FIRST DIVISION

FERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT G.R. No. 156081

JOHN SOBREPEÑA, and RAFAEL
PEREZ DE TAGLE, JR.,
Petitioners, Present:

Davide, Jr., C.J.,

(Chairman),
Quisumbing,
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.

WILSON GO, Promulgated:

Respondent.
October 19, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For our review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated September 2, 2002

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67388, as well as its
Resolution[2] dated November 12, 2002, denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. The appellate court dismissed the petition for review under
Rule 43[3] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for being an erroneous mode
of appeal from the Resolution[4] of the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary
had modified the Resolution[5] of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig
City in I.S. No. PSG 00-04-10205 and directed the latter to file an
information for estafa against petitioners.

The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of Fil-Estate

Properties, Inc. (FEPI).

On October 17, 1995, FEPI allegedly entered into a Project

Agreement with Manila Southcoast Development Corporation (MSDC),
whereby FEPI undertook to develop several parcels of land in Nasugbu,
Batangas allegedly owned by MSDC. Under the terms of the Agreement,
FEPI was to convert an approximate area of 1,269 hectares into a first-class
residential, commercial, resort, leisure, and recreational complex. The said
Project Agreement clothed FEPI with authority to market and sell the
subdivision lots to the public.

Respondent Wilson Go offered to buy Lot 17, Block 38 from FEPI.

Lot 17 measured approximately 1,079 square meters and the purchase price
agreed upon was P4,304,000. The Contract to Sell signed by the parties was
the standard, printed form prepared by FEPI. Under the terms of said
contract of adhesion, Go agreed to pay a downpayment of P1,291,200 and a
last installment ofP840,000 on the balance due on April 7, 1997. In turn,
FEPI would execute a final Deed of Sale in favor of Go and deliver to Go
the owner’s duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) upon
complete payment of the purchase price.

Go fully complied with the terms of the Contract. FEPI, however,

failed to develop the property. Neither did it release the TCT to Go. The
latter demanded fulfillment of the terms and conditions of their agreement.
FEPI balked. In several letters to its clients, including respondent Go, FEPI
explained that the project was temporarily halted due to some claimants who
opposed FEPI’s application for exclusion of the subject properties from the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Further,
FEPI’s hands were tied by a cease and desist order issued by the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Said order was the subject of several appeals
now pending before this Court. FEPI assured its clients that it had no
intention to abandon the project and would resume developing the properties
once the disputes had been settled in its favor.

Go was neither satisfied nor assured by FEPI’s statements and he

made several demands upon FEPI to return his payment of the purchase
price in full. FEPI failed to heed his demands. Go then filed a complaint
before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). He
likewise filed a separate Complaint-Affidavit for estafa under Articles
316[6] and 318[7] of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City against petitioners as officers of FEPI. The
complaint for estafa averred that the Contract to Sell categorically stated that
FEPI was the owner of the property. However, before the HLURB, FEPI
denied ownership of the realty. Go alleged that the petitioners committed
estafa when they offered the subject property for sale since they knew fully
well that the development of the property and issuance of its corresponding
title were impossible to accomplish, as the ownership and title thereto had
not yet been acquired and registered under the name of FEPI at the time of
sale. Thus, FEPI had grossly misrepresented itself as owner at the time of
the sale of the subject property to him and when it received from him the full
payment, despite being aware that it was not yet the owner.

Petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the City Prosecutor of Pasig

City to conduct the preliminary investigation on the ground that the
complainant was not from Pasig City, the contract was not executed nor
were the payments made in Pasig City. Besides, countered petitioners, none
of the elements of estafa under Articles 316 and 318 were present. They
averred that FEPI was not the owner of the project but the developer with
authority to sell under a joint venture with MSDC, who is the real owner.
They further denied that FEPI ever made any written nor oral representation
to Go that it is the owner, pointing out that Go failed to positively identify
who made such misrepresentation to him nor did Go say where the
misrepresentation was made. According to petitioner, there being neither
deceit nor misrepresentation, there could be no damage nor prejudice to
respondent, and no probable cause exists to indict the petitioners.
Petitioners likewise insisted that they could not be held criminally liable for
abiding with a cease-and-desist order of the DAR.

In his reply, Go stressed that the City Prosecutor of Pasig City had
jurisdiction over the case. He argued that the Contract to Sell specifically
provided that payment be made at FEPI’s office at Pasig City and the
demand letters bore the Pasig City address. He averred that FEPI could not
disclaim ownership of the project since the contract described FEPI as owner
without mentioning MSDC. Additionally, the acts executed by FEPI
appearing in the contract were the acts of an owner and not a mere
developer.
 After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor resolved to
dismiss the complaint for estafa, thus:
Wherefore, the case for estafa, under Articles 316 and 318 of the
Revised Penal Code, filed against the respondents Ferdinand Santos,
Robert [John] Sobrepeña, Federico Campos, Polo Pantaleon and Rafael
Perez de Tagle, Jr. is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.[8]

The City Prosecutor found no misrepresentation stating that, (1) the

Contract to Sell did not mention FEPI as the owner of the property; (2)
since no Deed of Sale had been executed by the parties, then petitioners are
not yet bound to deliver the certificate of title since under both the Contract
to Sell and Section 25[9] of Presidential Decree No. 957,[10] FEPI was bound
to deliver the certificate of title only upon the execution of a contract of sale;
and (3) the City Prosecutor disavowed any jurisdiction since it is the
HLURB, which has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes and controversies
involving the sale of lots in commercial subdivision including claims
involving refunds under P.D. No. 1344.[11]

Go appealed the City Prosecutor’s Resolution to the Department of

Justice (DOJ), which, in turn reversed the City Prosecutor’s findings, and
held, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolution is hereby MODIFIED.
The City Prosecutor of Pasig City is directed to file an information for
estafa defined and penalized under Art. 316, par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code against respondents Ferdinand Santos, Robert [John] Sobrepeña,
Federico Campos, Polo Pantaleon and Rafael Perez De Tagle, Jr. and
report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The DOJ found that there was a prima facie basis to hold petitioners
liable for estafa under Article 316 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, pointing
out that the elements of the offense were present as evidenced by the terms
of the Contract to Sell. It ruled that under the Contract, the petitioners sold
the property to Go despite full knowledge that FEPI was not its owner. The
DOJ noted that petitioners did not deny the due execution of the contract and
had accepted payments of the purchase price as evidenced by the receipts.
Thus, FEPI was exercising acts of ownership when it conveyed the property
to respondent Go. Acts to convey, sell, encumber or mortgage real property
are acts of strict ownership. Furthermore, nowhere did FEPI mention that it
had a joint venture with MSDC, the alleged true owner of the property.
Clearly, petitioners committed acts of misrepresentation when FEPI denied
ownership after the perfection of the contract and the payment of the
purchase price. Since a corporation can only act through its agents or
officers, then all the participants in a fraudulent transaction are deemed
liable.

Accordingly, an Information for estafa was filed against petitioners

and Federico Campos and Polo Pantaleon before the MTC of Pasig City.
However, the arraignment was deferred since Campos and Pantaleon filed a
Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, which was granted by
the trial court. Meanwhile petitioners herein filed with the Court of Appeals,
a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67388. Accordingly, the
trial court deferred the arraignment of petitioners until the petition for review
was resolved.

On September 2, 2002, the appellate court disposed of CA-G.R. SP

No. 67388 in this wise:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition,
HAVING NO MERIT, is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE AND
ORDERED DISMISSED, with cost to Petitioners.
 SO ORDERED.[13]

The appellate court opined that a petition for review pursuant to Rule

43 cannot be availed of as a mode of appeal from the ruling of the Secretary

of Justice because the Rule applies only to agencies or officers exercising

quasi-judicial functions. The decision to file an information or not is an

executive and not a quasi-judicial function.

Herein petitioners seasonably moved for reconsideration, but the

motion was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals.

Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:

(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RULE
43 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CANNOT BE
AVAILED OF TO APPEAL THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.[14]

(2) THE DOJ SECRETARY ERRED WHEN IT FOUND

PROBABLE CAUSE AND RESOLVED TO FILE AN
INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA UNDER ART. 316, SEC. 1 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE AGAINST PETITIONERS,
CONSIDERING THAT: (A) Petitioners did not pretend that they,
or FEPI, were the owners of the subject property; (B) FEPI need
not have been the owner at the time the Contract to Sell was
furnished to respondent Go; (C) There was no prejudice caused to
respondent Go; (D) There is no personal act or omission
constituting a crime ascribed to any of the Petitioners, therefore,
there can be no probable cause against them; and (E) There was no
deceit or even intent to deceive.[15]

To our mind, the sole issue for resolution is whether a petition for

review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the

Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to file an information in a

criminal case. In the course of this determination, we must also consider

whether the conduct of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor is a

quasi-judicial function.

Petitioners submit that there is jurisprudence to the effect that Rule 43

covers rulings of the Secretary of Justice since during preliminary

investigations, the DOJ’s decisions are deemed as “awards, judgments, final

orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the

exercise of its quasi-judicial functions”, and its prosecutorial offices are

considered quasi-judicial bodies/officers performing quasi-judicial functions.

Respondent counters that the herein petition is a dilatory tactic and

emphasizes that “injunction will not lie to restrain criminal prosecution.”

Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it

governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or

resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasi-judicial agencies in the

exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The Department of Justice is not

among the agencies[16] enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Inclusio unius

est exclusio alterius.

We cannot agree with petitioners’ submission that a preliminary

investigation is a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-

judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the

findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause.

In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,[17] we held that a preliminary

investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, thus:

[t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-
making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is
often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose
except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be
acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment
on the accused, not the fiscal.[18]

Though some cases[19] describe the public prosecutor’s power to

conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true

only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer

of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and

the similarity ends at this point.[20] A quasi-judicial body is as an organ of

government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the

rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.[21] A

quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards,

determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as

judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor

conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an

information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the

Secretary of Justice is reviewing the former’s order or resolutions.

Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those

agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court

of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding

probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to

the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. Accordingly,

the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ petition for review.

Notwithstanding that theirs is a petition for review properly under

Rule 45, petitioners want us to reverse the findings of probable cause by the

DOJ after their petition for review under Rule 43 from the court a

quo failed. This much we are not inclined to do, for we have no basis to

review the DOJ’s factual findings and its determination of probable cause.

First, Rule 45 is explicit. This mode of appeal to the Supreme Court

covers the judgments, orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals, the

Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or any authorized court and

should raise only pure question of law. The Department of Justice is not a

court.

Also, in this petition are raised factual matters for our resolution, e.g.

the ownership of the subject property, the existence of deceit committed by

petitioners on respondent, and petitioners’ knowledge or direct participation

in the Contract to Sell. These are factual issues and are outside the scope of

a petition for review on certiorari. The cited questions require evaluation

and examination of evidence, which is the province of a full-blown trial on

the merits.

Second, courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public

prosecutor in evaluating the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint

forthwith, if he finds the charge insufficient in form or substance, or without

any ground. Or, he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint in

his view is sufficient and in proper form.[22] The decision whether to dismiss

a complaint or not, is dependent upon the sound discretion of the

prosecuting fiscal and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.[23]

Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made

with grave abuse of discretion.[24] In this case, petitioners have not shown

sufficient nor convincing reason for us to deviate from prevailing

jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

67388, dated September 2, 2002 and November 12, 2002, respectively,

are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

 SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
Chairman

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
 HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 67-76. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Romeo A.
Brawner, and Mario L. Guariña III concurring.
[2]
Id. at 78.
[3]
The Rule is entitled “Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the
Court of Appeals.”
[4]
Rollo, pp. 240-250.
[5]
Id. at 154-161.
[6]
ART. 316. Other forms of swindling. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such
value, shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who, pretending to be the owner of any real property, shall convey, sell,
encumber or mortgage the same.
2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same,
although such encumbrance be not recorded.
3. The owner of any personal property who shall wrongfully take it from its lawful possessor, to
the prejudice of the latter or any third person.
4. Any person who, to the prejudice of another, shall executed any fictitious contract.
5. Any person who shall accept any compensation given him under the belief that it was in
payment of services rendered or labor performed by him, when in fact he did not actually perform such
services or labor.
6. Any person who, while being a surety in a bond given in a criminal or civil action, without
express authority from the court or before the cancellation of his bond or before being relieved from
the obligation contracted by him, shall sell, mortgage, or, in any other manner, encumber the real
property or properties with which he guaranteed the fulfillment of such obligation.
[7]
ART. 318. Other deceits. – The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the
damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall
defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.
Any person who, for profit or gain, shall interpret dreams, make forecasts, tell fortunes, or take
advantage of the credulity of the public in any other similar manner, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
[8]
Rollo, p. 160.
[9]
SEC. 25. Issuance of Title. – The owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot or unit to the
buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit. No fee, except those required for the registration of the
deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds, shall be collected for the issuance of such title. In the event a
mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time of the issuance of the title to the buyer, the
owner or developer shall redeem the mortgage or the corresponding portion thereof within six months
from such issuance in order that the title over any fully paid lot or unit may be secured and delivered to
the buyer in accordance herewith.
[10]
SECTION 1. Title–This Decree shall be known as THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM
BUYERS’ PROTECTIVE DECREE.
[11]
EMPOWERING THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY TO ISSUE WRIT OF EXECUTION
IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ITS DECISION UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957.
. . .
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
 A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.
[12]
Rollo, p. 249.
[13]
Id. at 76.
[14]
Id. at 23.
[15]
Id. at 35-36.
[16]
Among these agencies are: Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social
Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657,
Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions
Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments,
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
[17]
G.R. No. 143375, 6 July 2001, 413 Phil. 159.
[18]
Id. at 168-169.
[19]
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. Nos. 92319-20, 2 October
1990, 190 SCRA 226, 244; Koh v. Court of Appeals, No. L-40428, 17 December 1975, 70 SCRA 298,
307; Andaya v. Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Norte, No. L-29826, 30 September 1976, 73 SCRA
131, 135; Crespo v. Mogul, No. L-53373, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 462, 469-470.
[20]
Supra, note 17 at 167.
[21]
Id. at 168.
[22]
Id. at 169.
[23]
Public Utilities Department v. Hon. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 130399, 20 September 2001, 417 Phil.
798, 804.
[24]
Id. at 805.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117363. December 17, 1999]

MILA G. PANGILINAN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

Is the conviction of the accused-appellant by the Regional Trial Court under an

information falling with the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial court valid?
On 20 September 1990, appellant Mila G. Pangilinan was charged with the crime of
Estafa in an information[1] which reads:
The undersigned Asst. Prov’l. Prosecutor accuses Mrs. Mila Pangilinan of the
Crime of Estafa, committed as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of June, 1984 in the municipality of Tanay, Rizal
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-
named accused, by means of false pretenses and misrepresentations introduced
and misrepresented herself that she was instructed by Mr. Rodolfo Elnar, father
of Miss Luzviminda SJ Elnar, a girl 15 years of age, to get one (1) stereo
component, marked Fisher PH 430K valued at more or less P17,000.000, one
(1) headphone, one (1) electrical jack and two (2) record tapes worth P450.00,
or with total amount of P17, 450.00 form their house and falsely alleging that
said father of the minor further instructed her that the stereo component be
tested in a turntable somewhere in EDSA, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and taking advantage of the
inexperience and feelings of the said minor, induce the said minor Luzviminda
SJ Elnar to give her said stereo component and electrical parts belonging to
spouses Rolando Elnar and Soledad SJ Elnar when in truth and in fact said
accused was not authorized by Mr. Rolando Elnar to have said stereo
components be tested and once said accused had in her possession the said
articles, she took them away to the damage and prejudice of such Mr. and Mrs.
Rolando Elnar in the aforesaid amount of P17,450.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On 12 March 1991, appellant was arraigned before the Regional Trial Court of
Morong, Rizal, where she entered a plea of “not guilty”. After due trial, said court in a
Decision dated 7 October 1992[2] convicted the appellant of the crime of ESTAFA under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
This unfavorable verdict was appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 13 August
1993, affirmed the conviction but modified the sentence, to wit:

xxx and that there being no proof of mitigating and or aggravating circumstances which
attended the commission of the offense, the appellant should suffer the penalty of four (4)
months of arresto mayor and a fine of P17,450.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.[3]

A Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the respondent court on 11 November

1993.[4] On 3 December 1993, appellant filed a petition for New Trial in the Court of
Appeals[5] which was denied by said Court on 10 January 1994.[6] Hence, the present
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on the
following grounds:
I
THAT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT CONVICTING HEREIN
ACCUSED IS NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER
THE CRIME CHARGED. BEING NULL AND VOID, THE DECISION OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS ON APPEAL HEREIN CANNOT VALIDATE
IT;
II

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE TRIAL

COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, THE GUILT OF THE
PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[7]

The Court has carefully reviewed the records of this case and finds the appeal to be
impressed with merit.
The information uses the generic term Estafa as the classification of the crime
appellant is charged with without citing the specific article of the Revised Penal Code
violated.
The trial court, however, presumed that the petitioner was charged with the crime of
estafa falling under Article 315 of the RPC. This is evidenced by the trial court’s
assumption of jurisdiction over the case and its subsequent conviction of the appellant for
this form of estafa,[8] to wit:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused MILA PANGILINAN, GUILTY of

the Crime of Estafa, in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended and hereby sentences her to suffer imprisonment of One (1) year,
Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days of Prision Correccional, as minimum to
Five (5) years, Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days of Prision Correccional as
maximum, plus costs.

Further to pay the complainant Soledad Elnar the amount of P17,000.00 the
value of the unrecovered one stereo component.

SO ORDERED.

In order to find estafa with abuse of confidence under subdivision No. 1, par. (b) of
Art. 315, the following elements must be present:
1. That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust,
or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same;
2. That there be misrepresentation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and
 4. That there is a demand made by the offended party to the offender.[9]
A circumspect examination of the allegations in the information will disclose that the
information under which the appellant is charged with does not contain all the elements
of estafa falling under Article 315 (b). There was a failure to allege that demand was
made upon the appellant by the offended party.
Thus, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals in the questioned decision, to
which the Solicitor General agrees, appellant was charged under an information alleging
an offense falling under the blanket provision of paragraph 1(a) of Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code, which treat “other Deceits.”[10]
As prescribed by law, a violation of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is
punishable by imprisonment for a period ranging from one (1) month and one (1) day to
six (6) months. At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force
was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Under the express provision of Section 32 of B.P. 129,
the offense of which the petitioner was charged with falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court:

Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial courts, Municipal Trial Courts

and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases.

xxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with

imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not
more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment regardless
of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature,
value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.

Settled is the rule that it is the averments in the information which characterize the
crime to be prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried.[11] Without a doubt, it
was the Municipal Trial Court who had jurisdiction over the case and not the Regional
Trial Court.
However, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the appellant is barred
from raising the issue of jurisdiction, estoppel having already set in.
This contention is without merit. In our legal system, the question of jurisdiction
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The Office of the Solicitor General relies
on this Court’s ruling in the landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibanghanoy[12] where the Court
stated that:
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. In this case just cited,
by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the
court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties
was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct
not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated –
obviously for reasons of public policy.

The Office of the Solicitor General’s reliance on the said ruling is misplaced. The
doctrine laid down in the Tijam case is an exception to and not the general rule. Estoppel
attached to the party assailing the jurisdiction of the court as it was the same party who
sought recourse in the said forum. In the case at bar, appellant cannot in anyway be said
to have invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Thus, we apply the general rule that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be
conferred or waived by the parties. Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did
not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the
lower court had no jurisdiction over the case:

The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly

depends upon whether the lower court had jurisdiction or not. If it had nor jurisdiction,
but the case was tried and decided upon the theory it had jurisdiction, the parties are not
barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same “must exist as a matter of
law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel.”[13]

Estoppel in questioning the jurisdiction of the court is only brought to bear when not
to do so will subvert the ends of justice. Jurisdiction of courts is the blueprint of our
judicial system without which the road to justice would be a confusing maze. Whenever
the question of jurisdiction is put to front, courts should not lightly brush aside errors in
jurisdiction especially when it is the liberty of an individual which is at stake:

“Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, the court must keep strictly within
the limits of the law authorizing it to take jurisdiction and to try the case and to render
judgment. It cannot pass beyond those limits in any essential requirement in either stage
of these proceedings; and its authority in those particulars is not be enlarged by any mere
inferences from the law or doubtful construction of its terms. There has been a great deal
said and written, in may cases with embarrassing looseness of expression, as to the
jurisdiction of the courts in criminal cases. From a somewhat extended examination of
the authorities we will venture to state some rule applicable to all of them, by which the
jurisdiction as to any particular judgment of the courts in such cases may be
determined. It is plain that such court has jurisdiction to render a particular judgment
only when the offense charged is within the class of offenses placed by the law under its
jurisdiction; and when in taking custody of the accused, and its modes of procedure to the
determination of the question of his guilt or innocence, and in rendering judgment, the
court keeps within the limitations prescribed by the law, customary or statutory. When
the court goes out of these limitations its action, to the extent of such excess, is void.”[14]

The Office of the Solicitor General makes a final attempt to bolster its position by
citing Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When

there is a variance between the offense charged in complaint or information,
and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charge is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted or of the offense charge included in that which is proved.

According to the OSG, since the offense proved (Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code)
is necessarily included in the offense charged, then the decision of the respondent court
modifying the court of origin’s judgment is perfectly valid and the petitioner’s claim that
the trial court had no jurisdiction must necessarily fail.[15]
This argument is specious. Aforementioned section applies exclusively to cases
where the offenses as charged is included in or necessarily the offense proved. It
presupposes that the court rendering judgment has jurisdiction over the case based on the
allegations in the information. However, in the case at bar, from the onset of the criminal
proceedings, the lower court had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the Regional Trial Court did not have
jurisdiction to try the case against the appellant, it is no longer necessary to consider the
other issues raised as the decision of the Regional Trial Court is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-GR CR No. 12320 is set aside as the Regional Trial
Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over the Criminal Case
No. 0867-M.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Chairman, Puno, Pardo, and Santiago, JJ. concur.

[1]
Rollo, p. 67.
[2]
Records, p. 24.
[3]
Rollo, p. 87.
[4]
Id., at 124.
[5]
Id., at 126.
[6]
Id., at 134.
[7]
Id., at 25.
[8]
Id., at 67.
[9]
Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Book II, 1993.
[10]
Rollo, pp. 86; 173-174.
[11]
People v. Polo, 169 SCRA 471 (1989).
[12]
23 SCRA 29 (1968).
[13]
People vs. Casiano, 111 Phil. 73 (1961), citing 5 CJS, 861-863.
[14]
People v. Pegarum, 58 Phil. 715 (1933).
[15]
Rollo, p. 234.

SECOND DIVISION

JAIME GUINHAWA, G.R. No. 162822

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, J., Chairman,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. August 25, 2005
x------------------------------------ --------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

 Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new
motor vehicles, including Mitsubishi vans, under the business name of
Guinrox Motor Sales. His office and display room for cars were located
along Panganiban Avenue, Naga City. He employed Gil Azotea as his sales
manager.

On March 17, 1995, Guinhawa purchased a brand new Mitsubishi L-

300 Versa Van with Motor No. 4D56A-C8929 and Serial No. L069WQZJL-
07970 from the Union Motors Corporation (UMC) in Paco, Manila. The
van bore Plate No. DLK 406. Guinhawa’s driver, Leopoldo Olayan, drove
the van from Manila to Naga City. However, while the van was traveling
along the highway in Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte, Olayan suffered a heart
attack. The van went out of control, traversed the highway onto the opposite
lane, and was ditched into the canal parallel to the highway. [1] The van was
damaged, and the left front tire had to be replaced.

The incident was reported to the local police authorities and was
recorded in the police blotter.[2] The van was repaired and later offered for
sale in Guinhawa’s showroom.[3]

Sometime in October 1995, the spouses Ralph and Josephine Silo

wanted to buy a new van for their garment business; they purchased items in
Manila and sold them in Naga City.[4] They went to Guinhawa’s office, and
were shown the L-300 Versa Van which was on display. The couple
inspected its interior portion and found it beautiful. They no longer
inspected the under chassis since they presumed that the vehicle was brand
new.[5] Unaware that the van had been damaged and repaired on account of
the accident in Daet, the couple decided to purchase the van
for P591,000.00. Azotea suggested that the couple make a downpayment
of P118,200.00, and pay the balance of the purchase price by
installments via a loan from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB),
Naga Branch, with the L-300 Versa Van as collateral. Azotea offered to
make the necessary arrangements with the UCPB for the consummation of
the loan transaction. The couple agreed. On November 10, 1995, the
spouses executed a Promissory Note[6] for the amount of P692,676.00 as
payment of the balance on the purchase price, and as evidence of the chattel
mortgage over the van in favor of UCPB.

On October 11, 1995, the couple arrived in Guinhawa’s office to take

delivery of the van. Guinhawa executed the deed of sale, and the couple
paid the P161,470.00 downpayment, for which they were issued Receipt No.
0309.[7] They were furnished a Service Manual[8] which contained the
warranty terms and conditions. Azotea instructed the couple on how to start
the van and to operate its radio. Ralph Silo no longer conducted a test drive;
he and his wife assumed that there were no defects in the van as it was brand
new.[9]

On October 12, 1995, Josephine Silo, accompanied by Glenda Pingol,

went to Manila on board the L-300 Versa Van, with Glenda’s husband,
Bayani Pingol III, as the driver. Their trip to Manila was uneventful.
However, on the return trip to Naga from Manila on October 15 or 16, 1995,
Bayani Pingol heard a squeaking sound which seemed to be coming from
underneath the van. They were in Calauag, Quezon, where there were no
humps along the road.[10] Pingol stopped the van in Daet, Camarines Norte,
and examined the van underneath, but found no abnormalities or defects.[11]
But as he drove the van to Naga City, the squeaking sound persisted.
 Believing that the van merely needed grease, Pingol stopped at a Shell
gasoline station where it was examined. The mechanic discovered that some
parts underneath the van had been welded. When Pingol complained to
Guinhawa, the latter told him that the defects were mere factory defects. As
the defects persisted, the spouses Silo requested that Guinhawa change the
van with two Charade-Daihatsu vehicles within a week or two, with the
additional costs to be taken from their downpayment. Meanwhile, the
couple stopped paying the monthly amortization on their loan, pending the
replacement of the van. Guinhawa initially agreed to the couple’s proposal,
but later changed his mind and told them that he had to sell the van first.
The spouses then brought the vehicle to the Rx Auto Clinic in Naga City for
examination. Jesus Rex Raquitico, Jr., the mechanic, examined the van and
discovered that it was the left front stabilizer that was producing the
annoying sound, and that it had been repaired.[12] Raquitico prepared a Job
Order containing the following notations and recommendations:

1. CHECK UP SUSPENSION (FRONT)

2. REPLACE THE ROD END
3. REPLACE BUSHING

NOTE: FRONT STEP BOARD HAS BEEN ALREADY DAMAGED

AND REPAIRED.

NOTE: FRONT LEFT SUSPENSION MOUNTING IS NOT ON

SPECIFIED ALIGNMENT/MEASUREMENT[13]

Josephine Silo filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale and the
refund of their money before the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
During the confrontation between her and Guinhawa, Josephine learned that
Guinhawa had bought the van from UMC before it was sold to them, and
after it was damaged in Daet. Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew their
complaint from the DTI.

On February 14, 1996, Josephine Silo filed a criminal complaint for

violation of paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code against
Guinhawa in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Naga City. After the
requisite investigation, an Information was filed against Guinhawa in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Naga City. The inculpatory portion reads:

The undersigned Assistant Prosecutor of Naga City accuses Jaime

Guinhawa of the crime of OTHER DECEITS defined and penalized under
Art. 318, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

“That on or about October 11, 1995, in the City of

Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being a motor vehicle
dealer using the trade name of Guinhawa Motor Sales at
Panganiban Avenue, Naga City, and a dealer of brand new
cars, by means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
private complainant, JOSEPHINE P. SILO, as follows: said
accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations, sold to said private complainant, as brand
new, an automobile with trade name L-300 Versa Van
colored beige and the latter paid for the same in the amount
of P591,000.00, when, in truth and in fact, the same was
not brand new because it was discovered less than a month
after it was sold to said Josephine P. Silo that said L-300
Versa Van had defects in the underchassis and stepboard
and repairs had already been done thereat even before said
sale, as was found upon check-up by an auto mechanic; that
private complainant returned said L-300 Versa Van to the
accused and demanded its replacement with a new one or
the return of its purchase price from said accused but
despite follow-up demands no replacement was made nor
was the purchase price returned to private complainant up
to the present to her damage and prejudice in the amount
of P591,000.00, Philippine Currency, plus other damages
that may be proven in court.”[14]
 Guinhawa testified that he was a dealer of brand new Toyota, Mazda,
Honda and Mitsubishi cars, under the business name Guinrox Motor Sales.
He purchased Toyota cars from Toyota Philippines, and Mitsubishi cars
from UMC in Paco, Manila.[15] He bought the van from the UMC in March
1995, but did not use it; he merely had it displayed in his showroom in Naga
City.[16] He insisted that the van was a brand new unit when he sold it to the
couple.[17] The spouses Silo bought the van and took delivery only after
inspecting and taking it for a road tests.[18] His sales manager, Azotea,
informed him sometime in November 1995 that the spouses Silo had
complained about the defects under the left front portion of the van. By
then, the van had a kilometer reading of 4,000 kilometers.[19] He insisted that
he did not make any false statement or fraudulent misrepresentation to the
couple about the van, either before or simultaneous with its purchase. He
posited that the defects noticed by the couple were not major ones, and could
be repaired. However, the couple refused to have the van repaired and
insisted on a refund of their payment for the van which he could not allow.
He then had the defects repaired by the UMC.[20] He claimed that the van
was never involved in any accident, and denied that his driver, Olayan, met
an accident and sustained physical injuries when he drove the van from
Manila to Naga City.[21] He even denied meeting Bayani Pingol.

The accused claimed that the couple filed a Complaint[22] against him
with the DTI on January 25, 1996, only to withdraw it later.[23] The couple
then failed to pay the amortizations for the van, which caused the UCPB to
file a petition for the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage and the sale of the
van at public auction.[24]
 Azotea testified that he had been a car salesman for 16 years and that
he sold brand new vans.[25] Before the couple took delivery of the vehicle,
Pingol inspected its exterior, interior, and underside, and even drove it for
the couple.[26] He was present when the van was brought to the Rx Auto
Clinic, where he noticed the dent on its front side. [27] He claimed that the
van never figured in any vehicular accident in Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte
on March 17, 1995.[28] In fact, he declared, he found no police record of a
vehicular accident involving the van on the said date.[29] He admitted that
Olayan was their driver, and was in charge of taking delivery of cars
purchased from the manufacturer in Manila.[30]

On November 6, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment convicting

Guinhawa. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

declaring the accused, JAIME GUINHAWA, guilty of the crime of Other
Deceits defined and penalized under Art. 318(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of
imprisonment from 2 months and 1 day to 4 months of Arresto Mayor and
a fine of One Hundred Eighty Thousand Seven Hundred and Eleven Pesos
(P180,711.00) the total amount of the actual damages caused to private
complainant.

As to the civil aspect of this case which have been deemed

instituted with this criminal case, Articles 2201 and 2202 of the Civil
Code provides:

“Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the

damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is
liable shall be those that are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the
parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at
the time the obligation was constituted.
 “In case of fraud, malice or wanton attitude, the
obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the
obligation.”

“Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the

defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have
been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by
the defendant.”

Thus, accused is condemned to pay actual damages in the amount

of One Hundred Eighty Thousand Seven Hundred and Eleven Pesos
(Php180,711.00), which represents the 20% downpayment and other
miscellaneous expenses paid by the complainant plus the amount of
Nineteen Thousand Two Hundred Forty-One (Php19,241.00) Pesos,
representing the 1st installment payment made by the private complainant
to the bank. Accused is, likewise, ordered to pay moral damages in the
amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) in view of the
moral pain suffered by the complainant; for exemplary damages in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00) to serve as
deterrent for those businessmen similarly inclined to take undue advantage
over the public’s innocence. As for attorney’s fees, the reasonable amount
of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) is hereby awarded.

SO ORDERED.[31]

The trial court declared that the accused made false pretenses or
misrepresentations that the van was a brand new one when, in fact, it had
figured in an accident in Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte, and sustained serious
damages before it was sold to the private complainant.

Guinhawa appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Naga City, Branch 19, in which he alleged that:

1. The lower court erred in its finding that the repair works on
the left front portion and underchassis of the van was the result of the
accident in Labo, Camarines Norte, where its driver suffered an attack of
hypertension.
 2. The lower court erred in its four (4) findings of fact that
accused-appellant made misrepresentation or false pretenses “that the van
was a brand new car,” which constituted deceit as defined in Article 318,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

3. The lower court erred in finding accused-appellant civilly

liable to complainant Josephine Silo. But, even if there be such liability,
the action therefor has already prescribed and the amount awarded was
exhorbitant, excessive and unconscionable.[32]

Guinhawa insisted that he never talked to the couple about the sale of
the van; hence, could not have made any false pretense or misrepresentation.

On August 1, 2002, the RTC affirmed the appealed judgment.[33]

Guinhawa filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA),
where he averred that:

I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE
CRIME OF OTHER DECEITS AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER
IMPRISONMENT OF TWO MONTHS AND ONE DAY TO FOUR
MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR AND TO PAY FINE IN THE
AMOUNT OF P180,711.00.

II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT P180,711.00 AS
DOWNPAYMENT,P19,241.00 AS FIRST INSTALLMENT WITH
UCPB NAGA, P100,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES, P200,000.00 AS
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND P100,000.00 AS ATTORNEY’S FEES.
[34]
 On January 5, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming with
modification the decision of the RTC. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

hereby partially granted insofar as the following are concerned: a) the
award of moral damages is hereby REDUCED to P10,000.00 and b) the
award of attorney’s fees and exemplary damages are
hereby DELETED for lack of factual basis. In all other respects, We
affirm the decision under review.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.[35]

The CA ruled that the private complainant had the right to assume that
the van was brand new because Guinhawa held himself out as a dealer of
brand new vans. According to the appellate court, the act of displaying the
van in the showroom without notice to any would-be buyer that it was not a
brand new unit was tantamount to deceit. Thus, in concealing the van’s true
condition from the buyer, Guinhawa committed deceit.

The appellate court denied Guinhawa’s motion for reconsideration,

prompting him to file the present petition for review oncertiorari, where he
contends:

I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
INFORMATION CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONER DID NOT
INFORM HIM OF A CHARGE OF OTHER DECEITS.

II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
EMPLOYED FRAUD OR DECEIT AS DEFINED UNDER ARTICLE
318, REVISED PENAL CODE.
 III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
CIRCUMSTANCES POINTING TO THE INNOCENCE OF THE
PETITIONER.[36]

The issues for resolution are (1) whether, under the Information, the
petitioner was charged of other deceits under paragraph 1, Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code; and (2) whether the respondent adduced proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the petitioner’s guilt for the crime charged.

The petitioner asserts that based on the allegations in the Information,

he was charged with estafa through false pretenses under paragraph 2,
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering the allegation that the
private complainant was defrauded ofP591,000.00, it is the RTC, not the
MTC, which has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The petitioner
maintains that he is not estopped from assailing this matter because the trial
court’s lack of jurisdiction can be assailed at any time, even on appeal,
which defect cannot even be cured by the evidence adduced during the trial.
The petitioner further avers that he was convicted of other deceits under
paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, a crime for which he
was not charged; hence, he was deprived of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature of the charge against him. And in any case, even if
he had been charged of other deceits under paragraph 1 of Article 318, the
CA erred in finding him guilty. He insists that the private complainant
merely assumed that the van was brand new, and that he did not make any
misrepresentation to that effect. He avers that deceit cannot be committed
by concealment, the absence of any notice to the public that the van was not
brand new does not amount to deceit. He posits that based on the principle
of caveat emptor, if the private complainant purchased the van without first
inspecting it, she must suffer the consequences. Moreover, he did not attend
to the private complainant when they examined the van; thus, he could not
have deceived them.

The petitioner maintains that, absent evidence of conspiracy, he is not

criminally liable for any representation Azotea may have made to the private
complainant, that the van was brand new. He insists that the respondent was
estopped from adducing evidence that the vehicle was involved in an
accident in Daet, Camarines Norte on March 17, 1995, because such fact
was not alleged in the Information.

In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General

avers that, as gleaned from the material averments of the Information, the
petitioner was charged with other deceits under paragraph 1, Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code, a felony within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
MTC. The petitioner was correctly charged and convicted, since he falsely
claimed that the vehicle was brand new when he sold the same to the private
complainant. The petitioner’s concealment of the fact that the van sustained
serious damages as an aftermath of the accident in Daet, Camarines Norte
constituted deceit within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 318.

The Information filed against the petitioner reads:

 That on or about October 11, 1995, in the City of Naga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being a motor vehicle dealer using the trade name of Guinhawa
Motor Sales at Panganiban Avenue, Naga City, and dealer of brand new
cars, by means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud private complainant,
JOSEPHINE P. SILO, as follows: said accused by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations, sold to said private
complainant, as brand new, an automobile with trade name L-300 Versa
Van colored beige and the latter paid for the same in the amount
of P591,000.00, when, in truth and in fact, the same was not brand new
because it was discovered less than a month after it was sold to said
Josephine P. Silo that said L-300 Versa Van had defects in the
underchassis and stepboard and repairs have already been done thereat
even before said sale, as was found upon check-up by an auto mechanic;
that private complainant returned said L-300 Versa Van to the accused and
demanded its replacement with a new one or the return of its purchase
price from said accused but despite follow-up demands no replacement
was made nor was the purchase price returned to private complainant up to
the present to her damage and prejudice in the amount of P591,000.00,
Philippine Currency, plus other damages that may be proven in court.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[37]

Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that

the Information must allege the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense:

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or

information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of

them shall be included in the complaint or information.
 The real nature of the offense charged is to be ascertained by the facts
alleged in the body of the Information and the punishment provided by law,
not by the designation or title or caption given by the Prosecutor in the
Information.[38] The Information must allege clearly and accurately the
elements of the crime charged.[39]

As can be gleaned from its averments, the Information alleged the

essential elements of the crime under paragraph 1, Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code.

The false or fraudulent representation by a seller that what he offers

for sale is brand new (when, in fact, it is not) is one of those deceitful acts
envisaged in paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The
provision reads:

Art. 318. Other deceits. – The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine
of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice
such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or
damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding
articles of this chapter.

This provision was taken from Article 554 of the Spanish Penal Code
which provides:

El que defraudare o perjudicare a otro, usando de cualquier

engaño que no se halle expresado en los artículos anteriores de esta
sección, será castigado con una multa del tanto al duplo del perjuicio que
irrogare; y en caso de reincidencia, con la del duplo y arresto mayor en
su grado medio al máximo.
 For one to be liable for “other deceits” under the law, it is required
that the prosecution must prove the following essential elements: (a) false
pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the preceding
articles;
 (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and
(c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.[40] It is
essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the
very cause or the only motive for the private complainant to part with her
property.

The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those
enumerated in Articles 315 to 317 of the Revised Penal Code. [41] It is
intended as the catchall provision for that purpose with its broad scope and
intendment.[42]

Thus, the petitioner’s reliance on paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the

Revised Penal Code is misplaced. The said provision reads:

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts

executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess

power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other
similar deceits.

The fraudulent representation of the seller, in this case, that the van to
be sold is brand new, is not the deceit contemplated in the law. Under the
principle of ejusdem generis, where a statement ascribes things of a
particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the
generic words will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those
particularly enumerated unless there be something in the context to the
contrary.[43]
 Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be
conferred by the will of the parties, nor diminished or waived by them. The
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or
Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the
criminal complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the
crime charged at the time of its commission.

Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act

No. 7691, provides that the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years, irrespective of the
amount of the fine:

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial

Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except in
cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all

violations of city or municipal ordinances committed
within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all

offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless
of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including
the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
 Since the felony of other deceits is punishable by arresto mayor, the
MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the offense lodged against the
petitioner.

On the merits of the petition, the Court agrees with the petitioner’s
contention that there is no evidence on record that he made direct and
positive representations or assertions to the private complainant that the van
was brand new. The record shows that the private complainant and her
husband Ralph Silo were, in fact, attended to by Azotea. However, it bears
stressing that the representation may be in the form of words, or conduct
resorted to by an individual to serve as an advantage over another. Indeed,
as declared by the CA based on the evidence on record:

Petitioner cannot barefacedly claim that he made no personal

representation that the herein subject van was brand new for the simple
reason that nowhere in the records did he ever refute the allegation in the
complaint, which held him out as a dealer of brand new cars. It has thus
become admitted that the petitioner was dealing with brand new vehicles –
a fact which, up to now, petitioner has not categorically denied.
Therefore, when private complainant went to petitioner’s showroom, the
former had every right to assume that she was being sold brand new
vehicles there being nothing to indicate otherwise. But as it turned out,
not only did private complainant get a defective and used van, the vehicle
had also earlier figured in a road accident when driven by no less than
petitioner’s own driver.[44]

Indeed, the petitioner and Azotea obdurately insisted in the trial court
that the van was brand new, and that it had never figured in vehicular
accident. This representation was accentuated by the fact that the petitioner
gave the Service Manual to the private complainant, which manual
 contained the warranty terms and conditions, signifying that the van
was “brand new.” Believing this good faith, the private complainant decided
to purchase the van for her buy-and-sell and garment business, and even
made a downpayment of the purchase price.

As supported by the evidence on record, the van was defective when

the petitioner sold it to the private complainant. It had ditched onto the
shoulder of the highway in Daet, Camarines Norte on its way from Manila to
Naga City. The van was damaged and had to be repaired; the rod end and
bushing had to be replaced, while the left front stabilizer which gave out a
persistent annoying sound was repaired. Some parts underneath the van
were even welded together. Azotea and the petitioner deliberately concealed
these facts from the private complainant when she bought the van, obviously
so as not to derail the sale and the profit from the transaction.

The CA is correct in ruling that fraud or deceit may be committed by

omission. As the Court held in People v. Balasa:[45]

Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything

calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment
involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and
unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term
embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and
which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over
another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all
surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another
is cheated. On the other hand, deceit is the false representation of a
matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed
which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon
it to his legal injury.[46]
 It is true that mere silence is not in itself concealment. Concealment
which the law denounces as fraudulent implies a purpose or design to hide
facts which the other party sought to know.[47] Failure to reveal a fact which
the seller is, in good faith, bound to disclose may generally be classified as a
deceptive act due to its inherent capacity to deceive.[48] Suppression of a
material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to
a false representation.[49] Moreover, a representation is not confined to
words or positive assertions; it may consist as well of deeds, acts or artifacts
of a nature calculated to mislead another and thus allow the fraud-feasor to
obtain an undue advantage.[50]

Fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent concealment are of the same

genre. Fraudulent concealment presupposes a duty to disclose the truth and
that disclosure was not made when opportunity to speak and inform was
presented, and that the party to whom the duty of disclosure, as to a material
fact was due, was induced thereby to act to his injury.[51]

Article 1389 of the New Civil Code provides that failure to disclose
facts when there is a duty to reveal them constitutes fraud. In a contract of
sale, a buyer and seller do not deal from equal bargaining positions when the
latter has knowledge, a material fact which, if communicated to the buyer,
would render the grounds unacceptable or, at least, substantially less
desirable.[52] If, in a contract of sale, the vendor knowingly allowed the
vendee to be deceived as to the thing sold in a material matter by failing to
disclose an intrinsic circumstance that is vital to the contract, knowing that
the vendee is acting upon the presumption that no such fact exists, deceit is
accomplished by the suppression of the truth.[53]
 In the present case, the petitioner and Azotea knew that the van had
figured in an accident, was damaged and had to be repaired. Nevertheless,
the van was placed in the showroom, thus making it appear to the public that
it was a brand new unit. The petitioner was mandated to reveal the
foregoing facts to the private complainant. But the petitioner and Azotea
even obdurately declared when they testified in the court a quo that the
vehicle did not figure in an accident, nor had it been repaired; they
maintained that the van was brand new, knowing that the private
complainant was going to use it for her garment business. Thus, the private
complainant bought the van, believing it was brand new.

Significantly, even when the petitioner was apprised that the private
complainant had discovered the van’s defects, the petitioner agreed to
replace the van, but changed his mind and insisted that it must be first sold.

The petitioner is not relieved of his criminal liability for deceitful

concealment of material facts, even if the private complainant made a visual
inspection of the van’s interior and exterior before she agreed to buy it and
failed to inspect its under chassis. Case law has it that where the vendee
made only a partial investigation and relies, in part, upon the representation
of the vendee, and is deceived by such representation to his injury, he may
maintain an action for such deceit.[54] The seller cannot be heard to say that
the vendee should not have relied upon the fraudulent concealment; that
negligence, on the part of the vendee, should not be a defense in order to
prevent the vendor from unjustifiably escaping with the fruits of the fraud.

In one case,[55] the defendant who repainted an automobile, worked it

over to resemble a new one and delivered it to the plaintiff was found to
have warranted and represented that the automobile being sold was new.
This was found to be “a false representation of an existing fact; and, if it was
material and induced the plaintiff to accept something entirely different from
that which he had contracted for, it clearly was a fraud which, upon its
discovery and a tender of the property back to the seller, [it] entitled the
plaintiff to rescind the trade and recover the purchase money.”[56]

On the petitioner’s insistence that the private complainant was

proscribed from charging him with estafa based on the principle of caveat
emptor, case law has it that this rule only requires the purchaser to exercise
such care and attention as is usually exercised by ordinarily prudent men in
like business affairs, and only applies to defects which are open and patent
to the service of one exercising such care.[57] In an avuncular case, it was
held that:

… The rule of caveat emptor, like the rule of sweet charity, has
often been invoked to cover a multitude of sins; but we think its protecting
mantle has never been stretched to this extent. It can only be applied
where it is shown or conceded that the parties to the contract stand on
equal footing and have equal knowledge or equal means of knowledge and
 there is no relation of trust or confidence between them. But, where one
party undertakes to sell to another property situated at a distance and of
which he has or claims to have personal knowledge and of which the
buyer knows nothing except as he is informed by the seller, the buyer may
rightfully rely on the truth of the seller’s representations as to its kind,
quality, and value made in the course of negotiation for the purpose of
inducing the purchase. If, in such case, the representations prove to be
false, neither law nor equity will permit the seller to escape responsibility
by the plea that the buyer ought not to have believed him or ought to have
applied to other sources to ascertain the facts. …[58]

It bears stressing that Azotea and the petitioner had every opportunity
to reveal to the private complainant that the van was defective. They
resolved to maintain their silence, to the prejudice of the private
complainant, who was a garment merchant and who had no special
knowledge of parts of motor vehicles. Based on the surrounding
circumstances, she relied on her belief that the van was brand new. In fine,
she was the innocent victim of the petitioner’s fraudulent nondisclosure or
concealment.

The petitioner cannot pin criminal liability for his fraudulent omission
on his general manager, Azotea. The two are equally liable for their
collective fraudulent silence. Case law has it that wherever the doing of a
 certain act or the transaction of a given affair, or the performance of
certain business is confided to an agent, the authority to so act will, in
accordance with a general rule often referred to, carry with it by implication
the authority to do all of the collateral acts which are the natural and
ordinary incidents of the main act or business authorized.[59]

The MTC sentenced the petitioner to suffer imprisonment of from two

months and one day, as minimum, to four months ofarresto mayor, as
maximum. The CA affirmed the penalty imposed by the trial court. This is
erroneous. Section 2 of Act 4103, as amended, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, provides that the law will not apply if the
maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year:

SEC. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses

punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment; to those convicted of
treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those convicted of
misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted
of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have
escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the
terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not
exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the
time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof. (As
amended by Act No. 4225.)

In this case, the maximum term of imprisonment imposed on the

petitioner was four months and one day of arresto mayor. Hence, the MTC
was proscribed from imposing an indeterminate penalty on the petitioner.
An indeterminate penalty may be imposed if the minimum of the penalty is
one year or less, and the maximum exceeds one year. For example, the trial
court may impose an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as
maximum, since the maximum term of imprisonment it imposed exceeds
one year. If the trial court opts to impose a penalty of imprisonment of one
year or less, it should not impose an indeterminate penalty, but a straight
penalty of one year or less instead. Thus, the petitioner may be sentenced to
a straight penalty of one year, or a straight penalty of less than one
year, i.e., ten months or eleven months. We believe that considering the
attendant circumstances, a straight penalty of imprisonment of six months is
reasonable.

Conformably with Article 39 in relation to paragraph 3, Article 38 of

the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment
if he has no property with which to pay the penalty of fine.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.

The assailed Decision and Resolution areAFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Considering the surrounding circumstances of the case,
the petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer a straight penalty of six (6)
months imprisonment. The petitioner shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.

Costs against the petitioner.

 SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
 REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

[1]
Exhibit “B.”
[2]
Exhibit “D.”
[3]
TSN, 1 June 2000, pp. 16-17.
[4]
TSN, 3 August 2000, p. 5.
[5]
TSN, 6 October 1999, p. 18.
[6]
Exhibit “DD-1.”
[7]
Exhibit “FF.”
[8]
Exhibit “J.”
[9]
TSN, 6 October 1999, p. 18.
[10]
TSN, 29 January 1998, pp. 5-7.
[11]
Exhibit “F.”
[12]
Exhibits “K” to “K-1.”
[13]
Exhibit “AA.”
[14]
Records, p. 1.
[15]
TSN, 1 June 2000, p. 6.
[16]
Exhibit “4-A.”
[17]
TSN, 1 June 2000, p. 19.
[18]
Id. at 7.
[19]
Exhibit “4-A.”
[20]
TSN, 1 June 2000, p. 19; Exhibits “4” to “4-C.”
[21]
Exhibit “4.”
[22]
Exhibit “8.”
[23]
Exhibit “11.”
[24]
Exhibits “DD” and “EE.”
[25]
TSN, 23 November 2000, p. 11.
[26]
TSN, 3 August 2000, pp. 6-7.
[27]
Id. at 10.
[28]
Id. at 14.
[29]
Id. at 13.
[30]
Id. at 13-14.
[31]
Records, pp. 641-642.
[32]
Records, p. 575.
[33]
Id. at 588-592.
[34]
Id. at 606.
[35]
Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and
Regalado E. Maambong, concurring; CA Rollo, p. 100.
[36]
Rollo, p. 9.
[37]
Records, p. 1.
[38]
Buhat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119601, 17 December 1996, 265 SCRA 701; People v.
Escosio, G.R. No. 101742, 25 March 1993, 220 SCRA 475; Buaya v. Polo, G.R. No. 75079, 26 January
1989, 169 SCRA 471.
[39]
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148769, 28 January 2003, 396 SCRA 443.
[40]
… 1. que exista realmente una defraudacion, un perjuicio ejectivo; (2) que este se haya causado
mediante engaño, esto es, con el empleo de medios fraudulentos puestos en juego por el estafador para
conseguir su mal proposito. (Viada, CODIGO PENAL, 6th ed., Vol. 6, p. 570)
[41]
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 2001 ed., Vol. II, p. 815.
[42]
Regalado, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS, 1st ed., p. 592.
[43]
Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118552, 5 February 1996, 253 SCRA
241.
[44]
Rollo, p. 34.
[45]
G.R. No. 106357, 3 September 1998, 295 SCRA 49. (Emphasis supplied)
[46]
Id. at 71-72.
[47]
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Daniel Motors Co., 149 S.W.2d 979 (1941).
[48]
Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 83 A.L.R., 3rd ed., p. 680 (1976); 554 P.2d 349.
[49]
Tyler v. Savage, 143 U.S. 79, 12 S.Ct. 340, 36 L.Ed. 82.
[50]
Lindberg Cadillac Company v. Leonard Aron, 371 S.W.2d 651 (1963).
[51]
Lovell v. Smith, 169 So. 280 (1936).
[52]
Supra, at note 47.
[53]
Lindbergh Cadillac Company v. Aron, 371 S.W.2d 651 (1963).
[54]
Burnett v. Boyer, 285 S.W. 670; Madton v. Norton, 238 N.W. 686.
[55]
Kraus v. National Bank of Commerce of Mankato, 167 N.W. 353.
[56]
Snellgrove v. Dingelhoef, 103 S.E. 418 (1920).
[57]
Judd v. Walker, 89 S.W. 558.
[58]
Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, et al., 173 N.W. 255 (1919).
[59]
Park v. Moorman Manufacturing Company, 40 A.L.R. 2d 273 (1952).

SECOND DIVISION

RAFAEL T. FLORES, HERMINIO G.R. No. 154714

C. ELIZON, ARNULFO S.
SOLORIA, Present:
 Petitioners,
PUNO, J.,

Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

HON. LYDIA QUERUBIN LAYOSA,

In her capacity as Judge of RTC,
Quezon City, Branch 217, Promulgated:
BENIGNO S. MONTERA and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, August 12, 2004
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on

Certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated May 2, 2002 and
the Resolution dated August 15, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan in
SCA No. 009.[2]

On December 16, 1991, respondent Benigno Montera

(Montera) of the Enforcement, Investigation and Prosecution
Department of the National Food Authority (NFA) filed an
affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman,
charging Judy Carol L. Dansal and Ronaldo Vallada, together
with petitioners Rafael T. Flores, Herminio C. Elizon
and Arnulfo S. Soloria, with Estafa through Falsification of
Public Document.

After conducting a preliminary investigation, the Office of

the Ombudsman filed an Informationcharging petitioners with
the offense of Estafa through Falsification of Public
Documents with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(RTC). The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-
66607 and raffled to Branch 217 of the RTC.

The Information reads:

The undersigned accuses JUDY CAROL L. DANSAL,

Department Manager, RAFAEL T. FLORES, Asst.
Department Manager, HERMINIO C. ELIZON, Division Chief
III, ARNULFO S. SOLORIA, Security Officer, RONALDO
VALLADA, Security Guard, all from the National Food
Authority Central Office, Quezon City, of the Crime of Estafa
thru Falsification of Public Document as defined and
penalized under Article 315 in relation to Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code committed as follows:

That sometime in or about July 1991 in Quezon

City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused taking
advantage of their respective official positions,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
falsify the Daily Time Record of the said accused
Ronaldo Vallada for the month of July 1991, by
making entries therein to make it appear that Vallada
reported for work as Security Guard at the National
Food Authority, when in truth and in fact said accused
very well knew that Vallada never reported for work for
the month of July 1991 and with the use of said
falsified Daily Time Record, accused were able to
collect the corresponding salary of Vallada amounting
to Two Thousand Two Hundred Forty-Four Pesos and
Four Centavos (P2,244.04) which the accused willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously appropriated and converted
to their own use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of NFA in said sum.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Subsequently, the prosecutors filed a motion to suspend

the accused pendente lite.[4] Petitioners opposed the
motion. On January 17, 2001, the RTC issued
an Order suspending petitioners pendente lite for a period of
ninety (90)-days. The trial court held that Republic Act No.
3019 (R.A. No. 3019), otherwise known as the “Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act,” mandates that a public official charged
under a valid information for an offense under said
Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property shall be suspended from office while the criminal
prosecution against him is pending in court.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the

January 17, 2001 Order but the same was denied by the RTC
in another Order dated June 8, 2001.

Petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari with

the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the RTC erred in ordering
their suspension pendente lite even though the crime charged
in the Information is within the ambit of Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019.

On May 2, 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated

its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It
affirmed the trial court’s suspension pendente lite of the
accused because the offense for which they are charged is
included in the offenses referred to in Section 13, R.A. No.
3019. It further stated that the Information is valid because it
sufficiently informs the accused that they are being charged
for estafa through falsification of public document even though
the word “fraud” or “deceit” is not used therein.[5]

Petitioners moved to reconsider the aforementioned

decision but their motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in
a Resolution dated August 15, 2002.

Hence, the instant petition.

 Petitioners contend that the Sandiganbayan erred in
affirming their suspension pendente lite by the RTC since the
offense for which they are charged does not fall under Section
13, R.A. No. 3019, and in ruling that the trial court’s order of
suspension is valid although it was issued upon motion of a
person who had no right to intervene in the criminal case.[6]

While petitioners concede that

the Information sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense
of falsification of public document, they assert that it does not
contain an averment of fraud or deceit on their part. Hence,
they claim that the Information does not charge them with
estafa but only falsification of public document. Accordingly,
they claim that their suspension from office during the
pendency of Criminal Case No. Q-96-66607 is not warranted
under Section 13, R.A. No. 3019.[7]

Petitioners further contend that the Sandiganbayan

disregarded settled doctrines in criminal procedure [8] when it
affirmed the RTC’s order suspending them pendente lite even
though the motion for their suspension was filed not by the
prosecutor but by the private complainant Montera.[9]

In their Comment, the People of the Philippines, through

the Office of the Special Prosecutor, argue that
the Information sufficiently alleges the elements of estafa
through falsification of public document under Article 318 in
relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. [10] According
to the People, this complex crime is an “offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property” under Section
13, R.A. 3019. Thus, the suspension pendente lite of
petitioners is justified under the aforementioned provision. [11]
 The People also point out that the other ground raised by
petitioners in support of their position that the RTC’s order of
suspension is invalid, i.e., that the order was issued upon
motion of the private complainant, not the prosecutor was
raised by them before the Sandiganbayan and cannot
therefore be pleaded for the first time before this Court. In
any case, the People explained that the filing by Montera of the
first and second motions for petitioners’ suspension pendente
lite was with the conformity of the public prosecutor.[12]

In reply, petitioners assert that the Information states

that they are being charged with estafa under paragraph 1(b)
of Article 315, not Article 318, of the Revised Penal
Code. Hence, they maintain that theInformation is invalid
because it does not sufficiently allege the elements of estafa
under paragraph 1(b), Article 315.[13]

The issues presented by the petitioner are (i) whether the

offense charged in the information falls within the coverage of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, and (ii) whether the motion for
suspension filed by the counsel for the government agency
concerned in this case, with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, sufficed to enable the lower court to issue the
suspension order pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.

There is no merit in the petition.

Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 provides:

Suspension and loss of benefits.—Any incumbent

public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under
a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property whether as
a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
 shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by
final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against
him. (Emphasis supplied)

It is settled that once a court determines that the

information charging a public officer with an offense under
R.A. No. 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
[14]
or any other offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property is valid, it is bound to issue an order
of preventive suspension of the accused public officer as a
matter of course.[15]

The order of suspension pendente lite, while mandatory

in nature, is by no means automatic or self-operative. Before
such suspension is imposed, a determination as to the validity
of the information must first be made in a pre-suspension
hearing. There is no hard and fast rule as to the conduct of
such hearing, as the Court has previously explained in several
cases:

…No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-

suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused
should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to
challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings
against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of
due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he
stands charged do not constitute a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions
of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his
mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of
the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the
information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117
of the Rules of Court…
 . . .

Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the

propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts
for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of
Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the
Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a motion to
quash the information on any other grounds provided in
Rule 117 of the Rules of court.

However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal

proceedings on the ground that the acts for which the
accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the
provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on
bribery of the Revised Penal Code, should be treated only
in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal
proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the
ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of the
challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on
such ground, should be limited to an inquiry whether the
facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically
admitted, constitute the elements of an offense
punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on
bribery of the Revised Penal Code (Emphasis supplied).[16]

It therefore suffices that the accused is afforded the

opportunity of challenging the validity or regularity of the
proceedings against him and that the information charging the
accused of any of the offenses mentioned under Section 13,
R.A. No. 3019 is found to be valid before the court suspends
the accused pendente lite.

In the present case, the record shows that petitioners

were given the chance to dispute the validity of
the Information against them and the January 17,
2001 Order suspending them for ninety (90)-days while their
case is pending when they opposed Montera’s motion for their
suspension.
 More importantly, both the RTC and the Sandiganbayan
found that the Information alleges the elements of the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public document and
that the offense falls within the ambit of Section 13, R.A. No.
3019, thereby making their suspension pendente
litemandatory.

Parenthetically, it would seem that the averments in

the Information allege the complex crime of estafa under
paragraph 2(a),[17] Article 315, through falsification of public
document. Under paragraph 2(a), the elements of estafa are
as follows: (1) the accused uses a fictitious name, or falsely
pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, oremploys
other similar deceits; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act
or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) the
offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to
part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result
thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[18]

The Information against petitioners alleges that

petitioners took advantage of their respective official positions
and, conspiring with one another, falsified the daily time
record (DTR) of accused Ronaldo Vallada for July 1991 to
make it appear that he reported for work during that month
when, in truth, he did not, and used the falsified DTR to
collect Vallada’s salary in the amount of P2,244.04 for July
1991, and thereafter appropriated and converted the said
amount to the damage and prejudice of the National Food
Authority (NFA). Petitioners’ acts of falsifying Vallada’s DTR
prior to the collection of his salary for July 1991 from the
NFA, using the same DTR to collect Vallada’s salary, causing
the NFA to release Vallada’s salary on the basis of the falsified
DTR and to suffer losses of P2,244.04 satisfy the elements of
estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315.

Still, any error in the Information, with regard to the

specification of the particular mode of estafa, allegedly
committed by petitioners will not result in its invalidation
because the allegations therein sufficiently inform petitioners
that they are being charged with estafa through falsification of
public document.

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that

an information shall be deemed sufficient if it states, among
others, the designation of the offense given by the statute and
the acts of omissions complained of as constituting the
offense.[19] However, the Court has clarified in several cases
that the designation of the offense, by making reference to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing, it is not
controlling; what actually determines the nature and
character of the crime charged are the facts alleged in the
information.[20] The Court’s ruling in U.S. v. Lim San[21] is
instructive:

…Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction

between caption and body, we believe that we ought to say
and hold that the characterization of the crime by the fiscal
in the caption of the information is immaterial and
purposeless, and that the facts stated in the body of the
pleading must determine the crime of which the defendant
stands charged and for which he must be tried. The
establishment of this doctrine is permitted by the Code of
Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with
common sense and with the requirements of plain justice….

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it

is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of
the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him
in a defense on the merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its
result is to enable the accused to vex the court and
embarrass the administration of justice by setting up the
 technical defense that the crime set forth in the body of the
information and proved in the trial is not the crime
characterized by the fiscal in the caption of the
information. That to which his attention should be directed,
and in which he, above all things else, should be most
interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did
he commit a crime given in the law some technical and
specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the
body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If
he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of
procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates
the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of
the crime by name in the caption of the information from the
facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of
law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the
accused never has a real interest until the trial has
ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know
the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence
whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The
real and important question to him is, “Did you perform the
acts alleged in the manner alleged?” not, “Did you commit a
crime named murder?” If he performed the acts alleged, in
the manner, stated, the law determines what the name of the
crime is and fixes the penalty therefore. It is the province of
the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is
named….[22]

Thus, notwithstanding the discrepancy between the

mode of commission of the estafa as alleged in
the Information (which states that petitioners committed
estafa under Article 315), or as claimed by the People in
their Comment (that petitioners committed estafa under Article
318) and the absence of the words “fraud” or “deceit” in
the Information, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan and
the RTC that the factual allegations therein sufficiently inform
petitioners of the acts constituting their purported offense and
satisfactorily allege the elements of estafa in general
committed through the offense of falsification of public
document.[23] As the Sandiganbayan correctly held:

Every element of which the offense is composed must

be alleged in the complaint or information by making
reference to the definition and the essentials of the specific
crimes. This is so in order to fully apprise the accused of the
charge against him and for him to suitably prepare his
defense since he is presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. It is not
necessary, however, that the imputations be in the language
of the statute. What is important is that the crime is
described in intelligible and reasonable certainty.

Moreover, reasonable certainty in the statement of the

crime suffices. All that is required is that the charge be set forth
with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact
offense of which the accused is alleged to have committed and will
enable him to intelligently prepare his defense, and if found
guilty, to plead her conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense [Balitaan v. CFI of Batangas, 115 SCRA 729].

In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way

that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know
what is meant, and the court can decide the matter
according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the
information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the
language of the statute in the information. The information
will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law.

In the case at bar, although the word “deceit” or

“fraud” was not specifically alleged in the information,
nonetheless, the same alleges the manner by which
deceit or fraud was committed; that it was committed by
falsifying the daily time record of accused Vallada; and
that it was committed by using said falsified daily time
record to collect the corresponding salary of Vallada to
the damage and prejudice of the National Food
Authority. To our mind these allegations are sufficient to
maintain the validity of the information. The language is
clear and explicit, and is equivalent to an allegation that the
crime was committed with fraud or deceit. Thus, the
inescapable conclusion is that the information is valid
inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the
deceit or fraud was committed. Verily the purpose of the law,
that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge
against them, is reasonably complied with.

Furthermore, the fraudulent intent of the accused can

be gleaned from their act of using the falsified document to
draw the salary of the accused Vallada. The accused would
 not have made use of the falsified document except and
unless to defraud the government.

It must be noted that the crime for which the accused

are charged is the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document wherein the falsification of
the public document is a necessary means to commit the
estafa. In this type of crime, the offense of falsification is
considered already consummated even before the falsified
document is used to defraud another. The damage to
another is not caused by the falsification of the document
but by the use of the falsified document. Veritably, the
information sufficiently alleges the crime charged. And
inasmuch as the offense imputed falls within the ambit of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, suspension
pendente lite of the accused should accordingly follow
(Emphasis supplied).[24]

It bears stressing that the words “fraud” or “deceit” need

not be used in an information for the allegations therein to
sufficiently allege the offense of estafa. It is enough that acts
constituting abuse of confidence or deceit, which are
indispensable to estafa, are averred in the information in such
a manner that would sufficiently apprise an accused that he is
being charged with that offense. Whether the act involved
constitutes “abuse of confidence” or “deceit” within the
technical meaning of the terms as used in Article 315, it is
inescapable that it falls within the common and generic
signification[25] of “fraud” as used in Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019.

In any case, the information in question not only alleges

the elements of estafa through falsification of public document
with sufficiency, it also clearly states that petitioners are
charged with having committed fraudulent acts involving
government funds. Thus, whether on the face of
the Information,the offense charged is estafa under paragraph
1(b),[26] or paragraph 2(a)[27] of Article 315, or under Article 318,
[28]
through falsification of public document, or even only
falsification of public document, is of no consequence. For the
purpose of resolving the propriety of petitioners’
suspension pendente lite, it is sufficient that
the Information unequivocally recites that the offense charged
involves fraud upon government or public funds or property.

Evidently erroneous is petitioners’ contention that the

offense of falsification of public document alone, which
according to them is what is charged in the Information, would
not warrant their suspension pendente lite.
The Information alleges that petitioners falsified Vallada’s DTR
by making entries therein to make it appear that he reported
for work at the NFA in July 1991 when, in truth and in fact,
he did not. What was purportedly falsified is a DTR which the
government agency, concerned here, as in other government
agencies, had to use in determining the salary to be paid to
the accused Ronaldo Vallada as its employee for the period
covered thereby, as well as his earned leave credits. [29] The
falsification of one’s DTR to cover up his absences or tardiness
automatically results in financial losses to the government
because it enables the employee concerned to be paid salary
and to earn leave credits for services which were never
rendered. Undeniably, the falsification of a DTR constitutes or
foists a fraud involving government funds.

Now, the issue of whether the motion to suspend

petitioners filed by Atty. Montera may validly trigger the
assailed suspension order.

As the offense for which petitioners are charged clearly

falls under Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, it follows that their
suspension pendente lite is mandatory pursuant to the said
law and pertinent jurisprudence. The trial court is left with no
alternative but to order the suspension of the accused public
official pendente lite upon being convinced that the
information charges the accused with acts of fraud involving
government funds. Its duty to order the suspension of the
accused pendente lite is mandatory in character[30] and must
be issued by the court regardless of whether the prosecution
files a motion for the preventive suspension of the petitioners,
or if the motion is filed by the counsel of the government
agency concerned, with or without the conformity of the public
prosecutor. In fact, Section 13, R.A. 3019, as worded, allows
the court to issue such suspension order motu proprio.

The Court in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan[31] emphasized

the mandatory nature of the preventive suspension required
under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 in this wise:

[S]ection 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it

mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public
officer against whom a valid information charging violation of
that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property is filed. The Court trying a case has neither
discretion nor duty to determine whether or not a preventive
suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his
office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or
continue committing malfeasance in office. The
presumption is that unless the accused is suspended he
may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of
malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding
that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof,
the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of
the accused. The law does not require the court to determine
whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the
jurisdiction of the court.[32]

Again, in Socrates v. Sandiganbayan,[33] the Court

reiterated the doctrine that the preventive suspension under
Section 13, R.A. No. 3019 is compulsory, thus:

…[I]t is evident that upon a proper determination of the

validity of the information, it becomes mandatory for the
court to immediately issue the suspension order. The rule on
 the matter is specific and categorical. It leaves no room for
interpretation. It is not within the court’s discretion to hold
in abeyance the suspension of the accused officer on the
pretext that the order denying the motion to quash is pending
review before the appellate courts….

Once the information is found to be sufficient in form

and substance, then the court must issue the order of
suspension as a matter or course. There are no ifs and buts
about it. This is because a preventive suspension is not a
penalty. It is not imposed as a result of judicial
proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension... . Taking into
consideration the public policy involved in preventively
suspending a public officer charged under a valid
information, the protection of public interest will definitely
have to prevail over the private interest of the accused.[34]

The obligatoriness of the task of the trial court and the

inevitability of the suspension from office of the accused
pending termination of the case under Section 13 of the Anti-
Graft Law effectively settle the second issue and cogently
eviscerate petitioners’ negative position on the question.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O.
TINGA Associate
Justice

WE CONCUR:
 REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

L Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairm
an, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
 Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi and concurred in by Justices
Edilberto G. Sandoval and Raoul V. Victorino.
[2]
Rafael T. Flores, et al. v. Hon. Lydia Q. Layosa, in her capacity as the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, et al.
[3]
Rollo, p. 19.
[4]
This motion which was filed on July 25, 2000 was the second motion to
suspend pendente lite filed by the prosecution. Prior thereto, petitioners filed a Motion to
Quash the information on the ground that the delay in the termination of their
preliminary investigation was violative of their rights to due process of law and to a
speedy disposition of the case against them, but the same was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court but
said petition was dismissed for lack of merit (see Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr., G.R. No.
126814, March 2, 2000, 327 SCRA 145). The prosecution filed a motion to suspend the
accused pending litigation but the motion was opposed by the accused who manifested
before the RTC that they would be filing a motion for reconsideration of this
Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 126814. After their motion for reconsideration was denied
by this Court, the prosecution filed the second motion to suspend accused pendente
lite on July 25, 2000 (Petition, Id. at 14-15).
[5]
Id. at 38-41.
 [6]
Id. at 17.
[7]
Petition, id. at 20-26, Reply, id. at 112-122.
[8]
Petitioners cited the cases of Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos.
74989-90, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 54; People v. Beriales, G.R. No. L-39662, April
7, 1976, 70 SCRA 361; Gorospe and Gorospe v. Gatmaitan, 98 Phil. 600 [1956]; and
Tan v. Gallardo, G.R. Nos. L-41213-14, October 5, 1976, 73 SCRA 306.
[9]
Petition, id. at 28- 29, Reply, id. at 119-122.
[10]
Rollo, p. 74.
[11]
Id. at 74-79.
[12]
Id. at 79-80.
[13]
Reply, id. at 112-118.
[14]
Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code refers to crimes committed by public
officers, including bribery, frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses and
malversation.
[15]
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001, 356 SCRA 636;
Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 124067, March 27, 1998, 288 SCRA 328; Bayot v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-61776 to 61861, March 23, 1984, 128 SCRA 383.
[16]
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 15, citing Luciano v. Mariano, G.R.
No. L-32950, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 187; People v. Albano, G.R. Nos. L-45376-77,
July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 511.
[17]
Estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 is committed with deceit, i.e., by
means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; specifically, by using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
[18]
See Reyes, Luis B., Revised Penal Code Annotated, Book Two (1998 Ed.), p.
763.
[19]
Section 6, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[20]
Naya v. Abing, G.R. No. 146770, February 27, 2003; People v. Tan, G.R. Nos.
116200-02, June 21, 2001, 359 SCRA 283; People v. Banihit, G.R. No. 132045, August
25, 2000, 339 SCRA 86; People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 130210, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA
168; People v. Juachon, G.R. No. 111630, December 6, 1999, 319 SCRA 761; People v.
Salazar, G.R. No. 99355, August 11, 1997, 277 SCRA 67; People v. Sandoval, G.R. Nos.
95353-54, March 7, 1996, 254 SCRA 436; People v. Escosio, G.R. No. 101742, March
25, 1993, 220 SCRA 475; U.S. v. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273 (1910).
[21]
Supra, note 20.

[22]
Supra note 20 at 278-279.
 [23]
The elements of estafa in general are: (a) the accused defrauded another by
abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit; and (b) the offended party or a third party
suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. (Santos v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 71523-25, 72420-22, 72384-86, 72387-39, December 8,
2000, 347 SCRA 386, citing People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 104739-44, 282 SCRA 105
(1997)). The elements of falsification of public document, on the other hand, are as
follows: (a) the offender is a public officer, employee or notary public; (b) he takes
advantage of his official position; (c) he falsifies a document by committing any of the
acts mentioned in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (i.e., [1] Counterfeiting or
imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric; [2]Causing it to appear that persons
have participated in an act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; [3]
Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other
than those in fact made by them; [4] Making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts; [5] Altering true dates; [6] Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning; [7] Issuing in authenticated form a document
purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or
including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine
original; or [8] Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a
protocol, registry or official book).

[24]
Sandiganbayan Decision, Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[25]
“Fraud” is defined as an instance or an act of trickery or deceit especially
when involving misrepresentation (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language, 1993 Ed., p. 904). It is also defined as “An intentional perversion of
truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable
thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal right. A false representation of a matter
of fact, whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by
concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended
to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. Anything calculated
to deceive, whether by a single act or combination, or by suppression of truth, or
suggestion of what is false, whether it be by direct falsehood or innuendo, by speech or
silent, word of mouth or look or gesture. . . A generic term, embracing all multifarious
means which human ingenuity can devise, and which are resorted to by one individual
to get advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth, and
includes all surprise, trick, dissembling, and any unfair way by which another is
cheated. . . ‘Bad faith’ and ‘fraud’ are synonymous, and also synonyms of dishonesty,
infidelity, faithlessness, perfidy, unfairness, etc.” (BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1990 Ed.
p. 660, citations omitted).
[26]
Article 315.

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

. . .

(b) by misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,

money, goods or any other personal property received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property;
 [27]
Supra, note 17.
[28]
Other deceits.- The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the
amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed
upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit not
mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.

[29]
See Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 41-98 (1998)
which states, among others, that 24 days of actual service entitles a government
employee to one day vacation leave and one day sick leave; and CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 04-91 (1991) on habitual or frequent absenteeism and tardiness which
penalizes the act of covering up for one’s absences or tardiness by falsifying one’s DTR.
[30]
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, supra, note 15, Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 116259-60, 118896-97, February 20, 1996, 253 SCRA 773; Bolastig v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.110503, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 103.
[31]
G.R. No. 110503, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 103.
[32]
Id. at108.
[33]
G.R. Nos. 116259-60, 118896-97, February 20, 1996, 253 SCRA 773.
[34]
Id. at 796-797.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 140904. October 9, 2000]

RENE S. ONG, MAGDALENO B. ALBARRACIN, JR., PETRONIO

C. AALIWIN and J. O. NERIT, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION
MELO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, wherein petitioners, accused
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, charge said
court with having committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
their demurrer to evidence.
 The facts of the case are as follows:
On February 8, 1993, Zeny Alfonso purchased a paper bag-making
machine for P362,000.00 from the Solid Cement Corporation. When she
went to the corporation's Antipolo plant, however, no machine could be
given to her, it appearing that the machine sold had been earlier
mortgaged to a creditor, who, unfortunately, refused to release the
mortgage. Herein petitioners offered to return the money paid by Mrs.
Alfonso but she refused and instead filed a criminal complaint with the
City Prosecutor of Makati.
The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint on the ground that
liability, if any, would be civil and not criminal in nature. This dismissal
was, however, reversed by the Department of Justice.
On October 18, 1994, an Information for estafa and other deceit
based on Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code was filed with the
MeTC of Makati City. After pre-trial, the prosecution presented as its
sole witness complainant Zeny Alfonso. The prosecution then formally
offered its documentary evidence and rested its case. The admissibility
of these documents was questioned by petitioners.
The disputed documents are alleged photo copies of (1) the
approval of the sale of the paper bag-making machine supposedly
signed by petitioners; (2) an official receipt of Solid Cement Corporation
evidencing payment of P362,000.00; (3) a plant gate pass from one J.P.
Valencia dated February 16, 1993 for entry into the Antipolo compound
and pull-out of the machine; (4) a letter from one Atty. Maximino Robles
demanding delivery of the machine to the complainant; (5) a letter of
Solid Cement's Rene S. Ong offering to return P362,000.00 plus
interest;(6) a letter from Atty. Robles informing Solid Cement of
complainant's refusal to accept the refund of the P362,000.00; (7) a
memorandum from five officers or employees of Solid Cement
Corporation recommending the sale of the paper bag-making-machine;
(8) another gate-pass dated December 3, 1992 from one Ramon
Enriquez allowing the pull out of the machine; (9) a letter from one
Lorenzo P. Ligot thanking Solid Cement, through one Peter Aaliwin, for
the former's grant of a right of first refusal; and (10) a copy of the
resolution dated July 26, 1993 of the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of
Rizal. The defense objected to the admission of these pieces of
evidence, claiming that the same were only unauthenticated
photocopies of the originals.
 On July 12, 1996, petitioners filed a motion for leave to file demurrer
to evidence, attaching thereto their demurrer. In their pleading,
petitioners stressed that all the above-mentioned documents being
uncertified photocopies bearing unidentified or unauthenticated
signatures are inadmissible in evidence. Without ruling on the motion for
leave to file demurrer, the MeTC, on August 19, 1996, held:

WHEREFORE, the instant demurrer is hereby denied and the motion to hold
departure order of all accused Granted. Let a copy of this Order be sent to the
Commissioner of Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for proper
disposition and implementation against the accused RENE ONG,
MAGDALENO ALBARRACIN, JR., PETRONIO C. AALIWIN and J.O.
NERIT of Solid Cement Corporation, No. 168 Salcedo Street, 3rd Floor,
Golden Rock Building, Makati City.

(pp. 113-114, Rollo.)

In its Order denying the demurrer to evidence, MeTC Judge

Felicidad Y. Navarro-Quiambao summarized private complainant's
testimony as follows:

The prosecutor presented the private complainant Zeny Alfonso who testified
that on February 8, 1993, she was awarded by the accused the sale of a Paper
Bag Making Machine including its spare parts. On February 16, 1993, she paid
in full the purchase price of the machine including the charges for its freight to
Cebu in the amount of P362,000.00 and as a consequence of said payment she
was issued a Plant Gate Pass for the pull out of shipment of the machine to
Cebu; that the following day, she proceeded to the plant site of the Solid
Cement Corporation in Antipolo where she was told that accused Rene S. Ong
has ordered to stop and discontinue with the shipment of the machine; that on
the same day, she rushed to see Mr. Ong in Makati and she was told to wait for
a week; that on March 1, 1993, she went again to Mr. Ong who informed her to
go back to the plant site for final arrangement regarding the shipment of the
paper bag machine so she proceeded to the plant only to be told that the
machine cannot be released on order of Mr. Ong; that upon the demand of her
lawyer to the Solid Corporation for its compliance with their obligation under
the transaction, Mr. Ong offered a compromise which was turned down by her.

(pp. 112-113, Rollo.)

 The MeTC, in fact, found that there was a prima facie case against
petitioners on the basis of the documents submitted by the prosecution,
stating:

The Court noted from the documentary evidence on record that the machine
subject of the transaction between the complainant and the accused is
mortgaged to another creditor, who, incidentally, refused to release the
mortgage on said subject machine. Indeed, this strongly suggest (sic) the
existence of a prima facie case that would warrant a trial on the
merits. Accordingly, the motion for hold departure order is hereby Granted.

(p. 113, Rollo.)

Acting on a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the accused,

the Regional Trial Court of Makati, per Judge Teofilo Guadiz, Jr.,
reversed the above ruling in its order dated May 19, 1997, disposing:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby granted. The

Order dated August 19, 1996 denying the Demurrer to Evidence and the Order
dated September 18, 1996, insofar as it declares the existence of cause to hold
the petitioners for further trial, are hereby set aside and declared null and
void. The respondent judge is hereby ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No.
157290 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rene Ong, et al.

(p. 159, Rollo.)

The Guadiz resolution was raised to the Court of Appeals by the

People. On April 8, 1999, the 13th Division thereof (Mabutas [P], Aquino,
and Rivera, JJ.) rendered a reversal decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED - and

the assailed resolution (dated May 19, 1997) and order (dated October 16,
1997) of the respondent judge SET ASIDE. The writ of preliminary injunction
issued by this Court on June 5, 1998 is made permanent. The private
respondents herein are given the option to either present their evidence (in
Criminal Case No. 157290 which is reinstated) before the trial court below
(Metropolitan Trial Court) or to submit the case for decision based solely on
the prosecutor's evidence.

(p. 71, Rollo.)

 Petitioners submit that the Court of Appeals acted contrary to law
and jurisprudence and committed grave abuse of discretion in:
1) finding that appeal and not certiorari was the remedy that should have been
availed of by petitioners;
2) finding that RTC Judge Teofilo Guadiz, Jr. erred in evaluating the
prosecution's evidence for sufficiency and inadmissibility;
3) not finding that the RTC resolution dated May 19, 1997 was an acquittal and
not applying double jeopardy in their favor;

The petition is meritorious.

In setting aside the regional trial court's decision which ordered the
MeTC to dismiss the criminal case filed against petitioners, the Court of
Appeals held that petitioners, after the denial by the MeTC of their
demurrer to evidence, should not have filed a petition for certiorari with
the regional trial court. In its words:

As pointed out, the Supreme Court, in the case of Joseph v. Villaluz (89 SCRA
324), held that it would not annul an interlocutory order denying a motion to
dismiss in a criminal case. Appeal is the proper remedy of the petitioners in
order to have the findings of fact reviewed by a superior court (Manalo v.
Mariano, 69 SCRA 80). Such ruling was a reiteration of an earlier one
in People v. Romero (22 Phil. 565) wherein the Highest Tribunal stressed that
the question of whether or not the evidence by the prosecution is sufficient to
convince the court that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, rests entirely within the sound judgment of the trial court. The
error, if any is committed by the denial of the demurrer to evidence, can only
be corrected by appeal (Cruz v. People, 144 SCRA 677).

Similarly, the Supreme Court held in People v. Court of Appeals (119 SCRA
162) that it has been the long settled rule that certiorari does not lie to
challenge the trial court's interlocutory order denying the accused's motion to
dismiss. "The appellate courts will not review in such special civil action the
prosecution's evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not
yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The orderly
procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court is for the accused to present his
evidence after which the trial court, on its own assessment of the evidence
submitted by both the prosecution and defense, will then properly render its
judgment of acquittal or conviction. If the verdict is one of acquittal, the case
ends there. But if it is one of conviction, then appeal is the proper
recourse (Cruz v. People, supra).
(pp. 64-65, Rollo.)

In other words, the position of the Court of Appeals is to the effect

that after the denial of their demurrer to evidence, petitioners instead of
filing a petition for certiorari with the regional trial court, should have
presented their evidence and in case of an adverse decision, appealed
the same to the regional trial court.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals brushed aside petitioners' invocation
of their right against double jeopardy, stating that the order of the
regional trial court dismissing the criminal case filed against petitioners
did not amount to their acquittal. Held thus the appellate court:

As aptly posited by the petitioner (The People) the requisites that must concur
for legal jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court
of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case dismissed or terminated
without the express consent of the accused (People v. Gines, 197 SCRA
481, De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 499). The fourth requisite is
lacking, because respondent court's resolution of May 19, 1997 is a "fruit"
emerging from a grave abuse of discretion - thus it cannot ripen to an acquittal
of the private respondents, whose demurrer to evidence had been denied by the
trial court below. It is true that an accused is presumed innocent until his guilt
is shown beyond reasonable doubt. However, after the prosecution has adduced
evidence, the constitutional presumption of innocence must yield to what has
been so amply and persuasively demonstrated (People v. Andal, 70 SCRA
30). The respondent judge could not decide in the special civil action before
him whether or not the evidence adduced by the prosecution had established
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioners (private respondents herein),
because factual matters are not proper for consideration in proceedings brought
either as an original action for certiorari or as an appeal by certiorari (Insular
Bank of Asia and America v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 420; Navarro v.
Commission on Elections, 228 SCRA 596). It is, therefore, incumbent on the
part of the accused (private respondents herein) to neutralize the evidence of
the State in order to maintain the presumption of their innocence of the crime of
which they were charged. If convicted, appeal will be their (private
respondents') proper remedy to have the findings of fact by the trial judge
reviewed by a superior court (Manalo v. Mariano, et al., 69 SCRA 80).

Indeed, the rule generally prevailing is that "certiorari does not lie to
review a trial court's interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss (or
to acquit), which is equivalent to a demurrer to evidence, filed after the
prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case. An order
denying a demurrer to evidence is interlocutory. It is not
appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition
for certiorari (Tadeo v. People, 300 SCRA 744 [1998])."
However, Tadeo itself states that "[f]rom such denial (of the
demurrer to evidence), appeal in due time is the proper remedy,
not certiorari, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or excess of
jurisdiction, or an oppressive exercise of judicial authority."
Consequently, if the denial of the demurrer to evidence is attended
by grave abuse of discretion, the denial may be assailed through a
petition for certiorari. This exception was explicitly recognized by the
Court in Cruz v. People (303 SCRA 533 [1999]), where we stated that:

The general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to
challenge (the denial of the demurrer to evidence) may be subject to
exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or
issued with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies.

Likewise, in Gutib v. Court of Appeals (312 SCRA 365 [1999]), we

declared that "the rule is not absolute and admits of an exception. Thus
where, as in the instant case, the denial of the motion to dismiss by the
trial court was tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may assail the order of
denial on certiorari."
The present case presents one such exception warranting the resort
to the remedy of certiorari, the trial court judge having committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying petitioners' demurrer to evidence. A demurrer to evidence is an
objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party
demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a
verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised
in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there
is competent orsufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to
support a verdict of guilt (Gutib v. CA, supra).
In the instant case, there is no competent and sufficient evidence to
sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt against
petitioners.As pointed out by petitioners, all documentary evidence
submitted by the private complainant were uncertified photocopies of
certain documents, the signatures on which were either unidentified or
unauthenticated.
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that
"before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.

Thus, prior to the admission in evidence of a private writing, the

identity and authenticity of the document sought to be presented must
first be reasonably established. Where there is no proof as to the
authenticity of the executor's signature appearing in a private document,
such private document should be excluded (Paz v. Santiago, 47 Phil
334 [1925]).
The documentary evidence submitted by the complaining witness
are private instruments, being instruments executed by private persons
without the intervention of a public notary or of other persons legally
authorized, by which document some disposition or agreement is
proved, evidenced, or set forth (U.S. v. Orera, 11 Phil. 596 [1907]).
Being private instruments, their due and valid execution and their
genuineness and authenticity must first be established, either by the
testimony of any one who saw the writing executed or by evidence of
the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker hereof.
A painstaking perusal of the testimony of the prosecution's sole
witness reveals, however, that the due execution and authenticity of
these documents were never proved. In fact, the prosecution took no
effort to prove the due execution and authenticity of these documents
during the presentation of their sole witness. Absent such proof, these
documents are incompetent as evidence. It is elementary that this Court
cannot rightly appreciate firsthand the genuineness of an unverified and
unidentified document; much less, accord it evidentiary value (People v.
Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464 [1998]). In People v. Gamiao (240 SCRA
254 [1995]), we declared, "[p]arenthetically, appellant failed to present in
evidence the originals or the xerox copies of the documents
hereinbefore discussed. The requirements for the admission of such
secondary evidence in court were not satisfied. The Rules of Court
provide that private documents require proof of their due execution and
authentication before they can be received in evidence. When there is
no such proof, the substitutionary documents may be excluded."
Moreover, the documents submitted are mere photocopies of the
originals. Thus, they are secondary evidence and as such are not
admissible unless there is ample proof of the loss of the
originals (Section 3, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court). However, the
loss of the originals have not been proved by the prosecution, neither
have they shown that the original is a public record in the custody of a
public office or is recorded in a public office, nor that the same is in the
custody or under the control of petitioners.
The due execution and authenticity of the documentary evidence
presented not having been proved, and since these are mere
photocopies, the loss of the originals of which was not previously
established, the same are clearly inadmissible in evidence. Being
incompetent evidence, the only evidence the prosecution could rely on
to prove petitioners' guilt would be the sole testimony of the private
complainant. Unsupported by any other evidence, said testimony is
insufficient to sustain a finding of culpability.
Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is
such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the
judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. To
be considered sufficient, therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the
commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation
therein by the accused. In the instant case, the prosecution miserably
failed to establish by sufficient evidence the existence of the crime of
estafa and other deceit.
Aside from complainant's testimony, the only evidence of petitioners'
supposed complicity in the alleged offense is the photocopy of the
approval of the sale of the paper bag-making machine, said document
containing the names of petitioners Ong, Nerit, Aaliwin, and
Albarracin.As stated earlier, however, said document is inadmissible in
evidence. Thus, there is no evidence as to their participation in the
crime. In fact, among the petitioners, private complainant had personal
contact only with Ong, whom she met only after the alleged approval of
the sale of the machine. Having met Ong after the sale, Ong could not
have misrepresented anything to complainant to induce her to part with
her money. As to the others, not having had personal dealings with
private complainant, it boggles one's mind to even entertain the
speculation that they could have misrepresented anything to the latter.
 With our ruling that the documentary evidence submitted by the
prosecution is inadmissible in evidence, the prosecution's evidence
against petitioners is grossly and patently insufficient to support a
finding of guilt. Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion for the MeTC to
consider that there was a prima facie case against petitioners
warranting a trial on the merits given the paucity of evidence against
petitioners.
Had said court been more punctilious and thorough in its study and
preparation of the case, it could have fully appreciated the weakness of
the state evidence against petitioners, and that it was useless, not to
say a waste of time and money, but most of all unfair to the accused, to
proceed with the tedious process of trial and direct petitioners to adduce
evidence in their defense, since it was obvious from the beginning that
petitioners could not be convicted of the crime charged.
In ruling against petitioners, the appellate court also held that
petitioners could not avail of their constitutional right against double
jeopardy, allegedly because the regional trial court's reversal of the
MeTC denial of their demurrer to evidence is a "fruit" emerging from
grave abuse of discretion. It declared that Judge Guadiz could not
decide in the special civil action filed before him whether or not the
evidence adduced by the prosecution had established beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioners, factual matters not being
proper for consideration in certiorariproceedings.
It is true that the prerogative writ of certiorari does not lie to correct
every controversial interlocutory order but is confined merely to
questions of jurisdiction. Its function is to keep an inferior court within its
jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts, meaning acts
which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. It is
not designed to correct procedural errors or the court's erroneous
findings and conclusions (De Vera v. Pineda, 213 SCRA 434 [1992]).
However, certiorari can be properly resorted to where the factual
findings complained of are not supported by the evidence on
record(Congregation of the Religious of the Virgin Mary v. CA, 291
SCRA 385 [1998]). As earlier observed, with the inadmissibility of the
prosecution's documentary evidence, the trial court's finding of a prima
facie case against petitioners is glaringly unsupported by the sole
testimony of private complainant, hence the RTC resolution reversing
the MeTC's denial of the demurrer to evidence cannot be said to be the
"fruit" of grave abuse of discretion. Since the factual findings of the
MeTC are devoid of support in the evidence on record, it was proper for
the RTC to review said findings. Moreover, in order to determine
whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion in denying the
demurrer to evidence, the RTC had to inquire into the admissibility and
sufficiency of the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by
the prosecution.
With the grant by the RTC of the demurrer to evidence, the same
constituted a valid acquittal and any further prosecution of petitioners on
the same charge would expose them to being put twice in jeopardy for
the same offense. A dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of a
demurrer to evidence is not appealable as the accused would thereby
be placed in double jeopardy (See Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, p. 441).
Lastly, it has been said that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a
court of justice in certiorari proceedings. The cases in
which certiorariwill issue cannot be defined, because to do so would be
to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the
discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show
that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition
or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control over other
courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular
case "as the ends of justice may require." So it is that the writ will be
granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice (Gutib v. CA, supra).
The case at bar presents one such instance calling for this
appropriate remedy. As discussed elsewhere, petitioners have
satisfactorily demonstrated in their demurrer that the prosecution failed
to prove the crime charged against them, hence, there remains no
reason to hold them for trial. Indeed, an accused is always presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. Parenthetically, petitioners have
the right to be protected against hasty, malicious, and oppressive
prosecution; to be secure from an open and public accusation of a
crime; and, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public
trial. Similarly situated is the State, which must be shielded at all times
from useless and expensive litigations that only contribute to the
clogging of court dockets and take a heavy toll on its limited time and
meager resources.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 8, 1999 setting aside the
Regional Trial Court's resolution dated May 19, 1997, as well as
respondent appellate court's Resolution dated November 16, 1999
denying reconsideration of its decision, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The dismissal of Criminal Case No. 157290 entitled "People of
the Philippines v. Rene S. Ong, et al. is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to
the filing of an appropriate civil action.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

LEONARDO U. FLORES, G.R. No. 188197

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
HON. RAUL S. GONZALEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of Justice, and Promulgated:
EUGENE LIM,
Respondents. August 3, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Court assailing the Decision[2] dated March 6, 2008 and the
Resolution[3] dated May 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R.
CEB SP No. 02726.

The antecedent facts and proceedings follow:

On June 24, 2004, petitioner Leonardo U. Flores (Flores) filed a
complaint-affidavit[4] against private respondent Eugene Lim (Lim) for
estafa before the City Prosecutor of Cebu City, docketed as I.S. No. 04-
5228-F.

Briefly, the complaint alleged that, during the pre-incorporation stage

of Enviroboard Manufacturing, Inc. (EMI) in October 1996, Lim tricked
Flores and the other EMI’s incorporators (Flores, et al.) to purchase two
compact processing equipments, CP15 and CP14, from Compak System
Limited, Inc. (Compak) in Great Britain for the manufacture of “Fiber
Boards.” Unknown to Flores, Lim was connected with Bendez International
Corporation (Bendez), the exclusive distributor of Compak. Flores executed
an agreement to purchase only a CP15. After the execution of the sales
contract and due to some delay in the delivery of the CP15, Lim, through
insidious words and deliberate bad faith, was able to convince Flores, et al.
to purchase instead an unused but later model of the compact processing
equipment, CP14, for £1,466,000.00 or P60,106,000.00, with the assurance
that Lim could effect the cancellation of the purchase for the CP15. Flores,
et al. agreed and purchased the CP14, using their funds allotted for the
CP15. Later, however, Lim told them that the purchase of the CP15 could
not be cancelled. Out of fear of lawsuits and acting upon the advice of Lim,
Flores, et al. raised the necessary funds through bank loans to pay for the
CP15. Then in 2001, Flores, et al. discovered the distributorship agreement
between Bendez and Compak. Upon further investigation, they learned that
the purchase price of the CP14 was only £908,140.00 or P38,174,618.16 (at
the conversion of P41.80) per the Letter of Credit (LC) No. 263-C-6-
00073[5], Proforma Invoice No. CP627A dated June 18, 1996[6] and the
Ocean Bill of Lading[7] relative to these documents.
Lim filed his counter-affidavit[8] denying all the accusations against
him. Among others, he insisted that the CP14 was actually priced
at P60,106,000.00, and LC No. 263-C-6-00073 represented only part of the
payment for the purchase price. To support his refutations, he submitted a
Contract Payment Receipt[9] dated August 20, 1996 showing that the full
price of a CP14, in reference to Proforma Invoice No. CP627B dated March
4, 1996, was actually £1,466,000.00 or P60,106,000.00. He also submitted
documents showing that a CP10, an older model of the CP14 was already
priced at £1,031,585.00.[10]

After further exchange of pleadings and the case was submitted for
resolution, the City Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution[11] dated
January 16, 2005 dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause. The
motion for reconsideration[12] filed by Flores was denied in a
Resolution[13] dated June 2, 2005.

On July 12, 2005, Flores filed a petition for review[14] with the
Secretary of Justice questioning the January 16, 2005 and the June 2, 2005
Resolutions. Lim opposed this petition.[15]

In a Resolution[16] dated March 2, 2006, the Secretary of Justice

dismissed the petition on the ground that there was no showing of any
reversible error on the part of the handling prosecutors, and for Flores’
failure to append several documents to his petition.

Flores moved for a reconsideration of this Resolution.[17] Lim opposed,

[18]
to which Flores replied.[19]

In his Resolution[20] dated May 31, 2006, the Secretary of Justice

reconsidered, disposing thus—

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed resolution is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Cebu City
 is hereby directed to file an information for other deceits defined and
penalized under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, and to report the action taken
thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.[21]

Pursuant to the said directive, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City an
[22]
Information against Lim for the crime of Other Deceits under Article 318
of the Revised Penal Code. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
135467-R and was raffled to Branch 4.

Lim thus filed a motion for reconsideration[23] of the May 31, 2006
Resolution. Flores opposed.[24] Lim replied.[25] Flores filed a rejoinder.[26]

On March 22, 2007, the Secretary of Justice reconsidered anew and

issued another Resolution,[27] disposing as follows—

WHEREFORE, finding respondent’s motion for reconsideration to

be meritorious, the Resolution dated May 31, 2006 is REVERSED. The
instant petition for review is hereby DISMISSED WITH FINALITY.

Consequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor is hereby directed

to withdraw the information, if any had been filed in Court, and report the
action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.[28]

Accordingly, on May 3, 2007, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed with the
MTCC a Motion to Withdraw Information.[29]

Seeking to nullify the March 22, 2007 Resolution, Flores filed a

petition for certiorari[30] with the Court of Appeals on May 22, 2007.

Meanwhile, on June 20, 2007, the MTCC issued its

Resolution[31] denying the Motion to Withdraw Information. Ratiocinating
on the denial of the motion, it declared—
 The Court notes the flip-flopping of the Public Prosecutors,
notably the Secretary of Justice in the instant case. On January 16, 2005,
the Investigating Prosecutor dismissed the case for lack of probable
cause. After his Motion for Reconsideration was denied, the private
complainant appealed to the Secretary of Justice who, however, dismissed
the same on a technicality. Private complainant filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the Secretary of Justice granted on Mary 31,
2006. In that Resolution, the City Prosecutor of Cebu was directed to file
within ten (10) days from receipt, an Information charging Accused with
the crime of “Other Deceits” under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code. Now the same Secretary of Justice has reversed himself again and,
through his subordinates, is asking the Court to withdraw the Information.

The Court has conformably to the doctrine laid down in

Crespo and other cases made its own independent assessment of the
evidence thus far submitted and is convinced that there exists
probable cause to hold accused to trial where the parties can better
ventilate their respective claims and defense[s].[32] (Emphasis supplied.)

On June 29, 2007, Flores filed a Manifestation[33] with the Court of

Appeals, attaching the June 20, 2007 Resolution of the MTCC.

Meanwhile, Lim, on July 20, 2007, moved to reconsider the June 20,
2007 MTCC Resolution.[34]

On August 20, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed
with the Court of Appeals its Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment.
[35]
The OSG’s position was that the Secretary of Justice acted with grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint and directing the withdrawal
of the Information. Lim filed his Comment[36] on September 28,
2007. Flores filed his Reply[37] to Lim’s Comment on November 8, 2007.

In the meantime, on November 26, 2007, the MTCC issued an

[38]
Order holding in abeyance the proceedings pending before it, including
the resolution of Lim’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of the
Motion to Withdraw Information. It held—

In a manner of speaking, the subject incident is straddling on two

horses. The ardent desire of the private complainant to prosecute the
accused is evident when he filed the petition before the Hon. Court of
Appeals to question the Resolution of the Hon. Secretary of Justice. There
is nothing wrong to be zealous in prosecuting an accused except that his
chosen approach coupled with the fact that this court chose to disregard
the subject Resolution and insists on its jurisdiction over the case result in
a procedural disorder or confusion. This is taking into account the
unquestionable primacy of the Hon. Court of Appeals over this court by
virtue of which any action or resolution by this court on the issue can be
negated or voided by the former. By reason of such primacy, this court
ought to defer to the Hon. Court of Appeals and observe judicial courtesy
to a superior court.

The outcome of the pending case before the Hon. Court of Appeals
questioning the resolution and order of the Hon. Secretary of Justice will
eventually determine the merit of the resolution of this court in denying
the motion to withdraw filed by the prosecution acting on the order of the
Hon. Secretary of Justice.

Hypothetically, if the Hon. Court of Appeals will sustain the Hon.

Secretary of Justice, how can this court take a posture different from that
of a superior court and insist[s] on hearing this case. Conversely, if the
Hon. Court of Appeals will sustain the private complainant, it will, in
effect, sustain the resolution of this court denying the motion to withdraw
Information, and render the motion for reconsideration of the public
prosecution moot and academic. In such a case, the prosecution of the
accused will have to proceed.

If the court will proceed with this case but the Hon. Secretary of
Justice will be eventually upheld by the Hon. Court of Appeals, all the
proceeding[s] already had in this court would become useless and wasted,
including the time and efforts of all parties concerned.

Furthermore, to continue with the proceedings in this case while a

case that matters is pending in the Hon. Court of Appeals will constitute
discourtesy and disrespect to a superior court. That there is no injunction
or restraint on this court to proceed with this case is not an issue since in
the first place it was the private complainant and not the public prosecutor
or the accused who initiated the petition for certiorari in the Hon. Court of
Appeals. In fact, judicial courtesy and respect dictate that the private
complainant ought to initiate the suspension of the proceedings of the case
in this court while the petition is pending, or if he wants the proceedings
herein to continue, then he should have initiated the withdrawal or
termination of the case he filed in the Hon. Court of Appeals.[39]
 On March 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated the questioned
Decision finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of
Justice in issuing his March 22, 2007 Resolution.

Flores filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 8, 2008

Decision. The Court of Appeals denied it in its Resolution dated May 28,
2009. Hence, this petition anchored on the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE JUNE 20, 2007 RESOLUTION

OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, DENYING
RESPONDENT LIM’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
INFORMATION AND FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE,
RENDERED THE DISPOSITION OF THE PETITION
BEFORE [THE] COURT OF APPEALS ACADEMIC?

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HON. SECRETARY OF

JUSTICE COULD RULE IN A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION ON THE VALIDITY, WEIGHT,
ADMISSIBILITY, AND MERITS OF PARTIES’ DEFENSES,
EVIDENCE, AND ACCUSATION?

In gist, Flores asserts in his petition that the June 20, 2007 Resolution
of the MTCC denying the Motion to Withdraw filed by the prosecution and
finding probable cause to hold Lim for trial for the crime of Other Deceits
under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code rendered his petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals moot and academic. He says that
this is pursuant to the ruling in the landmark case of Crespo v. Mogul[40] that
once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case
resulting either in the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the court, who is the best and sole judge on what action
to take in the case before it.

Flores further argues that the Secretary of Justice overstepped his

jurisdiction in the determination of probable cause when he ruled during the
preliminary investigation on the validity, weight, admissibility and merits of
the parties’ evidence. According to him, these matters are better ventilated
before the court during the trial proper.
 Our Ruling

With respect to the first issue, we rule in the affirmative. Indeed,

as Crespo declared—

[O]nce a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition

of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the
case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction
and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should
be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It
does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of

the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already
been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.[41]

In this case, on a petition for review, the Secretary of Justice found

probable cause for Other Deceits against Lim; thus, the proper Information
was filed in Court pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of Justice. Upon
filing of the Information, the MTCC acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Lim filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 31, 2006 Resolution
of the Secretary of Justice. There was nothing procedurally infirm in this
course of action inasmuch as there is nothing in Crespo that bars the
Secretary of Justice from reviewing resolutions of his subordinates in an
appeal or petition for review in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice was
merely advised inCrespo that, as far as practicable, he should not take
cognizance of an appeal when the complaint or information is already filed
in court.[42]
 This is also true with respect to a motion for reconsideration before
the Secretary of Justice. Review, whether on appeal or on motion for
reconsideration, as an act of supervision and control by the Secretary of
Justice over the prosecutors, finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence
committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an
administrative agency may be corrected by higher administrative authorities,
and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are
exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.[43] In any case, the grant of a
motion to dismiss or a motion to withdraw the information, which the
prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses the finding of
probable cause, is subject to the discretion of the court.[44]

In this case, the Secretary of Justice, reversed himself in his March 22,
2007 Resolution, and directed the withdrawal of the Information against
Lim. In compliance with this directive, the prosecutor filed a Motion to
Withdraw Information on May 3, 2007. Flores, on the other hand, filed on
May 22, 2007 a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to assail
the March 22, 2007 Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. Then, on June
20, 2007, the MTCC denied the Motion to Withdraw Information on the
ground that, based on its own assessment, there exists probable cause to hold
Lim for trial for the crime of Other Deceits. In view of the June 20, 2007
MTCC Resolution, Flores manifested before the Court of Appeals this
disposition, attaching a copy of the said Resolution to his
pleading. Meanwhile, Lim filed a motion for reconsideration with the
MTCC. Cognizant of the pending petition forcertiorari in the Court of
Appeals and Lim’s motion for reconsideration of the June 20, 2007
Resolution, the MTCC suspended the proceedings before it, and deferred the
arraignment of Lim until the resolution of Flores’ certiorari petition of the
Court of Appeals.

We wish to point out that, notwithstanding the pendency of the

Information before the MTCC, especially considering the reversal by the
Secretary of Justice of his May 31, 2006 Resolution, a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, anchored on the alleged
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the
part of Secretary of Justice, was an available remedy to Flores as an
aggrieved party.[45]

In the petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals is not being asked
to cause the dismissal of the case in the trial court, but only to resolve the
issue of whether the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion
in either affirming or reversing the finding of probable cause against the
accused. But still the rule stands—the decision whether to dismiss the case
or not rests on the sound discretion of the trial court where the Information
was filed.[46] As jurisdiction was already acquired by the MTCC, this
jurisdiction is not lost despite a resolution by the Secretary of Justice to
withdraw the information or to dismiss the case, notwithstanding the
deferment or suspension of the arraignment of the accused and further
proceedings, and not even if the Secretary of Justice is affirmed by the
higher courts.[47]

Verily, it bears stressing that the trial court is not bound to adopt the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice, in spite of being affirmed by the
appellate courts, since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the
merits of the case and it may either agree or disagree with the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance on the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty
and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.[48] Thus, the trial court may
make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the
affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the
Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the court may order
the latter to produce before it; or any evidence already adduced before the
court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.
[49]
The trial court should make its assessment separately and independently
of the evaluation of the prosecution or of the Secretary of Justice. This
assessment should be embodied in the written order disposing of the motion
to dismiss or the motion to withdraw the information.[50]

This was precisely what the MTCC did when it denied the Motion to
Withdraw Information in its June 20, 2007 Resolution, and it correctly did
so. In view of the above disquisitions, and while the disposition of the issue
of whether or not the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of
discretion in not finding probable cause against Lim may be persuasive, the
MTCC is not bound to dismiss the case or to withdraw the Information. For
these reasons, the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals has
effectively become moot and academic upon the issuance by the MTCC of
its June 20, 2007 Resolution. The March 6, 2008 Decision and the May 28,
2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the Secretary of Justice
will really make no difference anymore.

As held in Auto Prominence Corporation v. Winterkorn,[51] pursuant to

our ruling in Crespo and in the subsequent related cases, this Court held—

In ascertaining whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess or jurisdiction in his
determination of the existence of probable cause, the party seeking the
writ of certiorari must be able to establish that the Secretary of Justice
exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough, it must amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had
jurisdiction over the case, but (he) transcended the same or acted without
authority.

There is no escaping the fact that resolving the issue of whether the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction would necessarily entail a review of his
finding of lack of probable cause against the respondents AUDI AG
officers.

If we should sustain the DOJ Secretary in maintaining that no

probable cause exists to hold respondents AUDI AG officers liable to
stand trial for the crime they were charged with, our ruling would actually
serve no practical or useful purpose, since the RTC had already made such
a judicial determination, on the basis of which it dismissed Criminal Case
No. 4824-A. Lest it be forgotten, the fact that the Information against
respondents AUDI AG officers had already been filed in court, its
disposition, i.e., its dismissal or the conviction of the accused, rests on the
sound discretion of the Court. And although the fiscal retains direction
and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
 already in court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The
Court is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. Thus, the court may deny or grant the motion to withdraw an
Information, not out of subservience to the (Special) Prosecutor, but in
faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative. For these very
same reasons, we must now refrain from resolving the issues raised by
petitioners PPC and APC, considering that the information against
respondents AUDI AG officers had already been filed before the RTC; the
RTC acquired exclusive jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 4824-A; and
it has already rendered judgment dismissing the charges against
respondents AUDI AG officers.

This is not to say that we are already affirming the 2 July 2008
Order of the RTC dismissing Criminal Case No. 4824-A. To the contrary,
we are much aware that petitioners PPC and APC’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the said order of dismissal is still pending resolution by
the trial court. By refusing to go into the merits of the instant Petition, we
are only respecting the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC over Criminal
Case No. 4824-A and avoiding any pronouncement on our part which
would preempt its independent assessment of the case. Irrefragably, a
determination by us that probable cause against respondents AUDI AG
officers does or does not exist would strongly influence, if not directly
affect, the resolution by the RTC of the matter still pending before it. In
any case, the party that would feel aggrieved by the final judgment or
order of the lower court in Criminal Case No. 4824-A has the option of
elevating the same to the higher courts. And if only for the orderly
administration of justice, the proceeding in Criminal Case No. 4824-A,
that is, the resolution of the pending motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners PPC and APC, should be allowed to continue and take its
course.

Under the circumstances, the denial of the present Petition is

clearly warranted for being moot. Where a declaration on an issue would
have no practical use or value, this Court will refrain from expressing its
opinion in a case where no practical relief may be granted in view of a
supervening event. Thus, it is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a case presenting a moot question, as a judgment thereon
cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.[52]

Anent the second issue, suffice it to state that these matters are best
addressed to the MTCC, where they will be thoroughly ventilated and
threshed out in the resolution of Lim’s motion for reconsideration of the
MTCC June 20, 2007 Resolution, and eventually, if the trial court denies the
motion, during the trial on the merits before it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The petition

for certiorari before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02726 is
declared MOOT AND ACADEMIC. Consequently, the assailed Decision
dated March 6, 2008 and the Resolution dated May 28, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in the said case are SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-33.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justices Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla
and Franchito N. Diamante, concurring; id. at 35-45.
[3]
Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante, with Associate Justices Edgardo L.
delos Santos and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring; id. at 47-48.
[4]
Id. at 83-84.
[5]
See Peso Debit Memo; id. at 92.
[6]
See Compak Invoice No. 4520 dated June 30, 1996; id. at 94.
[7]
Id. at 96.
[8]
Id. at 97-104.
[9]
Id. at 112.
[10]
Id. at 115-117.
[11]
Id. at 163-165.
[12]
Id. at 166-172.
[13]
Id. at 174.
[14]
Id. at 175-187.
[15]
Id. at 276-286.
[16]
Id. at 297-298.
[17]
Motion for Reconsideration; id. at 299-306.
[18]
Comments/Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration; id. at 361-366.
[19]
Reply; id. at 372-375.
[20]
Id. at 376-380.
[21]
Id. at 380.
[22]
Id. at 382.
[23]
Id. at 383-389.
[24]
Id. at 395-398.
[25]
Id. at 399-402.
[26]
Id. at 413-416.
[27]
Id. at 78-81.
[28]
Id. at 81.
[29]
Id. at 417.
[30]
Id. at 49-77.
[31]
Id. at 423-424.
[32]
Id. at 423.
[33]
Id. at 421-422.
[34]
Id. at 521-532.
[35]
Id. at 426-443.
[36]
Id. at 444-493.
[37]
Id. at 494-516.
[38]
Id. at 863-865.
[39]
Id. at 864-865.
[40]
L-53373, June 30, 1987, 235 Phil. 465, 476 (1987).
[41]
Id. at 471-472.
[42]
Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 568, 598 (1996), citing Marcelo v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 106695, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 39, 48-49.
[43]
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207, 230 (1997).
[44]
Caoili v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 791, 796 (1997).
[45]
Chan v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 147065, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 337, 350.
[46]
Id. at 351.
[47]
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra note 43, at 232; Caoili v. Court of Appeals, supra note 44, at
796.
[48]
People of the Philippines v. Odilao, Jr., 471 Phil. 623, 635 (2004).
[49]
Santos v. Orda, Jr., 481 Phil. 93, 108 (2004).
[50]
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra note 43, at 235.
[51]
G.R. No. 178104, January 27, 2009, 577 SCRA 51.
[52]
Id. at 61-63.

SECOND DIVISION

MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILS. G.R. No. 164081

CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
- versus - VELASCO, and
BRION, JJ.

ROLANDO SIMON and Promulgated:

CONSTANTINO AJERO,
Respondents. April 16, 2008

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

In the instant petition, Mitsubishi Motor Philippines (petitioner)

questions the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] dated 20 February 2004 and 14
June 2004, respectively, in CA GR SP NO 70704 entitled Rolando Simon
and Constatino Ajero v. Mitsubishi Motor Phils. Corp. and National Labor
Relations Commission wherein the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside
the resolution and decision of the NLRC and instead ordered the
reinstatement of respondents, or if reinstatement is not possible, the
payment of separation pay to respondents.

The facts of the case follow.

Rolando Simon and Constantino Ajero (respondents) were employees

of petitioner and members of the Hourly Union. Simon was designated as
Union Chairman of the Rice Subsidy Sub-Committee[3] with Ajero as his
Vice Chairman. On 29 May 1997, Rodolfo Siena (Siena), one of the
accredited rice suppliers of petitioner complained to petitioner that
respondents had extorted money from him in exchange for union protection
for his rice store’s continued accreditation in the rice subsidy program. In
support of said allegation, Siena executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay,
[4]
wherein he detailed that he was approached by respondents who
introduced themselves as newly elected union officers, and demanded that
he pay them P50.00 per sack of rice given to petitioner’s
employees. Siena claimed that he was forced to give
respondents P3,0000.00 after they threatened him that they would no longer
get him as a rice supplier. He was also warned not to tell anyone about the
incident.
 Petitioner, through its Industrial Relations Department, issued a
Notice of Disciplinary Charge with Preventive Suspension against
respondents. Administrative hearings were conducted, after which
respondents were found guilty of “‘serious misconduct’ and ‘breach of
trust’ amounting to loss of confidence, under Article 282(a) and (c) of the
Labor Code in relation to Par. E.(1) of the Company Rules and Regulation
(CRR) for ‘Commission of an Act which is considered a crime under the
Republic of the Philippines’ namely, ‘Swindling or Estafa’ (extortion) under
Article 315(2)(a) and/or Article 318 (other deceits) of the Revised Penal
Code.”[5]

Respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal but their complaint was
dismissed by the labor arbiter for lack of merit.[6] The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the complaint for illegal dismissal is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, by way of compassionate justice,
respondent is directed to extend financial assistance of P88,389.48 (P94.43
x 8 hrs. x 26 days x9/2 to Rolando Simon and P69,580.16 (P86.43 x 8 hrs.
x 26 days x 8/2 to Constantino Ajero.

SO ORDERED.[7]
 Respondents appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). Petitioner also filed an appeal insofar as the award
of financial assistance to respondents is concerned. The NLRC affirmed the
labor arbiter’s decision, but it deleted the award of financial assistance,
considering that respondents
were dismissed for cause on the ground of serious misconduct.
[8]
Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the decision but their
motion was denied by the NLRC.[9]

Feeling aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the

Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, finding in the main that
the labor tribunals did not properly appreciate the evidence presented before
them. The Court of Appeals thus ordered:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby

GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Decision of the NLRC are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the private respondent to:

(1) Reinstate petitioners to their former position without loss of

seniority rights, and to pay full backwages computed from the time of their
illegal dismissal to the time of actual reinstatement; and
(2) Alternatively, if reinstatement is not possible, pay petitioners
separation pay equivalent to one month’s salary for every year of service.[10]

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the decision but to

no avail.[11]

Before us, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in

reversing the factual finding of the NLRC and the labor arbiter and in
relying on the defense of alibi and the self-serving statements of
respondents.
 We find for the petitioner.

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be

raised under a petition for review on certiorari. The Court, not being a trier
of facts, is not wont to reexamine and reevaluate the evidence of the parties,
whether testimonial or documentary. Moreover, the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals on appeal from the NLRC are, more often than not, given
conclusive effect by the Court. The Court may delve into and resolve
factual issues only in exceptional circumstances, as when the Court of
Appeals has reached an erroneous conclusion based on arbitrary findings of
fact; and when substantial justice so requires.[12] In the present case, the
Court of Appeals overlooked the applicable laws and jurisprudence when it
reached its conclusion.
 The settled rule in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings is
that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in determining the
legality of an employer’s dismissal of an employee, and not even a
preponderance of evidence is necessary as substantial evidence is considered
sufficient.[13] Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence
or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might
conceivably opine otherwise.[14]

Petitioner alleges that respondents extorted money from Siena, one of

the rice dealers contracted by the company to provide for its rice subsidy
program. According to petitioner, said act is “a clear case of serious
misconduct, fraud and willful breach of trust, and disloyalty to the Company
as their employer” as it “sabotages the Company’s Rice Subsidy Program
and disrupts the efficient administration of services and benefits to
employees.” Thus, they claim that respondents betrayed not only the
Company, but also the union members whom they had sworn to serve,
reneging on their loyalty to the company, its visions and goals.[15] Petitioner
based its conclusions on the sworn statements of Siena and his wife, as well
as on the explanations and evidence presented by respondents. The labor
arbiter and the NLRC, after finding the evidence presented by petitioner to
be credible vis a vis respondents’ general denial, ruled that respondents
were not illegally dismissed.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in reversing the findings of

the labor tribunals, observed that the former did not take into account the
affidavits of respondents’ co-employees attesting to their presence in the
company premises at the time of the alleged extortion and found the need for
a graphology expert to verify Ajero’s signature in the receipt. It also noted
that Siena’s affidavit is replete with inconsistencies which cast doubts on the
credibility of the accusation and should have been clarified by the labor
tribunals. Finally, the appellate court mentioned that petitioner did not even
present a police blotter or a copy of the criminal charges against
respondents, “when the same are crucial, petitioners’ [respondents] dismissal
being grounded on their alleged commission of the crime that amounts to a
violation of the company rules. On the other hand, petitioners were able to
present certifications from various agencies attesting to the fact that they
were never charged with the crime being imputed to them.”[16]

In so doing, the Court of Appeals raised the degree of proof

in administrative cases. Rather than mere substantial evidence, the appellate
court seems to be looking for proof beyond reasonable doubt, or at the very
least, a preponderance of evidence.
 The Court of Appeals point to affidavits supposedly executed by
respondent’s co-employees, who claim that respondents were in their work
stations when the extortion occurred. We checked the records of the case
and discovered that the documents referred to are not affidavits, but
mere handwritten letters. One of the letters[17] signed by fourteen (14)
employees reads:

July 31, 1997

Para sa Kinauukulan:

Ito ay nagpapatunay na si Kasamang Rolando Simon ng 7210

w Canter chassis at halal na tagasuri ng Chrysler Philippine Labor Union
ay nakasama naming sa loob ng Planta (m.M.P.C.) nuong Abril 14,
1997. Siya ay nakita naming mula alasais-imedya ng umaga 6:30
AM hanggang alasdos imedya ng hapon 2:30 PM.

Narito po ang aming mga pangalan at lagda.

(names and signatures of 14 persons follow).

Respondent Simon admitted that he was the one who prepared the
above letter and solicited the signatures of his co-employees.[18]

The other “affidavit” is another handwritten document which states:

 August 19, 1997

Ito po ay nagpapatunay na noong Abril 14, 1997 mula 6:00 ng

umaga hanggang 2:34 ng hapon ako si Mr. Constantino Ajero ay pumasok
at nasa loob ng planta sa nabanggit na oras at araw. Kalakip dito ang mga
lagda ng aking mga kasamahan sa Aming Departamento 9210-B at ang
time sheet na magpapatunay na ako ay nasa loob ng pagawaan ng MMPC.

Narito po ang mga lagda.

Dept. no. 9210-B

(Names and signatures of 19 persons follow)

We find these documents to be self-serving and as such cannot prevail

over the positive assertions by Siena.

The Court of Appeals also point to the alleged inconsistencies in the

affidavit of Siena, i.e.; that respondent Ajero signed the receipt but
warned Siena not to tell anyone about the extorted money, which should
have been clarified by the labor tribunals. It added that the “labor tribunals
are required to utilize all necessary means to ascertain the truth considering
that a worker’s livelihood is at stake. We have read the affidavit referred to,
and like the NLRC and the labor arbiter, we do not see the said
inconsistencies. Moreover, the Court of Appeals seems to imply that it was
duty of the labor tribunals to make the case for respondents. In the first
place, the labor arbiter had
allowed the conduct of a formal trial on the merits, wherein both
 respondents testified. The hearings should have been the proper venue for
respondents to strike down the alleged inconsistencies, but they failed to do
so. A review of the transcripts of the hearings[19] shows that these
inconsistencies were not passed upon by the parties, especially by
respondents themselves.

Another point of contention made by the Court of Appeals is the lack

of formal criminal charges against respondents, which it deems crucial to the
administrative charges against them. Again, we disagree.

A criminal charge, much more a criminal conviction, is not necessary

in order to charge administratively charge and erring employee. Time and
again, we have held that the findings and conclusion in a labor case are not
affected by the outcome of a criminal case. These two cases respectively
require distinct and well delineated degrees of proof, [20] namely, proof
beyond reasonable doubt in one and substantial evidence in the other.

Moreover, we find no need for the services of a graphology expert to

prove that the signature appearing in the receipt is that of respondent
Ajero. As we have previously stated, the burden of proof
required in a labor case is not proof beyond reasonable doubt, but
merely substantial evidence. Furthermore, while a graphology expert could
tell whether the signature appearing in the receipt could be that of Ajero, it
would still not be enough to dispel the extortion charges, that is the fact that
he had demanded upon, and received money from Siena. Finally, it is settled
the testimony of a handwriting expert is just an opinion and
never conclusive. Courts and tribunals have the discretion whether to
accept or overrule an such an expert’s opinion.[21]

We find substantial evidence to support respondents’ dismissal. True,

the core of petitioner’s decision to dismiss respondents is the statements of
the spouses Siena. However, testimonies are to be weighed, not numbered;
thus it has been said that a
finding of guilt may be based on the uncorroborated testimony of a
single witness when the tribunal finds such testimony positive and credible.
[22]

These sworn statements of the spouses Siena are straightforward and

uncomplicated. In the simplest of terms, they narrated how Mr. Siena was
approached by respondents, the actual handing out of money, and the
warning not to tell the incident to anyone. We see no reason to doubt their
credibility, nor any motive for them to make up the story. They are not
employees of petitioner;
even respondents admitted that they could not think of any motive
why Siena would accuse them of extortion.[23] The testimonies of persons not
shown to be harboring any motive to depose falsely against an employee
must be given due credence, particularly where no rational motive is shown
why the employer would single out an employee for dismissal unless the
latter were truly guilty.[24] And even where motive is established, the same
does not put in doubt the positive identification of the accused.[25]

Respondent’s denials and alibi fall flat in the face of the credible
testimonies of the spouses Siena. They were positively identified
by Siena to be the same persons who demanded and received the
money. The claim that they could not have committed the extortion since
they were at their workstations when the incident happened is a weak
defense, easily debunked by the fact that the Antipolo Public Market
where Siena’s store is located can be reached in a short time from the
company premises.[26] Even the certifications made by respondents’ co-
employees cannot help them get out of their predicament. In the first place,
these are self-serving statements, having been prepared by respondents
themselves. Second, said co-employees could not have monitored the
comings and goings of respondents, and the latter could have easily left and
returned to the workplace unnoticed since the Antipolo Public Market is
only a few minutes away, as earlier discussed.

Respondents’ acts constitute serious misconduct and willful breach of

trust reposed by the employer, which are
[27]
just causes for termination under the Labor Code. For serious
misconduct to exist, the act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by
an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal
rules.[28] On the other hand, in loss of trust and confidence, it must be shown
that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct or infraction
and that the nature of his participation therein rendered him absolutely
unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.
[29]
Respondents demanded money from Siena, giving the impression that
they had the authority to cause the termination of his contract should he not
accommodate their demand. This amounts to fraud and extortion, and
possible estafa under Art. 318 of the Revised Penal Code.[30] Under SMC
rules,[31] the commission of an act which is considered a crime under the
Republic of the Philippines, committed against the company or
its employees is punishable by dismissal after administrative conviction. By
their acts, they have betrayed not only SMC, but also their fellow union
members who elected them to their positions. They have prejudiced SMC’s
rice subsidy program, and disrupted the efficient administration of the
services and benefits to their fellow employees. Without a doubt, there is
substantial evidence to support respondents’ dismissal for cause.

The office of a petition for review under Rule 45 is to review the

decision of the Court of Appeals, not the NLRC’s,[32] or the labor
arbiter’s, for that matter. All told, we find the decision of the Court of
Appeals not to be in accord with the applicable laws and jurisprudence in
this case.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision
dated 20 February 2004 and Resolution dated 14 June 2004of the
Court of Appeals are hereby nullified and ASIDE. The Decision of the
NLRC dated 31 January 2002 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O.
TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
 Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 55-64; Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Associate Justices
Roberto A. Barrios and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring.
[2]
Id. at 66.
[3]
Petitioner’s Rice Subsidy Program is administered by the Rice Subsidy Committee and Sub
Committee. Under the program, petitioner’s employees receive one sack of rice every two months
[4]
Rollo, p. 67. Siena’s wife also executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 9 June 1997, stating that
she was asked by her husband to prepare P3,000.00 and that the receipt for the said amount was signed by
respondent Ajero, id. at 69.
[5]
Termination letter dated 4 September 1997, Rollo, p. 106; Decision of petitioner to terminate
respondents, id. at 86-105.
[6]
Decision of Labor Arbiter Nieves V. De Castro dated 27 July 2000, id. at 174-181.
[7]
Id. at 180-181.
[8]
NLRC decision dated 31 January 2002, id. at 254-261. In ruling that respondents are not entitled
to financial assistance, the NLRC cited the case of Nuez v. NLRC (239 SCRA 518), which held that “
separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is
validly dismissed for cause other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. xxx.
[9]
Id. at 268.
[10]
Id. at 63.
[11]
The Court of Appeals denied the motion on 14 June 2004., id. at 64.
[12]
Kwok v. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. No. 149252, 28 April 2005, 457
SCRA 465, 475.
[13]
Salvador v. Philippine Mining Service Corporation, G.R. No. 148766, 22 January 2003, 395
SCRA 729, 738.
[14]
Salvador v. Philippine Mining Service Corporation, G.R. No. 148766, 22 January 2003, 395
SCRA 729, 738.
[15]
Id. at 46.
[16]
Id. at 62-63.
[17]
NLRC records, p. 15.
[18]
TSN, 20 August 1998, id. at 283.
[19]
TSNs of the 7 August 1998 and 20 August 1998 hearings, id. at 192-226 and 236-285.
 [20]
Nicolas v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113948, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 250, 253.
[21]
Ceballos v. Intestate Estate of the Late Emigdio Mercado, G.R. No. 155856, 28 May 2004, 430
SCRA 326.
[22]
People v. Obello, G.R. No. 108772, 14 January 1998, 284 SCRA 79, 89.
[23]
In the 7 August 1998 hearing, respondent Simon testified:

ATTY. GALLARDO
Do you know of any motive why Mr. Siena wrote that complaint against you?

WITNESS
I don’t know, ma’m.
…

Yes, I really could not think of any motive that he has against me because I met
him only one and we are only new acquaintances. (NLRC records, pp. 204-205.)

Respondent Ajero also testified that:

ATTY. GALLARDO
So in so far as your are concerned, there is no personal disagreement or no
personal problem between you and Mr. Simon which could have provoked him to
file a case against you?

WITNESS
No whatsoever. (NLRC records, pp. 223-224.)
[24]
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126805, 16 March 2000, 328 SCRA 273.
[25]
People v. Guillermo, G.R. No. 113787, 28 January 1999, 302 SCRA 257, 271.
[26]
Petitioner estimates the time to be 10 minutes, one way, or about 20-25 minutes, back and forth
(Company Decision dated 4 September 1997, Rollo, p. 105.); while respondent Simon stated that it would
normally take 18-20 minutes (TSN, 20 August 198, NLRC records, p. 281.
[27]
Art. 282. Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of
the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by his employee or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by his employee or any immediate member of his family or
his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing..
[28]
Francisco v. Cosico, A.M. No. CA-04-37, 16 March 2004, 425 SCRA 521, 525.

[29]
Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. NLRC., G.R. No. 118651, 16 October 1997, 280 SCRA 806,816.
[30]
Art. 318. Other deceits. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of
the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall
defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.
 [31]
NLRC records, p. 322.
[32]
Floren Hotel v. NLRC, G.R. No. 155264, 06 May 2005, 458 SCRA 129, 147.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-02-1677. February 28, 2002]

JERUSALINO V. ARAOS, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROSALINA L.

LUNA-PISON, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, respondent.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

A Complaint was filed by Jerusalino V. Araos against Judge Rosalina Luna-

[1]

Pison, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of QuezonCity, Branch 107,
for Graft and Corruption, Knowingly Rendering An Unjust Decision and Gross
Ignorance of the Law.
Complainant is the accused in Criminal Case No. Q-91-26112 for Estafa as
defined and penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged
that on January 25, 2000, respondent judge rendered a decision convicting him [2]

of the crime of Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
Complainant alleged that at the time of the filing of the Information in Criminal
Case No. Q-91-26112 on October 10, 1991, the Metropolitan Trial Court had
exclusive jurisdiction over the crime of Estafa regardless of the imposable fine
pursuant to the provisions of Batas PambansaBlg. 129.
Moreover, complainant claims that he did not employ deceit or
misrepresentation when he entered into an agreement with the private offended
party for the construction of the latter’s house. He further explained that the
amount of P350,000.00 which was given to him by the private offended party was
spent solely for the purchase of the required building materials.
On October 16, 2000, respondent Judge filed her Comment praying that the [3]

complaint be dismissed averring, among others, that she merely inherited

Criminal Case No. Q-91-26112 from Judge Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis who has
been elevated to the Court of Appeals. Respondent contends that after the
prosecution had presented all its evidence, complainant through counsel filed a
Demurrer to Evidence datedMay 9, 1999 which she denied in a Resolution
[4]

dated September 11, 1996. A motion for reconsideration thereto was likewise
[5] [6]

denied by respondent in an Order dated January 8, 1997. [7]

Respondent Judge further states that complainant subsequently challenged

the two (2) adverse orders against him before the Court of Appeals by way of a
petition for certiorari with application for preliminary injunction docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 43160. The petition was denied due course in a Resolution
[8]

dated February 24, 1997. [9]

Complainant then filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 128768. On June 16, 1997, this Court denied the petition
[10]

for failure to show reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The [11]

resolution attained finality and was thereafter entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgments on September 2, 1997. [12]

Respondent Judge maintains that she decided the case with justice and
equity being always the overriding consideration. She stressed that she had
studied meticulously the case and that her decision was based on the facts and
evidence presented and the law applicable to the offense charged.
The OCA recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent
reasoning that the issues raised by complainant pertains to the respondent
Judge’s exercise of judicial discretion, and that the alleged want of jurisdiction of
respondent judge had already been settled by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, which upheld the jurisdiction of respondent judge over Criminal
Case No. Q-91-26112.
The findings of the OCA are well taken. In administrative proceedings,
complainants have the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations
in their complaints. In the absence of contrary evidence as in this case, what
[13]

will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed her
duties.
[14]

xxx. The Rules, even in an administrative case, demand that, if the respondent
judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the
evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct
knowledge. The Judiciary to which the respondent belongs demands no
less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should only be after due
investigation and after the presentation of competent evidence, especially since
the charge is penal in character. [15]

In cases where the charges involved are misconduct in office, willful neglect,
corruption, or incompetency, the general rules in regard to admissibility in
evidence in criminal trials apply. In other words, the ground for the removal of a
judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. [16]
 Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of a person
concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to
the right determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper or
[17]

unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.

To justify the taking of drastic disciplinary action, as is what is sought by
[18]

complainant in this case, the law requires that the error or mistake must be gross
or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith. [19]

For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found
to be erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established that he was moved
by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive. Similarly, a judge will
[20]

be held administratively liable for rendering an unjust judgment – one which is

contrary to law or jurisprudence or is not supported by evidence – when he acts
in bad faith, malice, revenge or some other similar motive. In other words, in [21]

order to hold a judge liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must
be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is and that it was made
with a conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. In fine, bad faith is the
[22]

ground for liability in either or both offenses. [23]

In the case at bar, the record is bereft of any showing of a wrongful, improper
or unlawful conduct on the part of respondent judge. As observed by the Court
of Appeals in its Resolution dated February 24, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43160:

xxx. The painstaking analysis with which the respondent evaluated the
evidence adduced by the prosecution and the well-reasoned conclusions arrived
by her in the assailed resolution and order, cannot but negate any imputation of
grave abuse of discretion on her part. Quite the contrary, both resolution and
order unmistakably speak of the care and meticulousness with which the said
respondent addressed the issues raised in the petitioner’s demurrer and motion
for reconsideration.[24]

Assuming for the nonce that respondent judge may have erred at all, the
lapse would be a mere error of judgment. A judge may not be administratively
charged for mere errors of judgment, in the absence of showing of any bad faith
malice or corrupt purpose. Indeed, it is settled that judges cannot be held to
[25]

account criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered

in good faith.
[26]

As held in Dionisio v. Escano, if a party is prejudiced by the orders of a

[27]

judge, his remedy lies with the proper court for the proper judicial action and not
with the Office of the Court Administrator by means of an administrative
complaint. Divergence of opinion between a trial judge and a party’s counsel is
not proof of bias and partiality. [28]

All told, the absence of any evidence showing that respondent Judge acted
in bad faith, ill-will or malice reduces the charges against her into a mere
indictment. We cannot, however, give credence to charges based on mere
suspicion and speculation. [29]

We will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that would
violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the people’s faith in the
judiciary. However, when an administrative charge against a Judge or court
[30]

personnel holds no basis whatsoever in fact or in law, we will not hesitate to

protect them against any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial
processes. The Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline
[31]

upon all employees of the judiciary, but neither will it hesitate to shield them from
unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice. [32]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the complaint against respondent

Judge is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, p. 1.
[2]
Ibid., p. 53.
[3]
Id., p. 92.
[4]
Id., p. 153.
[5]
Id., p. 195.
[6]
Id., p. 218.
[7]
Id., p. 231.
[8]
Id., p. 235.
[9]
Id., p. 260.
[10]
Id., p. 263.
[11]
Id.
[12]
Id., p. 282.
[13]
Lorena v. Encomienda, 302 SCRA 632 [1999]; Cortes v. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 423 [1998].
[14]
Oniquit v. Binamira-Parcia, 297 SCRA 354 [1998].
[15]
OCA v. Judge Filomeno Pascual, 259 SCRA 604 [1996].
[16]
Raquiza v. Castaneda, Jr., 81 SCRA 235 [1978].
[17]
Canson v. Garchitorena, SB-99-9-J, 28 July 1999, 311 SCRA 268, citing Black’s Law
Dictionary, Fourth ed., p. 1150.
[18]
Ibid., p. 285, citing Words and Phrases, Vol. 27, p. 466, citing Sewell v. Sharp, La App., 102 So
2d 259, 261.
[19]
Fernadez v. Español, 289 SCRA 1, 7 [1998], citing Roa, Sr. v. Imbing, 231 SCRA 57, 61
[1994]; Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr., 240 SCRA 154, 161 [1995]; Alvarez v.Laquindamum, 245
SCRA 501, 504 [1995]; Bengzon v. Adaoag, 250 SCRA 344, 348 [1995].
[20]
De la Cruz v. Concepcion, 235 SCRA 597 [1994].
[21]
Guerrero v. Villamor, 296 SCRA 88, 98 [1998].
[22]
Naval v. Panday, 275 SCRA 654, 694 [1997], citing Wingarts v. Mejia, 242 SCRA 436
[1995]; Basbacio v. Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice, 238 SCRA 5 [1994];
Louis Vuitton, S.A. v. Villanueva, 216 SCRA 121 [1992].
[23]
Heirs of the late Nasser D. Yasin v. Felix, 250 SCRA 545 [1995]
[24]
Rollo, p. 262; emphasis provided.
[25]
Re: Judge Silverio S. Tayao, RTC Branch 143, Makati, 229 SCRA 723 [1993].
[26]
In Re: Petition for Dismissal from Service and/or Disbarment of Judge Baltazar R. Dizon, 173
SCRA 719 [1989].
[27]
302 SCRA 411, 422 [1999].
[28]
Go v. CA, 221 SCRA 397 [1993]; Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, 252 SCRA 541 [1996].
[29]
Lambino v. De Vera, 275 SCRA 60 [1997].
[30]
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit, RTC Br. 117, Pasay City, 291 SCRA 1 [1998].
[31]
Sarmiento v. Salamat, A.M. No. P-01-1501, 4 September 2001, p. 11.
[32]
Francisco v. Leyva, 304 SCRA 365 [1999].

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

SIMON FERNAN, JR. and G.R. No. 145927

EXPEDITO TORREVILAS,[1]
Petitioners, Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. August 24, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The instant petition under Rule 45 originated from 119 criminal

cases[2] filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) involving no less than 36 former
officials and employees of the then Ministry of Public Highways (MPH) and
several suppliers of construction materials for defalcation of public funds
arising from numerous transactions in the Cebu First Highway Engineering
District in 1977. Because of the sheer magnitude of the illegal transactions,
the number of people involved, and the ingenious scheme employed in
defrauding the government, this infamous 86 million highway scam has few
parallels in the annals of crime in the country.

The Case

Petitioners Simon Fernan, Jr. and Expedito Torrevillas seek the

reversal of the December 4, 1997 Decision[3] of the SB in the consolidated
Criminal Case Nos. 1640, 1641, 1642, 1643, 1818, 1819, 1820, 1821, 1822,
1823, 1879, 1880, 1881, 1882, 1883, 1884, 1885, 1886, 1887, 1888, 1889,
2839, 2840, 2841, 2842, 2843, 2844, 2845, 2846, 2847, 2848, 2849, 2850,
2851, 2852, 2853, 2854, 2855, 2856, 2857, 2858, 2859, 2860, 2861, 2862,
2863, 2864, 2865, 2866, 2867, 2868, 2869, 2870, 2871, 2872, 2873, 2874,
2875, 2876, 2877, 2878, 2879, 2880, 2881, 2882, 2883, 2884, 2885, 2886,
2887, 2888, 2889, 2890, 2891, 2892, 2893, 2894, 2895, 2896, 2897, 2898,
2899, 2900, 2901, 2902, 2903, 2904, 2905, 2906, 2907, 2908, 2909, 2910,
2911, 2912, 2913, 2915, 2917, 2918, 2919, 2920, 2921, 2922, 2923, 2924,
2925, 2926, 2927, 2928, 2929, 2930, 2931, 2932, 2936, 2937, 2938, and
2939,[4] all entitled People of the Philippines v. Rocilo Neis, et al., finding
them guilty of multiple instances of estafa through falsification of public
documents;[5]and the subsequent August 29, 2000 SB Resolution which
denied their separate pleas for reconsideration.

Petitioner Fernan, Jr. disputes the adverse judgment in only six (6)
cases, namely: 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885, 2914, and 2918; while petitioner
Torrevillas seeks exoneration in nine (9) cases, namely: 2855, 2856, 2858,
2859, 2909, 2910, 2914, 2919, and 2932.

Both petitioners assert their strong belief that their guilt has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt and, hence, exculpation is in order.

The Facts

The SB culled the facts[6] this way:

On June 21, 1978, COA Regional Director Sofronio Flores Jr. of

COA Regional Office No. 7, directed auditors Victoria C. Quejada and
Ruth I. Paredes to verify and submit a report on sub-allotment advises
issued to various highway engineering districts in Cebu, particularly,
the CebuCity, Cebu 1st, Cebu 2nd and the Mandaue City Highway
Engineering Districts. Complying with the directive, they conducted an
investigation and in due course submitted their findings. Their report
(Exhibit C) confirmed the issuance of fake Letters of Advice of
Allotments (LAAs) in the districts mentioned. They discovered that two
sets of LAAs were received by the districts. One set consists of regular
LAAs which clearly indicated the covering sub-allotment advices and
were duly signed by Mrs. Angelina Escaño, Finance Officer of the MPH
Regional Office. The LAAs were numbered in proper sequence and duly
recorded in the logbook of the Accounting, Budget and Finance Division.
The other set consists of fake LAAs which do not indicate the covering
sub-allotment advice and were signed by Chief Accountant Rolando
Mangubat and Engr. Jose Bagasao, instead of the Finance Officer. These
fake LAAs were not numbered in proper sequence; they were mostly
undated and were sometimes duplicated. They could not be traced to the
files and records of the Accounting, Budget and Finance Division. The
accounting entry for the disbursements made on the fake LAAs was
debited to the Accounts-Payable Unliquidated Obligations (8-81-400) and
credited to the Checking Account with the Bureau of Treasury (8-70-
790). Nevertheless, the expenditures were taken from obligations of the
current year (1978) because all the supporting papers of the payment
vouchers were dated in that year. The entries in the journal vouchers filed
with the MPH Regional Office were adjusted every month to 8-81-400
(unliquidated or prior years obligation), 8-83-000 (liquidated or current
year obligations) and 8-70-700 (Treasury/Agency Account). All of these
were approved for the Finance Officer by Chief Accountant Rolando
Mangubat. Mangubat, however, had no authority to approve them because
since October 1977, he had already been detailed to the MPH Central
Office. There were indications that the practice had been going on for
years.

xxxx

Due to these serious irregularities, then President Marcos created a

Special Cabinet Committee on MPH Region VII “Ghost Projects
Anomalies” which in turn organized a Special Task Force composed of
representatives from the Finance Ministry Intelligence Bureau (FMIB),
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Treasury and the
Commission on Audit. The mission of the task force was to conduct a
wider and more extended investigation in all the fifteen (15) highway
engineering districts of MPH Region VII, including the Cebu First
Highway Engineering District, the 1977 questionable disbursements of
which are the subject matter of these cases.

xxxx

For a better understanding of these highways cases, the flow in the

release of funds to the various agencies of the government and the control
devices set up for disbursement and accounting of public funds should
first be explained. A chart (Exhibit B) graphically shows the flow of
allotments from the Ministry down to the district level.

On the basis of appropriation laws and upon request made by

heads of agencies, the then Ministry of Budget released funds to the
various agencies of the government by means of an Advice of Allotment
(AA) and a Cash Disbursement Ceiling (CDC). The Advice of Allotment
is an authority for the agency to incur obligations within a specified
amount in accordance with approved programs and projects. The Cash
Disbursement Ceiling is an authority to pay. Upon receipt of the AA and
CDC from the Budget, the Central Office of the agency prepares the Sub-
Advice of Allotment (SAA) and the Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling
(ACDC) for each region, in accordance with the disbursement
allotment. These are sent to the Regional Office. Upon receipt, the
Budget Officer of the region prepares the corresponding Letters of Advice
of Allotment (LAA) which are forwarded to the various districts of the
region (The amount that goes to each district is already indicated in the
Advice of Allotment). Only upon receipt of the LAA is the district office
authorized to incur obligations.
 Now, how are funds released by the Regional Office to the
different districts and ultimately paid out to contractors, the District
Engineer submits to the Regional Director a request for allotment in
accordance with the program of work prepared by the former. This
procedure starts with the preparation of a Requisition for Supplies and
Equipment (RSE) in the District Office by the Senior Civil Engineer,
approved by the District Engineer, and signed by the Chief Accountant of
the Highway Engineering District, who certifies as to the availability of
funds. The RSE is then submitted to the Regional Director for
approval. Once it is approved, a Request for Obligation of Allotment
(ROA) is prepared by the Chief Accountant of the district Senior Civil
Engineer. The ROA signifies that a certain amount of district funds has
been set aside or earmarked for the particular expenditures stated in the
RSE. On the basis of the ROA, the District Office puts up advertisements,
[conducts] biddings, makes awards and prepares purchase orders which
are served on the winning bidder. The District Office also prepares a
summary of deliveries with the corresponding delivery receipts and tally
sheets, conducts inspection and prepares the General Voucher for the
payment of deliveries. Once the General Voucher (GV) has been
prepared, the corresponding check in the form of a Treasury Check
Account for Agency (TCAA) is drawn by the Disbursing Officer and
finally released to the contractor.

At the end of every month, the Report of Checks Issued by

Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDD) is prepared, listing all the checks
issued during that period. The RCIDDO is submitted to the accounting
division of the region. Upon receipt of the RCIDDO, the Regional Office
draws a journal voucher, debiting the account obligation (liquidated or
unliquidated obligation, whichever is applicable), and crediting the
account Treasury Check Account for Agency (TCAA). The RCIDDO is
recorded in the Journal of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing
Officers (JCIDDO) and posted in the general ledger at the end of each
month.

Simultaneous with the flow of the RCIDDO, the ROAs are

summarized in the Reports of Obligations Incurred (ROI) in the District
Office, once or twice a month, depending upon the volume of
transactions. The ROI is then submitted to the Regional Office. Upon
receipt of the ROI, the accountant of the Regional Office draws a journal
voucher taking up the following entry: debiting the appropriation allotted
(0-90-000) and crediting the obligation incurred (0-82-000). This is
recorded in the general voucher and posted to the general ledger at the end
of each month. The journal voucher is prepared, closing the account 8-70-
709 to 8-71-100-199 at the end of each month. It is also recorded and
posted to the general ledger. At the end of the month, the balances of each
account shown in the general ledger are summarized in a statement called
the trial balance. The trial balance is submitted to the MPH Central Office
in Manila where it is consolidated with other trial balances submitted by
other regional offices.

xxxx

The elaborate accounting procedure described above with its

system of controls was set up obviously to make sure that government
funds are properly released, disbursed and accounted for. In the hands of
untrustworthy guardians of the public purse, however, it proved to be
inadequate. There were loopholes which an unscrupulous person adroit in
government accounting could take advantage of to surreptitiously draw
enormous sums of money from the government.

Sometime in February, 1977, accused Rolando Mangubat (Chief

Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget
Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), all of MPH Region VII, met at
the Town and Country Restaurant in Cebu City and hatched an ingenious
plan to siphon off large sums of money from government
coffers. Mangubat had found a way to withdraw government money
through the use of fake LAAs, vouchers and other documents and to
conceal traces thereof with the connivance of other government officials
and employees. In fine, the fraudulent scheme involved the splitting of
LAAs and RSEs so that the amount covered by each general voucher is
less than P50,000.00 to do away with the approval of the Regional
Auditor; the charging of disbursements to unliquidated obligations due the
previous year to provide the supposed source of funds; and the
manipulation of the books of account by negation or adjustment, i.e., the
cancellation of checks through journal vouchers to conceal disbursements
in excess of the cash disbursement ceiling (CDC), so as not to reflect such
disbursements in the trial balances submitted to the Regional Office.

Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him. All

three agreed to help him carry out his plan. They typed the fake LAAs
during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating or
selling the fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the gross
amount. Preagido on her part manipulated the General Ledger, Journal
Vouchers and General Journal thru negative entries to conceal the illegal
disbursements. Thus, in the initial report of the auditors (Exhibit D), it
was discovered that the doubtful allotments and other anomalies escaped
notice due to the following manipulations:

“The letter-advices covering such allotments (LAA) were

generally not signed by the Finance Officer nor recorded in the
books of accounts. Disbursements made on the basis of these fake
 LAAs were charged to the unliquidated Obligations (Account 8-
81-400), although the obligations being paid were not among those
certified to the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400) at the
end of the preceding year. To conceal the overcharges to
authorized allotments, account 8-81-400 and the excess of checks
issued over authorized cash disbursements ceiling, adjustments
were prepared monthly through journal vouchers to take up the
negative debit to Account 8-81-400 and a negative credit to the
Treasury Checking Account for Agencies Account 8-70-
790. These journal vouchers in effect cancelled the previous entry
to record the disbursements made on the basis of the fake LAAs.
Thus, the affected accounts (Accounts 8-81-400 and 8-70-790), as
appearing in the trial balance would not show the irregularity. The
checks, however, were actually issued.”

The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy. Other

government employees, tempted by the prospect of earning big money,
allowed their names to be used and signed spurious documents.

Although the anomalies had been going on for sometime (February

1977 to June 1978), the PNB and Bureau of Treasury had no inkling about
it until the NBI busted the illegal operations. (Some of the recipients of
the stolen funds spent lavishly and bought two cars at a time). The reason
for this is that, at that time, the PNB and Bureau of Treasury were not
furnished copy of the mother CDC and the local branch of the PNB did
not receive independent advice from the PNB head office
in Manila. There were no deposits of money made with the PNB from
which withdrawals could be charged. Only CDCs were presented to it,
and not knowing that some of the CDCs were fake, the PNB branch paid
out the checks drawn against them. The bank had also no way of knowing
what amount was appropriated for the district; consequently, it did not
know if the limit had already been exceeded. Only an insider steep in
government accounting, auditing and banking procedures, particularly
their flaws and loopholes, could have pulled off such an ingenious and
audacious plan.

xxxx

Focusing our attention now on the anomalies committed in the

Cebu First District Engineering District, hereinafter referred to as the
Cebu First HED for brevity, the Court finds that the same pattern of fraud
employed in the other highway engineering districts in MPH Region VII
was followed. The Cebu First HED received from Region VII thirty-four
Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) in the total sum of P4,734,336.50
and twenty-nine (29) corresponding Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement
Ceiling (SACDCs), amounting to P5,160,677.04 for the period January 1,
1977 to December 31, 1977. But apart from this, the Cebu First HED
appears to have also received for the same period another set of eighty-
four (84) LAAs amounting to P4,680,694.76 which however, could not be
traced to any Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) or matched to the Advices
of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) received from the MPH and
Regional Office. This is highly irregular and not in consonance with
accounting procedures.

It was also made to appear that the payments were made for
alleged prior year’s obligations and chargeable to Account 8-81-400,
obviously because, they were not properly funded. Furthermore, the list of
projects in Region VII for 1977 showed that Cebu First HED completed
rehabilitation and/or improvement of roads and bridges in its districts from
February to May 1977, with expenditures amounting to P613,812.00. On
the other hand, the expenditures for barangay roads in the same district in
1977 amounted to P140,692.00, and these were all completed within the
period from November to December, 1977. These completed projects
were properly funded by legitimate LAAs and CDCs in the total amount
of only P754,504.00. However, an additional amount of P3,839,810.74
was spent by the Cebu First HED for maintenance of roads and bridges for
the same year (1977) but the same could not be traced to any authoritative
document coming from the MPH.

xxxx

A total of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from fake LAAs and

ACDCs, were traced back to Rolando Mangubat, Regional Accountant of
Region VII and Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer, also of
Region VII. Those LAAs and ACDCs became the vehicles in the
disbursement of funds amounting to P3,839,810.74, through the vouchers
purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of the aforementioned
materials allegedly used for the maintenance and repair of the national
highways within the Cebu First HED. Despite the enormous additional
expenditure of P3,839,810.74, the roads and bridges in the district, as
found out by the NBI, did not show any improvement. As testified to by
several barangay captains, the road maintenance consisted merely of
spreading anapog or limestone on potholes of the national highway.

Obviously, the vouchers for payments of alleged maintenance of

roads and bridges in the additional amount of P3,839,810.74 were
prepared for no other purpose than to siphon the said amount from the
government coffer into the pockets of some officials and employees of
Region VII and the Cebu First HED, as well as the suppliers and
contractors who conspired and confederated with them.
 The nuclei of this massive conspiracy, namely: Rolando Mangubat,
Jose Sayson, and Edgardo Cruz, all of MPH Region VII, were found guilty
in all 119 counts and were accordingly sentenced by the SB. The other
conniver, Delia Preagido, after being found guilty in some of the cases,
became a state witness in the remainder. On the basis of her testimony and
pertinent documents, Informations were filed, convictions were obtained,
and criminal penalties were imposed on the rest of the accused.

On the other hand, petitioners were both Civil Engineers of the MPH
assigned to the Cebu First Highway Engineering District. Petitioner Fernan,
Jr. was included among the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2879, 2880,
2881, 2885, 2914, and 2918 allegedly for having signed six (6) tally sheets
or statements of deliveries of materials, used as bases for the preparation of
the corresponding number of general vouchers. Fund releases were made to
the suppliers, contractors, and payees based on these general vouchers.

The Information against Fernan, Jr. in SB Criminal Case

No. 2879 reads as follows:

The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis, Rolando Mangubat,

Adventor Fernandez, Angelina Escaño, Delia Preagido, Camilo de Letran,
Manuel de Veyra, Heracleo Faelnar, Basilisa Galvan, Matilde Jabalde,
Josefina Luna, Jose Sayson, Edgardo Cruz, Leonila del Rosario, Engracia
Escobar, Abelardo Cardona, Leonardo Tordecilla, Agripino Pagdanganan,
Ramon Quirante, Mariano Montera, Mariano Jarina, Leo Villagonzalo,
Asterio Buqueron, Zosimo Mendez, Simon Fernan, Jr. and Juliana de los
Angeles for estafa thru falsification of public and commercial documents,
committed as follows:

That on, about and during the period from December 1,

1976 up to January 31, 1977, both dates inclusive, in the City of
Cebu and in Cebu Province, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused Rocilo Neis, Assistant District
Engineer of Cebu HED I; Rolando Mangubat, the Chief
Accountant of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways and
Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer of same
Regional Office, conniving with each other to defraud the
Philippine Government with the indispensable cooperation and
assistance of Angelina Escaño, Finance Officer of Region VII of
the Ministry of Public Highways; Delia Preagido, Assistant Chief
Accountant of same Regional Office; Camilo de Letran, Chief
Accountant of Cebu I HED; Manuel de Veyra, Regional Director,
MPH, Region VII; Heracleo Faelnar, then Assistant Director MPH
Region VII; Basilisa Galvan, Budget Officer, MPH, Region VII;
Matilde Jabalde, Supervising Accounting Clerk, MPH, Region VII;
Josefina Luna, Accountant II, MPH, Region VII; Jose Sayson,
Budget Examiner, MPH, Region VII, Edgardo Cruz, Accountant I,
MPH, Region VII; Leonila del Rosario, Chief Finance and
Management Service, MPH, Central Office; Engracia Escobar,
Chief Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Abelardo Cardona,
Assistant Chief Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Leonardo
Tordecilla, Supervising Accountant, MPH, Central Office;
Agripino Pagdanganan, Budget Officer III, MPH, Central Office;
Ramon Quirante, Property Custodian of Cebu I HED; Mariano
Montera, Senior Civil Engineer Engineer of Cebu I HED; Mariano
Jarina, Clerk in the Property Division of Cebu I HED; Leo
Villagonzalo, Auditor’s Aide of Cebu I HED; Zosimo Mendez,
Auditor of Cebu I HED; Asterio Buqueron, Administrative Officer
of Cebu I HED; Simon Fernan, Jr., Civil Engineer of Cebu I HED
and Juliana de los Angeles, an alleged supplier, all of whom took
advantage of their official positions, with the exception of Juliana
de los Angeles, mutually helping each other did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify and/or cause the
falsification of the following documents, to wit:

1. Request for Allocation of Allotment

2. Letter of Advice of Allotment

3. Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling

4. General Voucher No. B-15

5. Check No. 9933064

6. Abstract of Bids

7. Purchase Order

8. Statement of Delivery

9. Report of Inspection

10. Requisition for Supplies or Equipment

11. Trial Balance

 by making it appear that Regional Office No. VII of the Ministry
of Public Highways regularly issued an advice of cash
disbursement ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding letter of
advice of allotment (LAA) to cover the purchase of 1,400 cu. m. of
item 108[7] for use in the repair of the Cebu Hagnaya Wharf
road from Km. 50.30 to Km. 60.00, when in truth and in fact, as
all the accused knew, the same were not true and correct; by
making it appear in the voucher that funds were available and that
there were appropriate requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the
aforesaid purchase; that a requisition for said item was made and
approved; that a regular bidding was held; that a corresponding
purchase order was issued in favor of the winning bidder; that the
road construction materials were delivered, inspected and used in
the supposed project and that the alleged supplier was entitled to
payment when in truth and in fact, as all the accused know, all of
the foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the foregoing
falsifications, the above-named accused were able to collect from
the Cebu I HED the total amount of TWENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND PESOS (P28,000.00), Philippine Currency, in
payment of the non-existing deliveries; that the said amount
of P28,000.00 was not reflected in the monthly trial balance
submitted to the Central Office by Region VII showing its
financial condition as the same was negated thru the journal
voucher, as a designed means to cover-up the fraud; and the
accused, once in possession of the said amount, misappropriated,
converted and misapplied the same for their personal needs, to the
damage and prejudice of the Philippine Government in the total
amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS
(P28,000.00), Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The Informations in the six (6) cases involving Fernan, Jr. were
essentially identical save for the details as highlighted in boldface
above. For ease of reference, Fernan, Jr.’s criminal cases are detailed below:

Criminal Dates of Main Items Allegedly Purchased Amount of

Case No. Commission Documents Fraud
Falsified
2879 December 1, 1. General 1,400 cu. m. of item 108 for use in PhP 28,000.00
1976 up Voucher No. the repair of
to January 31, B-15; the CebuHagnaya Wharf road from
1977 2. Check No. Km. 50.30 to Km. 60.00
 9933064;
2880 December 1, 1. Request for 1,400 cu. m. of item 108 for use in PhP 28,000.00
1976 up Allocation of the repair of the Bogo-Curva-
to January 31, Allotment 101- Medellon road from Km. 110.00 to
1977 12-105-76; Km. 119.00
2. General
Voucher No.
B-55;
3. Check No.
9933104;
2881 January 2, 1. Request for Approximately 1,500 cu. m. of PhP 31,000.00
1977 up Allocation of item 108 for use in the repair and
toFebruary 28, Allotment 101- rehabilitation of damaged roads
1977 2-56-77; and bridges by Typhoon Aring at
2. General the Tabogon-Bogo provincial road
Voucher No. from Km. 92 to Km. 98
B-245;
3. Check No.
9933294;
2885 January 2, 1. Request for materials for use in the repair and PhP 30,000.00
1977 up Allocation of rehabilitation of the Daan-
toJanuary 31, Allotment 101- Bantayan road from Km. 127.00 to
1977 12-112-76; Km. 136
2. General
Voucher No.
B-76;
3. Check No.
9933125;
2914 October 1, 1. General 1,200 cu. m. of item 108 for use in PhP 27,000.00
1977 up Voucher No. the rehabilitation of the Cajel-
toNovember 30, B-927; Lugo, Barbon barangay road
1977 2. Check No.
9403425;
2918 January 2, 1. General 1,500 cu. m. of item 108 for the PhP 30,000.00
1977 up Voucher No. rehabilitation of
toFebruary 28, B-107; theCebu North HagnayaWharf roa
1977 2. Check No. d from Km. 71 to Km. 76
9933157;

On the other hand, petitioner Torrevillas was one of the accused in

Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, 2859, 2909, 2910, 2914, 2919, and
2932.

The Information against Torrevillas in SB Criminal Case

No. 2855 reads as follows:

The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis, Rolando Mangubat,

Adventor Fernandez, Angelina Escaño, Delia Preagido, Camilo de Letran,
Manuel de Veyra, Heracleo Faelnar, Basilisa Galvan, Matilde Jabalde,
Josefina Luna, Jose Sayson, Edgardo Cruz, Leonila del Rosario, Engracia
Escobar, Abelardo Cardona, Leonardo Tordecilla, Agripino Pagdanganan,
Ramon Quirante, Jorge de la Peña, Leo Villagonzalo, Asterio Buqueron,
Expedito Torrevillas, Mariano Montera and Rufino V. Nuñez
for estafa thru falsification of public and commercial documents,
committed as follows:

That on, about and during the period from June 1, 1977 up
to June 30, 1977, both dates inclusive, in the City of Cebu and in
Cebu Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused Rocilo Neis, Assistant District Engineer of Cebu HED
I; Rolando Mangubat, the Chief Accountant of Region VII of the
Ministry of Public Highways and Adventor Fernandez, Regional
Highway Engineer of same Regional Office, conniving with each
other to defraud the Philippine Government with the indispensable
cooperation and assistance of Angelina Escaño, Finance Officer of
Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways; Delia Preagido,
Assistant Chief Accountant of same Regional Office; Camilo de
Letran, Chief Accountant of Cebu I HED; Manuel de Veyra,
Regional Director, MPH, Region VII; Heracleo Faelnar, then
Assistant Director MPH Region VII; Basilisa Galvan, Budget
Officer, MPH, Region VII; Matilde Jabalde, Supervising
Accounting Clerk, MPH, Region VII; Josefina Luna, Accountant
II, MPH, Region VII; Jose Sayson, Budget Examiner, MPH,
Region VII, Edgardo Cruz, Accountant I, MPH, Region VII;
Leonila del Rosario, Chief Finance and Management Service,
MPH, Central Office; Engracia Escobar, Chief Accountant, MPH,
Central Office; Abelardo Cardona, Assistant Chief Accountant,
MPH, Central Office; Leonardo Tordecilla, Supervising
Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Agripino Pagdanganan, Budget
Officer III, MPH, Central Office; Ramon Quirante, Property
Custodian of Cebu I HED; Jorge de la Peña, Auditor of Cebu I
HED; Leo Villagonzalo, Auditor’s Aide of Cebu I HED; Asterio
Buqueron, Administrative Officer of Cebu I HED; Expedito
Torrevillas, representative of the Engineer’s Office, Cebu I HED;
Mariano Montera, Senior Civil Engineer Engineer of Cebu I HED;
and Rufino V. Nuñez, an alleged supplier, all of whom took
advantage of their official positions, with the exception of Rufino
V. Nuñez, mutually helping each other did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify and/or cause the falsification of
the following documents, to wit:

1. Request for Allocation of Allotment – 101-10-186-76;

10-190-76; 10-192-76; 10-188-76; 10-180-76
 2. Letter of Advice of Allotment

3. Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling

4. General Voucher No. B-613

5. Check No. 9403099

6. Abstract of Bids

7. Purchase Order

8. Statement of Delivery

9. Report of Inspection

10. Requisition for Supplies or Equipment

11. Trial Balance

by making it appear that Regional Office No. VII of the Ministry

of Public Highways regularly issued an advice of cash
disbursement ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding letter of
advice of allotment (LAA) to cover the purchase of 153.63 m. t. of
item 310[8] for use in asphalting of the Toledo-Tabuelan road at
Km. 108.34 to Km. 109.52, when in truth and in fact, as all the
accused knew, the same were not true and correct; by making it
appear in the voucher that funds were available and that there were
appropriate requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the aforesaid
purchase; that a requisition for said item was made and approved;
that a regular bidding was held; that a corresponding purchase
order was issued in favor of the winning bidder; that the road
construction materials were delivered, inspected and used in the
supposed project and that the alleged supplier was entitled to
payment when in truth and in fact, as all the accused know, all of
the foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the foregoing
falsifications, the above-named accused were able to collect from
the Cebu I HED the total amount of FORTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS &
85/100 (P48,431.85), Philippine Currency, in payment of the non-
existing deliveries; that the said amount of P48,431.85 was not
reflected in the monthly trial balance submitted to the Central
Office by Region VII showing its financial condition as the same
was negated thru the journal voucher, as a designed means to
cover-up the fraud; and the accused, once in possession of the said
amount, misappropriated, converted and misapplied the same for
 their personal needs, to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine
Government in the total amount of FORTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS &
85/100 (P48,431.85), Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The Torrevillas cases were substantially the same save for the details
highlighted in the aforequoted typical accusatory pleading. For ease of
reference, Torrevillas’ criminal cases are particularized as follows:

Criminal Case Dates of Main Documents Items Allegedly Amount of Fraud

No. Commission Falsified Purchased
2855 June 1, 1977 up 1. Request for 153.63 m. t. of PhP 48,431.85
toJune 30, 1977 Allocation of item 310 for use in
Allotment 101-10- asphalting of the
186-76; 10-190- Toledo-Tabuelan
76; 10-192-76; 10- road from Km.
188-76; 10-180- 108.34 to Km.
76; 109.52
2. General
Voucher No. B-
613;
3. Check No.
9403099;
2856 June 1, 1977 up 1. Request for 153.76 m. t. of PhP 48,472.84
toJune 30, 1977 Allocation of item 310 for use in
Allotment 101-10- the asphalting of
15-76; 9-201-76; the Toledo-
8-152-76; 8-153- Tabuelan road
76;9-181-76; 9- from Km 108.34 to
184-76 Km. 109.52
2. General
Voucher No. B-
619;
3. Check No.
9403105;
2858 June 1, 1977 up 1. Request for 151.35 m. t. of PhP 47,713.09
toJuly 31, 1977 Allocation item 310 for use in
Allotment 101-6- the asphalting of
234-76; 6-237-76; the Toledo-
6-239-76; 6-241- Tabuelan road
76; 6-240-76 from Km. 108.34
2. General to Km. 109.52
Voucher No. B-
629;
3. Check No.
9403115;
2859 June 1, 1977 up 1. Request for 110.01 m. t. of PhP 34,680.65
toJune 31, 1977 Allocation of item 310 for use in
 Allotment 101-7- asphalting of the
63-76; 8-102-76; Toledo-Tabuelan
8-121-76 road from Km.
2. General 108.34 to
Voucher No. B- Km.109.52
631;
3. Check No.
9403117;
2909 September 1, 1. General 1,200 cu.m. of item PhP 27,900.00
1977 up Voucher No. B- 108 for use in the
to November 30, 928; rehabilitation of
1977 2. Check No. the Buanoy-
9403426; Cantibas, Balaban
barangay road
2910 September 1, 1. General 1,200 cu. m. of PhP 27,900.00
1977 up Voucher No. B- item 108 for use in
to November 30, 929; the rehabilitation
1977 2. Check No. of the Magay-
9403427; Canamukan,
Compostela
barangay road
2914 October 1, 1977 up 1. General 1,200 cu. m. of PhP 27,000.00
toNovember 30, Voucher No. B- item 108 for use in
1977 927; the rehabilitation
2. Check No. of the Cajel-Lugo,
9403425; Barbon barangay
road
2919 January 2, 1977 up 1. General 1,550 cu. m. of PhP 31,000.00
toFebruary 28, Voucher No. B- item 108 for use in
1977 244; the repair and
2. Check No. rehabilitation of
9933293; damaged roads and
bridges at the
Toledo-Tabuelan
national road from
Km. 71 to Km. 83
2932 June 1, 1977 up 1. Request for 250 gals of PhP 44,762.58
toJuly 31, 1977 Allocation of aluminum paint
Allotment 101-7- 324 gals of red
83-76; 7-84-76; 7- lead paint for use
124-76; 8-153-76; in the maintenance
8-170-76; of national roads
2. General and bridges
Voucher B-643;
3. Check No.
9403130;

The Sandiganbayan’s Ruling

The anti-graft court was fully convinced of the guilt of petitioner

Fernan, Jr.; and in its December 4, 1997 Decision, it found him criminally
liable in the six (6) cases against him, thus:
 In Criminal Case No. 2879, the Court finds accused JOSE
SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA, ZOSIMO
MENDEZ, MARIANO JARINA and SIMON FERNAN, Jr.,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa
thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles
318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there
being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of
them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided
by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00);
to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos (P 28,000.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.[9] (Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2880, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE

LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO
MONTERA, ZOSIMO MENDEZ, and SIMON FERNAN, Jr.,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa
thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles
318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there
being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of
them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided
by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00);
to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos (P 28,000.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.[10] (Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2881, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE

LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, ZOSIMO
MENDEZ and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional,
as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay
a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify,
jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of
Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P 31,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate
share of the costs.[11] (Emphasis supplied.)
 In Criminal Case No. 2885, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE
LETRAN JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, ZOSIMO
MENDEZ and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional,
as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay
a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify,
jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P 30,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share
of the costs.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2914, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE

LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, EXPEDITO
TORREVILLAS and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification
of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no
modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided
by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00);
to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Pesos (P 27,000.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.[13] (Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2918, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE

LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, ZOSIMO
MENDEZ, SIMON FERNAN, Jr. and ISMAEL SABIO, Jr.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa
thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles
318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there
being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of
them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided
by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00);
to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P 30,000.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.[14] (Emphasis supplied.)
 Petitioner Torrevillas suffered the same fate and was convicted in the
nine (9) criminal cases, to wit:

In Criminal Case No. 2855, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE

LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO
MONTERA, and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification
of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no
modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided
by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00);
to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of Forty Eight Thousand Four Hundred Thirty One Pesos and
85/100 (P 48,431.85); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
[15]
(Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2856, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE

LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO
MONTERA and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification
of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no
modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided
by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00);
to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of Forty Eight Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Two Pesos and
84/100 (P 48,472.84); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.[16]
(Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2858, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE

LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO
MONTERA and EXPEDITO TOREVILLAS, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru Falsification
of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal relation to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in
attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten
(10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of
Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly
and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Seven
Thousand Seven Hundred Thirteen Pesos and 9/100 (P47,713.09); and, to
pay their proportionate share of the costs.

In Criminal Case No. 2859, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE

LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO
MONTERA and EXPEDITO TOREVILLAS, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru Falsification
of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no
modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided
by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00);
to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of Thirty Four Thousand Six Hundred Eighty pesos and 65/100
(P34,680.65); and , to pay their proportionate share of the costs.[17]

In Criminal Case No. 2909, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE

LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, FLORO
JAYME and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification
of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no
modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided
by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00);
to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P 27,900.00);
and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.[18] (Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2910, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE

LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, FLORO
JAYME and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification
of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no
modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided
by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00);
to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P 27,900.00);
and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.[19] (Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2914, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE

LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, EXPEDITO
TORREVILLAS and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification
of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no
modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided
by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00);
to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Pesos (P 27,000.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2919, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE

LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO
MONTERA, ZOSIMO MENDEZ, EXPEDITO
TORREVILLAS and ISMAEL SABIO, Jr. GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification
of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no
modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided
by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00);
to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P 31,000.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.[20](Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2932, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE

LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO
MONTERA, PEDRITO SEVILLE and EXPEDITO
TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in
the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and
penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance,
hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
six (6) years ofprision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the
 accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the
Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Four Thousand Seven
Hundred Sixty Two Pesos and 58/100 (P 44,762.58); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.[21] (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners made the supplication before the court a quo to recall the
adverse judgments against them which was declined by the August 29,
2000 SB Resolution.

Firm in their belief that they were innocent of any wrongdoing, they
now interpose the instant petition to clear their names.

The Issues

Petitioners put forward two (2) issues, viz:

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN TOTALLY IGNORED

PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED
INNOCENT WHEN IT RULED THAT THE BURDEN OF
CONVINCING THE HON. COURT THAT THE DELIVERIES OF THE
ROAD MATERIALS ATTESTED TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY
THEM WERE NOT GHOST DELIVERIES RESTS WITH THE
ACCUSED AND NOT WITH THE PROSECUTION.

II

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN CONVICTING

PETITIONERS AS CO-CONSPIRATORS DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO SPECIFICALLY PROVE BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
WOULD IMPLICATE THEM AS CO-CONSPIRATORS AND JUSTIFY
THEIR CONVICTION.

The Court’s Ruling

We are not persuaded to nullify the verdict.

Petitioners’ guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt

Petitioners mainly asseverate that their guilt was not shown beyond a
peradventure of doubt and the State was unable to show that government
funds were illegally released based on alleged ghost deliveries in
conjunction with false or fake tally sheets and other documents which they
admittedly signed.

We are not convinced.

Our Constitution unequivocally guarantees that in all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.[22] This sacred task unqualifiedly means proving the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Definitely, “reasonable doubt” is not
mere guesswork whether or not the accused is guilty, but such uncertainty
that “a reasonable man may entertain after a fair review and consideration of
the evidence.” Reasonable doubt is present when

after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidences, leaves
the minds of the [judges] in that condition that they cannot say they feel an
abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge; a
certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the
reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon
it.[23]

A thorough scrutiny of the records is imperative to determine whether

or not reasonable doubt exists as to the guilt of accused Fernan, Jr. and
Torrevillas.

Petitioners were charged with the complex crime of estafa through

falsification of public documents as defined and penalized under Articles
318 and 171 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:

ART. 318. Other deceits. – The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not
less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such
amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage
another by any deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this
chapter.

ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or

ecclesiastical minister. – The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee,
or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following acts:

xxxx

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

The complex crime is pruned into the following essential elements:

For estafa

1. Deceit: Deceit is a specie of fraud. It is actual fraud, and consists in any

false representation or contrivance whereby one person overreaches and
misleads another, to his hurt. There is deceit when one is misled, either by
guile or trickery or by other means, to believe to be true what is really
false.[24]

2. Damage: Damage may consist in the offended party being deprived of

his money or property as a result of the defraudation, disturbance in
property right, or temporary prejudice.[25]

For falsification

1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;

2. That he takes advantage of his official position;

3. That he falsifies a document by committing any of the acts defined

under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.[26]
 Before the SB, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
dated September 1, 1988 was entered into between the State and the accused
with the following stipulations and admissions:

(1) To expedite the early termination of the instant cases and

abbreviate the testimony of Mrs. Delia Preagido, the prosecution and the
accused have agreed to reproduce and adopt as the testimony of Preagido
in the instant cases, her previous testimonies in Criminal Cases Nos. 889,
etc. (Mandaue City HED ’78 cases), on May 18 and 19, 1982 and in
Criminal Cases Nos. 1446-1789, etc. (Danao City HED ’77 cases) on
November 10, 1987 and March 14, 1988, both on direct and cross
examination x x x without prejudice to whatever direct and/or cross
examination question, that may be propounded by the Prosecution and the
accused on said State witness, which questions will only be limited to the
fake or irregular LAA’s and SACDC’s issued to Cebu I HED in 1977, the
sale of such fake or irregular LAA’s and SACDC’s issued to Cebu I HED
in 1977, the sale of such fake or irregular LAA’s and SACDC’s in said
engineering district in the said year and the participation of the accused
thereon;

(2) That in the event Mrs. Delia Preagido is presented to testify as

a State witness in the instant cases without reproducing and adopting her
previous testimonies in the Mandaue City HED ’78 and the Danao City
HED ’77 cases, she will identify documents and exhibits which have been
previously marked and identified by other prosecution witness x x x.

(3) That in the previous testimonies of Mrs. Delia Preagido in the

Mandaue City HED ’78 and the Danao City HED ’77 cases, she identified
twenty-six separate lists containing names of officials and employees of
MPH, Regional Office No. VII, of the various Highways Engineering
Districts in MPH, Region VII, and the MPH Central Office who have
allegedly received money or various sums from 1977 to 1978 out of the
proceeds or sales of fake LAA’s in 1977 and 1978 and, therefore, to
obviate Mrs. Preagido’s previous testimony of these lists, the Prosecution
hereby reproduces and adopts specifically such testimony and the
markings of the lists, i.e., Exhibits ‘KKK’, ‘KKK-1’ to ‘KKK-25’ in the
Mandaue City HED ’78 cases and Exhibits ‘0000’, ‘0000-1’ to ‘0000-25’
in the Danao City HED ’77 cases, substituted or re-marked accordingly as
‘Exhibits ‘LL’, ‘LL-1’ to ‘LL-25’ in the instant cases.[27]

As a result of this MOA, the testimony of state witness Preagido on

the modus operandi of the conspirators, or the unique and distinct method of
procedure by which the malversation of public funds in Region VII of the
MPH was perpetrated and accomplished, dealt a major blow to the defenses
raised by petitioners. Preagido’s vital testimony, wherein she identified the
methods, documents, exhibits, and other pertinent papers that led to the
crafting of fake Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs),[28]general vouchers,
disbursement of funds for non-existent projects, general vouchers, and other
documents, was not even successfully refuted or overturned by petitioners.

Preagido confirmed and admitted under oath that the illegal

disbursement of public funds pertained to non-existent projects and was
supported by fake LAAs, fake general vouchers, and other pertinent papers
that were also falsified. The fake LAAs and general vouchers were, in turn,
supported by signed tally sheets that pertained to alleged ghost deliveries of
road construction materials for non-existent or illegal projects.
The fake tally sheets, delivery receipts, reports of inspection, requests
for supplies and materials, and other related documents signed on separate
occasions by petitioners, which were attached as supporting documents to
corresponding general vouchers; the alleged amounts and quantities of road
construction materials delivered; and the specific fake general vouchers,
checks, and other pertinent documents issued which led to the illegal
disbursement of funds are summarized as follows:

Petitioner Fernan, Jr.

Criminal Specific Main Items Allegedly Purchased FAKE Amount of

Case No. Exhibits Documents LAAs that Fraud
Falsified authorized
purchase
2879 T-86-f-1, 1. General 1,400 cu. m. of item 108 for use in Not PhP
etc. (Tally Voucher No. the repair of numbered 28,000.00
Sheets) B-15; theCebu HagnayaWharf road from contrary to
2. Check No. Km. 50.30 to Km. 60.00 official
9933064; procedure
2880 T-87-f-1, 1. Request for 1,400 cu. m. of item 108 for use in Not PhP
etc. (Tally Allocation of the repair of the Bogo-Curva- numbered 28,000.00
Sheets) Allotment Medellon road from Km. 110.00 to contrary to
101-12-105- Km. 119.00 official
76; procedure
2. General
Voucher No.
B-55;
3. Check No.
9933104;
2881 T-104-g- 1. Request for Approximately 1,500 cu. m. of Not PhP
 1, etc. Allocation of item 108 for use in the repair and numbered 31,000.00
(Tally Allotment rehabilitation of damaged roads contrary to
Sheets) 101-2-56-77; and bridges by Typhoon Aring at official
2. General the Tabogon-Bogo provincial road procedure
Voucher No. from Km. 92 to Km. 98
B-245;
3. Check No.
9933294;
2885 T-89-f-1, 1. Request for Materials for use in the repair and Not PhP
etc. (Tally Allocation of rehabilitation of the Daan- numbered 30,000.00
Sheets) Allotment Bantayan road from Km. 127.00 to contrary to
101-12-112- Km. 136 official
76; procedure
2. General
Voucher No.
B-76;
3. Check No.
9933125;
2914 T-115-g- 1. General 1,200 cu. m. of item 108 for use in PhP
1, etc. Voucher No. the rehabilitation of the Cajel- 27,000.00
(Tally B-927; Lugo, Barbon barangay road
Sheets) 2. Check No.
9403425;
2918 T-116-f-1, 1. General 1,500 cu. m. of item 108 for the Not PhP
etc. (Tally Voucher No. rehabilitation of numbered 30,000.00
Sheets) B-107; the Cebu NorthHagnaya Wharfroa contrary to
2. Check No. d from Km. 71 to Km. 76 official
9933157; procedure

Petitioner Torrevillas

Criminal Specific Main Documents Items Allegedly FAKE LAAs Amount of

Case No. Exhibits Falsified Purchased that authorized Fraud
purchase
2855 T-33-f 1. Request for 153.63 m. t. of Not numbered PhP 48,431.85
(Delivery Allocation of item 310 for use contrary to
Receipt); T- Allotment 101-10- in asphalting of official
33-f-1 (Daily 186-76; 10-190-76; the Toledo- procedure
Tally Sheet); 10-192-76; 10-188- Tabuelan road
76; 10-180-76; from Km.
2. General Voucher 108.34 to Km.
No. B-613; 109.52
3. Check No.
9403099;
2856 T-34-f 1. Request for 153.76 m. t. of Not numbered PhP 48,472.84
(Delivery Allocation of item 310 for use contrary to
Receipt); T- Allotment 101-10- in the asphalting official
34-f-1 (Daily 15-76; 9-201-76; 8- of the Toledo- procedure
Tally Sheet); 152-76; 8-153- Tabuelan road
76;9-181-76; 9- from Km 108.34
184-76 to Km. 109.52
2. General Voucher
 No. B-619;
3. Check No.
9403105;
2858 T-35-f 1. Request for 151.35 m. t. of Not numbered PhP 47,713.09
(Delivery Allocation item 310 for use contrary to
Receipt); T- Allotment 101-6- in the asphalting official
35-f-1 (Daily 234-76; 6-237-76; of the Toledo- procedure
Tally Sheet); 6-239-76; 6-241- Tabuelan road
76; 6-240-76 from Km.
2. General Voucher 108.34 to Km.
No. B-629; 109.52
3. Check No.
9403115;
2859 T-36-f 1. Request for 110.01 m. t. of Not numbered PhP 34,680.65
(Delivery Allocation of item 310 for use contrary to
Receipt); T- Allotment 101-7- in asphalting of official
36-f-1 (Daily 63-76; 8-102-76; 8- the Toledo- procedure
Tally Sheet); 121-76 Tabuelan road
2. General Voucher from Km.
No. B-631; 108.34 to
3. Check No. Km.109.52
9403117;
2909 T-113-b 1. General Voucher 1,200 cu.m. of Not numbered PhP 27,900.00
(Request for No. B-928; item 108 for use contrary to
Supplies and 2. Check No. in the official
Equipment); 9403426; rehabilitation of procedure
T-113-d the Buanoy-
(Report of Cantibas,
Inspection); T- Balaban
113-c barangay road
(Abstract of
Sealed
Quotation)

2910 T-114-c 1. General Voucher 1,200 cu. m. of Not numbered PhP 27,900.00
(Request for No. B-929; item 108 for use contrary to
Supplies and 2. Check No. in the official
Equipment); 9403427; rehabilitation of procedure
T-114-e the Magay-
(Report of Canamukan,
Inspection); T- Compostela
114-f barangay road
(Abstract of
Sealed
Quotation)

2914 T-115-c 1. General Voucher 1,200 cu. m. of Not numbered PhP 27,000.00
(Request for No. B-927; item 108 for use contrary to
Supplies and 2. Check No. in the official
Equipment); 9403425; rehabilitation of procedure
T-115-e the Cajel-Lugo,
(Report of Barbon barangay
Inspection); T- road
115-f
(Abstract of
 Sealed
Quotation)

2919 T-117-g 1. General Voucher 1,550 cu. m. of Not numbered PhP 31,000.00
(Delivery No. B-244; item 108 for use contrary to
Receipt); T- 2. Check No. in the repair and official
117-g-1, etc. 9933293; rehabilitation of procedure
(Daily Tally damaged roads
Sheets) and bridges at
the Toledo-
Tabuelan
national road
from Km. 71 to
Km. 83
2932 1. Request for 250 gals of Not numbered PhP 44,762.58
Allocation of aluminum paint contrary to
Allotment 101-7- 324 gals of red official
83-76; 7-84-76; 7- lead paint for procedure
124-76; 8-153-76; use in the
8-170-76; maintenance of
2. General Voucher national roads
B-643; and bridges
3. Check No.
9403130;

On the part of petitioners, they readily admitted that they either signed
the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of inspection, requests for
supplies and materials, and other related documents which became part of
the supporting documents that led to the issuance of general vouchers and
eventually the disbursement of public funds.[29] The tally sheets are
statements of delivery that purportedly indicated the specified quantities of
materials for the construction and maintenance of roads that have been
delivered on supposed project sites on given dates at specific places.

As a result of petitioners’ signatures in the tally sheets and/or delivery

receipts, reports of inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other
supporting documents—which became the basis for payment to suppliers—
public funds were released via general vouchers and checks to the said
suppliers despite the fact that the latter did not make any deliveries in
accordance with projects allegedly funded by mostly fake LAAs.

The accusation that there were no actual deliveries of road

construction and maintenance materials in support of projects or otherwise
funded by LAAs was proven true by the testimonies of the various barangay
captains and residents of the barangay who were supposed to be benefited by
the construction and repair activities of the Cebu First Highway Engineering
District. The testimonies of these barangay captains and residents are
summarized as follows:[30]

1. MACARIO LIMALIMA, Barangay Captain of Barangay

Antipolo, Medellin, Cebu, testified that his barangay is traversed by the
national highway stretching to a distance of 2 kilometers and 750 meters
(Km. 122; Km. 123 to 125). He described the road as full of
potholes. Except for filling up these potholes with “anapog” or crushed
limestone, no major repairs were undertaken on the said road in 1978 or in
previous years. (TSN., pp. 6-14, June 5, 1986).[31]

2. FELOMINO ORBISO, Barangay Captain of

Cawit, Medellin, Cebu, from 1972 to 1981, testified that his barangay is
traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 125 to Km.
127.9. He described the road as a rough or dirt road. No improvement
was ever made on this road whether during the year when he gave his
statement to the NBI (1978) or in previous years. The road remained in
bad shape, with numerous potholes which the camineros merely filled up
with limestone. (TSN., pp.14-19, June 5, 1986).[32]

3. TIMOTEO ANCAJAS, Barangay Captain of Paypay, Daan

Bantayan, Cebu, from 1972 to 1982, testified that his barangay is traversed
by the national highway, stretching from Km. 132 to Km. 134 ½, or a
distance of 2 ½ kilometers. He described the portion of the highway as a
rough road with potholes. He stated that the only improvement done on
this road was the filling up of the potholes with “anapog” or crushed
limestone and this was done only once in 1977. It even took the
camineros three months from the time the limestones were delivered to
start working on the road. (TSN., pp. 20-26, June 5, 1986).[33]

4. LUCIA PEÑAFLOR, Barangay Captain of Don Pedro,

Bogo, Cebu, from 1966 to 1982, testified that her barangay is traversed by
the national highway, stretching from Km. 103 to Km. 105 ½, up to the
boundary of San Remigio, and from the boundary to Daan Bantayan, a
distance of more than 3 kilometers. It was only in 1984 or 1985 when this
portion of the national highway was asphalted. Prior to that, the road was
maintained by filling up the potholes with crushed limestone or
“anapog.” These potholes started to appear between January and June of
1977. However, as alleged by her in her affidavit (Exh. II-1-d), these
potholes were filled up only from January to June, 1978. (TSN., pp. 28-46,
June 5, 1986).[34]
 5. MARCELO CONEJOS, Barangay Captain of Tapilon, Daan
Bantayan, from 1972 to 1982, testified that his barangay is traversed by
the national highway, stretching from Km. 130 to Km. 134, or a distance
of 4 kilometers. In 1977, said portion of the national highway was in bad
condition and that nothing was done to improve it until 1982, except for
the time when the potholes were filled up with crushed limestones. (TSN.,
pp. 48-56, June 5, 1986).[35]

6. REMEDIOS FELICANO, Barangay Captain of Looc, San

Remigio, Cebu from 1977 to 1982, testified that her barangay is traversed
by the national highway, stretching form Km. 109 to Km. 110. She
described said portion of the national highway as “stoney.” The only
maintenance work undertaken to improve the road was the filling up of
potholes with crushed limestone which camineros gathered from the
roadside. (TSN., pp.57-67, June 5, 1986).[36]

7. ALBERTO BRANSUELA, a resident of Barangay San Jose,

Catmon, Cebu, from 1974 to 1978, testified that barangay San Jose is
traversed by the national highway (Km. 58), covering a distance of ½
kilometer more or less. He stated that while this portion of the national
highway was already asphalted as of 1977, there were potholes which the
camineros filled up with anapog taken from the roadside. (TSN., pp. 69-
80), June 5, 1986).[37]

8. CARIDAD PUNLA, Acting Barangay Captain of Barangay

Corazon, Catmon, Cebu, from 1977 to 1982, testified that the Poblacion of
Catmon is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 57 to
Km. 58. In 1977, only more than ½ of this portion of the national
highway was cemented while the remaining portion was asphalted. While
said portion of the national highway already had cracks and potholes as of
1977, the real problem was the uneven elevation of the surface of the
shoulder of the road. No general repair was undertaken by the authorities
to correct the uneven elevation, except for the work done by the camineros
who covered up the potholes. (TSN., pp. 81-89, June 5, 1986).[38]

9. FELIPE MOLIT, Barangay Captain of Bao, Sugud, Cebu,

from 1975 to 1982, testified that barangay Bao was traversed by the
national highway, stretching from Km. 59 to Km. 60 1/2. He described
said portion of the national highway as a gravel road surfaced with
anapog. In 1977, the said road already had potholes which maintenance
men filled up with anapog beginning in March, 1977. The anapog was
hauled in from Km. 64, the usual excavation place of anapog. It took only
3 truckloads of anapog to cover the entire length of the 1 ½ kilometers
traversing their barangay. (TSN., pp. 90-99, June 5, 1986).[39]
 10. LEONARDO PINOTE, Barangay Captain of Barangay
Argawanon, San Remigio, Cebu, from 1972 to 1980, testified that his
barangay is traversed by the national highway covering a distance of ½
kilometers more or less. In 1977, this portion of the national highway was
a rough road with potholes. In the same year, camineros worked on the
road, using wheelbarrows, shovels and rakes, pitching up the potholes
with anapog. (TSN., pp. 29-35, June 6, 1986).[40]

11. PEDRO ORSAL, Barangay Captain of Poblacion, San

Remigio, Cebu, from January 1972 to 1980, testified that his barangay is
traversed by the national highway, from Km. 107 to Km. 110, or a
distance of three kilometers more or less. In 1977, the road from Km. 107
to Km. 108 was a gravel road. It was properly maintained by the
highways people, and every time potholes appeared on the road, they
would be filled-up with anapog. This material was dumped along the road
by trucks of the Bureau of Public Highways. On the other hand, the road
leading to the heart of the poblacion was asphalted, but with potholes. In
1977, the potholes were filled up by camineros with gravel delivered by
dump trucks of the Bureau of Public Highways. It was only in 1978 when
the road was re-asphalted and extended from the junction of the poblacion
to the adjacent barrio of Looc. x x x (TSN., pp.36-45, June 6, 1986).[41]

The inescapable conclusion from the aforementioned testimonies of the

barangay captains and residents of Cebu whose respective barangay are
traversed by the national highway is that there were no actual major repair
works undertaken on the national highway except the filling of potholes by
crushed limestone (anapog). Clearly, there were no deliveries of supplies and
materials for asphalting and repair of roads described in the tally sheets and
other supporting documents signed by petitioners.

While petitioner Torrevillas presented Vice-Mayor Emigdio Tudlasan

of Tabuclan, Cebu, who testified that he saw the asphalting of the Tabuclan
Road from kilometers 18 to 19, said testimony is not conclusive on the actual
delivery of the supplies indicated in the tally sheets, as Tudlasan was not
present at the time of alleged delivery. Moreover, his testimony runs counter
to the testimonies of Barangay Captain Remedios Feliciano of Looc, San
Remigio, Cebu and Barangay Captain Pedro Orsal of Poblacion, San
Remigio, Cebu. Feliciano testified that she was Barangay Captain of Looc,
San Remigio, Cebu from 1977 to 1982; that her barangay is traversed by the
national highway, stretching from km. 109 to km. 110; and that the only
work undertaken to improve the road was the filling up of potholes with
crushed limestone which camineros gathered from the roadside. On the other
hand, Orsal testified that he was Barangay Captain of Poblacion, San
Remigio, Cebu, from January 1972 to 1980; that his barangayis traversed by
the national highway, from km. 107 to km. 110; that in 1977, the road from
km. 107 to km. 108 was a gravel road maintained by the highways people,
and every time potholes appeared on the road, they would be filled-up
with anapog, which was dumped along the road by the Bureau of Public
Highways; and that it was only in 1978 when the road was re-asphalted and
extended from the junction of the poblacion to the adjacent barrio of Looc.

Compared to the testimony of Vice-Mayor Tudlasan, the testimonies

of Barangay Captains Feliciano and Orsal are entitled to more weight and
credit, and are more credible considering the fact that they are residents of
the area where the road supposedly to be repaired is located plus the fact that
they saw only limestone, not asphalt, that was used in the repair of the road
in 1977. The testimonies of Feliciano and Orsal are further buttressed by the
findings and statements of government witnesses, namely––Ruth Inting
Paredes, Supervising Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor assigned to
Region VII; Felicitas Cruz Ona, Supervising COA Auditor assigned to the
main COA office; Federico A. Malvar, Senior National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Agent of the Anti-Graft Section and member of the COA
NBI team assigned to investigate the anomalies; Rogelio C. Mamaril,
Supervising NBI Agent of the Anti-Fraud and Action Section; and Delia
Comahig Preagido, Accountant III, MPH, Region VII––to the effect that the
general vouchers and LAAs that corresponded to the aforementioned tally
sheets signed by petitioner Torrevillas were fake or falsified. Undeniably, the
government witnesses have no motive to testify falsely against petitioner
Torrevillas and, hence, credible. We conclude that there were no actual
deliveries of supplies for asphalting of road and repair on kilometers 108 and
109, which were the subjects of Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, and
2859.

Glaring is the finding of the SB that the Cebu First Highway

Engineering District, to which petitioners were assigned, had fake LAAs
totaling to PhP 4,924,366.50, while the fake Cash Disbursement Ceilings
issued amounted to PhP 6,271,150.[42] The Cebu First Highway Engineering
District had also issued checks per unrecorded reports in the total sum of PhP
1,135,176.82.[43] Therefore, the total illegal disbursements in the Cebu First
Highway Engineering District alone were a staggering PhP 12,330,693.32
circa 1977.

Of this total, petitioner Fernan, Jr. freely admitted signing tally sheets
which pertained to non-existent deliveries of road construction supplies and
materials totaling PhP 146,000,[44] including PhP 27,000 in Criminal Case
No. 2914 where petitioner Torrevillas was among the co-accused.[45] These
tally sheets were attached as the supporting papers to fake general vouchers
which facilitated the release of check payments to suppliers.

These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Juliana de los

Angeles (Criminal Case Nos. 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885, and 2914) and Ismael
Sabio, Jr. (Criminal Case No. 2918).[46]

On his part, petitioner Torrevillas voluntarily admitted to signing tally

sheets, reports of inspection, requisitions of supplies and equipment, and
other pertinent documents totaling an even greater amount of PhP
337,861.01,[47] including PhP 27,000 in Criminal Case No. 2914 where
petitioner Fernan, Jr. was among the co-accused.[48] These documents signed
by petitioner Torrevillas were likewise attached as supporting papers to fake
general vouchers which facilitated the release of check payments to
suppliers.

These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Rufino V. Nuñez

(Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, and 2859), Juliana de los Angeles
(Criminal Case Nos. 2909, 2910, and 2914), Ismael Sabio, Jr. (Criminal Case
No. 2919), and Manuel Mascardo (Criminal Case No. 2932).[49]

These general vouchers and checks could not be traced to genuine

LAAs. Ergo, there were no actual deliveries of supplies and materials for the
road repair and rehabilitation in Region VII, which were the subjects of the
criminal cases where petitioners were charged.
 We find no reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo that all the
essential elements of the crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents were present. There is no question that petitioners, at the time of
the commission of the crime, were public officers—civil engineers—
assigned to the MPH. Their signing of tally sheets and related documents
pertaining to the alleged deliveries of supplies for road repair and
construction constitutes intervention and/or taking advantage of their official
positions, especially considering that they had the duty to inspect the
purported deliveries and ascertain the veracity of the documents and the
statements contained in them.

The tally sheets bearing their signatures contained false recitals of

material facts which the petitioners had the duty to verify and
confirm. These tally sheets were attached as supporting documents to fake
LAAs and subsequently became the bases for the disbursement of public
funds to the damage and prejudice of the government. Indubitably, there
exists not even an iota of doubt as to petitioners’ guilt.

The essential elements of estafa through falsification of public

documents are present in the cases against petitioners, as follows:

1. Deceit: Petitioners Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas made it appear that

supplies for road construction and maintenance were delivered by suppliers
allegedly in furtherance of alleged lawful projects when in fact said supplies
were not delivered and no actual asphalting or repair of road was
implemented. In doing so, petitioners:

1.1. Were public officers or employees at the time of the commission

of the offenses;
1.2. Took advantage of their official position as highway engineers;
and
1.3. Made untruthful statements in several narrations of fact.

2. Damage: The government disbursed PhP 146,000 in the case of

Fernan, Jr. and PhP 337,861.01 in the case of Torrevillas, as payments to
various suppliers for the delivery of non-existent supplies.
 By way of defense, petitioners posit that the tally sheets and other
documents could in fact be traced to genuine LAAs that were in the custody
of the NBI. Unfortunately, these genuine LAAs were not introduced in
evidence. It is an age-old axiom that s/he who alleges something must prove
it. Petitioners’ assertion that the documents they signed were all genuine and
duly covered by genuine LAAs was substantiated only by their own self-
serving and uncorroborated testimonies. We hesitate to give much weight
and credit to their bare testimonies in the face of clear, convincing,
overwhelming, and hard evidence adduced by the State.

If the genuine LAAs were vital to their defense, and they firmly
believed that the documents were indeed in the custody of the NBI, then
petitioners could have easily procured the compulsory process to compel the
production of said documents. However, petitioners miserably failed to
avail of subpoena duces tecum which the court a quo could have readily
granted. The inability to produce such important and exculpatory pieces of
evidence proved disastrous to petitioners’ cause. Their conviction was
indeed supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt which was not
overturned by defense evidence.

Petitioners acted in conspiracy with one another

Petitioners vigorously claim error on the part of the lower court when
it made the finding that they were co-conspirators with the other parties
accused despite the dearth of evidence to amply demonstrate complicity.

We are not convinced by petitioners’ postulation.

Indeed, the burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy falls to the

shoulders of the prosecution. Considering, however, the difficulty in
establishing the existence of conspiracy, settled jurisprudence finds no need
to prove it by direct evidence. In People v. Pagalasan, the Court explicated
why direct proof of prior agreement is not necessary:
 After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a
successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common
purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or
more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other, were in fact, connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.[50]

In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we categorized two (2) structures of

multiple conspiracies, namely: (1) the so-called “wheel” or “circle”
conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the “hub”) dealing
individually with two or more other persons or groups (the “spokes”); and
(2) the “chain” conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or
other contraband, in which there is successive communication and
cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations
between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then
retailer and consumer.[51]

We find that the conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the “wheel”
conspiracy. The 36 disparate persons who constituted the massive
conspiracy to defraud the government were controlled by a single hub,
namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant
III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), who
controlled the separate “spokes” of the conspiracy. Petitioners were among
the many spokes of the wheel.
We recall the painstaking efforts of the SB through Associate Justice
Cipriano A. Del Rosario, Chairperson of the Third Division, in elaborating
the intricate web of conspiracy among the accused, thus:

Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him. All

three agreed to help him carry out his plan. They typed fake LAAs
during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating or
selling fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the gross amount. Preagido
manipulated the general ledger, journal vouchers and general journal
through negative entries to conceal the illegal disbursements. In the initial
report of COA auditors Victoria C. Quejada and Ruth I. Paredes it was
discovered that the doubtful allotments and other anomalies escaped
notice due to the following manipulations:

“The letter-advices covering such allotments (LAA) were

not signed by the Finance Officer nor (sic) recorded in the books of
accounts. Disbursements made on the basis of these fake LAAs
were charged to the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400),
although the obligations being paid were not among those certified
to the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400) at the end of
the preceding year. To conceal the overcharges to authorized
allotments, account 8-81-400 (sic) and the excess of checks issued
over authorized cash disbursements ceiling, adjustments were
prepared monthly through journal vouchers to take up the negative
debit to Account 8-81-400 and a negative credit to the Treasury
Checking Account for Agencies Account 8-70-790. These journal
vouchers in effect cancelled the previous entry to record the
disbursements made on the basis of fake LAAs. Thus the affected
accounts (Accounts 8-81-400 and 8-70-790), as appearing in the
trial balance, would not show the irregularity. The checks,
however, were actually issued.”[52]

The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious

conspiracy. Other government employees, tempted by the prospect of
earning big money, allowed their names to be used and signed
spurious documents.

xxxx

3. Cebu First Highway Engineering District Anomalies

Focusing our attention now on the anomalies committed in the

Cebu First District Engineering District, hereinafter referred to as the
Cebu First HED for brevity, the Court finds that the same pattern of fraud
employed in the other highway engineering districts in MPH Region VII
was followed. The Cebu First HED received from Region VII thirty-four
Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) in the total sum of P4,734,336.50
and twenty-nine (29) corresponding Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement
Ceiling (SACDCs), amounting to P5,160,677.04 for the period January 1,
1977 to December 31, 1977. But apart from this, the Cebu First HED
appears to have also received for the same period another set of eighty-
four (84) LAAs amounting to P4,680,694.76 which however, could not be
traced to any Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) OR MATCHED TO THE
Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) received from the MPH
and Regional Office. This is highly irregular and not in consonance with
accounting procedures.

It was also made to appear that the payments were made for
alleged prior year’s obligations and chargeable to Account 81-400,
obviously because, they were not properly funded. Furthermore, the list of
projects in Region VII for 1977 showed that Cebu first HED completed
rehabilitation and/or improvement of roads and bridges in its districts from
February to May, 1977, with expenditures amounting to P613,812.00. On
the other hand, the expenditures for barangay roads in the same district in
1977 amounted to P140,692.00, and these were all completed within the
period from November to December, 1977. These completed projects
were properly funded by legitimate LAAs and CDCs in the total amount
of only P754,504.00. However, an additional amount of P3,839,810.74,
was spent by the Cebu First HED for maintenance of roads and bridges for
the same year (1977) but the same could not be traced to any authoritative
document coming from the MPH.

The following payments for materials purchased for the year 1977
were made to appear as payment for prior year’s obligation and were paid
out of fake LAAs:

Supplier No. of Kind of Measurement Amount

Vouchers Materials
Rufino Nuñez 29 Item 310 4,640,275 mt P1,374,135.00
J. delos Angeles 21 Item 108 22,290 cu.m. 433,300.00
Iluminada Vega 11 Item 108 8,325 cu.m. 191,500.00
Florencio Gacayan 10 Item 108 7,800 cu.m. 156,000.00
Ismael Sabio, Jr. 6 Item 108 6,198 cu.m. 123,960.00
FBS Marketing 3 Lumber 70,610.00
Cebu Hollow Blocks 2 Hollow Blocks 19,880.00
Bienvenido Presillas 4 Equip. Rental 29,580.00
T.R. Eustaquio Ent. 1 Office Supplies 7,461.90
Santrade Mktg. 1 Johnson 8,392.90
Products
Pelagia Gomez 1 Item 108 2,000 cu.m. 40,000.00
M & M Ent. 1 Paints 49,736.20
Freent Ind. 1 Office Supplies 590.20
Total……… P2,505,147.00

The NBI also discovered that there were purchases of materials in

1977 that were charged to current obligations but paid out of spurious
LAAs, to wit:

Supplier No. of Kind of Measurement Amount

Vouchers Materials
 Rufino Nuñez 11 Item 310 162,549 m.t. P529,475.00
Item 108 5,000 cu.m.
Juliana delos Angeles 16 Item 108 13,280 cu.m. P276,400.00
Item 111 1,00 cu.m. 24,000.00
Item 200 307 cu.m. 7,982.00
Iluminada Vega 3 Item 108 3,600 cu.m. 72,090.00
Florencio Gacayan 2 Item 108 2,400.00 cu.m. 48,000.00
Vicon Ent. 1 Steel Frame 19,042.74
Ismael Sabio, Jr. 5 Item 108 6,950 cu.m. 139,000.00
Jabcyl Mktg. 3 Bridge 128,764.80
Materials
Total……… P1,339,663.74

Grand Total ………. P3,839,810.74

A total of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from fake LAAs and

ACDCs, were traced back to Rolando Mangubat, Regional Accountant of
Region VII and Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer, also of
Region VII. Those LAAs and ACDCs became the vehicles in the
disbursement of funds amounting to P3,839,810.74, through the vouchers
purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of the aforementioned
materials allegedly used for the maintenance and repair of the national
highways within the Cebu First HED. Despite the enormous additional
expenditure of P3,839,810.74, the roads and bridges in the district, as
found out by the NBI, did not show any improvement (Exhibit II). As
testified to by several barangay captains, the road maintenance consisted
merely of spreading anapog or limestone on potholes of the national
Highway.

Obviously, the vouchers for payments of alleged maintenance of

roads and bridges in the additional amount of P3,839,810.74 were
prepared for no other purpose than to siphon off the said amount from the
government coffer into the pockets of some officials and employees of
Region VII and the Cebu First HED, as well as the suppliers and
contractors who conspired and confederated with them.[53]

After a close re-examination of the records, the Court finds no reason

to disturb the finding of the anti-graft court that petitioners are co-
conspirators of the other accused, headed by Chief Accountant Rolando
Mangubat, who were similarly convicted in practically all the 119 counts of
estafa. Undisturbed is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and in the
absence of strong and compelling reasons or justifications, it will accord
finality to the findings of facts of the SB. The feeble defense of petitioners
that they were not aware of the ingenuous plan of the group of accused
Mangubat and the indispensable acts to defraud the government does not
merit any consideration. The State is not tasked to adduce direct proof of the
agreement by petitioners with the other accused, for such requirement, in
many cases, would border on near impossibility. The State needs to adduce
proof only when the accused committed acts that constitute a vital
connection to the chain of conspiracy or in furtherance of the objective of
the conspiracy. In the case at bench, the signing of the fake tally sheets
and/or delivery receipts, reports of inspection, and requests for supplies and
materials by petitioners on separate occasions is vital to the success of the
Mangubat Group in siphoning off government funds. Without such
fabricated documents, the general vouchers covering the supply of materials
cannot be properly accomplished and submitted to the disbursing officer for
the preparation of checks.

State witness Ruth Paredes, Supervising COA Auditor, elaborated on

the procedure regarding the award of the contract more specifically to the
payment of the contractor or supplier. Once the Request for Supplies and
Equipment is approved by the Regional Office, the Request for Obligation
of Allotment (ROA) or the request for funds is signed by the District
Engineer pursuant to the approved plans and budget and signed by the
district accountant as to availability of funds.

The district office will advertise the invitation to bid and award the
contract to the lowest bidder. The Purchase Order (PO) is prepared and
addressed to the winning bidder. Upon delivery of the supplies and
materials, the supplier bills the district office for payment. Consequently,
the requisitioning officer will prepare the general voucher which must be
accompanied by the following documents:

a. The ROA;
b. The PO;
c. The abstract of Bid together with the Bid quotations;
d. The delivery receipts together with the tally sheets; and
e. The tax clearance and tax certificate of the supplier.
 After the preparation and submission of the general voucher and the
supporting documents, the disbursing officer shall prepare and draw a check
based on said voucher. The check is countersigned by an officer of the
district office and/or the COA Regional Director based on the amount of the
check.

Thus, it is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts, the
general voucher cannot be prepared and completed. Without the general
voucher, the check for the payment of the supply cannot be made and issued
to the supplier. Without the check payment, the defraudation cannot be
committed and successfully consummated. Thus, petitioners’ acts in signing
the false tally sheets and/or delivery receipts are indispensable to the
consummation of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents. Surely, there were ghost or false deliveries of supplies and
materials as convincingly shown by the testimonies of the barangay
captains, officials, and residents of the areas where the materials were
allegedly used. More importantly, if there were actual deliveries of
materials made, then there would be no need to fake the LAAs because the
suppliers will have to be paid the cost of said materials plus a reasonable
profit. As a result, there is nothing or not much to share with the more than
30 or so co-conspirators, for the suppliers would not be too dim-witted to
part with even their cost in buying the materials they allegedly
supplied. Moreover, the fake delivery receipts and tally sheets signed by
petitioners were linked to the general vouchers upon which check payments
were made to the suppliers who were found guilty of participating in the
fraud. With respect to petitioner Fernan, Jr., he signed tally sheets on the
ghost deliveries of Juliana de los Angeles and Ismael Sabio, Jr. On the part
of petitioner Torrevillas, he signed false tally sheets and delivery receipts on
supplies allegedly delivered by Rufino V. Nuñez, Juliana de los Angeles,
Ismael Sabio, Jr., and Manuel Mascardo. Lastly, the checks issued to these
suppliers based on general vouchers supported by the false tally sheets and
general vouchers signed by petitioners cannot be traced to any genuine
LAAs, resulting in the inescapable conclusion that these LAAs were
unauthorized; hence, fake or fabricated. These are undisputed tell-tale signs
of the complicity by petitioners with the Mangubat syndicate.
 In People v. Mangubat, the court a quo elucidated the conspiracy in
the Cebu highway scam in a trenchant manner:

Where the acts of each of the accused constitute an essential link in

a chain and the desistance of even one of them would prevent the chain
from being completed, then no conspiracy could result as its
consummation would then be impossible or aborted. But when each and
everyone of the accused in the instant cases performed their assigned tasks
and roles with martinet-like precision and accuracy, by individually
performing essential overt acts, so much so that the common objective is
attained, which is to secure the illegal release of public funds under the
guise of fake or simulated public documents, then each and everyone of
said accused are equally liable as co-principals under the well-established
and universally-accepted principle that, once a conspiracy is directly or
impliedly proven, the act of one is the act of all and such liability exists
notwithstanding no-participation in every detail in the execution of the
offense.[54]

In sum, the required quantum of proof has been adduced by the State
on the conspiracy among the accused including petitioners. The conviction
of petitioners must perforce be sustained.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the December

4, 1997 Decision of the SB in the consolidated criminal cases subject of this
petition.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO

MORALES
Associate
Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
In the SB criminal cases, petitioner is named Expedito Torrevillas; nevertheless, only one
person is referred to despite the variance in spelling.
[2]
The entire case record consists of three (3) separate volumes.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 28-192. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Cipriano A. Del Rosario
(Chairperson) and concurred in by Associate Justices Leonardo I. Cruz and German G. Lee, Jr.
[4]
The other criminal cases, namely: Criminal Case Nos. 889, etc., and 2070, etc., have been
dismissed for various reasons; see id. at 147. Petitioners Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas were not impleaded as
accused in said cases.
[5]
The accused in the aforementioned cases did not have custody or control of public funds;
hence, the crime charged was estafa instead of malversation under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
[6]
Supra note 3, at 102-109.
[7]
Rollo, p. 18; limestone, or sand and gravel––the latter being of higher quality.
[8]
Id. at 23; bituminous asphalt.
[9]
Id. at 170.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id. at 171.
[12]
Id. at 172.
[13]
Id. at 182.
[14]
Id. at 183-184.
[15]
Id. at 161.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Id. at 162-163.
[18]
Id. at 180.
[19]
Id. at 180-181.
[20]
Id. at 184.
[21]
Id. at 188-189.
[22]
Art. III, Sec. 14 (2).
[23]
People v. Balacano, G.R. No. 127156, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 615,
621.
.
[24]
People v. Hernando, G.R. No. 125214, October 28, 1999, 317 SCRA 617, 627.
[25]
L.B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE Book Two 712-713 (13th ed., 1993).
[26]
Id. at 191-192.
[27]
Rollo, pp. 66-67.
[28]
Id. at 69-72. On the basis of appropriations laws and upon request made by heads of agencies,
the Ministry of Budget releases funds to the various government agencies (in this case the MPH) via an
Advice of Allotment (AA) and a Cash Disbursement Ceiling (CDC). The AA is written authority for the
MPH to incur obligations within a specified amount in accordance with approved programs and
projects. The CDC is written authority to pay. Upon receipt of the AA and CDC from the Ministry of
Budget, the Central Office of the MPH prepares the Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) and the Advice of
Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDC) for each region, in accordance with the disbursement allotment. These
are sent to the Regional Office (in this case Region VII). Upon receipt, the region’s Budget Officer
prepares the corresponding Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) which are forwarded to the
various districts of the region (in this case, the First Highway Engineering District; incidentally, the
amount that goes to each district is already indicated in the AA). Only upon receipt of the LAA is the
district office authorized to incur obligations, that is, spend public funds. (Emphasis supplied.)
[29]
Id. at 15, 17, 94-96, 131, 134 & 206-207.
[30]
Id. at 84-86 & 88.
[31]
Id. at 84.
[32]
Id.
[33]
Id.
[34]
Id. at 84-85.
[35]
Id. at 85.
[36]
Id.
[37]
Id.
[38]
Id. at 85-86.
[39]
Id. at 86.
[40]
Id. at 88.
[41]
Id.
[42]
Id. at 78.
[43]
Id. at 79.
[44]
Id. at 170-172 & 182-183.
[45]
Id. at 182.
[46]
Records, Informations Envelope Vol. 1 (of 6 volumes).
[47]
Rollo, pp. 161-162, 180, 182, 184 & 188.
[48]
Id. at 182.
[49]
Id.
[50]
G.R. Nos. 131926 & 138991, June 18, 2003, 404 SCRA 275, 291.
[51]
G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 556-557.
[52]
Rollo, p. 106.
[53]
Id. at 107-109.
[54]
SB Criminal Case Nos. 2073-95 & 3323-45, promulgated on May 30, 1989.