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Survival: Global Politics and

Strategy
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Why alliances endure or collapse

a
Stephen M. Walt
a
Professor of Political Science and Master of the Social
Science Collegiate Division , The University of Chicago , IL
Published online: 03 Mar 2008.
To cite this article: Stephen M. Walt (1997) Why alliances endure or collapse, Survival:
Global Politics and Strategy, 39:1, 156-179, DOI: 10.1080/00396339708442901
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Why Alliances Endure or Collapse
Stephen M. Walt
Introduction
The formation and cohesion of international alliances can have profound effects
on the security of individual states and help determine both the probability and
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likely outcome of war. Because the ability to attract and maintain allied support
can be a formidable asset, prudent leaders will pay close attention to the forces
that bring states together or drive them apart.
These issues are especially salient given the new strategic landscape. During
the Cold War, the clarity of the Soviet threat and the relatively static nature of
the global balance of power kept the main coalitions more or less fixed for over
four decades. The end of the Cold War has eliminated the original rationale
behind many of these arrangements (most notably NATO), leading to a lively
debate over their future prospects.1 For the most part, however, this debate has
not been informed by a sophisticated theoretical understanding of alliance
dynamics. This fact is partly because participants from the policy world are
usually unfamiliar with the theoretical scholarship on alliances, but also because
the recent theoretical literature has tended to overlook the question of why
alliances collapse or endure.2
This article seeks to narrow this gap by exploring two closely related
questions. First, why do alliances dissolve? What are the forces or events that
lead states to abandon security ties that they once welcomed? Second, why do
some alliances persist in the face of such strains? In particular, why do some
alliances survive even after their original rationale has evaporated?
In exploring these two questions, this article aims to provide an extensive
inventory of the mechanisms that will cause an alliance to dissolve or endure.
Accordingly, both 'rational' explanations for change and persistence, as well as
more 'irrational' factors, are considered. An alliance may collapse because it is
no longer in the interest of one or more members; in these circumstances, the
decision to end the alliance can be seen as a rational response to new conditions.
Alternatively, an alliance may collapse for essentially 'irrational' reasons -
domestic politics, personal pique or misperception, for example - even when,
with hindsight, there are ample reasons why it should have continued.
The same distinction applies to alliances that endure. An alliance may persist
despite drastic external changes because its members are still better off in the
Stephen M. Walt is Professor of Political Science and Master of the Social Science
Collegiate Division at the University of Chicago, IL. He is the author of The Origins of
Alliances and Revolution and War, and co-editor of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs.
Survival, vol. 39, no. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 156-79.
Why Alliances Endure or Collapse « 1 5 7
alliance than they would be outside it. On the other hand, it may survive even
after it has become something of a liability, because of domestic politics,
misperception or simple human error. Because political life usually combines
elements of rationality and irrationality, the analysis that follows considers both
sorts of explanation.
What is an Alliance?
An alliance is a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation
between two or more states. Although the precise arrangements embodied in
different alliances vary enormously, the defining feature of any alliance is a
commitment for mutual military support against some external actor(s) in some
specified set of circumstances. This concept includes both formal alliances -
where the commitment is enshrined in a written treaty - and informal, ad hoc
agreements based either on tacit understandings or some tangible form of
commitment, such as verbal assurances or joint military exercises. Including
both formal and informal alliances in this study makes sense because states may
provide considerable support to one another even without a formal treaty, and
because the presence of a formal agreement often says relatively little about the
actual degree of commitment.
The primary purpose of most alliances is to combine the members'
capabilities in a way that furthers their respective interests. The form of
collaboration and the nature of the commitment varies widely, however. An
alliance may be either offensive or defensive, for example, intended either to
provide the means for an attack on some third party or intended as a mutual
guarantee in the event that another state attacks one of the alliance members.
Alliances may also be symmetrical or asymmetrical, depending on whether the
members possess roughly equal capabilities and take on broadly identical
commitments to each other.3 An alliance may be a purely expedient arrangement
between states with very different regimes and political values - such as the
Second World War alliance of the United Kingdom, the United States and the
Soviet Union - or it may bring together states whose strategic interests and
ideological principles are similar and mutually reinforcing - as in NATO today.
Alliances also vary in their level of institutionalisation. Modern alliances are
more than a mechanical combination of independent national assets; they are
also social institutions that may involve extensive interactions between the
member-states. At one extreme, formal alliances such as NATO are highly
institutionalised, with elaborate decision-making procedures and an extensive
supporting bureaucracy. This sort of alliance inevitably produces a dense web of
élite contacts and subsidiary agreements, and it is likely to exert a more lasting
influence on the attitudes and behaviour of each member. At the other extreme
are largely ad hoc coalitions like the Axis alliance of 1939-45 or most inter-
Arab alliances, which were limited partnerships in which each member acted
relatively independently.
Third, alliances also differ in the functions that they perform. Most great-
power alliances have arisen in order to aggregate power: members pool their
resources to achieve some common, or at least compatible, ends. Yet such
158 • Stephen M. Walt
agreements inevitably allow members to influence each other's conduct, which

enables strong states to use the alliance to exercise a restraining influence over
allies and adversaries alike. Alliance commitments also impart a greater degree
of predictability in international affairs, and can facilitate conflict management
among member-states.4
Finally, alliances differ in important ways from other forms of security
cooperation. An agreement to reduce tensions between adversaries - for
example, via an arms-control agreement, a formalised process of détente or a set
of 'confidence-building' measures - is not an alliance, because it does not
involve a commitment to mutual defence. Thus, the Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks (START) Treaty or the 1972 Agreement on Prevention of Incidents at Sea

were not alliances, even though they involved cooperation on important security
issues.
Similarly, an alliance is not a collective-security agreement. A collective-
security arrangement is an inclusive institution: it commits the members to
oppose any act of aggression, even one committed by one of its members. By
contrast, alliances are exclusive institutions: they entail a commitment to support
the other members against states outside the community. Although members of
an alliance may also be part of a collective security organisation and may engage
in other forms of security cooperation, failure to keep these concepts distinct can
lead to misleading analyses and muddy policy-making.5
Why Do Alliances End?

There are several reasons why an existing alliance will erode or dissolve. This
article assumes that membership in an alliance entails some costs - for instance,
joining an alliance usually reduces a state's autonomy. Accordingly, states will
be reluctant to bear these costs if the alliance no longer serves a useful purpose.
What sorts of changes might lead states to rethink their alliance commitments?
Changing Perceptions of Threat

Alliances are most commonly regarded as a response to an external threat. The
level of threat is a function of relative power, geographic proximity, offensive
capabilities and perceived intentions; other things being equal, an increase in any
of these factors will raise the level of threat that a state poses to others. States
usually join forces in order to balance against the greatest threat(s) they face,
although revisionist states and especially weak states will sometimes 'band-
wagon' by allying with a strong or aggressive power.6
It follows that alliances will dissolve whenever there is a significant shift in
the level of threat that its members face. This sort of shift can occur for a number
of different reasons. The most obvious mechanism is a change in the balance of
power. An existing alliance is likely to dissolve if the states that posed the
original threat become much weaker, because the members of the alliance will
have less need for external support. This tendency explains why wartime
alliances usually dissolve once victory is won and forms the basis for the belief
that NATO will gradually dissolve now that the Soviet threat has evaporated.7
By the same logic, alliances are also likely to dissolve if one of its members
becomes significantly stronger, both because the rising power will have less
need for allied support and because the other members may begin to view it as
a threat to their security.
Second, an alliance will be prone to deteriorate if the members revise their
beliefs about other states' intentions. In particular, if an alliance's members
become convinced that their adversaries are not as bellicose as they once feared,
or if an alliance member becomes increasingly aggressive, then the alliance itself
is less likely to endure. In either case, the magnitude or identity of the main
threat to be countered has shifted, triggering a corresponding shift in alliance
relations.
These two elements of threat are often related: states whose power is
increasing often adopt more ambitious international objectives, thereby alarming
both their traditional adversaries and their current allies.8 A classic example of
this tendency is the erosion of Otto von Bismarck's alliance network and the
gradual formation of the anti-German Triple Entente between 1902 and 1907.
This shift was partly the response to the growth of German power, but it was also
driven by the growing conviction that Wilhelmine Germany harboured unusually
aggressive intentions.9
These same tendencies also explain why offensive alliances are generally
more fragile than defensive ones. Offensive alliances form in order to attack a
specific target; once the victim is defeated, the motivation for the partnership is
gone and quarrels over the division of the spoils are likely. Thus, Prussia's
alliance with Italy in 1866 lasted only a few weeks, and members of the 1912
Balkan League of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece fell upon each other within days
of their victory over Turkey in May 1913. Similarly, the infamous 1939
Molotov-von Ribbentrop Pact that divided Poland between Nazi Germany and
the Soviet Union proved to be short-lived, and delayed Adolf Hitler's eastward
advance for a mere two years.10
Third, even when the original threat is still present, an alliance may erode if
its members acquire other means to protect their interests. Here the need for
allies declines not because the external danger is gone, but because one or more
members have become more capable of meeting it on their own. Such a shift
may occur because the allies' capabilities are growing faster than those of their
rival(s), or because changes in the nature of military technology make it more
difficult for opponents to attack.11
During the Cold War, this logic led some experts to predict that the invention
of nuclear weapons would render great-power alliances obsolete, because states
with a robust nuclear deterrent would have less need for allies and because
nuclear deterrence could not be credibly extended to other countries.12 Although
this view was clearly exaggerated, the recurring fear that nuclear weapons might
'decouple' the United States from its European allies reveals that the problem
was taken seriously on both sides of the Atlantic.13 Those who now believe that
the United States should adopt a policy of 'strategic independence' base this
claim in part on the belief that nuclear weapons obviate the need for allies.14
Declining Credibility
Because alliances are formed primarily to increase their members' security,
anything that casts doubt on their ability to contribute to this goal will encourage
the members to re-evaluate their position. Even if the level of threat is
unchanged, an alliance will become more fragile if its members begin to doubt
that the existing arrangements are sufficient to guarantee their security.15 During
the Cold War, for example, US leaders continually worried that a single setback
might raise doubts about US credibility and lead its allies to move towards a
neutral or even a pro-Soviet position. Because US leaders feared that a minor
defeat could cause its own allies to lose heart, they were willing to commit
extraordinary resources to otherwise marginal areas.16
Doubts about the efficacy of an existing alliance may emerge for at least two
reasons. First, alliance members may become convinced that they lack the
material capabilities to deter or defeat their opponents. If additional resources
cannot be found, it may be safer to realign with the enemy or to adopt a neutral
position. Weak states are more likely to act this way than strong states are, and
this type of behaviour is probably most common during wartime, when the costs
of being on the losing side are more apparent. Thus, the 1793 First Coalition
against revolutionary France dissolved after a series of French victories in 1794-
95 had convinced Spain, Prussia and others that continued opposition was no
longer viable.17 Romania reluctantly aligned with Nazi Germany in 1940 when
it became clear it had no alternative, and subsequently switched to supporting the
Soviet Union once Hitler's defeat became inevitable. Arab opposition to the state
of Israel waned as each war ended with an Arab defeat, and Anwar Sadat's
decision to abandon Egypt's alliance with the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s in
favour of a partnership with the United States arose from his belief that the
Soviet Union could not provide the combination of military, economic and
diplomatic support he needed to regain the Sinai and to sustain Egypt's faltering
economy.11*
Second, an alliance may dissolve if its members begin to question whether
their partners are genuinely committed to providing assistance. Here the question
is one of will rather than capability, and such doubts are more likely to arise
when it is no longer obvious that the alliance is in every member's interest. This
problem will be more severe when the allies are geographically separate,
because a threat to one may not threaten the other; and when there is a large
asymmetry of power among the member-states. In the latter case, the weaker
members may suspect they are not very important to their more powerful
partners, and will fear being abandoned if they are attacked. Skilful aggressors
will take advantage of these tendencies by exaggerating their power and
portraying their aims as limited in order to raise the perceived cost of resistance
and to persuade potential opponents to leave individual victims to their fate.19
Taken together, these concerns help explain why US allies in Europe and Asia
are now experiencing renewed doubts about the credibility of the US commit-
ment. During the Cold War, both the United States and its Eurasian allies had a
clear and obvious interest in preventing war and containing Soviet expansion.
Now that the Soviet Union is gone, however, the motivation for an extensive US
Why Alliances Endure or Collapse • 161
commitment is not as apparent, no matter how often US leaders reiterate it.

Although the United States is still concerned with political developments
throughout Eurasia, the regional actors inevitably care more about these events
than Americans do. These disparities are also likely to grow over time, which
means that doubts about the US commitment will only increase.
Domestic Politics
The hypotheses just discussed all assume that states are essentially rational
actors making decisions in response to shifts in the external environment. An
alternative perspective explains alliance dissolution by focusing on political
processes within an existing alliance, and especially on political processes within

the member states, ^hese hypotheses fall into four main categories.
• Demographic and Social Trends. This category explains alliance dissolution

by focusing on long-term demographic or social trends. Specifically, if an
existing alliance is based to some degree on transnational links between the two
societies - such as a common ethnic or cultural background, shared historical
experiences and so on - then changes in the internal composition of either
society will dilute this unifying force. Similarly, if two states are united by
common historical origins, as was true for the British Commonwealth, for
example, these bonds will inevitably weaken with the passage of time.20 This
hypothesis underlies the claim that demographic and generational changes in the
US could undermine its traditional commitment to Europe and encourage a more
active involvement in Asia or Latin America.21 Such a perspective sees alliances
rooted in more than just narrow calculations of power and threat, but in per-
ceptions of a common background, values and heritage as well. If that is indeed
the case, then anything that dilutes this social 'glue' could be problematic.
• Domestic Competition. An existing alliance may be jeopardised if influential

élites decide that they can improve their internal positions by attacking the
alliance itself. This problem is more likely to arise when the benefits of the
alliance appear biased towards some members (thereby making it appear unfair)
or if the terms of the alliance involve measures that are seen as an affront to
national sovereignty. In these circumstances, curtailing or ending the alliance
may yield domestic political benefits that outweigh any strategic costs. Thus,
French President Charles de Gaulle reinforced his domestic position by
removing France from NATO's integrated military command in 1967, and left-
wing politicians in Wellington undermined the Australia-New Zealand-United
States (ANZUS) alliance in 1985-86 by declaring that US warships could not
enter New Zealand's ports unless they certified that they did not carry nuclear
weapons. Domestic pressures also led the Philippines to insist that the United
States withdraw from the Subie Bay naval and air base in 1992, despite its
considerable contribution to the local economy.
These three cases suggest that efforts to exploit domestic opposition will be
more common when ending the alliance involves modest strategic consequences.
France could afford to withdraw from NATO command structures in 1967
because the US commitment to the rest of Europe was a defacto guarantee of

French security. Similarly, the end of ANZUS and the withdrawal from Subie
Bay did not eliminate the US role in the Pacific, so these states continued to
enjoy the benefits of US protection, even after the earlier relationship had ended.
Nonetheless, these examples also confirm that a long-standing alliance commit-
ment can deteriorate even when the level of threat is largely unchanged, if it
comes to be seen as a domestic political liability.
• Regime Change. A third set of hypotheses focuses on the effects of regime

change. State interests are not fixed by nature, and different groups within a
given society may define these interests differently. If the composition of the
government alters - through legitimate or illegitimate means - then the
probability of realignment will increase. This effect will be least powerful when
the change is relatively minor (for example, when one set of leaders is replaced
via a legitimate election), but the impact is likely to increase when the leadership
alters because of a change in the basic nature of the regime. Not only are the new
leaders likely to prefer policies that differ sharply from those of their
predecessors, but they will probably feel little obligation to honour prior
commitments.
Not surprisingly, these effects are especially powerful in the aftermath of a
major revolution, and states that undergo a revolution are overwhelmingly likely
to make new alliance arrangements. Revolutionary France thus abandoned its
long-standing alliance with Austria; Bolshevik Russia signed a separate peace
with Germany and severed ties with the Anglo-French entente; the Chinese
Communists ended the Nationalists' close association with the United States and
allied with the Soviet Union (at least temporarily); and the revolutionary regimes
in Cuba (1959), Iran (1979) and Nicaragua (1979) quickly condemned the allies
of the old regime (most notably the US), and sought better relations with several
former adversaries. Similar actions also followed the American, Mexican,
Turkish, Angolan and Ethiopian revolutions.22
The explanation for this pattern is easy to discern. A movement dedicated to
overthrowing the regime is unlikely to view its present allies favourably, particu-
larly if these allies are helping the regime retain power. By the same token, the
regime's allies are unlikely to welcome its demise, if only because they cannot
be certain how its successors will behave. For these and other reasons, relations
between the new government and the regime's associates are likely to be
extremely suspicious, and existing alliance commitments are unlikely to survive
the transfer of power.
• Ideological Divisions. A final internal source of alliance dissolution is

ideological conflict. A trivial version of this hypothesis blames alliance
dissolution on the inevitable disagreements that arise between states espousing
different ideologies. Although a grave external threat can overcome ideological
antipathies temporarily (as it did during the Second World War, for example),
basic differences in values and objectives will soon drive the former allies apart
once the threat is gone.
A more interesting variation is the tendency for certain ideologies to promote

conflict among states that subscribe to similar beliefs. In particular, an ideology
that directs its adherents to form a single centralised movement is more likely to
be divisive than unifying. The reason is simple: when each regime's legitimacy
rests on ideological principles that prescribe obedience to a single central author-
ity, they will inevitably quarrel over who should occupy the leading position.
And when differences arise, as they inevitably will, the different factions will
regard their own views as entirely justified and the views of their opponents as
heretical. As the history of international communism and pan-Arabism both
reveal, centralised ideological movements are ironically prone to the worst sorts
of internal schisms. Paradoxically, although Marxism-Leninism and pan-

Arabism explicitly mandated that their member-states form a close and cohesive
movement, alliances among communist states or within the Arab world were
actually extremely fragile.23 Among other things, this argument suggests that
there is little danger of a meaningful alliance among today's Islamic states -
even if fundamentalist movements gain power in additional countries - because
such regimes are unlikely to share identical principles and will be prone to
quarrel over which version of Islam should be followed.24
Summary
Alliances deteriorate and dissolve for several reasons. The most obvious and
important cause is a change in the identity or nature of the threat that produced
the original association. If the threat declines, or if it is supplanted by a greater
one, then an alliance formed to counter the original threat is likely to change.
Alliances will also tend to erode if members acquire other means to protect
themselves, or if the members begin to question either the capacity or
willingness of their partners to fulfill their obligations. An existing alliance will
probably suffer if states redefine their interests as a result of a domestic political
upheaval, or if ideological principles are incompatible and the level of threat is
too small to override these differences.
The strength of these various tendencies - and thus the fragility of existing
alliance networks - will vary considerably from case to case. Alliances will tend
to be less robust in a multipolar world, because the major powers will possess
more options as their numbers increase, and because shifts in the distribution of
capabilities will be more frequent when there are more great powers in the
system. It will also be more difficult for each state to determine where the
greatest threat lies, and international alliances are likely to be more flexible and
fluid.
Domestic politics will become increasingly important as the number of
alliance options increases, if only because the increased range of choice
broadens the range of 'acceptable' public debate.25 Foreign-policy options that
were once regarded as heretical can now be openly considered; for example,
advocates of US isolationism are no longer regarded as irresponsible iconoclasts,
and the current debate over the future course of German foreign policy is wider
than at any time since the early 1950s.26 Debates such as these will be observed
by others and help shape their own calculations and discussions, thereby
reinforcing the fluidity that is inherent in multipolarity.
These trends are likely to be especially important for the US, whose
combination of capabilities and geographic separation grants it unprecedented
security and freedom of action.27 Thus, where bipolarity strongly disposed the
US to support a world-wide network of anti-Soviet alliances, the gradual re-
emergence of multipolarity will give Washington a great deal of latitude. How
that latitude is ultimately exercised will be shaped less by the structure of world
power and more by domestic political competition; similar strictures will apply
to other major powers as well. As a result, neither the history of the past 45 years
nor the public statements of contemporary national leaders offer a reliable guide
to the future, and prudence suggests that existing alliance commitments can no
longer be taken for granted.
The analysis thus far suggests that contemporary alliances will be subject to
increasing strains, and might lead us to expect most of them to lapse. Yet NATO
appears to be thriving, and other Cold War alliances remain intact, at least for
now. These facts demonstrate that alliances will sometimes endure even when
the original motivation for their creation has disappeared. So why and how does
an alliance persist, even when the prevailing strategic environment has been
radically transformed?
Why Do Alliances Persist?

Hegemonic Leadership
An obvious source of alliance durability is the exercise of hegemonic power by
a strong alliance leader. Alliance leaders can discourage dissolution by bearing
a disproportionate share of the costs, by offering material inducements to make
alignment more attractive, or by threatening to punish disloyal regimes. Athens
exercised this sort of leadership during the Peloponnesian Wars, Great Britain
used similar tactics with its own clients during its imperial heyday, and both the
US and the USSR used a variety of instruments (including the threat or use of
force) to keep their own allies in line. In extreme cases - such as Iran 1953,
Hungary 1956 or Czechoslovakia 1968 - an alliance leader may overthrow a
defecting regime in order to keep it within the fold.
This source of intra-alliance solidarity rests on two obvious prerequisites. The
alliance leader must be strongly committed to preserving the relationship and
willing to expend the effort needed to keep its allies from straying. In particular,
if changes in the external environment alter the leader's desire for allies, then
this source of solidarity will not be available. The alliance leader must also be
significantly stronger than its potentially disloyal allies, so that it is able to bear
the additional costs of enforcing compliance.
Several implications follow. First, hegemonic leadership is more likely in
bipolarity, because the asymmetry of power between leaders and clients will be
greater and because the bipolar rivalry gives the two leading states additional
incentives to keep their allies in line.28 Second, hegemonic leadership is most
likely when the alliance leader has extensive global interests and faces a serious
external threat, because this creates both a desire for allied support and an
incentive to acquire influence over other states. Third, hegemonic leadership is
most easily exercised against relatively weak clients, which means that this tactic
will be most effective for preserving alliance ties that are relatively less
valuable.29 Finally, hegemonic leadership is not a permanent solution to strong
centrifugal tendencies. Not only will major external changes affect the leader's
interests - and thus its willingness to pay a disproportionate share of the alliance
costs - but the additional burdens of alliance leadership will eventually erode the
asymmetry of power on which such leadership depends.30
Preserving Credibility
Alliances are more likely to persist if they have become symbols of credibility
or resolve. As discussed above, an alliance is more likely to dissolve if its
members begin to question their partners' reliability. To prevent this, a state with
many allies may be unwilling to abandon any of them, in case this action is
interpreted by its opponents (or by other allies) as a sign of deteriorating resolve.
Thus, even when a particular alliance is of little intrinsic value, its members may
retain it in order to avoid disturbing other commitments that they regard as more
important.
This factor played a central role throughout the Cold War, where concern for
the credibility of their commitments led US and Soviet policy-makers to defend
a number of marginal allies largely in order to convince others that they were
reliable patrons. Similar worries now explain the US reluctance to withdraw
troops from South Korea, even though the need for a direct US presence in the
country is far less than it once was. In particular, US policy-makers fear that
withdrawal would be regarded as a sign of diminished US interest in East Asian
security, thereby triggering a host of potentially destabilising shifts throughout
the region. In the same way, the reluctant US decision to intervene in Bosnia
appears to have been motivated less by concern for the Bosnians themselves than
by the fear that failure to act would cast further doubt on NATO's future.31
Domestic Politics and Elite Manipulation

Alliances may also survive because self-interested groups in one or more
countries need the alliance to support their individual self-interest, even though
the alliance may not be in the interest of the larger societies of which they are a
part. For example, an alliance may be created and sustained due to pressure from
an ethnic group with a powerful attachment to a foreign power, or by élites with
large economic interests in the allied state. For example, Jewish-Americans have
been a key source of support for the US alliance with Israel and Polish-
Americans have actively lobbied for NATO expansion. Similarly, military
officials may defend a particular alliance either because it is central to their
budgetary demands or because it has become deeply ingrained in their
conception of vital interests.32
Detecting this source of alliance maintenance can be difficult, because special
pleading by interest groups usually disguises itself with patriotic rhetoric.
Moreover, the élites who lobby to maintain a particular alliance may genuinely
believe that this commitment is both in their own interest and in the broader
national interest. They are virtually certain to describe the commitment in terms
of the latter, and it may be only with the benefit of hindsight that observers can
recognise the extent to which an alliance was sustained by domestic political
manipulation.
This sort of alliance will also be rare and relatively fragile, because most
states cannot afford to squander resources on commitments that are no longer of
value. Furthermore, political élites usually try to avoid being seen as overly loyal
to a foreign power, thereby discouraging them from supporting commitments
that are only of limited value. Thus, although élite manipulation can delay
adjustments to new strategic conditions, it will usually be unable to prevent
them. Exceptions are most likely when the state in question is extremely wealthy
or secure - and can thus afford to devote resources to marginal interests - or
when the costs of the commitment are relatively small.
The Impact of Institutionalisation

The greater the level of institutionalisation within an alliance, the more likely it
is to endure despite an extensive change in the array of external threats. Here
'institutionalisation' means both the presence of formal organisations charged
with performing specific intra-alliance tasks (such as military planning, weapons
procurement and crisis management), and the development of formal or informal
rules governing how alliance members reach collective decisions.
The level of institutionalisation can affect alliance cohesion in several distinct
ways. First, if the alliance generates a large formal bureaucracy, this will create
a cadre of individuals whose professional perspectives and career prospects are
closely tied to maintaining the relationship. Such individuals are likely to view
the alliance as intrinsically desirable and will be reluctant to abandon it even
when circumstances change. The longer the alliance lasts, the more numerous
and influential its advocates will be. To cite the most obvious example, NATO
is now supported not only by the common interests of its members, but by an
elaborate transatlantic network of former NATO officials, defence intellectuals,
military officers, journalists and policy analysts, all of whose professional lives
have been devoted to addressing the security issues facing the 'Atlantic
community'. Ending the alliance would liquidate the principal professional
achievement of this transnational community and foreclose the continuing series
of transatlantic conferences that these élites have long enjoyed. One can safely
expect these élites to resist pressures to dismantle the Alliance, even if it had
outlived its usefulness.33
Second, a high level of institutionalisation may create capabilities that are
worth keeping even after their original purpose is gone, especially if it costs less
to maintain them than it did to create them in the first place.34 As Philip H.
Gordon points out, the capabilities and assets that NATO created in order to deal
with the Soviet threat are of considerable value in the post-Cold War world, and
they may well be worth retaining in order to deal with other contingencies.35 The
1991 Gulf War could not have been fought without NATO assets, and the 1995
intervention in Bosnia relied on a similar base of infrastructure, military assets
and joint decision-making procedures. NATO also provides a hedge against
future uncertainties, and it surely provides a better basis for ensuring its
members' security than any of the more lavish alternatives that have been
proposed since 1990.36
This type of institutionalisation will operate most powerfully when it creates
capacities that are highly adaptable. In general, flexibility will occur when the
alliances possesses diverse capabilities - which may include military, economic
and diplomatic assets - and when these capabilities rest on a division of labour
that would be difficult to replace. Durability is also increased when the alliance's
institutions facilitate the creation of new rules and principles, thereby making it
easier to adapt to new conditions.37 Once again, NATO seems to the defining
example of this sort of alliance, given its long duration, diverse capabilities and
demonstrated capacity to amend doctrines and organisational forms in response
to external developments.38 Indeed, some experts now see NATO as evolving
from a defensive alliance into a more diverse 'security-management institution',
whose purpose is both collective defence and managing a varied array of low-
level security problems.39
The benefits of institutionalisation are bought at a price, however. High levels
of institutionalisation may not lead to greater efficiency or effectiveness,
especially when an elaborate decision-making process encourages stalemate or
inaction. Moreover, an elaborate institutional structure may mask the degree to
which the fundamental bases for the alliance are eroding. Like Oscar Wilde's
picture of Dorian Gray, an ageing alliance may appear robust and healthy so long
as its formal institutions continue to operate, even if the basic rationale for the
arrangement is crumbling. If the governing bureaucracy continues to function,
if ministerial meetings continue to issue innocuous communiqués on schedule,
and if the alliance is not called upon to do anything, then its members may not
be fully aware of the extent to which their interests have diverged. The danger,
of course, is that the alliance may be dead long before anyone notices, and the
discovery of the corpse may come at a very inconvenient moment.
Finally, although NATO has successfully redirected its mission away from
conventional and nuclear defence and towards regional 'security management',
this new orientation may not be feasible for very long. 'Security-management
institutions' do not have an encouraging track record, and past efforts to devise
institutional remedies for inter-state conflict - including the Concert of Europe,
the League of Nations and the United Nations - proved unable to prevent a
return to competitive power politics.40 Such institutions can provide a forum for
discussing emerging security issues, and may facilitate efforts to resolve minor
problems such as migration or international terrorism. But institutions like
NATO or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) do
not have independent capabilities of their own, and can only take action when
the member-states deem it in their interest to do so. It is by no means clear that
NATO's members (including the United States) will be willing to pay the costs
required to manage more serious security problems in Europe (or elsewhere),

and the painfully slow response to events in Bosnia shows how little institutions
can do when key members are unwilling to act. Indeed, even the most dedicated
advocates of institutional solutions recognise that they are primarily useful for
facilitating cooperation among states whose aims are compatible, and cannot
overcome more fundamental conflicts of interest. Finally, we should accept that
NATO's ability to address new security issues is partly the legacy of four
decades of cooperation, which was itself a product of a particular international
structure and a specific set of institutional arrangements, most notably the
substantial US military presence. The existing array of 'security-management
institutions' may be able to dampen security competition so long as this basic

structure endures, but whether they can do so without these conditions is
questionable.41
Ideological Solidarity, Shared Identities and 'Security Communities '

'Ideological solidarity' exists when two independent states share common
political values and objectives, while continuing to regard themselves as separate
political entities. Other things being equal, states will usually prefer to ally with
governments whose political outlook is similar to their own and similar regimes
may be willing to support each other simply because they believe that doing so
contributes to promoting certain intrinsic goods, such as democracy, socialism
or Islamic fundamentalism. Ideological solidarity can reduce intra-alliance
conflicts, and a commitment to similar basic goals can help sustain an alliance
long after its original rationale is gone.
One can also imagine an alliance that persists because its members come to
see themselves as integral parts of a larger political community. Here the
member-states no longer think of themselves as wholly separable units, and thus
find it difficult to imagine dissolving the partnership. This sort of alliance
contrasts sharply with the traditional conception of an alliance as a compact
between sovereign states. When independent states form an alliance to advance
separate national interests, a significant change in the balance of threats will lead
each state to rethink its options. But when an alliance either reflects or creates
a sense of common identity, then the entire notion of an individual 'national
interest' becomes less applicable. If élites and/or publics begin to view their own
society as inextricably part of a larger political community, then members will
find it difficult to conceive of themselves as separate and will see their interests
as identical even if the external environment changes dramatically. As a result,
this sort of alliance - if alliance is the correct term - is likely to be extremely
robust.
This possibility resembles Karl Deutsch's notion of a 'pluralistic security
community', defined as a group of formally sovereign states enjoying a 'sense
of community' sufficient to 'assure, for a long time ... the resolution of social
problems without recourse to force'.42 Deutsch's work focused primarily on
eliminating violent conflict among member-states, but its basic logic can also
apply to alliances formed primarily to oppose others. If two or more societies
develop a powerful sense of shared identity, then a threat facing one of them by
definition becomes a problem facing them all, and a mutual commitment is likely
to be sustained, even when there is no immediate challenge to be faced.
Deutsch argued that forming a security community rested on compatible
values, expectations of economic gain, a wide range of mutual transactions
(trade and communications flows, for example), broad élite networks and high
levels of social communication. Drawing upon this logic, a number of scholars
have recently suggested that the Atlantic Alliance has (or is about to) become a
security community in the Deutschian sense. If so, then NATO - or something
very much like it - is likely to endure even in the absence of a major external
threat, simply because the member-states no longer make a firm distinction

between their separate national interests and the broader interests of the 'Atlantic
community'. This view also regards war as increasingly 'unthinkable' among
NATO's current members, largely because the combination of US hegemony
and the Soviet challenge forged a common European identity and reinforced the
prevailing aversion to renewed great-power competition.43
This vision of the Atlantic Alliance is undeniably appealing, as it implies that
past patterns of competition will not recur and that Europe and the US will
continue to work together for widely shared ends. Unfortunately, there are
several reasons to question whether this vision is an accurate account of the past
or a useful guide to the future.
First, even if there is a growing sense of community between particular states,
such bonds are far weaker than the ties of nationalism within most modern states.
Even in Europe itself, where the process of integration is most advanced, there
is little evidence that loyalty to some larger political community has superseded
the idea of a 'national interest'.44 Politicians still owe their careers to how well
they satisfy their own electorates, not to how well they advance the larger
interests of the European Union or the 'Atlantic community'. These two goals
do not necessarily conflict; they may even reinforce each other. When they do
clash, however, most leaders will give greater priority to national preferences
than to foreign ones. As Robert Art has shown, European élites certainly do not
regard the possibility of 'renationalisation' as far-fetched, which itself suggests
that identities have not merged enough either to guarantee maintaining the
Alliance or preventing a return to inter-state competition within Europe.45
Second, students of NATO are likely to exaggerate the importance of
common ideologies and shared identities by taking the rhetoric of national
leaders and foreign-policy élites too seriously. National leaders are prone to
describe their allies in overly flattering terms, and to overstate the level of
compatibility and identification between them, both to convince adversaries that
the alliance is firm and to sustain domestic support for potentially costly
commitments. During the Second World War, for example, the demands of
alliance solidarity led US leaders to transform Joseph Stalin from a bloodthirsty
tyrant into the benevolent 'Uncle Joe'. Similarly, Soviet and East European
élites stressed the bonds of 'socialist fraternity' that allegedly bound the Warsaw
Pact together, while politicians on both sides of the Atlantic habitually invoke
the rhetoric of 'community' to describe US-European relations. But it is

impossible to know whether such expressions of community are really
meaningful, or if they are strong enough to sustain the alliance in the absence of
other motivations. The litmus test comes not at annual summit meetings - which
are designed for the ritual incantation of unifying rhetoric - but when member-
states are called upon to do something for each other. And as NATO's icy
response to the Bosnian crisis suggests, unity cannot be taken for granted.
Third, and following from the second point, citizens on both sides of the
Atlantic should not assume that attitudes and identities formed in one context
will continue to thrive once the circumstances in which they emerged are altered.
A long-lived alliance may foster a sense of community among its members, and
this sense of community is likely to delay its dissolution, but a dramatic external
transformation is likely to strain the sense of community and shared identity as
well. New political structures create new possibilities, new possibilities provoke
new debates, and these debates inevitably yield new conceptions of the political
universe and thus new identities and conceptions of political community. There
is no guarantee that today's allies will continue to feel a powerful sense of
identification with their current partners, now that the material conditions that
brought them together have altered. To repeat: a sense of common identity may
slow the process of dissolution for quite some time, but the level of solidarity
and mutual identification is not strong enough to prevent states from pursuing an
independent course once their interests begin to conflict.
Summary •
This section has identified a number of reasons why states will maintain a mili-
tary alliance even when the conditions under which it was formed have changed
substantially. Taken together, alliances are more likely to persist when there is
a large asymmetry of power within them, when the allies share similar political
values, and when the relationship is highly institutionalised. Such alliances will
find it easier to adapt to new conditions and will be better equipped to handle the
conflicts of interest that inevitably arise. Alliances will be especially durable
when relations among the member-states have brought about a strong sense of
common identity, but this sort of transformation is extremely rare.
Conclusion
There is nothing sacred about an existing alliance, no matter how successful or
long-lived it has been. When domestic preferences or external conditions
change, existing commitments may no longer be desirable and states are more
likely to seek other arrangements. Yet new conditions need not provoke an
instantaneous reaction, and alliances formed in one context may well endure
under quite different circumstances. The Austro-French alliance lasted from
1756-92; the Austro-German 'Dual Alliance' persisted from 1879 until the end
of the First World War, and the Anglo-Portuguese alliance survived, by some
estimates, an extraordinary 600 years.46 Alliances can endure despite far-
reaching shifts in the internal or external environment, if only because national
leaders are often eager to reduce uncertainty during a period of rapid change.
This analysis contains a number of implications for contemporary alliance

commitments. On the positive side, the Cold War alliance of democratic powers
has proven to be more resilient than many pessimists predicted. In the short term,
this event is not that difficult to explain: these alliances clearly remained intact
because the member-states believed that abandoning such arrangements would
leave them worse off. For the United States, the network of Cold War alliances
was both a stabilising force during an era of rapid change and a useful
mechanism for shaping the post-Cold War order. For Europeans, NATO
provided a forum for negotiating new security arrangements and kept the United
States committed to the continent, thereby inhibiting the 'renationalisation' of
European security policy. NATO was also reinforced by a set of shared political
values, and its highly institutionalised character made it easier to resolve the
mild conflicts that did arise and facilitated joint efforts to adapt to new
geopolitical conditions. In Asia, where historical enmities still linger and multi-
lateral institutions are weaker, the three bilateral alliances between Washington
and Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei offered both an impediment to regional
competition and a hedge against a rising and increasingly assertive China. Thus,
the US and its allies had little reason to abandon their existing security
commitments after the Soviet Union collapsed, and ample reason to preserve
them.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the US role in these developments,
and the future of these relations will be determined primarily by the future
course of US foreign policy. As discussed above, alliances are more likely to
persist when a strong power is both willing and able to pay the costs associated
with leadership. Because the end of the Cold War left the US in an
overwhelmingly strong position, and because world leadership is a hard habit to
break, the Soviet Union's collapse did not lead to immediate US retrenchment
and thus did not trigger the rapid dissolution of its existing alliance network. And
by helping smooth the transition from the Cold War to the present day - a
transition in which the potential for serious conflict was clearly present - these
alliances made a clear contribution to peace.
On the negative side, however, these relationships are likely to face growing
strains in the years to come. Although the absence of a major threat is cause for
rejoicing, it also means that these alliances will lack a firm basis for
commitment. In the past, intra-alliance conflict was ultimately subordinated to
the larger purpose of deterring the Soviet Union. But with the Soviet Union
gone, there is less reason to keep such disputes within bounds. Managing the
alliance is likely to be more difficult, therefore, and will require a defter
diplomatic touch. In particular, if US leaders do too much to keep their allies
happy, they are likely to trigger a domestic backlash. But if they try to use their
hegemonic position to impose their own preferences or to gain unilateral
advantages (thereby satisfying their domestic constituents), they will inevitably
provoke allied resentment. Similarly, any reluctance to act in places like Bosnia
will trigger doubts about US credibility, but to use force - as in the missile
strikes against Iraq in September 1996 - will undermine the norms of intra-
alliance consultation and raise doubts about US judgement. These are not new
problems, but they will be more difficult to overcome without a clear and present
danger. US leaders will thus have to exhibit greater imagination, wisdom and
restraint than they did during the Cold War, and it will not be easy to balance the
requirements of alliance leadership and the demands of public opinion.
These dilemmas will be exacerbated by a number of other structural trends,
which are slowly undermining the factors that sustained these alliances in the
past. First, far-flung US commitments rest upon a level of military spending that
will be increasingly difficult to justify or sustain. Although US defence spending
has declined from its Cold War levels, it still accounts for nearly 35% of the
global total. The United States spent five times more on defence than Russia in
1995, at least six times more than Japan or Germany (the third and fourth
ranking military powers) and may have spent as much as eight times more than
China.47 It is hard to believe that US citizens will continue to support this
disproportionate level of expenditure, and if they do not, future US leaders will
have to make some hard choices about current US commitments.48 US allies will
begin to reconsider their positions as the US presence dwindles, paving the way
for more substantial realignments than have occurred so far.
Second, the focus of US economic activity is shifting to Asia, and although
this trend does not eliminate the US interest in Europe, it will inevitably affect
the proportion of national attention that is devoted to different regions.49 This
trend will be reinforced by a gradual decline in the percentage of the US
population that is of European ancestry, as well as by the continued westward
movement of the US population.50 Furthermore, the 1990s are witnessing the
departure of the generation for whom the Depression, the Second World War
and the Cold War were defining political events.51 Although their successors
may recognise the value of allied solidarity and strive to preserve it, these
commitments will not receive the reflexive support that they did from previous
generations. The Cold War partnership of Europe, US and several Asian powers
will have even less meaning for those now in their teens, or for children for
whom the Cold War will be a distant historical episode. These trends do not
necessarily herald the formal dissolution of NATO, but they do not bode well for
its long-term health. Strains in US relations with its Asian allies, as economic
competition continues and the clarity of US interests begin to blur, are also
likely.
Given these powerful underlying trends, it would be foolhardy to base future
expectations either on the experience of the past 50 years or the declared
intentions of contemporary officeholders. On the contrary, the US and its allies
should expect and prepare for greater tension within the main democratic
alliances. What steps are most likely to keep future disagreements within
bounds, thereby preserving some capacity for common action and preventing a
return to intense security competition?
First, given the absence of a clear external threat and the growing potential for
disagreement, the obvious course for the West is to lower its expectations. The
primary goal should be preserving a substantial US presence in Europe and Asia
and maintaining robust consultative mechanisms between the United States and
its major allies. The US presence is still the best safeguard against renewed
regional competition, and retaining the existing institutional structure provides
a mechanism for coordinating action when unexpected contingencies arise.52 But
instead of seeking a common front on each and every issue, the US and its
principal allies must learn to live with less unanimity and greater flexibility.
Presumptions of agreement will disappoint both sides, and create a greater risk
of a truly disruptive backlash once the inevitable disagreements arise. Among
other things, this means supporting initiatives that facilitate independent action
by certain alliance members, even at the cost of diminished US control.53
Second, although it is probably too late to rescind the pledge to expand
NATO eastwards, efforts to implement this decision should be delayed as long

as possible.54 As many critics have noted, such a step will inevitably fuel Russian
suspicions and jeopardise relations between Moscow and the West. Russia's
present weakness may diminish such concerns for the time being, but probably
not forever. More important, it is far from clear whether NATO's present
members - especially the United States - are really willing to fight for Poland,
Hungary, Finland or any other potential members. The decision to enlarge
NATO thus seems to be based on the assumption that the commitment will never
have to be honoured, which is hardly a sound basis for a formal military
guarantee. Enlargement will also require formal ratification by the US Senate,
and such a debate could easily turn into a far-reaching referendum on the entire
array of US commitments. It is by no means clear that supporters of NATO
should welcome such a prospect.55
Finally, sustaining the current array of great-power alliances will require
renewed efforts at public persuasion by those who regard these commitments as
a valuable insurance policy for peace. Structural forces and domestic pressures
will make this policy more difficult to sell, but there is a powerful prudential
logic behind it. Even if these alliances do dissolve - as they eventually will - it
will be better if they do so after Europe and Asia have fashioned new security
arrangements to replace the Cold War order. In short, if it is true that 'NATO's
years are now numbered' - and if the same point holds for alliances in Asia - it
would still be prudent to keep that number rather large.56
Acknowledgements Notes
1
James Fearon, Charles Glaser, Lloyd For a representative sample of
Gruber, Pierre Hassner, Robert Keohane alternative views, consult John J.
and John Mearsheimer provided valuable Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future:
comments on an earlier draft of this Instability in Europe after the Cold War',
article. I have also profited from discus- International Security, vol. 15, no. 1,
sions with David Priess and the comments Summer 1990; Barry Buzan et al., The
of participants at the 1996 IISS Annual European Security Order Recast:
Conference, Dresden, \-4 September Scenarios for Post-Cold War Europe
1996. David Edelstein provided timely (London: Pinter, 1990); Kenneth N.
research assistance, for which I am also Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of
grateful. International Politics', International
Security, vol. 18, no. 2, Autumn 1993;

Stephen Van Evera, 'Primed for Peace: asymmetrical alliance is a security
Europe after the Cold War', guarantee, by which a great power agrees
International Security, vol. 15, no. 3, to protect a smaller power but neither
Winter 1990-91; Stanley Hoffmann and requires nor expects its client to do much
Robert Keohane, (eds), After the Cold in return.
4
War: International Institutions and State Robert Osgood thus suggests that 'next
Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 to accretion, the most prominent function
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University of alliances has been to restrain and
Press, 1993); Richard H. Ullman, control allies', and Paul Schroeder
Securing Europe (Princeton, NJ: argues that 'all alliances in some
Princeton University Press, 1992); and measure functioned as pacts of restraint'.

Charles L. Glaser, 'Why NATO Is Still But, as Schroeder's own account makes
Best: Future Security Arrangements for clear, the leverage that allies use to
Europe', International Security, vol. 18, restrain each other is based largely on
no. 1, Summer 1991. the importance each attaches to its
2 partners' capabilities. The distinction
Recent theoretical work on alliances
includes Stephen M. Walt, The Origins between 'power aggregation' and
of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 'mutual restraint' is therefore not a very
University Press, 1987); Steven David, sharp one. See Robert Osgood, Alliances
Choosing Sides: Alignment and and American Foreign Policy
Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 22; and Paul
University Press, 1991); Dan Reiter, W. Schroeder, 'Alliances, 1815-1945:
Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, Weapons of Power and Tools of
and World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Management', in Klaus Knorr (ed.),
University Press, 1996); Fred Chernoff, Historical Dimensions of National
After Bipolarity: The Vanishing Threat, Security Problems (Lawrence, KS:
Theories of Cooperation and the Future University of Kansas Press, 1976), pp.
of the Atlantic Alliance (Ann Arbor, MI: 230-31.
University of Michigan Press, 1995); and 5
On the distinction between inclusive
Randall K. Schweller, 'Bandwagoning and exclusive institutions, see John J.
for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of
Back In', International Security, vol. 19, International Institutions', International
no. 1, Summer 1994. For guides to Security, vol. 19, no. 3, Winter 1994-95;
earlier scholarship on alliances, see and also see Arnold Wolfers, 'Collective
Roger V. Dingman, 'Theories of, and Defense vs. Collective Security', in
Approaches to, Alliance Politics', in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), Alliance Policy
Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: and the Cold War (Baltimore, MD:
New Approaches in Theory, History and Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959).
Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979); 6
See Walt, Origins of Alliances, pp. 17-
Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann and 33, 147-180; Walt, 'Testing Theories of
John D. Sullivan, Unity and Alliance Formation: The Case of
Disintegration in International Alliances Southwest Asia', International
(New York: John Wiley, 1973); and Organization, vol. 38, no. 2, Spring
Michael Don Ward, Research Gaps in 1988; and Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for
Alliance Dynamics (Boulder, CO: Profit'. Earlier works advancing similar
University of Denver Monograph Series, arguments include Robert Rothstein,
1982). Alliances and Small Powers (New York:
3
The most extreme form of an Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 52;
and George Liska, Nations in Alliance: because they have less need of allied
The Limits of Interdependence assistance and because the costs of war
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins will be higher. See Thomas Christenson
University Press), p. 13. and Jack Snyder, 'Chain Gangs and
7
Pessimistic appraisals of NATO's Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance
future include Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Patterns in Multipolarity', International
Future' ; Waltz, 'Emerging Structure of Organization, vol. 44, no. 2, Spring
International Politics', especially pp. 75- 1990.
12
76; and Walt, Origins of Alliances, See, for example, Pierre Gallois, The
preface to paperback edition, p. vii. Balance of Terror: Strategy for the
8
See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in Nuclear Age (Boston, MA: Houghton
World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Mifflin, 1961); Gallois, 'US Strategy and
University Press, 1981). the Defense of Europe', Orbis, vol. 7,
9
This element of threat is nicely no. 2, Summer 1963; Robert W. Tucker,
revealed in Eyre Crowe's famous 1907 Stability and the Nth Country Problem
memorandum on British policy towards (Washington DC: Institute for Defense
Germany. Crowe noted that 'the mere Analyses, 1962); and Henry A.
existence and healthy activity of a Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A
powerful Germany is an undoubted Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance
blessing to the world', and emphasised (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965),
that 'so long as Germany's action does especially pp. 12-14.
13
overstep the line of legitimate protection See David C. Schwartz, NATO's
of existing rights it can always count on Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington DC:
[England's] sympathy and good will'. Brookings Institution, 1981).
But he also warned that 'this benevolent 14
See Eric Nordlinger, Isolationism
attitude will give way to determined Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy
opposition at the first sign of British or for a New Century (Princeton, NJ:
allied interests being adversely affected'. Princeton University Press, 1995), pp.
See George Peabody Gooch and Harold 47-49, 123-25; and Earl Ravenal,
Temperley (eds), British Documents on Designing Defense for a New World
the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 Order: The 1992 Military Budget and
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Beyond (Washington DC: Cato Institute,
Office, 1928), volume 3, pp. 397-420; 1991), pp. 64-68.
see also Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of 15
Thus Glenn Snyder points out that
the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860- alliances face an unavoidable trade-off
1914 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980); between 'abandonment' and
and Imanuel Geiss, German Foreign 'entrapment'. Allies must demonstrate
Policy 1871-1914 (London: Routledge their value and commitment in case their
and Kegan Paul, 1977). partners abandon them for other
10
See Schroeder, 'Alliances, 1815- arrangements. Unfortunately, a state's
1945', p. 241; Ernst C. Helmreich, The desire to prove its loyalty will make it
Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912- easier for its allies to 'entrap' it in an
1913 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard undesirable or unnecessary wars. See
University Press, 1938); and Geoffrey Glenn Snyder, 'The Security Dilemma in
Roberts, The Unholy Alliance: Stalin's Alliance Politics', World Politics, vol.
Pact with Hitler (Bloomington, IN: 36, no. 4, July 1984.
16
Indiana University Press, 1989). John F. Kennedy thus warned that 'if
11
In general, states will be less inclined the United States were to falter ... the
to form an alliance when military whole world would inevitably begin to
technology favours the defensive, both move towards the Soviet bloc'; Henry
Kissinger believed that 'if leaders around M. Walt, 'The Precarious Partnership:
the world assume that the United States Europe and America in a New Era',
lacked the forces or the will... they will forthcoming in Charles A. Kupchan
accommodate themselves to what they (ed.), The Future of Transatlantic
regard as the dominant trend'. Similarly, Security Relations (New York: Council
Ronald Reagan once argued that 'if we on Foreign Relations Press, 1997).
22
cannot win [in Central America], our See Walt, Revolution and War,
credibility will collapse and our alliarces chapters 3-6.
will crumble'. These quotations are nom 23
On these general points, see Walt,
Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power: Origins of Alliances, pp. 35-36, 206-12;
Constancy and Change in US Foreign and Malcolm S. Kerr, The Arab Cold
Policy from Truman to Johnson (New War, 1958-1961: Gamal Abdel Nasser
York: Columbia University Press, 1968), and His Enemies (London: Oxford
p. 14; House Foreign Affairs Committee, University Press, 1962).
The Soviet Union in the Third World: 24
On this point, see Walt, Revolution
Watershed in Great Power Policy (97th and War, pp. 246-48 and John L.
Congress, 1st session, 1977), pp. 157- Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or
58; and New York Times, 28 April 1983, Reality? (London: Oxford University
p. A12. Press, 1992).
17 25
See Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and As Glenn Snyder points out, bipolar
War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University alliances identify interests that are
Press, 1996), pp. 103-4. largely determined by the external
18
On Romania, see Norman Rich, structure of the system, while multipolar
Hitler's War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi alliances create interests that are only
State, and the Course of Expansion loosely shaped by the distribution of
(New York: Norton, 1973), pp. 187-92; power. See Glenn Snyder and Paul
on Egypt, see Walt, Origins of Alliances, Diesing, Conflict Among Nations:
pp. 115-17, 125-26, 169 and 177. Bargaining, Decisionmaking, and
19
Hitler and Napoleon were masters of System Structure in International Crises
these tactics during their early careers. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
By contrast, inept aggressors like Press, 1977), pp. 419-29.
26
Saddam Hussein can provoke otherwise See Gunther Hellmann, 'Goodbye
unlikely coalitions through heavy-handed Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of
diplomacy and ill-timed acts of Contemporary Germany', International
aggression. Studies Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 1, April
20
Australian troops fought against 1996. Hellmann sees Bonn's future
Germany in both world wars, even foreign policy as more constrained than I
though Germany did not threaten do, and believes that the more diverse
Australia directly in either one. debate that has recently emerged in
According to one account, the colonies' German intellectual circles is unlikely to
loyalty to England was 'not one of all to lead to dramatic changes in German
one but of all to all, to the British ideal foreign policy.
27
and way of life wherever it was to be It is easy to forget how secure the US
found'. See James A. Williamson, Great presently is. In addition to being shielded
Britain and the Commonwealth behind two enormous ocean 'moats', the
(London: Adam and Charles Black, US also possesses a robust nuclear
1965), pp. 180-81. arsenal, the world's most technologically
21
See Philip H. Gordon, 'Recasting the sophisticated military, a diverse
Atlantic Alliance', Survival, vol. 38, no. economy, productive agricultural lands
1, Spring 1996, pp. 36-38; and Stephen and a reasonably tranquil domestic
order. This is not to say that there are 1994). For a demonstration of how
no threats that might affect the United enduring commitments can foster
States, but it is surely the most secure ossified strategic beliefs and impede a
great power in history. state's ability to adapt to new conditions,
28
On the differences in alliance see Charles A. Kupchan, The
dynamics between bipolar and Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, NY:
multipolar systems, see especially Cornell University Press, 1994).
33
Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among As of December 1996, there were over
Nations, p p . 4 1 9 - 2 9 . 8,000 people assigned to NATO
29
Soviet control over its Warsaw Pact headquarters, Allied Command Atlantic
allies was thus greater than U S control and Supreme Headquarters Allied
over its allies in Western Europe, but Powers Europe, including over 2,000
the Warsaw Pact contributed less to the civilians - see the NATO homepage,
overall capabilities of the Soviet bloc http://www.nato.int. These figures omit
than U S allies contributed to N A T O . military personnel assigned to NATO
See Walt, Origins of Alliances, chapter missions in their home countries, as well
8 and Appendix II. as academics, journalists and other
30 experts whose work focuses on European
This factor is a central theme of the
literature on 'imperial overstretch'. security issues. The transnational
See, in particular, Paul M. Kennedy, network of élites is therefore larger than
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: these figures suggest. On this broad
Economic Change and Military point, see Robert McCalla, 'NATO's
Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New Persistence after the Cold War',
York: Random House, 1987); and International Organization, vol. 50, no.
Gilpin, War and Change in World 3, Summer 1996, pp. 456-61.
34
Politics. Ibid., pp. 462-63; and Celeste
31
According to US President Bill Wallander and Robert Keohane, 'Why
Clinton: 'The United States must be an Does NATO Persist?: An Institutionalist
essential part of the mission (in Approach', unpublished manuscript,
Bosnia). If we're not there, NATO will Harvard University, Cambridge, MA,
not be there ... A conflict that already March 1996.
35
has claimed so many victims could See Gordon, 'Recasting the Atlantic
spread like poison ... eat away at Alliance', p. 49.
36
Europe's stability and erode our See especially Glaser, 'Why NATO Is
partnership with our European allies'. Still Best'.
37
See 'Clinton's Words on Bosnia: The See McCalla, 'Why NATO Persists',
Right Thing to Do', New York Times, pp. 460-64; Wallander and Keohane,
28 November 1995, p. A6. 'Why Does NATO Persist?', especially
32
One would therefore expect the US pp. 19-23; and John S. Duffield,
Navy to be especially vocal in 'NATO's Functions after the Cold War',
defending present US commitments in Political Science Quarterly, vol. 109, no.
Europe and Asia, because these 5, Winter 1994-95.
38
commitments are central justification Because most alliances are not heavily
for a large, blue-water fleet. For a institutionalised, both scholars and
general account of how domestic policy-makers should be wary of
political struggles can affect the drawing overly sanguine lessons from
definition of vital interests, see Jack L. the NATO experience.
39
Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic See Wallander and Keohane, 'Why
Politics and International Ambition Does NATO Persist', pp. 23-26; and
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, McCalla, 'NATO's Persistence', pp.
466-68. Since 1991, NATO has Major War (New York: Basic Books,
developed a new Strategic Concept de- 1989); and Robert Jervis, 'The Future of
emphasising forward defence; in 1994 it World Politics: Will It Resemble the
endorsed the Combined Joint Task Past?' International Security, vol. 16,
Forces concept for meeting a wider no. 3, Winter 1991-92.
44
range of non-Article 5 contingencies. See Anthony Smith, 'National Identity
This latter decision balances the and the Idea of European U n i t y ' ,
European desire to act with greater International Affairs, vol. 6 8 , n o . 1,
autonomy against the continued need for January 1992.
US support in key areas such as 45
Indeed, European élites want to
command and control. See Simon Duke, preserve the U S presence in Europe
The New European Security Disorder primarily to prevent a return to inter-

(New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), pp. state competition. See Robert J. Art,
288-94; and Charles Barry, 'NATO's 'Why Western Europe Needs the United
Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory States and NATO', Political Science
and Practice', Survival, vol. 38, no. 1, Quarterly, vol. 111, n o . 1, S p r i n g 1996.
Spring 1996, pp. 81-97. 46
The first Anglo-Portuguese alliance
40
See Bradley A. Thayer, 'Creating was signed in 1373 and was
Stability in New World Orders: Why subsequently renewed ten times, most
Concert and Collective Security Systems recently in 1943. See Glyn A. Stone,
Fail, Why the Balance of Power Works', 'The Official British Attitude to the
unpublished doctoral dissertation, Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, 1910-1945',
University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, Journal of Contemporary History, vol.
1996. 10, no. 4, October 1975, p. 729.
41 47
As Wallander and Keohane recognise, Estimates of Chinese spending vary
even 'sticky' institutions can collapse if widely, but even the highest estimates
external changes are sufficiently far- place it at roughly a fifth of the US total
reaching. See 'Why Does NATO in 1994. See The Military Balance 1995/
Persist?', p. 17. 96 (London: Oxford University Press for
42
See Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political the IISS, 1995), pp. 263-67, and The
Community in the North Atlantic Area: Military Balance 1996/97 (London:
International Organization in Light of Oxford University Press for the IISS,
Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: 1996), pp. 306-11.
48
Princeton University Press, 1957), US defence spending has been
especially p. 5. sustained partly by conservative
43
See G. John Ikenberry and Daniel Republicans in the US Congress and
Deudney, 'The Logic of the West', partly by President Clinton's delicate
World Policy Journal, vol. 10, no. 4, relationship with the US military, but the
Winter 1993-94; Ole Waever, impact of both factors will probably
'Integration as Security: European decline over time.
49
International Identity and American Trade with Asia now comprises
Domestic Discipline', in Kupchan, roughly 34% of total US trade, while
Future of Transatlantic Security trade with Europe comprises 23%. Direct
Relations; and Charles A. Kupchan, US investment in Europe is still three
'Reviving the West', Foreign Affairs, times larger than investment in Asia, but
vol. 75, no. 3, May-June 1996. The the gap is shrinking. See Direction of
belief that changes in attitudes and Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1993
identities has helped to stabilise Europe (Washington DC: International Monetary
is also made by John Mueller in Retreat Fund, 1993); International Direct
from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Investment Statistics Yearbook (Paris:
Organisation for Economic Cooperation himself as a 'cheap hawk' suggests his

and Development, 1995), and own aversion to spending significant
International Financial Statistics amounts to preserve present US
Yearbook 1994 (Washington DC: commitments.
52
International Monetary Fund, 1994). According to Philip H. Gordon,
50
The percentage of US citizens of 'perhaps the most important role
European origin will decline from 80% Alliance leaders can play today is to
in 1980 to 64% by 2020, while the ensure that the institutions, patterns of
percentage of Hispanics will rise to 15% communication, command structures and
and the percentage of Asians will shared military capacities built up over
increase from 2 to 7%. Approximately the last 40 years are preserved ... So
27% of the US population lived in the long as it is plausible that European and
North-east in 1950, while the Far West US forces might be called upon to
contained only 13.7%. By 1990, undertake military tasks together ... it
however, the percentage in the West had makes sense to preserve an integrated
reached 21.2%, while the North-east command structure and shared assets'.
held only 20.4%. The fastest growing See Gordon, 'Recasting the Atlantic
states are expected to be Nevada, Alliance', p. 49.
Hawaii, California and Washington. See 53
The Combined Joint Task Force
Statistical Abstract of the United States initiative of 1994, finalised in 1996, is a
(Washington DC: US Bureau of the welcome step in this direction.
Census, 1994), p. 18; George T. Kurian, 54
The case for expanding NATO may be
Datapedia of the United States, 1790- found in Strobe Talbott, 'Why NATO
2000 (Lanham, MD: Bernan Press, Should Grow', New York Review of
1994); and Population Profile of the Books, 10 August 1995; a perceptive
United States, 1995, Current Population critique is Michael Brown, 'The Flawed
Reports, Special Studies Series P23-189 Logic of NATO Expansion', Survival,
(Washington DC: US Department of vol. 37, no. 1, Spring 1995.
Commerce, 1995). 55
The original concept of the Partnership
51
This trend is symbolised by the 1992 for Peace remains preferable to
and 1996 Presidential US elections, in expanding NATO, as it provided a
which two different but distinguished mechanism for security cooperation
Second World War veterans were between NATO and its eastern
defeated by a man born after 1945 and neighbours but did not require
who had avoided military service during ratification, did not exclude Russia, and
his youth. Werner Weidenfeld recently did not extend an insincere security
declared that US Congressmen with a guarantee.
56
genuine interest in Europe were an See Waltz, 'Emerging Structure',
'endangered species', and Speaker of the p. 76.
House Newt Gingrich's description of

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On: 14 October 2014, At: 04:22

Survival: Global Politics and

Why alliances endure or collapse

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396339708442901

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agreements inevitably allow members to influence each other's conduct, which

Talks (START) Treaty or the 1972 Agreement on Prevention of Incidents at Sea

Why Do Alliances End?

Changing Perceptions of Threat

commitment is not as apparent, no matter how often US leaders reiterate it.

processes within an existing alliance, and especially on political processes within

• Demographic and Social Trends. This category explains alliance dissolution

• Domestic Competition. An existing alliance may be jeopardised if influential

because the US commitment to the rest of Europe was a defacto guarantee of

• Regime Change. A third set of hypotheses focuses on the effects of regime

• Ideological Divisions. A final internal source of alliance dissolution is

A more interesting variation is the tendency for certain ideologies to promote

of internal schisms. Paradoxically, although Marxism-Leninism and pan-

Why Do Alliances Persist?

Domestic Politics and Elite Manipulation

The Impact of Institutionalisation

required to manage more serious security problems in Europe (or elsewhere),

institutions' may be able to dampen security competition so long as this basic

Ideological Solidarity, Shared Identities and 'Security Communities '

threat, simply because the member-states no longer make a firm distinction

the rhetoric of 'community' to describe US-European relations. But it is

This analysis contains a number of implications for contemporary alliance

NATO eastwards, efforts to implement this decision should be delayed as long

Security, vol. 18, no. 2, Autumn 1993;

Princeton University Press, 1992); and measure functioned as pacts of restraint'.

The New European Security Disorder primarily to prevent a return to inter-

Organisation for Economic Cooperation himself as a 'cheap hawk' suggests his

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