G.R No. 202124 People Vs Jugueta Case Digest
G.R No. 202124 People Vs Jugueta Case Digest
G.R No. 202124 People Vs Jugueta Case Digest
202124
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
VS.
IRENEO JUGUETA, Accused-Appellant
FACT:
On June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when suddenly their
wall made of sack was stripped off by appellant and his companions.
They ordered Norberto to go out of their house and when he refused despite
his plea for mercy, they fired at them successively and indiscriminately,
having hit and killed his two daughters, Mary Grace Divina and Claudine.
The victims were defenseless and unarmed, and the attack rendered them
helpless. The perpetrators were charged with double murder for the deaths of
Mary Grace and Claudine and multiple attempted murder for the other family
members.
ISSUE:
Whether the argument extended by the appellant meritorious.
HELD:
Court did not find merit in the argument extended by the appellant. In
disposing the issue on this case, the Court had the occasion to discuss the
nature of an information. According to the Court, there is no cogent reason to
overturn the trial court’s ruling that the prosecution evidence, particularly the
testimony of Norberto Divina identifying appellant. The Court clarified that
the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify the crimes for which
appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court’s
use of the terms “Double Murder” and Attempted Murder” in convicting
appellant, and yet imposing penalties which nevertheless show that the trial
court meant to penalize appellant for two separate counts of Murder and four
counts of Attempted Murder.
The court affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court, finding the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder and multiple
attempted murder.
EN BANC
April 5, 2016
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30,
2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252. The CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, finding accused-appellant Ireneo
Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder in Criminal Case No.
7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay
Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a caliber.22
firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm Mary
Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who suffered the following:
"Gunshot wound -
Point of Entry – lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level of the
umbilicus, directed upward toward the left upper abdomen."
and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age, who suffered the following:
"Gunshot wound -
Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter
Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"
That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given
provocation for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the
commission of the offense.
Contrary to law.2
In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San
Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad
Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent
to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said
firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the
commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the
spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife
Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils
and who are minors, were not hit.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said
proceedings, one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on June 6,
2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it
was only appellant who was carrying a firearm while the other two had no participation in the
shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel was not present at the crime
scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found no prima
facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.4 Thus, upon motion of the
prosecution, the case for Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel
was dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to appellant.5
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr.
Lourdes Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the
children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr.
Taguinod noted that the trajectory of the bullet wounds showed that the victims were at a
higher location than the shooter, but she could not tell what kind of ammunitions were used.6
Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of
June 6, 2002, as his entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep,
the "sack" walling of their hut was suddenly stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo
(fences) remained. With the covering of the wall gone, the three (3) men responsible for the
deed came into view. Norberto clearly saw their faces which were illuminated by the light of
a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3 men as appellant, Gilbert
Estores and Roger San Miguel.
The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The
men then uttered, "Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon." Norberto pleaded with
them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin, matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong
kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a gunshot was fired, and Norberto
immediately threw his body over his children and wife in an attempt to protect them from
being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the direction where his
family huddled together in their hut.7
When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2)
young daughters were wounded. His wife went out of their house to ask for help from
neighbors, while he and his older daughter carried the two (2) wounded children out to the
street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the hospital, while Claudine expired at
the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive her.8
In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto
replied that he had a previous altercation with appellant who was angered by the fact that he
(Norberto) filed a case against appellant's two other brothers for molesting his daughter. 9
On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense.
Appellant's testimony, along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San
Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he (appellant) was just watching TV at the house of
Isidro San Miguel, where he had been living for several years, at the time the shooting
incident occurred. However, he and the other witnesses admitted that said house was a
mere five-minute walk away from the crime scene.10
Finding appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of
Norberto, the trial court ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together
with two other assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was
then convicted of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted
Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for Double Murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of
Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to
suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Claudine Divina and accused is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00. In addition, he is hereby
ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00 and to
pay for the costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No.
7702-G, reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article
248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional as minimum to
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum for each of the offended
parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. Further,
accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30,
2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming appellant's conviction for the crimes charged. 13
Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30,
2012, the Court issued a Resolution14 notifying the parties that they may submit their
respective Supplemental Briefs. Both parties manifested that they will no longer submit
supplemental briefs since they had exhaustively discussed their positions before the CA.15
The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's
testimony, such as his failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants had guns,
and to categorically identify appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill Norberto’s
children.
At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions
based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the
Court will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon
by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.16
The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA,
that appellant acted in concert with two other individuals, all three of them carrying firearms
and simultaneously firing at Norberto and his family, killing his two young daughters.
Norberto clearly saw all of the three assailants with their firearms as there is illumination
coming from a lamp inside their house that had been laid bare after its walling was stripped
off, to wit:
Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the same time, do
you have light in your house?
A: Yes, sir.
A: A gas lamp.
xxxx
A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.
A: Only one.
xxxx
A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters were
hit.
xxxx
A: All of them.
Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that night?
Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was your position
then?
Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie
down?
A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and ordering
them to line (sic) down face down)
Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what
happened to them?
Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's
daughters because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a prior meeting between the
perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as long as their
concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is
the act of all.18 Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house
of Norberto together, each with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to
identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly fired from appellant's firearm that killed the
children.
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a
person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or
evident premeditation.19 The presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in
Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing as murder.20 The trial court correctly
ruled that appellant is liable for murder because treachery attended the killing of Norberto’s
two children, thus:
x x x Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side by
side about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when suddenly
their wall made of sack was stripped off by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel
and Gilberto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. They ordered him to go out of their house and
when he refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them having hit and killed his two
(2) daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children were at very
tender ages. Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years old
and 3 ½ years old respectively. In this case, the victims were defenseless and manifestly
overpowered by armed assailants when they were gunned down. There was clear showing
that the attack was made suddenly and unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and
unable to defend themselves. Norberto and his wife and his children could have already
been asleep at that time of the night. x x x 21
Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As
held in People v. Fallorina,22 the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Minor children, who
by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult
person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.
As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code states that a felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission
of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. In Esqueda v. People,23 the Court held:
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is
either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim, or
frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender
intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the
nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and
number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e)
the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.
In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant
as shown by the use of firearms, the words uttered24during, as well as the manner of, the
commission of the crime. The Court thus quotes with approval the trial court’s finding that
appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.:
In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder
first by suddenly stripping off the wall of their house, followed by successive firing at the
intended victims when Norberto Divina refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If
only there were good in aiming their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been
killed but surely all the rest of the family would surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were
liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted
Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as
[appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one charged in this case, he alone is liable for the
crime committed.25
Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state
from the very beginning that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the
shots from appellant’s firearm that killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to
put a dent on said witness's credibility. An examination of Norberto's testimony would show
that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled in People v. Cabtalan,26 "[m]inor
inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility of
witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the
crime."27 Both the trial court and the CA found Norberto's candid and straightforward
testimony to be worthy of belief and this Court sees no reason why it should not conform to
the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People28 that:
Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the
absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent
facts and circumstances that would justify altering or revising such findings and
evaluation. This is because the trial court's determination proceeds from its first-hand
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude
under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in unique position to assess
the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor x x
x.29
The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding
or exceptional circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing principle. There is
no cogent reason to overturn the trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence, particularly
the testimony of Norberto Divina identifying appellant as one of the assailants, is worthy of
belief. Thus, the prosecution evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that
appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime.
However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court
to identify the crimes for which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by
the trial court's use of the terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in
convicting appellant, and yet imposing penalties which nevertheless show that the trial court
meant to penalize appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder and four (4) counts of
Attempted Murder.
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during
trial, show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder,
as the killing of the victims was not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant
and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of
Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears
stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in Section
13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one
offense.
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the
same is defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v.
Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al.,30 thus:
The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the
accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently
prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges
which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for
quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his
plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move
for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the
same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground
of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did
not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),
(b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as
many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for
each offense.31
Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted
murder, respectively, and proven during trial.
Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,32 the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as
defined in Article 4833 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the
law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one
penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a compound
crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the
other is known as a complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in
the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts
result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from
separate shot, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.34
Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two
others, in firing successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their
respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several
gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it shows
their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime.
What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because
as held in People v. Nelmida,35 "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their
respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct
and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime."36
Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account
dwelling as an ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that effect, to wit:
That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given
provocation for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the
commission of the offense.37
x x x the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified
by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house
occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime
of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would
have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous
desistance of the accused x x x38
In People v. Agcanas,39 the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that
dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human
abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he
who offends him elsewhere." Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in
the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation
therefor.40 The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of appellant violated
the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein, without
provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have appreciated dwelling
as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the
penalties imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus,
with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for
each of two (2) counts of murder.41 However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346,
proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant
should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility for
parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for
each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty should
be imposed in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
penalty should be from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted
murder.
Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as
regards criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
Generally, in these types of criminal cases, there are three kinds of damages awarded by
the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages. Likewise, actual
damages may be awarded or temperate damages in some instances.
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended
party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven
actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil
law.42 This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states, "Every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be
increased by the Court when appropriate.43 Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In
addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless
the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of
Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's
inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support
from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the
exact duration to be fixed by the court;
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the
latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil
indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment
imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as
restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum
amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a
ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing
the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the
present circumstance warrants it.44
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also
compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals45 expounded on the nature and
purpose of moral damages, viz.:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold
injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the
concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant
for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left
to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been
suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases
expressed in Article 221946 and Article 222047 of the Civil Code. x x x.
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey
Castillon: "[T]he award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible,
of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted."50
Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222051 of the Civil Code also does not fix the
amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on
the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral
damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the
award of civil indemnity.52
Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense
has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other
upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability
which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for
an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to
the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 56
The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure57 requires
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or
information. It is in order not to trample on the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature of the alleged offense that he or she has committed. A criminal
complaint or information should basically contain the elements of the crime, as well as its
qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively determine the
proper penalty it should impose. This, however, is not similar in the recovery of civil liability.
In the civil aspect, the presence of an aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged in the
information but proven during trial would entitle the victim to an award of exemplary
damages.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to
the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case
show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way
as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article
2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v.
Matrimonio,58 the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse
tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also,
in People v. Cristobal,59 the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral
corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant
married woman. In People v. Cañada,60 People v. Neverio61 and People v. Layco, Sr.,62 the
Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders
who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at ₱30,000.00,63 despite the
lack of any aggravating circumstance. The Court finds it proper to increase the amount to
₱50,000.00 in order to deter similar conduct.
If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because
of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing jurisprudence64 sets the amount of
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first
consider the penalty imposed by law. Under RA 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty
on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for
Other Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and special penal laws were amended to
impose the death penalty under certain circumstances.65 Under the same law, the following
crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general,66 mutiny on the high
seas,67 and simple rape.68 For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death: qualified piracy;69 qualified bribery under certain
circumstances;70 parricide;71 murder;72 infanticide, except when committed by the mother of
the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents
for the same purpose;73 kidnapping and serious illegal detention under certain
circumstances;74 robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under certain
circumstances;75 destructive arson, except when death results as a consequence of the
commission of any of the acts penalized under the article;76 attempted or frustrated rape,
when a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder;77 and carnapping,
when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.78 Finally, RA 7659 imposes
the death penalty on the following crimes:
(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or
present.
(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person; (ii) when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention; (iii)
when the victim is raped, subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.
(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
penalized under Article 320, death results.
(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane
or homicide is committed; (ii) when committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances: (1) when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the
victim; (2) when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities; (3)
when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or
other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a
religious or a child below seven years old; (5) when the offender knows that he is
afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when
committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine
National Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or on the
occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible
penalties or single indivisible penalty, all of them must be taken in relation to Article 63 of the
RPC, which provides:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of
the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration
of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in
accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)
Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the
court has the duty to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court
can impose either reclusion perpetua or death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances present.
But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of
the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.79
As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to
impose reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of
damages, following the ruling in People v. Salome80 and People v. Quiachon,81 is "the
penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the
public penalty actually imposed on the offender."82
When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death
penalty were it not for RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v.
Victor,83 that the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable by death
should be ₱75,000.00 We reasoned that "[t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of
the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."84 Such
reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was later
increased to ₱100,000.00.85
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346,
the imposable penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569,
must be used as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty
imposed.1avvphi1
Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an
ordinary aggravating circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty,
the actual penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence90 pegs the amount
of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱100,0000.00 as moral damages. For the qualifying
aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary aggravating circumstances present, the
amount of ₱100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and
moral damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the
exemplary damages shall be fixed at ₱100,000.00. "[T]his is not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, but also
an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes x x x." 91
When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion
perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the
proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and
₱75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating
circumstances present.
When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the
offender caused several crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design, the
amount of civil indemnity and moral damages will depend on the penalty and the number of
victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should be properly compensated. If it is multiple
murder without any ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating
circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the
maximum penalty shall be imposed,92 then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be
indemnified with ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article 48
of the RPC, the following doctrines are noteworthy:
In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog,93 this Court ruled that special complex crime,
or more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty in the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case
of People v. Barros,94 explained that composite crimes are "neither of the same legal basis
as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code],
since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave
felonies [compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to
commit another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and
the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is
imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses."95
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit
robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during
or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that
has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through
reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely,
robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that
aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed
by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of
homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a
homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery
with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are
integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is
used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.97
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood
in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or
on occasion of the rape.98 Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of
superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly
established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the
crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with
homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales:99
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against
persons and not to crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in this case
correctly characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying,
circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending himself when his
arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant
Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled
that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the
Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the
Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the
actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder
but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be imposed.100
Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it
cannot be imposed due to RA 9346 and what is actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral damages will be ₱100,000.00 each, and another
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the heinousness of the crime and to set an
example. If there is another composite crime included in a special complex crime and the
penalty imposed is death, an additional ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 moral
damages and ₱100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite crime
committed.
For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide101 wherein three (3) people died as a
consequence of the crime, the heirs of the victims shall be entitled to the award of damages
as discussed earlier. This is true, however, only if those who were killed were the victims of
the robbery or mere bystanders and not when those who died were the perpetrators or
robbers themselves because the crime of robbery with homicide may still be committed even
if one of the robbers dies.102 This is also applicable in robbery with rape where there is more
than one victim of rape.
In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in
which the crime was committed and proven during the trial. Article 6 of the RPC provides:
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is
death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral
damages that should be awarded will each be ₱100,000.00 and another ₱100,000.00 for
exemplary damages or when the circumstances of the crime call for the imposition
of reclusion perpetua only, the civil indemnity and moral damages should be ₱75,000.00
each, as well as exemplary damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00. If, however, the crime
proven is in its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be
awarded will each be ₱50,000.00, and an award of ₱25,000.00 civil indemnity and
₱25,000.00 moral damages when the crime proven is in its attempted stage. The difference
in the amounts awarded for the stages is mainly due to the disparity in the outcome of the
crime committed, in the same way that the imposable penalty varies for each stage of the
crime. The said amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of felonies
in their frustrated or attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes committed
constitute complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder
with attempted murder, the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages is ₱100,000.00 each, while in the attempted murder, the civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages is ₱25,000.00 each.
In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several
victims (except the robbers) sustained injuries, they shall likewise be indemnified. It must be
remembered that in a special complex crime, unlike in a complex crime, the component
crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages because the intention of the offender/s is to
commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of committing the said crime,
another crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with homicide,
other victims sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still
robbery with homicide as the injuries become part of the crime, "Homicide", in the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and now forms
part of the essential element of robbery,103 which is the use of violence or the use of force
upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity of the injuries sustained by the victims must
still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil indemnity and damages. If a victim
suffered mortal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the
victim should be awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages
equivalent to the damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that
are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should
likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in an attempted stage.
In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible
penalties, like homicide, death under tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be ₱50,000.00 and
₱50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary damages being awarded. However, an award
of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of homicide shall be added if there is an
aggravating circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the information.
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain
cases. The award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is
proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial
court.104 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it
cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact
amount was not proved.105 In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded
as temperate damages to ₱50,000.00.
In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were
further made atrocious by the fact that the victims are innocent, defenseless minors – one is
a mere 3½-year-old toddler, and the other a 13-year-old girl. The increase in the amount of
awards for damages is befitting to show not only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over
such crimes and wastage of lives.
In summary:
a. Frustrated:
b. Attempted:
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the
above-mentioned:
a. Frustrated:
b. Attempted:
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely
attempted:112
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-
mentioned:
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:
III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death,
injuries, or sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages will depend on the penalty, extent of violence and sexual abuse; and the
number of victims where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-
mentioned:
The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime
committed. In other complex crimes where death does not result, like in
Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary
damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty imposed, as the
case may be.
IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide,113 Robbery with
Rape,114 Robbery with Intentional Mutilation,115 Robbery with
1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds125 and could have died if
not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-
mentioned:
2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if
not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the
robber/s or perpetrator/s are themselves killed or injured in the
incident.1âwphi1
Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply,
and that for every additional rape committed, whether against the same victim
or other victims, the victims shall be entitled to the same damages unless the
other crimes of rape are treated as separate crimes, in which case, the
damages awarded to simple rape/qualified rape shall apply.
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of
divisible penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to
conceal the dishonour of the offender,127 Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes
where there are no stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under
tumultuous affray:
a. Frustrated:
b. Attempted:
B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the
rebellion and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the
following shall be awarded:
VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral
expenses is presented in court, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages
shall be awarded.
To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of
civil indemnity is P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum
amount cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly
modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it.131
Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the
victims the following damages: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of the two
children who died; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages for each of the two victims; (3)
another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the two victims; and (4) temperate
damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For the four (4) counts
of Attempted Murder, appellant should pay ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the four victims. In
addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages
payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the finality of this decision until fully paid.132
Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges
against Gilberto Estores and Roger San Miguel who had been identified by Norberto Divina
as the companions of appellant on the night the shooting occurred. Norberto had been very
straightforward and unwavering in his identification of Estores and San Miguel as the two
other people who fired the gunshots at his family. More significantly, as noted by the
prosecutor, the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who insisted they were not at the
crime scene, tended to conflict with the sworn statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was the
basis for the Provincial Prosecutor's ruling that he finds no probable cause against the two.
Danilo Fajarillo's sworn statement said that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain
"Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a
firearm and the two other people with him had no participation in the shooting incident. Said
circumstances bolster the credibility of Norberto Divina's testimony that Estores and San
Miguel may have been involved in the killing of his two young daughters.
After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy
because the same only attaches if the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy
has attached before the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a
second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only
(a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a
valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or
the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.133 In this case, the
case against Estores and San Miguel was dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus,
there can be no double jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the
real participation, if any, of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine
Divina.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo
Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of murder
defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, and hereby sentences him to suffer two (2) terms
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under R.A. 9346. He
is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina the
following amounts for each of the two victims: (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b)
₱100,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d)
₱50,000.00 as temperate damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo
Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of
attempted murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of
the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted
murder. He is ORDERED to PAY moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of PS0,000.00 to each of the four
victims, namely, Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann
Divina.
(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid,
to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and
temperate damages.
(4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice,
be FURNISHED a copy of this Decision. The Prosecutor General is DIRECTED to
immediately conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the possible criminal liability of Gilbert
Estores and Roger San Miguel regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice for his information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
On leave
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
No part
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court.
Footnotes
*
On leave .
**
No part.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora T. Lantion, with Associate Justices Isaias
P. Dicdican and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring; rollo. pp. 2-21.
2
Record, Vol. 1, pp. 2-3.
3
Record, Vol. II., p. 2.
4
Order of the Provincial Prosecutor, Record, Vol. I, pp. 12-14.
5
RTC Order, Record, Vol. II, pp. 66-67.
6
TSN, February 5, 2004, Folder of TSN's.
7
TSN, March 3, 2004, Folder of TSN's.
8
Id.
9
TSN, June 28, 2004, Folder of TSN's.
10
TSN's, February 10, 2005, April 7, 2005, February 15, 2006, August 3, 2006,
September 6, 2006 and June 7, 2006.
11
Record, Vol, I, pp. 293-294.
12
Record, Vol. II, p. 131.
13
Supra note 1.
14
Rollo, p. 27.
15
Rollo, pp. 33-34.
16
People of the Philippines v. Renandang Mamaruncas, 680 Phil. 192, 211 (2012).
17
TSN, July 14, 2004, pp. 6-8.
18
People v. Nazareno, 698 Phil. 187, 193 (2012).
19
People v. Adviento, et al., 684 Phil. 507, 519 (2012)
20
Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to
insure or afford impunity.
21
Supra note 11, at 287.
22
468 Phil. 816, 840 (2004), citing People v. Bustamante; 445 Phil. 345, 363-364
(2003); People v. Magno, 379 Phil. 531, 554 (2000).
23
607 Phil. 480, 505 (2009).
24
"Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon."
25
Supra note 12, at 128-129.
26
682 Phil. 164 (2012).
27
People v. Cabtalan, supra, at 168.
28
G.R. No. 161308, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 311.
29
Medina, Jr. v. People, supra, at 320.
30
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015.
31
People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao
Station, et al., supra.
32
694 Phil. 529, 581 (2012).
33
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes – When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
34
People v. Nelmida, supra note 32, at 569-570. (Emphasis omitted)
35
Supra note 32.
36
People v. Nelmida, supra, at 570.
37
Supra note 2.
38
Supra note 3.
39
674 Phil. 626, 635 (2011).1
40
People v. Evangelio, 672 Phil. 229, 248-249 (2011).
41
Revised Penal Code, Art. 63, par. (1), provides, in part, that when the penalty
consists of two (2) indivisible penalties and is attended by one or more aggravating
circumstances, the greater penalty shall be applied, and in this case, the death
penalty shall be imposed.
42
People v. Combate, 653 Phil. 487, 504 (2010), citing People v. Victor, 354 Phil.
195, 209 (1998).
43
Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014, 724 SCRA 1,
57.
44
Id. at 58-59.
45
G.R. No. 104576, January 20, 1995, 240 SCRA 348, 356-357.
46
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and
35.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brother and sisters may bring the
action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
47
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.
48
Bagumbayan Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-66274, September 30,
1984, 132 SCRA 441, 446.
49
6A C.J.S. Assault § 68.
50
G.R. No. 160709, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 285, 296.
51
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.
52
Lito Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, supra note 43, at 59.
53
People v. Dalisay, 620 Phil. 831, 844 (2009), citing People v. Catubig, 416 Phil.
102, 119 (2001), citing American Cent. Corp. v. Stevens Van Lines, Inc., 103 Mich
App 507, 303 NW2d 234; Morris v. Duncan, 126 Ga 467, 54 SE 1045; Faircloth v.
Greiner, 174 Ga app 845, 332 SE 2d 905; §731, 22 Am Jur 2d, p. 784; American
Surety Co. v. Gold, 375 F 2d 523, 20 ALR 3d 335; Erwin v. Michigan, 188 Ark 658,
67 SW 2d 592.
54
§762, 22 Am Jur 2d pp. 817-818.
55
§733, 22 Am Jur 2d, p. 785; Symposium: Punitive Damages, 56 So Cal LR 1,
November 1982.
56
People v. Catubig, supra note 53, at 119-120.
57
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:
58
G.R. Nos. 82223-24, November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 613, 634.
59
322 Phil. 551 (1996).
60
617 Phil. 587 (2009).
61
613 Phil. 507 (2009).
62
605 Phil. 877 (2009).
63
People v. Abellera, 553 Phil. 307 (2007).
64
People v. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508, 533-534.
65
People v. Combate, supra note 41, at 509.
66
Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. -
The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high
seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of
its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said
vessel, its equipment or passengers. The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of
mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters.
67
Id.
68
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
69
Art. 123. Qualified piracy. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed upon those who commit any of the crimes referred to in the preceding
article, under any of the following circumstances:
1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same;
70
Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public officer is entrusted with law
enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has
committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of
any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which
was not prosecuted. x x x
71
Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse,
shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
72
Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to
insure or afford impunity.
73
Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for
murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less
than three days of age.
74
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
xxxx
75
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:
x x x x.
76
Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed upon any person who shall burn:
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any
person who shall burn:
xxxx
77
Republic Act No. 7080 (1991), Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties.
- Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination
or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of
the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any
person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating
and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks
derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
78
Republic Act No. 6539 (1972), Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who
is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by x x x the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant
of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
79
RA 9346, Sec. 2.
80
532 Phil. 368, 385 (2006).
81
532 Phil. 414, 428 (2006).
82
See People v. Sarcia, 615 Phil. 97 (2009).
83
Supra note 41.
84
People v. Victor, supra, at 210.
85
People v. Gambao, supra note 64, at 533.
86
384 Phil. 766 (2000).
87
People v. Arizapa, supra.
88
436 Phil. 719 (2002).
89
Supra note 64.
90
People v. Gambao, supra note 64.
91
People v. Victor, supra note 42, at 210.
92
ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
93
674 Phil. 444 (2011).
94
315 Phil. 314 (1995).
95
Id. at 338.
96
608 Phil. 701 (2009).
97
People v. De Leon, supra, at 716-717, citing People v. Salazar, 342 Phil. 745, 765
(1997); People v. Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569,
582; People v. Ponciano, G.R. No. 86453, December 5, 1991, 204 SCRA 627, 639
and People v. Mangulabnan, et al., 99 Phil. 992, 999 (1956).
98
People v. Nanas, 415 Phil. 683 (2001), citing People v. Penillos, G.R. No. 65673,
January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 546, 564 and People v. Sequiño, 332 Phil. 90 (1996).
99
400 Phil. 1221 (2000).
100
People v. Macabales, supra, at 1236-1237, citing People v. Vivas, G.R. No.
100914, May 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 238, 242.
101
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. —
Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any
person shall suffer:
102
People v. De Leon, supra note 96; People v. Ebet, 649 Phil. 181 (2010).
103
Revised Penal Code, Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. - Any person who, with
intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, shall be
guilty of robbery.
104
People v. Tagudar, 600 Phil. 565, 590 (2009), citing People v. Dacillo, 471 Phil.
497, 510 (2004).
105
Id., citing People v. Surongon, 554 Phil. 448, 458 (2007).
106
Article 255, RTC.
107
Article 248, RTC.
108
Article 246, RTC.
109
Article 262, RTC.
110
Note that if the crime penalized in Article 255 [Infanticide] was committed by the
mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, she shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods, and if said crime was
committed for the same purpose by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the
penalty shall be reclusion temporal. (As amended by R.A. 7659). Hence, the
damages to be awarded should be the same as in Roman Numeral Number Five (V)
of the summary, i.e., In other crimes that result in the death of the victim and the
penalty consists of divisible, because the prescribed penalties are divisible.
111
Exemplary damages in rape cases are awarded for the inherent bestiality of the
act committed even if no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the
crime.
112
There is no frustrated stage in the crime of rape.
113
Art. 294 (1), RPC.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Art. 266-A, RPC as amended by RA 8353.
118
Art. 267, RPC.
119
RA No. 6539.
120
Id.
121
P.D. 532.
122
Art. 123, RPC.
123
Art. 320, RPC.
124
RA No. 8049.
125
This is so because there are no stages of the component crime in special complex
crimes but the victims must be compensated as if the component crimes were
separately committed.
126
Art. 294 (3), RPC.
127
If the crime of infanticide in Art. 255 of the RPC was committed by the mother of
the child or by the maternal grandparent/s in order to conceal her dishonor, the
penalties against them are divisible, i.e., prision mayor in its medium and maximum
periods, and reclusion temporal, respectively.
128
See People v. Catubig, supra note 53.
129
Although the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion perpetua, the damages
awarded should be the same as those where the penalty is death due to the gravity
of the offense and the manner of committing the same.
130
In order to deter the commission of the crime of rebellion and serve as an
example, exemplary damages should be awarded.
131
Supra note 38.
132
See Dario Nacar v. Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr., G.R. No. 189871,
August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439, 459.
133
Quiambao v. People, G.R. No. 185267, September 17, 2014, 735 SCRA 345,
356-357.