Civil Law Review 1

Case Digests
(Justice Mario V. Lopez Cases)

Submitted to:
Atty. Crisostomo Uribe

Submitted by:
12 – Micaller, Ana Camille C.
LPU 4B

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 Table of Contents
ACTS EXECUTED AGAINST MANDATORY OR PROHIBITORY
LAWS

1. CENTRAL BAY RECLAMATION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND THE
PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION AUTHORITY …………………………………………………………………..................................................
4

REPEAL OF LAWS

2. PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO-LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDPLABAN) VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN

BANC ..............................................................................................................................................................................
....... 6
3. ROSARIO J. ABRENICA, ET. AL VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND NILDA B. PLARAS, Director IV, COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, COMMISSION ON PROPER EN BANC ……………………………………………………………………………………..……………………
8

HUMAN RELATIONS

4. HAGONOY WATER DISTRICT, CELESTINO S. VENGCO, AND REMEDIOS M. OSORIO, PETITIONERS, VS.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA)
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………….…… 10
5. JUAN B. NGALOB VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT …………………………………………………………………………………………..……. 12

6. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Respondent ……..……. 14

7. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT ………………….
16

FAMILY CODE

Void Marriages
8. CHARNNEL SHANE THOMAS VS. RACHEL TRONO AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ……………………………..…
18

Article 36 (Psychological Incapacity)

9. ANTONIO S. QUIOGUE JR. VS. MARIA BEL QUIOGUE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ………………………..…
19
10. CAROLYN T. MUTYA-SUMILHIG VS. JOSELITO T. SUMILHIG AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES …..…..
21
11. JENNIFER A. DEDICATORIA VS. FERDINAND M. DEDICATORIA AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES …..
23
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
12. BELINDA ALEXANDER VS. SPOUSES JORGE AND HILARIA ESCALONA, AND REYGAN ESCALONA ………..
25
13. STRONG FORT WAREHOUSING CORPORATION VS. REMEDIOS T. BANTA ………………………………………….
27

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 SUCCESSION

Compulsory Heirs
14. SYLVIA R. RIVERA VS. ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN ………………………………………………………………………..……
29
Disallowance of a Will
15. IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF AIDA A. BAMBAO, LINDA A. KUCSKAR vs. COSME B.
SEKITO, JR.
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 31

CIVIL 2 CASES

Pacto De Retro Sale

16. SPOUSES ADOLFO B. VELARDE AND ANTONINA T. VELARDE, ET. AL. VS. HEIRS OF CONCEPCION
CANDARI ……………………………………………………………………………………..………………………………………………………. 33
Absolute or Relative Simulated Sale
17. FELIX CHINGKOE AND ROSITA CHINGKOE, PETITIONERS, VS. FAUSTINO CHINGKOE AND GLORIA
CHINGKOE …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
35
Notice of Redemption
18. HERMELINA RAMA AND BABY RAMA LAURON VS. SPOUSES MEDARDO NOGRA AND PURITA NOGRA
AND SPOUSES RICARDO RAMA AND MARILES RAMA ……………………………………………………………………………
37
Compromise Agreement
19. CITY GOVERNMENT OF TACLOBAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS …………………………………………………..……..….
39
Donation
20. ROWENA PATENIA-KINATAC-AN, ET. AL. VS. ENRIQUETA PATENIADECENA, ET. AL. …………………………...
41

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TOPIC: ACTS EXECUTED AGAINST MANDATORY OR PROHIBITORY LAWS
1. CENTRAL BAY RECLAMATION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND THE PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION AUTHORITY,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 252940, April 05, 2022, EN BANC, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: The Court is not a legitimizer of violations of law. What cannot be done
directly cannot be done indirectly. This principle is elementary and does not need explanation. Certainly,
if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. These
precepts guide the Court in resolving this petition for certiorari assailing the Decision[4] of the
Commission on Audit (COA) dated May 23, 2019 in COA CP Case No. 2010-350.

A. FACTS:
Respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA), formerly PEA, entered into an Amended Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA) with petitioner Central Bay, formerly known as AMARI, to develop three (3)
reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road, Parañaque City, and to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the Manila Bay. This
Court nullified the Amended JVA for violating Secs. 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
respectively prohibit the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain,
and the acquisition of private corporations of any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Aggrieved, Central Bay moved for reconsideration. In a Resolution, this Court denied the motion and
affirmed the nullity of the JVA. However, the Court held that Central Bay is not precluded to recover from
PEA the costs incurred in implementing the agreement prior to its declaration of nullity on a quantum
meruit basis in the proper proceedings. Central Bay filed a petition for money claim against PRA before
the COA. Central Bay sought to reimburse from PRA. Later, the parties submitted a joint motion for
judgment based on a Compromise Agreement where PRA offered to pay the incurred costs by transferring
102,703.15 square meters of reclaimed land to Central Bay's qualified assignee.
Central Bay filed this petition for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in
disapproving the Compromise Agreement and disallowing the other money claims. Central Bay insists
that it will not own the reclaimed land but will be assigning it to a qualified individual. On the other hand,
the COA, through the Office of the Solicitor General, counters that the Compromise Agreement
contravened the letter and intent of the constitutional ban against corporate ownership of land.
B. ISSUE:
Whether or not the disapproving of the Compromise Agreement by the COA is valid.
C. RULING: YES
The proscription against corporate ownership of alienable lands is absolute and clear. Apropos is Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that private corporations "may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,

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renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand, hectares in area." Here,
the Compromise Agreement obliged PRA to transfer the reclaimed land to Central Bay's qualified
assignee. Yet, this scheme grants Central Bay beneficial ownership or equitable title defined as "[a] title
derived through a valid contract or relation, and based on recognized equitable principles; the right in
the party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal title transferred to him[.]" Indeed, the provision in the
Compromise Agreement allowing conveyance to "Central Bay's [q]ualified [a]ssignee" clearly means
that Central Bay will hold the reclaimed land other than by lease which the constitutional ban seeks to
avoid. Further, the stipulation presupposes that Central Bay, as an assignor, is qualified by law to exercise
ownership of the land and transfer it to another party. On this score, the Court reiterates that an assignee
cannot acquire greater rights than those pertaining to the assignor. The assignee is merely subrogated to
the rights and obligations of the assignor. The assignee is bound by exactly the same conditions that held
the assignor under the original parties' transaction.
In the same vein, the Compromise Agreement allowing Central Bay to assign the reclaimed land is void.
Applying the maxim "nemo dat quod non habet," the qualified assignee can acquire ownership of the land
only if Central Bay owns the land.31 Otherwise, the stipulation will evade the Court's decision which
declared void the Amended JVA between PRA and Central Bay for violating the constitutional prohibition
against private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain except
through a lease. As the COA aptly observed, the qualified assignee mentioned in the Compromise
Agreement can only acquire rights which Central Bay can lawfully exercise. However, Central Bay is a
private corporation that cannot own land in the Philippines. Consequently, Central Bay cannot transfer
ownership of any land to another party.
Obviously, the Compromise Agreement between PRA and Central Bay must bear the approval of the
Congress since the stipulated ₱1,027,031,483.79 money claim exceeded the threshold amount. Notably,
Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." Sections 84 and 85, Chapter 4, Title II of
PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, reinforce this
constitutional mandate and require that before a government agency can enter into a contract involving
the expenditure of government funds, there must be an appropriation law for such expenditure. Section
8640 of PD No. 1445, on the other hand, requires that the proper accounting official must certify that
funds have been appropriated for the purpose. Section 8741 of PD No. 1445 provides that any contract
entered into contrary to the requirements of Sections 85 and 86 shall be void.
Applying Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, as implanted in Sections 84 and 85 of the
Government Auditing Code, a law must first be enacted by Congress appropriating ₱1,027,031,483.79 as
compromise money before payment to Central Bay can be made. Otherwise, such payment violates a
prohibitory law and thus void under Article 5 of the Civil Code which states that "[a]cts executed against
the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their
validity." Indisputably, without an appropriation law, PRA cannot lawfully pay the money claims to
Central Bay. Any contract allowing such payment, like the Compromise Agreement, shall be void.

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TOPIC: REPEAL OF LAWS
2. PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO-LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDPLABAN) herein represented
by its Secretary-General, CONG. PANTALEON "BEBOT" ALVAREZ, petitioner, LEON
ESTRELLA PERALTA, MELCHOR GRUELA MAGDAMO, and OTHELLO ESTROPIGAN
DALANON, intervenors, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.
G.R. No. 225152, October 5, 2021, EN BANC, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: The core issue in this Petition for Certiorari I is whether the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) is guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it extended the deadline for the
submission of Statements of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCEs).

A. FACTS:
On October 2, 2015, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9991, prescribing the guidelines for the
submission of the SOCEs for the May 9, 2016 national and local elections. The COMELEC reminded the
candidates and the political parties to submit their SOCEs not later than June 8, 2016. The deadline is
"final and non-extendible" and any submission filed beyond such date will not be accepted. This is
pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7166 4 which provides that the SOCEs must be filed
within 30 days after the day of the elections.
On June 23, 2016, the COMELEC En Banc, through Resolution No. 10147, extended the filing of SOCEs
until June 30, 2016. The candidates and political parties who will submit their SOCEs on or before the
new deadline will not incur any administrative liability. The majority of the commissioners explained that
the law in providing that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required" implies that the SOCEs
may be submitted beyond the 30-day period. Moreover, the COMELEC previously allowed extension of
time in filing the SOCEs due to legal necessity and to prevent vacuum in the public service.
On July 7, 2016, the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDPLaban) filed a Petition for
Certiorari 9 questioning COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 10147. The PDP-Laban argues that the
COMELEC exceeded the limits of its delegated rule-making authority and violated Section 14 of RA No.
7166 that the SOCEs must be filed within 30 days after the elections. The COMELEC should have
retained the original deadline to avoid perceptions of partiality given that other candidates and political
parties timely complied with the requirement.
B. ISSUE:
Whether or not the extension of the filing of the SOCEs and exemption of the candidates and political
parties from administrative liabilities is in violation of the law.
C. RULING: YES
The Court agrees with the PDP-Laban and Peralta, et al., that the language of Section 14 of RA No. 7166
is unambiguous and that the required SOCEs must be filed within 30 days after the elections. Foremost,
verba legis non est recedendum is a basic rule in statutory construction. The maxim translates "from the

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words of a statute there should be no departure." Differently stated, a statute that is clear is not susceptible
to interpretation and should be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law is harsh and
onerous. The remedy is with Congress to modify or even abandon the law.
Contrary to the COMELEC's interpretation, the commas separating the phrase "within thirty (30) days
after the day of the election" from the rest of the first sentence of Section 14 of RA No. 7166 do not make
the period to file SOCEs extendible. A comma is a punctuation mark used to divide a sentence, but it does
not introduce a new idea. As such, the separated phrase must relate to the same subject matter which
precedes it. Notably, the provisions "within thirty (30) days after the day of the election" is preceded by
the phrase "Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall" and followed by the phrase "file in
duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and
expenditures in connection with the election."
As discussed earlier, the Congress fixed the period to file SOCEs "within thirty (30) days after the day of
the election." Hence, the COMELEC cannot arbitrarily extend the deadline and substitute its own wisdom
in defiance with the clear legislative intent. The COMELEC likewise cannot conveniently invoke the
exigency of public service to justify its actions. The COMELEC's task is to administer and not to interpret
the election laws. At most, the COMELEC can only provide details to implement the statute but not to
supplant the expressed provisions of the law.
A similar interpretation must be given to the third sentence of Section 14, RA No. 7166 which states that
"[t]he same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidate fails to
file the statement required herein within the period prescribed by this Act." This is because the third
sentence explicitly refers to "the same prohibition" mentioned in the second sentence. At most, the non-
compliance with Section 14, RA No. 7166 will trigger only the imposition of administrative liabilities
provided by law.
Further, the fourth sentence of Section 14, RA No. 7166 penalizes the failure to file SOCEs with
administrative fines. And, in case of repeated non-compliance, the seventh sentence of Section 14, RA
No. 7166 provides a stiffer penalty of administrative fines plus perpetual disqualification to hold public
office. Clearly, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed resolution. The
arbitrary extension of the deadline for the submission of the SOCEs effectively condoned erring
candidates and political parties from administrative liabilities even if the law does not provide any
exempting circumstances.
inistrative act and has the force of law. However, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the resolution and is invalid in so far as it extended the deadline for submission of SOCEs for the 2016
elections until June 30, 2016. Consequently, the administrative act cannot be a source of legal rights.
Article 7 of the New Civil Code is explicit that "administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."

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TOPIC: REPEAL OF LAWS
3. ROSARIO J. ABRENICA, MARY ANN JOY C. AGUADERA, VICTORIA S. ALARCON,
LALAINE D. ARCANGEL, EDGARDO BAUTISTA, RAPHAEL T. BAUTISTIA, MAY EMMA
BOOKSMONTELLANO, DANTE P. BORNALES, ARTURO H. CABANBAN, VICENTE F. CO,
JR., VILMA J. CRUZ, ROSALINA L. CUENCA, FERDINAND S. DE GUZMAN, MA. FE F.
DECLARO, EFREN M. DIMAANO, ALEXIS Q. DIMAPILIS, VIRGINIA DIMAPILIS, MA.
OLIVIA M. DIZON, EDNA MA. ENDRADA, BONNA M. ESPARTERO, BENJAMIN D.
ESTRELLA, JR., JOVITA C. GONZALES, WILMA P. LADORES, SUSAN C. LEE, JESUS
MARIO J. LOGMAO, ARLAN C. LOPEZ, JEROME LACEDA, ALBERT G. LU, MINDA A.
MANALO, SHANE D. MARTE, EDNA ABELLERA MIRANDA, MA. LUISA J. NALLICA,
EMILIO S. PANDONG, MONICA B. PAUBILLO, MICHAELA B. PANZALAN, NIMFA M.
PUTONG, ELEONORITA E. REYES, JUDITH T. REYES, BIENVENIDO G. ROMERO, JR.,
NAOMI RUTH D. SALUDAR, EUMELIA P. SALVA, EDNA G. SANTIAGO, RONTGENE M.
SOLANTE, DAVID T. SUPLICO, DANIEL S. TAGULAO, RUEL TEANO, ELIZABETH O.
TELAN, FELIZ ROBERTO TORRES, EDITH S. TRIA, FRANCIS R. VILLANUEVA, JOSE
BENITO R. VILLARAMA, VOLTAIRE C. YABUT, and JOSEFINA T. MAPAGU, as represented
by the SAN LAZARO HOSPITAL (SLH) MEDICAL STAFF ASSOCIATION , petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and NILDA B. PLARAS, Director IV, Commission on Audit,
Commission Proper En Banc, respondents.
G.R. No. 218185, September 14, 2021, EN BANC, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: This Petition for Certiorari 1 under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Court, assails Commission on Audit (COA) Resolution 2 dated February 27, 2015,
which dismissed Rosario J. Abrenica, et al.'s (petitioners) motion for reconsideration (MR) of Decision
No. 2014-158 3 dated August 15, 2014 for being filed out of time.

A. FACTS:
Petitioners are employees of San Lazaro Hospital (SLH) with Salary Grades (SG) 20 to 26. From January
to June 2009, they received hazard allowances pegged at P4,989.75 per month. This rate was, however,
found to be not in accord with Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7305, otherwise known as "The
Magna Carta of Public Health Workers" and Section 7.1.5.a, Rule XV of its revised implementing rules
and regulations (IRR), which prescribe hazard allowances to be proportional to the employee's monthly
salary, i.e., equivalent to at least five percent (5%) of the monthly basic salary of health workers within
SG 20 and above. Thus, an aggregate amount of P1,094,188.98, representing those paid beyond five
percent (5%) of the health workers' basic salaries, was disallowed in Notice of Disallowance (ND) No.
09-006-101MDS-(09) dated November 23, 2009.
In a Letter of Appeal dated January 4, 2010 and Appeal Memorandum dated February 10, 2010 filed
before the COA National Government Section (NGS) Cluster C — Social Services, petitioners sought to
be relieved from liability under the ND. They argued that the hazard pay was given pursuant to
Department of Health (DOH) Administrative Order (AO) No. 2006-0011 dated May 16, 2006, which
fixed the payment of hazard pay to public health workers with SG 20 and above at P4,989.75. They

8
asserted honest belief that they were entitled to the hazard benefits received because they occupy
positions and/or work in an area classified as high risk.
B. ISSUE:
Whether the amounts of hazard pay given beyond the minimum rate prescribed by RA No. 7305 were
validly disallowed.
C. RULING: YES.
Indeed, administrative issuances or orders are products of delegated legislation, which are within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrines of non-delegability, and separation of powers. The
principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally-allocated sphere.
Our Constitution has given the country a well-laid out and balanced division of powers, distributed
among the legislative, executive and judicial branches with specially established offices geared to
accomplish specific objectives to strengthen the whole constitutional structure. Thus, the legislative
branch is vested with the power to make and enact laws; the executive branch is tasked with the
enforcement of the laws; while the judicial branch is mandated to interpret and apply laws.
Applying these principles, the executive, through the DOH, is expected to faithfully enforce RA No.
7305. As stated above, Section 35 of RA No. 7305 mandated the "Secretary of Health after consultation
with appropriate agencies of the Government as well as professional and health workers' organizations or
unions, [to] formulate and prepare the necessary rules and regulations to implement [its] provisions x x
x." In conferring power upon the DOH to implement the statute, the legislature recognizes the
impracticability, if not impossibility, of anticipating and providing for the multifarious and complex
situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. The Legislative Branch, in effect, diminishes its
own power for it delegates a fraction of that power to the Executive. In so doing, however, the legislature
is not allowing the Executive to override its legislative authority as to let the Executive exceed its
delegated authority. It is hornbook that an administrative agency, like the DOH, cannot amend an act of
Congress. It cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law that it is intended to implement. It is
mandatory, thus, that the administrative rule be germane to the purpose of the law and be in conformity
with the standards that the law prescribe. This is where the judiciary's power to apply and to interpret laws
comes in as a necessary corollary of the system of checks and balances to ensure that the executive's act
does not go beyond its delegated power. In other words, it is true that rules and regulations issued by
administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce also have the force of law,
and are entitled to great respect; administrative issuances likewise partake of the nature of a statute and
have in their favor a presumption of legality.
To be sure, the COA does not have the discretion to review the validity or conclusiveness of the Court's
application and interpretation of the law. In applying our pronouncements to affirm the disallowance, the
COA Proper merely acted pursuant to its constitutional mandate to determine whether government entities
complied with the law and prevailing jurisprudence in disbursing public funds, and thereafter, to disallow
such disbursements which are found to be illegal or contrary to law. After all, like this Court, the COA
cannot turn a blind eye to the fundamental principles set out under Article 7 of the New Civil Code, viz.:
ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or the Constitution.
We stress, an administrative rule or regulation, like DOH AO No. 2006- 0011, may be considered valid
only if it conforms, and not contradicts, the provisions of the enabling law. Necessarily, if a discrepancy
occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails,
because the law cannot be limited nor broadened by mere administrative issuance. An administrative
interpretation that contradicts the law that it purportedly implements cannot be considered valid or given
weight, and may thus be disregarded. Stated differently, the presumption of validity that the DOH
issuance enjoys is effectively overturned when the Court found it to have patently contravened the
unequivocal provisions of RA No. 7305. To rule otherwise would be to amend the statute.

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TOPIC: HUMAN RELATIONS
4. HAGONOY WATER DISTRICT, CELESTINO S. VENGCO, AND REMEDIOS M. OSORIO,
PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 247228, March 2, 2021 (Formerly UDK 16410), En Banc, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: This Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Court, questions Decision No. 2017-4862 dated December 28, 2017 and Resolution
dated November 26, 2018 of respondent Commission on Audit (COA).

A. FACTS:
Petitioner Hagonoy Water District (HWD) is a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC)
organized under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended, while petitioner Celestino S. Vengco, Jr.
(Vengco) is its General Manager, and petitioner Remedios R. Osorio is its Division Manager - Finance. In
2012, HWD released anniversary bonus and rice allowance to its officials and employees pursuant to
Board Resolution No. 009 dated April 24, 1996 and Board Resolution No. 016 dated October 13, 1992,
respectively. Various allowances were also given to its Board of Directors in the same year.
On November 14, 2013, Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 2013-001HWD(2012) (First ND) was issued,
disallowing HWD disbursements amounting to P582,000.00, consisting of the P174,000.00 excess in the
payment of anniversary bonus; and P408,000.00 worth of rice allowance paid to employees hired after
July 1, 1989. The ND stated that the payment of P5,000.00 to each HWD official and employee was in
violation of the Office of the President's Administrative Order (AO) No. 263, which limits the payment of
such bonus to an amount not exceeding P3,000.00. Thus, the excess of P2,000.00 given to each official
and employee was disallowed. On the other hand, the disallowance of the rice subsidy paid to employees
hired after July 1, 1989 was grounded upon Section 12 of RA No. 6758 and COA Resolution No. 2004-
00614 dated September 14, 2004, which allow the grant of additional allowances and benefits on top of
the standardized salary rates only to incumbents as of July 1, 1989.
Petitioners filed separate Appeal Memoranda to the COA Regional Office No. III, San Fernando,
Pampanga to question the First and Second NDs. Relevant to the present petition is petitioners' argument
with regard to the disallowance of the rice subsidy. In the main, petitioners invoked good faith in granting
and/or receiving rice allowance considering that its grant has been an established and existing practice in
HWD since 1993 as authorized by a board resolution. They also cited as evidence of their good faith the
immediate discontinuance of the grant of rice allowance upon receipt of the ND.
B. ISSUE:
Whether the COA gravely abused its discretion on its disposition with regard to the liability to refund the
disallowed rice subsidy.
C. RULING:
Petitioners ascribe grave abuse of discretion against the COA in failing to appreciate good faith in favor
of the HWD Board of Directors in issuing Board Resolution No. 016, which approved the grant of rice
allowance in 1993. Further, petitioners argue that the officers, who merely implemented the board

10
resolution as a matter of duty should likewise benefit from the doctrine of good faith inasmuch as the
passive recipients were exonerated from liability to refund the disallowed amounts on the basis of their
good faith. We do not agree.
In the recent case of Madera v. Commission on Audit, the Court had the opportunity to clarify the
jurisprudential variations on the liability of transaction participants in settling the disallowance. The Court
explained that the civil liability of approving or certifying officers provided under Sections 38 and 39,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, and the treatment of such liability as solidary
under Section 43, Chapter 5, Book VI of the same Code, are grounded upon manifest bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence in the performance of their official duties; while the liability of the recipients in a
disallowed transaction is based on the civil law principles of solutio indebiti and unjust enrichment.
Indeed, one's participation in the disallowed transaction is a determinant of the extent of liability. As
clarified in Madera, however, both officers and recipients have undeniable participation in a transaction,
i.e., in the grant, approval, and certification of the disbursement in the performance of the officers' duty;
and/or the receipt of such funds. Thus, while the officers' good faith is determinative of their liability,
such state of mind is immaterial to the recipients' obligation because mere receipt of disallowed funds
results in unduly benefitting from the government, giving rise to the obligation to refund.
In other words, good faith may excuse the officers' liability to refund the disallowed amounts, but not that
of the recipients. Recipients may only be absolved from the liability to settle the disallowed transaction:
(1) upon a showing that the questioned benefits or incentives were genuinely given in consideration of
services rendered; or (2) excused by the Court on the basis of undue prejudice, social justice
considerations, and other bona fide exceptions depending on the purpose, nature, and amount of the
disallowed benefit or incentive relative to the attending circumstances.
With these postulates in mind, the COA gravely erred in excusing the passive recipients' liability to return
the rice allowance that they individually received solely on the basis of good faith. To emphasize, mere
receipt of public funds without valid basis or justification, regardless of good faith or bad faith, is already
undue benefit that gives rise to the obligation to return what was unduly received in accordance with the
principles of solutio indebiti and unjust enrichment. In this case, there was no showing that the grant of
rice allowance in 2012 had proper legal basis, and was denied merely on the ground of procedural
infirmity. Also, no evidence was proffered to show that the 2012 rice allowance was given in
consideration of actual service rendered or work accomplished. In fact, Board Resolution No. 016 granted
rice allowance specifically to recognize the excellent performance and loyalty of HWD employees for the
year 1992, not 2012. Neither was there any genuine or bona fide equitable consideration relevant to the
nature, purpose, and amount of the grant that would warrant the recipients' absolution from their civil
obligation to the government. Consequently, all the recipients of the disallowed rice subsidy are
individually liable to return the amounts that they received.

11
TOPIC: HUMAN RELATIONS
5. JUAN B. NGALOB, in his capacity as Vice-Chairman of the Regional Development Council-
Cordillera Administrative Region [RDC-CAR] and former Regional Director of the National
Economic and Development Authority-Cordillera Administrative Region (NEDA-CAR),
HERMINIA B. SAMUEL, in her capacity as Regional Accountant, PATERNO C. LABOY, in his
capacity as former Chief Administrative Officer, and ALL PAYEES IN THE PAYROLL (as
recipients of the year-end incentives), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. No. 238882, January 5, 2021, EN BANC, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Court implores this Court to review respondent Commission on Audit's (COA) Decision
No. 2016-335 dated November 9, 2016 and Resolution No. 2017-491 dated December 28, 2017.

A. FACTS:
On August 28, 2009, the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR)- Regional Development Council
(RDC) Executive Committee (ExCom), headed by its Chairman, petitioner Juan B. Ngalob (Ngalob),
issued RDC ExCom Resolution No. 73, authorizing the grant of incentives covering January to June
2008, and quarterly releases for the third and fourth quarters of 2009 to compensate RDC-CAR officials
and secretariat's "extra work" in implementing the RDC-CAR Work Program on Development and
Autonomy. The CAR-RDC disbursed P1,095,000.00 for this purpose.
Similarly, on December 10, 2010, the RDC ExCom issued Resolution No. CAR-103, providing for a
year-end incentive to its officers and secretariat, in lieu of honoraria from the RDC Regional
Development and Autonomy Fund, to recognize the considerable responsibilities and tasks related to
regional autonomy that they undertook over and above their regular functions. This time, P1,080,000.00
was disbursed.
Upon audit, the incentives amounting to P1,095,000.00 were disallowed in Notice of Disallowance (ND)
No. 11-001-101 (09) dated April 13, 2011, while the year-end incentives amounting to P1,080,000.00
were disallowed in ND No. 11-005-101 (10) dated June 21, 2011, both for lack of legal basis. Petitioners
were charged liable for the transactions in both NDs.
he Prosecution and Litigation Office, Legal Services Sector, this Commission, is directed to forward the
records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for investigation and filing of appropriate charges
considering the possible violation of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code against the approving
officers.
B. ISSUE:
1) Whether the COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in upholding the disallowance; and
(2) Whether the COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in affirming petitioners' liability.
C. RULING:

12
In this case, while petitioners put forward an identifiable output,i.e., to socially prepare the CAR for
regional autonomy, only general principles on the concept of special project and honorarium were
presented.
Furthermore, even assuming that a legitimate special project was undertaken, the RDC-CAR failed to
present a transparent and fair "performance evaluation plan that considers timeliness, quality outputs, and
other applicable work efficiency determinants," required under paragraph 4.7 of DBM Circular No. 2007-
2 to be the basis of the computation of the "honoraria." The 2009 and 2010 GAAs mandated that "the rate
of honoraria [be dependent upon] the level of responsibilities, nature of work rendered, and extent of
individual contribution to produce the desired outputs: PROVIDED, [t]hat [the] total honoraria received
from all special projects shall not exceed [25%] of the annual basic salaries." Petitioners failed to adduce
evidence of accomplishments or deliverables upon which the computation of incentives may have been
based. Interestingly, RDC ExCom Resolution No. CAR-103 itself required the RDC secretariat to make a
determination of the incentives on the basis of additional tasks given to the RDC staff and officers, the
burden of accountability, and other criteria that the secretariat head deemed appropriate. Yet, the records
bare no proof that the secretariat complied with such determination before petitioners-officers approved
and certified the release of the incentives granted.
What is more, the COA appropriately observed that the disallowed incentives were illegally charged
against the agency's MOOE as there was no specific appropriation in the RDC-CAR's PS account under
the 2009 and 2010 GAAs for the payment of honoraria or incentives to officers and employees assigned
to a special project. All government agencies were prescribed to use the NGAS effective January 1, 2002
under COA Circular No. 2001-004. The NGAS Manual provides that "basic pay, all authorized
allowances bonus, cash gifts, incentives and other personnel benefits of officials and employees of the
government" are expenses chargeable against the agency's PS account, not the MOOE, which only
"include expenses necessary for the regular operations of an agency like, among others, travelling
expenses, training and seminar expenses, water, electricity, supplies expense, maintenance of property,
plant and equipment, and other maintenance and operating expenses." Concomitantly, DBM Circular No.
2007-2 provides that the amounts necessary for payment of honoraria shall be "charged against [the
national government agencies'] respective appropriations in the annual GAA." As well, DBM Circular
No. 2007-510 provides that the honoraria should be "charged against the appropriations for the purpose in
the annual GAA." Thus, the COA correctly ruled that
In sum, we find no grave abuse of discretion that can be imputed against the COA in affirming the NDs.
The RDC-CAR utterly failed to discharge its burden to establish the legal and factual basis of its grant of
incentives in 2009 and 2010.
The civil liability of approving or certifying officers provided under Sections 38 and 39, Chapter 9, Book
I of the Administrative Code of 1987, and the treatment of such liability as solidary under Section 43, 49
Chapter 5, Book VI of the same Code, are grounded upon the manifest bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence of public officers, who have in their favor the presumption of good faith and regularity in the
performance of official duty. On the other hand, the payees' obligation in a disallowed transaction is
grounded upon the civil law principles of solutio indebiti and unjust enrichment. Thus, while the officers'
good faith or bad faith is determinative of their liability, such state of mind is immaterial with regard to
the recipients' obligation to return in disallowance cases. By way of exception, the recipients do not incur
liability to refund when they can prove their entitlement to what they received as a matter of fact and law
because in such situation, there is no undue payment and the government incurs no loss. Additionally,
certain justifications that may excuse a recipient's liability to return may be recognized such as undue
prejudice, social justice considerations, and other bona fide exceptions depending on the purpose and
nature of the disallowed amount relative to the attending circumstances.
In this case, no badge of good faith can be appreciated in favor of the approving and certifying officers
considering the blatant disregard of the rules and laws that they themselves invoked and relied upon. By
jurisprudence, the palpable disregard of laws and other applicable directives amounts to gross negligence
which betrays the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official functions
enjoyed by public officers. Hence, the approving and certifying officers are solidarily liable to refund the
disallowed amount.

13
TOPIC: HUMAN RELATIONS
6. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 218378, June 14, 2021, Second Division, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assails the Decision dated August 29, 2014 and Resolution dated May 22, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96352, affirming the Decision dated September 15, 2010 and
Resolution dated November 10, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63
(RTC) in Civil Case No. 04-CV-2055 which declared the underBilling of National Power Corporation
(NPC) against Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO) for the period covering May 2000 to
February 2004, as illegal, unjust, and unenforceable.

A. FACTS:
NPC is a government-owned and controlled corporation that supplies power to BENECO under a
franchise agreement. In turn, BENECO distributes power to all its members and consumers in Baguio
City and Benguet Province.
On January 1, 1998, NPC and BENECO entered into a Contract of Sale of Electricity. Subsequently, the
parties executed a Transition Contract for the Supply of Electricity (Transition Contract) whereby NPC
will supply electric power and energy to BENECO at multiple points of delivery, including the Irisan
Substation. In 1999, the NPC's Metering Services Group installed the metering system in Irisan
Substation and conducted several tests to determine the multiplier. After the tests, the NPC set the Current
Transformer Ratio (CTR) at 75/5, which fixed the multiplier at 5,196.31. The Irisan Substation was
energized in March 2000.
From May 2000 to February 2004, the NPC maintained the CTR at 75/5 and billed BENECO using
5,196.31 as the multiplier. NPC granted BENECO a Prompt Payment Discount (PPD) every month as
long as BENECO's account was fully paid and updated.
In February 2004, BENECO's employee, Engineer Lawrence Umaming (Umaming), studied BENECO's
operations and discovered its low systems losses. Because of this, Engineer Umaming called the attention
of the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO), the company which took over NPC's
transmission functions in 2004. TRANSCO conducted tests on BENECO's billing meter and noticed that
the CTR was set at 75/5 instead of 150/5, which means that NPC had been billing BENECO at half the
correct amount of electricity delivered to it.
In a demand letter dated May 13, 2004, NPC informed BENECO of its underbilling from May 2000 to
February 2004, amounting to PI57,743,314.43 and requested BENECO to pay the amount. BENECO
refused to pay the underbilling and argued that it resulted from NPC's failure to discover the error in the
metering device. In consequence, NPC revoked BENECO's PPD privilege on June 23, 2004. NPC also

14
billed BENECO an additional amount of P7,870,456.14, representing the PPD and the interest charges
from April 2004 to July 2004. Too, NPC notified BENECO that it will issue a disconnection order if it
does not pay the balance. For these reasons, BENECO filed a Complaint for injunction, damages, and
other relief on September 30, 2004, before the RTC.
B. ISSUE:
Whether BENECO's non-payment of the underbilling constitutes unjust enrichment.
C. RULING:
BENECO's liability for the underbilling is based on contract, not the principle of unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists when a person unfairly retains a benefit, money, or property against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. The principle against unjust enrichment is
embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code, which provides that a person who acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of another without just or legal ground must return it. To be
applicable, Article 22 requires that: (a) a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (b)
such benefit is derived at another's expense or damage.
In University of the Philippines v. Philab Industries Inc., (G.R. No. 152411),46 the Court's discussion of
the principle of unjust enrichment and the elements required for its application is instructive:
Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of
others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term
unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.
Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove that
another party knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state
of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit. x x x.
xxx
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the
defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the
defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no other
remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under any
other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem
verso will not lie.47 (Italics in the original, emphases supplied, and citations omitted.)
Thus, the principle of unjust enrichment does not automatically apply when one party benefits from the
efforts or obligations of another. It is necessary to show that the enrichment of one party is without a just
or legal ground, and that the plaintiff has no other action against the other party. In other words, there is
no unjust enrichment when the person who benefited has a valid claim to such benefit. Relevantly, the
Court ruled in Shinryo (Phil) Company, Inc. v. RRN, that the principle of unjust enrichment is not
applicable because the petitioner's claim is based on contract, viz.:

As found by both the CIAC and affirmed by the CA, petitioner failed to prove that respondent's free
use of the manlift was without legal ground based on the provisions of their contract. Thus, the third
requisite, i.e., that the enrichment of respondent is without just or legal ground, is missing. In
addition, petitioner's claim is based on contract, hence, the fourth requisite that the plaintiff has no
other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict is also absent. Clearly, the principle
of unjust enrichment is not applicable in this case. (Emphases supplied.)

15
TOPIC: HUMAN RELATIONS
7. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, represented
by its President, LUTHGARDA S. SIBBALUCA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
respondent.
G.R. No. 217285, November 10, 2020, En Banc, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court
seeks to reverse respondent Commission on Audit's (COA) Decision No. 2014-388 dated December 17,
2014 that upheld Notices of Disallowance (ND) Nos. 08-001-158-(08), 09-003-158-(09), and 10-001-
158-(09).

A. FACTS:
On October 29, 2004, then Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary Rene Villa (Secretary Villa)
and the DAREA executed a Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA). Pursuant to this CNA, the DAR
Regional Office No. 02 (DAR-R02) released a total of P6,598,000.00 to its officials and employees as
incentives for accomplishing their targets from 2008 to 2009: P1,894,000.00 for January to June 2008;
P1,584,000.00 for January to June 2009; and P3,120,000.00 for October to December 2009.
These disbursements were, however, disallowed in ND No. 08-001-158- (08) dated September 9, 2008;
ND No. 09-003-158-(09) dated July 17, 2009; and ND No. 10-001-158-(09) dated February 18, 2010. The
COA Audit Team found that the CNA Incentives were illegally charged against the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) Fund or Fund 158 in violation of Section 4 (3) of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1445 or the "Government Auditing Code of the Philippines," stating that "[t]rust funds shall be
available and may be spent only for the specific purpose for which the trust was created or the funds
received." The Audit Team explained that as the CARP Fund was created under Republic Act (RA) No.
6657 or the "CARP Law of 1988," as amended, for a specific purpose, its use should be strictly
scrutinized.
The DAR-R02, through its Executive Committee, filed appeals to the COA Regional Office No. 2 (COA-
R02), for and on behalf of all its officers and rank-and-file employees. They argued that Section 4 (3) of
PD No. 1445 is not applicable because the CARP Fund is a special fund, not a trust fund. Also, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Budget Circular 2006-1, which laid down the guidelines
in the grant of CNA Incentives, does not specify what savings may be used for the incentives granted.
Hence, for the DAR-R02, the CNA Incentives may be taken from the CARP Fund savings
B. ISSUE:
Whether or not there was unjust enrichment for the disbursements being sourced from the CARP fund.
C. RULING: YES
The extent of one's participation in the grant and/or disbursement of the disallowed transaction is indeed
considered as one of the determinants of liability. In the past, the Court has ruled that the recipients'
retention of the disallowed amount received in good faith was justified due to their lack of participation in

16
the approval or disbursement process. In the recent case of Madera v. Commission on Audit, however, the
Court exhaustively clarified that this justification is unwarranted, considering that payees always have an
involvement in the transaction by mere receipt of the benefits. We said:
Verily, excusing payees from return on the basis of good faith has been previously recognized as
an exception to the laws on liability for unlawful expenditures. However, being civil in nature, the
liability of officers and payees for unlawful expenditures provided in the Administrative Code of
1987 will have to be consistent with civil law principles such as solutio indebiti and unjust
enrichment. These civil law principles support the propositions that (1) the good faith of payees is
not determinative of their liability to return; and (2) when the Court excuses payees on the basis
of good faith or lack of participation, it amounts to a remission of an obligation at the expense of
the government.
To be sure, the application of the principles of unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti in
disallowed benefits cases does not contravene the law on the general liability for unlawful
expenditures. In fact, these principles are consistently applied in government infrastructure or
procurement cases which recognize that a payee contractor or approving and/or certifying officers
cannot be made to shoulder the cost of a correctly disallowed transaction when it will unjustly
enrich the government and the public who accepted the benefits of the project.
In the ultimate analysis, the Court, through these new precedents, has returned to the basic premise that
the responsibility to return is a civil obligation to which fundamental civil law principles, such as unjust
enrichment a n d solutio indebiti apply regardless of the good faith of passive recipients. x x x. (Emphases
supplied; citations omitted.)
Without doubt, the receipt of public funds without valid basis or justification is already undue benefit that
gives rise to the obligation to return. This obligation is founded by the civil law principles of solution
indebiti and unjust enrichment. The recipients' good faith or bad faith is immaterial in the determination
of their liability.
By way of exception, however, the recipients do not incur liability to refund when they can prove their
entitlement to what they received as a matter of fact and law because in such situation, there is no undue
payment and the government incurs no loss. The essence of solutio indebiti and unjust enrichment is
thereby negated. Additionally, certain justifications that may excuse a recipient's liability to return may be
recognized such as undue prejudice, social justice considerations, and other bona fide exceptions
depending on the purpose and nature of the disallowed amount relative to the attending circumstances.

17
TOPIC: LEGA STANDING IN VOID MARRIAGES
8. CHARNNEL SHANE THOMAS, PETITIONER, VS. RACHEL TRONO AND THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 241032, March 15, 2021, Second Division, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: The propriety of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment
filed by Charnnel Shane Thomas (Charnnel) is the crux of the controversy in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari1 assailing the October 10, 20172 and July 26, 20183 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 152507.

A. FACTS:
Earl Alphonso Thomas (Alphonso), an American citizen, was married to Rachel Trono (Rachel) on
October 7, 1984. The couple begot a son, Earl James Thomas (Earl), born on August 14, 1985. Upon
Alphonso's petition for declaration of nullity, his marriage to Rachel was declared void ab initio in a
Decision, dated August 22, 1997, rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch
140. The RTC held that the marriage was a bigamous marriage since Alphonso was still married to Nancy
Thomas (Nancy), an American citizen. In the course of the trial, Alphonso and Rachel agreed that the
properties they acquired during the marriage shall go to Rachel and Earl.
Relying on the dissolution of his marriage with Rachel, Alphonso cohabited with Jocelyn C. Ledres
(Jocelyn). On August 21, 1998, Jocelyn gave birth to their child, Charnnel. On July 22, 2007, out of their
desire to make their union legal and binding and to legitimize the status of their child, Alphonso and
Jocelyn got married in Makati City.
Alphonso died on February 12, 2011. To settle his affairs, Jocelyn, requested for certified true copies of
the August 22, 1997 Decision, its certificate of finality, and the entry of judgment from the RTC believing
in good faith that the judgment had already attained finality after the lapse of 13 years since it was
rendered.7 As a result of the request, the Branch Clerk of Court purportedly discovered that the Republic,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), was not furnished a copy of the August 22, 1997
Decision. The RTC, instead of granting Jocelyn's request, furnished the OSG with a copy of the Decision
and gave it 15 days from receipt to perfect an appeal, or to file a motion for reconsideration.
B. ISSUE:
Whether or not Charnnel, as an heir of Alphonso, has a legal standing to assail the marriage of Alphonso
and Rachel.
C. RULING:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, the Court ruled that void marriages governed by the New Civil Code can be
questioned even after the death of either party. The death of a party does not extinguish the action for
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as the deceased may have heirs with legal standing
to assail the void marriage.27 As borne by the records, Charnnel was neither made a party to the
proceedings nor was she duly notified of the case. Also, she was a minor at the time the RTC granted the

18
OSG's motion. While Jocelyn was able to file a Manifestation and Special Appearance on the OSG's
motion for reconsideration, this should not bind, much less prejudice, Charnnel as a perusal of it readily
shows that Charnnel's interests as Alphonso's heir were not directly raised and threshed out in this
pleading. To hold otherwise, would be tantamount to depriving a then innocent child, now rightfully
asserting her rights, of due process of law.
Anent, the jurisdiction of the RTC to rule on the OSG's motion for reconsideration and reverse its
Decision dated August 22, 1997, the CA overlooked the fact that the OSG's motion for reconsideration
was belatedly filed.1avvphi1 Considering that the OSG received a copy of the August 22, 1997 Decision
on March 8, 2011, it had until March 23, 2011 to file its motion for reconsideration. However, the motion
was filed only on March 28, 2011, beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, the August 22, 1997
Decision became final. In effect, the RTC already lost its jurisdiction over the case and could no longer
alter or reverse the August 22, 1997 Decision.

TOPIC: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

9. Antonio S. Quiogue Jr. v. Maria Bel Quiogue and the Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 203992, August 22, 2022, Second Division, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: The Court resolves this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated May 22, 2012 and Resolution dated October 3, 2012 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93554, which dismissed the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage filed by petitioner Antonio S. Quiogue, Jr.

A. FACTS:
In his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Civil Case No. Q-02- 46137, filed before the RTC,
petitioner Antonio S. Quiogue, Jr. (Antonio) alleged that he and his wife, respondent Maria Bel B.
Quiogue (Maribel), were married on October 16, 1980. They have four children: Marie Antonette, Jose
Antonio, Anabel, and Maritoni. They have been separated in fact since the year 1998 after Maribel drove
him out of the conjugal home. He was forced to temporarily stay in his office in the family-owned
Nacional Memorial Homes. He went home to ask his wife for reconciliation for the sake of their children,
but his efforts failed. Antonio claimed that he and Maribel are both psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the basic marital obligations. They did not observe mutual love and respect and also failed to
provide the necessary emotional, psychological, and moral support for each other.
In her Answer, Maribel denied the allegations in the Petition. She did not drive Antonio out of their home
because he voluntarily left their conjugal dwelling to pursue his womanizing and perennial nocturnal
gambling. Maribel stated that Antonio would only come home in the wee hours of the morning only to
leave again. He stayed in his office for a month during their separation and came back. Thereafter, he
would often come home from work drunk and violent. There were even times when he would threaten
and harass Maribel. Antonio was verbally abusive to the extent of humiliating her in front of their
children and neighbors.
The last witness for petitioner is the psychiatrist Dr. Valentina Del Fonso Garcia (Dr. Garcia). She
conducted a mental status assessment and clinical psychiatric interviews with Antonio and their eldest
daughter, Marie Antonette. Dr. Garcia likewise interviewed Maribel in several sessions when the latter
brought their second daughter Anabel for consultation and treatment of her depression. In a Psychiatric
Evaluation dated October 29, 2001, Dr. Garcia recommended that the marital nullification be strongly
considered by the court on the ground of psychological incapacity of the spouses.
B. ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage can be declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code?
C. RULING: YES.

19
Psychological incapacity is a ground to declare a marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
provision speaks of two requisites. First is gravity, or that the person who contracted the marriage is
psychologically incapacitated to assume the essential marital obligations and not merely refuses or
neglects to do so because of difficulty or ill will. The second one, antecedence, requires that the
incapacity exists at the time of the solemnization of the marriage, even if it manifests only thereafter. This
should not be confused with divorce wherein the marital bond is severed for causes occurring after the
celebration of the marriage. Recently in 2021, the Court revisited the concept of psychological incapacity
in Tan-Andal v. Andal. There, we observed that what was first described in 1995 in Santos v. CA as a
"mental incapacity'" that renders a person incognizant of the basic marital covenants, has since
fortuitously evolved into the rigid criteria laid down in Republic v. Molina. The Molina doctrine required
the parties to prove not only gravity and antecedence stated under Article 36, but also incurability. The
parties were then expected to present expert testimony to sufficiently prove that the root cause of the
psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified.
Later, the Court saw that viewing psychological incapacity from a medical perspective is unnecessary. As
clarified in Marcos v. Marcos an actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to if the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Besides, demanding proof of incurability is antithetical to Article 36 since the incapacitated spouse is not
considered ill-equipped to remarry another person. For this reason, the aspect of incurability is now
approached in the legal sense. This contemplates of a situation wherein the person's personality structure
manifests through clear acts of dysfunctionality which undermine the marital union and there must be
clear and convincing proof that the incapacity is enduring or persistent with respect to a specific partner.
Antonio's chronic infidelity is a form of psychological incapacity: In the assailed Decision, the CA held
that although there was a reference made in the psychiatric evaluation regarding the extra-marital affairs
of Antonio's biological father, still, his own infidelity throughout his marriage with Maribel does not
equate to psychological incapacity as it was not shown to be existing prior to the union. The CA is
mistaken.
Under Article 68 of the Family Code, the "husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." Clearly, the law itself recognizes fidelity
as the norm and a spouse should not be made to settle for anything less than absolute faithfulness from the
other. This stems from the nature of marriage being a "special contract" of an exclusive partnership
between a man and a woman. While it is true that infidelity is a ground for legal separation, the same may
also be an indication of a psychological incapacity if, for the same reason, one is completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
Of course, this is not to say that the Court will intuitively declare a marriage void for a single act of
marital indiscretion. Infidelity is not measured in terms of frequency. To be considered as a form of
psychological incapacity, infidelity must satisfy the requirements of (1) gravity or severity, (2)
antecedence, and (3) legal incurability or persistence during the marriage. (1) Juridical antecedence: In
this case, Antonio's Chronic infidelity is not only comprised of multiple illicit amorous relations. As
detailed in the Psychiatric Evaluation by Dr. Garcia, his affairs are not casual mistakes as these were
shown to be deeply rooted in his psychopathology which was in place even before his marriage.
(2) Gravity and (3) lncurability: Apart from the chronicity of Antonio's infractions, the Court also notes
that there is no clear recognition on his part that fidelity is one of his essential obligations to his wife
Maribel.
In the Psychiatric Evaluation, Dr. Garcia quoted Antonio saying: "As a husband, I'm practically a good
husband; but I would always be cheating on my wife." From his perspective, his illicit affairs are minor
incidents which Maribel should have overlooked or dealt with differently. It also did not escape the
Court's attention that Antonio has a distorted concept of a wife. During his interviews with Dr. Garcia,
Antonio referred to Maribel as a "good housewife," "because she is not employed anyway. " He described
Maribel as a dedicated mother "because she has no work, and she can always be with kids. " In return,
Antonio "compensated her" by giving her a monthly allowance for household expenses. It is evident that
Antonio considers himself superior to his wife. He does not consider Maribel as a partner, hence, there is
a constant need for him to look for affection outside the marriage.
Moreover, Antonio blamed Maribel's nagging and tactlessness for the demise of their marriage, saying
that her actions drove him away. He admitted that he was weak in not being able to control his
womanizing, but Maribel is at fault for not doing anything to win him back. He did not perceive his wife's
actions as a sign of despair or her own peculiar way of fighting for their marriage. Antonio focused on
Maribel's anger and its effects on him. Antonio's failure to show sincere remorse for his blatant infidelity
and the lack of desire to fix his ways to save their marriage clearly amount to psychological incapacity,
which is grave in nature.

20
No sufficient evidence of psychological incapacity on the part of Maribel: As for Maribel's retaliatory
acts, i.e., sending vulgar fax messages and hateful letters, and evicting Antonio from the conjugal home,
the Court sees that these are typical of a woman treated with contempt. Maribel was a college student
when she got pregnant. She got married to Antonio and devoted herself to becoming a wife and mother to
their kids. She wanted someone to grow old with and exerted efforts.
to have a stable and healthy home for Antonio and their children. However, when Maribel discovered her
husband's illicit affairs, she was seething with anger that her nurturing ways turned into rage. Admittedly,
Maribel's vengeful stance contributed to the collapse of the marriage as it aggravated Antonio's
psychological incapacity. Despite Maribel's belligerent attitude and verbal offensives towards Antonio,
the Court rules that these do not amount to psychological incapacity because these only existed during the
marriage, particularly, as a reaction to Antonio's philandering.

TOPIC: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

10. Carolyn T. Mutya-Sumilhig v. Joselito T. Sumilhig and Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 230711, August 22, 2022, Second Division, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: Assailed in the Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court are the
Decision dated November 14, 2016 and the Resolution dated March 9, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 105453, which affirmed the Decision dated March 17, 2015 and the Resolution dated
May 25, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107 (RTC) denying petitioner Carolyn
T. Mutya-Sumilhig's (Carolyn) Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

A. FACTS:
Carolyn met respondent Joselito T. Sumilhig (Joselito) in February 1984 on her first day of work as a
waitress at Daungan Restaurant. Joselito also worked there as an assistant cook. They became good
friends and eventually lovers. During their relationship, Carolyn noticed Joselito's gambling and drinking
habits. He would pass the time playing tong-its and mahjong with bystanders while waiting for her. When
Carolyn worked at Syvel's Department Store, there were instances when Joselito was already drunk when
he would fetch her.
In 1987, Carolyn got pregnant with their first child, Jay Charles M. Sumilhig (Jay). Blinded by his
promise to reform, Carolyn married Joselito on October 20, 1987. Carolyn gave birth to Jay on April 6,
1988. Joselito did not visit his wife and baby at the hospital. When Carolyn was discharged from the
hospital two days after giving birth, Carolyn saw that Joselito was playing basketball with his friends.
Thereafter, Jay had to be hospitalized for two months because he was defecating through the umbilical
cord. However, when Jay got sick, Joselito was easily irrititated because of the baby's cries and he neither
showed love nor bothered to take care of Jay. To make matters worse, Joselito stopped working and
busied himself with mahjong, drinking, and gambling in the neighborhood.
On May 24, 1989, Carolyn gave birth to their second child, Jennalyn M. Sumilhig (Jennalyn). Jennalyn
was born premature because Carolyn was stressed during her pregnancy due to her frequent quarrels with
Joselito. Despite his growing family, Joselito did not change his ways and remained jobless. He still drank
and his gambling habits became worse.
On October 18, 2010, Carolyn filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage based on
psychological incapacity.
At the trial, Dr. Soriano testified that Joselito had poor upbringing and was spoiled by his grandparents
when he was growing up. According to her, Joselito lacks the proper life skills which makes him overly
dependent on others. He is also immature and could not comply with his obligations and responsibilities
as a husband and a father. Joselito has a defective superego, thus, he sees other people as objects over

21
which to exert control and he feels the need to see Carolyn powerless. Joselito exhibited gross disregard
for his wife's feelings and persistent attitude of irresponsibility in marital life. Based on Carolyn's and
Mamerto's narration, Dr. Soriano concluded that Joselito suffers from Antisocial-Dependent Personality
Disorder, comorbid with alcohol dependence and pathological gambling. Such disorder is not curable
because it is developmental in origin. Treatment is only palliative.
B. ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the marriage can be declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code?
2) Whether or not there was sufficient evidence presented by the plaintiff to declare the marriage void on
the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?
C. RULING:
1. YES. The differing guidelines in determining the existence of psychological incapacity were settled by
the Court in the recent case of Tan-Andal v. Andal (Tan-Andal). First, a party's psychological incapacity
must have juridical antecedence as required in Republic v. CA. Article 36 explicitly requires the
psychological incapacity to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. As contemplated under the law, psychological
incapacity depicts an enduring aspect of a spouse's personality structure, existing at the time of the
celebration of marriage, that renders them incapable of understanding and complying with their essential
marital obligations, manifested through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. Proof of
this aspect of personality may be given by ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the
supposed incapacitated spouse before the latter contracted marriage. These witnesses may testify on
behaviors that they have consistently observed. The judge will then decide if these behaviors are
indicative of a true and serious incapacity to assume the essential marital obligations.
Joselito's defective superego and Antisocial-Dependent Personality Disorder, which existed prior to his
marriage, are parts of his personality structure manifesting through clear acts of dysfunctionality. Joselito
was also found to have alcohol dependence and pathological gambling. These factors make it impossible
for him to understand and comply with his essential marital obligations. The clear and understandable
causation between Joselito' s condition pre-existing before his marriage and its incapacitating nature
regarding the performance of the essential marital covenants clearly proved the juridical antecedence
requirement.
Second, the psychological incapacity contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable, not in
the medical, but in the legal sense. This simply means that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent
with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple's respective personality
structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable
and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. There must be an undeniable pattern of such persisting failure
to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse, and the pattern must be established so
as to demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the
other.
There are no medications that may be taken or intervention that may be done as treatment for Joselito's
psychological incapacity to enable him to fulfill his obligations as husband to Carolyn because what is
involved here is Joselito's personality structure.
Third, as to gravity, psychological incapacity must be caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause and
excludes "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts[.]" The
psychological incapacity cannot be a mere "refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will." Joselito's
psychological incapacity exemplifies gravity since he was not able to carry out the normal and ordinary
duties of marriage performed by any married person under ordinary circumstances. He did not exert any
effort at all to keep his marriage and support his family. He did not work, he chose to drink and gamble,
and he physically and verbally abused Carolyn. There was neither understanding nor willingness to
perform the obligations of marriage. Surely, these circumstances exhibit more than indolence,
peculiarities, difficulty, or ill will.
2. YES. In a long line of cases, it has been established that the absence of respondent's personal
examination is not fatal.
The presentation of expert testimony in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychiatrist, psychologist, or expert for a conclusive identification of a grave and severe presence of
psychological incapacity. The probative force of the testimony of an expert lies in the assistance that the

22
expert can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as basis for the criterion and the reasons
upon which the logic his conclusion is founded. For courts to arrive at a legal conclusion of psychological
incapacity, the aggrieved party must prove certain facts. A psychologist or psychiatrist may help prove
those facts by assessing and evaluating the psychological condition of the parties. Although expert
opinion is not mandatory as ruled in Tan-Andal, due regard must be given to expert opinion on the
psychological disposition of the respondent when it is presented in Article 36 cases.
Indeed, the totality of evidence has sufficiently established that Joselito is psychologically incapacitated at
the time he got married to Carolyn. He is not cognizant of the basic marital covenants which is enough to
declare the nullity of his marriage with Carolyn.

TOPIC: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

11. JENNIFER A. DEDICATORIA, petitioner, vs. FERDINAND M. DEDICATORIA and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 250618, July 20, 2022, Second Division, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: This court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated May 31, 2019 and the Resolution dated
November 26, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 107786, which ruled against the
declaration of nullity of petitioner Jennifer A. Dedicatoria (Jennifer) and respondent Ferdinand M.
Dedicatoria's (Ferdinand) marriage.

A. FACTS:
Jennifer and Ferdinand were married on December 20, 1995. However, on October 23, 2014, Jennifer
filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage due to Ferdinand's psychological incapacity.
Summons was served through substituted service, but Ferdinand failed to file an answer. The Office of the
Solicitor General entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and deputized the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City on its behalf. After investigation, the Assistant City Prosecutor
found no collusion between the parties.
During trial, Jennifer testified that she noticed bow irresponsible, immature, insensitive, self-centered, and
dependent on his parents Ferdinand was, since they lived in her in-laws' residence after the exchange of
vows. Ferdinand's mother continued to take care of him so he found no reason to look for a permanent
job. She experienced how her in-laws' interests prevail over hers. She was also made to do all the
household chores for Ferdinand's entire family. Distressed, she decided to leave and move in to her
parents' house. But Ferdinand never visited her so she eventually decided to go back to her in-laws' house
to be with Ferdinand.
When she got pregnant, her father rented an apartment for her and Ferdinand to have their own place, but
Ferdinand still opted to go to his parents' house every day and return to the apartment only at night. After
Jennifer gave birth, the couple returned to live with Ferdinand's family. Jennifer expected Ferdinand to
change his ways for their baby, but her ordeal only became worse as Ferdinand remained unemployed and
took no part in looking after their newborn. Distraught, Jennifer decided to move out with their son in
1999 for good and all. Like before, Ferdinand never visited them. Worse, she became completely
estranged from her husband upon the passing of her mother-in-law. Later on, Jennifer discovered that
Ferdinand was already living with another woman with whom he had sired a child.
To support her claim, Jennifer presented the testimony of Dr. Sheila Marie O. Montefalcon
(Montefalcon), a clinical psychologist who conducted psychological tests on her, as well as clinical
interviews on Ferdinand's sister, Teresita Dedicatoria (Teresita), and the couple's long-time common

23
friend, Anarose Talag-Aguirre (Anarose). Ferdinand was invited for a psychological assessment, but to no
avail. With the available resources, Montefalcon diagnosed Ferdinand to be suffering from Dependent
Personality Disorder, rendering him incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Montefalcon
described Ferdinand's psychological incapacity as follows: (1) grave for being chronic and pervasive,
which made him socially immature, inflexible, and ill-equipped to perform his marital obligations; (2)
incurable as it is deeply ingrained in his personality structure; and (3) with juridical antecedence as it
roots from dysfunctional factors involved in his childhood, unreliable parenting style from figures around
him, and unfavorable early life experiences, which affected his perceptions of himself and his
environment.
Anarose was also presented in court. She testified that Jennifer and Ferdinand have not been living
together since 1999 — this fact being privy to her as she has always been Jennifer's confidant. She also
alleged that Jennifer usually takes refuge at her house every time the couple had altercations. As the
couple's close friend, she claimed to have personally witnessed the breakdown of the marriage, Jennifer's
emotional sufferings, and Ferdinand's neglect of his son. In brief, Anarose characterized Ferdinand as
immature, irresponsible, and a "mama's boy."
B. ISSUE:
Whether sufficient evidence was presented to prove psychological incapacity for the Court to declare the
marriage void.
C. RULING: YES
Jennifer's cause of action is grounded upon Article 36 of the Family Code. which states:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. In the recent case of Tan-Andal v. Andal,
the Court settled the varying guidelines in determining the existence of psychological incapacity as a
ground to declare a marriage void. Foremost, the psychological incapacity must have juridical
antecedence as required in Molina because Article 36 explicitly requires it to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Tan-
Andal, however, clarified that such requirement does not require proof that the psychological incapacity
roots from a medically identified mental incapacity or psychological incapacity as previously required in
Molina. Psychological incapacity has always been a legal concept — it is neither a mental incapacity nor
a personality disorder in a strict medical sense, although one's clinical mental or personality disorder can
be its root cause.
As contemplated under the law, psychological incapacity plainly depicts an enduring aspect of a spouse's
personality structure, existing at the time of the celebration of marriage, that render [them] incapable of
understanding and complying with [their] essential marital obligations, manifested through clear acts of
dysfunctionality that undermines the family. In other words, the law does not require a clinical diagnosis
of a mental or personality disorder to obtain a decree of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity.
"
The psychological incapacity must also be grave to distinguish it from "mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" generally brought about by human nature
and the natural dynamics of every personal relationship. Finally, the psychological incapacity must be
incurable, but unlike in Molina, such incurability should not be confused with medical or clinical
permanence. Rather, the psychological incapacity must be incurable in the legal sense, meaning: [T]he
incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation
where the couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only
result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. " [A]n undeniable
pattern of such persisting failure [to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse] must
be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the
spouse relative to the other." (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
Jennifer's account of her experiences with Ferdinand, corroborated by the testimonies of the couple's
long-time friend, Anarose, and the expert evaluation of Montefalcon who examined, not only Jennifer and
Anarose, but also Teresita, clearly and convincingly prove that Ferdinand's incapacity to fulfill his marital
and parental obligations are deeply-rooted from his childhood experiences carried on to his married life.
These testimonies sufficiently established that Ferdinand had developed and exhibited extreme
dependency upon his family, which rendered him incapable of standing on his own as a family man, and
ultimately, incapacitated him to understand and discharge his essential marital and parental obligations to
his wife and child. Evidence shows that "from the beginning of the marriage, [Ferdinand] has not
contributed — emotionally or financially — to their marriage. Ferdinand consistently seeks support and

24
reassurance from his family, which causes pernicious effects on the decisions he made for his own family.
For one, he would rather be with his family, especially his mother, than with his wife and child. He also
constantly looks for his mother's personality in the person of his wife. Further, the trial court correctly
observed that Ferdinand has no job, not because he lacks motivation or is simply lazy, but because of his
childish disposition, i.e., he would rather be taken cared of by his mother than assume the responsibility
of looking after, and establishing his own family.
As discussed earlier, proof of juridical antecedence may consist of testimonies of ordinary witnesses who
have been present in the couple's life before marriage, and are competent to describe the environment
where the alleged incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to the incapacity as manifested through
[their] errant behavior. Thus, Teresita's narration on what could have given rise to her brother's
psychological incapacity, as evaluated by an expert witness, should be a sufficient basis to determine
juridical antecedence of Ferdinand's incapacity. We acknowledge Montefalcon's assessment, and find no
reason to discredit her testimony on this matter.
We stress, psychological incapacity does not need to be a medical or clinical condition. The witnesses'
attestations as to Ferdinand's incorrigible personality towards Jennifer and their child sufficiently
established Ferdinand's persistent failure to understand and fulfill his marital and parental obligations,
inevitably resulting in the breakdown of their marriage. Moreover, apart from the finding that Ferdinand's
traits are deeply-ingrained in his personality structure, the fact that Ferdinand has been estranged and
physically living separately from Jennifer for more than 15 years at present is demonstrative of an
incurable incapacity to comprehend and assume his responsibilities in the marriage. Taken together with
the established facts, it is also indicative of the irreparable reluctance of the spouses to accept the other,
which is indispensable to the marital relationship.
TOPIC: CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
12. BELINDA ALEXANDER, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES JORGE AND HILARIA
ESCALONA, AND REYGAN ESCALONA, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 256141, July 19, 2022, EN BANC, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: These are the core issues in this Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the Decision dated October 26, 2020 and the Resolution dated March 5, 2021 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 110958.

A. FACTS:
Respondents Spouses Escalona were married on November 14, 1960. Thereafter, Spouses Escalona
acquired unregistered parcels of land identified as Lot Nos. 1 and 2. On June 16, 1998, Jorge waived his
right over Lot No. 1 in favor of his illegitimate son, respondent Reygan Escalona (Reygan). On July 28,
2005, Reygan relinquished his right over Lot No. 1 to petitioner Belinda Alexander (Belinda). On August
8, 2005, Reygan likewise transferred Lot No. 2 to Belinda through a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim.
On August 10, 2005, Reygan and Belinda entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot Nos. 1 and 2
for P1,600,000.00.
Spouses Escalona confronted Belinda and explained that Reygan cannot validly sell the lots. However,
Belinda invoked the legitimacy of her contracts with Reygan. Aggrieved, Spouses Escalona filed on
September 5, 2005 a Complaint9 for annulment of documents with damages against Belinda and Reygan
before the Regional Trial Court. Spouses Escalona averred that they never transferred Lot No. 2 to a third
person, but Reygan fraudulently sold the lot to Belinda. Also, Hilaria did not consent to the waiver of
rights over Lot No. 1 and that such transaction was not meant to convey ownership to Reygan. Moreover,
Spouses Escalona referred the controversy to the barangay on August 5, 2005 where they informed
Belinda that Reygan had no authority to sell Lot Nos. 1 and 2, but she still pushed through with the sale.
B. ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property without the wife’s consent is void.
C. RULING: YES
Spouses Escalona were married on November 14, 1960, or during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Article 119 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree
upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any
other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains x x x shall govern the property relations between husband

25
and wife." The default property relations of Spouses Escalona is the conjugal partnership of gains absent
any showing that they agreed on a particular regime.
The alienation of Lot No. 1 is void under Article 124 of the Family Code because it was made without
Hilaria's consent. However, the action to nullify the transaction is not imprescriptible under Article 1410
of the Civil Code.
Significantly, any alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property concluded after the eftectivity of
the Family Code requires the other spouse's written consent or a court order allowing the transaction,
otherwise, the disposition is void. This is because before the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the
interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a
legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in the
community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net
remainder resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the
right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the disso1ution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined
that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the
spouses or their respective heirs. Apropos is Article 124 of the Family Code, thus:
Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to, participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Family Code has retroactive effect to existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested
rights. Articles 105, 254, 255, and 256 of the Family Code are clear on these matters, to wit:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter
shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established
between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 255.

26
TOPIC: CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
13. STRONG FORT WAREHOUSING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. REMEDIOS T. BANTA,
respondent.
G.R. Nos. 222369 and 222502, November 16, 2020, Second Division, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: The validity of real estate mortgage contracts is the core issue in this
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision dated May 25, 2015 in
CA-G.R. CV Nos. 99511 and 100241.

A. FACTS:
Antonio Banta (Antonio), married to Remedios Banta (Remedios), formed Metro Isuzu Corporation
(MIC) and obtained series of loans from Westmont Bank in the name of MIC. The loans were evidenced
by several promissory notes signed by Antonio and Remedios. On November 23, 1995, Antonio executed
a deed of Real Estate Mortgage (REM), covering several of their conjugal properties, to secure a loan of
P25 million from Westmont Bank. On February 6, 1997, Antonio and Westmont Bank amended the REM
to increase the loan to P36 million.
On October 27, 1998, Remedios filed a complaint with the RTC to nullify the REM and the amendment
to the REM, including the various promissory notes and credit agreements that were executed by Antonio
and Westmont Bank. Remedios alleged that her signatures on the loan documents were forged. She did
not sign these documents as she and Antonio had been separated since 1991. In its answer to the
complaint, Westmont Bank invoked the principle of mortgagee in good faith and insisted that the loan
documents are genuine.
B. ISSUE:
Whether or not the Real Estate Mortgage executed covering the conjugal property of the spouses is valid.
C. RULING:
To be sure, there is no law imposing an obligation upon Remedios to file an action in court to protect her
interest in the conjugal properties because her interest is already protected and reserved for her by law as
a conjugal partner. On the contrary, it is Westmont Bank that failed to observe the required level of
caution in ascertaining the identity of the mortgagor and the genuineness of her signature. We note that
the bank approved the REMs without conducting a credit investigation on Remedios. It did not also take
steps to ascertain if the woman introduced by Antonio as his wife was actually Remedios. Accordingly,
Westmont Bank must bear the consequences of its negligence.

27
Equally baseless is Strong Fort's argument that the subject deeds of mortgage should remain valid with
respect to the conjugal properties that belong to Antonio. Antonio and Remedios were married on April 5,
1975, or before the Family Code took effect in 1988. Hence, the applicable law is the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article (Art.) 160 of the Civil Code provides that "[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife." The subject deeds of mortgage were executed in various years beginning 1995, or after the
effectivity of the Family Code. Any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the
effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Art. 124, which states:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property by one spouse must be consented to, by the other;
otherwise, it is void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the
conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate,
and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the
liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder resulting from the
liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. "Thus, the right of the husband or wife to
one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of
conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective
heirs." Consequently, even on the assumption that Antonio mortgaged only his portion of the conjugal
partnership, the mortgage is still theoretically void because his right to one-half of the conjugal assets
does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Notably, when Antonio executed the
assailed deeds of mortgage in 1995, 1997, and 2000, his marriage with Remedios was still existing and
the conjugal partnership was not yet dissolved. As such, it could not be determined yet which of the
conjugal assets belong to Antonio that he can validly mortgage.

28
TOPIC: COMPULSORY HEIRS
14. SYLVIA R. RIVERA, complainant, vs. ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, respondent
G.R. No. A.C. No. 12724, July 28, 2020, First Division, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: It is imperative that all lawyers live by the law. Any lawyer who engages
in deceitful conduct deserves administrative sanctions. One such instance is present in this complaint for
disbarment against a lawyer who exhibited dishonesty in feigning that he did not represent a client
resulting in violations of the rules on notarial practice.

A. FACTS:
Sylvia Rivera, the surviving spouse of the late Teofilo Rivera, and Nicasio Rivera, Teofilo's son from
another woman, filed a civil case for annulment of documents, cancellation of title and damages against
Felipe Pecache and the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) docketed
as Civil Case No. 1470. The controversy is over a land registered in Teofilo's name under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT217758. However, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Immediately, Sylvia and Nicasio elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 53694. The CA affirmed the RTC's findings. Aggrieved, Sylvia and Nicasio sought assistance from
Atty. Bayani Dalangin who prepared a motion for reconsideration. In due course, the CA granted the
motion and ruled in favor of Sylvia and Nicasio. Upon finality of the decision, Atty. Dalangin filed a
motion for execution of judgment and then a motion to clarify writ of execution.
Later, Sylvia discovered that Nicasio and his wife Emily de Luna executed on June 14, 2009 an Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication with Sale involving Teofilo's property. The land was sold for P100,000.00 to
Spouses James Martin and Mary Ann Wy, who were later issued TCT No. N-47751 in their names.
Aggrieved, Sylvia charged Nicasio and Emily of estafa through falsification. 4 Thereafter, Sylvia wrote to
Spouses Wy and expressed her intention to recover the property by tendering payment of P100,000.00
and consigning the amount in court in case of refusal.
Meantime, Sylvia filed a complaint for the annulment of the affidavit of self-adjudication with sale
against Spouses Wy, Nicasio and Emily and the cancellation of TCT No. N-47751 before the RTC.
Likewise, Sylvia consigned the P100,000.00 in court. In their answer, the Spouses Wy attached a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated May 28, 2009 with a consideration of P4,000,000.00 and notarized by Atty.
Dalangin. However, Sylvia claimed that the deed was antedated to prevent the consignment. Moreover,
Atty. Dalangin was aware that Sylvia has an interest over the property of her late husband.

29
On the issue of the execution of Deed of Sale dated May 28, 2009, it was admitted that respondent
prepared and notarized the said Deed for Four Million Pesos (PHP4,000,000.00) in favor of Spouses Wy,
signed solely by vendor Narciso it being his inheritance. This by itself is anomalous, dishonest and done
in bad faith intended to prejudice the rights of the complainant. First, in the Civil Case where he became
counsel for plaintiffs, it was alleged therein that the heirs of Teofilo are the surviving spouse, herein
complainant and Narciso, his son by another woman. Having knowledge of this fact, he should not have
proceeded with the said transaction with only one of the plaintiffs executing the sale without the
participation of his other client, to her great loss. Art. 998 of the Civil Code provides that if a widow or
widower survives with illegitimate children, such widow or widower shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance, and the illegitimate children or descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to the other
half. Second, there has to be a settlement of estate and partition of the properties of the deceased so that
the proper estate tax be paid first before the heirs to whom the property is adjudicated could legally sell
their respective portions. Sad to say that these were not done by the respondent who, as counsel should
have properly advised his client.
B. ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent disregarded the rules on succession that the widow is a compulsory heir of
the decedent.
C. RULING: YES
Here, Atty. Dalangin exhibited dishonesty in feigning that he did not represent Sylvia. Foremost the
caption in Civil Case No. 1470 and CA-G.R. CV No. 53694 is entitled "Sylvia Reyes Rivera & Nicasio
Rivera v. Felipe Pecache and the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija." Atty. Dalangin even moved for
execution of judgment with preliminary words "Plaintiffs, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully
states. " The motion to clarify writ of execution that Atty. Dalangin filed was similarly worded. Verily,
there is no way Atty. Dalangin could forget that Sylvia is his client. The theory that he counseled only
Nicasio and Emily can hardly be given credit.
Likewise, Atty. Dalangin cannot deny that Sylvia is Teofilo's wife or that she has an interest in the
disputed land. As such, Atty. Dalangin should have been circumspect in notarizing the deed of absolute
sale over Teofilo's property knowing that a legal heir was left out. The transaction disregarded the rules on
succession that the widow is a compulsory heir of the decedent. Corollarily, Atty. Dalangin should have
refused the notarization of the deed.
However, there is no proof that Atty. Dalangin antedated the deed of absolute sale. Suffice it to say that a
notarial register enjoys the presumption of regularity absent contrary evidence. In this case, he presented a
page from the notarial register showing that the deed was executed on May 28, 2009 or before the
affidavit of self-adjudication dated June 14, 2009. Quite the contrary, Sylvia failed to substantiate such
accusation. On this point, we reiterate that the quantum of proof in administrative complaints against
lawyers is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden rests upon the complainant. The bare allegations
of misconduct are insufficient to support a case for disbarment.

30
TOPIC: DISALLOWANCE OF A WILL
15. IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF AIDA A. BAMBAO, LINDA A.
KUCSKAR, petitioner, vs. COSME B. SEKITO, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 237449, December 2, 2020, Second Division, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: The allowance of a foreigner's will executed abroad is the main issue in
this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals'
(CA) Decision dated August 31, 2017 in CAG.R. CV No. 104100.

A. FACTS:
On October 28, 1999, Aida A. Bambao (Aida), a naturalized American citizen, executed a Last Will and
Testament (will) in California where she nominated her cousin, Cosme B. Sekito, Jr. (Cosme), as a special
independent executor over her assets located in the Philippines.
On February 5, 2000, Aida died a widow in her residence at Long Beach, California. On March 27, 2000,
Cosme filed a Petition for the Allowance of Will/Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem (allowance of the
will), before the RTC-Pasig. Cosme prayed that he be appointed as the Special Administrator of Aida's
estate pending the issuance of letters testamentary, and as guardian ad litem of Aida's adopted minor
child, Elsa Bambao (Elsa). Meanwhile, Linda A. Kucskar (Linda), the decedent's sister, and one of the
heirs named in the will, opposed the petition and claimed that she is the one defraying all of Elsa's
expenses. Linda added that Aida left a real estate property in Calbayog City which was excluded in the
petition.
At the trial, Cosme presented authenticated copies of Aida's will as well as her Revocable Living Trust
(living trust). The parties stipulated that these documents are faithful reproductions of the original. In due
course, the RTC appointed Cosme as special administrator of Aida's estate, but designated Cosme and
Linda as Elsa's co-guardians. Thereafter, the petition for allowance of the will was submitted for
resolution. On August 4, 2011, the RTC granted the petition.
Dissatisfied, Linda sought for a reconsideration. On the other hand, Cosme moved to disinherit Linda. On
November 10, 2014, the RTC denied both motions. The RTC held that Linda is estopped from contesting
the due execution and allowance of the will because she repeatedly mentioned in her pleadings that she
had no opposition with its approval. The RTC likewise explained that there is no reason to disinherit
Linda, but warned that her share may be revoked should she insist on contesting the will.
Hence, this recourse. Linda argues that Aida's will should not have been considered for probate. The
foreign law governing the formalities of the will was not alleged and proven. The will also failed to

31
conform with Philippine laws. Specifically, the will was not acknowledged before a notary public, the
witnesses did not sign on each and every page, there were only two witnesses, and the attestation clause
omitted the total number of pages.
B. ISSUE:
Whether or not the will of Aida should be disallowed.
C. RULING: YES
Philippine laws require that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it has been proved
and allowed. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad. A foreign will
can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article (Art.) 816 of the Civil Code is instructive, viz:
ART. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed
in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Here, it is undisputed that Aida is a naturalized American citizen and that she executed the will in
California, United States of America where she was residing at the time of her death. As such, the
Philippine courts must examine the formalities of Aida's will in accordance with California law. Yet, it is
settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in this jurisdiction, and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be properly pleaded and proved. Under the
Rules of Court, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by (1)
an official publication thereof, or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such
official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of
the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case tray be, and must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer.
We have scoured the records and found no copy of the pertinent California law presented as evidence
pursuant to the requirements of the rules. In this circumstance, the doctrine of "processual presumption"
comes into play, thus:
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the
burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this cast,
petitioners failed to discharge. The Court's ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int'l. v. NLRC illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor
Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g., specific causes for termination,
termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply
to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to
be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a
foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus,
the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption
comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in
determining the issues presented before us. (Emphasis in the original.)
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be
alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a
copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court[.] x x x; (Emphases supplied.)

Hence, this Court applies Philippine laws in determining whether the will should have been considered
for probate. Our laws define a will as an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities
prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his
death. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.

32
A will may either be holographic or notarial. A person may execute a holographic will which must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and
may be made in, or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. In contrast, a notarial will must
comply with solemnities including attestation, subscription and acknowledgment. The attestation refers to
the act of three or more witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the will before them, and to
the manner of its execution. The acknowledgment is the act of the one who executed the will in going to a
competent officer and declaring that the will is [his/her] act or deed. The subscribing or attesting
witnesses are likewise required to acknowledge the will before the notary public. These requirements are
indispensable for the validity of the will.
Obviously, Aida's will cannot pass as holographic because it is not entirely in her handwriting. At most,
the will may be classified as a notarial will. However, an examination of the will reveals that only two
witnesses attested its execution. The witnesses did not sign on each and every page of the will. The
attestation clause failed to state the total number of pages. Worse, Aida and the witnesses did not
acknowledge the will before a notary public. It bears emphasis that the CA adopted the substantial
compliance rule in allowing the will despite the defects in its attestation clause.
Lastly, Linda's failure to object at the onset of the probate proceedings does not relieve the proponent of
the will from establishing that it complied with the legal formalities. Estoppel is not applicable in probate
proceedings because they involve public interest. Otherwise, the truth as to the circumstances surrounding
the execution of a testament may not be ascertained which is inimical to public policy.
In sum, Aida's will should have been disallowed because it failed to comply with the legal formalities. 37
It is regrettable that this case has dragged on and up to this Court unnecessarily only for Us to come to the
conclusion that the foreign law was not alleged and proven, and that the Will does not comply with
Philippine laws.

TOPIC: PACTO DE RETRO SALE

16. SPOUSES ADOLFO B. VELARDE AND ANTONINA T. VELARDE, SPOUSES ROMULO B.
VELARDE AND JEAN T. VELARDE, BELLA B. VELARDE, BENEDICTO B. VELARDE,
ISABELLE V. DIAZ, AND CARMELITA B. VELARDE, PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF
CONCEPCION CANDARI, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 190057, October 17, 2022, Second Division, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court (Rules), assailing the Decision4 dated October 30, 2008 and the
Resolution5 dated September 29, 2009 of the Court of Appeals-Cebu City (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
72998.

A. FACTS:
In a notarized Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase dated April 20, 1978, respondent Concepcion
Candari (Concepcion) sold seven parcels of land located in Aklan to Isagani with the right to repurchase
within five years. Concepcion failed to redeem the lots. Thus, in a notarized Deed of Quitclaim and
Waiver of Rights dated February 11, 1986, Concepcion relinquished absolute ownership of the lots in
favor of Isagani and petitioners. Petitioners averred that after Isagani's death on February 22, 1987,
Concepcion began to represent herself as the owner of the parcels of land by instituting tenants on
portions of the vast lands, collecting rentals, and appropriating the lands' produce. Their demand upon
Concepcion to desist from usurping their proprietary rights fell on deaf ears, prompting them to file a
complaint for quieting of title and damages. Concepcion, on the other hand, denied having sold or
relinquished ownership and possession of the properties to Isagani or petitioners. She claimed that Isagani
was merely her lessee, to whom she entrusted the TDs of all her properties for safekeeping and payment
of realty taxes.18 Hence, she was surprised when she learned about petitioners' claims.
B. ISSUE:
Whether the action for quieting of title should prosper.
C. RULING:
Petitioners' complaint may have been captioned as quieting of title, but an assiduous examination of
petitioners' averments indubitably show that the remedy sought constitutes an accion reivindicatoria.

33
Here, petitioners' cause of action is grounded upon their claims of ownership, which they argue to have
been clouded by Concepcion's exercise of proprietary rights — instituting tenants and collecting rentals
and products. What they perceive as clouds over their title were Concepcion's intrusive acts of dominion
over the properties.
In Titong v. Court of Appeals,39 we emphatically ruled that physical intrusion is not a ground for quieting
of title. With an allegation of a violation (physical intrusion) of a right (ownership), petitioners clearly do
not seek a declaratory relief or mere removal of cloud over their title. Ultimately, they seek to recover full
possession of the properties as an element of their ownership, which was disturbed by Concepcion's
physical intrusion. Thus, petitioners' claims and arguments clearly speak of an accion reivindicatoria — a
suit to recover full possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership.
Article 1607 of the NCC states: ART. 1607. In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the
vendee by virtue of the failure of the vendor to comply with the provisions of Article 1616 shall not be
recorded in the Registry of Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has been duly
heard. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the provision requires a judicial order before the consolidated title in a pacto de retro sale may be
registered in the Registry of Property. Such requirement was devised as a counter measure to the
prevalent practice of simulating pacto de retro sales only to circumvent usury laws or the prohibition
against pactum commissorium arrangements, i.e., the automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing
mortgaged or pledged in the event of non-payment of the principal obligation. Precisely, to that end, the
law requires courts to determine the true agreement between the parties or the genuineness of the
stipulations in a pacto de retro sale. It goes without saying then that, without such judicial determination,
it is premature to declare the real intentions of the parties, especially so to conclude that fraud attended
the execution of a pacto de retro sale.
Verily, records show that the Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase and the Deed of Quitclaim and
Waiver of Rights, wherein Concepcion acknowledged her failure to redeem, as well as Isagani's and
petitioners' ownership and possession of the properties, were duly notarized documents. Notably,
Concepcion alleged nothing against the true intention of the parties as stipulated in the pacto de retro sale.
Instead, she denies the very existence of the deeds on the ground of fraud. But her claim of fraud starkly
lacks specificity and proof.
Considering Concepcion's failure to impugn the conveyance under the pacto de retro sale, the case
presents no more basis to invalidate the OCTs issued to petitioners. "The essence of a pacto de retro sale
is that title and ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject [only]
to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the stipulated period." Once the
vendor a retro fails to redeem the property within the agreed period, absolute ownership is vested upon
the vendee a retro by operation of law. Here, as agreed upon under the Deed of Sale with Right of
Repurchase, Concepcion had five years or until 1983 to repurchase the properties, but as admitted in the
quitclaim and waiver of rights, she failed to do so. Without anything more required from both parties,
thus, irrevocable title to the properties were automatically transferred to Isagani in 1983 since the
resolutory condition was not fulfilled.
It is of no moment that the Deed of Quitclaim and Waiver of Rights was executed only after more than
two years from the lapse of the redemption period, and in favor of petitioners who are not vendees a
retro. We stress, by the very nature of a pacto de retro sale, ownership is automatically vested upon the
vendee a retro by operation of law when the vendor a retro failed to exercise the right to redeem the
properties. Inevitably, the vendor a retro no longer owns the property sold at that point. Thus, subsequent
conveyance of the unredeemed properties through quitclaim and waiver of rights was, improper,
unnecessary, and a mere surplusage.

34
TOPIC: SIMULATION OF A CONTRACT MAY BE ABSOLUTE OR RELATIVE
17. FELIX CHINGKOE AND ROSITA CHINGKOE, PETITIONERS, VS. FAUSTINO
CHINGKOE AND GLORIA CHINGKOE, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 244076, March 16, 2022, Third Division, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision1 dated April 30, 2018 in CA-G.R. CV No. 106434,
which reversed the Decision2 dated May 12, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

A. FACTS:
Faustino Chingkoe (Faustino) and his wife, Gloria Chingkoe (Gloria), were the registered owners of a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 8283. Faustino alleged that sometime in 1990, he allowed his brother,
Felix Chingkoe (Felix), to occupy the subject property. Upon the request of Tan Po Chu, their mother,
Faustino signed an undated Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of Felix. Tan Po Chu assured
Faustino that she will keep the undated Deed of Sale because she just wanted to appease Felix who was
then becoming an alcoholic.
On the other hand, Felix averred that he had been in possession of the subject property since 1989. After
five years of occupying the subject property or on October 10, 1994, Felix purchased it from Faustino.
Both parties then signed the Deed of Sale before a notary public, Atty. Reynaldo Z. Calabio (Atty.
Calabio). Despite repeated demands, Faustino refused to surrender the Owner's Duplicate of TCT No.
8283 which prevented Felix from having it transferred to his name. Felix later discovered that Faustino
had mortgaged the subject property to RCBC. This discovery prompted Felix to file a complaint for
specific performance with damages to compel Faustino to turn over the TCT, and facilitate its transfer
pursuant to the Deed of Sale.
B. ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Sale between Faustino and Felix is valid.
C. RULING: YES.
Settled is the rule that notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity which can be overturned
only by clear and convincing evidence. Being duly notarized, the Deed of Sale carries with it the

35
presumption of regularity, authenticity, and due execution. "It has been the consistent rule that without
clear, convincing, and more than preponderant evidence to controvert the presumption of regularity, the
evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with respect to its execution, as well as the
statements and the authenticity of the signatures thereon, stand."
We emphasize that the evaluation of the witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the
trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. Too, it is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can
testify only on the facts that she/he knows of her/his own personal knowledge, i.e., those which are
derived from her/his own perception. A witness may not testify on what she/he merely learned, read, or
heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the
truth of what she/he has learned, read, or heard.
In contrast, there is ample evidence to prove the validity of the Deed of Sale and the parties' intention in
the execution of the contract. The rule is that one who signs a contract is presumed to know its contents,
especially if the person who signed has caused the preparation of the document. It is, thus, reasonable to
conclude that Faustino knew the contents of the Deed of Sale which was executed with legal formalities.
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the parties
do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true agreement.
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not
prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.
The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or
intended to produce a legal effect or alter the parties' juridical situation. However, a reading of Faustino's
testimony clearly shows that he fully intended to be bound by the Deed of Sale.
Failure to pay consideration is different from lack of consideration; actual payment of the obligation is not
one of the three (3) essential requisites of a valid contract.26 In other words, non-payment of an
obligation does not render a contract void, in which case, the remedy of the injured party is simply
demand fulfillment, or rescission of the contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code.
Given that Faustino failed to overturn the presumption of regularity in favor of the Deed of Sale, the
attestation of payment in it sufficiently proves that Felix has fully paid the purchase price. Invariably,
Faustino cannot now be allowed to disavow the contractual effects of the notarized deed. It is true that
parol evidence may be admitted to challenge the contents of an agreement "where a mistake or
imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the
validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings." However, evidence must be clear and
convincing and of sufficient credibility as to overturn the written agreement. The flimsy protestations of
Faustino are not substantiated by any compelling evidence. As borne out by the notarized deed, a
perfected contract of sale was forged between the parties, and Faustino received in full the payment of
P3,130,000.00 from Felix for the sale of the subject property. Faustino even caused the preparation of the
Deed and if its terms were not in consonance with his expectations, he could have easily insisted on the
provisions he wanted.

36
TOPIC: NOTICE OF REDEMPTION
18. HERMELINA RAMA AND BABY RAMA LAURON, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES
MEDARDO NOGRA AND PURITA NOGRA AND SPOUSES RICARDO RAMA AND MARILES
RAMA, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 219556, September 14, 2021, First Division, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court questions the Decision dated January 26, 2015 and Resolution dated June 10, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 04327, which set aside the Decision4 dated October 25, 2011
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-33782.

A. FACTS:
Ricardo sold his one-fourth undivided share for ₱35,000.00, payable in installments, to respondents
Spouses Medardo and Purita Nogra (Spouses Nogra). Upon full payment, Ricardo and Spouses Nogra
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 13, 2001. Petitioners claimed that they had no knowledge of
this sale. It was only when they sought the assistance of the barangay, through conciliation proceedings
conducted on July 25, 2007 and September 9, 2007, that Ricardo and Spouses Nogra confirmed the sale.
Hermelina offered to redeem the property despite respondents' refusal to give a copy of the Deed of
Absolute Sale and the details about it. The offer to redeem was rejected. Few days alter the second day of
the barangay proceedings, Spouses Nogra entered into the property and had it surveyed for partition. This
prompted petitioners to confront Ricardo once again on September 26, 2007, and there Ricardo gave them
a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Petitioners then filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale,
Redemption, and Other Reliefs before the RTC. On October 26, 2007, petitioners consigned the full
redemption price.
RTC Ruling: In a Decision dated October 25, 2011, the RTC ruled that Hermelina was properly notified
of Ricardo's sale for purposes of redemption under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code only on
September 26, 2007, when Ricardo gave her a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale. The RTC emphasized
that Article 1623 requires that the notice must be in writing and given by the vendor. Hence, the running
of the 30-day period of redemption was not triggered by Hermelina's knowledge of the sale obtained

37
during the barangay conciliation. Also, the RTC ruled that the postal registry return slip, without the letter
itself, was insufficient to prove that Ricardo notified Hermelina of the sale in 1992.
CA Ruling: Citing the cases of Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Spouses Si v. Court of
Appeals, and Aguilar v. Aguilar, the CA granted the appeal in its Decision dated January 26, 2015.
Specifically, while the CA agreed with the RTC that the postal registry return slip was not sufficient to
prove that Hermelina received a written notice of sale in 1992, the appellate court ruled that the required
written notice under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code may be dispensed with due to circumstances that
have given Hermelina actual knowledge of the sale of Ricardo's share. For one, during
the barangay conciliation on July 25, 2007, Ricardo had already admitted to Hermelina that he sold his
share to Spouses Nogra. The CA also considered Hermelina's active involvement in the ejectment case
against Lucina to have given her sufficient information on the conveyances made by her co-owners. Thus,
the 30-day period of redemption under Article 1623 should be reckoned sometime between September 10,
1992, when Ricardo made the provisional sale, and July 25, 2007, when the parties stood before
the barangay.
B. ISSUE:
Whether Hermelina validly exercised her redemption right by the filing of the complaint before the RTC
on October 16, 2007.
C. RULING: YES.
As earlier adverted to, the focal point of the controversy is the 30-day written notice requirement under
Article 1623 of the New Civil Code, which states:
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days
from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The Court has been consistent in ruling that the required written notice by the seller is mandatory and
indispensable for the 30-day redemption period to commence. In the oft-cited case of De Conejero v.
Court of Appeals, the Court explained:
With regard to the written notice, we agree with petitioners that such notice is indispensable, and that, in
view of the terms in which Article 1623 of the Philippine Civil Code is couched, mere knowledge of the
sale, acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner, does not satisfy the statute. The written notice
was obviously exacted by the Code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and
to quiet any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. The statute not having provided for any
alternative, the method of notification prescribed remains exclusive.
Justice Edgardo Paras, referring to the origins of the requirement, would explain in his commentaries on
the New Civil Code that despite actual knowledge, the person having the right to redeem is STILL
entitled to the written notice. Both the letter and the spirit of the New Civil Code argue against any
attempt to widen the scope of the "written notice" by including therein any other kind of notice such as an
oral one, or by registration. If the intent of the law has been to include verbal notice or any other means of
information as sufficient to give the effect of this notice, there would have been no necessity or reason to
specify in the article that said notice be in writing, for under the old law, a verbal notice or mere
information was already deemed sufficient.
The peculiar circumstances contemplated are those that gave the co-owners sufficient knowledge of the
sale and its particulars so that they can properly exercise their redemption right. On this score, we
emphasize the rationale behind the mandatory written notice, i.e., "to remove all uncertainties as to the
sale, its terms, and its validity, and to quiet any doubts that the alienation is not definitive." Thus, mere
knowledge of the fact of sale is insufficient to serve the purpose of the law. Essential information on the
terms or particulars of the sale, such as the actual purchase price paid, is necessary for the redemptioners
to properly exercise their right of legal redemption. To be sure, it would be senseless to compel co-owners
to exercise their redemption right when they are ignorant of the terms or status of the sale.
Moreover, actual knowledge of the sale and its particulars would likewise not suffice to disregard the
explicit requirement of written notice under the law. Such actual knowledge must, be coupled with laches
on the part of the redemptioner. Laches has been defined as "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier." It is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time,46 but with the inequity caused by the
relief-seeker's inaction.

38
In sum, the explicit requirement of written notice may only be dispensed with upon a showing that the co-
owners already had sufficient knowledge of the sale and they were guilty of laches in the exercise of their
redemption right. Absent these factors, the strict letter of the law must apply – the written notice from the
seller remains to be an indispensable requirement to commence the running of the 30-day redemption
period.

TOPIC: COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

19. CITY GOVERNMENT OF TACLOBAN, represented by the City Mayor, HON. ALFRED S.
ROMUALDEZ , petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Tacloban
City, LUDY C. MARMITA, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City, ESTEBAN
B. SACRAMENTO and THE HEIRS OF SALVACION SIONY L. SACRAMENTO, respondents.
G.R. No. 221554, February 3, 2021, Second Division, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: The doctrine of res judicata requires that stability be accorded to
judgments lest there would be endless controversies. The relitigation of issues already settled burdens the
courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy that
could be devoted to worthier causes. 1 We apply this policy in this Petition for Review on Certiorari 2
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals-Cebu City's (CA) Decision 3 dated
April 30, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No. 07675.

A. FACTS:
Spouses Esteban R. Sacramento and Salvacion Siony L. Sacramento (Spouses Sacramento) owned
parcels of land situated in Barangay Sto. Niño, Tacloban City which includes Lot No. 4144. The City
Government of Tacloban, with authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod, filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for eminent domain over a portion of Lot No. 4144 for use as access road
to the city's dumpsite.
On September 8, 2008, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement with the following terms and
conditions.
On September 18, 2008, the RTC, presided by Judge Rogelio C. Sescon (Judge Sescon) approved the
Compromise Agreement and directed the parties to comply with its terms and conditions. On September
24, 2008, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the agreement through Resolution No. 2008-10-530
stating: "RESOLVE, as it is hereby resolved, to confirm/ratify the Compromise Agreement entered into

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by the Parties in Civil Case No. 2006-01-04 and duly approved by Hon. Rogelio C. Sescon, Presiding
Judge, RTC Branch 9, Tacloban City dated September 18, 2008 [.]"On November 19, 2008, however, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod withdrew its ratification and issued Resolution No. 2008-10-581 entitled
"RESOLUTION WITHDRAWING/RESCINDING AND/OR REPEALING AND DECLARING AS
NULL AND VOID RESOLUTION NO. 2008-10-530 PASSED AND APPROVED BY THIS
HONORABLE BODY ON SEPTEMBER 24, 2008."
Meantime, Spouses Sacramento moved for the enforcement of the compromise agreement. On March 16,
2009, the RTC denied 10 the motion for execution in view of the withdrawal of the city council's
ratification of the compromise agreement. Spouses Sacramento filed a motion for reconsideration. On
June 4, 2009, the RTC granted the motion, and ordered the enforcement of the compromise agreement.
On July 1, 2009, a Writ of Execution was issued. Unsuccessful at a reconsideration, the City Government
of Tacloban elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
04526. The City Government of Tacloban argued that public funds are not subject to levy and execution,
and that the judgment based on a compromise agreement cannot be enforced without a valid ratification
from the city council.
B. ISSUE:
Whether there is res judicata based on the compromise agreement.
C. RULING: YES
It bears emphasis that a compromise agreement is in the nature of both a contract and a judgment on the
merits. As a contract, the compromise agreement can only be avoided on grounds of illegality, lack of
consent, fraud or duress. In this case, Spouses Sacramento and the City Government of Tacloban freely
and voluntarily entered into a compromise agreement. The terms and conditions of the agreement are
likewise clear. Moreover, the RTC approved the agreement and the Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified it.
The parties knew exactly the rights and duties they assumed. The City Government of Tacloban did not
even file any action or motion to set aside the agreement. It is settled that a compromise agreement, once
stamped with judicial imprimatur, becomes more than a mere contract and acquires the force and effect of
a judgment that is immediately final and executory. 30 As such, the City Government of Tacloban cannot,
later, relieve itself of liability simply because the city council changed its position. To be sure, the RTC
issued a writ of execution on July 1, 2009, to enforce the agreement as a matter of course. The validity of
the writ of execution was settled with finality in CA-G.R. SP No. 04526.
Corollarily, the CA correctly applied the principle ofres judicata in dismissing the petition for certiorari in
CA-G.R. SP No. 07675. The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must
be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Apropos
is Section (Sec.) 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Based on the above-quoted provision, res judicata is applicable either under the concept of "bar by prior
judgment" under Sec. 47 (b), Rule 39; or "conclusiveness of judgment" under Sec. 47 (c), Rule 39. Case
law explained that if there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action in the two cases, then
res judicata, in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If, as between the two cases, only
identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of
judgment" applies.
We reiterate that nothing is more settled in law than the doctrine of immutability of judgments. Otherwise,
there would be no end to litigation and would set to naught the main role of courts of justice to assist in
the enforcement of the rule of law, and the settling of justiciable controversies with finality. 36 It is in the
interest of justice that the Court writes finis to this dispute.

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TOPIC: DONATION
20. ROWENA PATENIA-KINATAC-AN, ZOSIMA ROWELA PATENIADANGO, FE RUCHIT
PATENIA-ALVAREZ, FATIMA ROBERTA PATENIA-TRUPA, REY ANTHONY G. PATENIA
AND RICARTE ABSALON G. PATENIA , petitioners, vs. ENRIQUETA PATENIADECENA, EVA
PATENIA-MAGHUYOP, MA. YVETTE PATENIALAPINED ABO-ABO, GIL A. PATENIA, ELSA
PATENIA IOANNOU AND EDITHA PATENIA BARANOWSKI, respondents.
G.R. No. 238325, June 15, 2020, First Division, Lopez, J)
NATURE OF THE ACTION: The validity of a donation of an immovable property is the core issue in
this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals'
(CA) Decision dated June 30, 2017, in CAG.R. CV No. 04126, which affirmed the findings of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC).

A. FACTS:
Spouses Ramiro and Amada Patenia (Spouses Patenia) owned a 9,600- square meter (sq m) lot and
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-168688. After Spouses Patenia's death, their
children consisting of the petitioners discovered that TCT No. T-168688 has been cancelled by virtue of a
Deed of Donation dated January 18, 2002 that their parents supposedly executed in favor of the
respondents. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed an action against the respondents to annul the donation
before the RTC. The petitioners alleged that Spouses Patenia's signatures on the deed were forged and that
the donation impaired their legitimes. On the other hand, the respondents claimed their parents owned a
30,644-sq m parcel of land which includes the donated property. Ramiro, being the eldest child, was
entrusted by their parents to divide and distribute the land to his siblings. Accordingly, the deed of
donation was just part of the distribution of their share on the property.

41
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It held that the petitioners failed to present
preponderant evidence to establish forgery and inofficiousness of the donation.
Dissatisfied, the petitioners appealed to the CA docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 04126. They argued that the
donation is void because the notary public failed to require the parties to sign the notarial register. On
June 30, 2017, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and explained that the irregularity in the
notarization did not invalidate the donation.
The petitioners sought reconsideration; but was denied. Hence, this recourse. The petitioners maintained
that the donation impaired their legitimes and that the defective notarization renders the donation void.
B. ISSUE:
Whether the defective notarization would render the donation void.
C. RULING:
As a rule, contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the
essential requisites for their validity are present. When, however, the law requires that a contract be in
some form to be valid, that requirement is absolute and indispensable. Its non-observance renders the
contract void and of no effect. Here, what transpired between Spouses Patenia and the respondents was a
donation of an immovable property that requires strict compliance with Article 749 of the Civil Code, to
wit:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must be made in a
public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but
it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an
authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. (Emphasis supplied.)
Unlike ordinary contracts, which are perfected by the concurrence of the requisites of consent, object and
cause, solemn contracts like donations of immovable property are valid only when they comply with legal
formalities. Absent the solemnity requirements for validity, the mere intention of the parties and
concurrence to the agreement will not give rise to a contract. In Abellana v. Sps. Ponce, we ruled that an
oral donation of a real property is void and an action to declare its inexistence does not prescribe. Also, in
Sumipat v. Banga, the donation was patently void because the donees' acceptance is not manifested either
in the deed itself or in a separate document.
In Dept. of Education, Culture & Sports v. Del Rosario, we stated that a deed of donation acknowledged
before a notary public is a public document. The notary public shall certify that he knows the person
acknowledging the instrument and that such person is the same person who executed the instrument,
acknowledging that the instrument is his free act and deed. On the other hand, it is settled that a defective
notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument. Thus, a
defective notarization renders the donation of an immovable property invalid since the requirement that
such contract must appear in a public instrument is absent. In this case, the petitioners argued that the
donation is void because the notary public failed to require the parties therein to sign the notarial register.
However, we note that the prevailing law at the time of notarization was the Revised Administrative Code
which mandate a notary public to record in his notarial register the necessary information regarding the
instrument acknowledged before him.
There is nothing in the law that obligates the parties to a notarized document to sign the notarial register.
This requirement was subsequently included only in Section 3, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.
As explained in Miranda, Jr. v. Alvarez, Sr. and Gaddi v. Atty. Velasco, the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice provides that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the signatory to the
document is in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization, and personally known to
the notary public or otherwise identified through competent evidence of identity. At the time of
notarization, " the signatory shall sign or affix with a thumb or mark the notary public's notarial register."
The purpose of these requirements is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature
and to ascertain that the document is the signatory's free act and deed. If the signatory is not acting of his
or her own free will, a notary public is mandated to refuse to perform a notarial act.
The present deed of donation, however, was executed and acknowledged before the notary public on
January 18, 2002, when there is no rule yet that requires the parties to sign the notarial register.

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Indeed, the new rules cannot be given retroactive effect if they would work injustice or impair vested
rights. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals , we discussed the exceptions to the rule that procedural laws are
applicable to pending actions or proceedings, to wit:
x x x The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication
provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it to pending
proceedings would impair vested rights. Under appropriate circumstances, courts may deny
the retroactive application of procedural laws in the event that to do so would not be
feasible or would work injustice. Nor may procedural laws be applied retroactively to pending
actions if to do so would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of
the courts. (Emphasis ours.)
In sum, the deed of donation between Spouses Ramiro and Amada Patenia and the respondents is valid
and compliant with the solemnities in Article 749 of the Civil Code.

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