'I

Fortress

The Lines of
Torres Vedras 1809-1 1
 Introduction

Chronology

Design and development

Wellington's method of defence

The forts

Life within the Lines

Aftermath

The Lines today

Definition of key terms

Fonificadon .Various kinds of Reld wohr Obrecler
Additional obstacles .Various definitions

Further reading

Index
 Spencer. On 17 August 1808. Wellesley's force
Introduction brushed aside a numerically inferior French
force, commanded by General Delaborde, at the
small village of Rolica. The battle, a skirmish
by later standards, was followed four
days later by a much more important
and impressive victory at Vimeiro,
When Napoleon Bonaparte sent General Andoche Junot over the Pyrenees where for the first time on a
into Spain at the head of 25,000 French troops in October 1807, he did so Peninsular battlefield, lines of
not knowing that he was committing his armed forces to a conflict which British infantry demonmated the
Sir Richard Fletcher. Bart they would never really master; a conflict that would, over the next six and a advantages gained by fighting
(1768-1 8 13).Wellingon's chief
engineer and the man behind the
half years, become a constant drain on the resources of his empire. Spain was in such a formation against
conrtrucrion of the Uner ofTorres not Junot's intended objective; that dubious distinction fell to Portugal, where French columns. The defeat of a
Vedrar. Fletcher war killed at the Jun0t hoped to impose his emperor's Continental System on the Portuguese French Napoleonic army was a / 'L
storming of San Sebartian In 1813. king and his government. Portugal, one of Britain's allies, had steadfastly rare event indeed: and if in
refused to implement the blockade of British trade and so was England church bells sounded
about to pay for its sin against the French empire. in victory around the country, F-
Junot arrived in Lisbon in November 1807, but
failed to arrest the Portuguese royal family,
the only bells that rang in
France were ones of alarm. The 4;:, e

which sailed off to the safety of Brazil. In the war in the Peninsula was never
meantime, Portugal was in the hands regarded by Napoleon as being
of Napoleon's lieutenants, as was Spain the anything more than a sideshow,
- ..r
followinn - , war. Tired of the bickering
\ between King Carlos IV and his
hut the British victory at Vimeiro
did not go unnoticed by many ',,\

son, Ferdinand, Napoleon summoned

them to Bayonne where he had both
of his ginerals who would f&l
the power of British musketry on '\ t
\ .i:cI
men arrested. Madrid was occupied many a dusty battlefield during the I . ' ,

by Joachim Murat and in May next six years. ~ - f

t. 1808 risings in the caDital were The short-term result of Wellesley's \ . ' - , ,

\ ruthlessl~suppressed,causing a victory at Vimeiro was the infamous ,\ ~. -

backlash against the French Convention of Cinha. Trapped against the '.,
throughout the country. The
Iberian nations appealed to
Li~bonPeninsula, with the Tagus in their rear
and to the nght, and with the Atlantic to their left.
the French sued for an armktice, which they concluded
'\ u
Britain for help, and so it
was that in August 1808. Sir to their advantage. Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Bunard,
Arthur Welleslev, the future two British generals who had arrived in Portugal to take over from Wellesley, Ma].Gen.Roben Cnuhrrd.
I Duke of wellindon, landed in along with an apparently unwilling and reluctant Wellesley, negotiated the final (17MI8I2):Black Bob',as he war
known, commanded the Light
j Portugal at the head of 9,000 treaty known as the Convention of Cintra, which allowed the French to escape
Division from 1810 until his death
British troops. These were the from what they themselves called 'a mousetrap'. The treaty allowed the French to a t Ciudad Rodrigo in January 1812.
first steps along an extremely sail back to France with their accumulated arms and plunder, but worse, they were His division was the most salve of
I long and at times painful road taken back to France in the ships of the Royal Navy. Naturally, this was all too WellingonS divisions throughout
' that would eventually lead much for the British government, who were appalled by the fact that, instead of the spring and summer of 1810
them to Toulouse, in southern destroying the French army, the British generals had given them a ride home. The during the period of che Unes'
France, which they entered in fact that the French had given up all the fortressesin Portugal without the British ~on$tructiOn.
1 triumph after a campaign that army having to conduct lengthy siege operations appears to have escaped them.
was to last six years. The fact remains that, in early lgth-century Britain, enemy armies were there to
The war in the lberian Peninsula be destroyed, not helped home. With this in mind, Dalrymple and Burrard were
had been raging for just over two recalled to face a court of inquiry, Wellesley already having gone home on leave
years before the subject of this anyway.
book, the Lines of Tones Vedras, began In the meantime, the British Army in Portugal was placed under the
to make a dramatic and crucial impact command of Sir John Moore, one of Britain's finest soldiers. Moore had been
on events. Following their landings in instrumental in the development of light infantry in addition to which he had
Portugal, the British Army had enjoyed introduced lasting reforms regarding the internal discipline of infantry
mixed fortunes. The initial battles of the war battalions. Nevertheless, when he led his army into Spain in order to help the
were fought shortly after the 9,000-strong am?? Spanish insurgents, he found himself quickly overtaken by events in the
had been joined by a further 5,OM) troops who had country as Napoleon himself came south arross the Pyrenees to chase Moore
sailed up from Gibraltar under the command of Sir Brent and his army into the sea. In the event, he failed and turned back, leaving the
 much lprga Rmfh armp at
TshwPmn-asJtllyhc~
w h a t ~ m b e t k ~ b a u k
 Chronology

1807
18 October French troops under General Andoche Junot cross the Spanish border,
marching south to Lirbon.
30 November French troops occupy the Portuguese capital. Lirbon.
1808
23 March French troops occupy the Spanish capital. Madrid.
2 May The Dos de Mayo insurrection in Madrid. Other risings follow
throughout May and June.
l August SirArthurWellesley and his troops land at the mouth ofthe River
Mondego in Portugal.
17 August Wellesley defeats Delaborde at Rolica.
2 I August Wellesley is victorious again, this time atvimeiro: he is superseded by
Dalrymple and Burrard.The Convention of Cinrn follom, and the
French are able to negotiate a fafavourable armistice.They sail home in
the ships of the Royal Narl. Burnrd and Dalrymple are recalled. but
Wellerley has already returned home.
18-26 October The British Army. now under the command of Sir John Moore, begins
its advance form Lisbon.
10 December Moore advancer from Salamanca.
21 December Pager is victorious at Sahagun. He follows this up with another victory.
ix,.+i The 3rd Foar Guards in action n : . m The Battle of Busaca.27 September 18IO.This was the one great bade during at Benavente on 29 December.
during the Bade ofTalavera.27-28 July Wellinpn'r reveat w the Lines. 2nd although he was vimariour he never enremined the
1809. Fourteen months were w ~ a s r
before Wellington fought his next
nation of followine , and driviw
- it UD " the French back towards S~ain. . -
French aoolodrrr claim
a vim07 far MasrCna. on account of the fact that he found a way mundWellington'r lefr
1809
16 January The Bade of CoNnmThe British Army debts Souk at &N~M,bur Moore
is momlly wounded.The victory allom the Bridsh to sail back to England.
battle (at Buraco) dunng the retreat flank after the battle. causing the Allies to withdraw in greater haste than they would
to the Liner. otherwire haw done 22 A p r i l Wellesley is once again in command in Portugal.
12 May Wellesley captures Oporto. Soult is thrown out of Portugal.
27-28 July Wellesley achiwes a costly vicrory acTalavera. He is rewarded with a
peerage.and the name'Wellington'.
20 October Wellington issues his Memorandum for the construction of the Lines
of TorresVedns.
1810
10 Julv Ciudad Rodrigo falls to the French under Marshal Massena.
24 July The Combat of the C6a: Robert Craufurd and his Light Division are
swerely tested on the C6a as the French invasion gathers momentum.
26 August Almeida is devastated by a huge explosion as the magazine b l o w up.
The town surrenders to the French rho* afterwards.
27 September Wellington defeats Ney and Marsena at Busaco.A rearguard action, it
delays Masdna for only a short time before the French find their way
round the Allied right flank
9 October Wellington's voops begin to take up positions in the Lines ofTorres W m .
14 N w e m b e r Massena withdraws to Santarhm in order to procure fresh supplies.
181 1
5 March Massena begins his retreat north towards the Mondego.
I l March Combat at Pombal. the first in a series of fights betweenWellington
and the retreating French.
I 2 March Combat at Redinha.
14 March Combat at Cazal Nova.
15 March Combat at Foz d'Arouce.
3 April Combat at Sabugal. the last action of Massha's retrear
3-5 May Battle of Fuentes de O6om. Massena's last battle in Spain and the dfecrive
end of the third French invasion of Portugal.
 Design and development
Ii
The idea of using the surrounding hills as a means to defend the Portuguese
capital, Lisbon, was not a new one. Wellington may well be credited with
the most successful use of this natural barrier but its strength was obvious
to anyone possessing a sound military mind. A Portuguese major, Jose Maria
I/
I
~. i:I
das Neves Costa, is often cited as being the originator of the conception of
I

~1
the Lines, having conducted an extensive survey of the hills north of Lisbon
towards the end of 1808. However, the singular characteristics of the hills
had been noted late in the previous century. Costa's own plans to utilise the
hills as a means of defence against future French invasions were submitted
to the Portuguese government the following spring, information that was 1
subsequently passed on to Wellington himself. But although it is usually stated
that Wellington began his plans for the defence of Lisbon in October 1809 he
. , '.
.
had, in fact, already began to mull over such plans as early as September 1808. 1 ..
. ,.
',I . .
During the lull in hostilities caused bv the Cintra negotiations, Wellington 3.. !' .
took the opportunity of riding round the hills around Torres Vedras, and, with
his usual expert eye for ground, made extensive observations on how the hills to A
r w \ ~ typical Napoleonic field work, a ser-shaped fortification on the Mouir ~ i ~ ~ . , - , A n o r htypical
er earthwork the Sane Barbe
the north of Lisbon leant themselves superbly to the defence of the capital. Th plateau on m p of rhe Rhune mounrain ar p a n of the French defences along the redoubt apin on the French line of the Niwlie.
Nivelie.The f o n is a superb example of the a n of fieid fonificarion. although its This redoubt is very similar to the f o m
stone conrtmcdon is nor typical of such fans: the majoriry were eanhworks, as constructed by the Allies along the Lines of
were most of the f o m along rhe Liner ofTorrerVednr. TorresVedns. Nore the angler of the dirch.
I

Msi.Gen.Wiliiam Cam bnsford

(I 764-1 854).Wellingon'r preferred
choice of second-in-command in the
Peninsula. Bererford played a
prominent p a n in the
reorganisation and mining of the
Portuguese a m y in the Peninsula.
when the repon submitted by Neves Cona came to him he was already fully
awareofthe~~tobegainedfrom~gthehiUJ.in~,throughout
the spang of 1809, even whilst he was in the throes of driving the French born
Portugal,he had begun making plans for the defence of the upper River Tagus,
whilst makingrecommendationsto the British government that guns be sent to
PorNgal for the spedfic purpore of the d a c e of the lisbon Rtninsula.
The real planning began in October 1809 though.With his army in position
behind the Portuguere border and with the Light Division acting as a mtinel
beOMentheAguedaandCBadven,W~tookhlmrelfofftoLlsbon
where, in the company of his chief engineer,Colonel Richard Fletcher, and the
Quart- Generals of his own army and that of the Pomtguese army, he
carried out a thorough slnvey of the 30-de-wlde position between the Atlantic
at UlemMlthoftheRhramdreandALhandraonthe-Throughoutthe
6rst week of Octobe~he isrued orders for the movement of troops to the redoubts
that had already been constructed even befoR the issue of his now-famous
memorandum of 20 October. Indeed, it is dear from Wellington's despatches
that extensive work had already begun on &of the fom.
On 22 October 1809, one of Fletchefs enghengineers, Ueutenant Rice Jones,
wrote to his father, inbinforming hlm of the work gotag on to the north of Lisbon.
The tone and content of the letter dearly indicate the seaecy that surrounded
the coruhuction of the Llnes, for although Jones was aware of Wellington's
intentions regarding the defence of Usbon, he appears to have had little idea
of the eventual extent of the Lines. He wrote:

Lord Vixount WeUington set out from Badajoz for thls place Wbon] on
the 8th instant, accompanied by a fewof his staff, the Qr.-Mr.-. And
our Chlef [netcher] in whore suite I have navelled thus far, together with
 Capt. Chapman. There are a number of reports on the subject of this visit.
I know that his Lordship and the Col. have been riding all over the
I country for 30 miles round, and have nearly knocked up Col. Fletcher's
i stud; from which it is easy to conclude that the ground to be ocnlpied for
the defence of Lisbon i5 a material part of the Commander of the Forces'
business at this place. I will also tell you what is an impenetrable secret
at prescnt w e n to our officers: viz., that all our Corps are ordered from
the army to a place called Castanheira, about 30 miles higher up and on
the same side of the Tagus as this city. The Col. talks of setting out for
Castanheira tomorrow or the next day: I of course shall accompany him.
and understand are a great number of works in contemplation.

So what of the hills themselves? They were, in the words of Fortescue, the
historian of the British Army, 'nothing so much as a gigantic mountain-torrent
instantaneously converted into solid earth.' The hills formed two main lines,
rvitli a third covering an area close to t h e T a p s to the west of Lisbon where any
re-embarkation might have to take place. The first line stretched from Alhandra
on the Tagus, west to Sobral, to Torres Vedras and the mouth of the River
Zizandre, whilst the more southerly extended again from Alhandra to Mafra
and on to Ribamar on the Atlantic. There was a fourth line of defences on the
5nutiiem hank of the T a p s , although this chain was comparatively short and
was intended simply to prevent the French threatening Lisbon from the south.
Therc were effectively only four roads through the hills, being through Mafra
\~i;l Torres Vedras, Montachique via Torres Vedras, Bucellas via Sobral, and
the road along the bank of the T a p s at Alhandra. Like the Pyrenees, there were
stretches where anv light infantrymen could pass with ease, although, again
like the Pyrenees, it was equally impossible for wheeled vehicles, artillery and
More v i e w of typical Napoleonic fieldworks at the French forr on the Mouiz plateau on cavalry to pass. The major difference between the hills to the north of Lisbon
the Rhune mountsin.The cop picture shows the interior of the fort complete with firestep. and those in northern Spain was that, unlike the latter, most of the hills in
The below picture is a view of the fort fmm the French defences on the Lesser Rhune. Portugal (once fortified by Wellington) bristled with guns, forts and heavily
armed infantry. They would prove to be totally impassable whereas the
prenees were breached by the French and, indeed, by Wellington's army itself,
with relative ease in 1813.
As a result of his previous reconnaissance, and in particular that undertaken with
Fletcher in early October 1809, M'ellington was satisfied with his arrangements
for the defence of Lisbon, using the hills as the pillars of defence. And so, on
20 October, he issued to Fletcher his Memorandum for the conshuction of what
were to k o m e known as the Lines of Torres Vedras. In addition to the actual
points regarding the forts themselves, Wellington made quite clear the object of the
massiveexercise. 'The great object in Portugal.' he wrote. 'is the possession of Lisbon
and theTaps, and all our measures must he directed to that obiect. There is another
also connected with that first object, to which we must likewise attend, viz., the
embarkation of the British troops in case of a reverse.'
This give us a clear insight into W o of Wellington's major priorities. Almost
certainly mindhl of what happened to Moore earlier the same year, \Vellington
was determined that, in the event of a retreat he would have a safe haven to head
for. Rritain had only one field army, and he was its commander. He simply
couldn't afford to lose it or see it disintegrate in the way that Moore's army had.
When historians criticise Wellington for being defensive and cautious he was, in
fact, simply being a realist. It was n o good leading his army carelessly into war
only to lose it and put Britain into a position from which she might never recover.
Moore himself had considered Portugal indefensible, with the longest open
frontier in Europe. He was probably correct, and the point was not lost on
Wellington. However it was never M'ellington's intention to fight for Portugal on
its border, rather to defend it in the strong position in the hills to the north of
Lisbon. With the Lines in his favour, he could make it impossible for an invading
army to linger for any great length of time.
 It went without saying that the maintenance of the Taguswas of paramount
irnnottance. As lonrr as Britannia led the waves Wellineton's armv would be
-
su&ed through IiWm unlike the French invaden, whose polij of living
offthe land would soon be proved to be fatally Iiawed. Lisbon and t h e w
were, therefore, of vital importance. In fact, the role of the Royal Navy would
prove to be an absolutely mdal one. The navy would bring in ship loads
of supplies, not only for Wellington and his army, but for the population of
Usbon i W , and the thousands of &.%gees who would seek shelter withln
the tines and in Lisbon after ha* given up their homes in the fkce of the
French invasion.
The concept of the Lines of Tares Vedras as the keystone to Wellington's
defence of F'omgal is thus simple to ~mdeatandBut what of theit a d
devebpment?We can do no betMr than to llst the 21 mah points in Welllngtons
Memomndum to Fletcher that rekr @caUy to the cmmuah of the 6ats
and rdoubts which fonned the core of the sptan.It should not be fagotten
that several works had slrsedy beea wnsmckd befme FIetrber was tnwd with
hisinsfllctioas.ButasWelllngmnstated,'~lnto~the~
it is ngersary that difkmt worb should be conrtruaed immediately,
posltio~1.5,
and that mmgcments and prepamthms should be made for the ams&udionof
others.Accadiaghl,,l~Co~F1etcherassoonas~leto~the
sePeralpositbnw!lhqrw€zeasfdlows:

He Fetcher] will examine the effect of damming up the

mouth of the Castanhelm fiver, how far it will render the r h r a bauier,
andwhatextent itwillfiu

He will calculate the labour required for that work, and the m e it will
take, as well as the means of demoging the hedge o m the dvm, and d
such redoubts as mlght be necesary on the plain, and on
thehillontheleftoftheroad,effectually mdekndtheplain. H e m
state~Nlarlywhatmeans~outdbepreparedfortk~.Hewill
also consider of the means and time requid, and the effect whlch might
bepmducedbyxlrpingthebanksoftherlvez

He will make the same calmlatiom for the works to be executed on the
hill in front, and on the rlght of Cadah; paftidarly on the left of that
hill, to shut the entry of the valley of C a m .

He will examine and report upon the means of maldng a good mad of
conmumicatlon from the plain across the hills with the valley of the
Cadafos and the left of the proposed position, and calculate the tlme
and labour it will take.

He will examine the road from Otta Abtlngola, Labourgeira to Merdana.

and thence to Torres Vedms and also from Madana to Sobral de Monte
Agtaca. He will also examine and report upon the road from Alemquer to
sobral de Monte Agaca.
He will entrench a port at Torres Vedras for 5000 men. He wlll examine
theroadfromTorresVedrastoCabgadeMontachlqw,andBxnponthe
spots at whlch to break it up might stop or delay the enemy; and if there
should be advantageow ground at suchspott, &., will entrench a poditlon
for 4000men, to c m w the retreat of the o ~ p from
s Tones Vedrar
He will examtne the position of Cabeca de Monkhtque, and determine
upon i*, h e of defence, and upon the works to be cummmd for its
defenceby a 09of WOO, of which he will & b a t e the time and labour.
He will cntrench a position for 4000 on the two heights which command The task set for Fletcher lvas a massive one. It wasn't rmde any easier by the
the road from Sobral de Monte Agraca [Graca] to Rucellas. He will entrench fat-t that there were few Royal Engineer officers with the am!?, something which
a position for 400 men on the height of St Ajuda, between Sobral and clogged \Vellington'r operations - particularly siege operations - throughout
Rucellas, to cover the retreat of the corps from Sobral to Bucellar and the Peninsular War. Kevertheless, Fletcher was the most capable engineer
he will calculate the means and the time it will take to destroy the road \t'i.llington possessed and in the event he rose to the occasion magnificently.
at that spot. ..\\ri?ted by a handful of British and King's German Legion engineer officers, the
supemision of the construction of the Lines went remarkably rvell.
He will construct a redoubt for 200 men and three guns at the windmill 'The actual construction of the Lincs was carried out by an army of
on the height bearing east-by-south and east-south-east from the height Pnrtuguesc peasants, augmented by the militia. The peasants u.ere paid the
of Sohral de Monte Agraca: which guns will bear upon the road from princely sum of six vintems per day as labourers and hwlve as mechanics.
Sobral to Arruda. whilst the militia worked for just one third of these rates. As the work grew
and the employment became almost full-time, the peasants' pay rose to ten
He will ascertain the points at which and the means by which the road vintems per day as labourers. Remarkably, the entire workforce was supervised
from Sobral to Arruda can bc destroyed. by no more than 17 engineer officers, 11 British, two KGL and four Portuguese.
'lhe engineers were assisted by 18 of their own men, whilst 150 soldiers
He will ascertain the time and labour required to entrench a position from various line regiments were detached to assist also. As Jones, himself an
which he will fix upon for 2000 men. to defend the road coming out of engineer officer, wrote:
Arruda towards Villa Franca and Alhandra.
In some of the districts a subaltern officer of engineers, with that small
He will fix upon the spots at which the road from Arruda to Alhandra can number of English soldiers [2-31 utterly ignorant of the language, directed
he destroyed with advantage. and controlled the labours of a thousand or fifteen hundred peasantry,
compelled to work, many at the distance of forty miles from their
He will construct a redoubt on the hill which commands the road from homes, whilst their own lands lay neglected ... nevertheless, during a
Arruda, ahout one leawe in front of Alhandra. !~\.elvemonth of this forced labour, n o t a single instance of
insubordination or riot occurred, and the great quantity of work
He will examine the little rivers at Alhandra, and see whether, by performed should, in justice to the Portuguese, be more ascribed to regular
damming them up at the mouths, he could increase the difficulties of a habits of persevering labour in those employed, than to the efficiency of
passage by that place; and he will ascertain the time, labour, and means the control exercised over them.
which this work will require.
It is sometimes thought that the Lines formed one continuous barrier,
He will fix upon the spots and ascertain the time and labour required to cirnilar to Hadrian's Wall or the Great Wall of China, hut this was not the case,
construct redoubts upon the hill of Alhandra on the right, and prevent the nor was it ever Wellington's intention that it should be so. Blessed ~ 9 t ha
passage of the enemy by the high road, and on the left, and in the rear, to nah~ralbarrier, all that \Vellington and Fletcher had to do was to decide how
prevent by their fire the occupation of the mountains towards Alverca. to assist natlrre and strengthen the natural features even further. A major
priority was the destruction of all roads leading to the Lines and those that ran
He will determine upon the works to be constructed on the right of the parallel In front of them. After all, there was n o sense In allowing the enemy to
posltlon upon the Serra de Serves, as above pointed out, to prevent the approach unhindered. The destruction of all bridges was another priority. In
enemy from forcing that point; and he will calculate the means and fact, anything that could be done to retard the forward movements of the
the time required to execute them. He urili likewise examine the pass of French was done. Wellington also, and very controversially, initiated a
Rucellas, and f i x upon the works to be constructed for its defence, and scorched earth policy, which we will discuss later.
calculate the means, time, and labour required for their execution. Once the French had been denied ease of approach and access, the next task
rvas to block all valleys and passes: this was made possible by constructing
He will calculate the means, time, and labour required to construct a dams. by the placement of huge barriers of felled trees, and by building stone
work on the hill on which a windmill stands, at the southern entrance of rr'alls, something which the Light Division did a t Anuda. What Wellington
the pass of Rt~cellas. %r.ouldhave given for barbed wire we will never know, but he was constructing
a defensive posltlon the likes of which would have been appreciated by those
He will fix upon the spots on which signal-posts can be erected upon cornmanding armies in World War I. After all, Wellington, like Haig a c e n t u v
these hills to communicate from one of these positions to the other. later, was simply preparing himself for a war of attrition.
Notwithstanding the natural strength of the hills to the north of Lisbon,
It is very desirable that we should have an accurate plan of this ground. \Vellington and Fletcher identified several places where man could assist
naturc. To the west of Bucellas, for example, in the second line, thc hillside was
Examine the island in the river opposite Alhandra, and fix upon the spot qc.lrped away by blasting. Not only did they wish to make the ascent of the
and calculate the means and time required to construct batteries upon it, :jllied position steeper t h a n i t already was, but they wished to deny the French
and play upon the approach to Alhandra. any points where they may rally their troops in the event of a failed assault.
and to remove the dead ground and sheltered spots. Thus, the already steep
Examine the effect of damming up the river which runs by Loures, and approach to the hills was made almost vertical by the removal of hundreds of
calculate the time and means required to break the bridge at Loures. tons of earth, changing the profile of these panicular hills forever.
 deluded and Influenced enough to conshuct a d defend all those
foaihcations; there was sufficient time to piepare them in advance, an
open sea to feed everyone, and a large unencumbered Beet

One might consider the question of just how the construction of the
mes by thousands of toiling Portuguese labourers could possibly have been
hidden from the enemy. The truth is that it wasn't The conrrction of the
Uner might be called one of histows most open secrets. However, n w n e
quite appreciated just how the forts and redcubk actually linked up to form a
continual deEenslve line from the Atlantic to the Tagus. Even Wellington's
offim, induding same engineer office^^, never realised just what was gohq
on untll the Lines were actuaUy complete. Whitst they could aU see what was
golng on they never appreciated or imagined what the end result of all the
work would be.
The story goes that one day F1etdw walked into a tent in camp and saw a
plan of one of the fom lying on a desk.Without any hws at aU, he sald simply,
'Ah! This is nicelydrawn,but plans erevery dangermu Wngs,' and qulcklg tore
it up. Thete was no sense leaving plans around tor the enemy. It is almost as if
a massive game of bluff was played out by Wellington and Fletcher: although
they lmew full well it would be impossible to conceai the construction work
from the rest of the wofid, they hoped that nobody but themselves and
Wellington's own very rmall 'Inner clrcle' actuaUy realisedwhat the end malt
watld be. IR the event, nobody appears to bve done so. As Jones,the historian
oftheslqes,mote:'Seaffywith tespecttotheextentandnatu~ofworlu
going f o d was enjoined, and it is highly creditableto aU concernedxhffely
a vague paragmph m p e c t i q the lina found ik way into public prink; and,
nohvlthstandingthe magnihtde of the works, the invaders temained Ignorant
of the nature of the benier d s Q against them, till they h n d the army
arrayed on it to stop their hxther advance.'
But despite theseaahlraland artihdalbank=, both Wellington and Retcher
knew that men and w, 6nnly positioned inside strong fortr and reboubts,
wouklalmostrrrtalnly bethededdbgfactoriftheRenche9.erdidattack.
ThusthePvodrthnthadalreadybegunpriormOctober1809wasstcppedupas
theinltlalsedesofredoubab-intoamasrtoeandmely-ve
rangeofWesti~ll~,allofofwere~ed~bem~y~~in
the event of an enemy attack.
A massive the c o d o n of the Lines took Just over one year.
from the date of Wellinnon's Memorandum until the date of their omurntion
by Webgmfs army. m e consmaion has oRen beenlekrred to as oniof the
bestaeptsecretsinmllitaryhiJtory.TheLlwsrrrtalnlycameasa~ve
shock to Mass€na when he arrived in fmnt of them in Octcbe11810. 'Que
d i e , he is feputed to have said on seging them tor the &st time. Jean Jacques
Pelet, one of Masha's aldes, heard reports of the Lines the French
advance but, Uke most of his comrades, was sceptical of both their extent and
their effectiveness. However, when he saw them for the h t Ume, he was as
sh~ashlschiet:

Thus the announcement of the enormous englirh Mes did not

make a verg gnat impsession on us; however, evqthhg was different
fromwhatwehsdexpfftedinotherplsceJ.'IhtLineswereofsucban
exaaordlnarynaturethatldaresaythexewasmotherposltloninthe
world that could be compared to them.In effect, it was not enox@ to
encounter this formidable wall of rucks, supported on o w side by the sea
and on the other by an Immen?e xiws Behind it was a gteat capital with
l k arsenah, worMmp5, magazhes to tumish all needs, worlten of every
-on, artillery depots, and numemus batteries whexe large calibre
guns were concentmted. Mo-, the pophtlon of the kingdom was
 pnrtu~ai,and the last thing he wanted was for the retreat to degenerate into a
Wellington's method repeat of Moore's retreat to Corunna in IROR-09. The construction of the Lines
clcnionstrates Wellington's great ability to anticipate future events. At the heart

of defence of his strategy he would have to embrace the concept of siege warfare, with a
i ~ o l o n g e dstay behind his fortifications. But the unique situation of the Lines
afforded Wellington the opportunity to engage in tactics, the sort of which
could not effectively he used in conventional siege uwarfare, such as the
In the words of the age-old adage. Spain is a country where 'large armies stanre aforementioned scorched earth policy.
and small ones get swallowed up.' Never was there a finer example of this Weilington anticipated making a stand somewhere along the route back
than when Massena's invading French army arrived before the Line? of Tones to Lisbon. In the event, this stand was made atop the ridge at Rusaco on
Vedras. True, he was invading Portugal, but the two countries were, militarily, 2: Septemher 1810. Here, in what proved to be a very convincing victory for
one and the same, and together they form the lberian Peninsula. Although him, Wellington completely and bloodily repulsed a series of French assaults
Napoleon may have referred to the Peninsular War as 'the war in Spain' or 'the nn his strong position to the extent that many historians have criticised him
Spanish ulcer', the two nations of the Iberian Peninsula proved as deadly as for not following up his victory and driving MassPna back towards Spain. But This photograph illuswater perfecdy
each other to the massive armies of imperial France when they ventured south this was never Wellington's intention. His design was to draw the French the rvengd, of the Liner. It was rake"
deeper into Portugal where, if his overall scheme of things worked as well as he lwking wen fmm the area of fom
of the Pyrenees from 1807 onwards.
40-42 and s h w the hills
When MassPna invaded Portugal in the summer of 1810. Wellington had hoped - and his scorched earth policy was ruthlessly enforced - the French
immediately w the south ofthe
been planning for the eventuality for over a year: as noted, the Lines were ~couidquickly find themselves on the point of starvation. With the land Alhandra ro &cellar mad. Not
begun in October 1809 as a result of observations made by Wellington during stripped of its resources and with the onset of winter, they would soon be faced contenr with the reties of foru that
the same year and, indeed, in late 1808. But he knew full well that it would rvitll little option but to retreat. dot& the skyline in this a m .
take more than just an extensive range of redoubts sited along an even more It was a weli-thought-out strategy by Wellington, perhaps obvious today, but Fletcher saw ro it that the hillside
extensive range of lofty, impassable hills t o bring the invasion to a halt. In in the early 19th century it certainly had its critics, not least of whom were the itseif was scarped in order to
1 members of the Portuguese Council. They.considered the Allied retreat to be increase the arcent towards the
order to thwart the French, Wellington knew he would have to call upon the summit It is still possible to see
people of Portugal to make a tremendous sacrifice, to give up and destroy their too hasty by far, verging on the cowardly - not that anyone actually came evidence of this today, visible
land, their farms, vineyards, mills, and their whole way of life in order to deny out and stated this - and claimed that it was a disaster to the country. There is immediatek to the tight of the rue
the enemy the very resources they required to sustain an invasion. Wellington's little doubt that Wellington's policy was indeed a disaster for the country, but in ragged poinrr in the cenve of this
strategy was what we would call today a scorched earth policy, designed to April 1811, by which time Wellington had driven MassOna's staning, bedraggled photo. By digging away at the slops
starve the enemy rather than to defeat them in the field. army back over the Spanish border, he was able to tell the Portuguese people of the hill Fiercher not onb increased
that he had delivered their country from the hated French invaders. Sadly, it the arcent but also denied the French
Wellington was only too aware himself of the adage about large armies
any possible rallying point in the
starving in the Peninsula, and he resolved to see to it that MassPna's French i5 estimated that about two per cent of the Portuguese population, some
went of a failed assault Note also
army, if and when it ever did invade Portugal, would starve itself into 40-50,000 people, lost their lives during the period of Wellington's tenure the fact that this position formed
submission in front of a defensive position. There was nowhere in Spain where I
hchind the Lines, mainly through stanvation and sickness. pan of the second line ofdefences.
such a position existed, and the war, once carried to the Lisbon Peninsula,
would ultimately be decided by the abilities of the contending armies in the
field. True, there were mountain ranges, but nowhere was there an area that
afforded him the various elements that made the position north of Lisbon so
immensely strong, where Wellington's own relatively small army could not be
outflanked anywhere. The hills to the north of Lisbon were, therefore, a real gift,
and there were few soldiers better qualified than Wellington, with his expen eye
for the ground, to take advantage of their natural strengths and combine them
with the sort of man-made defences that his head engineer, Fletcher,
constructed throughout the 12 months from October 1809 to October 1810.
Under normal circumstances, strategy in siege warfare was dictated by the
ability of the attacking force to sustain a siege and bring it to a successtul
conclusion, either by means of a storm, or by forcing the garrison to surrender,
usually through starvation. It was also dictated by the prowess of the garrison to
defend itself, and to buy enough time for itself to allow a friendly force to march
to their relief. These were the kind of operations that Wellington undertook at
Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Burgos and San Sehastian, with contrasting results. The
French had likewise undertaken similar operations at Almeida. Zaragoza, Tarifa
and, like Wellington, at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. When MassPna led his
troops into Portugal in August 1R10, we may well imagine Wellington planning
for a similar senario, with Massena sitting down in front of the Allied position
hoping to find his way through. Basically, the French invasion, post-Busaco (of
which more later) developed into a siege operation, but with major differences.
When Wellington was considering his strategy for 1810 he fully appreciated
that, at some stage, his army may well be called upon to make a retreat into
 W~ththe fom having been c o m c t e d and the natural defences augmented
by his engineers,Wellington had to deride how to arrange both the garrk~nsand
h ~ main
s field army. One of the more unusual arpecll of Wellington's strategy was
to use his mam field army, not as garrisons for the redoubts, but as a mobile force
hd& which w l d only be
ready to move against any part of the Lines that may be breached by the French.
assauhed after a sllomThe
dw1rv~ldhmkenadearnmp The actual garrkonlng of the redoubts was left to Portuguesetroops,to the militia
and the Ordenanza (an irregular armed force, akin to a national guard). The
main AUied field army was then w e d with Hill's corps, consisdng of iwo
divisions, guarding the dght of the Lines at h d r a . Robert Craururd's hght
Ihvision took up a position in and around AM&, reaching out towards h d r a
in the east and Sobral in the west, whilst Piclon's 3rd Division occupied T o m
V&, watching the h e of the rive^ &andre. Leith's 5th DMsion was placed in
reserve behind the heights south of M,with Denlr Pack's independent
Poauguese brfgade occupyingthe great redoubt on the hill itself. The lst, 4th and
6th Divisions, under Spencer, Cole and Campbell, occupied Zibdaa, Riidiera,
and Runa, their left flank resting upon Picton's right, and their right upon kith's
5th Division. Three thousand cavalry were kept in reserve in the rear, whilst La
Romana's 6,000 Spanish infantry were poritioned between the fmt and second
lines at Enxata doz CavaUeiros.

The scorched earth policy empl . by Wellington im I the complete

devastation of the countryride to the north of the Lines. After all, there was
little point in his army occupying the Lines and still allow the French to help
themselves to food and pmvisions from the land. Vineyards and aops were
destroyed, mills dismantled, and the people ordered to destroy all stocks of food.
Unfortunately, many of them understandably chore to ignore Wellington's order
and hid their food instead. This was a foolish policy, for there were no troops
more adept at diwovering hidden food stocks than the French Every bushel of
wheat, ewry sack of flow or barrel of wine found by the French prolonged their
existence in front of the Lines, thus causing Wellington real problems.
The vast ma/ority of the population did, however, comply with his order
and, after destroying all they could, hurried off to the south and to the relative
safety of the Lines and Lisbon. Unfortunately, the conditions in the streets of
the capital soon deteriorated owing to the massive increase in the population.
It was here that so many of the people perished, for not even the Royal Navy
was able to keep pace with the demands for food in the capital. Indeed, the
malority of supplies bmught in by ship went straight to the military.
No matter how effective the poky of scurched earth was, It would count for
little If the French were able to attack the Lines surreufully. Should they be able
to do so the results for Wellington and his army would be nothing short of
catastmphic Barely 30 miles stood between the front line and the -barkation
beaches on the Tagus,and so Wellington's arrangements for the actual defence of
the Lines needed to be very e M v e indeed.
 While Wellington hoped never to have to defend
the Lines, he had ensured that, should it he necessal):
his men were more than ready to counter any French
threat. The extent of the Torres Vedras position was
llttle more than 30 miles wide, from the Tagus to the
Atlantic, and with British infantry positioned along
virtually its entire length, It should not, he reasoned, he
particularly difficult to move his men east or west to
parry any enemy attack, trusting in the ability of the
redoubts to cause maximum damage to the French and
to delay them long enough for the main field army to
arrive. Given the excellent series of telegraph stations
along the Lines, it would he relatively easy - provided
the weather was good - to reiav information along the
Lines and through to Wellington's headquarters at Pero
Negro in quick time. Wellington's army was certainly
well versed in this sort of operation. Indeed, it should
not be forgotten that, during the summer of 1810, the
chain of outposts on the C6a and Agueda rivers was so
effective that it took the Light D~visionjust seven
minutes to get under arms 115 in darkness) once an
enemy attack had been detected - and this was along a
40-mile front. In fact Craufurd's system of outposts nas
so effective that the line, as Oman put it, 'quivered at
the slightest touch.' Given the depth of supporting
infantry within and behind the Lines, it was hoped.
rightly so, that such an arrangement would be well
within the abilities of ~ellingt&'sdivisions.
Arthur Wellerley, 1st Duke of In order to facilitate the movement of troops, several miles of lateral
Wellington (1769-1852). He communication roads were cut into the reverse slops of the hills, out of sight of
commanded the Angl~Ponuguere the enemy. These roads, finally completed during 1811, formed a communication
anny in the Peninsula in August
channel along the entire length of the position from the Tagus to the Atlantic,
1808 and from April 1809 until the
end of the war.Although he war with direct communications from the rear line. Although the lateral
criticired for his scorched earth communication roads were newly constructed, the roads between many of
policy prior m the occupation of the redoubts remained as before, being old tracks, used by carts and other
the Lines, there is little doubt that small-wheeled vehicles. Many were improved with paving stones, particularly
this rtrategl proved immensely those in wet areas, to prevent them becoming impassable. Fortunately, there were
damaging ro the French. He remains plenty of rock and stones on the hillsides where the main communication roads
one of Britain's grearert roldierr.
were constructed, providing suitable material.
With artillery and garrisons in the forts, the riven dammed, the valleys
blocked, the approach roads broken up and destroyed, and with Wellington's
main field army sitting secure and well-supplied behind them, the Lines
presented an immensely mong and impregnable position. Notwithstanding this,
Wellington was still concerned lest the French attempt to turn the right of the
OP~SITETW deellr
O from the plan position by coming down the T a p s itself by boat. To counter any threat along
of the Liner whlch appears in loner' the river, Royal Naw gunboats were anchored ready to receive the enemy.
journal of the Sieges in Spoin.The
section above shows the area from
All in all, the Lines of Torres Vedras were so immensely strong that there is ...
I..,. . ~

the enreme right-hand end of the

little Massha could have done to pass them. Wellington's precise arrangements 21:,L

firrt line at Alhandra. bordering on combined with Fletcher's own meticulous supenision and attention to detail
the RiverTagur. to the second line meant that It would take a superhuman effort at tremendous cost even to get
as far wen ar the Monrachique pass close to a successful attack - although Massena was tempted on more than one
The steep hills to the south of occasion to try it. Wellington (and Massha) knew only too well that he needed
Bucellas un easily be reen.with to d o nothing, other than ensure that he maintained constant vigilance. There
fom 40.41 and 42 a t the eanern
end of the range of heights.The
was no need for any aggressive defence, the likes of whlch was required of a
section below rho% the area of commander and his garrison during regular siege warfare when sorties were the
the Lines between Sobral and norm. Wellington's greatest ally was starvation, and this could do more damage
Torres Vedrar. to the French than anv sortie ever could.
The forts

The elaborate star-shapedforb were a thing of the past when Fletcher turned
his attention to the cmtruction of the Lines. True, t k r e was sill scope for
such for& but it had long since been consided necessary to ensure that
forts and redoubts were functional rather than simply pleaskg to the eye.
Generations of enginem had built their fortsalong the principles laid down by
the great engineer, Vauban, whose star-fortsadorned the length and breadth of
France and the Low Countries. But the lixation with angles led many engineers
to forget the basic principles of defence and thus it was that Barn began to
emerge in the design and construction of many fortsand wen to- that had
been encompassed within outwardly strong-lcakbg but basically ordinary
walk.As the mgbeer ofthe Ueges, Jones, wmm %any of the Rdoubts first
thrown up, even some of the smallest, were shaped Hke stars, under the idea
of plocuring a t3ank defence for the ditEhes;but this constmaion was lattedy
rejected, It being found to cut up the interior space, and to be almost falladosu
with reqect to BanL -ce, the breadth of the exterior doper being in
some cases equal to the whote length of the flanks so obtained' Indeed, the
Great Redoubt at Sobral had no fewer than 23 'fronts', and by the time it
was completed p m t e d a very unusual shape indeed The key factor was,
how eve^, that all qpuaches were covered, although Jones considered the
redoubt to have been d & % ~ on account of a lack of flank defaces.
One of the first considerations before building could begin was, of m,
the ground Not an obvious consideration, but it was if you owned the land
 used for the construction of a redoubt. Being situated so close to Lisbon meant
that virtually all of the land was in use one rvay or another, whether it was used
as a vineyard, olive grove or simply for grazing. Compensation was, therefore,
a matter of serious concern for the local population and was indeed paid out
to owners of olive trees and other trees felled in private woods. Compensation
was also paid out to farmers whose crops were destroyed in the face of the
French advance. Mill owners. whose mills had been dismantled or destroyed,
were paid a monthly sum that equated to their average monthly income, in
addition to which they were paid a sum for the restoration of their machinery
aftenvards. Unfortunately, the vast majority of individuals who lost property
during the French invasion received nothing and had to bear the cost of the
damage themselves
There were several other considerations to be made before construction
could begin on the redoubts. First of all. Fletcher and his engineers, after
carrying out a survey of the area, had to decide the purpose of the redoubt. In
other u,ords, was it there to prevent the enemy from taking up that same
ground, or was it there in order to fire upon the enemy who might be attacking
another point? The siting of the fort was made with careful consideration given
to the direction of any possible enemy attack and on the accessibility of the
surrounding area. In other words, it was no use building a fort on a height
simply because the height happened to be there, particularly if the area around
the height rras open and easily accessible. If this was the case Fletcher had to
These rwo bamb-proof tnvener ensure that the redoubt was supported by other works close by, works that,
ran parallel to each other and
ailowed guns, men and ammunition
if possible, could be supported by natural obstacles. This was another
consideration, for it was important that no work could ever be completely
-, . Y
,
. .

ro move freely along the fort at San

Vicente with a relatively large
degree d pmtemon.
isolated by the enemy. The redoubt also needed to be large enough to support
a garrison, and the size of the garrison, as we will see, was based upon the .
calculation of two men for each yard of frontage. The size of the fort dictated This small chapel actually lies within
the size of the garrison therefore. the walls of Fort SanVicente.
With the position of the redoubt having been decided upon, Fletcher's Over~oOkin~Torresvedras.~nthe
bacQround be One Of the
1 engineers had to trace out the shape of the fort. Having discovered that it was
unnecessary to have elaborate shapes, Napoleonic engineers needed only to
bomb-proof rravener.

ensure that all approaches to the redoubt were covered and that the redoubt's
5ecurity could not be compromised, at least not without a great deal of effort
on the part of the enemy. And so, if a redoubt needed to be square, round,
oblong, or even square with an oblong built on to it, then so be it. If angles
were required it was a relatively simple business to work out the correct angle.
Surveying equipment was easy to come by, but if not, an engineer only had to
obtain a piece of rope and then divide it into twelve or nine equal lengths by
way of tying a knot. Then, he would lay down the rope with four lengths along
one edge, three along another and two along the final edge (five, four and three
for a twelve-length rope). It was quite simple mathematics really. With the
'
I
rope laid in this fashion, a right-angle triangle would be formed and thus the
engineer would have his initial angle for the corner of his fort. This simple
technique features in many manuals of the period. Experienced engineers
would do this by sight. It may seem rather meticulous to have precise angles.
hut if a redoubt was incorrectly constructed it might have severe consequences
for its occupants.
Many of the works were constructed on the summits of the many hills that
comprised the Lines, giving the Lines a most formidable aspect. However, it
was soon realised that this was, in fact, a flaw, for so steep was the ground in
front of the works that it was extremely difficult, and in some cases nigh on
impossible, for either artillery or musketry to fire downwards. However, their
formidable situations gave the inexperienced and young Portuguese garrisons
 .. . - e.. ~

*,Qo Rdthstspa areaj:4- Somc d ihe fats3 ,aleqe the liner werr
 .-..-.-- concept. As with Wellington's I -
,, ,. .. , famous 'reverse slope' tactic of
! sheltering his infantry from enemy
1
), '
fire on reverse slopes, so these
. , ; redoubts and their garrisons
. ,. i equally benefited from being
positioned out of sight of the
enemy artillery.
The guns themselves, along
I,
!
..
with ammunition and artillery
stores, were provided by the
Portuguese army from the arsenal
1 '.
I
in Lisbon, with Portuguese
gunners manning them. It is a
measure of the tremendous
I
effort put in by the Portuguese
1 workmen, that the guns were got
i 'I
into position after hauling them to
I the redoubts on the hilltops,
I having dragged them up truly
1 rough tracks and roads. Jones, the
, historian of the sieges, wrote. 'It
- -
FT-=
.. . .
j
'/
was gratifying to ohsenre, on these
I ~ ~-

I
, ,.. .,
-:. ~

i
.,
occasions, by what persevering t - I
. . ... .. ., and patient labour the peasantry,
+r- ..,.'I,: 8' -
..,. . , . ,, '
u.ith their rude means of transport
> ., . , ., .
. . . (merely the common carts of
i

i .*.~
+ *.
~ - < .;)-\?& i
-
?.
* the counhy pushed foroard by
A, 9 9~
i oxen) succeeded in transporting . ,. ,.AA
I \.- :'
.., /
1
I
I ..:...
. 12-pounders into situations where
! '--L-..n
L '
. ' ~ -4. d. - %..,A. .<
.. ! wheels had never before rolled,
1" ! ~8: iI and along the steep sides of
/I
..us
i'
8 ~
..2 .
~

$.:-
: mountains where horses would
; have been useless.' Some 3,208
1 ,

I , ...
1 Portuguese troops, regular and
1 ,J
.. . ..
.*
! irreplar, manned these guns,
I

, supervised by General Rosa, whose

I
'zeal and activity smoothed all ! !
. , ; - : difficulties.
!
L
p - -- These were some of the main
principles applied to the con-
i
,,:,, .? I;.I "
i w ~ r~ n c rvn
t c ~ ~ iMore
i : plans struction of the redoubts, although these were n o different to those applied to the
from Ioner'Iwmalofthe Sieges in construction of redoubts and field works anyushere. It was really the positioning
Spain. bath showing the widely of the redoubts and the manner in which Fletcher utilised the natural strength
varying shapes of some of the
and features of the area which made the Lines of Torres Vedras an impenetrable
redoubts within the Liner of
TorrerVedrar. fortress.
Each of the forts required a garrison, of course, and the calculation of just
how many men were required to man each redoubt was based upon having two
men for each yard of frontage, not including the space needed for the artillery.
By the time of the Lines' occupation some 29.751 men were required to garrison
them, in addition to which there were 427 pieces of artillery. In 1812. by which
time the Lines were considered to have been as perfect as they could, some
34,125 men were required to garrison the 152 redoubts, which in turn were
armed with 534 guns. I
A major consideration of any fort or redoubt was water. After all, n o matter
I I1
how strong a fort may have been, the garrison would not be expected to hold on
for very long without water. In each of the redoubts within the Lines, casks of
waterww~calculnedtocontain~guartcof~watapernranfor
the ganiJon.In addition to water wpplb, n a p z b m wereformed made of
splInm-prooftimben, lOinby810.Draiarwaecutammdthemtokeepthe
ammuaitiondry.Bnemally,themagazinswere~withZftofearthin
~wlth~~sjueadoverthemtokeepthemdrg.
Although the deknce of the Lines was largely e n w e d to the gardsons
and artillery of the men manning the redoubk, it was also vag reliant upon
hasing Wellin@on's main f d d army in position in the rear, ready to advauce
and oppose any enemy threar Commuaiationswere, t h d r e , ofparamount
importance and a series of telegraph stations were mnst~ctedwhich were
worked by a party of m e n under Ueutenant Leith, ofthe Royal Naoy. The
telegraphs themselves ombted of a mast and yard, from which W s were
suspended. Although the laaguase of the telegraphs was that used in the Royal
Navy, many sentencesand phrases used by the army were introduced in time.
The telegraphs were usually positioned seven or eight miles apart but
because the mountainous nature of the a m ovez whlch they were de&?uedto
norl:obscoredlheirilneofslght,fnrestationswereneededandwaebulltb
ordertommmuai~along~~ofthe~~at~dra,Sobnl,
MonteSonora.TorreVedrasandinredoubtmrmber30at~deRol.The
lofty~tofMonteSoecora,tothewestofSobnl,dominated theareaand
proved m be Wehgtonn's'eagle's nest', fmm where it was poulble, pmvided
~y~goOatosee~sastdistancesin~itwouldhapebeen
impossible for the W c h to have advanced any formation of lmops without
beingobsewedfromhere.Wellingtonhim(elflodefomardeachlnomingfmm
hirheadquartersatPemNegro,situatedtothe~~~thofSobnl.'Ihldngthe
newly-made mad to the Great Redoubt (otherwise Imown as redoubt number
14), pihlated atnidst the cl- of d w b a nunbemi 12 to 17 and 152, he
raouldscanthe~areaasiar~the~n,LmldagforJiensof
enemy activiy.
Itirb~loo~bacLcnerthelongperiodsincethehe~m
conrtrueted,that, although we may condder them to have been hqmgmble,
them were, mvwthelesr, BriBdtlsh engineer o f k x s who doubted wh-
thgr would hold the French back for one rntuute. Indeed, some thought it
veryWcelgthatthePorhrgoeseganisoarwouldmawayatthehntshot
614. Wellington himself, whilst appeadng ounvardly optimlrtic, was too
~OnalasoldiernattohavecondderedthepmspectofFrenchNms.
WeUngmfs army was, after all, the only fteld army Britain possaKd and its
pmenaion was an absolute pdoritg. It would mnUnue to he throughout the
restofthewar. ~fe,heensuredthatpoWsofmedmkationmfuUy
nnveyed and &abIlshed. It was detamiaed to make the pdmaq point of
medmkationdoaetoFmtSanJulian,tothewestoflishn, where t h e m
of the fort wuld cover the beach. Here,a s d bay, sheltered somewhat from
the tides, afford& a redmnably safe place where boats could come and go,
although wen here the tMep were noto&udy had, wave after wave crashing in
against the beach. Nwe~U~eleu, between them We&gton and Fletcher
decided that thtc small beach, covered by Fort San Julian, would he the point
of~tionshoulditbenecessargtodoso.
Inadditiontobeingealledoneofthebest-keptsglrebinmilltaty~,
&mnce has alsobeenmade to the hees being one of the cheapest So, what was
theacblalmstinpue6nandal-?AecordingtoJoneSthedisbursemeotr
on~ofthe~,upd6JUty1810,waeplwrd~,000.Bythe
amethe~waeoeatpied,the~costhadmtol00,~Bgtheendof
the war, the the of repair, psenation, and and fam-icatioos, not to
mamOn~~daims,hadplshedthemstuptoaramdtheE2M),OM)
~ihe~inhumantermglostikgndnedlhrellhoodsradsufhWre.was
lmmtanrraMeButinpneEg~~,thlswasasmaUprfcetopayforthe
totaldefeatofan~Fxenchhn*~my.
 death from stanration. They risked this rather than return to their farms and suffer
Life within the Lines at the hands of the invaders. Thousands more made off along the roads to Lisbon.
lohn Stepney Coweii, of the Coldstream Guards, witnessed their flight:

It was a fearful sight to behold a whole nation's panic. It looked as though

no soul that could move remained behind. The strong, the healthy, and
the young were in arms: the old, the decrepit, delicate women and young
Life within the Lines of Torres Vedras was, quite simply, awful - at least for children, were on foot in flight, wandering through forest, heath and
the unhappy Portuguese people who had been herded there having first been mountain - in by-paths and cross-roads - over the face of their own
forced to destroy what amounted to their li\~elihoods.Theirs was the greatest fatherland, to avoid the destroyer. They carried on donkeys and mules, in
sacrifice of all during the 1810-11 campaign, for they had little choice but to their arms and on their heads, all of their small worldly chattels they
comply with Wellington's mthless demands. Their olive groves, vineyards, and could convey; the rest was buried or destroyed, and nothing was left to
orchards were all destroyed in order to prevent the French from feeding their foe but bare walls and empty habitations. The French might revel in
themselves throughout what was expected to be a prolonged 'siege'. a wilderness of dwellings - they were indeed masters of the soil, for none
As we have already noted, many peasants refused to cwperate and instead of were left to share it with them.
destroying their crops they merely hid them, which was totally futile given the
ability of the experienced French troops to sniff out food in the unlikeliest of Despite the hardships of life in Lisbon the people stuck with it, although at
places. The peasants' natural inclination to try and hide food annoyed Wellington a terrible cost to themselves. Lisbon is not the largest of European capital cities
A fine view of the mmpam of fon
immensely, but there was little he could do about it. In addition to this was the today, never mind in 1810, and it is worth considering that n o fewer than number 40, overlooking the mad
fact that some British officersfailed to ensure that foodstocks were either destroyed .300.000 people were herded into the area behind the Lines, the majority in hPm Alhandn. to Bucellas.The fort
or canied off. In his journal, John Burgope, a Royal Engineers officer, wrote: 1.1~bonitself. Sanitation was at best poor, and coupled with the lack of food it basically an earthwork conmcdon.
ic not difficultto understand why as many as 40,000 people perished in Lisbon was rvengrhened with none,as were
I myself was witness to messages coming to a general of a division. during the winter of 1810111. the other mo f o m close by41 and
informing him of quantities of corn, kc., which they were forced to leave Wellington also had to deal with the political fallout as a consequence of his 42.All three f o m formed pan of the
second line of defences no& of
in such and such places, and which he would take n o measures about, retreat. There were many, particularly on the Portuguese Council, who considered
Lirbon.The fort hour- one of the
having no instmctions on the subject. Such was the confusion and little the retreat to be unnecessary and at best too hasty. Why did Wellington not stand few remaining magaziner in the Liner
warning the people had, that a cargo of English cheeses, kc., were left in at Busaco, they asked? As we know, It was never his intention to do so, although Deceptively raong. ir completely
Santarem or Villa Franca, quantities of turkeys and all kinds of poultry this has been the subject of much heated debate ever since. We know that, in coven the surrounding area
were left in the villages. So far from being in want, they [the French] must
be living luxuriously ... Even at Villa Franca, a town immediately on the
Tagus, and only one league in front of our line, a ver). large quantity of
grain was left. Therefore, all things considered, the idea of starving the
enemy out of their ground is out of the question.

Burgoyne's view was certainly shared by others, but perhaps they failed to
appreciate the size of the great French eating machine bearing down upon
them, and the demands it would make upon the land, for it would not take
long for starvation to set in, despite the amount of food discovered by
Massena's forage parties.
Wellington was not unaware of the sacrifices made by the people and knew full
well what he was demanding of them. But Wellineon was a professional soldier,
and he cared little for popular opinion, of either himself or his policies, nor for
the hardships experienced by the people. Wellington had to take a detached view
of things, to examine the 'bigger picture'. It was his job to see to it that the
French failed in their attempt to reach Lisbon, and that they were driven out
unceremoniously as soon as possible. He didn't know how long it would take but
that wasn't his problem. So long as the ships of the Royal Navy supplied his own
men he knew he could remain to the north of Lisbon indefinitely He simply had
to see to it that his men were kept ever on the alert, that the defences were
maintained in good condition throughout the winter, and that, in the event of a
French attack, he had done everything possible to deal with it. Beyond that, he
could do little more. If the people of Portugal thought that life was bad enough
with their crops destroyed and with conditions in Lisbon becoming increasingly
unpleasant, to say the least, then they should consider what it would be like if
Wellington's strategy failed.
As Massha's army marched deeper into Portugal the people fled in their
thousands before it. Hundreds made off into the mountains, only to suffer a slow
Anomcrviwdfwci*mba40, Augwt 1810, WelliogMn had already decided upon retreating to the safety of the
--me
emwed me
Wk * k Lines,stopping to dght a rearguard action along the way. We know this from one
of his ielters. But it must have been exmmely tempting for him to launch his
a v.*
'DlpWdbmrd n~ at~afterthefai~~~of~scolumnstokcsaulthism
dillkulrbrchaFrmch to rmb
wh%r~maprto~udlnkfI position. It has been suggested that perhaps Wellington was bent on employing
wOu(dbbemplrrWbyme theLinesdmp1ybffautehehadtojumfyboththecostandhisdemuctive
d e d earth poliq. After all, even considering the fact that the Lines were there
to be emohwed throuehout the remainder ofthe war if needed. WeUimton micht
have &d*himself i a rather awkward position had he turned succe';sfuliy&d
driven the French out after Buraco, leaving the Llnes unormpled and dinrsed
But, as we know,the Lines were indeed occupied and used, and to great efkct.
Once Wellington's men had occupied the Lines they quickly settled down
to a prolonged pedod of inactivity. Initially, there was work to be done
strmgthenlng their respective positions. Although Wellington's main field
army was not Intended to remain a static Eorce, it did, nevertheless, adopt a sort
of siege mentality and so began improving their defences or seeing to It that
any spot which may have been overlooked by Fletcher was made secure. For
example, at Anuda, where Craufurd's Light Division was positioned, covering
the Lines from AUlandra to Sobral, the men busied themselves in constructing
a huge wall, some 40ft high and 16ft thick, which blocked the ravine to the
west of the village.
Other than the work d e d on to improve the existing defences, the daily
lot of Wellington's o f 6 m and men won developed into a regime of standing
to in expectation of enemy attack, b e f o standing
~ down again to resume work
 on their positions. In his 'Memoranda Relative to the Lines of Torres Vedras',
which forms part of his classic lormtal of tlte Sie&'es, Major General John T Jones,
himself a Royal Endneer who had worked on the Lines, described the daily
routine of Wellington's army:

Every morning, two hours before daybreak, the troops stood to their arms
at the point of assembly of their several cantonments, as did also the
garrisons of the works; Lord Wellington, in person, being in the fort on
Monte Craca, in readiness to direct any general movement, according to
the exigencies of the moment. The army thus remained under arms till a
communication from every portion of the line, and ocular demonstration.
had assured their commander that n o change had taken place in the
disposition of the hostile troops, nor any preparation been made for
immediate attack the several divisions and brigades were then ordered to
resume their daiiy labours of strengthening their respective fronts, making
lateral communications, improving the roads, sheltering and securing
their outposts. Erc. The weather was generally wet, and the duty irksome
- still all supported it with cheerfulness, in the full confidence of
annihilating their opponent, whenever the threatened attack should take
place; but after a week had elapsed, expectation would n o longer support
itself, and the hope of an immediate and brilliant triumph subsided.

Whilst the men themselves may have been dismayed at the prospect of the
campaign terminating without a decisive battle, Wellington could not have
wished for anything better. His was an attritionai campaign of almost Great War
Two more v i m of the f o m
covering the B u c e i i ~mad.The
proportions, save for the fact that, unlike Earl Haig, Wellington had n o need of
rrone remining wall begun to costly forays against the enemy positions. No, all Wellington had to do was to
notbad for a fon a~morr sit tight, hope that MassPna was as clueless as he had hoped, and that logistics
2M) pars old. would begin to take their toll. In the event, this is exactly what happened.

I he French made only a few half-hearted attempts to force the Lines, from Another view of the hills t o the
12-14 October, at Sohral. These were repulsed with relative ease, following which sourh of the AihandrrBuceilar
the men settled down into the monotony of their daiiy routine. However, it road,giving r wider perspective of
the defencer of the second iine.The
\iiouid not be imagined that the state of readiness amongst Wellington's men
phatagraph.taken from the area of
was anything less than extremely high. As Stepnev Cowell wrote: f o m 40-42, show the scarped area
in the centre.and the conrinuing
We remained unmolested in our position, but in constant readiness to series of hilir funher wesr most of
meet ~ 4 t hprompt attention any visit our opponents may think proper to which were crowned with f o m . it
pay us; for this purpose our men slept In their accoutrements and we in our was an immensely strong position.
clothes. An hour before daylight each morning we stood to our arms; the
baggage was packed and sent to the rear; clear roads, a clear field, and no
'impedimenta', was the order, and thus we remained till daylight made all
objects distinct in the distance. Lord Wellington was generally with us
almost daily hefore dawn, and generally took up his post with his telescope
near our advance-piquets, or at the large fort which looked down on Sobral
and the enemy's posts, till satisfied by personal observation in broad
daylight, that no movement of attack T3as contemplated by the enem):
after which he generally returned to Pero Negro.

For Wellington's men, life inside the Lines of Torres Vedras was, therefore, a
mlxture of tension, expectation of battle, disappointment, tedium and, at times.
discomfort. Life for officers was n o less uncomfortable, although those who
managed to get off to Lisbon and stay in one of the many hotels - assuming they
could find a room in the very overcrowded city- fared rather better. The hardest
hit of all were, naturally, the Portuguese people. Short of food, living on the streets
or in overcrowded accommodation, amidst disease and filth, theirs was not a
happy lot. But they stuck it out and their sacrifices would eventually yield v i c t o ~ .
 But what of the French? Ftnt of all, we should consider what ErlWglP
intended to do once he discwed the Lines. natural Instinct unde nonnal
drcumstkes would have been to attack. But these were not nmmpl
dmunstances. Never belore had he enanmtered xu& a bauier as the lines of
Toms Vedras, and his welldocumenred reaction was one ofcomplete shock,
When~eofhisatdaventwdthepatbotic~nthattbeWnerhadbeen
constructed in -, Mzssena snapped back wantr to the effect that
WelUngton did not create the momtaw, asking why he had not been
informed of their obvious natural strength.It appears that, for once,French
intellfgencehad falled him, wMch Is rmwkabk ghren the tact that the French
hadalreadyompied Wmn oace, whenJunotumrhedinta thecapital in
November 1807. It seems inawlible that nobody left Ma&aa detailed ippolts
of the topography nonh of the capital.
h4adnawasnotththrstPrenehofaeutodiseoverthemes,bowver,that
pafiadu distbcUon fa- to Montbnm,whose c a w came up In front of
Sobralon11O*obeLhulngthel~xtttueedays~warsomesharp
~infmntofSobtPt,themost-fomlogon14O*0&~when
Junotattacked Spenrrr'splqwts to the south of the W e advantage was
gained by the French, however, and when Ma&m came up Mmvlf he at once
reaUKdjurthowdffedtthiru(swouldbeovertheWakrwweelaArhemde
b d w ~ h i s s t a f f , p e e r i n - a t * e ~ ~ h i s acaanon h ~ ~ ,
sited in redoubt mrmber 120 let loose a single shot at him which feIl wt too
fuaway. M a s h i took the hint and a f t e ~ his m hat to the men in the

vev thorough ~ g g n x m i s m e
WMSandUatedthefdlyof-pansaM8ttadconhIndeea
rewaled the immense ,wpagm of the =?,"=
r P d o u b t , t t o o L ~ o f f t o t h e ~ w ~ a r t o f r a n g e o f t h e A O i e d g u o s . H LYWLlba'hdearr*M

-Mkaah.n.wl
F

one of hic aid-, JeanJacquesPelet, was left to mitein bis ioumsl, The enemy mh ~ n r a
hadwodredontbeLlnerformoretbana~andhadgatherrdthe~ts
ofthemdinamM&MaThmMmnWaperkahmtor Whgabq5dnhaar
 Ilespite the immense problems in feeding themselves, the i:rmch hung on The British fleet prepares ro
grimly, scouring the land for the merest of rations. Even Wellington was re-embark the army,foliowing the
Btirirh t m p s marching ro cake this country and had executed it completely to their advantage ... it was very amazed at their ability to feed themselves. On 27 October, barely two weeks Battie of Corunna in Januav 1809.
up their positions within the Liner. It war just such a scenario chat
difficult, if not impossible, to force the Lines without losing a dreadful number after Massha had arrived at Sobrai, he wrote: 'All the accounts which I receive
The natural m n g h of the hills Wellington hoped to avoid when he
of soldiers.' of the distresses of the enemy for want of provisions would tend to a belief that occupied the Lines. N e v e h e l e r r
can easily be discerned in this
It was a real dilemma for Massena. Having pursued Wellington to the their army cannot remain long in the position in which it is placed, and it is he had earmarked a recrion of
contemporary picture.
very gates of Lisbon, his prize was about to elude him, and all because of a astonishing that they have been able to remain here so long as this.' beach west of Lirbon.covered by
combination of natural and man-made defences. What was he to do? He was Despite the amazing ability of the French to exist in a iand bare of resources. Fort hn Julian,where any possible
relatively isolated. with n o real support, save for Soult in Andalucia and the situation was hound to tell on them eventually. So dire was their re-embarkarion would rake place.
Estremadura, and despite having a strong army, numerically, he was at a loss as to predicament that the problem of dealing with the Lines became of secondary
how to attack the Lines without losing heavy casualties. There was nothing for it, importance. Whereas usually the French would hare conducted themselves
he reasoned. He would wait for reinforcements to arrive before deciding his next much in the same way that an army laying siege to a town would, their
course of action. priorities soon became the feeding and subsistence of their army. Massena and
The problem was, of course, that this is exactly what Wellington had hoped his staff may well have harboured hopes that an answer to the puzzle might be
for. He needed to do nothing other than to watch and wait for starvation to set found but his men cared for little but their bellies. After four weeks, and with
in. It wasn't long before the first signs of this strategy began to bite. With the iand tile situation growing worse by the day, Massena decided to retreat north to
stripped bare, and despite the French having found good supplies that had been 5antari.m where he hoped to be able to feed his army and await reinforcements.
hidden rather than dertroved by the Portuguese, starvation soon began to prey on And so, on the night of 14 November 1810, his army began to drag itself away
Massha's army, forcing the French to send foraging parties far and wide in search undetected by the Rritish piquets who, when dawn broke, could see nothing
of fwd. Indeed, some of these parties were gone for as long as nine days whilst owing to a thick fog that had risen in the night. In fact, it was not until around
out foraging, and as the situation grew worse more and more men left their camps Inam that the fog cleared and revealed to them that the French had moved off.
in search of provisions. The situation grew so bad, in fact, that one of General Even then there was a delay in the Rritish detecting the retreat, owing to the
Clausel's staff was moved to report the following to Massena: fact that the French had left behind them a line of stuffed dummies, which
Rave all the appearance of being real troops, until their stiffness caused the ever
General Clausel wishes to observe that during the daytime he cannot curious British to go and investigate. The news was immediately sent off to
count on any other troops save those actually guarding the outpost line. \Veilington who quickly made his way to the great redoubt at Sohral. A swift
The majority of the men are absent on raids to the rear, to seek for maize cvamination of the French lines told him all he needed to know ahout the
and cattle. The last detachment which came back to camp had been nine fituation that presented itself before him. The French were on the run. The
days away. Generals and soldiers agree in stating that for some time it has [Lines had worked.
only been possible to collect a little corn with extreme difficulty. For eight
days the troops have been living on polenta (boiled maize flour) alone,
and of this they have received only half a ration. During the last four days
the 1st Division has received only one ration of meat, which amounted
to six ounces of goat's flesh.
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 compromised Massena to accuse Ney of Sahugal effectively marked the end of Wellington's pursuit of blassena, and
deliberately trying to get him captured. he was able to proclaim, with satisfaction, that the French invasion %%,as over.
after not advising him of his own 'The Portuguese nation.' he said. 'are informed that the cruel enemy who have
movements. invaded Portugal, and devastated their country, have been obliged to evacuate
There was yet another skirmish at it, after suffering great losses, and have retired across the Agueda. The
Cazal Nova, but the most serious action inhabitants of the country are therefore at liberty to return to their occupations.'
came at Foz d'Arouce, on 15 March. Rut although Wellington had driven the French from Portugal, there
Once again, the action involved the rrmained in the country one last enemy garrison which held on at Almeida,
divisions of Mermet and Marchand. and it was the attempt to relieve the town that led to the Battle of Fuentes
against the British 3rd and Light ile Oiloro. on 3-5 May 1811. In the event, Massena was unsuccessful in his
Divisions. In fact, the Light Division, still attempt to break through to the beleaguered garrison and a few days later.
smarting after their chastisement at Rrennier, commanding them, and his men were forced to abandon the place
Ney's hands during their close escape and make good their escape through Allied lines. Massena, on the other hand,
across the Cba river on 24 July 1810, got could look forward to nothing more than a return to France, for he was relieved
..
.. full revenee for that near-calamitous
day. The British vanguard arrived before
$hortly afterwards by Napoleon and replaced by Marshal Auguste Marmont.
The Peninsular War would last for another three years, during which time
I
Foz d'i\rouce near dusk, and found the \Vellington and his men fought many great battles, the war finally coming to
. .. 1,
French preparing to camp for the night. ;In end in April 1814 with Wellington emerging triumphant. However, it is
. - '.#
, -: Ney's arrangements for the security important to stress that. uvhilst the Lines of Torres Vedras were never employed
-3
.T
~ ...;
--7sFT
? of his position were tardy to say the axain by Wellington, they were never far from his mind, and he knew that,
~. least and thus, when Wellington arrived $hould they ever be required again, he could turn to them with confidence.
r--
. - ~. -
.':i.~
.. .~
- : ,.
~~ ~~
+ - . -.
. . . .. ;
.-
~ ~
; .- I
8
_
-
on the scene to order an immediate
attack, Ney was caught unprepared. The
circumstances of his defeat at Foz
Indeed, much of his strategy in the Peninsula suhsequent to 1811 was based on
thi5 knowledge. For example, following the disastrous siege at Burgos, and the
suhsequent terrible retreat from there in October and November 1812,
One of the w o monuments ro the d'Arouce bear uncanny similarities to that suffered by the Light Division on the tVeliington knew full well that, if the French pursued him beyond the
fighting at For d'Arouce.one of the Cba. His men were caught isolated on the wrong side of the river Ceira, with Ikrrtuguese border, he could continue his retreat knowing that a great safety net
actions during Masrbna'r recreat just a single partially destroyed bridge at their back when Wellington launched was waiting to catch him. In the event, the French halted at Saiamanca, and The Banie of Fuentes de OITom.
from Ponupl. 3-5 May 181 l.Ostenribly an
his attack. Whilst the Light Division attacked the French right, the 3rd Division thus the use of the Lines was never required.
anempr by Masrdna ro reliwe rhe
came up on their left, threatening the escape route across the hridge. Panic set The Lines of Torres Vedras were, as we have seen, a total success. But in some garrison of Almeida, it war rhe final
in, and then, suddenly, the French broke ranks and made off pell-mell towards ways they remain an enigma: we shall never know what might have happened battle of rhe French retreat fmm
the hridge, which collapsed beneath their weight. In the scrum to escape, many i f Massha had attacked them. It is almost certain that whilst Wellington Pomupl. It war also Masrdna'r last
of the French 39th Ligne Regiment attempted to swim the river and were himself was relieved they did not, there were some Royal Engineers officers in Spain before he was recalled to
drowned. The regiment lost its prized Imperial Eagle, the golden bird that rvho must have been very curious to see the Lines put to the ultimate test. Fnnce in defear
adorned their regimental flag. This was found some months later, washed up
on the river bed.
After Foz d'Arouce, the French made for the bridge over the Mondego
at Coimhra, but found it blocked by some Portuguese militia. Here, the
Portuguese bluffed the French into thinking they were far more superior in
number than they actually were after being summoned by the French to clear
the way. The delay was long enough to allow British cavalry to come up and,
fearing the rest of the Allied army might he close behind - they were not that
far off, in fact - t h e French abandoned their plan to cross the Mondego and
were forced to march along the south bank of the river instead.
A supply problem, owing to overstretched lines of communication, forced
Wellington to halt for a while, which allowed Massena to put some
much-needed breathing space between himself and the snapping jaws of the
Allied vanguard. However, Wellington was soon up with the French again, and
on the fogp, rainy morning of 3 April clashed with them at Sahugal, in what
was, for the numbers involved, one of the hottest contests of the war. Sent
across the river Cba to try and get round the hack of the French, a single
brigade of the Light Division blundered into their flank instead, which brought
an entire French division down on them. In what was a fine example of British
staying power, Sidney Beckwith and his men more than held their own until
the fog began to lift, exposing to full view their perilous situation. Fortunately,
the lifting of the fog also revealed Wellington's army waiting and watching
from the other bank, and the French were forced into making a hasty
withdrawal.
 Of course, the concept of the Lines of
The Lines today Torres vedns was not hased on man-made
defences alone, and from these same
three redoubts it is possible to obtain a
wonderful vlew of how man helped
nature to achieve his aim. By loddng
west along the btward nert of the ridge
on which the redoubts are situated, you

II
capital, LLrbon, the ~ G ed s in a rather good state of repair today. indeed, canseehowthescarpofthecrestwascut
it is possible to carry out a thorough examination of the Lines, from east to away by the Portuguese workmen in order
west, and still obtain a real feellog for their immense mength and their to make the approach steeper than it
magni6cent design. Like the serifs of French forts on the heights along the b d p -
River NkeUe, the demands made on land have taken their toll on many of the As you i m e y west from B u d a s
fortr, which have been -ed or ploughed into the ground, but there towards Sobral It is impossible not to
remain a suf6cknt number of --to make an expbrahon of the Lines a notice just how many hllltops are studded
very rewarding experience. Eadr vtsltor to the Lines will, no doubt, 6nd his or with works, from small earthworks to
her own favourite lpdoubt or area ThC redoubts at %bra1 and Tomes Vedras are larger mbnlbts. As you appmach sobnl
natunlly the most v&ited, but such is the extent of the Lines that visitors will fromBucellas,pyougreetedbya~
6nd it more tean rewarding to seek out the smaller work+ Indeed, it Is often sign indicating the diredlon to Forte
these smaller, more remote redoubts that prow more de AlqueMao. This, in fact, was the Great
Thepbquc~~uarided The obrlous place to begin any tour of the Lines is at Alhandra Here,the Redoubt, to which Wellington would
da bara d9r RLchod F k h & vlsltor will End the h u e memorial to Weuinston's chief enninea. Sir Rlchard make hIs way every morning horn his
manoriJ.rAlhudn Fletcher, the man &y respnulble for t h l mnstruction & the Lines. Due he- at nearby Per0 Negro. If ev&
-hlr-v.ra ~ ~ e d l t i s & g i w n h o w e e e r t o ~ e v e s ~ ~ a , t h e ~ o ~ m a j o r o f t e n d t e dwe needed reminding of the massive lob
q"Aphgusonh-sidedh as behg e q d y important in the concept of the ~ w sThe . memorial takes carried out by the Portuguese workmen, it
namhleDmrmrrorrprNmr
-*--whoir thefonnofahugeco~,toppedwiththeftgureofHeRules,and&bullton is here, for the road they hilt to the
*~ipd~mthpnmwho theodglnalslteof&btnumberZFmherea~daNvlewtotheeast redoubt survives today. The gmund
d m h d d n h opnsoutorrrthe~,x,thatyoucan~howthegunboatroftheRoJral was cut and thourands of stones laid to
Navy d d have prwented any attempt fadlltate the movement of men, hones
bytkFremhtohyandtumtheUnes and attilhy. It takes a good 15 minutes
I
1
by way of the rim orsotoreachtheredoubt,whichtoday
MorrlDgwest,awayfromthe'IBgmand lies amidst thick woods, but the view
bytheroadtoBucenyavLrlttoredoubb is ti'emendous. Although bushes and

-
n~f&e1~40,41and42isvergwathWhk
here are examples of rrdoubts which
have masonry ramparts, and one of
trees have tended to obscure the w d u
t h d v e s , it is still possible to fmd the
original tnces of the works, the ditches
I
1 the cdxbis, nlrmber 41, even has a
lMnae.TheredoubbaRsituaDedwell
offthemainr~adandac~nddereb~e~alk
and the fomad flkbesthat were dug to cmm the approaches to the Rdmbt.
Todays Portuguese army have constructed a fine viewing platform in the centre
of the fmwith tiles placed all round the inside indicating the posulons of the
is inmlved in mching them. However, vatlousfortsfntheam. I t i s a 6 a ~ v l e w h g p o i n St o b n l l a w s i n t h e
it is certainly worth it. The three distance at the foot of the position, and it b easy to see why, with the French
fa%ubtsarpporteachotherpedffttgand in possesion of the town, WWelUngon constdered the redoubt x, important.
cwnpletely c o w the wrounding'ama. Rvo other forts are situated neatby, although these are thickly covered by
Anyadvancebythe~wouldhave bushes and trees tw.
been seen &st Immedtatd~ The AWtoPeroNe(potaelfisamust.ItispwsiMetotradthe~
mengthofthethmledouMsisobvious Penfnsuk andvisit scoresofkddings used by Wellington. Fu-do, the
toanyonetoday,inltitisisywhenwe convent of SaoJh, StJeande luz.and FrmeMa are just a few.His he8dquate~S
madder that these three aedDuba formed atPeroNegroarevetyeaqto6nd..%luatedona hllltotheeastofthetorm,
partofthesemndIineofforU6aUons an imposing yellow house, sunwnded by a Ugh wall, is dMn@hed by
that we begin to appredate the great a plaque which informs visitors of Wellington's (or Wdkslep, as the plaque
depth of the Lines. After all, it d d have states) stay there.- the occupation of the Lines. An atmosphaic place, it
talwaqmbmanefeortbythePrench iseasytofrmginethemmingsandgoingsofWeliingtonandhlsstaff
to panr the first Une of defenm. W then throughout the late autumn and early wtater of 1810.Leaving Pero Negro to
havetodeplwithWrecoadkoaly the east, and croshq thqrstlway, a short drive of about one d e south brings
servestoremindurofpsthowfomMable yartoasmalldutchofhouses,dtuaMdonthel&oftheroadThehrtthoux,
andalltutirnposiblethetaskfsdoe Casal al, once a fine-lwldng bulldtng but now rather dilapidated, served
-0aUally- as the headquarters of Marshal Bersford.
 only a few of the main ones. Driving around the area you will never cease to
be amazed by the strength of the Lines. But it should not be forgotten that
\Vellington was taking n o chances, and in the event of a French breakthrough
had ordered Fletcher to come up with a suitable place where the British army
might re-embark in safety. The place decided upon was on a small beach
immediately to the east of the very powerful Fort San Julian, which itself is
~ituatedto the west of Lisbon on the road to Cascais. Fort San Julian is still a
military establishment today and is also a government hospitality centre. .4
rtrong fort was huilt on a hill just to the north of the fort in order to cover the
re-embarkation of the troops, but it was the guns of Fort San Julian that would

~
have provided the most effective cover. Looking at the waves crashing in on the
!
F- '
- '
shore of the Tagus it is worth contemplating the difficulties the British troops
, I. ' 4 4 1
1
& b : m r ! w. . r.i, ,. ~vouldhave faced in getting into the small boats: they would have been tossed
5 ;v- .--+S... about, as they had been when the army came ashore at the River Maceira prior
-. _-..--.a:.
, .
1
ii
iF ,!Ti ., -
-- ~-
. ..
- -. . ..
!

,.
to the battle of Vimeiro. In order to facilitate the re-embarkation, four jetties
were built, much to the amusement of the locals who thought they would be
'?"?
i.---3--
ma.
I
I."

I I I !ikIi.;1 :!i I , -~ > j w e p t away in n o time. However, the jetties survived for some years after the
war~hadended.
, r /,jI~~!!il; i ,: .., . -..
, ,
- i Wellington ensured that the arrangements made at Fort San Julian, and on
The front entrance to
headqusrterr.the
Beresford'r
ofEreat
.i the third set of Lines which covered the re-embarkation area, were carried out
a* thoroughly as at any point in the Lines. Nevertheless, it is worth taking a
comine and
of 18k111.
- - -
durinn the ,.,inter

moment to try to imagine the scenes on

2 *plh-..
?.. .,
,
.,..,
. ~ . - .-;I"+*..
,,,.. .'.?+.$ tiiese beaches had Wellin@on been forced
-i
~

.:: to pull hack from the Lines and re-embark

.,&.~ -, .-?*
,-.
. ~? ;~.&
"> -,... , ; ,.~>,~ a,e
.,-~~,,.
: . .r:..7:~;:~.., -:7:

his men in the ships of the Roval Navy.

It is also worthwhile visiting Santarem,
a pretty town in its own right, but
from November 1810 until March 1811
A rho= distance along the mad Although not mounting any redoubt, Mount Soccora is well worth a visit Slas56na's headquarters. It was here that
rourh fmm Pero Negro lies the too. Situated about two and a half miles to the north-west of Pero Negro, it the French commander sat and oondered
Casai Cachim.Thir war Beresfor& provided Wellington with a magnificent observation point, upon which a over the various courses of action oven to
headquarters during the winter of telegraph station was placed. A very poor unmade road winds its way to the top him, none of which yielded anything
181011I.The house is somewhat
dilapidated today, although a plaque and although it is possible to drive a car to the top (I've done it a few times - other than frustration and misery for
happily recalls Bererford'r although i made sure it was a hire car, and not my ou.n!) visitors should think 130th himself and his army. The area
occupation of the premises. twice about doing it. The road is steep in places and can be very tricky if you're round Santarbm was stripped bare of
not used to off-road driving. rcwurces, and when Mass6na himself
Naturally, n o visit to the Lines would be complete without visiting Torres witiidrew north, he left behind a town
Vedras itself. There is a small but good museum in the town which houses which had been completely sacked by its
many artefacts dating from the Peninsular War, some good dioramas and, of former inhabitants.
course, much on the Lines themselves. A large obelisk stands in the centre of There is also a fine military museum in
the town, commemorating the victories of the Anglo-Portuguese Army at Li\l)on itself, with rooms dedicated to
Rolica, Vimeiro and Busaco. The principle reason for visiting the town, thc Peninsular War and the Lines. The
however, is to explore Fort San Vicente, the strongest and best-preserved fort in museum, once the royal arsenal, also
the Lines. Today, it provides the focal point of commemoration, and plaques houses one of the finest collections of
mark the visit by the present-day Duke of Wellington. Fort San Vicente stands arms, armour and equipment in Europe.
on a hill, high above the town, and encompasses an old chapel within its The museum has a direct link with the
ramparts. It actually consists of three forts joined together. Numbered 20. 21 Peninsular War and in particular the Lines
and 22, they have long since been restored and somewhat artificially of Torres Vedras, for it was from here that
strengthened with stone and concrete, but their extremely deep ditches and the majority of the guns that were placed
bomb-prwf traverses provide ample evidence of the fort's immense strength. in the redoubts along the Lines were
Indeed, the fort was designed to hold some 5,000 men and mounted n o fewer brought. The building is situated on the
than 40 guns. It was also protected by fort number 27, which was in effect a riverfront: allow a few hours if you intend
Moorish castle, built to command the road from the north. Like Wellington, visiting it. Finally, it should be mentioned
the Moors also appreciated the strategic importance of Torres Vedras and built that many of the redoubts,that still exist
their own castle to protect the road. today are siNated on private property and
There are scores of redoubts dotting the hills today, and visitors will, n o ar \uch visitors should take care not to
doubt, discover their own favourites in time. The ones referred to above are trespass or to cause any damage.
Definition of key terms

The follow@ de6nttiom of foxti6cation tams anne from Insbuctimr @r

offiun ofIqimby, sllowing How to Dau and Consbuct aU sortr of Field Work;As
aLro the best ndhod to put Chunlryrobr, C h m k , Wlo,VfUa@s, ?brms, 6a.in
a S m o f L k f k t . The book was wmten by G e n d F Gaudi, and aanslated fnto
English by C Marom de Martemont. Published in 1804, the bodr dacdbts in
meat detail ewmhbu an emhm officu needed to lmow about the mtndvla

formspartofthemdnuaLSomeofthemmpeullar~havebemeditcd
out,ahasdmplilied, but on the whole these dehltiom appear exactly as they
mere pubbhed.
Fortification

thesame.
PamsnaaroltiecrtionisputkulPrlgappliedtothee~attaddng,aacl
de6endtng of such places as are propedgdenominated -, and
whi&arecoamuctedintimeofpeace,totheplrposeofpfirteniaga
whole eocmby &gabmfuture attack or imption of the enemy.
'kmwmrv m .which is called hdd forU6catio11,has a slmlla~

namely, that field rvalrr are only intended to exIst for a short limited
U&Od.MattheVare~tlvcotWm&dfnthe~hoap:when
&y kqutsiwWarwaning, e A sometimes thei-cedihe
enemy.
Various kinds of field works
A fort, generally so d e d , is a place surrounded by a parapet Po-, however,
~dBfemt~~,~totheirhgure,andtothenumbQ
oftheirridesorfaces.
A M , whose6guseisa&&, b c a l l e d a m a n d o r ~ f o r t .
A M is said to be a tdangdw, square, pentagonal or hexagod Ma &G
acumnngas~hacthrre,h,6veordx,&c.*orfaas.
When the dmmfemce of a fort is wmoosed of L L a laminnalternate
n

fort, 6rc sccording as its d e n t ang~esa& six, &cin number.

~~fieldworlothathrvenoRaakdekmeofthefrormarecalledrrdoclb(*
M-mdo&t, @&he or -, b a small wnlr with only two faces, whlch
Obstacles are placed in front of the parapet, and about sixteen or twenty feet from
A parapet is an elevation of earth thrown up around a fortified place, and
which, owing to its height and thickness, serves to protect the men who
I the counterscarp.
(:rows feet, or chntrsse-tmppes are pieces of iron with four points, each a feu.
are to defend it against every attack from the enemy, and especially inches, and so formed that in what manner soever they may be thrown.
against the fire of his musketry and artillery. Now, the parapet being made one of the points always remains upwards.
of loose earth, it could not possible stand long, if its outer and inner sides \n abattis is formed by means of trees cut down, placed close by and over
n.ere carried up perpendicular to the horizon; therefore, it is proper they one another, so that their heads are presented towards the enemy and
should make an acute angle with the horizontal base of the work. The their trunks towards the work.
slope of the sides is calied the interior and exterior slope or talus of the I:ourgasses are s~nallmines whose chamber is sunk but a feu' feet deep.

1
parapet.
The upper surface of the parapet is called the summit or crown; it must he
made sloping towards the country, othenvise the enemy could not be hit Various definitions
from behind the parapet, when advanced within a moderate distance Pieces of cannon placed adjacent to one another behind a parapet form a
from the work. The slope of the upper surface is called the slope or talus battery. There are two different sorts of batteries, namely, batteries with
of the summit of the parapet, or simply, the slope or talus of the parapet. embrasures, and batteries ol borbelte.
As the height of the parapet exceeds that of the men who are to defend the Embrasures are openings so practised in the parapet that the guns may fire
work, an elevation of earth is made immediately behind, and at the foot through them. Where cannons are to fire over a parapet without
of it, which is called the banquette; this elevation, which the soldiers embrasures, we call it firing en bnrbette.
mount when they are to fire, enables them to fire over the parapet. To Fnfilade. A work is said to be enfiladed when a gun may fire into it, so that
render the ascent of the bnrlq~lrncmore easy, you must give a slope to its the shot may run all along the inside of the parapet.
inner side, which is called the slope or talus of the bn~iqr~rtte. Hy cross fire is meant the fire of two or more adjoining sides crossing
A small space must be left between the foot of the parapet and the ditch, which each other.
is called the berm, and intended to prevent the giving way of the scarp. :\ breach is an opening made in a wall or'parapet with cannon or mines,
which would have too great a pressure to sustain from the parapet, if the sufficientlv wide for a body of troops to enter into the work and drive the
exterior slope of this latter, and the scarp formed but one continued surface. enemy from it.
It is customary to make a ditch on the outside of the parapet, in order to (:ommand. When a hill or rising ground overtops any work of a fortification,
procure the earth that is required for the formation of the parapet, as also and is within cannon shot, that hill or rising ground is said to command
to oppose an additional obstacle to the enemy. that work.
Both sides of the ditch must have a slope or talus; that of the Inner side is ..\ revetment is a lining generally made in the field, and composed of fascines
called the scarp, and that of the outer side, the countencarp. The or sods, sometimes of hurdles of willow trees woven together in the
coveted way is a space left between the counterscarp and the glacis. manner of basket-work, the object of which is to support the interior, and
The glacis is a kind of parapet raised up beyond the ditch, the summit of sometimes the exterior side of the parapet.
which ought to be continued outwards in a gentle slope, and gradually :\ traverse is a parapet made within field works to cover the entrance, or
decreasing till it meets the surface of the ground. when there are any hills or rising ground from which the inside of the
We call a n advanced ditch a second ditch, formed in front of the former works may be discovered.
beyond the glacis. A fascine (common) is a kind of bundle made of branches tied in two or
A covered way practised beyond an advanced ditch is called an advanced more places, of about six or eight inches diameter.
covered way. :\ sntccisson is a fascine which is longer than the common one, and which
has in general one foot diameter. Sn~tcissotl.<
are used for the revetment of
batteries, parapets, and for repairing breaches. kc.
Additional obstacles A gahion is a kind of cylindrical basket open at both ends, of about three feet
Resides the parapet, the ditch, kc. other obstacles may be presented to the wide, and from three to six feet high, which is filled with earth.
enemy to check his progress, or impede him in his attempt to become 1.oop holes are square or oblong holes made in a wall to fire through with
master of a work. These are as follows: muskets.
Palisades, a name given to one or several lines of square stakes, pointed at Communication is a passage from one work to another, and generally
the top, and driven two or three feet deep in the ground. These are joined covered by a parapet or palisades on each side.
together near the top with laths, which are fastened to them with rivetted 11Place of Arms. A proper place for collecting the men and materials, as
nails. also the engines of every description destined for the attack or defence
Fralses are a kind of palisades, placed nearly in a horizontal direction (by of a post.
which is meant, that the pointed ends are rather inclined towards the .A block house is a building of timber erected in the middle of a work to
bottom of the ditch) in the revetment of the parapet. shelter the garrison, and especially the guard, from bad weather; it ought
Chevauxde-frlse are square beams through which stakes four inches thick are to be roofed with beams, over which earth and sods are heaped a few
driven in an oblique direction, so as to cross each other, and to stretch feet thick.
out as much on one side as on the other, in such a manner that two rows I
of those stakes touch the ground, and the other two are upwards.
Tross-de-lorrp are holes pointed at bottom, in the middle of which a stake
pointed at the top is two feet lower than the top of the hole; fn~crc-de-loup
 The French view is perhaps best represented in Jean Jacque Pelet's book, The
Further Froiclt Campaiqrt in Porhrgfll, 1811. Although edited by the very pro-French
Donald Honvard. Pelet's own account gives us a marvellous insight into French
thinking, their shock at seeing the Lines for the first time, and the growing
desperation within their camps as they sat there, unable to find a solution to
the problem of breaking the Lines.
Another very important work is, of course, Wellington's Despatches and
There have been surprisingly few books written about the Lines of Torres S~~pplentefttflry which were published in 1832 and 1857 respectively.
Despotcl~e.~,
Vedras since the Peninsular War ended in 1814. In fact, there are really only In these multi-volume works are to be found the majority of Wellington's own
two works on the subject, and one of those was written as late as 2 W . It was correspondence relating to all matters concerning the Lines and their
not until 1846 that the first great work on the Lines of Torres Vedras was construction. His Gei~eralOrders, published in 1839, are useful also.
published. Major General Sir John T Jones's Iounial of the Sieges Camed on by the Good accounts of the Lines, their construction, but mainly their effects on
Anny irnder The Duke o f Wellin.fo~tin Spain, during the years 1811 to 1814, was the Peninsular War can be found in the three classic accounts of the war:
first published in 1814 in a single volume, but in 1846 a three-volume edition William Napier's six-volume History of the War in the Peninsula, published from
appeared, massively enlarged and with the addition of a whole volume 1828 onwards; Sir Charles Oman's seven-volume History of the Peniilsular Wflr,
focussing on the Lines. Jones had been a Royal Engineer officer in the published from 1902 onwards, and in volumes 6-10 of Sir John Fortescue's
Peninsula and was thus more than qualified to give an account of the Ifisto~yof the British Army, published between 1910 and 1920.
proceedings relative to the Lines and, indeed, to the other sieges in general.
Jones gives a complete and extremely thorough appraisal of the Lines, from the
country to the north of Lisbon, the planning, the construction, the cost and
the effects on the population. He is critical where necessary and gives a
completely professional view of the Lines.
Perhaps reflecting just how much historians have underestimated their
importance, it was not until 2000 that the next major volume o n the Lines
appeared. Written by John Grehan, and simply entitled Tlie Lines of Tones
Vedras: The Cornerstone of Wellington's Slrategy in the Peninsular War 1809-1812,
the book differs from Jones' work in as much as it addresses the wider issues
involving the construction of the Lines. For example, the book goes into
the original conception of the Lines and it outlines in some detail how
Wellington's campaign in 1810 was heavily reliant o n their construction and,
more imponant, their completion. The book also tackles the sensitive issue of
the sacrifices made by the Portuguese people and the cost in terms of destroyed
livelihoods and the thousands of deaths through disease and starvation. We
also see how Wellington could, perhaps, have avoided using the Lines at all,
particularly after Busaco. The author also argues the case that Wellington's
strategy throughout the years subsequent to 1810 was planned with the
knowledge that the Lines would always be there should it ever be necessary for
him to retreat.
In 1986, the British Historical Society of Portugal published its own guide to
the Lines. Written by A H Noms and R W Bremner, Tlte Lines of Torres Vedras is
an extremely useful, if brief, guide to the Lines both from a visitor's viewpoint
and an historical one. The authors had the advantage of much local
information, of course, but put it to great use in what is a very helpful book,
giving a complete guide to the redoubts' locations and their state in 1986.
There are several coiiections of papers in the archives of the Royal Engineers
Museum in Brompton. Chatham. Kent, and in the RE'S library itself. Otherwise,
there are few other boob directly concerned with the Lines, the two books
named above being the major works. Of course, there are scores of journals and
letten that refer to the construction of the Lines, their occupation and the
French retreat. A first-rate bibliography can be found in John Grehan's 771eLines
of Torres Vedras. One diary of note is Rice Jones' An En@?ieer Officer trnder
WellinffZonin the Peninsula, edited by H V Shome. Published by Ken Trotman in
1986, Jones' book is full of very interesting sketches of some of the redoubts
including the Great Redoubt at Sobral and Fort San Vicente. It is interesting that
whilst Jones could not fail to notice the extensive works being carried out across
the Lisbon Peninsula, even he had no idea just how they would eventually link
up, emphasising the secrecy surrounding their construction.
Figurer in bold refer to illurvationr consrruction 15.33.35 Lisbon
cmrr-section 19 conditions in 26.41
Alhrndn 54 dramage 35 museum 57
Allied a r m y garrnronr 27.36
AlgarveVolunreen IS parapets and rampam 34-5 Madrid. French occupation 4
Independent Ponuguere brigade 27 planr 36.31 magazines 38
Ponugvere 36 shape 31.33 Masrena. Msnhal Andre. Prince of Errling 6
Spanish 27 siting 32.33-4.35-6 invasion of Ponugal (1810) 24-5
see olro British Amry size 32-3 and N q 5 1-2
water rupplier 36-8 reaction to Lines 22.47-8
Beckith. Sidney 52 fern and redoubts of the Lines: individual revear from Ponupdl - .(1810-11) 50.3.50.
Bererford. Msj.Gen.William Carr 12 No.2 55 51
HQ 56.57 Nor 20-2 r e FonSanVicenre Monre Soccoro 38.56
British AT 48 No.40 41.42 Moore. Sir John 5.6 17
deploymenu (1810) 10-11.27 Nor 40-2 30.35.54.5 M o u h plareau.fortificatioo on 11.16
life within Liner 42-5 Nor 40-2: view from 25.44.45 MuratJoachtm 4
punuir of remating French (I81 1) 50-3 Nor I01 and 102 35
rupply liner 18 r e oko Great RedoubtSabnl: Fort Ln Napoleon Bonapane 4.5.5-6.24
Brhish AT rubunirr Julian. Fon SanMcente Nwer Conm.Jore Maria dss 12.13.54
Is t Divirion 27 Foz d'Arouce, combar at (1810) 52 Ney. Manhal 50.51.52
I st Foot Guardr 7 monument to 52
3rd Division 27.52 French s w
3rd Foot Guardr 8 anempu on Liner (1810) 45.47
4th Divirion 27 before Liner 48-9 Pelet JeanJacques 22-3.47-8.63
5th Divirion 27 invasion of Portugal (1810) 245 Pem Negro 47.55
6th Division 27 retreat fmm Ponupl (1810-11) 49.50-3. Picron. Str Thomas 27.5 1
King's German Legion 21.51-2 50.51
- ~. Ponuguere see Allied a v civilians
Light Diirion 14.21.27.28.42.52 French arml:rubuniu Portuguese Council 25.41
Royal Engineers 15.21 39th Ligne Regiment 52
&Irgor,riege of (1812) 53 Marrhand Divsion 5 1.52 Redinha. combar ar (181 1) 5 1
&Irgqne.Jahn 40 Mermer Division 5 1.52 redoubts see f o m and redoubu
0urrard.Sir Ham( 5 Fuenter de ORoro. Bade of (181 1) 53.53 Rolica. Brrrle of (1808) 5.7
Busaco. Banle of (1810) 8.25.41-1 Ronrer~llespars. earthwork a t I 4
G ~ aRedoubr
t Sobral l9.34.35.43.54 Rosa. Gen. 36
Carlos IY King of Spain 4 pmreNon 34 Royal Navy 18.28.38.49
Caral Cachim 55.56.51 mad to 46
Cinrra. Conrendon of (1808) 5 shape 31 Sabupl.combatat(1811) 51.52
civilians Grehan.John 62 Sane Barbe redoubt 13
compensation paid to 32 guns 35-6 Santdrem 49.50.57
c d i s du- h c h invarim 244401.45 Signal Redoubt 23
communications 28.38 Sault Manhal 6.50
conrvunion 15.19.21-3.33.35 on costs 38 Spencer. Sir Brent 4-5.27.47
Corunna. Bade of (1809) 6 Jwmal of the Siega: overview 62 Stepney Cowell.John 41.45
afremeth 49 Jmrnaf ofthe Siess: planr 29.35.36 rupply lines. army 18
Craufurd. Mai.Gen. Roben VBlsck Bob) 5.27. Journal of the Sleger: quoerionr 2 1.23.3 1.
28.42 36.44 Talmra. Bade of (1809) 6.8
Jones.LC Rice 14-17, W, 62 telegraph moons 28.38
Dalrymple.Sir Hew 5 Junot GenAndoche 4.47.50 TorresVedrar 56
Delaborde. Gm. 5
derign 12-11 Liner ofTomrVedrar
con 38
Fletcher. Col. Sir Richard 4 French attempts on 45.47 Welli~on.AnhurWellerIey, 1st Duke of 28.
and Lines 14-20.21.23.25.32 hypotheocal amck on 59 43
memorislr ro 54.54.55 layom and porloon 10-1 1 , 17 and derign d Liner 12-20.21.23
Fon San Jullan 38.57 life wlrhm a - 5 early P~enmruhrcampaign (1808-9) 4-6
Fon SanV~cente26-7.3 1.32.13.34 mannlng 27-8.36 HQ 47.55
Fon 20 39 n o w d m 54-7 publications 63
nowadqr 56 phnr 29 punult of reveating French (I81 1) 49.50.
planr 35.39
fomfiationr. French Il.14. 16.22.23
scarped rider 59
t m p s marching m 48
-- .
,.<,
re-embarbdon plans 38.49.57
bm and redoubu of the Liner 3 1-8 vrorkforce 21 murine wnhm Liner 38.44.45.47
see oho fonr and redovbu of the Liner e c o u 248.40- 1
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Fortress 7

Design, technology and history of key fortresses.

strategic positions and defensive systems
The Lineg of
Torres Vedras
1809-11

OSPREY
PUBLISHING
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