Case 1:22-cr-00200-APM Document 159 Filed 01/18/24 Page 1 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

: CRIMINAL NO. 22-cr-200 (APM)
v. :
:
PETER K. NAVARRO, :
:
Defendant. :

UNITED STATES’ SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

When Peter K. Navarro was served with a subpoena from the House Select Committee to

Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (“the Committee”), he thumbed his

nose at Congressional authority and refused to comply – even before knowing what information

the Committee sought. He cloaked his bad-faith strategy of defiance and contempt behind

baseless, unfounded invocations of executive privilege and immunity that could not and would

never apply to his situation. The Committee sought documents and testimony from the Defendant

pertinent to a matter of national importance – the circumstances that led to the violent attack on

the Capitol on January 6, 2021, and the disruption of the peaceful transfer of power. But the

Defendant, like the rioters at the Capitol, put politics, not country, first, and stonewalled

Congress’s investigation. The Defendant chose allegiance to former President Donald Trump over

the rule of law even after being apprised that executive privilege would not excuse his default. For

his sustained, deliberate contempt of Congress, the Defendant should be sentenced to six months’

imprisonment for each count—the top end of the applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines’

range—and fined $200,000.

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As this Court is aware, and as elaborated below, on February 23, 2022, the Defendant

defaulted on the Committee subpoena’s demand for documents. ECF No. 1 (Indictment), ⁋ 15.

One week later, on March 2, he defaulted again, this time on the Committee subpoena’s demand

for deposition testimony. Id. ⁋ 21. The United States House of Representatives voted on April 6,

2022, to hold the Defendant in contempt and referred his conduct to the United States Attorney for

the District of Columbia as provided for by law. H. Res. 1037, 117th Cong. (2022). On June 2,

2022, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging the

Defendant with two counts of contempt of Congress, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 192—one count

for each of his willful defaults—see ECF No. 1, and on September 7, 2023, a federal petit jury

found him guilty as charged, ECF. No. 128 (Verdict Form). The Defendant is scheduled to be

sentenced on January 25, 2024.

RELEVANT SENTENCING EVIDENCE

To determine an appropriate sentence, the Court may consider all evidence relevant to the

conduct of conviction, including evidence not presented to the jury, without regard to the rules of

admissibility at trial. United States v. Bell, 795 F.3d 88, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Rita v. United

States, 551 U.S. 338, 352 (2007)); U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a). The Court’s findings of fact at sentencing

are subject to clear error review. United States v. Bikundi, 926 F.3d 761, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

At the Defendant’s trial, the reason he willfully defaulted—that is, why he deliberately

chose not to comply with the subpoena—was not relevant. Now, at sentencing, it is. The Court

can and should consider the Defendant’s motive as part of his history and characteristics, and as

part of the nature and circumstances of the offense. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 485

(1993) (confirming that “[t]he defendant’s motive for committing the offense is [an] important

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factor” to consider when imposing sentence). The factual record in this case is replete with proof

that with respect to the Committee’s subpoena, the Defendant consistently shielded his defiance

behind claims of executive privilege he knew to be meritless, and did so because of his contempt

for the Committee and its mission. The sentence imposed on the Defendant must vindicate the

authority of Congress to investigate matters of national importance and demonstrate that attacks

on Congress’s lawful authority as a co-equal branch of government will not be tolerated.

The Defendant’s Default

On June 30, 2021, the U.S. House of Representatives established the Committee to

investigate the facts, circumstances, and causes of the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol.

Indictment, ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1-3. The resolution establishing the Committee also tasked it with, at

the conclusion of its investigation, making recommendations for corrective measures to protect the

United States’ democracy against future domestic attacks. Id. ¶ 4.

As part of its investigation, the Committee identified the Defendant as someone with

information relevant to its inquiry. They did as much based on the Defendant’s own public

statements, and a book he had written about the 2020 election. Trial Ex. 2. As the Committee

noted, the Defendant was willing to talk with many others about these issues – but not Congress.

Ironically, the Defendant all but dared the Committee to issue the subpoena, taunting them, to do

so, stating publicly that, “[t]hey don’t want any part of me. I exonerate Trump and Bannon.” 1

On February 9, 2022, a Committee staff member emailed the Defendant and asked if the

Defendant would accept service of a subpoena from the Committee by email. Trial Ex. 4 at 2.

1
See Jose Pagliery, ‘‘Trump Adviser Peter Navarro Lays Out How He and Bannon Planned to
Overturn Biden’s Electoral Win,’’ The Daily Beast, (December 27, 2021), available at https://
https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-advisor-peter-navarro-lays-out-how-he-and-steve-bannon-
planned-to-overturn-bidens-electoral-win (last accessed January 17, 2024).

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The Defendant responded within three minutes and stated only, “yes. no counsel. Executive

privilege.” Id. In other words, he decided to hide behind claims of privilege before even reviewing

the subpoena. He had forecasted his disdain for the Committee, refusing to acknowledge that

contempt of Congress was even a crime, tweeting on October 21, 2021, “[i]f contempt of Congress

were a crime, 80% of America would be in jail. Bannon an American hero.” 2

Later that day, the staff member emailed the Defendant the subpoena at issue in this case.

Trial Ex. 4 at 1. The subpoena required the Defendant to appear before the Committee on February

23, 2022, and produce various documents relating to the Defendant’s role in the lead-up to and

events of January 6, 2021, and also to appear on March 2, 2022, for deposition testimony. Trial

Ex. 2. In a cover letter accompanying the subpoena, the Committee gave the Defendant some

examples of why the Committee believed the Defendant had relevant information, including that

it had been reported that the Defendant had worked with various individuals to change the outcome

of the 2020 presidential election and that the Defendant had publicly repeated discredited claims

of election fraud. Id.

Between the time the subpoena was served and the deadline for the document production

on February 23, 2022, the Defendant did not communicate with the Committee in any way, and he

did not produce a single document by the deadline.

On February 24, 2022, the staff member emailed the Defendant and confirmed he was in

default of the subpoena’s document demand. Trial Ex. 4. In the same email, the staff member

also confirmed that the Defendant still was required to appear for his deposition and instructed the

Defendant to contact the Committee to discuss the details. Id. The Defendant responded three

2
See https://twitter.com/RealPNavarro/status/1451292969076727809?s=20&t=bkT-
Ao30z9PrV5JNPad3HA (last accessed, January 16, 2024).

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days later, after his default, and stated that former President Trump had “invoked Executive

Privilege in this matter” and that he would not, therefore, comply. Trial Ex. 5. In response to the

Defendant’s email, the Committee rejected the Defendant’s wholesale refusal to comply on

executive privilege grounds, instructed him to appear for his deposition as required and, to the

extent the Defendant believed there were privileged matters, to invoke privilege on a question-by-

question basis. Id.

On February 28, 2022, the Defendant again refused to comply, asserting the “privilege is

not mine to waive.” Trial Ex. 6. Later that same day, the White House Counsel’s Office sent the

Defendant a letter, notifying him that President Joseph R. Biden had “determined that an assertion

of executive privilege is not in the national interest, and therefore is not justified, with respect to

the particular subjects within the purview of the Select Committee.” ECF 79-2. After listing

several of the subjects over which President Biden had decided not to invoke privilege, the letter

continued:

President Biden accordingly has decided not to assert executive privileged as your
[sic] testimony regarding those subjects, or any documents you may possess that
bear on them. For the same reasons underlying his decision on executive privilege,
President Biden has determined that he will not assert immunity to preclude you
from testifying before the Select Committee.

Id.

Despite the letter from President Biden and an additional admonition to comply from the

Committee on March 1, 2022, the Defendant did not appear as required for his deposition on March

2, 2022. At no time did the Defendant provide the Committee with any evidence supporting his

assertion that the former President had invoked executive privilege over the information the

Committee’s subpoena sought from the Defendant, or otherwise challenge the Committee’s

authority or composition.

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The Defendant’s Motivation and Unfounded Executive Privilege Claims

On August 17, 2022, the Defendant sought to dismiss the Indictment pursuant to Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 because “when a former president invokes Executive Privilege as

to a senior presidential adviser, the adviser cannot thereafter be prosecuted.” ECF No. 34 at 17.

As the only proof of former President Trump’s invocation of executive privilege, the Defendant

offered a November 20, 2021, press release by the former President, issued well over two months

before the Committee even contacted the Defendant, and claimed it constituted an invocation of

executive privilege over the information sought by the Committee’s not-yet-issued subpoena. ECF

No. 34 at 5.

The Government responded to the Defendant’s motion on August 31, 2022. ECF No. 44.

The Government agreed that it has been the Department of Justice’s position that if a sitting

president made a plausible assertion of privilege and directed a current adviser not to comply with

a subpoena seeking testimony about presidential communications, the adviser is not in contempt

of Congress, and the Executive Branch may not bring a contempt charge. See Prosecution for

Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted a Claim of Executive

Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. 101 at 102 (May 30, 1984). But the Government noted the obvious: that

those circumstances were not met with regard to the Defendant because, among other reasons,

there had been no actual invocation of executive privilege as to the subpoena – which at all times

the Defendant was well aware.

The Court first heard argument on the Defendant’s motion on November 4, 2022.

Throughout, the Court asked repeatedly for the Defendant to provide evidence of former President

Trump’s invocation of executive privilege. See, e.g., Hrg. Tr. 11/4/22 at 8 (“So what I’m

wondering is by – is there any other evidence other than that single statement in which you claim

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the President of the United States invoked executive privilege as to Dr. Navarro with respect to

this subpoena?”). The Court evaluated the parties’ pleadings and made its factual findings: there

was no invocation. See Mem. Op., January 19, 2023, ECF No. 68 at 3-4.

Nevertheless, the Defendant continued to obfuscate – falsely arguing to the Court and the

public that there had been an invocation of privilege, all while dodging inquiries about the specific

details. Following protracted litigation, the Court again held an evidentiary hearing on the

Defendant’s false executive privilege claims, including testimony from the Defendant, and again

found that there was no invocation. See Hrg. Tr. 8/30/23 at 24-25 (“The Court finds, based upon

all of the evidence, including Dr. Navarro’s testimony, that he has not carried his burden of

establishing a formal claim of privilege from President Trump after his personal consideration of

the Select Committee subpoena, or that President Trump had authorized him to make a

determination about whether to invoke executive privilege with respect to the subpoena.”). As the

Court emphasized, the Defendant presented nothing – no words from the former President, no

“smoke signal” from any conversation nor anything conveyed by another – that would constitute

an actual assertion of the privilege. See Hrg. Tr. 8/28/23 at 102. The Court was left with only the

Defendant’s fan fiction version of what the Defendant wished or hoped the former President might

have wanted but left unsaid.

In short, the Defendant knew all along that the former President had not actually invoked

executive privilege with regard to the information sought by the Committee’s subpoena. At most,

giving the Defendant the benefit of the doubt, one could speculate that while he knew that the

former President had not invoked, the Defendant may have actually believed that the former

President wanted the Defendant to nonetheless to make privilege claims. But the Defendant’s

defiance, and his purported assertion of “executive privilege,” began well before he could have

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had any basis to assert it – and continued well after he had an opportunity to discuss the subpoena

with the former President.

The Defendant’s bad-faith invocation is belied by his own evidence. He repeatedly cited

a January 23, 2023, letter from lawyer for President Trump for support full well knowing that it

lent none. As this Court is aware, the letter states only that the Defendant, in general, “had an

obligation to assert executive privilege,” over communications with the former President. ECF

No. 71-1. It does not suggest that this general obligation excused his compliance with the

Committee’s subpoena, nor does the letter contain evidence that former President Trump made a

“formal claim of privilege” after “personal consideration” with respect to the Select Committee

subpoena, in the manner this Court suggested would be required for an executive privilege

assertion. Mem. Op. ECF No. 68 at 5. It also does not state that former President Trump had or

would have directed the Defendant not to comply with the subpoena’s requirements altogether.

And, perhaps most importantly, the Defendant has claimed that he never spoke directly with the

former President about his plans in the lead up to January 6, 2021 – information he freely shared

with the press. 3 In other words, his position was all along that there was no information over which

the former President wanted him to assert privilege – because he did not have any communications

with the President regarding the subpoena’s topics.

3
See Jose Pagliery, ‘‘Trump Adviser Peter Navarro Lays Out How He and Bannon Planned to
Overturn Biden’s Electoral Win,’’ The Daily Beast (December 27, 2021), available at https://
www.thedailybeast.com/trump-advisor-peter-navarro-lays-out-how-he-and-steve-bannon-
plannedto-overturn-bidens-electoral-win (last accessed January 17, 2024) (When asked if Trump
himself was involved in the strategy [to stop the January 6 certification], Navarro said, “I never
spoke directly to him about it. But he was certainly on board with the strategy. Just listen to his
speech that day. He’d been briefed on the law, and how Mike [Pence] had the authority to it.”).
Certainly, the ability to probe the veracity of this statement was essential to the Committee’s work
and highlights the extent to which the Defendant’s contempt thwarted it.

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The Defendant now claims he has accepted responsibility for his conduct, but for his

executive privilege-based legal challenge. This flies in the face of the facts; he never accepted

responsibility for his conduct, and his legal challenges were always predicated on false pretenses.

This begs the question: why did the Defendant do this? The answer is clear. Like Stephen Bannon

before him, throughout the pendency of this case, the Defendant has exploited his notoriety—

through courthouse press conferences, his books, and through podcasts—to display to the public

the reason for his failure to comply with the Committee’s subpoena: a disregard for government

processes and the law, and in particular, the work of the Committee.

The Defendant wrote a book on the very topic that was the subject of the Committee’s

subpoena. He was happy to tell the world what he knew – but not Congress. He made his reasons

for this abundantly clear – his placed his support for former President Trump over the rule of law:

For example:

– He repeatedly refers to the Committee as a “kangaroo court” involved in what he

describes as a witch hunt of the former President. 4

– He remains in denial about the nature and scope of his conduct, going so far as to state
in a post-verdict press conference that, “I was not tried for contempt of congress today.
That’s not what the trial was about. . . . I’m not here convicted because of contempt of
congress. I’m here because of association with J6.” 5

– He lamented in a fundraising email, “[w]hy do Nancy Pelosi and Joe Biden want to put
Peter Navarro in prison now? Because Peter is standing up to a Kangaroo
Congressional Committee and standing tall for our Constitution, President Trump, and
our country….” 6

4
See, e.g., YouTube video, available at
https://m.facebook.com/85452072376/videos/766847251178208/?__so__=permalink&locale=hi
_IN (last accessed January 16, 2024).
5
A YouTube video of the press conference is available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HCYqueidUEA (last accessed January 17, 2024). This
particular statement can be found near the 5:10 mark.
6
See ECF No. 156 (Presentence Investigation Report) (“PSR”) ¶ 88.

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 Case 1:22-cr-00200-APM Document 159 Filed 01/18/24 Page 10 of 20

– In a June 1, 2022, opinion article in The Washington Times, titled, “Jan. 6 committee
is a kangaroo committee,” he accused the Committee of using unauthorized subpoenas,
“clearly seeking to punish Mr. Trump and his most senior advisors.” 7

For all his complaints, not once did the Defendant raise any concerns about the

Committee’s constitution or legitimacy to the Committee itself. The Defendant’s own statements

prove that his contempt was not aimed at protecting executive privilege or the Constitution, rather

it was aimed at undermining the Committee’s efforts to investigate a historic attack on government.

The Presentence Investigation

After the Defendant was found guilty, the Probation Office initiated its routine

presentencing investigation in preparation for the sentencing hearing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a);

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c). For any defendant convicted of a federal offense and facing sentencing,

that investigation typically includes a personal interview, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2), and an

assessment of the defendant’s financial condition, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(2)(ii). For the

Defendant’s part, he cooperated in that investigation only insofar as it was convenient to his

interests. He freely answered questions about his family, professional life, personal background,

and health. But the Defendant refused to disclose his financial records, instead insisting that he is

willing and able to pay any fine imposed. PSR ⁋ 85. The Probation Office’s investigation of the

Defendant’s financial condition was, therefore, curtailed to commercially available and other

public sources. See id. ⁋⁋ 84-86.

7
See Peter Navarro, “Jan. 6 committee is a kangaroo committee,” The Washington Times (June
1, 2022) (available at https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/jun/1/jan-6-committee-is-a-
kangaroo-committee/) (last accessed January 18, 2024).

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ALLOCUTION

The mandatory minimum sentence of one month in prison is insufficient to account for,

punish, and deter the Defendant’s criminal offenses. For each Count, the Court should instead

impose a sentence of six months’ imprisonment—the top end of the applicable Guidelines’

advisory sentencing range—and fine the Defendant $100,000.

Statutory Penalty

The first step in determining the appropriate sentence is to look to the statute of conviction

itself. The plain terms of Section 192 require that the Defendant be sentenced to a term of

imprisonment of at least one month for each count of conviction. See United States v. Bloch, 762

F. Supp. 2d 115, 123 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Congress expressly provided for a mandatory minimum

sentence of one month, evidencing its intention to do so”); see also United States v. Bannon, 21-

CR-670 (CJN) (transcript of sentencing hearing at 18-19) (attached as Exhibit 1) (“I hold that 2

U.S. Code Section 192 imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of incarceration of 1 month . . .

.”); United States v. Bloch, 10-MJ-215, April 3, 2011 Mem. Op. and Order (RCL) at 10 (attached

as Exhibit 2) (“The Court pauses here to note that 2 U.S.C. § 192 plainly states that misdemeanor

Contempt of Congress is “punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and

imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months.”)

(emphasis in original); U.S. SENT. COMM. 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY

MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FED. CRIM. JUSTICE SYSTEM, Appendix A (noting that 2 U.S.C. § 192

requires mandatory term of one month’s incarceration). 8 The terms of imprisonment may be

imposed concurrently. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584. Although Section 192 provides for a maximum fine

8
Available at https://www.ussc.gov/research/congressional-reports/2011-report-congress-
mandatory-minimum-penalties-federal-criminal-justice-system (last accessed January 18, 2024).

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of $1,000, 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b) provides that the maximum fine for Class A misdemeanors is the

greater of either the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense or $100,000.

Accordingly, the Court must sentence the Defendant to at least one month in prison on each

count, which can be imposed concurrently, and the maximum fine for each count is $100,000.

The Sentencing Guidelines

The next step in determining the appropriate sentence is to calculate the applicable advisory

sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or “Guidelines”). Gall

v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007). The Government agrees with the Probation Office

that the applicable offense guideline is Section 2X5.2 and that the applicable sentencing range is

1 to 6 months, with a fine range of $1,000 to $100,000. See PSR ⁋⁋ 32-45.

To determine the applicable offense guideline, the Guidelines direct the Court to begin with

the Statutory Index found in Appendix A. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a). For violations of 2 U.S.C. § 192,

the Statutory Index references Guidelines Sections 2J1.1 and 2J1.5. Because the Statutory Index

specifies more than one offense guideline, “the court will determine which of the referenced

guideline sections is most appropriate for the offense conduct charged.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2, App.

Note 1. Although neither offense guideline specifically addresses contempt of Congress, Section

2J1.1, which is captioned “Contempt,” is akin to the Defendant’s offense and most appropriate to

address his conduct. Section 2J1.1 in turn directs that Section 2X5.1 be applied. See U.S.S.G. §

2J1.1, App. Note 1 (“Because misconduct constituting contempt varies significantly and the nature

of the contemptuous conduct, the circumstances under which the contempt was committed, the

effect the misconduct had on the administration of justice, and the need to vindicate the authority

of the court are highly context-dependent, the Commission has not provided a specific guideline

for this offense.”). Because Section 2X5.1 applies only to felony offenses, however, and a

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violation of Section 192 is a Class A misdemeanor, the application notes for Section 2X5.1 in turn

indicate that Section 2X5.2 should be applied. See U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1, App. Note 3. Applying

Section 2X5.2, as did the Probation Office, an offense level of 6 applies to both counts of

conviction in this case before any adjustment for Zero-Point Offender status. Applying the§ 4C1.1

Adjustment, the total offense level is 4, and the advisory sentencing range is 1 to 6 months. PSR

⁋⁋ 32-45; see also U.S.S.G. §§ 5G1.1(b), (c)(2) (explaining that a statutory mandatory-minimum

sentence—here, one month—shall establish the bottom-end of the applicable range).

The Court should also reject the Defendant’s assertion that he is entitled to credit for

acceptance of responsibility. See PSR at 25-26. To be entitled to a reduction for acceptance of

responsibility, the Guidelines require that the Defendant “clearly demonstrates” his acceptance.

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a); see also United States v. Dozier, 162 F.3d 120, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“To

qualify for an adjustment, a defendant must ‘clearly’ accept responsibility for his crime; it is not

enough that he arguably do so.”).

And it is a “rare situation” in which a two-level reduction is appropriate, where, as here,

the defendant goes to trial. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, App. Note 2; see United States v. Thomas, 97 F.3d

1499, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Defendants who . . . force the government to trial are not ordinarily

entitled to the benefit of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.”). “The key, according to the application note 2, is

whether the defendant ‘puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential

factual elements of guilt,’ in which case the adjustment does not apply, or whether the defendant

goes to trial to ‘preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt,’ in which case the defendant

remains eligible for the adjustment.” FED. SENT. L. & PRAC. § 3E1.1 (2023 ed.).

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Here, the Defendant denied an essential element of his guilt – namely that he willfully

failed to comply with the lawfully issued subpoena. 9 And a defendant, who challenges whether

he had the intent required to commit the offense, contests a factual element of the offense and thus

is acting in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Mikutowicz

is instructive. 365 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004). In Mikutowicz, the First Circuit held that the district

court had clearly erred when it found that the defendant had accepted responsibility, where the

defendant had “admitted the actus reus of his crimes prior to trial. He admitted establishing

offshore bank accounts, taking deductions from AGM for ‘services’ provided by Ellis, diverting

the deducted monies to the offshore accounts, and not paying taxes on the diverted funds.

However, Mikutowicz remained steadfast that his conduct was not ‘willful’ . . . .”. Id. at 76

(emphasis added); see also United States v. Baucom, 486 F.3d 822, 830 (4th Cir.2007) (holding

that the district court clearly erred in granting a § 3E1.1 adjustment because the defendants did not

proceed to trial solely to preserve their constitutional challenge to the validity of the tax code, but

also contested the element of willfulness to challenge their factual guilt); United States v.

Gilbertson, 435 F.3d 790, 799 (7th Cir.2006) (upholding denial of § 3E1.1 adjustment where

defendant went to trial to contend he lacked requisite intent); United States v. Roy, 375 F.3d 21,

9
See, e.g., Def’s Closing Argument, 9/7/23 Transcript at 646 (“Because if the government has
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Dr. Navarro’s failure to comply with this subpoena
was the result of inadvertence, accident, or mistake, then they haven’t met their burden.”); at 649
(“Where was Dr. Navarro on March 2nd, 2022? We don’t know. The government provided no
evidence about that. Do we know that his failure to comply beyond a reasonable doubt was the
result of accidents, inadvertence, or mistake?”); at 650 (“So why didn’t the government – why
didn’t the government present evidence to you about where Dr. Navarro was or what he was
doing?”); at 650-51 (“Why hasn’t the government told you where he was? And as a result, ladies
and gentlemen, the government has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Dr. Navarro’s
failure to comply was not the result of accident, inadvertence, or mistake.”); see also CNN post
Sep. 7, 2023 (Defendant stated: “the reality here is the government has not proved his [sic] case”)
https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/07/politics/peter-navarro-contempt-of-congress-january-6-
committee-subpoena/index.html (last accessed January 17, 2024).

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25 (1st Cir.2004) (upholding denial of § 3E1.1 adjustment based on defendant's “continued

insistence that he acted without the requisite criminal intent”).

Furthermore, the Defendant’s claim for acceptance of responsibility is contradicted by his

conduct during and after the offense. Not once since he was served by the Committee with a

subpoena for documents and testimony did the Defendant, up to and including through his guilty

verdict (or prior to the Committee being disbanded), undertake any effort to comply with his

obligations under the law. The Defendant never offered to produce a single document or

endeavored to appear for the deposition as required. The Defendant has expressed no remorse

for his conduct and attacked others at every turn. There can be no doubt that were the Defendant

again placed under subpoena by a future Congress, he would likewise again refuse to comply if it

served the political interests of his allies and patrons. The Defendant’s conduct establishes that

his fealty is not to his legal obligations nor our constitutional order. The Court should reject the

Defendant’s request to be credited with acceptance of responsibility that he has never shown.

In sum, the Court should accept the Government’s and Probation Office’s recommendation

that Section 2X5.2 applies and the base offense level is 6. Accounting for the new Zero-Point

Offender adjustment, the offense level is reduced by two levels to 4, and the applicable advisory

sentencing range is 1 to 6 months’ imprisonment and a fine of $1,000 to $100,000.

The Statutory Sentencing Factors

The final step in determining the appropriate sentence is to consider the various factors set

forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), see Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50, including the nature, circumstances, and

seriousness of the offense; the history and characteristics of the Defendant; the need to promote

the rule of law and provide just punishment; the need to afford adequate deterrence; and the need

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to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. Those factors, which are addressed in seriatim, all

support a Guidelines-compliant sentence at the top of the advisory sentencing range.

The Nature, Circumstances, and Seriousness of the Offense

The nature and circumstances of the offense support a top-end Guidelines sentence. Even

before he was served with the subpoena, the Defendant had decided he would not comply with it.

After receiving the subpoena, and learning it sought the same information he had published in a

book (and in his own words, information he had not discussed with the former President), he

refused to comply with it. From the time he was initially subpoenaed, the Defendant has shown

that his true reasons for total noncompliance have nothing to do with his purported respect for the

Constitution, the rule of law, or executive privilege, and everything to do with his personal disdain

for the Committee and their effort to investigate the attack on our country’s peaceful transfer of

power. The Defendant attempted to hide his disregard for the Committee’s lawful authority behind

the baseless assertion of executive privilege in which he persisted despite the Committee’s

straightforward and clear admonishments that he was required to comply. There is nothing in the

Defendant’s background or history that excuses or justifies his behavior.

The seriousness of the offense also merits a top-end Guidelines sentence. The Defendant’s

contempt was directed at a congressional committee convened to investigate a violent attack on

the United States Capitol—the worst such assault since a foreign military descended upon the

Capitol in 1814—and an unprecedented effort to reverse a presidential election and stop the

peaceful transfer of power. The Defendant’s abject refusal to heed the Committee’s subpoena,

under the circumstances with which this country is confronted, could not be more serious.

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The History and Characteristics of the Defendant and the Need for Specific Deterrence

The need for specific deterrence requires the Court to sentencing the Defendant at the top

of the applicable Guidelines. The Defendant has continued to show his disdain for the lawful

processes of our government system, refusing to provide financial information to the Probation

Office so that it can properly evaluate his ability to pay a fine. Rather than disclose his financial

records, a requirement with which every other defendant found guilty of a crime is expected to

comply, the Defendant informed Probation that he would prefer instead to pay a fine. So be it.

This Court should require the Defendant to comply with the bargain he proposed when he refused

to answer standard questions about his financial condition. The Court should impose a $100,000

fine on both counts.

There also can be no doubt that faced with a Congressional subpoena seeking information

on a topic with which he meets with disdain, the Defendant would reoffend, given his refusal to

even acknowledge the criminality of contempt. This Court’s sentence must provide a clear

message to the Defendant that his contemptuous conduct stops here. Given this and all the other

factors discussed herein, only a sentence at the top end of the Guidelines will be sufficient but not

greater than necessary to accomplish this.

The Need to Provide for Adequate General Deterrence and to Promote the Rule of Law

A top-end Guidelines sentence is necessary to provide adequate general deterrence and

promote the rule of law. The Defendant thumbed his nose at the Committee from the moment he

was served with a subpoena; he never intended to, or even tried, to comply with his obligations

under the law. Such behavior cannot be tolerated, lest it become commonplace and accepted, and

the important work of congressional committees like the Select Committee rendered impossible.

And, while the Committee’s work has ended, there will be more congressional investigations in

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the future. A sentence of incarceration is mandatory, and imposing a sentence above the minimum,

at the top of the Guidelines, will reinforce to future subpoena recipients their legal obligations.

Moreover, sentencing the Defendant to a term of imprisonment at the top end of the Guidelines

will promote public confidence by demonstrating that individuals who commit crimes will be held

accountable, regardless of their own influence and prominence and that of their allies.

The Need to Avoid Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities

A sentence of imprisonment is mandatory, and a term at the top end of the Guidelines will

avoid unwarranted disparities between the Defendant and other congressional contemnors. There

are only a few cases in which defendants have been charged with willfully defaulting on a

subpoena and convicted after trial, like the Defendant was here. But in those few cases, each has

been sentenced to a period of incarceration. First, in perhaps the most analogous case – United

States v. Bannon, a sentence of four months was imposed. See Bannon Judgment and Commitment

Order, at 3 (attached as Exhibit 3). And Bannon, unlike the Defendant, engaged with the

Committee, and intermittently at least suggested that under certain circumstances he might comply

with the obligations of the subpoena he received. The sentences in other congressional contempt

cases are also consistent with a top of the Guidelines sentence. Peter Licavoli, for example, was

sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for his refusal to testify in response to a congressional

subpoena. See “Racket Figure Gets Contempt Sentence,” N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1960, available at

https://www.nytimes.com/1960/04/15/archives/racket-figure-gets-contempt-sentence.html (last

accessed Jan. 18, 2024). In United States v. Tobin, the defendant was sentenced to thirty days for

not providing certain documents in response to a subpoena. 195 F. Supp. 588, 617 (D.D.C. 1961).

Notably, however, the defendant in that case, unlike the Defendant here, had previously voluntarily

provided some records and was acting on clear directions not to comply from the sitting governors

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of two states which controlled the subpoenaed entity for which the defendant worked. Id. at 596.

The defendant also offered at sentencing to provide the records he previously had withheld. Id. at

617. The Defendant here, by contrast, has never taken a single step to comply with the

Committee’s subpoena and has acted in bad faith throughout by claiming he was merely acting on

former President Trump’s instructions—even though former President Trump’s attorney made

clear he was not. A sentence equal to what the court ordered in Tobin—the minimum allowed

under Section 192—would not reflect, therefore, the more contemptuous conduct at issue in this

case. And any sentence below the six-month sentence imposed in Licavoli would similarly fail to

account for the full extent of the Defendant’s deliberate conduct.

Moreover, several defendants who did appear in response to subpoenas and were convicted

with contempt for refusing to answer some—but not all—questions posed have been sentenced to

terms of imprisonment ranging from six months to a year. See, e.g., Hutcheson v. United States,

369 U.S. 599, 599 (1962) (defendant sentenced to six months’ imprisonment on eighteen counts

of contempt of Congress for refusing to answer eighteen questions); Yellin v. United States, 287

F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1961) (defendant sentenced to one-year terms of imprisonment, concurrent,

on four counts of contempt of Congress for refusing to answer four questions); United States v.

Seeger, 303 F.2d 478, 480 (2d Cir. 1962) (defendant sentenced to one-year terms of imprisonment,

concurrent on ten counts of contempt of Congress for refusing to answer ten questions). The

Defendant’s outright refusal to produce a single document or even appear at all is far more

contemptuous than the conduct of defendants who appeared and refused to answer a few of several

questions posed. Under these circumstances, the Defendant’s total noncompliance warrants a

sentence of incarceration at the top end of the Guidelines.

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CONCLUSION

The rioters who overran the Capitol on January 6, 2021, did not just attack a building—

they assaulted the rule of law upon which this country was built and through which it endures. By

flouting the Committee’s subpoena and its authority to investigate that assault, the Defendant

exacerbated that assault, following the attack on Congress with his rejection of its authority. He

unlawfully withheld documents and testimony that could have advanced the Committee’s

authorized investigation to get to the bottom of what led to January 6 and ascertain what steps must

be taken to ensure that it never happens again. That cannot be tolerated. Respect for the rule of

law is essential to the functioning of the United States government and to preserving the freedom

and good order this country has enjoyed for more than two centuries. The Defendant’s bad-faith

strategy of defiance and contempt deserves severe punishment. This Court should impose a

sentence of six months’ imprisonment, reflecting the most severe Guidelines-compliant

punishment available, and fine the Defendant $200,000.

Respectfully submitted,

MATTHEW M. GRAVES
United States Attorney
D.C. Bar No. 481052

By: /s/Elizabeth Aloi

Elizabeth Aloi, D.C. Bar No. 1015864
John Crabb Jr.
Assistant United States Attorneys
Fraud, Public Corruption, and Civil Rights Section
United States Attorney’s Office

601 D Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 252-7212 (Aloi)
[email protected]

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