Consti 1 Legislative
Consti 1 Legislative
Consti 1 Legislative
1. Senate
2. House of Representatives
a. District representatives
b. Party-list representatives
Composition, qualifications, and term of office of
members of Congress
• Senators (elected at large by qualified voters of • Not more than 250 members, unless otherwise
the Philippines as may be provided by law) provided by law. NOTE: Congress itself may by
law increase the composition of the HoR
• 6 years which shall commence, unless otherwise • 3 years, which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June
next following their election. next following their election.
• Term limit: Not more than 2 consecutive terms. • Term limit: Not more than 3 consecutive terms.
Composition, qualifications, and term of office of
members of Congress
Qualifications Qualifications
Legislative districts are apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area.
They are apportioned in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 5)
Each city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Each province
shall have at least one representative.
While Sec. 5(3) of Art. VI requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to
one representative; it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to
an additional district. (Mariano, JR. v. COMELEC)
Apportionment of legislative districts
Reapportionment may be made thru a special law. The Constitution did not preclude
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. Thus, a law converting a municipality into a highly-
urbanized city automatically creates a new legislative district and, consequently,
increases the membership of the HoR. (Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577,
March 7, 1995)
Apportionment of legislative districts
Congress cannot validly delegate the power to create legislative districts. The power to increase
the allowable membership in the House of Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts
is vested exclusively in Congress.
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law,
the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to
reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes
the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
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((4) Within three years following the return of every census, Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
(Emphasis supplied)
(SEMA V. COMELEC)
Manner of reapportionment
NOTE: The Constitution does not require a plebiscite for the creation
of a new legislative district by a legislative reapportionment. It is
required only for the creation of new local government units.
(Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, 2008)
In the Bagabuyo case, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371 was passed which increased Cagayan de
Oro's LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT from one to two.
For the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to
either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. The constituents
of each district would elect their own representative to Congress as well as eight members of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
The COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 78376 implementing R.A. No. 9371.
Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC. The petitioner
insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro as a local
government unit, and does not merely provide for the City's legislative apportionment.
Cagayan de Oro City's reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning of
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution which requires a plebiscite.
Bagabuyo case
RULING:
R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance
with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core
provision - Section 1 - provides:
SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. - The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby
apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays
Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, …………. and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall
comprise the second district.
Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes
place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is
not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the
addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of
representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does
not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two
districts.
Bagabuyo case
Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the
rules on legislative apportionment and it does not require a plebiscite.
The role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure that the voice of the people
of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the legislative
district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it has no legal personality
that must be created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence, there is no
need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar action on a
legislative district.
Bagabuyo case
The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are
the territorial and political subdivisions of the state. They possess legal personality on the
authority of the Constitution and by the action of the Legislature.
• Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be “a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.” The commas after the words “national (,)”
and “regional (,)” separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties.
• National and Regional parties need not represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors
• Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack “well-
defined political constituencies” nor represent “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors. (Atong
Paglaum v. COMELEC.)
• However, the participation of major political parties may be through their sectoral wings, a majority
of whose members are “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political
constituencies”. (Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC)
• Those “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. (LUV-OF-HIP)
The number of seats available to party-list representatives is based on the ratio of party-list
representatives to the total number of representatives. Accordingly, we compute the number of seats
available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts.
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives
to the total number of representatives, the Constitution left the
manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to
the wisdom of the legislature. (BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
179271,April 21, 2009)
Guidelines in the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Sec. 11 of RA 7941
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each.
3. Those garnering a sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than 3 seats.
Guidelines in the allocation of seats for party-list representatives
In other words, the allocation of the additional seats is no longer limited to the
two-percenters. Hence, even those who did not get at least 2% of votes, can still
benefit from the second round of seat allocation.
In Banat case, COMELEC INITIALLY proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-
list elections based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of votes were thus
given one (1) guaranteed partylist seat each. And the additional seats were also distributed
among them. Total of 19 seats
But the problem is, only 19 seats were filled, it did not appropriate the total number of
available seats for party-list.
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for
party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law.
Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55
seats available to party-list representatives.
SC RULING:
This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible
to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of
available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of
the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives
shall consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million
votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes.
Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60
seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of
parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied
party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
The Court therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives."
Computation of the additional seats:
• The final list of COMELEC of the PLs
that garnered 2% guaranteed seats. 17
seats are guaranteed.
• For example:
BAYAN MUNA = 6.14% x 38 = 233.32 / 100
= 2.33 = therefore, 2 additional seat
In applying the procedure from the previous slide, all 55 available party list seats are filled.
Qualifications of a party-list nominee
Note: It is the parties or organizations which are voted for, not their candidates.
However, it is the party-list representatives who are seated or elected into
office, not their parties or organizations.
Validity of Additional
Qualification Requirement
Principle: Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Term Tenure
The time during which the
officer may claim to hold the It represent the period
office as of right and fixes the during which the
interval after which the incumbent actually holds
several incumbents shall the office.
succeed one another.
Term - Senate members
Article VI SECTION 4.
The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.
Of the Senators elected in the election of 1992, the first twelve obtaining the
highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for
three years.
Term - House of representatives
Article VI SECTION 7.
No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Dimaporo v. Mitra 202 SCRA 77
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) Art IX, Sec 67
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he
be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during
the term for which he was elected.
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office
or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another
post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the
clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art.
IX-B, of the Constitution.
election
Sec. 8-9 Article VI , 1987 Constitution.
SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the
House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of
all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
quorum
Sec. 16(2) Article VI , 1987 Constitution.
SECTION 16. (3) Each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
Rules of proceeding
Sec. 21 Article VI , 1987 Constitution.
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not
have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
has agreed to a particular measure.
Discipline of members
Sec. 16(3) Article VI , 1987 Constitution.
The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only
because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because
the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House
knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
Can the Sandiganbayan suspend a Senator
facing a criminal case? (Santiago case)
Yes. In Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, the Court clarified
that the authority of either chamber of the Congress to
discipline its members by way of expulsion or
suspension for up to sixty days, “is a punitive measure
that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon
an erring member” and is not to be confused with the
recognized authority of the Sandiganbayan to impose a
suspension pendent lite against a member of the
Congress charged before it for violation of, and as
provided for under, the Anti-Graft and Corruption Act.
Said suspension pendent lite, said the court, is “not a
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on the petitioner for misbehavior as a
Member of the House of Representative.”
Can the Ombudsman suspend a member of the
House of Representatives pending investigation and
as penalty? )
Yes. Under Section 24 of RA 6770, the Ombudsman or his
Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance
of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the
service, or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due
to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which
case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Journal and Congressional Records (Sec.16[4])
“Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings,
and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security;
and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be
entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.”
The Enrolled Bill Theory
-Under the enrolled bill rule, once an election for the
adoption of a statute is held, the procedural method by
which the measure was placed on the ballot cannot be
challenged with a law suit since judicial inquiry into
legislative procedure is barred as an intrusion into the
lawmaking body.
- In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall
prevail over those of the journals.(Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito 78 Phil 1)
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by the officers and Congress and
approved by the Executive, the Court cannot speculate
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers. Remedy is amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial decree. (Casco vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347)
Probative Value of Journal
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to
matters that are required by the Constitution to be
recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the
absence to the contrary, the Journals have also been
accorded conclusive effect.
In United States vs Pons, the Court spoke of the
imperatives of public policy regarding the Journals as
“public memorials of the most permanent character”.
Thus, they should be public, because all are required to
conform to them; they should be permanent, that
rights acquired today upon faith of what has been
declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or
at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in
the memory of individuals.
Matters to be entered in the Journal
1. Yeas and nays on 3rd and final reading(sec.26[2])
2. Veto message of President (Section 27[1])
3. Yeas and nays on repassing of vetoed bill (id)
4. Yeas and nays on any question upon request of 1/5
of members present (Sec.16[4])
Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory
The enrolled bill doctrine is based mainly on the
respect due to coequal and independent departments,
which requires the judicial department to accept as
having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated. Also, it has been stated in other cases
that if the attestation is absent and the same is not
required for the validity of the statute, the courts may
resort to the journals and other records of Congress for
proof of its due enactment.
In case of conflict between the contents of an enrolled bill and
the journal of proceedings of Congress, which one prevails and
why?
In CASCO PHIL. VS. GIMENEZ, 7 SCRA 347, it was held by the Supreme Court
that the enrolled bill prevails over the journal. If the enrolled bill provides that
it is urea formaldehyde is exempt from tax, and not urea and formaldehyde
which appears in the journal which was really approved, the former prevails
and only CURATIVE LEGISLATION COULD CHANGE THE SAME, NOT JUDICIAL
LEGISLATION. However, if the President of the Philippines, the Senate
President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives withdraw their
signatures as a result of an anomaly surrounding the printing of the final copy
of the bill, then, the journal will prevail since what is left is no longer
considered an “enrolled bill.”
Astorga vs. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714
-It is the journal entry that is binding in this case.
Morales vs. Subido, 27 SCRA
- Enrolled bill is controlling.
Arroyo vs. de Venecia, supra
- Enrolled Billed and Journal Entry
Congressional Record (Section 16[4], par.2)
Each House shall also keep a Record of its
proceedings.
Sessions
Regular Sessions
- The Congress shall convene once every year on the
fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a
different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in
session for such number of days as it may determine
until thirty days before the opening of its next regular
session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. (Article VI, Section 15)
Regular Sessions
- Neither House during the sessions of the Congress
shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for
more than three days, nor to any other place than that
in which the Houses shall be sitting. (Article VI, Section
16(5) )
I. Special Session (No Need of a Presidential Call)
- The Congress may be called for special session at any
time by the President.
- The President’s call is not necessary for the following
instances:
a. When the Congress meets to canvass the
presidential election (Article VII, Section 4);
b. When it is required to resolve a conflict between a
majority of the members of the cabinet and the
President regarding the latter’s continuing ability to
discharge the powers and duties of his office (Article
VII, Section 11);
c. When Congress reviews the President’s declaration
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus (Article VII, Section 18)
d. When it is required to call a special election when
both the offices of the President and the Vice President
become vacant (Article VII, Section 10); and
e. When it decides to exercise the power of
impeachment, particularly where the respondent is the
President himself. (Article XI, Section 3)
II. Regular Session
- Every 4th Monday of July.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
ABBAS VS. SENATE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
it is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC
and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “judicial”
and “legislative” components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The
legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the
resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and
intent of the Constitution. The composition itself is 6 senators to three justices (2 is
to 1).
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie.
The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of
the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
Like the composition of the Electoral Tribunals, the structure of the Commission on
Appointments departs from that of its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution which
gave preferential representation only to the two largest political parties represented
in each House. The 1987 Constitution calls for proportional representation of all
political parties and parties and organizations registered under the party-list system.
And, as with the Electoral Tribunals, sectors will be represented only in so far as they
form part of the party-list system.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, involved the Senate contingent in the Commission. The
senatorial elections of 1992 yielded 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC, 3 Lakas-NUCD, and 1 LP-
PDP-LABAN. On the basis of proportional representation, therefore, the Commission
on Appointments could contain 7.5 LDP, 2.5 NPC, 1.5 Lakas, and .5 LPPDP-LABAN.
The Senate, however, put in 8 LDP by rounding up 7.5, 2 NPC by ignoring .5, 1 LAKAS
also by ignoring .5, and 1 LP-PDP by rounding out .5 to 1. Was this constitutional?
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
The Court ruled that rounding out 7.5 to 8 and .5 to 1 was unconstitutional because
it deprived Lakas and NPC of .5 each. Nor can the holders of .5 each, while belonging
to distinct parties, form a unity for purposes of obtaining a seat in the Commission.
Thus, under the Court's arithmetic, the result would be a total of only 11 members.
But the Court ruled that a full complement of 12 was not mandatory.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
Section 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive
an annual salary of three hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred forty thousand pesos each;
the Senators, the Members of the House of Representatives, the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional
Commissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.
PRIVILEGES
The privilege from arrest found in Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution was
the same parliamentary immunity from arrest enjoyed by the members of the
Parliament of England and by members of the United States Congress.
Section 9 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution made an assemblyman immune from
arrest arising from "all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment." The 1986 Constitutional Commission chose to follow what the 1971
Constitutional Convention did. Needless to say, moreover, the immunity applies for as
long as Congress is in session, whether or not the legislator involved is actually
attending it.
PRIVILEGES
1. Privilege from arrest.
a Congressman who has been convicted of rape and is in detention cannot claim
that he should be freed because of popular sovereignty and the need of his
constituents to be represented. People v. Jalosjos ruled that Members of Congress
are not exempt from detention for crime. They may be arrested, even when the
House is in session, for crimes punishable by a penalty of more than six months.
There is no basis whatsoever for treating him or her differently from other convicts.
PRIVILEGES
2. Freedom of speech and debate.
Section 15, Article VI, of the 1935 Constitution provided that "for any speech or debate" in
Congress, the Senators and Members of the House of Representatives "shall not be
questioned in any other place."
The 1935 provision was a copy of the speech and debate clause of Article I, Section 6, of
the United States Constitution. The 1987 text, as also the 1973 text, is a slight modification
of the traditional phraseology but it has preserved the traditional limit and scope of the
immunity.
PRIVILEGES
In the first place, it is a guarantee of immunity from answerability before an outside forum
but not from answerability to the disciplinary authority of Congress itself. In the second
place, to come under the guarantee the "speech or debate" must be one made "in the
Congress or in any committee thereof." This requirement, however, does not refer merely
to the locale of the "speech or debate" but, more importantly, also to its nature.
RESTRICTIONS
Section 12, Article VI, All Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their
financial and business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a
potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed
legislation of which they are authors.
RESTRICTIONS
Financial and business interests.
The first sentence of Section 12 sets down a policy of full disclosure of the financial and
business affairs of a legislator. The second sentence requires him to put the House on
notice about any "potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a
proposed legislation of which they are authors." However, it does not prevent the
legislator from filing the proposed legislation. It merely enables the House to examine
the arguments he might present with a sharper eye and in the context of his personal
interest. The advance disclosure would create a presumption in favor of the legislator
concerned should he later be charged by his colleagues with conflict of interest.
RESTRICTIONS
Section 13, Article VI, No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
RESTRICTIONS
Disqualifications.
A member of Congress may not hold, during his tenure as member, any other
office in the government or in any of its instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The prohibited offices
include membership in the board of regents, board of trustees, or board of
directors of state universities and colleges. Since the prohibition is only during his
tenure, a legislator is not prevented from accepting an appointment. However, if he
chooses to accept another office, he automatically forfeits his seat in Congress.
RESTRICTIONS
Disqualifications.
The disqualification in the second sentence, however, applies for the duration of
the six-year term even if he resigns from Congress before the end of his term.
Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, to come under this disqualification, two
conditions must concur:
(1) the office must be civil; and
(2) such office must have been created or its emoluments increased "while he was
a member " of the legislature. Under the 1987 provision, the office need not be a
civil one; it could be a military office.
RESTRICTIONS
Delegation of
powers Principle of Non-Delegability
• 28(2), Art VI – Delegation to the President (tariff, import and export quotas, etc)
Comelec • In the Twelfth Congress, Republic Act No. 9009 was enacted revising the
Local Government Code (LGC) by increasing the income requirement to
qualify for conversion into a city from ₱20 million annual income to ₱100
G.R. No. 176951. million locally generated income
November 18, 2008
• In the thirteenth Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed their individual
cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common provision
exempting the particular municipality from the ₱100 million income
requirement imposed by RA No. 9009.
• Issue: whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate
League of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the
cities vs equal protection clause.
comelec
Rulings
• Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
• Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities
League of from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into
Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
cities vs
comelec
• Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
• Rulings
SECTION 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
( Araullo v Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 209287, July 01, 2014)
ARTICLE VI SECTION 25 (1). The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President
for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation
of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
ARTICLE VI. SECTION 30. SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence.
The purpose is to prevent further additions to the present tremendous caseload of the
Supreme Court which includes the backlog of the past two decades. In meritorious
cases, however, such legislation may be enacted provided the Supreme court itself is
consulted and gives its concurrence.
What is DAP?
The Aquino Administration introduced the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) as a reform intervention to speed-
up public spending and to boost economic growth. It is not a fund, but a mechanism to support high-impact and priority
programs and projects using savings and unprogrammed funds. (Araullo v Executive Secretary)
DAP is unconstitutional
1. the DAP violates the principles of checks and balances and the separation of powers that the 1987 Constitution
integrates into the budgetary process;
2. the DAP violates the constitutional prohibitions against the transfer of appropriations and against the transfer
of funds from one branch of the government to another, both under Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution; and
3. the DAP violates the special conditions for the release of the Unprogrammed Fund.