Chs Fire Dept Lawsuit

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The document appears to be a legal complaint filed by a former firefighter against his employer and several individuals alleging injuries due to hazing. The plaintiff claims he suffered hearing loss due to an explosive device placed under his cot.

The plaintiff, a former firefighter, is suing his employer, the City of Charleston Fire Department, and several individuals for injuries sustained due to hazing by fellow firefighters.

The plaintiff alleges that due to a culture of hazing, harassment, and hostility tolerated by leadership, he suffered permanent hearing loss when another firefighter placed an explosive device under his cot. He further alleges this culture drives away qualified recruits and endangers public safety.

ELECTRONICALLY FILED - 2023 Oct 12 12:39 PM - CHARLESTON - COMMON PLEAS - CASE#2023CP1005032

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS


) FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON ) CASE NO.: 2023-CP-10_______
)
GEORGE BOLOVIS, )
)
Plaintiff, ) SUMMONS
) (Jury Trial Demanded)
v. )
)
THE CITY OF CHARLESTON FIRE )
DEPARTMENT (THE CITY OF )
CHARLESTON); ANDREW (“KYLE”). )
WEBB, in his individual capacity; )
WILLIAM HAIGLER, in his individual )
capacity; KEVIN MORRIS, in his )
individual capacity; KEVIN CARTER, in )
his individual capacity; )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)

TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS:

YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to Answer the Complaint in this action,
a copy of which is herewith served upon you and to serve a copy of your Answer to said
Complaint on the subscriber at his office, Apostolou Law Firm, LLC, 3443 Rivers Avenue, North
Charleston, South Carolina, 29405, within thirty (30) days after the service hereof, exclusive of
the day of such service and if you fail to answer the Complaint within the time aforesaid, the
Plaintiff in this action will apply to the Court for the relief demanded in the Complaint and will
seek a default judgment against you.

APOSTOLOU LAW FIRM

/S/ Michael Thomas Cooper


Michael Thomas Cooper, SC Bar 100053
3443 Rivers Avenue
North Charleston, SC 29405
Ph (843) 853-3637
[email protected]
Attorney for Plaintiff
Dated: Thursday, October 12, 2023
North Charleston, South Carolina!

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ELECTRONICALLY FILED - 2023 Oct 12 12:39 PM - CHARLESTON - COMMON PLEAS - CASE#2023CP1005032
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
) FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON ) CASE NO.: 2023-CP-10_______
)
GEORGE BOLOVIS, )
)
Plaintiff, ) COMPLAINT
) (Jury Trial Demanded)
v. )
)
THE CITY OF CHARLESTON FIRE )
DEPARTMENT (THE CITY OF )
CHARLESTON); ANDREW (“KYLE”). )
WEBB, in his individual capacity; )
WILLIAM HAIGLER, in his individual )
capacity; KEVIN MORRIS, in his )
individual capacity; KEVIN CARTER, in )
his individual capacity; )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, above-named, who would respectfully allege and show unto

the Court as follows:

PREFACE

1. As preface to the present legal action, Plaintiff is a former employee of the Charleston Fire

Department who sustained permanent hearing loss as a direct and proximate result of a

fellow fireman placing an explosive device underneath Plaintiff’s cot within the fire station,

a government building.

2. Plaintiff brings the present legal action, because Plaintiff firmly believes the residents and

taxpayers of the City of Charleston deserve a fire department worthy of our beautiful and

historic city.

3. Plaintiff believes and understands there is a culture of hazing, harassment, and hostility at

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ELECTRONICALLY FILED - 2023 Oct 12 12:39 PM - CHARLESTON - COMMON PLEAS - CASE#2023CP1005032
certain fire stations within the City that drives away talented and highly qualified recruits

and fellow firemen. Within these fire stations there exists a good-ole-boy attitude and

mentality that is prioritized over the safety and well-being of the public. This culture is

known and tolerated by leadership within the City of Charleston Fire Department.

4. As a victim of such hazing, Plaintiff seeks to shed light on these problems and effect what

change this litigation might bring about.

PARTIES AND JURISDICTION

5. Plaintiff, George Bolovis (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff” or “Bolovis”), is a citizen and

resident of Charleston County, South Carolina. During all times relevant herein, Plaintiff

was an employee of the City of Charleston and the Charleston Fire Department.

6. Defendant City of Charleston is a municipal subdivision of the State of South Carolina with

its principal offices located in Charleston County, South Carolina. The City of Charleston

operates the Charleston Fire Department (hereinafter “CFD” or “Fire Department”), a

department within the municipal subdivision.

7. Upon information and belief, Defendant Andrew Webb (hereinafter “Defendant Webb” or

“Webb”) is a resident and citizen of Charleston County, South Carolina. Defendant Webb is

sued in his individual capacity, however, during all times relevant herein Defendant Webb

was an employee of the City of Charleston and the Fire Department.

8. Upon information and belief, Defendant William Haigler (hereinafter “Defendant Haigler” or

“Haigler”) is a resident and citizen of Charleston County, South Carolina. Defendant Haigler

is sued in his individual capacity, however, during all times relevant herein Defendant

Haigler was an employee of the City of Charleston and the Fire Department.

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9. Upon information and belief, Defendant Kevin Morris (hereinafter “Defendant Morris” or

“Morris”) is a resident and citizen of Charleston County, South Carolina. Defendant Morris

is sued in his individual capacity, however, during all times relevant herein Defendant Morris

was an employee of the City of Charleston and the Fire Department.

10. Upon information and belief, Defendant Kevin Carter (hereinafter “Defendant Carter” or

“Carter”) is a resident and citizen of Charleston County, South Carolina. Defendant Carter is

sued in his individual capacity, however, during all times relevant herein Defendant Carter

was an employee of the City of Charleston and the Fire Department.

11. All events giving rise to this action took place in Charleston County, South Carolina.

12. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter and venue is proper pursuant to S.C. Code §

15-7-30.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

13. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the above numbered paragraphs as is set

forth herein verbatim.

14. Plaintiff, George Bolovis began employment with the City of Charleston in August 2019 and

graduated from the 19-02 recruit class as a certified level 2 fire fighter.

15. Plaintiff was hired to serve the Charleston community as a fire fighter and EMT.

16. Upon information and belief, the Fire Department’s values are: Honor, Commitment,

Community, Integrity, and Professionalism. See https://www.charleston-sc.gov/2012/

Mission-Vision-Values.

17. The City defines “Commitment” as “Duty and responsibility to our community and members

of the organization.”

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ELECTRONICALLY FILED - 2023 Oct 12 12:39 PM - CHARLESTON - COMMON PLEAS - CASE#2023CP1005032
18. The City defines “Integrity” as “Being honest, respectful, and loyal to our community and

peers.”

19. The City defines “Professionalism” as “Achieve excellence through progressive training and

courteous service.”

20. Plaintiff espouses these same values and ideals. However, in Plaintiff’s personal experience

at the Fire Department and especially within Station 13, such values are not being upheld

and there is a complete lack of accountability for their disregard.

21. At the time of Plaintiff’s hire, Plaintiff entered the Fire Department as a probationary fire

fighter commonly referred to as a “grey shirt” because probationary fire fighters wear a grey

uniform shirt while fully vested fire fighters wear a blue uniform shirt.

22. During a fire fighter’s probationary period, the fire fighter is supposed to perform drills with

his or her unit and learn all of the ins and outs of the duties and responsibilities of a fire

fighter. During this probationary period, the fire fighter conducts physical exercises as well

as mental ones.

23. Plaintiff completed his probationary period and earned a blue shirt.

24. Plaintiff along several with other fire fighters from Engine 113, was awarded a Life Saving

Award on November 18, 2022 for exemplary service to the Charleston Community.

25. However, the City failed to notify Plaintiff about the award or ceremony thereby excluding

him from the awards ceremony. Plaintiff only later found out about the award through word

of mouth.

26. Even though only possessing the rank of fire fighter, Plaintiff volunteered for and was

appointed to the strategic planning committee for the City of Charleston Fire Department.

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27. Plaintiff is not a South Carolina native being originally from Queens, New York.

28. Plaintiff moved to Charleston from Alabama. In Alabama, Plaintiff was a member of the

Laborers Union, Local 366, employed through Day and Zimmermann, conducting job-site

safety inspections and supervisions to prevent fire hazards within Browns Ferry Nuclear

Power Plant.

29. Plaintiff is of Greek heritage and decent.

30. When Plaintiff joined the fire department, he was assigned to James Island, Station 13, in the

City of Charleston.

31. Upon information and belief, the individual fire fighters stationed on James Island are all, if

not mostly all, from James Island and the surrounding areas.

32. Upon information and belief, the individual fire fighters stationed on James Island for

Plaintiff’s same shift, at the time giving rise to this action, were tenured fire fighters with at

least 10 years of employment with the fire department and had been working together that

time.

33. Upon information and belief, these fire fighters viewed Plaintiff as an outsider and made sure

to treat him the same.

34. On one occasion while Plaintiff was still a grey shirt, Defendant Carter took Plaintiff on a

night drive by themselves and informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff did not belong at the James

Island fire station, would not be welcome there, and that Plaintiff would never fit in there

because he was an outsider.

35. On multiple occasions, Defendant Carter requested Plaintiff put in a request for a transfer out

of Defendant Carter’s Station on James Island.

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36. Even after Plaintiff completed his probationary period and was a full-blown blue shirt, the

fire fighters with whom Plaintiff was stationed continued to haze him and subject him to

drills, duties, and other tasks that they singularly imposed upon him alone.

37. One example of such hazing took place when Plaintiff was forced to drill, by himself, in full

fire fighter gear, including his mask with oxygen, for extensive periods of time. This drilling

served no purpose except to harass, intimidate, and abuse Plaintiff.

38. On the day of the incident giving rise to this action, Plaintiff was forced to do the above-

described drilling by himself and for no other reason but to harass, intimidate, and abuse

Plaintiff.

39. Another example of such hazing took place where Plaintiff was made to be the only person

to clean the bathrooms in the Station, as he was the lowest ranking and newest member of

the force.

40. Immediately after Plaintiff would finish cleaning the bathrooms, ranking personnel, and

specifically Defendant Carter, would relieve themselves/ himself by urinating on the floor of

the bathroom and then direct Plaintiff to go back in to finish cleaning the bathroom. This

happened on multiple occasions where ranking personnel would urinate on the floor

immediately after Plaintiff had finished cleaning and then instruct him to go back into the

bathroom to clean it again.

41. Another example of such hazing took place on another occasion when Plaintiff was eating

dinner. Plaintiff was eating with other staff when Defendant Carter interrupted the meal to

instruct Plaintiff to go clean the bathtub in the shower because Defendant Carter had “left

and oyster” in the shower. Defendant Carter used this euphemism to mean that he wanted

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Plaintiff to clean the showers where Defendant Carter had recently masturbated. While

Plaintiff refused to follow Defendant Carter’s order, Plaintiff understood Defendant Carter’s

intent to embarrass, intimidate, and harass Plaintiff.

42. As the newest member at the James Island station, Plaintiff was expected to singularly

perform all of the “grunt” work and labor-intensive upkeep tasks, like cleaning, yard-work,

and other similar tasks that would generally and ordinarily be shared among the while team

of fire fighters at the station.

43. On top of having to perform all of the station duties normally shared by the shift team,

Plaintiff was generally the only EMT for his shift which meant that Plaintiff had to respond

to all injury calls, handle all medical aspects, and complete all paperwork relating to all

injury calls. This singular responsibility fell to Plaintiff because the other fire fighters on his

shift were not required to be EMTs as is the current standard and requirement because they

were “grandfathered in.”

44. On another occasion, the fire fighters on the same shift as Plaintiff mocked his Greek

heritage when Plaintiff was asked to cook Greek food for everyone. Plaintiff made chicken

gyros and tzatziki sauce. After this meal, the other members of Plaintiff’s shift would mock

Plaintiff about the meal repeatedly telling him how disgusting they thought it was and so on.

45. Plaintiff continually endured such hazing and harassment because Plaintiff felt called to be a

fire fighter and wanted to serve the Charleston community.

46. Plaintiff hoped the hazing would stop if he endured it long enough. Unfortunately, that did

not happen and the hazing never stopped.

47. On October 15, 2020, the date of the incident giving rise to this action, Plaintiff was again

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singled out and made to perform drills by himself wearing full gear including oxygen mask

and other equipment.

48. After that hazing exercise ended, Plaintiff showered off and began his regular maintenance

and cleaning duties around the station to include making up his bunk.

49. On the date of the incident giving rise to this action, Plaintiff was making up his bunk when

he flipped over the bunk mattress to have it made up on Plaintiff’s preferred side of the

mattress because there is a firm side and soft side.

50. When Plaintiff flipped the mattress over and it landed back on the bed frame, some type of

incendiary device exploded from somewhere underneath his bunk.

51. Upon the explosion Plaintiff fell over onto the bed and then rolled onto the floor.

52. The explosion caused an extremely loud noise, which immediately made Plaintiff nauseated

and caused pain and ringing in his ears.

53. The explosion from the incendiary device created so much sulfuric smoke that the crew had

to open up the doors and windows of the fire station and turn on all of the fans to vent out the

smell and smoke from the station.

54. Right after the explosion, while Plaintiff was still on the ground, Defendant Carter came out

of his office in the adjacent room and asked Plaintiff what happened telling Plaintiff that he

thought that Plaintiff had brought a gun to work and shot himself in the head.

55. Defendant Carter’s comment demonstrates his actual knowledge of the hazing and its

severity such that Defendant Carter thought Plaintiff might have been so suicidal that he

brought a gun to work to kill himself there at the fire station.

56. Defendant Carter then walked back out of the bunk room without offering aid or saying

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anything else to Plaintiff and leaving Plaintiff lying on the floor.

57. When the explosion happened Plaintiff immediately reported to his supervisors and ranking

department employees the injury to his ears, ringing, and terrible headache that he was

experiencing.

58. Not one of Plaintiff’s supervisors or ranking personnel took any action in response to the

incident.

59. Plaintiff was not offered any medical assistance or evaluation.

60. No report was made by Plaintiff’s fellow employees or supervisors to the City of Charleston

or Fire Department leadership on the date of the incident about what happened or the harm to

Plaintiff.

61. After the explosion, Plaintiff finished out his shift in the computer room and on his bunk and

then went home.

62. After the incident, Plaintiff was pressured by his supervisors, including Defendant Carter and

Defendant Morris, to not report the incident or his injury to the City of Charleston or the

highest levels of the Fire Department.

63. Upon information and belief, Defendants Carter, Morris, and Haigler each took overt steps to

cover up the incident up to and including lying to ranking officials within the Fire

Department about the incident and his/their knowledge thereof.

64. Plaintiff ultimately had no choice but to seek medical attention because he had persistent

ringing in his ears, impaired hearing, hyperacusis, and ongoing headaches.

65. The explosion directly and proximately caused Plaintiff to suffer a permanent partial hearing

loss to the extent that Plaintiff can no longer qualify to work as a fire fighter ever again.

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ELECTRONICALLY FILED - 2023 Oct 12 12:39 PM - CHARLESTON - COMMON PLEAS - CASE#2023CP1005032
AS A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Battery
As to the Individually-Named Defendants

66. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs as if set forth

herein verbatim.

67. The use of an incendiary device by Defendants against Plaintiff as set forth above constitutes

the infliction of forcible contact on the person of another, namely Plaintiff.

68. The forcible contact with Plaintiff was the direct and proximate cause of serious physical

injuries to include damage to Plaintiff’s hearing, hyperacusis, and intractable headaches.

69. Upon information and belief, the above-named individual Defendants, acted in concert,

jointly and severally, to cause the battery described herein and resulting injuries to Plaintiff.

70. As set forth more fully in Plaintiff’s prayer for relief, the above-named individual

Defendants are liable, separately, individually, and/or jointly and severally for the

compensatory damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct and proximate result of their actions

as set forth herein.

71. As set forth more fully in Plaintiff’s prayer for relief, the above-named individual

Defendants are liable, separately and individually, for punitive damages in this action.

AS A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION


Civil Conspiracy
As to the Individually-Named Defendants

72. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs as if set forth

herein verbatim.

73. The above-named individual Defendants combined and conspired for the purpose of injuring

Plaintiff.

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74. These individual Defendants acted for the purpose of injuring Plaintiff by and through the

coordinated harassment, hazing, and abuse to cause such harm to Plaintiff to make him quit

his employment as a fire fighter, request transfer to another station, resign from the City of

Charleston, and/or commit suicide.

75. These Defendants committed such overt acts as forcing Plaintiff to drill alone in full gear,

singling Plaintiff out for hazing, pressuring other fire fighters in the station and department

to remain silent about the abuse suffered upon Plaintiff, lying about such abuse to hide the

truth from ranking officials with the Fire Department, and such other overt acts that might be

obtained through discovery and proved at trial.

76. Plaintiff suffered special damages as a direct and proximate result of the above-described

conspiracy. Those special damages include loss of employment, loss of ability to serve as a

fire fighter, emotional and mental distress, harm to reputation, and such other special

damages to be proved at the trial of this action.

AS A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION


Violation of Fourteenth Amendment Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
As to All Defendants

77. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs as if set forth

herein verbatim.

78. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees certain recognized

substantive due process rights, including and specifically the rights to life, liberty, and bodily

integrity. These rights have been incorporated through the 14th Amendment as to the States

and such political subdivisions as the City of Charleston. See e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430

U.S. 651 (1977) (recognizing right to bodily integrity as a liberty interest under the 14th

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ELECTRONICALLY FILED - 2023 Oct 12 12:39 PM - CHARLESTON - COMMON PLEAS - CASE#2023CP1005032
Amendment).

79. The City of Charleston is a municipality subject to suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the

City is a “person” as defined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Monell v. Dept. of

Social Services, 436 U.Sd. 658 (1978).

80. The individually-named Defendants, at all times relevant herein, were employees of the City

of Charleston Fire Department and interacted with Plaintiff in such capacity as an employee

of the City of Charleston.

81. The individually-named Defendants, during all relevant times herein, were state actors and

acting under the color of state law.

82. The City of Charleston, by and through the ranking supervisors, Defendant Morris,

Defendant Carter, and/or Defendant Haigler, deliberately established and/or adopted policies,

procedures, customs, and practices that Defendants knew violated Plaintiff’s substantive due

process rights. Furthermore, Plaintiff understands and believes that Defendants intentionally

adopted the practice, custom, policy, and procedure of hazing, harassment, intimidation, and

abuse with the intent of harming Plaintiff including causing physical injury in addition to

taking Plaintiff’s ability to work and serve his community as a fire fighter.

83. Defendants’ conduct as set forth herein above was deliberately intended to injure Plaintiff,

shocks the conscience, and constitutes an arbitrary executive abuse of power. In addition

and/or in the alternative, Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the substantive due

process rights of Plaintiff by subjecting him to hazing and harassment culminating in the use

of an explosive device intended to injure and harm Plaintiff.

84. In addition, the use of the explosive device by a person acting under the color of state law is

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an intentional, conscience shocking, and deliberate assault on Plaintiff’s substantive due

process right to bodily integrity by the individually-named Defendants as set forth above.

85. As a direct and proximate result of the deliberate indifference and/or intentional acts by

Defendants, as state actors and/or individuals acting under color of state law, Plaintiff

suffered serious and permanent bodily injury in addition to other compensatory damages.

The individually-named Defendants are each liable for the punitive damages arising out of

their own specific and individual acts of intentional harm and deliberate indifference.

AS A FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION


Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress/ Outrage
As to the Individually-Named Defendants

86. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs as if set forth

herein verbatim.

87. Defendants intentionally and/or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress through the

above-described acts and/or omissions.

88. In addition and/or in the alternative, it was certain or substantially certain that such distress

would result from Defendants’ conduct described more fully above.

89. Defendants’ conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of

decency and must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.

90. Such outrageous conduct included intentionally urinating on the floor of the bathroom so that

Plaintiff would have to clean up the urine, masturbating in the facility so that Plaintiff would

have to clean up Defendant’s bodily fluids, forcing Plaintiff to perform drills in full gear

alone and with the sole purpose of harassing, intimidating, hazing, and embarrassing

Plaintiff.

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91. No decent society should or would tolerate such conduct and the Charleston community

should not tolerate such conduct - especially within public service departments who are

employed to protect the health and safety of the community and its residents.

92. Defendants actions were the direct and proximate cause of severe emotional distress upon

Plaintiff and such distress was so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure

it.

93. Defendants are liable, individually and jointly and severally, for the compensatory damages

caused by their extreme and outrageous conduct, and the punitive damages that may be

awarded by the finder of fact against the individually-named Defendants separately and

independently for each Defendant’s own conduct.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

94. Wherefore, Plaintiff prays for the following:

A. Judgment against Defendants, individually and/or jointly and severally, for all

compensatory damages found and awarded by the trier of fact in this action;

B. Judgment against Defendants, individually and/or jointly and severally, for all special

damages found and awarded by the trier of fact in this action;

C. Judgement against the individually-named Defendants, individually and separately, for

punitive damages found and awarded by the trier of fact in this action;

D. An award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;

E. And any and all such other relief that the Court and/or the trier of fact find to be just and

proper.

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Respectfully Submitted,

APOSTOLOU LAW FIRM

/S/ Michael Thomas Cooper


Michael Thomas Cooper, SC Bar 100053
3443 Rivers Avenue
North Charleston, SC 29405
Ph (843) 853-3637
[email protected]
Attorney for Plaintiff

Dated: Thursday, October 12, 2023


North Charleston, South Carolina

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