017). 98. The exception compared with the State Fragility Index
findings is that Burkina Faso scores better, which is possibly
77. For discussion on how odds are often stacked in favour of a reflection of the different timeframes in which the data was
incumbents in African elections, see Cheeseman (2010) compiled.
and EDCPM (2019). See also BTI (2020).
99. It should be noted the research team considered using SDG
78. Thiriot (2017). reporting. However, as highlighted in the OECD States of
Fragility report, there are well-known gaps in the availability,
79. As described in one critique in Carothers (2002). timeliness and quality of data to track progress on the SDGs
worldwide. The gaps are more pronounced in fragile contexts,
80. O’Donnell and Schmiter (1986). where statistical systems are comparatively weaker than
in the rest of the world due in part to a lack of capacity and
funding for data and statistics. See OECD (2022).
81. Lowenthal and Bitar (2015).
100. FFP (2021).

82. Depangne (2022).
101. UNDP (2017a).

83. Scoones (2022).
102. The Gender Inequality Index measures inequality on three

84. VDEM, GiZ and BMZ (2020).
important aspects of human development: reproductive
health, measured by maternal mortality ratio and adolescent
85. Depangne (2022).
birth rates; empowerment, measured by proportion of
parliamentary seats occupied by females and the proportion
86. Girod (2015). of adult females and males aged 25 years and older, with
at least some secondary education; and economic status,
87. Souaré (2014). expressed as labour market participation and measured by
labour force participation rate of female and male populations
88. Souaré (2022). aged 15 years and older. A higher score indicates greater
inequality. The world average score on this index was 0.47,
89. Du Pisani and Lamb (2018). while sub-Saharan Africa averaged 0.57 in 2021.
90. Modern Diplomacy (2023). 103. The Youth Progress Index is the most comprehensive measure
of the quality of life of young people in 150 countries around
91. Girod (2015). the world. A higher score indicates a country’s stronger
performance across indicators including basic human needs,
92. Nugent (2010). foundations of well-being and opportunity.
93. See, for instance, Clausen and Albrecht (2022). 104. The perilous and paradoxical effects of ‘resource windfalls’ on
development and peacefulness have been amply researched
and documented.
94. Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development
(2018).
105. Some of these inconsistencies can be explained by the
fact that indices data can be collected over longer time
95. FFP (2022).
periods, and caution should therefore be taken when making
comparisons to a specific time frame. The indices shown
96. OECD (2022).
throughout Section 1 have used the latest available data,
as per April 2023.
97. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance assesses the
quality of governance in 54 African countries on a scale
106. Diallo et al. (2011).
from 0 to 100, where the higher the number, the better
ENDNOTE S 175
107. Diallo (2020). 120. The New Humanitarian (2022).
108. Delasnerie and Diallo (2004). 121. Coded open-ended question, multiple codes possible.
UCG base sample n. = 812 respondents providing n. = 820
SEC TION 2 responses. DTS base sample n. = 323 respondents providing
n. = 338 responses. All responses analysed as percentage of
109. Abadie et al. (2010). This methodology has been used to respondents.
evaluate the impact of Brexit on the British economy, and
the impact of the German Reunification on Germany’s GDP. 122. Lowenthal and Bitar (2015).
110. More precisely, SMC aims to generate a synthetic value 123. Souaré (2022).
of a given variable (say, GDP per capita) for a chosen
geographical unit (in this case, a country). Using observed 124. Depagne (2022).
characteristics of a group of similar geographical units
(a synthetic control group [SCG] of similar countries), the 125. Ibid.
values are then weighted to generate the artificial, non-
observed outputs. The synthetic control group is built by 126. Loewe and Zintl (2021). The social contract as a conceptual
a linear combination from a pool of units that are similar frame through which to understand trust in society, and to
to the treated unit (in our case, a country that experienced define the relationships and set of rights and obligations
a coup) in terms of pre-intervention outcomes and other that exist between the governed and the governing based on
characteristics. The SCG is used as a benchmark to such quid pro quo trust dates back to antiquity, yet remains
estimate the counterfactual outcome in the absence of as relevant today. The idea of the social contract, reimagined
the intervention or treatment. for today’s world, has had a fresh resurgence in the face of
the global turbulence, as signalled by the UN Secretary-
111. ReliefWeb (2022). General’s emphasis on a reimagined global social contract as
one pillar of the 75th UN anniversary, Our Common Agenda,
112. OCHA (2022). and the use of ‘social contract diagnostics’ to guide country
engagement, as well as a focus on ‘social contract renewal’
113. The Economist (2022). and related discourse by leading international development
partners. See UNDP and Wits School of Governance (2018).
114. Afrobarometer, round 1 – round 8 (1999/2001 - 2019/2021). See also NYC CIC (2021).
Indicator: Support for democracy, percentage average
of respondents surveyed each round who answered that 127. UNDP (2017b) and International Alert (2018).
‘democracy is always preferable’ has fluctuated between
62 and 72 per cent over the past twenty years, with an 128. Afrobarometer, round 8 (2019/2021). Available at: https://
average of 68 per cent throughout the time series. www.afrobarometer.org/data/. Indicator: Reject one-party
rule, percentage of respondents who answered: ‘strongly
115. Ibid. approve’ or ‘approve’. Burkina Faso, Mali and Sudan all rank
amongst the top 10 countries when it comes to the level
116. Aspects of the Soldiers and citizens survey explored of approval of military rule as a way to govern the country.
different understandings of what democracy is to further Burkina Faso has the highest approval rates on the continent,
substantiate findings. with 51 percent approval, Sudan with 39 percent and Mali
with 26 percent.
117. These findings are at odds with others, which have

suggested that men have a stronger preference for 129. Degaut (2017).
democracy than women generally. See Afrobarometer
(2016). 130. Asante (2020).
118. Depagne (2022) and CFR (2021). 131. Both quantitative and qualitative approaches have been
used to measure the degree of inclusiveness, or otherwise,
119. Africanews (2022a). of a given political process or intervention, while this analysis
relies on observations from case study research and insights
176 ENDNOTE S
gleaned from the perceptions survey. See Potter (2018) 149. McKinsey Global Institute (2019).
and Carter (2014).
150. Financial Times (2021).
132. Deutsche Welle (2022).
133. Human Rights Watch (2022). A December 2022 UNDP SEC TION 3
strategic assessment mission concluded “… there is
no conclusion as to the level of inclusiveness of the 151. Shannon et al. (2015). See also Thyne et al. (2018).
transition process in Chad”. See UNDP (2023).
152. ISPI (2021).
134. Studio Tamani (2021) and Jeune Afrique (2021).
153. Arbatli and Arbatli (2017). See also Aslan (2020).
135. Jeune Afrique (2022b).
154. Thyne and Hitch (2020).
136. West Africa Gateway (2019). The study did not include
Sudan. These voter turnout figures are higher than those 155. The stance taken by ECOWAS, supported by the AU and the
of many Western democracies. rest of the international community, following the about-turn
of Yahya Jammeh over his initial acceptance of defeat in
137. Ibid. the December 2016 presidential election helped ensure a
peaceful transition/power transfer in The Gambia in January
138. Coded open-ended question, multiple codes possible. 2017, preventing the country from plunging into a crisis.
UCG base sample n. = 2115 respondents providing n. = Similarly successful were the actions taken by ECOWAS in
2793 responses. DTS base sample n. = 1383 respondents Niger in 2009, and the decision it took in September 2015,
providing n. = 1736 responses. All responses analysed as in close coordination with the AU and the UN, to help thwart
percentage of respondents. the military coup in Burkina Faso that nearly disrupted the
civilian-led transition started in November the previous year.
139. Coded open-ended question, multiple codes possible.
UCG base sample n. = 2337 respondents providing n. = 156. AU PSC (2020), ECOWAS (2022a) and (2022b). ECOWAS
2505 responses. All responses analysed as percentage of imposed limited sanctions on Mali after the first coup
respondents. (August 2020) and additional much harsher sanctions after
the second one (May 2021), including extensive economic
140. Coded open-ended question, multiple codes possible. and financial measures, border closure and the severance
DTS base sample n. = 1396 respondents providing n. = of diplomatic relations. The AU expressed its support for
1450 responses. All responses analysed as percentage of these measures and also suspended Mali. Following the
respondents. limited targeted sanctions it had imposed on key members
of the military junta in Guinea in September 2021, ECOWAS
141. West African Civil Society Institute (2009). imposed harsher diplomatic and targeted financial sanctions
on key members of the Guinean transitional authorities in 22
September 2022. These included travel bans and requests for
142. International Alert (2015) and Civicus (2014).
member states to recall their ambassadors. Burkina Faso has
been suspended by both the ECOWAS and AU, but its previous
143. Modern Ghana (2020).
transitional authorities were not sanctioned because of their
perceived cooperation with the regional organizations.
144. AUC and Population Reference Bureau (2019).
157. Derrso (2019).

145. UNDESA (2015).
158. Under the leadership of the AU Special Envoy, Professor

146. AUC and UNECA (2018).
Mohamed El Hacen Lebatt, who was later joined by
Ambassador Mohamed Drrir, the appointed envoy of IGAD.
147. World Economic Forum (2020). See Amani Africa (2019).
148. UNDP (2016). 159. Emmott (2022).

ENDNOTE S 17 7
160. UNDP (2023). and analytical expertise. See World Bank Group (2020). More
recently, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European
161. EEAS (2022). Investment Bank (EIB) and Islamic Development Bank (IsBD)
have put fragility frameworks
162. The Millennium Challenge Fund also paused dispersal of in place.
US$450 million of planned development aid in Burkina
Faso. See also Reuters (2022). 171. Gibson et al (2015).
163. Case study interview. See also AfricaGuinee (2022). 172. UNDP and World Bank (2018).
164. Guiryanan et al. (2021). 173. Gnanguenon (2021).
165. The World Bank has agreed to continue disbursements 174. Duursma (2021).
of existing projects on account of the anticipated
humanitarian impact of pausing projects that are 175. See Handy and Djilo (2021a) and (2021b).
primarily aimed at helping the country manage the
impacts of COVID-19 on social services. This includes 176. Yusuf (2021).
access to additional financing on existing projects.
In June 2022, for example, an additional $61m was 177. Dion and Cole (2021).
approved to support health systems strengthening and
the government of Burkina Faso’s COVID-19 response
178. EU (2021).
plan. See World Bank (2022).
179. Dion and Cole (2021) and Guiryanan (2021).

166. For example, the EU approved funding for new
investments in green energy projects within a few weeks.
180. House Foreign Affairs Committee (2022).
See Youngs et al. (2022) and Carnegie Europe (2021).
181. European Parliamentary Research Service (2021).

167. A recent evaluation found that the TSF “… has enabled
the Bank to respond effectively to the multidimensional
needs of Transition States”. AfDB (2022). 182. CISSM (2021).
183. Atta-Asamoah (2022).

168. DG INTAP (2022).
184. UNDP (2023).

169. OECD (2020).
185. World Bank (2020).

170. The AfBD was the first major IFI to institutionalize an
explicit focus on fragility, first doing so in 2001. Since
then, it has invested in building up institutional capacity 186. Just Security (2022).
and developing support mechanisms to assist transitions
out of fragility for its members. In 2020, the World Bank 187. UNDP and World Bank (2018).
Group (WBG) published its first organizational strategy
on FCV. It aims to “… enhance the WBG’s effectiveness to 188. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2021).
support countries in addressing the drivers and impacts
of FCV and strengthening their resilience, especially for 189. IPI (2021).
their most vulnerable and marginalized populations”.
It describes how the Bank will adopt greater risk 190. OECD (2022a).
tolerance, organizational policies and operating systems
to encourage contextualized responses, and to build
191. UNDP and World Bank (2018).
new partnerships, including with non-governmental,
humanitarian and security actors. The strategy also
192. OECD (2022a).
describes new funding windows allowing for flexible
grants and loans to fragile contexts, and outlines
structural reforms aimed at boosting in-country staffing 193. International IDEA (2017).
178 ENDNOTE S
194. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2011).
195. Niño-Zarazúa et al. (2020).
196. Ibid.
SEC TION 4
197. See UNDP (2022b).
198. Faulkner et al (2022).
199. UN (2021). See also UNDP (2022b).
200. It is also at the foundation of UNDP’s 2022 Crisis Offer:

A Framework for Development Solutions to Crisis and
Fragility. See UNDP (2022a).
201. UNDP (2015).
202. As re-asserted by the UN-World Bank Pathways to

Peace report: “… the best way to prevent societies
from descending into crisis, including but not limited
to conflict, is to ensure that they are resilient through
investment in inclusive and sustainable development.
For all countries, addressing inequalities and exclusion,
making institutions more inclusive, and ensuring that
development strategies are risk-informed are central
to preventing the fraying of the social fabric that could
erupt into crisis.”
203. The COVID-19 pandemic has set progress in reducing

MPI values back by 3–10 years (likely the high end of
those projections). OPHI and UNDP (2022).
204. ILO (2018).
205. See for instance Centre for European Reform (2021).

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SOLDIERS

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All rights reserved.

United Nations Development Programme

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is

The designations and terminology employed and the

Design by Studio Mnemonic

Military coups d’états, which involve the unconstitutional ascension to power

In an era marked by profound transformation and multifaceted

These trends are taking place

The African Union (AU) is contributing to and coordinating immense progress

Collectively, we need targeted, harmonized and integrated people-oriented

SECTIO N 3...................................................................................................................................................... 116

Figure 1 Total number of successful military coups per year.......................................................................................33

Box 1 Key AU legal instruments pertaining to UCG..........................................................................................................40

ACLED Armed Conflict Location IDP internally displaced person

AFSIT Africa Facility to Support MINUSMA UN Multidimensional Integrated

AU African Union MPI Multidimensional Poverty Index

AUC African Union Commission MYA Multi-Year Appeal (UN DPPA)

AUC-PAPS African Union Commission NDICI Neighbourhood, Development

CEWS Continental Early Warning System NGO non-governmental organization

DAC Development Assistance OIF Organisation Internationale

DPPA Department of Political and PBF Peacebuilding Fund (UN)

EMB electoral management body SADC Southern African Development

GDP gross domestic product UCG unconstitutional changes of

Democracies across the

Constitutional manipulation has increased on the continent as

While coups and military rule were common earlier in Africa’s

Against this backdrop, the recent resurgence in coups has sounded

The AU has denounced the trend, with high-level statements and

The Sahel has experienced significant insecurity in the past decade as a

• Rising frustration with government performance. Longitudinal data

• Democracy at an inflection point. The rise in military coups and

Structural and institutional factors

• State fragility and questions of legitimacy. Coup risk can be seen as a

confirms the relevance of viewing military coups from a development

Citizens’ perspectives: insights from

A significantly greater Hope for a new future

UCG-country respondents showed greater optimism and less scepticism than

Limited delivery of inclusivity The Soldiers and citizens

Divergent views on democracy and the military

These findings reflect disappointment with the delivery of democratically

When asked to elaborate on why alternatives to democracy may be justified, most

Disappointment with democratically elected leaders may therefore inspire

Coup risk may spread

KEY MES SAGES

1. To mitigate coup risk,

Countries that experience contemporary coups perform poorly on global

2. States must deepen democracy

A reset of the social contract is needed both to assist coup-affected states in

Limited inclusivity could create a crisis of legitimacy of governments and

3. International and regional partners

In turn, international partners must demonstrate solidarity by encouraging

A FR AMEWORK FOR POLICY AND PROGR AMMING ACTION

Regional and international actors face a momentous responsibility. Coups

• Responses to UCG events have tended to be reactive rather than proactive,

• Normative and development priorities have been subordinated to security

• Regional and international actors have been inconsistent in calling out

• Clearer frameworks are needed to navigate between pragmatism and