COGNITIVE BIASES AND POWER IN COLECTIVE DECISION MAKING

Gustavo Rodrigues Cunha1

Faculdade Novos Horizontes
Rua Alvarenga Peixoto, 1270, Bairro Santo Agostinho,
CEP 30180-121 Belo Horizontes, Minas Gerais
E-mail: [email protected]

ABSTRACT

The present work analysed the relationship between cognitive biases and power in a collective decision making context.

Notably, the analyse of investment clubs indicated that power may affect confidence in stock market forecasts, self-

assessment related to investment skills, beliefs on control and predictability of outcomes, and attributions of success and

failures concerning collective investment performance. In sum, powerful investors in club settings were more

overconfident, showed greater better-than-average perceptions, and were more prone to illusion of control and self-

attribution than investors in powerless position, according with the assumption that biases might be reinforced to a greater

extent by social variables.

KEYWORDS: Cognitive biases, Power, Investment clubs.

1. INTRODUCTION

Financial decisions are made in situations of high complexity and uncertainty which preclude reliance on fixed rules and

compel the decision-maker to rely on intuition (Kahneman & Riepe, 1998) making investors subject to biases and

cognitive illusions since intuition is fragile (De Bondt et al., 2008).

In focusing on the human susceptibility to frames and biases, the behavioral finance field has contributed to a deeper

knowledge about investor behavior and financial markets, providing a very well-documented list of biases and cognitive

illusions. However, the narrow focus on typical “mistakes” at micro-level is one of the main weaknesses of the field,

highlighting the need not just to identify them, but also to investigate their causes and the contexts in which they are likely

to occur (De Bondt et al., 2008). Here, power is investigated as a possible factor influencing judgmental biases of

investors.

Besides the traditional concern on the behavioral effects of power on people subject to it, recent social psychology

research has focused on the effects of power on those who have it, addressing thus, how powerful people think, act, judge

and decide (for a review, see Keltner et al. 2003, 2008; Overbeck, 2010). More specifically, a body of work in this stream

1
PhD in Business Administration at University of Bologna
1
regards the association between power and cognitive biases as well as risk in judgment and decision making (Anderson

& Galisnky, 2006; Sivanathan & Galinsky, 2007; Fast et al., 2009). The present study follows this line of reasoning.

Thus, this work aims to investigate whether power is related to cognitive biases of investors associated to investment

clubs. Assuming the possibility that stable individual differences in judgment may be partially shaped by a group’s social

environment, it is expected that biases be socially reinforced to a greater extent in investors who have more power.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The present work focuses on a cluster of related biases largely investigated by researchers from cognitive psychology and

behavioral economics and finance, namely, overconfidence, better-than-average effect, illusion of control and self-

attribution. Research evidence has consistently demonstrated the prevalence and relevance of these biases.

Overconfidence has been shown to affect financial markets and many models of volatility and volume have incorporated

it (Odean, 1998; Daniel et al., 1998, Hirshleifer, 2001). Illusion of control makes investors trade too often and too

speculatively (Barber & Odean, 2001), leading them to believe widely that risk can be managed by knowledge and trading

skill and, hence, disregarding portfolio diversification (Statman, 1995). Self-attribution bias has been argued to cause

successful investors to become progressively more overconfident in trading activities (Gervais & Odean, 2000), and to

intensify overreactions and lead to short-term momentum and long-term reversals in stock prices (Daniel et al. 1998;

Hirshleifer, 2001).

2.1 Behavioral Finance: Cognitive Biases

Although finance has traditionally assumed the neoclassical framework of microeconomics, there has been substantial

debate in the field concerning the neoclassical-based versus the behaviorally-based paradigm (Shefrin, 2001).

One of the main reasons of this controversy refers to the consistent divergence of empirical findings from core statements
2
underlying traditional theories , evidencing that modern finance can play just a limited role in understanding why

individual investors trade, how they perform, how they choose their portfolios, and why returns vary across stocks for

reasons other than risk (Subrahmanyam, 2007).

This void in investor behavior understanding has been partially filled by a growing body of research under the banner of

behavioral finance, a different approach to financial markets emerging partially in response to the difficulties faced by

the traditional paradigm.

2
For instance, research findings have consistently show cross-sectional variance of expected returns not associated to
risk, and also, that investors very often maintain just few stocks in their portfolios, disregarding thus the benefits of
diversification stated by traditional theory.
2
The microfoundation of behavioral finance lies in the behavioral decision making3 which draws mostly on cognitive

psychology to provide a descriptively accurate model of human behavior. In this sense, the behavioral stream of finance

focuses on how people actually behave in financial settings, reflecting a model of investor behavior which account for

susceptibility to frames and other cognitive errors, varying attitudes toward risk, aversion to regret, imperfect self-control,

and preferences to both utilitarian and value-expressive characteristics (Statman, 1999).

In the 1970’s and early 80’s, cognitive scientists made substantial advances in the research on biases and heuristics in

reasoning and decision making (to a review, see Nadel & Piattelli-Palmarini, 2002) contributing to the behavioral finance

sprouting as these advances caught the attention of economists and emerged as a research field in the 1980’s (Thaler,

1980, 1985; Shiller, 1981; Bondt & Thaler, 1985, 1987; Shefrin & Statman, 1985).

Shiller (2002) points out as the 1990’s as another important moment in the development of behavioral finance, when “a

lot of the locus of academic discussion away from these econometric analyses of time series on price, dividends and

earnings towards developing models of human psychology as it relates to financial markets”. Thenceforth, many

researchers have incorporated biases, such as, overconfidence and self-attribution in their economic models in order to

develop a theoretical framework that more adequately accounts for diverse factors likely to influence investor behavior

and market prices (Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999; Gervais & Odean, 2001).

Shefrin (2000) places heuristic-driven bias, frame dependence and inefficient markets as the three themes composing the

phenomena approached by behavioral finance. Diversely from traditional supporters which assume the appropriate and

correct use of statistical tools by practitioners, frame independence and market efficiency, behavioral researchers

recognize that investors rely on heuristics and are subjected to the frame of decision problems in their perceptions of risk

and return, and that both, heuristic-drive bias and framing effects, cause market prices to deviate from fundamental values

and hence to be inefficient. Next, it is present the biases investigated in the present work.

2.1.1 Overconfidence

Overconfidence has fascinated many researchers from different areas for so many years. Because of its generality and

importance, overconfidence research has been broadly influential outside the psychology field, including in the financial

domain (Schoemaker & Russo, 1992; Billett& Qian, 2005; Aukutsionek & Belianin, 2001; Koellinger et al., 2007; Barber

& Odean, 2000, 2002; Gervais & Odean, 2001; Kirchler & Maciejovsky, 2002; Alemanni & Franzosi, 2006; Glaser &

Weber, 2007).

There is no precise definition for overconfidence in psychology literature, and the bias has been conceived in three distinct

ways, namely, as the overestimation of one’s actual ability, performance, level of control, or chance of success; the

3
To a review, see Shefrin (2001).
3
overestimation of one’s ability or performance relative to others; and the excessive precision in one’s beliefs (to a review,

see Moore & Healy, 2008).

Calibration studies provide much of the evidence supporting judgmental overconfidence. One of the most consistent

findings is that people are miscalibrated, that is, they are prone to overestimate the probability that their judgments are

correct (for a review, see Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). When people are too confident, they are prone to

believe strongly in the correctness of their judgments, believing thus that they know more than they really know or that

their accuracy is higher than it in fact is (Pulford, 1996).

Notably, overconfidence is the most prevalent phenomena identified by psychological researchers, and while in the area

of cognitive psychology the study of their causes and consequences has been an issue for a long time, in the Economics

and Finance literature it is a rather new field of research (Alemani & Franzosi, 2006).

Behavioral researchers have investigated overconfidence in financial decision-making with field data (Barber & Odean,

2000; Statman et al., 2003; Glaser & Weber, 2007; Alemani & Franzosi, 2006), modeled in theoretical frameworks (Kyle

& Wang, 1997; Benos, 1998; Odean, 1998; Barber & Odean, 1999; Gervais & Odean, 2000;Daniel, Hirshleifer, &

Subramanyam, 1998, 2001; Caballé & Sákovics, 2003), and in laboratory settings (Adams et al., 1995; Benos & Tzafestas,

1997; Camerer & Lovallo, 1999;Kirchler & Maciejovsky, 2002; Brenner et al 2005).

Selecting common stocks that will outperform the market is the type of task for which people are most overconfident

(Barber & Odean, 2002). Overconfidence becomes more intensive when tasks are challenging and complex, and feedback

is unclear or inconclusive, like investing in the stock market, which involves a high degree of uncertainty and requires

investors to deal with highly speculative issues to uncover securities that have the highest expected returns (Daniel et al.,

1998).

Overconfidence has substantial importance in the financial market where forecasters need to deal with numerical

predictions, such as, currency exchanges, earnings and stock prices (Bolger & Onkal-Atay, 2004), and confidence

judgments become crucial to gauging the certainty of these forecasts since a prediction of decreasing stock prices made

with 95% certainty is naturally taken more seriously than a prediction made with 60% certainty (Sieck, Merkle & Zandt,

2007). Having appropriate confidence is important for making appropriate risky decisions, and for knowing when to seek

advice and information (Soll & Klayman, 2004).

Overconfident investors believe their knowledge is more accurate than it really is, that their forecasts are more precise

than their experience should validate (Baker & Nofsinger, 2002), and their personal assessments of the security’s value

are more accurate than the assessments of others, believing more strongly in their own valuations and concerning

themselves less with the beliefs of others (Odean & Barber, 2002). Overconfidence can make investors too certain about

their own opinions leading them to insufficiently consider the opinions of others. Based on unrealistic beliefs about how

4
high their returns will be and how precisely they can be estimated, overconfident investors lower their expected utility by

trading too much and spending time and money on investment information (Wood & Zaichkowsky, 2004).

It has been argued that overconfident investors either overestimate their ability to predict the value of the risk asset or

underestimate the asset’s variance in their financial forecasts, providing thus too narrow confidence intervals

corresponding to a specific probability to contain the actual prices (Glaser, Langer & Weber, 2005; Glaser & Weber,

2007; Alemani & Franzoni, 2006).

Besides the well-know explanation of cognitive biases in information processing, the prevalence of overconfidence in the

financial domain has also been explained as a function of self-attribution bias, the people’s tendency to attribute success

to their own skills, but blame failure on bad luck or others (Daniel et al. 1998, 2001; Barberis & Thaler, 2002, Barber &

Odean, 20024); hindsight bias, the proclivity to see past events as being predictable (Barberis & Thaler, 2002); illusion of

knowledge, the tendency for people to believe that the accuracy of their forecasts increases with more information

(Oskamp, 1965; Nofsinger, 2008), and illusion of control, the tendency to overestimate their level of control and

underestimate the role of luck when investing (Barber & Odean, 2002).

2.1.2 Better-Than-Average Effect

Research findings point out that most people perceived themselves to be better than others with regards to skills or positive

personality attributes very often (Svenson, 1981, Taylor & Brown, 1988; to a review see Alicke & Govorun, 2005). This

phenomenon has been largely labeled in the literature as “better-than-average” effect, which occurs when people believe

and rate themselves as above average, despite the fact that, by definition, the median lies exactly in the middle, with the

population equally divided on either side.

The better-than-average effect is a particular type of social comparison where people compare their characteristics or

behaviors against a norm or standard, which is usually the average standing of their peers on the characteristic (Alicke &

Govorun, 2005). The people’s unrealistically self-evaluation is regarded as one of the most consistent of the self-

enhancement phenomena (see Taylor & Brown, 1988).

In the financial field, it has been argued that overconfident investors are likely to believe that their personal assessments

of security’s values are more accurate than the assessments of others, believing more strongly in their own valuations and

concerning themselves less with the beliefs of others (Odean & Barber, 2002), which should lead investors to overestimate

their abilities to correctly interpret public signals, and among other consequences, to underestimate risk or to overestimate

4
Barber & Odean (2002) sustained the joint operation of three biases underlying investor overconfidence, arguing that
whose earn high returns trading online are likely to attribute this success disproportionately to their own investment ability
rather than luck, becoming, then, overconfident by operation of the self-attribution bias, and moreover, that investors’
overconfidence could be reinforced by illusion of knowledge and illusion of control, since online investors have access
to enormous volume of investment data and also manage their own stock portfolios and execute trades at the click of a
mouse.
5
their ability to beat the market (De Bondt, 1998). Moreover, overconfidence can make investors too certain about their

own opinions leading them to insufficiently consider the opinions of others. (Wood & Zaichkowsky, 2004).

2.1.3 Illusion of Control

Although the outcomes yielding from decisions are typically dependent on an arrangement of luck and skill, research

findings have evidenced that people hold an exaggerated view of how much control they exert over outcomes even of

uncontrollable ones (Langer, 1975; Langer & Roth, 1975;Mckenna, 1993; Koehler, Gibbs & Hogarth 1994;Thompson et

al. 1998; Hougton et al. 2000; Dixon, 2000). Langer (1975) labelled illusion of control as this expectancy of a personal

success probability inappropriately higher than the objective probability would warrant.

Research evidence has shown that people under the operation of illusion of control become prone to behave as though

their personal involvement could influence the outcome of chance events, and also more subject to other cognitive

illusions and biases. People are likely to be more overconfident when feeling control over the outcome of even chance

events (Barber & Odean, 2001; Odean & Barber, 2002; Nofsinger, 2008), and illusion of control appears to influence the

overoptimism of participants’ in predicting the future performance of their investments (Moore et al., 2009).

Illusion of control has been found across different tasks and in many situations (to a review, see Presson & Benassi, 1996),

and people are also subject to overestimate their level of control and underestimate the role of luck when investing

(Statman, 2005).

There is often true difficulty in making the discrimination between controllable and uncontrollable events, “since there

is an element of chance in every skill situation and an element of skill in almost every chance situation” (Langer, 1975).

This closed association becomes more confusing in investment decision-making where investors are likely to confuse the

control they have over investment options, with the control that they lack over the return of those investments (Barber &

Odean, 2001) motivated by high complexity and high uncertainty of financial decision which compels the decision-maker

to rely on intuition (Kahneman & Riepe, 1998).

De Bondt (1998) advocates that investors widely believe that risk can still be managed by knowledge and trading skill

even after funds have been committed - believing, for instance, that it is possible to limit equity exposure selling quickly

in the market. Then, deceived by this illusion of control based on a false belief in universal liquidity, investors could

become encouraged to invest in few assets. In fact, empirical findings have indicated that, very often, individual investors

hold in their portfolios only few stocks (Subrahmanyam, 2007), disregarding portfolio diversification despite the fact that

“we have no control over financial markets” (Statman, 1995).

Barber & Odean (2001) argue that illusion of control may lead investors to trade too speculatively, and many investors

indicated the “feeling of empowerment” as the most important reason to make the transition to online trading, and
6
advertisements for online brokerages often emphasize the importance of taking control of one’s investments (Wood &

Zaichkowsky, 2004).

2.1.4 Self-attribution Bias

Empirical findings have consistently shown that people are prone to take personal responsibility for their desirable

outcomes, yet externalize responsibility for the undesirable outcomes. Notwithstanding the common feature of human

beings to learn about their abilities by observing the consequences of their actions, psychological literature has reported

that individuals tend to overestimate the degree to which they are responsible for their success, and attribute them to

themselves, and conversely, to attribute failures to bad luck, the actions of others or other external factors, a phenomenon

which has been labeled as self-attribution bias (Bem, 1965; Miller & Ross, 1975).

Although most research efforts have focused on individuals performing alone, the analysis of self-serving attributions by

individuals performing within a group has also been addressed by researchers interested in which contextual conditions

individuals are prone to engage in self-enhancing and self-protective attributions (Schlenker, 1975; Forsyth & Schlenker,

1977; Schlenker & Miller, 1977; Forsyth, Berger & Mitchell; 1981; Miller & Schlenker, 1985; Zaccaro, Peterson &

Walker, 1987).

Self-attribution bias seems to be an important component of how investors process information concerning their

investment outcomes and abilities. The behavioral stream of finance and economics has indicated the bias as one of the

mechanisms underlying overconfidence, since “as individuals observe the outcomes of their actions, they update their

confidence in their own ability in a biased manner” (Daniel et al. 1998).

According to Hirshleifer (2001), self-attribution causes investors to learn to be overconfident instead of converging to an

accurate self-assessment. The author argues self-attribution as a barrier arising from self-deception which impedes

investors to simply learn with the outcomes of their past (biased) judgments, since already thinking of themselves as

competent. In Daniel et al. (1998) self-attribution bias intensifies overreactions and leads to short-term momentum and

long-run reversals in stock prices5, since confidence changes asymmetrically as a function of their biased perception,

resulting from the comparison between preceding private signals and new public signals. Gervais & Odean (2001) found

that traders’ overconfidence level increases in the early stages of their career, and so, it should decrease as a function of

their gained experience and greater recognition of their own abilities. Billett & Qian (2005) found that self-attribution

yielding from past success in mergers and acquisitions acquirers to managerial overconfidence in future decision-making.

5
Daniel et al. (1998) argue that such continuing overreaction causes momentum in security prices, but that suchmomentum
is eventually reversed as further public information gradually draws the price back toward fundamentals. Thus, biased
self-attribution implies short-run momentum and long-term reversals.
7
2.2 The Effects of Power on Those Who Possess It

Since there is no consensus in the definition of power, and given the variety of conceptions found in the literature, it

becomes appropriate to specify the conception of power adopted here.

The focus of the present work on the effects of power in a group context leads to drawing from social psychology

literature, where the traditional conception defines power in terms of social influence (Lewin, 1951; Lippitti et al., 1952;

French & Raven, 1959; Vescio et al., 2003; Overbeck, 2010) and control over outcomes (Kelman, 1958; Thibault &

Kelley, 1959; Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al. 2003 Fiske & Berdahl 2007).

Thus, in the present work, power is defined as an individual’s relative capacity to influence others in the collective

decision process by the control of rewards and punishments, attractiveness, expertise/credibility, access and control over

information required by other members (French & Raven, 1959; Raven, 1965, 1992, 1993; Keltner et al. 2003; Forsyth,

2009).

2.2.1 Power Effects on Cognition and Information Processing

Elevated power appears to be related to stereotyping (Fiske, 1993); to psychological distance with respect to others, and,

hence, more abstract information processing (Smith & Trope, 2006); and to increased reliance on the ease of retrieval

(Weick & Guinote 2008). Power leads people to action (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003), and misperception of

control in situations largely determined by chance (Fast et al. 2009). Powerful individuals are less likely to conform and

be influenced by context variables (Galinsky et al., 2008), and to take additional perspectives into account (Galinsky,

Magge, Inesi & Gruenfeld, 2006). People in high power positions engage in biased self-enhancement through the

devaluating of others (Kipnis, 1972), providing increasingly negative evaluations of others’ performances as becoming

more powerful (Georgesen & Harris, 1998), and are prone to explain collective performance in terms of their own

attributes (Fan & Gruenfeld, 1998).

Powerful individuals are more likely to take risks and hold positive expectations about outcomes (Anderson & Galinsky,

2006), and also more prone to better-than-average beliefs and overconfidence (Sivanathan & Galinsky, 2007). To a

review, see Keltner (2008), Forsith (2009), Fiske, Gilbert & Lindsay (2010) and Guinote & Vescio (2010).

It has been argued that elevated power can lead individuals to use automatic social cognition, and recognizing thus the

environment in a more automatic, rapid, and effortless way, through the use of cognitive heuristics and simple rules to

make judgments, instead of controlled social cognition, which is deliberate and effortful, and accounts to multiple

response options and stimulus characteristics (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Keltner et al. 2003;

Russel & Fiske 2010). Guinote (2010) argues that, however, whether powerful people are systematic information

processors capable of efficient judgment, planning and goal-directed action or mindless information processors guided

by heuristics depends on situational factors, such as task difficulty and motivation.

8
The relationship between power, biases and risk attitude has been the focus of selected literature. The Table 1 presents

the findings from this recent psychological literature.

Table 1 Recent findings linking power to biases and risk

Source Power Task Effect on emotion,
Manipulation thought, or action
Anderson & Dispositional power Estimates of future ↑Power—
Galinsky (2006, and power situation personal outcomes ↑Optimism for achieving
Study 1) prime positive and avoiding
negative outcomes.

Anderson & Nonconscious Choice of action in ↑Power—

Galinsky (2006, power prime Asian disease ↑likelihood of risky choice
Study 3) problem

Sivanathan & Power situation Confidence ↑Power—

Galinsky (2007, prime intervals to general ↑Overconfidence
Study 1) knowledge
questions

Sivanathan & Power situation Self-assessment in ↑Power—

Galinsky (2007, prime comparison to peers ↑Better-than-average
Study 2)

Sivanathan & Power situation Choice of roll the ↑Power—

Galinsky (2007, prime die. ↑Illusion of control
Study 3)

Sivanathan & Structural Power Dyadic negotiation ↑Power—

Galinsky (2007, task ↑Overconfidence
Study 4)

Fast et al., (2009, Power situation Choice of roll the ↑Power—

Study 1) prime die. ↑Illusion of control

2.3 Hypotheses

Based on psychological literature on power, and on the cognitive psychology literature on judgmental biases, I intend to

test the positive association between power with the aforementioned cognitive biases.

Power and Overconfidence (Miscalibration): Power makes people recognize the environment in a more automatic, rapid,

and effortless way, through the use of cognitive heuristics and simple rules when making judgments (Fiske, 1993;

Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Keltner et al. 2003; Russel & Fiske 2010), as well as, increases reliance on the

ease of retrieval, making people more likely to judge based on what easily comes to their minds (Weick & Guinote, 2008).

Power also makes people focus more on rewards associated with a given decision (Keltner et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007)

and on their own ideas (Galinsky et al., 2008), and disregard others perspectives and cues in the environment (Galinsky,

Magge, Inesi & Gruenfeld, 2006; Sivanathan & Galisnky, 2007; Galinsky et al., 2008). As a result, powerful individuals

are more likely to anchor on their own private information and be at greater risk to incur in overconfidence, in accordance

with miscalibration findings often explained in terms of a self-focused bias whereby individuals miscalibrate information

9
without the benefit of information available in the environment (Soll, 1996). Thus, taken together, I propose that members

with more power in investment clubs will show more overconfidence in their judgments about both general knowledge

and stock market forecast. Thus:

: The greater the power of an investment club member, the greater his/her level of overconfidence.

Power and Better-than-average effect: Better-than-average effect has been explained by people’s biased information-

processing about self and others, in which one keeps excessive focus on the self with a corresponding lack of attention to

others, serving as the basis of comparison (Griffin & Brenner, 1994).People anchor on their perceived level of skill,

personality attributes or performance, and then adjust insufficiently for the comparative nature of social judgments,

providing comparisons considerably more based on themselves than in their peers (Kruger, 1999). People also retrieve

information about self in greater amounts and with greater perceived ease (Schwarz et al., 1991), and when retrieving

information regarding others they engage less exhaustively and turn up less supporting evidence for the skills and

performance of their peers (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). Power has been shown to influence the selection and weigh

of the information available in the environment which is processed by people’s cognitive structure (Guinote,

2010).Powerful individuals make judgments in a more automatic, rapid, and effortless ways (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin,

Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Keltner et al. 2003; Russel & Fiske 2010), relying more on the ease of retrieval than those

with less power (Weick & Guinote, 2008), and stereotyping people (Fiske, 1993).Powerful individuals pay less attention

to their social environment than low-powered individuals (Galinsky et al., 2006), appearing not to be influenced by others

(Galinsky et al., 2008), disregarding perspectives which are not their own,(Galinsky, Magge, Inesi & Gruenfeld, 2006)and

maintaining psychological distance with respect to others (Smith & Trope, 2006). Last, power influences power holder’s

perceptions about self and others, leading individuals to evaluate performance of their peers negatively and their own

positively (Georgesen & Harris, 1998).

Taken together, I propose that members with more power in investment clubs will present higher self-evaluations in

abilities related to investment activities in comparison with those which have less power. Thus:

: The greater the power of an investment club member the greater the level of better-than-average effect.

Power and Illusion of Control: Besides the true difficulty in making the discrimination between controllable and

uncontrollable events -since there is an element of chance in every skill situation and an element of skill in almost every

chance situation6 - individuals are motivated to control their environment (Langer, 1975; Rothbaum et al, 1982) causing

6Langer (1975).
10
the presence of cues related to having control, such as competition, choice and involvement, to lead to illusion of control

(Langer, 1975; Langer & Roth, 1975; Thompson et al. 1998). Recent research has shown that power serves as one such

cue, (Sivanathan & Galinsky, 2007; Fast et al, 2009), which increases the sense of control of individuals experimenting

or having power, thus leading them to illusory control on events based on chance or largely determined by it.

Investors are likely to confound the control they have over investment options with the control that they lack over the

return those investments realized (Barber & Odean, 2001), and this misperception can become even stronger in powerful

club investors experiencing more influence over other members and control on the collective outcomes. Possessing

resources which other members do not have (e.g., expertise and information), members are likely to feel in greater control

of their decisions and environment.

Taken in concert, I propose that powerful members develop a greater sense of control related to the outcomes of their

investments, and hence, higher illusion of control on stock market concerns in comparison with investors which have less

power. Thus:

: The greater the power of an investment club member, the greater the member’s illusion of control.

Power and Self-attribution: People often erroneously associate control primarily with the occurrence of a desired outcome

seeing themselves as causal, and becoming, thus, more likely to perceive a relationship between their behavior and

outcomes when they succeed than when they fail (Miller & Ross, 1975). Empirical findings have shown that power affects

the perceived connection between one’s action and the desired outcome (Fast et al., 2009), which makes powerful

individuals more likely to engage in self-enhancement phenomenon.

Power also influences power holder’s perceptions about self and others less powerful, leading individuals in higher power

positions to make self-serving attributions established on false feedback about his own worth, through the devaluation of

performance of the less powerful subjects (Kipnis, 1972), to explain collective performance in terms of their own

attributes (Fan & Gruenfeld, 1998), and to evaluate performance of others negatively, and their own positively (Georgesen

& Harris, 1998). Based on these evidences, I hypothesize that powerful investors are more likely to biased self-attributions

related to performance in investment clubs. Thus:

: The greater the power of an investment club member, the greater the level of member’s self-attribution.

3. METHODS

The approach of the effects of power or other relational constructs, requires investigating small groups in real settings,

since to develop experiments able to reproduce such characteristics is pretty hard. Thus, in order to investigate the

relationship between member’s power and his/her level of self-deception biases, I sampled small groups of investors
11
acknowledged as investment clubs, voluntary associations of people who pool their money to invest in stocks in the

Brazilian capital market.

Differently from investment funds, in which people invest in a fund that is managed by a financial institution, in an

investment club, the group members manage their investments. In order to do that, members meet regularly to make

decisions on investments, new member entrance, and amount of capital invested. There are basically two kinds of

Brazilian clubs, closed and openinvestment clubs. The latter in fact, are not investment clubs in their true conception, but

investment funds formed and managed by brokerage firms and banks, and due this fact their members do not participate

in the decision-making process. So, they were not regarded in the present work.

During the clubs’ meetings, members articulate their reasons, pros and cons to buy or sell stocks, discussing their opinions

and judgments overtly. By law, all members can cast one vote in decision making, and in practice, clubs operate under

the majority-rule decision scheme. Although investment clubs are non-hierarchical organizations, and thus, nobody has

legitimate power in the group, members may rely on their power bases to influence other members and make decisions.

When judging, club members can take advice of those who they believe having superior knowledge, or they can turn to

others who generally hold specific information to a better judgment. Moreover, a member can occasionally accept

influence for reasons of identification and respect, or just to avoid conflict and other relational problems. Thus, the

processes underlying decision making may include diverse relations (e.g., identification, expertise, and information) built

on actors’ power bases.

3.1 Sampling and Data Gathering

Since there was not an available list of open and closed Brazilian investment clubs or any public or private source to draw

from, I contacted for the first time each one of the 72 Brazilian brokerage houses which are responsible for the register of

investment clubs in the BOVESPA and CVM7 ,and, for the execution of buying and selling orders. This contact with

brokerages revealed a small number of real investment clubs which accomplished often mettings, where could be

observed social interaction. Thus, after have access to 21 investment clubs, I sampled 7 with full conditions to compose

the present work.

Data gathering occurred by means of a questionnaire developed to collect data on psychometric and relational measures,

in order to analyze the relationship between power and biases at individual level, being applied during the meetings by

one of the researchers.

7
CVM – Brazilian Stock Exchange and Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission.
12
3.2 Variable Measurement

The measurement of power and cognitive biases was based on the conceptions of the constructs presented in the literature

review. Next, it is present the operationalization of each one.

Power: Power has received expressive attention by network analysts, and the development of numerical indices at

individual level (e.g., measures of network centrality or sociometric status) able to describe the power of an actor in terms

of features of his network environment has been an important agenda in social network research (Wasserman & Faust,

1994). In many cases, simple degree centrality measures have been associated with power (Burkhardt & Brass, 1990;

Brass & Burkdardt, 1992, 1993; Krackhardt & Brass, 1994), and I followed this approach to measure club members’

power. Here, power is regarded as the individual’s relative capacity to influence others by the control over rewards and

punishments, attractiveness, expertise, and access to and control over information required by club members (French &

Raven, 1959; Raven, 1965, 1992, 1993; Keltner et al. 2003). In this sense, to obtain measures of the power of each

member, all of them were asked to check off the names of the members who control a particular base of interpersonal

power (Friedkin, 1993). As a measure of the member’s power, I took the sum of the his/her normalized degree centrality

of the 5 matrices constructed from the members' responses, where = ⥡ is the matrix of responses for power base

k, and = 1 if member i reports that member j controls the base (e.g., i identifies with j), or = 0 otherwise.

Overconfidence (Miscalibration): Club members were asked to create confidence intervals with a probability of 90%

containing the true quantities relative to ten questions concerning stock market forecast, and 10 questions from the test

developed by Russo and Schoemaker (1992). Surprise index and the percentage of judgments which lie beyond the

boundaries of the confidence intervals, were compared with the confidence level required to compute individual

overconfidence measures.

Better-than-average effect: To measure better-than-average effect, members will be asked to rate themselves in

comparison to other members of the club, and also, in comparison with the average investor on the next skills in

investment decision making. The average of the percentages provided by each member was taken as proxy of the bias.

Illusion of Control: To measure illusion of control over investments outcomes in the stock market, I employed the four-

item scale developed by Glaser & Weber (2003) composed by a set of questions on luck and skill. The sum of the scores

derived from responses was taken as measure of investor’s illusion of control.

Self-attribution: To estimate self-attribution bias members were asked to respond – on a 7-point unipolar scale anchored

by not at all (1) and very much (7) – four items adapted from Miller and Schlenker (1985) referring to their personally

responsibility to the success and failures in the investment club, and also about the responsibility of all other members. A

positive/negative score indicates a member attributing more/less responsibility for the failures in the club to all other

13
members than to himself, while a positive/negative score indicates a member claiming more/less responsibility for the

success in the club than they are allowing the others.

4. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

The Table 2 presents descriptive statistics relative to all measures computed for the whole sample.

Table 2 Descriptive statistics of measures

N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Power 84 0 4.8 .99 1.13
Self-Attribution 84 -6 7 -.10 2.07
Better-than-average general 84 .17 .95 .55 .18
Better-than-average club 84 .04 .92 .51 .21
Illusion of Control 84 8 18 12.79 2.16
OverconSMF 84 3 9 6.07 1.387
OverconGK 84 3 9 6.56 1.426

Investors were overconfident of their judgments on general knowledge and stock market forecasts, in line with previous

research in the financial field (Kirchler & Marciejovsky, 2002; Alemani & Franzoni, 2006; Glaser & Weber, 2007; David,

Graham & Harvey, 2010). Overconfidence measure (mean of surprise) was higher for the general knowledge scale (M =

6.56; SD = 1.42) than for the stock market forecast scale (M = 6.07; SD = 1.38), t(83) = 2.980; p < .005, indicating that

both tasks were difficult with the former being significantly more difficult that the latter.

The average percentage of surprises was 76% for general knowledge scale and 71% for stock market forecasts, in line

with prior research. Russo & Schoemaker (1992) found percentages ranging between 42% and 64%; Glaser & Weber

(2007) presented 75% for general knowledge questions and 61% for stock market forecasts; and Hilton et al. (2011)

showed percentages from 62% to 78%.

In terms of better-than-average, a mean result of 55% shows that investors believe they are slightly above average in

investment skills, in comparison with the average investor in the stock market. When asked to evaluate themselves in

comparison with other members of their investment clubs, the mean self-evaluation of investors resulted in close to 50%,

indicating absence of better- or worse-than-average effect. However, when controlling to power variable the findings

evidence significant differences between people having power, and those in a powerless position. In conducting an

ANOVA, members in a higher power position show higher and above average self-evaluations related to most investor

in the market (M = 59%, SD = 17% compared to M = 51%; SD = 18%), F(1,82) = 5186, p < .05) than members in lower

power position. While the comparison with other members of the investment club shows also better-than-average effect

to members in a higher power condition, investors in powerless positions rank themselves as worse-than-average (M =

58%, SD = 21% compared to M = 42%; SD = 18%), F(1,82) = 14.06, p < .0001). These findings give primary support to

the predicted relationship between psychological traits and power.

In order to test the hypotheses on the positive relationship between power and cognitive biases, I performed a correlation

analysis between the variables (Table3).

14
Table 3 presents Pearson’s correlations between variables.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

(1) Power —
(2) SelfAttrib .362*** —
(3) Better-T-A .319*** .345*** —
(4) Illusion Cont .364*** .345*** .117 —
(5) OverconSMF .246** .179* -.061 .150 —
(6) OverconGK .386*** .312*** .176+ .153 .431*** —
*p < .10; **p < .05; *** p < .01, two-tailed.

Even though general knowledge questions and stock market forecasts are absolutely diverse tasks8, their scores are

positively and significantly correlated, r = .43, p< .001, supporting stable individual differences in the degree of

miscalibration. Glaser & Weber (2007) found similar results employing both type of tasks, and also Hilton et al. (2011)

presented a positive and significant relationship when using two different scales in general knowledge tasks.

In addition to the two overconfidence measures, it was also calculated each investor’s interval width score by taking each

item, ranking the width of each respondent’s interval, and summing the ranks across investors. Overconfidence scores

were positive and significantly correlated with interval width (r = .45, p< .001, for general knowledge questions, and r =

.59, p< .001 for stock market forecasts) indicating that more overconfident investors also assigned narrower confidence

intervals.

Notably, while the overconfidence scores for stock market forecasts were negatively and not significantly associated with

better-than-average measures relative do investment skills, overconfidence in general knowledge task was virtually

significantly and positively associated with better-than-average scores (r = .176, p = .109).

The absence or the little correlation found here between overconfidence and positive illusions9 such as illusion of control

and better-than-average is consistent with the findings in the psychological literature which have reported no significant

relationship (Deaves et al., 2003; Régner et al., 2004; Moore & Healy, 2008; Hilton et al., 2011). In the financial field,

Glaser, Langer & Weber (2005), Alemanni & Franzosi (2006) and Glaser & Weber (2003, 2007) found similar results.

The more a member discrepancy in attributions of personal responsibility to success and failures in the investment clubs,

the higher his or her overconfidence in both general stock market forecasts and general knowledge questions. In line with

theoretical and empirical evidences about the straight relationship between the two biases, self-attribution scores were

significantly positively associated with the calibration scores of general knowledge questions and almost significant with

those for stock market forecasts (r = .312, p< .10 for GKQ and r = .179, p< .11 for SMF). The association between self-

attribution and overconfidence biases is an underlying assumption in financial models (Daniel et al., 1998; Gervais &

8
Glaser & Weber (2003).
9
Taylor & Brown (1988) labeled them as positive illusions.
15
Odean, 2001; Hirshleifer, 2001). Self-attribution scores were also significantly and positively associated with the better-

than-average effect and illusion of control measures (r = .3447, p< .10, and r = .3455, p< .10 respectively).

Table 3 shows that all psychological traits were positively associated with power measure, supporting all the developed

hypotheses in the present work, according to higher levels of power would lead to higher levels of biases.

Since gender has often been associated to stable individual differences in the extant literature, I present also descriptive

statistics computed for the whole sample clustered by gender as well as F-statistics and p-values relative to mean

differences for all measures (Table 4).

Table 4 Oneway ANOVA by gender

Women Men
F(1,82) P-Value
Mean SD Mean SD
Power .685 .199 1.173 .152 3.776 .055*
Self-attribution -.968 .354 .415 .270 9.650 .003***
Better-than-average .454 .029 .609 .022 17.479 <..000***
Illusion of control 12.452 .388 12.981 .297 1.175 .282
OverconFin 6.226 .250 5.981 .191 .606 .438
OverconGer 6.935 .252 6.340 .193 3.520 .064*
*p < .10; **p < .05; *** p < .01, two-tailed.

Data showed interesting significant gender differences. For instance, women appear more overconfident in the precision

of their knowledge, while men judge themselves more responsible for success, but not for failures in the club in

comparison with other members, and also more prone to consider themselves as better than average in questions

concerning investment skill.. Moreover, men are assigned as having more power in investment club settings.

In order to address some relationships between different power measures, I dichotomized high- and low-power by

performing a median-split of the power measure concerning power bases obtained for the whole sample.

I found that higher-power individuals were more sought after for advice and information than low-power individuals (M

= .37, SD = .27 compared to M = .03; SD = .06; F(1,82) = 65.04, p <.0001), according with Friedkin’s (1998) assumption

that actors with noteworthy power basis on expertise and information in domains of interest to others actors would be

more sought after.

Powerful members also judged themselves both more responsible for success (M = .74, SD = .27 compared to M = -1.31;

SD = 1.52; F(1,82) = 32.95, p<.0001), and less responsible for failures (M = -.07, SD = 1.50 compared to M = .45; SD =

1.23; F(1,82) = 3.0445, p<.01) than those powerless. Moreover, the self-attribution measure employed to capture the

discrepancy between the attribution of success and failures revealed that power holders were more biased (M = 0.67, SD

= 2.32 compared to M = -0.86; SD = 1.44), F(1,82) = 13.047, p <.001) than members with less power.

16
4.1 Regression Analysis

The sample is composed of 84 members nested in seven investment clubs, which can make the use of the single level

regression model not appropriated.

Data collected in groups can violate assumptions of independence, and provide biased estimation of error variance due to

correlation of a group member’s scores (see Kenny & Voie, 1985), which may affect inferential statistics and p-values,

and hence lead to false conclusions. Thus, nonindependence was investigated for each dependent variable.

Kenny and La Voie (1985) suggest testing the intraclass correlation of each variable when searching for evidence of

nonindependence, a useful parameter associated to one-way Anova with random-effects (Bryk & Raundenbush, 2002).

The intraclass correlation can be interpreted as the correlation between the scores from two individuals who are in the

same group, or alternatively, as the proportion of variation in the outcome measure that is accounted for by a group (Kashy

& Kenny, 2000).

In order to compute intraclass coefficients, the variance decomposition by a fully unconditional hierarchical linear model

was performed, in which there is no specified predictor at individual or group levels (see Bryk & Raundenbush (2002).

In the level-1 model (individual) was set to zero for all j (investment club), yielding:

= +

where each , level-1 error, is assumed normally distributed with mean zero and constant level-1 variance, . The

prediction of the psychometric scores within each level-1 unit was performed with only one group parameter, the intercept

, in this case, equal to the mean score of the psychometric measure for the jth, that is, . In the level-2 model

(investment club) was set to zero for the ANOVA with random effects:

= +

where represents the grand-mean of the psychometric mesure in the population, and is the random effect

associated with group j, and is assumed to have a mean zero and variance . Thus, the combined random effects model10

results:

= + +

→ grand mean

→ group (level-2) effect

→ individual (level-1) effect

10
The label random effects model is due the random process employed in the construction of the group effects.
17
 Table 5 shows the estimated between-group variance - corresponding to the term INTRCPT1 - and within group variance

- corresponding to the term level-1. The intraclass correlation coefficient for each variable was obtained by the ratio of

the two variance components estimates in the fully unconditional model:

Var$Y&' ( = Var$u ' + r&' ( = τ +σ

,= / +

where is the between-group variance, and is the within-group variance. Table 6 presents the intraclass correlation

for each dependent variable.

Table 5 Variance Components of Biases

Standard Variance
Random Effect df Chi-square P-value
Deviation Component
Overconfidence INTRCPT1, R0 .02417 .00058 6 4.83505 >.500
GKQ level-1, E 1.42558 2.03228

Overconfidence INTRCPT1, R0 .12905 .01665 6 6.54832 .364

SMF level-1, E 1.38127 1.90792

Self-attribution INTRCPT1, R0 .32360 .10472 6 7.35897 .288

level-1, E 2.04626 4.18718

Illusion of control INTRCPT1, R0 1.02244 1.04539 6 24.86621 .001

level-1, E 1.95319 3.81496

Better-than-average INTRCPT1, R0 .05383 .00290 6 13.20971 .039

level-1, E .17150 .02941

The hypothesis of no between-group variance for illusion of control and better-than-average effect was rejected (table 6),

supporting that a significant portion of the total variance of the two biases occurs between groups.

Table 6 Intraclass Correlation Coefficients for Biases

Between-Club Within-Club Intraclass

Variance Variance Correlation
OverConGer .00058 2.03228 .00029
OverConInv .01665 1.90792 .00865
SelfAttrib .10472 4.18718 .02440
BTA .00290 .02941 .08976
Illusion 1.04539 3.81496 .21509

The 7 investment clubs sampled are small groups of 10 to 15 people, which reduces the potential effects of intraclass

correlation on p values. The ICC for overconfidence in both tasks were very small, which might allow accomplishing the

statistical analysis at single level performing a traditional multiple linear regression for these dependent variables.

However, since an intraclass correlation equal to .01 is still likely to bias standard errors, and that the measures obtained

for self-attribution, better-than-average effect and illusion of control were higher than this parameter; it was decided to

18
 treat this problem of nonindependence by adopting a hierarchical linear model design.

RANDOM INTERCEPT MODEL

Based on the fully unconditional model employed previously, where there is no predictor at individual or group levels, a

random intercept model was performed by adding power and the control variables age, genre, financial background and

the “Big Five factors” as predictors at individual level. Diversely from the traditional analysis regression, the coefficients,

t-statistics and p-values provided by the random intercept model are unbiased.

Table 7 Random Intercept Model - Coefficients for the Regression of Biases on Power and Control Variables

Dependent Variables
Independent
Variable OvercGK OvercSMF SelfAttrib IlluControl BTA

Constant 5.623*** 6.850*** 2.437 11.546*** 0.563**

(3.967) (4.689) (1.177) (5.341) (3.281)

Age .024* .027* .036* -.007 .000

(1.692) ( 1.829 ) (1.750) (-.309) (.099)

Genre 1.437*** .603+ -.771 -.036 -.086**

(3.825) (1.646) (-1.432) (-.062) (-1.887)

FinBack -.042 -.226 -.145 1.156 -.034

(-.072) (-.369) (-.169) (1.318) (-.476)

Extraversion -.010 .022 -.037 -.019 -.000

(-.432) (.904) (-1.100) (-.550) (-.156)

Agreeableness -.040 -.023 -.076+ -.032 -.008

(-1.267) (-.717) (-1.646) (-.685) (-2.198)

Conscientiousness -.016 -.044 -.036 .050 .000

(-.574) (-1.465) (-.854) (1.200) (.175)

Emotional Stability .019 .010 -.003 .004 .000

(.934) (.453) (-.111) (.130) (.092)

Intelect .017 -.023 .035 .019 .008**

(.587) (-.740) (.804) (.422) (2.187)

Power – PA .548*** .339** .494** .471** .036*

(3.267) (2.080) (2.161) (2.009) (1.922)

*p < .10; **p < .05; *** p < .01, two-tailed.

Among the control variables included in the models, age resulted significantly and positively related to self-attribution

and overconfidence, in both general knowledge questions and stock market forecasts, in line with assumptions that the

variable affects financial decisions (Barber & Odean, 2001; Dorn & Huberman, 2002; Glaser & Weber 2004, 2007).

Intelect appeared to be determinant to. In line with this finding signalized by the oneway ANOVA developed primarily,

after to control for the other variables, regression results indicated that women were more overconfident about the

19
precision of their knowledge, but less prone to believe themselves as better than average in investment skills. This

positively significantly association between gender and overconfidence contrasts with previous research, which found no

gender differences in miscalibration studies (e.g., Lichtenstein et al. 1982; Gigerenzer, et al. 1991; Biais et al., 2005).

Moreover, gender appeared positively and almost significantly at 10% level (p < .11) associated with overconfidence in

stock market forecasts, contrasting with former studies in the financial field, which have assumed a higher level of the

bias amongst men (Barber & Odean, 2001).

As hypothesized, power was found to be positively significant for all dependent variables11. Regression coefficients

indicated that individuals having more power were more overconfident in both general knowledge questions and in their

predictions on stock market forecasts; made higher than average self-assessment of investment skills in comparison to

other investors; believed more to be able to control or predict the market; attributed more personal responsibility to success

than failures with respect investment performance in the club; and were most optimist about the future. Interesting,

investors having more power in the investment club did not appear more prone to risk than investors in less power

positions.

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The present research examined the relationship of power in investment club settings with a cluster of cognitive biases.

Based on cognitive psychology literature, and on theoretical and empirical evidence from recent social psychology

research, it was hypothesized that powerful members show higher levels of biases than powerless members.

As predicted, power shows a significant positive association with all psychological traits treated here. Club investors

showed overconfidence in their judgments and, most important, power appeared to affect the degree of the bias in

information processing. Powerful investors presented higher overestimations of their judgments than those powerless,

and also assigned narrower confidence intervals in their stock market forecasts, evidencing that having power in a real

investment setting leads to greater confidence in the precision of specific knowledge about investments.

Although the average investor did not show biased attribution with respect group performance, after considering power

differences the pattern appeared overtly. It was founded found that powerful investors assigned themselves as more

responsible for successes, but not for failures, in the group performance, according with evidence that powerful people

make self-serving attributions (Kipnis, 1972), evaluate others’ performance negatively whereas himself positively

(Georgesen & Harris, 1998) and explain collective performance in terms of their own attributes (Fan & Gruenfeld, 1998).

11
I tested to possible moderation effects of gender and age variables. There were no moderation effects of the two
variables in the relationship between power and biases.

20
Financial theorists have argued an important role to self-attribution bias in their market models, and also claiming that

overconfidence partially stems from it (Daniel et al. 1998, 2001; Hirshleifer, 2001; Barberis & Thaler 2002).

The likely misperception experimented by individual investors related to the control that they have over investment

options, with the control that they lack over the return of those investments realized (Barber & Odean, 2001), seemed to

be reinforced by power. Club investors with more power perceived stock market outcomes as more controllable and

predictable, supporting the hypothesis that power can work as a cue, leading to biased perceptions of control (Fast et al.,

2009).

Powerful investors showed greater better-than-average perceptions about their investment skills in comparison to other

members of their groups, which could be partially explained by perceptions to be more able to influence investment

concerns in the club. However, when asked to compare themselves with the ordinary average investor, powerful members

also viewed themselves as better than average. On the other hand, investors in powerless positions showed worse-than-

average perceptions in comparison with the other members of their own group, and when asked to evaluate themselves

in comparison with the average investor, their mean response lay on the mean. Taken in concert, these findings suggest

that powerless individuals adjust their self-evaluations accounting to the context of the social comparison, while the

powerful see themselves invariably better.

Financial theorists often assume gender differences in overconfidence, sustaining a higher level of the bias amongst men

(Barber & Odean, 2001), although outside of the financial field, research findings have pointed out no gender differences

to the bias (Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Gigerenzer, et al., 1991; Biais et al., 2005). Here, notably, women were significantly

more overconfident (miscalibrated) than men in both general knowledge and stock market forecast and, moreover, they

considered themselves worse-than-average in investment skills, and less responsible for success in investment club

performance.

Notably, the findings in the present research point out a paradoxical situation: powerful members in investment clubs are

both, the more sought for advice and information and also the more biased in their judgments related to investment

concerns, which can compromise the collective performance.

The identification of power as one of the factors influencing the investors’ level of biases may contribute to the better

understanding of investor’s attitude and behavior, as well as offering the possibility to improve it, by providing some cues

to debiasing actions: “Learning more about what makes some people more prone to overconfidence, how, and when, will

be invaluable in understanding the processes that affect confidence judgments and how those can be improved” (Klayman

& Burt, 1998).

Last, although the current research is carried out in investment clubs, I believe that the analysis of the relationship between

social power and biases could be translated to other settings where investment decision-making is performed in groups,

such as retirement or pension funds in which investment decisions are made by an elected board. Since pension funds and

21
other kinds of institutional investors12 pool large sums of money and hold an important share in the stock market, it would

be interesting to account for individuals’ biases and social power in group decision processes of market stock players,

and investigate potential consequences for financial markets and institutions.

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