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THE LEGISLATIVE POWER

WHO MAY EXERCISE IT


Congress
• Legislative power is the authority under the Constitution to
make laws and to alter or repeal them.
• It is vested in Congress to the extent reserved to the people on the
provisions on the initiative and referendum.
• It is a derivative legislative power that being vested to Congress and
that which has been delegated by the sovereign people to the
legislative bodies.
• delegata potestas non potest delagari-what has been delegated
cannot be delegated.
• Being a delegated power from the People the Legislative cannot
transfer the Power of Making Laws.
• The Constitution is the basis of legislative authority, it lies as the
foundation of all laws and is a rule and commission by which both
legislators and judges are to proceed.
• Grant of legislative power to Congress is plenary (unlimited) – they
can legislate on any subject (e.g., changing street names as in
Roosevelt Ave. to FPJ Ave.) as long as limitations are observed. Sec.21
Art.VI plenary power of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation. Former Pres. Duterte wanted to stop the investigation on
Pharmally but it continued. (Senate v. Ermita, April 20, 2006)
Limitations on Legislative Power
1. Substantive Limitations b. Implied Limitations
a. Express limitations - Congress cannot legislate
- Bill of rights irrepealable laws.
- On appropriation - Congress cannot delegate
legislative powers.
- On taxation
- Non-encroachment of powers of
- On constitutional appellate other departments.
jurisdiction of SC
- No law granting royalty or
nobility shall be enacted. (Art.VI
Sec.31)
2. Procedural Limitations
- Only one subject
- Three readings on separate days
- Printed copies in its final form 3 days before passage of bill. ( Article
VI Section 26)
Regional and Local Legislative Power
• It is a power of the local legislative body to make rules in the form of
ordinances and resolutions of local application that have the force and
effect of law. In case of regions, ARMM has its own legislative body to make
laws for their autonomous region.
• The power of apportionment of legislative districts is textually committed
to congress by the constitution. Thus it cannot be validly delegated to
ARMM Regional Assembly (Sema v. COMELEC GR 177597)
• Only congress can create a province thus Sharif Kabunsuan is
unconstitutional. R.A. 11259 signed by then Pres. Duterte dividing Palawan
by 3 provinces but was not accepted by the people in a referendum.
People’s Initiative on Statutes
• Initiative and Referendum
The power of initiative and referendum is the power of the people
directly to propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law
or part thereof passed by the congress or local legislative body. (Article
VI Sec. 32).
People’s Initiative need implementing rules. (Santiago v. COMELEC;
Lambino v. COMELEC)
ARTICLE 2 sec.26 Congress must enact a law defining political dynasty –
can be a subject of initiative.
• The operationalization of initiative and referendum has been left by
the Constitution to Congress (Article VI Section 32 1987 Constitution)
• R.A. 6735 An Act Proving for a System of Initiative and Referendum
and Appropriating Funds Therefor Act providing for a system of
initiative and referendum cannot be used to amend the constitution
via people’s initiative.
• While RA 6735 exerted utmost due diligence and care in providing for
the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on
national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention it
failed rather intentionally to do so in the system of initiative on
amendments to the constitution. (Santiago v. COMELEC; PIRMA)
1997 there was a move to extend the term of office of the sitting
president. Probably due to the popularity of one of the candidates of
the upcoming presidential election, Erap Estrada. They gathered
signatures to amend the constitution via people’s initiative.
How a bill becomes a law
A law starts as a bill filed in congress it then goes through a process
which culminates of its submission to the President for his
consideration. The signed bill thereafter becomes a law.
The Philippine Congress is divided into two chambers the House of
Representatives composed of district and party-list representatives and
the Senate composed of senators.
A Member of Congress can file a bill that identifies a societal problem
providing a solution through implementation of a new law.
• Once a bill is filed it goes through three readings. For the first reading
the bill is introduced to the plenary and returned to the appropriate
committee composed of a limited number of House members
concentrating on specific topics for legislation.
• The provisions of the filed bill will then be deliberated by the
committee members and resource persons or experts as part of a
technical working group. The bill will be edited if necessary the end
point of which is the resulting committee report of the bill. Which is
voted upon by committee members.
• An approved committee report will then be returned to the
committee on rules which schedules the same for sponsorship,
interpellation and amendments at the plenary level. Then the bill is
sponsored by the main proponent of the proposed law. Whereby he
will be interpellated by his fellow members.
• The members of the House can then introduce amendments to the
bill. The bill that survives this process intact or with amendments. Will
then be set for second reading where all the members will vote to
approve the bill in its final form.
• The bill will then be set for consideration on third reading. At least
three days before that date printed copies of the bill are distributed
to all the members of the House for review. On third reading they
vote to approve the bill whereby an approved bill will be transmitted
to the Senate.
• If the Senate and the House do not agree on the provisions of the bill,
the bicameral conference committee is created
• This committee is composed of representatives from both house and
the senate. Together they harmonize the differences of the bill. They
either amend or produce a new version which is then sent back to
both House and the Senate ratification.
• Once ratified the bill is enrolled which means the Speaker and the
Secretary General of the House; the President and the Secretary of
the Senate signs it and transmit it to the President for his signature.
The President can either sign it as it is, veto items, or veto the bill
outright. A bill signed by the President becomes a law. It will then
take effect after publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of
general circulation.
One title one subject
• The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the
act or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the
measure.
• To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of
the general objective of the statute to be expressed in its title would
not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation
impossible (Phil. Judges Assoc. v. Prado, Nov. 11,1993)
Bills that must originate exclusively from the
House of Representatives.
• In sum while Article VI Section 24 provides that all appropriation
revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of public debt, bills of
local application and private bills must originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives. It also adds but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
• In the exercise of the power of the Senate may propose an entirely
new bill as a substitute measure. (Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance Oct.30
1995).
Three readings on separate days
• The purpose of for which three readings on separate days is required
is said to be two fold.
• Inform the members of Congress or what they must vote on.
• To give them notice that a measure is progressing through the
enacting process. Thus enabling them and other interested in the
measure to prepare there positions with reference to it.
(Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance, October 30,1995)
Enrolled bill
• An enrolled bill is the official copy of approved legislation and bears the
certification of the presiding officer of each House. It is the final copy of a
bill or joint resolution that had passed both houses of legislature and is
ready for signature.
• Under the enrolled bill doctrine the signing of the bill by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate and the certification of the
secretaries of both houses of congress that it was passed are conclusive of
its due enactment. Arroyo v. DeVenecia (August 14,1997)
• Thus where the certifications are valid and are not withdrawn the contents
of the enrolled bill are conclusive upon the courts as regard the provision
of the particular bill. Astorga v. Villegas (April 30, 1974)
Presidential Veto Sec.27(1)
• Every bill passed by the congress shall before it becomes a law be
presented to the President if he approves the same he shall sign it
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to
the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at
large in its journal and proceed to reconsider it.
• I after such reconsideration two-thirds of all the members of such
house shall agree to pass the bill it shall be sent together with the
objections to the House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered and
if approved by two-thirds of all the members of the House it becomes
a law.
• In all such cases the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas
and nays and the names of the members voting for or against shall be
entered in the journals.

• Presidential Inaction Sec.27 (1)


• The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House
where it originated within 30 days after the date of receipt thereof
otherwise it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
Item veto
• The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in any appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not object (sec. 27(2) Article
VI Constitution.
• The President therefore compelled to approve into law the entire bill
including its undesirable parts.
• It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the
“item veto power” to avoid inexpedient rider being attached to an
indispensable appropriation or revenue measure. (Bengzon v. Drilon
April 15, 1992)
Congressional veto
• A congressional veto is subject to serious question involving the
principle of separation of powers. (Phil. Constitution Assoc. v.
Enriquez August 19,1994).
• Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law
or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be
incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.
appropriation
• The congressional authorization maybe embodied in annual laws such
as general appropriation act or in special provisions of laws of general
or special applications which appropriate public funds for special
public purposes such as questioned decrees.
• An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention
clearly and certainly appears from the language employed.(Guingona
v. Carague, April 22, 1991)
• Inappropriate provisions- are unconstitutional provisions and
provisions which are intended to amend other laws because clearly
these kinds of laws have no place in an appropriation bill. (Phil.
Constitutional Assoc. v. Enriquez August 19, 1994)
The President under martial law.
• In General Order No. 1, signed September 22, 1972, Marcos declared:
• Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, do hereby proclaim that I shall govern the nation
and direct the operation of the entire Government, including all its agencies and
instrumentalities, in my capacity and shall exercise all the powers and
prerogatives appurtenant and incident to my position as such Commander-in-
Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
• By taking control over the entire government, Marcos put himself in a
position of absolute power over the laws of the land, with no legitimate
body in existence to hold him in check. He personally appointed every
provincial governor, city mayor, and municipal mayor throughout the
nation. Throughout his term, he issued 1941 presidential decrees, 1331
letters of instruction, and 896 executive orders. His word was law.
HOUSES OF CONGRESS
• Composition of Congress

The Philippine Congress is bicameral in nature, composed


of:

1. Senate
2. House of Representatives
a. District representatives
b. Party-list representatives
Composition, qualifications, and term of office of
members of Congress

SENATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


Composition Composition

• Senators (elected at large by qualified voters of • Not more than 250 members, unless otherwise
the Philippines as may be provided by law) provided by law. NOTE: Congress itself may by
law increase the composition of the HoR

Term of office Term of office

• 6 years which shall commence, unless otherwise • 3 years, which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June
next following their election. next following their election.
• Term limit: Not more than 2 consecutive terms. • Term limit: Not more than 3 consecutive terms.
Composition, qualifications, and term of office of
members of Congress

SENATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Qualifications Qualifications

1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines; 1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines;


2. At least 35 years of age on the day of election; 2. Except youth party-list representatives, at least 25
3. Able to read and write; years of age on the day of election;
4. A registered voter; 3. Able to read and write;
5. Resident of the Philippines for not less than 2 4. Except the party-list representatives, a registered
years immediately preceding the day of election. voter in the district in which he
NOTE: Enumeration is exclusive shall be elected;
5. Resident thereof for a period of not less than 1
year immediately preceding the day of the election.
NOTE: Enumeration is exclusive.
For election purposes, the residence is synonymous with domicile, that
is, a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning.

The mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without


the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
(Marcos v. COMELEC)

In order to qualify as a candidate for House of Representatives one


"must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile
of choice. (Aquino v. COMELEC)
Conclusion:

If a person retains his domicile of origin for purposes of the residence


requirement, the 1-year period is irrelevant because wherever he is, he is a
resident of his domicile of origin.

Second, if a person reestablishes a previously abandoned domicile, the 1-year


requirement must be satisfied.
Apportionment of legislative districts

Legislative districts are apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area.
They are apportioned in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 5)

Each city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Each province
shall have at least one representative.

While Sec. 5(3) of Art. VI requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to
one representative; it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to
an additional district. (Mariano, JR. v. COMELEC)
Apportionment of legislative districts

Reapportionment may be made thru a special law. The Constitution did not preclude
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. Thus, a law converting a municipality into a highly-
urbanized city automatically creates a new legislative district and, consequently,
increases the membership of the HoR. (Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577,
March 7, 1995)
Apportionment of legislative districts

Congress cannot validly delegate the power to create legislative districts. The power to increase
the allowable membership in the House of Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts
is vested exclusively in Congress.

Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law,
the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to
reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes
the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.

SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
xxxx
((4) Within three years following the return of every census, Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
(Emphasis supplied)
(SEMA V. COMELEC)
Manner of reapportionment
NOTE: The Constitution does not require a plebiscite for the creation
of a new legislative district by a legislative reapportionment. It is
required only for the creation of new local government units.
(Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, 2008)
In the Bagabuyo case, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371 was passed which increased Cagayan de
Oro's LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT from one to two.

For the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to
either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. The constituents
of each district would elect their own representative to Congress as well as eight members of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod.

The COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 78376 implementing R.A. No. 9371.

Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC. The petitioner
insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro as a local
government unit, and does not merely provide for the City's legislative apportionment.
Cagayan de Oro City's reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning of
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution which requires a plebiscite.
Bagabuyo case
RULING:

R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance
with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core
provision - Section 1 - provides:

SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. - The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby
apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays
Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, …………. and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall
comprise the second district.

Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes
place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is
not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the
addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of
representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does
not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two
districts.
Bagabuyo case
Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the
rules on legislative apportionment and it does not require a plebiscite.

The role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure that the voice of the people
of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the legislative
district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it has no legal personality
that must be created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence, there is no
need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar action on a
legislative district.
Bagabuyo case
The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are
the territorial and political subdivisions of the state. They possess legal personality on the
authority of the Constitution and by the action of the Legislature.

As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an "instrumentality of the state in


carrying out the functions of government." As a corporate entity with a distinct and
separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises special functions for the sole
benefit of its constituents. It acts as "an agency of the community in the administration of
local affairs" and the mediums through which the people act in their corporate capacity on
local concerns. In light of these roles, the Constitution saw it fit to expressly secure the
consent of the people affected by the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundaries of local government units through a plebiscite.
Composition of the party-list system
1. National parties or organizations
2. Regional parties or organizations; and
3. Sectoral parties or organizations.

National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral


parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need
not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular
sector.
The party-list system is not solely for the benefit of sectoral parties

• Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be “a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.” The commas after the words “national (,)”
and “regional (,)” separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties.

• National and Regional parties need not represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors

• Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack “well-
defined political constituencies” nor represent “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors. (Atong
Paglaum v. COMELEC.)

• However, the participation of major political parties may be through their sectoral wings, a majority
of whose members are “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political
constituencies”. (Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC)
• Those “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. (LUV-OF-HIP)

• Those lacking in “well-defined political constituencies” include


professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. (PEWY)
Composition of the party-list system

Party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of


representatives in the HoR including those under the party list. (1987
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 5, par. 2)
Formula mandated by the Constitution in determining the number of party-list
Representatives

The number of seats available to party-list representatives is based on the ratio of party-list
representatives to the total number of representatives. Accordingly, we compute the number of seats
available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts.
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives
to the total number of representatives, the Constitution left the
manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to
the wisdom of the legislature. (BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
179271,April 21, 2009)
Guidelines in the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Sec. 11 of RA 7941

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each.

3. Those garnering a sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than 3 seats.
Guidelines in the allocation of seats for party-list representatives

The 2% threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of


Sec. 5(2), Art. VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the “broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives” (BANAT v. COMELEC)

In other words, the allocation of the additional seats is no longer limited to the
two-percenters. Hence, even those who did not get at least 2% of votes, can still
benefit from the second round of seat allocation.
In Banat case, COMELEC INITIALLY proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-
list elections based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of votes were thus
given one (1) guaranteed partylist seat each. And the additional seats were also distributed
among them. Total of 19 seats
But the problem is, only 19 seats were filled, it did not appropriate the total number of
available seats for party-list.
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for
party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law.
Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55
seats available to party-list representatives.
SC RULING:

This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible
to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of
available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of
the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives
shall consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million
votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes.
Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60
seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of
parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied
party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
The Court therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives."
Computation of the additional seats:
• The final list of COMELEC of the PLs
that garnered 2% guaranteed seats. 17
seats are guaranteed.

• In the allocation of additional seats, the


percentage of votes is multiplied by the
remaining available seats, 38 (55
maximum seats less the 17 guaranteed
seats of the two-percenters)

• For example:
BAYAN MUNA = 6.14% x 38 = 233.32 / 100
= 2.33 = therefore, 2 additional seat
In applying the procedure from the previous slide, all 55 available party list seats are filled.
Qualifications of a party-list nominee

1. Natural- born citizen of the Philippines;


2. Registered voter;
3. Resident of the Philippines for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day
of the election;
4. Able to read and write;
5. Bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent
at least 90 days preceding election day; and
6. At least 25 years of age. (For youth sector nominees, at least)

Note: It is the parties or organizations which are voted for, not their candidates.
However, it is the party-list representatives who are seated or elected into
office, not their parties or organizations.
Validity of Additional
Qualification Requirement
Principle: Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs board,


GR No. 157870 Nov 3, 2008
Issue: Constitutionality of Sec 36 of RA 9165 otherwise known as
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs board, GR No. 157870
Nov 3, 2008

Sec 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the


assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification
requirements enumerated in the Sec 4, Art VI of the Constitution.
As couched, said Sec 36 (g)unmistakably requires a candidate for
senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-
condition to the validity of a COC for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non.
Term vs tenure
Dimaporo v. Mitra 202 SCRA 77
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) Art IX, Sec 67

Term Tenure
The time during which the
officer may claim to hold the It represent the period
office as of right and fixes the during which the
interval after which the incumbent actually holds
several incumbents shall the office.
succeed one another.
Term - Senate members
Article VI SECTION 4.
The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.

Article XVIII SECTION 2.


The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local
officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30,
1992.

Of the Senators elected in the election of 1992, the first twelve obtaining the
highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for
three years.
Term - House of representatives
Article VI SECTION 7.

The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of


three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Dimaporo v. Mitra 202 SCRA 77
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) Art IX, Sec 67

Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, otherwise known as the


Omnibus Election Code provides that an elective official running
for a public office other the one he is currently holding in a
permanent capacity, except for the positions for President and
Vice-president, is considered resigned from office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
Dimaporo v. Mitra 202 SCRA 77
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) Art IX, Sec 67

The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be


extended or shortened by the legislature, but the period during
which an officer actually holds the office (tenure), may be
affected by circumstances xxx. Under the questioned provision,
when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of
candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut
short his tenure not his term. The term remains xxx.
Disqualification
Sec. 13, 14 in relation to Article IX-B Sec. 7, 1987 Constitution Art IX

Flores vs. Drilon (223 SCRA 568)


Issue: Constitutionality of Sec 13, par. (d), of RA
7227 otherwise known as the Bases Conversion
Development Act of 1992.
Sec. 13, 14 in relation to Article IX-B Sec. 7, 1987 Constitution Art IX

Article VI Sec 13.

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he
be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during
the term for which he was elected.

Article VI Sec 14.


No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Flores v Drilon (223 SCRA 568)

Article IX-B Sec 7.

No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office
or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Article VII Sec 16.


The President (..) shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or
in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
Flores v Drilon (223 SCRA 568)

In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another
post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the
clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art.
IX-B, of the Constitution.
election
Sec. 8-9 Article VI , 1987 Constitution.

Tolentino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 148334 Jan 21, 2004


Issue: Whether a special election to fill a vacant
three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14
May 2001.
Tolentino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 148334 Jan 21, 2004

Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called


to fill any vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives "in the
manner prescribed by law," thus:

In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special


election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law,
but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall
serve only for the unexpired term.

(See: R.A. No. 6645)


Officers
Sec. 16(1) Article VI , 1987 Constitution.

SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the
House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of
all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
quorum
Sec. 16(2) Article VI , 1987 Constitution.

SECTION 16. (2) A majority of each House shall constitute a


quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn
from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such
House may provide.
quorum
Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil 17

Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil 17


Issue: Whether or not there was a quorum when
Avelino was ousted and Cuenco was elected Senate
President.
Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil 17

When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall


constitute a quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members. Even a
majority of all the members may constitute “the House.” There is a difference
between a majority of “the House,” the latter requiring less number than the
first.
Rules of proceeding
Sec. 16(3) Article VI , 1987 Constitution.

SECTION 16. (3) Each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
Rules of proceeding
Sec. 21 Article VI , 1987 Constitution.

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or


any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.
Arroyo v de Venecia, GR 127255 Aug. 14, 1997

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not
have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
has agreed to a particular measure.
Discipline of members
Sec. 16(3) Article VI , 1987 Constitution.

Osmena vs. Pendatun, 109 Phil 863


Issue: Whether or not the delivery of speeches
attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct.
Osmena vs. Pendatun, 109 Phil 863

The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only
because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because
the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House
knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
Can the Sandiganbayan suspend a Senator
facing a criminal case? (Santiago case)
Yes. In Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, the Court clarified
that the authority of either chamber of the Congress to
discipline its members by way of expulsion or
suspension for up to sixty days, “is a punitive measure
that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon
an erring member” and is not to be confused with the
recognized authority of the Sandiganbayan to impose a
suspension pendent lite against a member of the
Congress charged before it for violation of, and as
provided for under, the Anti-Graft and Corruption Act.
Said suspension pendent lite, said the court, is “not a
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on the petitioner for misbehavior as a
Member of the House of Representative.”
Can the Ombudsman suspend a member of the
House of Representatives pending investigation and
as penalty? )
Yes. Under Section 24 of RA 6770, the Ombudsman or his
Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance
of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the
service, or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due
to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which
case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Journal and Congressional Records (Sec.16[4])
“Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings,
and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security;
and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be
entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.”
The Enrolled Bill Theory
-Under the enrolled bill rule, once an election for the
adoption of a statute is held, the procedural method by
which the measure was placed on the ballot cannot be
challenged with a law suit since judicial inquiry into
legislative procedure is barred as an intrusion into the
lawmaking body.
- In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall
prevail over those of the journals.(Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito 78 Phil 1)
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by the officers and Congress and
approved by the Executive, the Court cannot speculate
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers. Remedy is amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial decree. (Casco vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347)
Probative Value of Journal
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to
matters that are required by the Constitution to be
recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the
absence to the contrary, the Journals have also been
accorded conclusive effect.
In United States vs Pons, the Court spoke of the
imperatives of public policy regarding the Journals as
“public memorials of the most permanent character”.
Thus, they should be public, because all are required to
conform to them; they should be permanent, that
rights acquired today upon faith of what has been
declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or
at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in
the memory of individuals.
Matters to be entered in the Journal
1. Yeas and nays on 3rd and final reading(sec.26[2])
2. Veto message of President (Section 27[1])
3. Yeas and nays on repassing of vetoed bill (id)
4. Yeas and nays on any question upon request of 1/5
of members present (Sec.16[4])
Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory
The enrolled bill doctrine is based mainly on the
respect due to coequal and independent departments,
which requires the judicial department to accept as
having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated. Also, it has been stated in other cases
that if the attestation is absent and the same is not
required for the validity of the statute, the courts may
resort to the journals and other records of Congress for
proof of its due enactment.
In case of conflict between the contents of an enrolled bill and
the journal of proceedings of Congress, which one prevails and
why?
In CASCO PHIL. VS. GIMENEZ, 7 SCRA 347, it was held by the Supreme Court
that the enrolled bill prevails over the journal. If the enrolled bill provides that
it is urea formaldehyde is exempt from tax, and not urea and formaldehyde
which appears in the journal which was really approved, the former prevails
and only CURATIVE LEGISLATION COULD CHANGE THE SAME, NOT JUDICIAL
LEGISLATION. However, if the President of the Philippines, the Senate
President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives withdraw their
signatures as a result of an anomaly surrounding the printing of the final copy
of the bill, then, the journal will prevail since what is left is no longer
considered an “enrolled bill.”
Astorga vs. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714
-It is the journal entry that is binding in this case.
Morales vs. Subido, 27 SCRA
- Enrolled bill is controlling.
Arroyo vs. de Venecia, supra
- Enrolled Billed and Journal Entry
Congressional Record (Section 16[4], par.2)
Each House shall also keep a Record of its
proceedings.
Sessions
Regular Sessions
- The Congress shall convene once every year on the
fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a
different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in
session for such number of days as it may determine
until thirty days before the opening of its next regular
session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. (Article VI, Section 15)
Regular Sessions
- Neither House during the sessions of the Congress
shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for
more than three days, nor to any other place than that
in which the Houses shall be sitting. (Article VI, Section
16(5) )
I. Special Session (No Need of a Presidential Call)
- The Congress may be called for special session at any
time by the President.
- The President’s call is not necessary for the following
instances:
a. When the Congress meets to canvass the
presidential election (Article VII, Section 4);
b. When it is required to resolve a conflict between a
majority of the members of the cabinet and the
President regarding the latter’s continuing ability to
discharge the powers and duties of his office (Article
VII, Section 11);
c. When Congress reviews the President’s declaration
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus (Article VII, Section 18)
d. When it is required to call a special election when
both the offices of the President and the Vice President
become vacant (Article VII, Section 10); and
e. When it decides to exercise the power of
impeachment, particularly where the respondent is the
President himself. (Article XI, Section 3)
II. Regular Session
- Every 4th Monday of July.

III. Article VII, Secs. 10-11 and Article VII, Secs. 18


- As discussed in the Special Session (No Need of a
Presidential Call).
Joint Session
Voting Separately
i. Choosing the President
- When two or more have an equal and highest number
of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the
vote of a majority of all Members of both houses of the
Congress, voting separately. (Article VII, Section 4)
Joint Session
ii. Determining President’s disability (Sec.11, Art.VII)
- Rule : There must be a written declaration.
- If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last
written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days
after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds
vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and powers and duties of his
office, the Vice-President shall act as the President;
otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the
powers and duties of his office.
Joint Session
iii. Confirming nomination of the Vice President (Sec.9,
Art.VII)
“Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice-
President during the term for which he was elected, the
President shall nominate a Vice-President from among
the Members of the Senate and the House of the
Representatives who shall assume office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of all Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
Joint Session
iii. Declaring the existence of a state of war (Article VI,
Section 23)
Voting Requirement: 2/3 of both Houses in joint
session assembled, voting separately, shall have the
sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
Joint Session
Voting Jointly : To revoke or extend proclamation
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
or placing the Philippines under martial law (Sec. 18,
Art. VII).
-The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be aside by the President.
Joint Session
-Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may,
in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.
Joint Session
Adjournment (Sec. 16 (5), Art. VI)
“Neither House during the sessions of the Congress
shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for
more than three days, nor to any other place than that
in which the Houses shall be sitting. “
Place – not to the building but to the political unit
where the two Houses may be sitting.
-There is a need for constant contact and consultation
between the two bodies.
Joint Session
Silent whether voting jointly or separately: Proposing
constitutional changes (Sec.1, Art. XVII)
-Only provides for the manner in which any
amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution may be
proposed.
Constitutional Organs Within Congress
Electoral Tribunal
“The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. (Sec.
17, Art. VI)
Constitutional Organs Within Congress
Composition
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of 9 Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the SC to designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the partylist system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Sec. 17, Art. VI)
In Tanada vs. Cuenco, it was held that the structure of SET be
founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the
minority parties with the Justices of the SC to insure greater
political justice in the determination of election contests. Thus,
the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may
nominate not more than three members thereof to the SET, and
the party having the second largest number of votes in the
Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three
Senators. The Senate may not elect, as members of the SET,
those who have not been nominated by the political parties
specified in the Constitution; hence, the Committee on Rules for
the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination
Powers and Composition
1. House Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
Power: Sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of
the House of Representatives.

Composition: Three (3) of whom are Justices of the


Supreme Court while the remaining six (6) are
Members of the House of Representatives.
Bondoc vs. Pineda, supra.
Case Summary: Pineda vs Bondoc
Facts:
In the election of May 1987, Marciano Pineda of the Laban Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP) and Emigdio Bondoc of Nacionalista Party (NP) were both vying for the
position as Pampanga Fourth District representatives where Pineda was proclaimed
as the winner. Bondoc subsequently filed a petition before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The tribunal was composed of 9
members, 3 of which is from the SC and 6 from members of House of
Representatives. The decision of the HRET was Bondoc won over Pineda. Cong.
Camasura of LDP, HRET member, along with SC Justices and Cong. Cerilles voted in
favor of Bondoc. Cong. Camasura revealed that he voted in favor of Bondoc which
LDP used as a cause for expelling Camasura in their party. Pursuant to the expulsion
of Camasura from LDP, HRET was informed that they are also revoking their
nomination and rescind the election of Camasura from the HRET.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the resolution of the House of
Representatives violates the independence of
HRET.
2. Whether or not the expulsion of Cong. Camasura in
LDP causes his discharge from the HRET
membership.
Ruling:
1. No. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the House of
Representatives in removing Congressman Camasura from the
House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast
his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a
clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House
Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest
between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such interference by the
House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral
Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the
aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three
justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be
powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well
abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
Ruling:
2. No. The Supreme Court held that "disloyalty to
party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid
grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.
In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for
having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc,
based strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes
by the tribunal, the House of Representatives
committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and
a violation of the Constitution. Therefore, its resolution
of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is null and
void.
Ruling:
On Cong. Camasura’s right to security of tenure –
Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional
election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just
as members of the judiciary enjoy the security of
tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House
Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a
just cause, such as the expiration of the member's
congressional term of office, his death, permanent
disability, resignation from the political party he
represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation
Ruling:
with another political party, or removal for other valid cause.
The expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for
a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the
tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive
Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the
action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of
the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be
the "sole judge" of the election contest between Pineda and
Bondoc.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
COMPOSITION AND COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS
ABBAS VS. SENATE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
ISSUE: Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators,
six of which are sitting in the tribunal

FACTS: On 09 October 1987 petitioner filed before Senate Electoral


Tribunal an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN who were
proclaimed senators-elect. With the exemption of Senator Estrada, the
senators filed for motion for disqualification or inhibition from the hearing
and resolution on the ground that all of them are interested parties to
said case.
ABBAS VS. SENATE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
Abbas argued that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play
and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
ABBAS VS. SENATE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS

it is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC
and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “judicial”
and “legislative” components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The
legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the
resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and
intent of the Constitution. The composition itself is 6 senators to three justices (2 is
to 1).
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

Composition, Nature and Functions

Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie.
The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of
the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

Like the composition of the Electoral Tribunals, the structure of the Commission on
Appointments departs from that of its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution which
gave preferential representation only to the two largest political parties represented
in each House. The 1987 Constitution calls for proportional representation of all
political parties and parties and organizations registered under the party-list system.
And, as with the Electoral Tribunals, sectors will be represented only in so far as they
form part of the party-list system.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, involved the Senate contingent in the Commission. The
senatorial elections of 1992 yielded 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC, 3 Lakas-NUCD, and 1 LP-
PDP-LABAN. On the basis of proportional representation, therefore, the Commission
on Appointments could contain 7.5 LDP, 2.5 NPC, 1.5 Lakas, and .5 LPPDP-LABAN.
The Senate, however, put in 8 LDP by rounding up 7.5, 2 NPC by ignoring .5, 1 LAKAS
also by ignoring .5, and 1 LP-PDP by rounding out .5 to 1. Was this constitutional?
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

The Court ruled that rounding out 7.5 to 8 and .5 to 1 was unconstitutional because
it deprived Lakas and NPC of .5 each. Nor can the holders of .5 each, while belonging
to distinct parties, form a unity for purposes of obtaining a seat in the Commission.
Thus, under the Court's arithmetic, the result would be a total of only 11 members.
But the Court ruled that a full complement of 12 was not mandatory.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

Since the composition of the Commission on Appointments is proportional


to the size of the political parties and organizations in Congress, periodic
reorganization may be necessary in order to reflect changes in the
proportion within Congress. This principle was emphasized in Daza v.
Singson. However, to justify reorganization, the changes in the political
complexion of the House must be permanent and not temporary in
character.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

The function of the Commission on Appointments is to consent to or confirm


nominations or appointments submitted to it by the President pursuant to
Article VII, Section 16 which enumerates the appointments which need action
by the Commission on Appointments. The Commission is thus intended to
serve as an administrative check on the appointing authority of the President.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

The powers of the Commission, however, can be abused. Hence, in order to


lessen the possibility that political vindictiveness might make the Commission
freeze the confirmation of unwanted nominees or allow one member to block
the confirmation of a nominee, the rule was added that the Commission shall
act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of Congress
from their submission and that the Commission should rule by majority vote.
SALARIES

Section 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive
an annual salary of three hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred forty thousand pesos each;
the Senators, the Members of the House of Representatives, the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional
Commissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.
PRIVILEGES

Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all


offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any committee thereof.
PRIVILEGES
1. Privilege from arrest.

The privilege from arrest found in Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution was
the same parliamentary immunity from arrest enjoyed by the members of the
Parliament of England and by members of the United States Congress.

Section 9 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution made an assemblyman immune from
arrest arising from "all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment." The 1986 Constitutional Commission chose to follow what the 1971
Constitutional Convention did. Needless to say, moreover, the immunity applies for as
long as Congress is in session, whether or not the legislator involved is actually
attending it.
PRIVILEGES
1. Privilege from arrest.

People vs. Jalosjos G.R. No. 132875 Feb. 31, 2001.

a Congressman who has been convicted of rape and is in detention cannot claim
that he should be freed because of popular sovereignty and the need of his
constituents to be represented. People v. Jalosjos ruled that Members of Congress
are not exempt from detention for crime. They may be arrested, even when the
House is in session, for crimes punishable by a penalty of more than six months.
There is no basis whatsoever for treating him or her differently from other convicts.
PRIVILEGES
2. Freedom of speech and debate.

Section 15, Article VI, of the 1935 Constitution provided that "for any speech or debate" in
Congress, the Senators and Members of the House of Representatives "shall not be
questioned in any other place."

The 1935 provision was a copy of the speech and debate clause of Article I, Section 6, of
the United States Constitution. The 1987 text, as also the 1973 text, is a slight modification
of the traditional phraseology but it has preserved the traditional limit and scope of the
immunity.
PRIVILEGES

2. Freedom of speech and debate.

In the first place, it is a guarantee of immunity from answerability before an outside forum
but not from answerability to the disciplinary authority of Congress itself. In the second
place, to come under the guarantee the "speech or debate" must be one made "in the
Congress or in any committee thereof." This requirement, however, does not refer merely
to the locale of the "speech or debate" but, more importantly, also to its nature.
RESTRICTIONS

Section 12, Article VI, All Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their
financial and business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a
potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed
legislation of which they are authors.
RESTRICTIONS
Financial and business interests.

The first sentence of Section 12 sets down a policy of full disclosure of the financial and
business affairs of a legislator. The second sentence requires him to put the House on
notice about any "potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a
proposed legislation of which they are authors." However, it does not prevent the
legislator from filing the proposed legislation. It merely enables the House to examine
the arguments he might present with a sharper eye and in the context of his personal
interest. The advance disclosure would create a presumption in favor of the legislator
concerned should he later be charged by his colleagues with conflict of interest.
RESTRICTIONS

Section 13, Article VI, No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
RESTRICTIONS
Disqualifications.

A member of Congress may not hold, during his tenure as member, any other
office in the government or in any of its instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The prohibited offices
include membership in the board of regents, board of trustees, or board of
directors of state universities and colleges. Since the prohibition is only during his
tenure, a legislator is not prevented from accepting an appointment. However, if he
chooses to accept another office, he automatically forfeits his seat in Congress.
RESTRICTIONS
Disqualifications.

The disqualification in the second sentence, however, applies for the duration of
the six-year term even if he resigns from Congress before the end of his term.
Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, to come under this disqualification, two
conditions must concur:
(1) the office must be civil; and
(2) such office must have been created or its emoluments increased "while he was
a member " of the legislature. Under the 1987 provision, the office need not be a
civil one; it could be a military office.
RESTRICTIONS

Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally


appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or
quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly,
be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during
his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office
RESTRICTIONS

1. Prohibitions; lawyer legislators.

The prohibitions found in Section 14 are intended to prevent members of


Congress from taking advantage, pecuniary or otherwise, of their position in
their dealings with the courts, or in their business operations, or in their
dealings with any government agency or corporation.
RESTRICTIONS
APPEARANCE AS COUNCIL

Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally


appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his
term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office.
APPEARANCE AS COUNCIL

Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally


appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his
term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office.
APPEARANCE AS COUNCIL

Prohibitions; lawyer legislators.

The prohibitions found in Section 14 are intended to prevent members of


Congress from taking advantage, pecuniary or otherwise, of their position in
their dealings with the courts, or in their business operations, or in their
dealings with any government agency or corporation.
APPEARANCE AS COUNCIL

Prohibitions; lawyer legislators.

The prohibition imposed on lawyer-legislators is a much stricter one than its


counterpart in the 1935 or 1973 Constitution neither of which had a blanket
prohibition of appearances in court. Under the 1987 provision, a lawyer legislator
may not "personally appear as counsel before any court of justice." This prohibition
cannot be circumvented under the guise of appearing "in intervention" in one's
behalf.
Powers of Congress
Powers of Congress

Under the 1987 Constitution, the


power to make, propose or amend
laws is also extended to the people,
Congress can pass, amend and in whom sovereignty resides,
repeal any law subject to limitations. through the mechanisms of initiative
and referendum.
• By Initiative, we mean that the authority is reserved to
the people through direct participation of the electorate in
law-making processes, either national or local level.
Powers of
congress • By Referendum, it means the process in which the
people are referred directly on any question of law
passed by Congress or a local legislative body for their
approval or rejection.
Legislative Power:
• Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. Since
Congress’ powers are plenary, and limited only by
the Constitution, any attempt to limit the powers of
future Congresses via an irrepealable law is not
allowed.
Powers of Congress

• Congress, as a general rule, cannot delegate its


legislative power. Since the people have already
delegated legislative power to Congress, the latter
cannot delegate it any further.
General Rule: What has been delegated, cannot be further delegated
(principle of non-delegability)

Delegation of
powers Principle of Non-Delegability

The principle of non-delegability provides that the Congress alone


can make laws and statutes,
but it cannot delegate its law-making power.
Exception: Delegation of Legislative Power
A.General Rule: Legislative power is vested in Congress (except to the
extent retained by the people through the system of initiative and
referendum)

1.Rationale – The increasing complexity of the task of government and the


growing inability of Congress to cope, directly with the problems demanding its
attention.
Exceptions:
• Local governments may be allowed to legislate or make laws, but only on local
matters.

• 28(2), Art VI – Delegation to the President (tariff, import and export quotas, etc)

• Delegation of emergency powers (lawmaking) under Sec 23, Article VI


• Sec, 32, Art VI – Delegation to the People (referendum, initiative, plebiscite)
Exceptions:
• Art. X, Sec. 5 – Delegation to the LGU
• Delegation to the Administrative Agencies
• Delegation of power to ascertain facts, contingencies, or
events upon which applicability of a law is made to depend
Test of Valid • Completeness Test
Delegation • Sufficient Standard Test
• Completeness Test

The completeness test, from the word itself, we


have to examine whether the law is complete in
all its terms and conditions when it leaves
Congress. So that when the law reaches the
Test of Valid delegates, the only task for the delegates is to
Delegation provide the implementation and enforcement of
the law. This way, the delegates will not have the
discretion anymore to fill in the gaps that are not
part of the legislative policy of the legislature.
It is to examine whether there is enough
guidelines or boundaries in the exercise of the
delegates authority. The delegates cannot just do
Sufficient anything according to his whim or caprice. There
Standard has to be certain guidelines, boundaries, and
test framework that limits what the delegates can do.
Facts:

• In the Eleventh Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of


municipalities into component cities were filed before the House of
League of Representatives. However, Congress did not act on the 24 out of the 57
Cities vs municipalities.

Comelec • In the Twelfth Congress, Republic Act No. 9009 was enacted revising the
Local Government Code (LGC) by increasing the income requirement to
qualify for conversion into a city from ₱20 million annual income to ₱100
G.R. No. 176951. million locally generated income
November 18, 2008
• In the thirteenth Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed their individual
cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common provision
exempting the particular municipality from the ₱100 million income
requirement imposed by RA No. 9009.
• Issue: whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate
League of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the
cities vs equal protection clause.
comelec
Rulings

We grant the petitions


The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.
League of
cities vs • First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a
prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while
comelec the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
• Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the
creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.
• Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they
prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
• Rulings:

• Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
• Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities
League of from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into
Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
cities vs
comelec
• Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
• Rulings

• Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws


were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
League of Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional
cities vs for violation of the equal protection clause.
comelec • WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare
UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely:
Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393,
9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434,
9435, 9436, and 9491
What is the plenary power of Congress?

Its plenary authority is a complete and absolute power to take action


on a particular issue, with no limitation.
• How was this principle applied in the case League of Cities?
In the case of League of Cities, this principle can be applied when the congress
enacted the Republic Act No. 9009 revising the Local Government Code
(LGC) by increasing the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a
city from ₱20 million annual income to ₱100 million locally generated
income for a short time which started the issue.
How a bill becomes a law:
1. The bill is prepared.
2. The House of Representatives has its first reading.
3. A Committee Consideration/Action session is held.
4. The House of Representatives has its second reading.
5. The House of Representatives has its third reading.
6. The approved bill is transmitted to the Senate.
7. A conference committee is assembled.
8. The bill is transmitted to the President of the Philippines to be
signed and passed.
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
When congress legislates, it should follow a “One title, One
subject” so that there would be no unrelated provisions.
However, the title of the bill is not required to be an index to
the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every
single detail of the measure. ( Tobias v Abalos )
Restoration of Bicameralism:

According to the 1987 Constitution, legislative power shall be vested in


the Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives.

"Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills, bills authorizing


increase of the public debts, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments."
Legislative Inquiries

Pursuant to Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, the House of


Representatives or any of its committees, may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with the rules. Either House or any of their
committees may conduct inquires ‘in aid of legislation’.

“In aid of legislation” does not mean that there is pending


legislation regarding the subject of the inquiry. In fact, investigation
may be needed for purposes of proposing future legislation.
If the stated purpose of the investigation is to determine the existence
of violations of the law, the investigation is no longer ‘in aid of
legislation’ but ‘in aid of prosecution’. This violates the principle of
separation of powers and is beyond the scope of congressional
powers.
Limitations:
The investigation must be in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure, and that the rights of persons appealing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected. It follows then that the rights of persons under Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to
testify against one’s self.
Congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Limitations on Legislative Power of Congress:
1. Substantive – limitations on the content of laws.
E.g. no law shall be passed establishing a state religion.
2. Procedural – limitations on the manner of passing
laws. E.g. generally a bill must go through three
readings on three separate days.
On appropriations:
An appropriation bill is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of funds from
the public treasury.

SECTION 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
( Araullo v Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 209287, July 01, 2014)

ARTICLE VI SECTION 25 (1). The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President
for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation
of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be passed


ARTICLE VI. SECTION 31. SECTION 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.
The purpose of this provision is to preserve the republican and democratic nature of our society by prohibiting
the creation of privileged classes with special perquisites not available to the rest of the citizenry. The
stratification of our society will result in the violation of Article II, Section 1, proclaiming that sovereignty
resides in the people as a whole without distinction as to birth or lineage, unlike in monarchical regimes.
On constitutional appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

ARTICLE VI. SECTION 30. SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence.

The purpose is to prevent further additions to the present tremendous caseload of the
Supreme Court which includes the backlog of the past two decades. In meritorious
cases, however, such legislation may be enacted provided the Supreme court itself is
consulted and gives its concurrence.

What is PDAF? ( Priority Development Assistance Funds )


Popularly known as the “Pork Barrel”, the PDAF is a lump sum appropriation in the
Annual General Appropriations Act (GAA) intended to fund priority development
programmes and projects of the government. (Belgica vs. Executive Secretary } I.
Procedural Issues.
II. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.

III. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.

What is DAP?
The Aquino Administration introduced the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) as a reform intervention to speed-
up public spending and to boost economic growth. It is not a fund, but a mechanism to support high-impact and priority
programs and projects using savings and unprogrammed funds. (Araullo v Executive Secretary)

DAP is unconstitutional
1. the DAP violates the principles of checks and balances and the separation of powers that the 1987 Constitution
integrates into the budgetary process;
2. the DAP violates the constitutional prohibitions against the transfer of appropriations and against the transfer
of funds from one branch of the government to another, both under Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution; and
3. the DAP violates the special conditions for the release of the Unprogrammed Fund.

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