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THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 239052, October 16, 2019 ]

APOLINARIO Z. ZONIO, JR., PETITIONER, V. 88 ACES MARITIME SERVICES, INC., KHALIFA A. ALGOSAIBI D
MARINE SERVICES CO., AND JANET A. JOCSON, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

INTING, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set
Decision2 dated July 31, 2017 and Resolution3 dated April 26, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
The CA dismissed for lack of merit the petition for certiorari filed by Apolinario Z. Zonio, Jr. (Apolinario), praying for th
reliefs: (1) the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari to annul the Decision4 dated January 28, 2016 and Resolution5 dated F
2016 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); and (2) payment of (a) disability benefits in the amount of
US$60,000.00, (b) sickness allowance of US$2,024.60, and (c) 10% of the total judgment award by way of attorney's

The antecedents are as follows:

88 Aces Maritime Services, Inc. (88 Aces) is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of Filipino seafarers f
behalf of its foreign principal Khalifa Algosaibi Diving & Marine Services Co. (Khalifa Algosaibi). Janet A. Jocson (Joc
president/owner/manager of 88 Aces.

On February 4, 2010, Apolinario was hired as an "ordinary seaman" by 88 Aces to board the vessel MV Algosaibi 42.
contract was for a duration of six months with a basic monthly salary of US$506.15.6
After passing the required pre-employment medical examination,7 Apolinario left Manila on February 26, 2010 and em
Algosaibi 42 in Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia.

As an ordinary seaman, Apolinario's job on board the vessel included the following: 1) give assistance to the able sea
assist in the handling and operation of all deck gear such as topping, cradling and housing of booms; 3) aid the carpe
repair work when requested; and 4) to scale and chip paint, handle lines in the mooring of the ship, assist in the actua
and letting go of the vessel and stand as a lookout in the vessel.

After completing his six-month contract with 88 Aces in August 2010, Apolinario however was not repatriated as he d
entered into a new contract with 88 Aces' foreign principal, Khalifa Algosaibi. His new contract with Khalifa Algosaibi l
April 2012.

In April 2012, Apolinario was repatriated in Manila. On May 8, 2015, he filed a Complaint before the Labor Arbiter aga
Aces, Jocson and Khalifa Algosaibi (collectively referred to as respondents) for the payment of disability benefits, atto
medical fees, sickness allowance and moral, exemplary and compensatory damages.8

In his Position Paper,9 Apolinario alleged that while on board MV Algosaibi 42 in December 2010, he suddenly exper
dizziness. As his condition did not improve, he was sent to As Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia where he
to have high glucose and cholesterol.10 Apolinario posited that he was given medicine by the doctor and was advised
proper diet and avoid stress. After taking the doctor's advice, his medical condition improved and he was able to perfo
well.

However, after two years, particularly in January 2012, Apolinario alleged that his dizziness recurred, accompanied b
blurring of his vision. On April 2, 2012, he stated that he returned to As Salama Hospital where he was diagnosed to
diabetes mellitus11 and dislipedemia.12

After his repatriation to the Philippines on April 11, 2012, Apolinario posited that he immediately reported to the office
to get his unpaid wages and for him to be referred to the company physician. However, since his repatriation was due
completion of his six-month Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved employment contract
allegedly told by President Janet Jocson that 88 Aces could not shoulder his medical expenses. Apolinario did not ins
and just continued taking the medicine given by the doctor in Saudi Arabia.

Subsequently, Apolinario felt well and thought that his illness was already cured. However, it recurred on August 2, 2
Apolinario consulted Dr. Joseph Glenn Dimatatac, an internal medicine physician, and was informed that his illness w
diabetes mellitus.13

On March 17, 2015,14 Apolinario consulted Dr. Rufo Luna, the Municipal Health Officer of the Municipality of San Jos
declared him to be physically unfit to continue work due to his hyperglycemia. 15 Consequently, Apolinario demanded
respondents the payment of his disability benefits, but to no avail.

Apolinario argued that his illness is presumed as work-related. According to him, his stress was a factor in the develo
diabetes mellitus since he was exposed to frequent overtime, lack of sleep, and emotional/psychological stress for be
from his family. Moreover, Apolinario contended that his disability is permanent and total because he was already inc
to resume his sea duties for more than 240 days. Apolinario maintained that his cause of action to file a claim against
respondents did not prescribe yet since his action was instituted within three years from his disembarkation from the

To counter Apolinario's claim, respondents, on the other hand, argued that Apolinario finished his six-month POEA-ap
employment contract in August 2010 without any medical issue whatsoever. They contended that since the filing of h
was made five years after the completion of his contract in August 2010, his cause of action had already prescribed f
having been filed within the three-year prescriptive period. Moreover, respondents claimed that contrary to Apolinario
he actually failed to comply with the three-day post-employment medical examination requirement. As such, he canno
entitled to his money claims, moral, compensatory and exemplary damages.

The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On October 30, 2015, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Apolinario and held that Apolinario's cause of action has not
yet.16 The Labor Arbiter explained that under Section 18 of the POEA-approved employment contract, the seafarer's
with the employer is effective until the date of his arrival at the point of hire. Corollary thereto, the Labor Arbiter clarifie
claims arising from the contract should be made within three years from the date the cause of action arose. The Labo
concluded that since Apolinario's arrival at the point of hire was April 11, 2012, he had until April 11, 2015 within whic
his action. Thus, he was able to institute his claim against respondents within the reglementary period when he filed h
for Single Entry Approach (SENA) at the NLRC in March 2015.

Moreover, the Labor Arbiter found that Apolinario, while on board, was exposed to physical and psychological stress
jobs, lack of sleep and homesickness. Inasmuch as stress can prompt an increase in the level of one's blood sugar, t
Arbiter found nexus between Apolinario's nature of work and his ailment diabetes mellitus.

Lastly, the Labor Arbiter gave more weight to Apolinario's allegation that he actually requested to undergo the require
employment medical examination, but 88 Aces denied it on the ground that his repatriation was not for medical reaso
to the completion of his contract.

Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case before the NLRC.

The Ruling of the NLRC

On January 28, 2016, the NLRC rendered a Decision17 granting respondents' Appeal. In ruling for the Respondents
dismissing Apolinario's complaint, the NLRC ratiocinated that the findings of Apolinario's physicians cannot be accord
since their medical certificates were only issued on March 17, 2015 and June 15, 2015—about three years or more fr
Apolinario's repatriation on April 11, 2012.

Lastly, the NLRC held that since Apolinario failed to establish that his illness was work-related and that he requested
employment medical examination, his claim for disability benefits must be denied.

The Ruling of the CA

On July 31, 2017, the CA affirmed the NLRC's Decision and dismissed Apolinario's Petition.

The CA held that Apolinario's repatriation was due to the completion of his contract and that Apolinario had no compl
whatsoever when he disembarked from the vessel. Moreover, the CA pointed out that Apolinario was no longer a sub
POEA Standard Employment Contract (SEC) when he was found unfit to work. Not being covered by the contract, th
Apolinario's claim based thereon.

Lastly, the CA opined that Apolinario did not proffer any reason for his failure to undergo the required post-employme
examination. Having failed to undergo the required medical test, the CA concluded that Apolinario cannot be entitled
benefits.

Hence, the instant Petition.

The Ruling of this Court

The present controversy involves the claim for permanent and total disability benefits of a seafarer. Apolinario argues
contrary to the findings of the NLRC and the CA, his illness is presumed as work-related and compensable. Likewise
argues that his cause of action had not prescribed yet as he instituted his action against the respondents within the th
reglementary period.

The petition is meritorious.

Work-relatedness and compensability of the disease

The 2000 POEA-SEC provides that any sickness resulting in disability because of an occupational disease listed und
32(A) of this Contract is deemed to be work-related, provided the conditions set therein are satisfied. Section 20(B)(4
2000 POEA-SEC, on the other hand, declares that if the illness, such as diabetes mellitus, is not listed as an occupat
disease under Section 32(A), the ailment is disputably presumed as work-related.

The effect of the legal presumption in favor of the seafarer is to create a burden on the part of the employer to presen
to overcome the prima facie case of work-relatedness. Absent any evidence from the employer to defeat the legal pre
the prima facie case of work-relatedness prevails.19

To reinforce the prima facie case in his favor, Apolinario stated that during the existence of his contract, he experienc
dizziness and was diagnosed at As Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar Saudi Arabia to have contracted diabetes mellitus.
while on board the vessel, he was twice sent to As Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar Saudi Arabia for medical treatment.
his claim, Apolinario presented the medical record issued by the hospital and the different medical certificates of his p
after his repatriation in Manila stating that he is already physically unfit to return to work due to his diabetes mellitus.

While the illness is not listed as one of the occupational diseases under Section 32(A) of the POEA-SEC, the ailment
presumed work-related under Section 20(B)(4) of the contract. Respondents are duty bound to overcome this presum
However, other than their bare allegation, respondents did not present a scintilla of proof to establish the lack of casu
connection between Apolinario's disease and his employment as a seafarer. Had respondents granted Apolinario's re
undergo a post-employment medical check-up, they could have presented a medical finding to contradict the presum
work-relatedness of Apolinario's illness. The post-employment medical check-up could have been the proper basis to
the seafarer's illness, whether it was work-related, or its specific grading of disability.20 Having failed to present any e
defeat the presumption of work-relatedness of Apolinario's diabetes mellitus, the prima facie case that it is work-relate

Nonetheless, the presumption provided under Section 20(B)(4) is only limited to the "work-relatedness" of an illness.
cover and extend to compensability.21 In this sense, there exists a fine line between the work-relatedness of an illnes
matter of compensability.22 The former concept merely relates to the assumption that the seafarer's illness, albeit no
an occupational disease, may have been contracted during and in connection with one's work, whereas compensabil
to the entitlement to receive compensation and benefits upon a showing that a seafarer's work conditions caused or a
increased the risk of contracting the disease.23

It is medically accepted that stress has major effects on a person's metabolic activity. The effects of stress on glucose
metabolism are mediated by a variety of counter-regulatory hormones that are released in response to stress and tha
elevated blood glucose levels and decreased insulin action. In diabetes, because of a relative or absolute lack of insu
increase in blood glucose on account of stress cannot be adequately metabolized. Thus, stress is a potential contribu
chronic hyperglycemia in diabetes.24

At this juncture, the case of Millora v. ECC25 is instructive. The petitioner therein was the widow of Prisco Millora. Th
a public school teacher and was diabetic during the last 11 years of his life. Upon his discharge from the hospital for t
his illness, he forthwith filed a claim for benefits due to diabetes mellitus, but it was denied. At the age of 40, Prisco d
Petitioner requested the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to reconsider its denial of the deceased's cla
avail. This compelled petitioner to elevate the case to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) for review, b
commission affirmed the dismissal of the case on the ground that the cause of the deceased's ailment was not work-c
The ECC relied on the evaluation made by the GSIS that diabetes mellitus is hereditary in nature and could not have
caused by his employment conditions. To assail the ECC's findings and prove that the nature of her late husband's w
teacher increased the risk of contracting diabetes mellitus, petitioner quoted the medical opinion of Dr. Augusto Liton
president of the Philippine Diabetic Association, published in the November 1, 1985 issue of Bulletin Today, to wit:

"Dr. Augusto Litonjua, president of the Philippine Diabetic Association, also said that other causes of diabetes are ove
accidents, operations, pregnancy and certain drugs.

"Speaking before the weekly 'Agham Ugnayan', Litonjua said diseases caused either by a virus or bacteria were foun
damaged the pancreas and caused diabetes in persons 'with a predisposition.'

"Litonjua explained that a person under stressful physical or emotional situations secrete hormones that are 'contra-in
hormones which outweigh the effects of insulin. Insulin, a hormone that is produced by the pancreas lowered blood s

"He noted that there are more diabetes cases in urban than in a rural setting. This discrepancy is believed to be attrib
more 'Westernized' environment in urban areas which have more problems and tensions x x x."26

The wife of the deceased argued that since the parents of her late husband were not diabetic and that the deceased
predisposed to the ailment by reason of obesity or old age, it would be more fair to conclude that his contracting diab
was increased by the nature of his work. This Court found merit in her contention and held that:

Prisco Millora began work as a public school teacher when he was twenty-one 21 years old. Although not predispose
diabetes mellitus by reason of old age, obesity or heredity, he became diabetic after eight [ 8 years in said employme
classroom teacher, his work was not confined to the regular eight-to-five schedule, but stretched into the long hours o
preparing lesson plans and instructional materials. Aside from this, he was actively involved in the school's developm
projects. To our mind, such work situation could reasonably be described as physically and emotionally stressful, a si
by Dr. Litonjua as producing hormones which are 'contra-insulin' in their effects and which satisfies the evaluation ma
respondent Commission of the endocrinal etiology of diabetes mellitus.27

In this case, to prove that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease, Apolina
that part of his duties as an Ordinary Seaman in MV Algosaibi 42 involved strenuous workload such as assist in the h
operation of all deck gear such as topping, cradling and housing of booms; aid the carpenter in the repair work when
scale and chip paint, handle lines in the mooring of the ship, assist in the actual tying up and letting go of the vessel a
a lookout in the vessel. Apolinario further stated that while inside the vessel for several months, he was exposed to p
psychological stress due to rush jobs, lack of sleep, heat stress, emergency works and homesickness for being away
family. From the above enumeration of Apolinario's duties on board the vessel, he was certainly exposed to various s
stress—physical, mental and emotional.

In the case of Sevilla v. Workmen's Compensation Commission,28 the First Division of this Court ruled in favor of the
compensability of diabetes mellitus quoting the case of Abana, et al. v. Quisumbing.29 This Court held:

While there is that possibility that factors other than the employment of the claimant may also have contributed to the
of his illness, this is not a drawback to its compensability. For, under the law, it is not required that the employment be
factor in the growth, development or acceleration of claimant's illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is e
his employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease.30

As earlier stated, respondents herein failed to adduce any contrary medical findings from the company-designated ph
show that Apolinario's illness was not caused or aggravated by his working conditions on board the vessel. There wa
showing that Apolinario is predisposed to the illness by reason of genetics, obesity or old age. Such being the case, t
consider that the stress and strains he was exposed to on board contributed, even to a small degree, to the developm
disease. Inasmuch as, compensability is the entitlement to receive disability compensation upon a showing that a sea
conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease, We find Apolinario's disease as compensa

Reportorial requirement to undergo post-employment medical examination within three days from disembarkation

Respondents insist that Apolinario did not comply with the post employment medical examination within three working
his repatriation. For his non-compliance, respondents argue that he is not entitled to the disability benefits he claim. T
their contention, Jocson submitted an Affidavit stating that Apolinario never requested for a post-employment medica
examination after termination of his contract.

Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 Amended POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels lays down the procedure , to be followed by a seafarer in claiming disability benefits

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract a
follows:

xxxx

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his
until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated p
in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designa
physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which cas
notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the man
reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. If a doctor appointed by the
disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The thir
decision shall be final and binding on both parties. [Emphases supplied]

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, a seafarer-claimant is mandated a period of three working days within which
submit himself to a post-employment medical examination so that the company-designated physician can promptly a
medical diagnosis. Due to the express mandate on the reportorial requirement, the failure of the seafarer to comply s
the forfeiture of his right to claim the above benefits.31

Nevertheless, while the requirement to report within three working days from repatriation appears to be indispensable
character, there are some established exceptions to this rule: (1) when the seafarer is incapacitated to report to the e
upon his repatriation; and (2) when the employer inadvertently or deliberately refused to submit the seafarer to a post
employment medical examination by a company-designated physician.32

In Apines v. Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc. et al.,33 the repatriated seafarer reported to the employer., He
however, not referred to the company-designated physician. The Court emphasized that the employer, and not the se
the burden to prove that the seafarer was referred to a company-designated doctor.

Here, Apolinario avers that two days after his repatriation to Manila on April 11, 2012, he reported to the office of 88 A
his unpaid wages and for him to be referred to the company designated physician. However, since his repatriation wa
completion of his six-month POEA-approved employment contract, he was told by 88 Aces through Jocson that they
shoulder his medical expenses. Having been denied to undergo the post medical examination, Apolinario just continu
the medicine given to him by the doctor in Saudi Arabia.

Between the two conflicting allegations from Apolinario and respondents, this Court is inclined to resolve the doubt in
Apolinario. Besides, the factual backdrop of the case supports Apolinario's allegation that he requested to be referred
company designated physician. As aptly noted by the Labor Arbiter, Apolinario repeatedly experienced dizziness and
and needed medical attention while on board MV Algosaibi 42. In fact, because of his recurring sickness, he was exa
at As Salama Hospital in Al-Khobar Saudi Arabia and even underwent thorough treatment thereat 10 days prior to his
to Manila. Given Apolinario's sensitive medical condition days prior to his repatriation, We find dubious respondents' a
that Apolinario did not request to be referred to post-employment medical examination when he arrived in Manila. Ap
medical condition during and after his employment on board lends credence to his claim that he asked to be medicall
by a company-designated physician but he was prevented so by respondents.

It must be underscored that under Section 20-B of the POEA-SEC, it is the company-designated physician who is en
the task of assessing a seafarer's disability.34 Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that it is the company-d
physician's findings which should form the basis of any disability claim of the seafarer.35 The company doctor has eit
240 days, depending on the circumstances, within which to complete the medical assessment of the seafarer to dete
whether the seafarer is fit to work and to establish the degree of his disability; otherwise, the disability claim shall be g

In the similar case of De Andres v. Diamond H Marine Services & Shipping Agency, Inc., et al.,37 the repatriated sea
also reported to the employer but was not referred to the company-designated physician. This Court stated that witho
assessment of the said doctor, there was nothing for the seafarer's own physician to contest. Consequently, this Cou
medical assessment made by the seafarer's doctor of choice and granted the seafarer's permanent and total disabilit

In this case, respondents had the opportunity to refer Apolinario to a company-designated physician, but they chose t
their responsibility. Between the non-existent medical assessment of the company-designated physician and the med
assessment of Apolinario's doctor of choice—stating that his disability is permanent and total—the latter evidently sta
a certification from the company-designated physician, the law steps in to conclusively characterize his disability as to
permanent.38

Termination of contract and prescriptive period to file claims for disability benefits

Sections 2 and 18 of the Standard term and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Oc
Vessels, provide for the duration and termination of contract between the employer and a seafarer, to wit:

Sec. 2. Commencement/Duration of Contract. -

A) The Employment contract between the employer and the seafarer shall commence upon actual departure of the se
the airport or seaport in the point of hire and with a POEA approved contract. It shall be effective until the seafarer's d
arrival at the point of hire upon termination of his employment pursuant to Section 18 of this Contract.

xxxx
Sec. 18. Termination of Employment. -

A) The employment of the seafarer shall cease when the seafarer completes his period of contractual service aboard
signs off from the vessel and arrives at the point of hire.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

A simple reading of the foregoing shows that a contract between an employer and a seafarer ceases upon its comple
the seafarer signs off from the vessel and arrives at the point of hire.

In this case, while Apolinario's six-month contract may have ended as early as August 2010, he nonetheless was able
from MV Algosaibi 42 and arrive at the point of hire only on April 11, 2012.

Section 30 of the 2000 POEA-SEC provides for the prescriptive period for filing claims arising from the contract:

Sec. 30. PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION.-

All claims arising from this Contract shall be made within three (3) years from the date the cause of action arises othe
same shall be barred.

It is well-settled that a seafarer's cause of action arises upon his disembarkation from the vessel. As Apolinario's dise
from Algosaibi 42 was on April 11, 2012, he had three years from the date, or until April 11, 2015, to make a claim for
benefits. Records show that Apolinario had requested for a SENA before the NLRC as early as March 25, 2015. To e
SENA is an administrative approach to provide an accessible, speedy, and inexpensive settlement of complaints aris
employer-employee relationship to prevent cases from ripening into full blown disputes. All labor and employment dis
undergo this 30-day mandatory conciliation-mediation process.39

Notwithstanding, that Apolinario filed his Complaint before the Labor Arbiter only on May 8, 2015 is of no moment. SE
pre-requisite to the filing of a Complaint before the Labor Arbiter, the date when Apolinario should be deemed to have
his claim was when he instituted his Request for SENA on March 25, 2015. Considering that the expiration of Apolina
of action was on April 11, 2015, his claim was filed well within the 3-year prescriptive period.

Claim for Sickness Allowance and Attorney's Fees

Under Section 20(A)(3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, the amount of sickness allowance that the seafarer shall receive from
employer shall be in an amount equivalent to his basic wage computed at the time he signed off until he is declared f
the degree of disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but shall in no case exceed 120 da

Considering that no assessment was made at bar by the company designated physician, Apolinario is entitled to a sic
allowance equivalent to 120 days. His basic pay being US$506.00 per month or US$16.866 per day, he should be aw
US$2,024.00 as sickness allowance, or its equivalent amount in Philippine currency.

Anent, Apolinario's claim for attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the New Civil Code provides that attorney's fees can be r
actions for the recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under employer's liability laws. Attorney's fees
recoverable when the respondent's act or omission has compelled the complainant to incur expenses to protect his in
conditions being present in the case at bar, we find that an award of attorney's fees is warranted in favor of Apolinario

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2017 and Resolution dated April 26, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G
145357 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are held jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner A
Zonio, Jr.: a) permanent total disability benefits of US$60,000.00 at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment;
allowance of US$2,024.00 at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment; and c) attorney's fees of 10% of the to
monetary award at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta (Chairperson), A. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., on leave.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on October 16, 2019 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court i
entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on November 20, 2019 at 3:32 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG III

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 35-95.

2 Id. at 11-30; as penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon with Associate Justices Franch
Diamante and Zenaida Galapate-Laguilles, concurring.

3 Id. at 32-33.

4 Id. at 326-340.

5 Id. at 342-344.

6 Id. at 161.

7 Id. at 162.

8 Id. at 149-159.

9 Id.
10 Id. at 165.

11 Commonly known as "diabetes" is a group of metabolic disorder characterized by high blood suga
a prolonged period, (visited September 12, 2019).

12 It is an abnormal amount of lipids (e.g. triglycerides, cholesterol and/or fat phospholipids) in the blo
September 12, 2019).

13 Id. at 168.

14 Dated as March 18, 2015 in some parts of the rollo.

15 It is a condition in which an excessive amount of glucose circulates in the blood plasma (visited Se
2019).

16 Rollo, pp. 232-246.

17 Id. at 326-340.

18 APQ Shipmanagement Co., Ltd. v. Caseñas, 735 Phil. 300, 310 (2014).

19 Romana v. Magsaysay Maritime Corp., G.R. No. 192442, August 9, 2017.

20 Lorna B. Dionio v. ND Shipping Agency and Allied Services, Inc., Caribbean Tow and Barge (Pana
G.R. No. 231096, August 15, 2018.

21 Romana v. Magsaysay Maritime Corp., supra note 19.

22 Id.

23 Atienza v. Orophil Shipping International Co., Inc., G.R. No. 191049, August 7, 2017.

24  (last viewed September 12, 2019).

25 227 Phil. 139 (1986).

26 Id. at 145.

27 Id. at 146.

28 174 Phil. 448 (1978).

29 131 Phil. 387 (1986).

30 Id. at 390.

31 De Andres v. Diamond H Marine Services & Shipping Agency, Inc., 813 Phil. 746 (2017).
 32 Falcon Maritime and Allied Services, Inc., et al. v. Angelito B. Pangasian, G.R. No. 223295, March

33 799 Phil. 220 (2016).

34 Navales. Jr. v. ARL Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 243530 (Notice), March 4, 2019.

35 Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Velasquez, 591 Phil. 839 (2008).

36 Lorna B. Dionio v. ND Shipping Agency and Allied Services, Inc., Caribbean Tow and Barge (Pana
LTD., supra note 20.

37 Supra note 31.

38 Ampo-on v. Reinier Pacific lnternational Shipping, Inc., G.R. No. 240614, June 10, 2019.

39  (visited September 12, 2019).

40 Romana v. Magsaysay Maritime Corp., supra note 19.

41 Remigio v. NLRC, 521 Phil. 330 (2006).

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