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Forensic Diagnosis on Flood-Induced Bridge Failure. I: Determination of the


Possible Causes of Failure

Article  in  Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities · February 2014


DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)CF.1943-5509.0000419

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Forensic Diagnosis on Flood-Induced Bridge Failure.
I: Determination of the Possible Causes of Failure
Helsin Wang1; Shih-Chun Hsieh2; Cheng Lin3; and Chung-Yue Wang4

Abstract: In Taiwan, many bridges span rivers that exhibit severe channel variations in response to drastically increased flows and resulting
floods caused by typhoons and storms. Flood-induced scour can undermine the effective embedment depth of bridge foundations. The
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Shuang-Yuan Bridge, spanning a downstream section of the Kaoping Stream, was severely damaged during Typhoon Morakot in August
2009. A qualitative investigation was conducted to determine the possible causes of this bridge collapse. Relevant hydrologic, meteorologic,
structural, geotechnical, and terrain information from various sources both in written and image formats was collected, updated, and
reviewed. The disaster investigation included field investigations, nondestructive inspection of bridge remnants, and investigation of struc-
tural damage of upstream river crossings, hydrologic changes, damage to training structures/embankment, riverbed profile changes, and de-
bris during the flood event. Several inspections were applied to determine the embedment depths, positions of underwater remnants, and
changes in riverbed elevation. The investigation results identified multiple possible causes of failure, including flood flows, river-bend-
induced turbulent flows, and the joint effects of extended foundations and rafted wood. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)CF.1943-5509.0000419.
© 2014 American Society of Civil Engineers.
Author keywords: Forensic engineering; Scour; Bridges; Multiple natural hazards; Inspection; Floods; Migration.

Introduction The common factors of flood-induced bridge failure include


general scour, local scour, constriction scour, headward erosion,
Taiwan, while famous for its natural beauty, is also well known for its lateral erosion, large-scale secondary erosion, river bending,
recurrent natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, debris flows, river convergence, short bridge span, ineffective embedment
landslides, and droughts. Bridge management and maintenance depth, protection works–induced overfall or hydraulic jump,
agencies are confronted with many serious flood-related challenges softened bedrock, sand mining, and debris impact or abrasion on
that impinge on the safety and integrity of in-service bridges. The risks bridge foundations. Bridge failures in Taiwan generally can be
and occurrence of bridge failure are related not only to natural envi- attributed to one or a combination of these factors (Lin 1998).
ronmental conditions and engineering design but also to land-use in- Currently, the web-based Taiwan Bridge Management System
tensity. Developing effective countermeasures to bridge failure is the (TBMS), the most complete bridge database in Taiwan, is limited in
main concern for bridge owners, especially when faced with serious terms of assessing scour potential and its possible impacts on
threats stemming from multiple hazards. Therefore, the assessment, the structural conditions of channels, abutment foundations, protection
investigation, and determination of countermeasures of bridge stability works, and pier foundations. Furthermore, bridge inspections in Taiwan
and safety have become crucial research issues in Taiwan in the past few focus mostly on the structural condition of the bridges themselves. The
decades [China Engineering Consultants (CECI) 2011a; Chern et al. lack of consideration of other factors such as environmental variables,
2006; Facilities and Assets Management Center for Infrastructures river migration, and site geologic characteristics could result in mis-
(FAMCI) 2009; Lin 1998; Lin et al. 2004, 2005; Lee et al. 2008]. In leading condition ratings and the implementation of potentially in-
Taiwan, most of the causes of the failure of bridges spanning rivers are appropriate countermeasures (CECI 2011a; Lin 1998; Lin et al. 2004).
associated with foundation scour and hydrologic migration (Lin 1998). However, a compromise has to be made because of limited available
budgets and the huge expense required for maintenance. Hence limited
funds are focused on bridges rated with the highest priority for main-
1
Senior Engineer, Institute of Bridge Engineering, China Engineering tenance based on an efficient and rapid assessment process (Chern et al.
Consultants, Inc., 27 F, No. 185, Section 2, Sinhai Rd., Taipei 10637, 2006). Currently, a scour inspection code for river-crossing bridges in
Taiwan (corresponding author). E-mail: [email protected] Taiwan is being developed to guide inspection types, levels, fre-
2
Research Fellow, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
Nanyang Technological Univ., Singapore 639798.
quencies, evaluation items, and stage of implementation (CECI 2011a).
3
Professor, Dept. of Civil Engineering, National Chung Hsing Univ., Visual inspection emphasizes the identification of any aberrations in
Taichung 40226, Taiwan. bridge structure as well as foundation scour during the regular in-
4
Professor, Dept. of Civil Engineering, National Central Univ., Jhongli City, spection schedule. Detailed inspections review structural, geotechnical,
Taoyuan County 32001, Taiwan; formerly, Director, Institute of Bridge Engi- environmental, and hydrologic conditions on questionable bridges
neering, China Engineering Consultants, Inc., 27 F, No. 185, Section 2, Sinhai during the flood season [CECI 2011a; Chinese Institute of Civil and
Rd., Taipei 10637, Taiwan. Hydraulic Engineering (CICHE) 2010]. Cracks, corrosion, and flood-
Note. This manuscript was submitted on June 29, 2012; approved on
induced ambient vibration variations are inspected or monitored, if
October 30, 2012; published online on November 3, 2012. Discussion period
open until July 1, 2014; separate discussions must be submitted for in- needed, to understand the long-term deterioration of bridge materials.
dividual papers. This paper is part of the Journal of Performance of For special inspections, nondestructive techniques are strongly rec-
Constructed Facilities, Vol. 28, No. 1, February 1, 2014. ©ASCE, ISSN ommended for determining in situ substructure conditions (CECI
0887-3828/2014/1-76–84/$25.00. 2011a; Ryan et al. 2006; Wightman et al. 2003).

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J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 2014.28:76-84.


Bridge Collapse Event

Typhoon Morakot hovered around Taiwan for 3 days, and its suc-
cessively accompanying moist air current brought more than 2,500
mm of heavy precipitation to southern Taiwan in early August 2009.
This was the most severe and damaging typhoon encountered in the
past 50 years. The event left 704 people dead and 18 others missing
and caused approximately NT$110 billion (US$3.7 billion) in
damage [United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humani-
tarian Affairs (OCHA) 2009]. The typhoon also caused serious slope
failures, numerous debris flows, and floods with more than a 200-
year recurrence interval, along with damage to approximately 130
highway bridges [CECI 2009; Chang et al. 2009; FAMCI 2009;
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National Science and Technology Center for Disaster Reduction


(NCDR) 2010].
The typhoon-induced flood delivered a huge amount of debris
and drifting wood, severely damaging several bridges within the
Kaoping Stream watershed in southern Taiwan. The Shuang-Yuan
Bridge [as shown in Figs. 1(a and b)] on Highway No. 17 pro-
vided the most common downstream crossing point over the
Kaoping Stream, around 2:7 km from the Taiwan Strait. This bridge
was severely damaged during the night of August 9, 2009. A 460-m-
long bridge section was completely swept away in the main channel.
Around 12:45 a.m., Piers P5–P16 collapsed (Stage I collapse), and
Piers P2–P4 were subsequently swept away at 4:00 a.m. (Stage II
collapse) [Fig. 1(c)]. The right embankment was damaged along
a 500-m length on the upstream side and along a 300-m length on the
downstream side. A temporary steel bridge with 50-m steel-pipe
foundations was constructed on the downstream side of the original
bridge 5 months after failure. A new long-span bridge was con-
structed on the upstream side and was open for traffic in late De-
cember 2011. Because the original bridge was found to be in good
condition in a routine inspection, this unexpected failure prompted
a forensic investigation supported by the bridge agency to provide
some indications of how bridges could be protected from storm or
typhoon disasters in the future (CECI 2011b).

Archive Establishment

The archival information supporting the forensic investigation of the


flood-induced bridge failure consisted of (1) hydrologic and meteo-
rologic information, (2) structural and geotechnical information, and
(3) a disaster investigation record. Building such an archive provided
an overview of and insight into the possible causes of the bridge
failure before embarking on further detailed analysis. The essential
elements in the archive consisted of hydrologic records describing the
river’s long-term migration and bridge engineering countermeasures, Fig. 1. (a) Geographic information on the bridge (data from Ministry
meteorologic events, whole-life bridge structural records, site geo- of the Interior); (b) site photo before failure (image by Cheng Lin); (c)
technical characteristics, and disaster records. The disaster records site photo after failure (image by Cheng Lin)
included field investigation and nondestructive inspection of bridge
remnants and assessments of upstream/downstream river-crossing
structural damage, hydrologic change, training-structure/embankment main river-crossing structures from the Li-Ling Bridge (No. 71)
damage, riverbed profile change, and debris transported and deposited downstream to the Kaoping Estuary (No. 1) are, in order, the Kaoping
during the flood event. Several nondestructive inspection techniques Weir (No. 50), the New Kaoping Stream Railroad Bridge (Railroad
enabled inspectors to determine the embedment depths and positions of Bridge for short, No. 45), the Kaoping Bridge (No. 40), the Wan-
underwater remnants and the riverbed elevation change for analysis. Da Bridge (No. 27), the Wan-Dan Weir (No. 20), and the Shuang-Yuan
Bridge (No. 5), whose representative numbers are marked in Fig. 2.
The elevation evolution of the longitudinal profile along the main
Hydrologic and Meteorologic Information channel indicates that a violent downward erosion of an average depth
of 5.3 m occurred at some point in time between 1975 and 1995
(Fig. 3) (Water Resources Planning Institute 2008). The official river-
Watershed-Wide Hydrologic Migration
management bans on sand mining, implemented from 1995, effec-
The area of the Kaoping Stream watershed in southern Taiwan is tively alleviated riverbed erosion, and the riverbed elevation recovered
3,257 km2 ; this is around one-tenth of Taiwan’s total land area. The 1 m back on average. Based on the watershed-wide hydrologic

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J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 2014.28:76-84.


migration record, insignificant riverbed variations were found at the severely threatened their safety (Fig. 4). The migration of the main
target bridge site (No. 5). erosion position from Point B to Point C was accelerated during this
typhoon flood event and caused the breaking of bridge piers adjacent
Local Hydrologic Migration to the right bank after Stage I collapse (Piers P4–P16). This showed
that the violent flow impacts and lateral erosion of the right bank led
The main channel, 900 m wide, has been continuously laterally to the change in flow direction at the bridge site and directly induced
eroding the right bank upstream of the bridge site since 1975. The Stage II collapse (Piers P2–P4) at 4:00 a.m. (CECI 2011b). The
Water Resources Agency has constructed several groins and training continuously extended failure range of the embankment nearby
structures to successfully alleviate the lateral erosion on the right verifies the downward movement of the erosion position after Stage
bank. The migration of the boundary of the main channel was ex- II collapse. The exact cause of the Stage I collapse (Piers P4–P16)
amined using historical satellite images dating from 2007 to the at 12:45 a.m. is still under discussion (see the companion paper,
postdisaster period for the upstream side (Fig. 4). The interactions Wu et al. 2014).
between the floodplains and main river flows, as well as the max- The variations in the riverbed elevation profile at the bridge site
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imum kinetic energy, have been marked using arrows in Fig. 4 to have been recorded for the period 1972–2009, as shown in Fig. 5.
determine the channel migration path. The shifting main channel Various exposed foundation depths ranging from 2 to 6 m were
directly undercuts the left-bank floodplain and expands the main- frequently observed on Piers P6–P18 located at the main channel.
channel width up to 1,200 m at the bridge site. The trend in local The most recent predisaster inspection revealed the continuous
hydrologic migration has subsequently caused the bend (erosion extension of the main channel from P6 to P4, as well as a maximum
position) on the right-bank floodplain to gradually move from an scour depth of up to 7 m at Pier P5 (CECI 2011b). Such bank
upstream position downward to the bridge site (from Points A to B degradation implied that lateral erosion had again been launched on
to C). The approaching bending vertex could have continuously the right bank. This could have led to elimination of the flood-
undermined the structural stability of the abutment and piers and resistance capacity of the bridge foundations during the typhoon. A
conservative measure of the maximum postdisaster scour depth was
13 m at the P15 position, measured using sonar techniques (details
are described in the section on the disaster investigation record).

Meteorologic and Hydrologic Archives during


the Typhoon
The entire Kaoping Stream watershed is located within the area that
experienced the most acute rainfall during the typhoon. Most of the
14 rainfall stations within the watershed recorded accumulated
rainfall of 2,000-year recurrence [Water Resources Agency (WRA)
2009]. The observed maximum 24-, 48-, and 72-h accumulated local
rainfalls were 1,414.5, 2,215.5, and 2,564.0 mm, respectively, the
highest ever recorded in Taiwan.
Three gauging stations at the Li-Ling Bridge (No. 71), the
Kaoping Weir (No. 50), and the Wan-Da Bridge (No. 27) provided
complete upstream water-stage and discharge hydrographs within
the Kaoping Stream (Fig. 6). The maximum water stages for these
Fig. 2. Bridges or hydraulic structures with representative number three gauging stations at the time of bridge collapse exceeded the
crossing the Kaoping Stream and 100-year recurrence flow rate (unit: first-alert water levels but were below the design flood water levels.
m3/s) (data from the Water Resources Planning Institute 2008) The water stage at the Shuang-Yuan Bridge was conservatively
estimated at 6 m about 80 min before the collapse (CECI 2011b). The

Fig. 3. Elevation evolution of longitudinal profile along main channel from Kaoping estuary (data from the Water Resources Planning Institute 2008)

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Fig. 4. Progressive lateral erosion of main channel toward left-bank floodplain and shifting bending-vertex zone toward bridge on right bank
(schematics redrawn based on the satellite images from the Aerial Survey Office, Forestry Bureau, Taipei, Taiwan)

Fig. 5. Variations in riverbed elevation profile at bridge site

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measured flood discharges exceeded the 200-year recurrence flow The geologic characteristics around the bridge site from the
rate (29,100 m3 =s) at the Kaoping Weir (No. 50). The official an- ground surface consisted of 5 m of silty sand, 15 m of fine to medium
alyzed discharge at these gauging stations reached 35,064 m3 =s, sand, and 20 m of silty clay overlying silty sand and fine to medium
much higher than the bridge design flood value of 26,800 m3 =s sand (Fig. 7). Six 0.9-m-diameter reversed-circulation installed con-
(WRA 2009). However, it should be noted that without consid- crete piles, at various lengths from 33.1 to 43.9 m, supported each
ering the depression effects of inundation and barrier lakes, the pier. Because of the lack of firm bedrock deeper than 280 m of
rainfall-based model may have provided an unreasonably high elevation, as verified in the most recent borehole investigations for
discharge rate, and hence the preceding figure was used as the upper- the new bridge (CECI 2010), the designated foundation-bearing
bound reference value in this forensic investigation. stratum for the piles was set at the silty-sand layer around 40 m deep
The typhoon induced a high tide with a sea level of 1.5 m during so as to provide what was assessed to be relatively strong bearing
the most severe period (see Fig. 6). The corresponding tidal ele- capacity.
vation at the time of bridge collapse was at a local minimum ele-
vation of 0.6 m. This indicated that the tidal elevation did not cause Inspection, Retrofitting, and Maintenance
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any direct pressure or suction effects on the flow velocity of the river
A comprehensive bridge inspection conducted in 2000 revealed
and consequently did not cause the bridge collapse.
structural safety issues such as concrete spalling and reinforcement
corrosion on the superstructure. Even though no significant scour
Structural and Geotechnical Information threat was found around the bridge piers, foundation underpinning
and relevant protection works were recommended to efficiently el-
evate the foundation bearing capacity and prevent unexpected flood
Original Structural and Geotechnical Design scour on the foundations.
In 2003, a structural retrofit project was launched to replace
The designated structural elements shown in Table 1, based on data compromised structural elements and underpin selected foundations
from the TBMS archives, reveal that the bridge was 2,083 m long and protection works at 30 piers, mostly located in the main channel
and 9.5 m wide and consisted of two parallel I-type prestressed- (Piers P5–P14). To increase the bearing capacity of the foundations,
concrete bridges built in different years. The older bridge on the four 0.9-m-diameter drilled shafts with a length of 50 m extended
upstream side was constructed in 1974. The newer bridge on the a 4.3-m-wide pile cap on each pier perpendicular to the flow di-
downstream side, an identical structural type to the old section, was rection (see Fig. 8). This extended pile cap could have led to dis-
built in 1981 in a bid to accommodate increasing traffic flows. The charge loss along the bridge site during the typhoon flood.
100-year recurrence flow rate was the basic design reference for the The archives of the TBMS also provide relevant information
bridge foundations. from regular bridge inspections. The routine inspections performed
The superstructure of the bridge was composed of 66 spans, each
30.6 m long, with two 31.6-m-long prestressed-concrete spans adja-
cent to the two abutments. The maximum horizontal acceleration for Table 1. Archive of the Shuang-Yuan Bridge (Data from the TBMS)
earthquake resistance was designed as 0:23g without any further Geometric dimensions
earthquake-resistance measures. The substructures of the bridges
comprised 67 cantilever-type prestressed-concrete piers with a max- Length 2,082.8 m
imum height of 9.2 m. The designated minimum clearance height Span number 68
was 7 m between the main-beam bottom and the still-water surface. Width 9.5 m
Span disposition 2 @ 31.60 m (two ends) 1 66
@ 30.60 m
Pier height 9.2 m
Pile length 33.1–50 m
Structural elements
I-Type main beam 94–95-m prestressed-
concrete beam
Transverse beam RC partition every 10 m
Deck RC structure paved with AC
Pier Prestressed-concrete
structure
Pile Reverse-circulation
installed-concrete structure
Abutment RC cantilever supported by
concrete piles
Bearing Rubber
Extension joint Sawed steel plate
Loading parameters
Live load HS20
Falling prevention length 0.7 m
Fig. 6. Stage hydrographs measured at gauging and tidal stations
Horizontal accelerationa 0.23g
during Typhoon Morakot (time scale begins at 00:00 on August 7, 2009)
Earthquake zoning B
(data from Central Weather Bureau and Water Resources Agency,
Note: AC 5 asphalt concrete.
Taiwan) a
No earthquake-resistant system is designed for the bridge.

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Fig. 7. Geologic profile along bridge site (from CECI 2011b, with permission)

Fig. 8. Design graphs of underpinned bridge foundation (unit: centimeters) (data from the Directorate General of Highways Bridge Archive)

in 2006, 2007, and 2008 indicated that the improvements had lifted failure, a temporary steel bridge supported with 50-m-long steel-
the Shuang-Yuan Bridge to a fine structural condition level. The pipe foundations was constructed over the downstream-side bridge
most recent precollapse inspection, carried out in March 2009, [Figs. 9(k and l)].
continued to classify the bridge safety level as in good condition. A resistivity image profiling (RIP) technique was applied to map
the electronic potential field of the damaged bridge site on the up-
stream side [Fig. 9(l)] (Wang et al. 2010). Line R1, 440 m long, was
Disaster Investigation Record extended from the position at Pier P1 to the position between Piers
P15 and P16 along the upstream side of the original bridge site. The
The conventional field investigations and subsequent inspections electrode probes were fixed on the tips of bamboo staffs and po-
were executed from August 12, 2009, to March 18, 2010, as shown sitioned on the river bottom by a diver. Line R2, 165 m long, was
in Fig. 9. The disaster investigation addressed six key items, in- positioned beside the original Pier P3 position, parallel to the flow
cluding bridge remnants, structural damage to upstream river cross- direction of the river.
ings, hydrologic changes, training-structure/embankment damage, The RIP results of Lines R1 and R2 are shown in the upper
riverbed profile change, and debris. This investigation provided portion of Fig. 10. The resistivity contour with a display mode of
crucial information about and evidence for determining the key visible-light spectrum, with corresponding resistivity values from
cause(s) of failure (Wu et al. 2014). 100 to less than 1 V-m, illustrates the resistivity intensity distributions
in space. The resistivity value for sediments composed of silt and sand
was more than 5 V-m. The steel-content structural pieces had lower
resistivity values, below 1 V-m.
Bridge Remnants
The RIP results are interpreted as follows (the lower portion of
The satellite and field images [Figs. 1(b and c), 4, and 9] indicated Fig. 10): (1) there was a positive identification of the foundation
that bridge sections between Piers P1 and P14 on the upstream side remnants at the Pier P2, P3, and P13 positions at depths of more
of the bridge were completely swept away, with similar conditions than 20 m, (2) the horizontal image configurations at depths from
between Piers P1 and P16 on the downstream side. On the right-bank 25 to 50 m and 15 m represented the scattering of bridge decks
section of the bridge, only one-span remnants from Abutment A1 along Piers P5–P8 and P9–P11, respectively, and (3) a high re-
and Pier P1 [Figs. 1(c) and 9(b, d, and j)] remained. One of the bridge sistivity distribution above 20–30 m deep along Piers P5–P11
slabs was askew and was suspended from Pier P14 of the upstream indicated the area of maximum scour or fluidization depths during
side of the bridge [Figs. 1(c) and 9(e)]. Five months after the bridge the typhoon.

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Fig. 9. Postdisaster site records: (a) broken right upstream embankment; (b) remnant of bridge; (c) deposition of rafted wood; (d) remnants of Pier P1
and Abutment A1; (e) ground-penetrating radar inspection around Pier P14; (f) remnant Piers P14 and P16; (g) drifting wood rafted on Piers P39 and
P40; (h) broken right upstream embankment; (i) damage at Kaoping Weir; (j) sonar inspection over main channel; (k) construction of temporary bridge;
(l) RIP inspection along upstream side of bridge site (from CECI 2011b, with permission)

Fig. 10. RIP results along upstream side of bridge site (Line R1) and beside former Pier P3 position (Line R2) and possible underwater foundation or
structural remnants

Upstream River-Crossing Structural Damage Hydrological Change and Training-Structure/


Embankment Damage
The damage investigation covered the upstream river-crossing
structures up to the Li-Ling Bridge (No. 71) (see Fig. 3). The Wan- The investigation into hydrologic changes consisted of identification
Dan Weir (No. 20) and the Kaoping Weir (No. 50) had lost their of channel changes and embankment damage. The satellite and field
reservoir functions of irrigation and drinking water supply because of images [Figs. 4 and 9(a, g, h, and l)] revealed that the width of the main
high levels of sedimentation [Fig. 9(i)]. channel had been expanded to 1,200 m, and the floodplains had been

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retrograded from Piers P4 through P1 on the right bank and from Piers caused damaging impacts on the piers and was rafted along the piers
P33 through P41 on the left bank. All groins and training structures and embankments. The resulting discharge loss caused severe
on the right bank had been completely destroyed during the flood downward flow in front of the bridge and severe erosion of the
[Figs. 4 and 9(a and h)]. The right embankment was eroded 500 m on riverbed sand. The local extreme flow caused strong scour at the
the upstream side and damaged 300 m on the downstream side. bridge site. The inspected scour depths of 20–30 m from under-
pinned Piers P5–P14 strongly suggested that the joint effects of local
scour and constriction scour were triggered by extended foundation
Riverbed Profile Change caps and rafted woody debris during the typhoon flood. In addition,
The posttyphoon riverbed elevation profile was expected to be dif- the rafted woody dam along the bridge site and the impact of the
ferent as a result of the extremely high and strong flood flows. woody debris itself brought enormous additional water pressure and
Inspections with underwater ground-penetrating radar (GPR) and lateral forces against the bridge foundations. The effects of a con-
sonar [Figs. 9(e and j)] provided information for evaluating the tinuously deteriorating flood-resistance capacity against an increasing
possible scour depth after the catastrophic failure. An underwater flood thrust resulted in the complete removal of all the structural
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GPR inspection with antenna frequencies of 200, 450, and 900 MHz elements from Piers P4 to P12 in the main channel. Foundation
was conducted along the main channel to map the streambed ele- remnants indicated the possibility of Stage I collapse (underpinned
vation. The measurable zone was spatially limited to the region of Piers P4–P16) under such severe flood conditions.
Piers P2–P20. However, because the high salt content in the water
significantly lowered signal resolution, the riverbed profile could
not be accurately determined. Accordingly, sonar techniques were Conclusions
employed to conclusively survey the riverbed elevation after the
typhoon flood. The new riverbed elevation profile is plotted in Fig. 5. The typhoon-induced extreme precipitation caused slope failures,
A maximum depth of 13 m was graphically found at the Pier P15 debris flows, barrier lakes, and unprecedented floods in southern
position, with actual scour depth deeper than 13 m during the bridge Taiwan in early August 2009. Despite its good maintenance record,
collapse. the Shuang-Yuan Bridge, one of 130 damaged highway bridges, still
collapsed. This also highlights possible improvements that could be
made to current maintenance mechanisms used by bridge agencies.
Debris A forensic investigation into the bridge collapse was conducted
Typhoon-induced damage caused drifting woody debris to be rafted to identify the main causes of failure. Based on the investigation
along the riverbank and bridge site [Figs. 9(a, c, and g)]. The highest results, the following conclusions can be drawn:
standing elevation of the wood debris implied that the flood-stage 1. A qualitative assessment process for flood-induced bridge
elevation was at least 6 m during the typhoon flood. The observed failure was developed to review relevant evidence and effec-
elevation was identical to the official proclaimed flood stage of 6 m. tively evaluate all possibilities through the establishment of an
This evidence also provides further insight into the various possible archival database. The hydrologic, meteorologic, structural,
causes for discharge loss, flow-velocity distribution, and rafting geotechnical, and damage information was collated to estab-
elevation that would be helpful for later scenario evaluation. lish a forensic archive to support the investigation into this
flood-induced bridge failure.
2. The relevant information covered related long-term hydro-
Identification of Possible Causes logic migration, hydraulic engineering countermeasures, me-
teorologic events, whole-life bridge structural records, and site
The establishment of an archival database assisted investigators in geotechnical characteristics from diverse sources existing in
their comprehensive review of the hydrologic, meteorologic, struc- the current TBMS archive and field investigation.
tural, geotechnical, and disaster information leading to the bridge 3. The satellite images and field scour measurement indicated
collapse event. Several possible causes of failure were identified as that the bending vertex (erosion position) on the right-bank
unprecedented flood flows, river-bend-induced skewed flows, tidal floodplain approached the bridge, induced by local hydrologic
effects, the effects of extended foundations, and the effects of rafted migration, and continuously undermined the structural stabil-
woody debris. ity of the bridge. The unexpected effect of extended pile caps,
The investigation results reveal that the rainfall that exceeded which were used to underpin the bridge foundations, was to
2,500 mm in the watershed upstream induced flow rates of over 200- cause discharge losses and increased flow velocity along the
year recurrence, as observed at the three upstream gauging stations. bridge site during the typhoon flood.
The tidal variation did not appear to directly contribute to the bridge 4. The disaster investigation recorded the conditions of bridge
collapse event, given the low tidal elevation. The fierce typhoon remnants, structural damage to upstream river crossings, hy-
flood also prompted the local hydrologic migration of the river. The drologic changes, training-structure/embankment damage, riv-
rapid movement of the upstream bending vertex (main erosion po- erbed profile changes, and debris. The resistivity image profiling
sition) approached Abutment A1 and the piers of the bridge adjacent indicated the likely scour and fluidization, which presents the
to the right bank during the typhoon. The bending-vertex zone temporarily deposited soil performing an aquiform mechanical
gradually shifted onto the bridge site and directly induced Stage behavior, not susceptible to any loading, and vulnerably af-
II collapse (unimproved Piers P2–P4) and failure of the right fected by local flood conditions at depths of around 20–30 m
embankment. during the typhoon. All structural elements of Piers P4–P12
Foundation underpinning with extended pile caps also could were completely swept away at the main channel. The rafted
have caused discharge loss along the bridge site, speeded up the flow woody debris formed a discharge blockage and sped up the flow
velocity, deepened the exposed depths of the foundations at the main velocity along the bridge site during the typhoon flood.
channel, and eliminated the flood-resistance capacity of the bridge 5. Multiple causes, including overflooding, river-bending-induced
subjected to the typhoon flood thrust. Likewise, a great amount of flow, and the joint effects of extended foundations and rafted
woody debris removed from the upstream watershed could have wood, induced the Shuang-Yuan Bridge collapse. The effects of

JOURNAL OF PERFORMANCE OF CONSTRUCTED FACILITIES © ASCE / JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2014 / 83

J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 2014.28:76-84.


extended foundations and rafted woody debris could have Chinese Institute of Civil and Hydraulic Engineering (CICHE). (2010).
eliminated the flood-resistance capacity of the bridge by con- Methods and application of bridge inspections, Scientific and Technical
tinuously developing scour and creating huge additional water Publishing, Taipei, Taiwan (in Chinese).
pressure and lateral forces. These joint effects caused the failure Facilities and Assets Management Center for Infrastructures (FAMCI).
(2009). “Data collection and preliminary cause evaluation on 52 pro-
of underpinned piers from Piers P4 to P16 (Stage I collapse).
vincial highway bridges damaged in Typhoon Morakot.” Rep. to the
The approaching bending-vertex zone developed, with long- Directorate General of Highways, Ministry of Transportation and
term river migration and typhoon flood, onto the bridge site and Communications, Taipei, Taiwan (in Chinese).
induced the failure of unimproved piers from Piers P2 to P4 Lee, W.-F., Chang, C.-F., Chen, M.-H., and Yeh, C.-C. (2008). “A study of
(Stage II collapse) and the right embankment. Based on all the inspection technology on piers and foundations system of river-crossing
information collected, there is no significant evidence to support railway bridges.” Rep. to the Railway Reconstruction Bureau, Ministry
direct interaction between Stage I and Stage II collapse. of Transportation and Communications, Taipei, Taiwan (in Chinese).
Lin, C. (1998). “Analysis of bridge pier disasters in the western area of
Taiwan and establishment of data base system for pier protection works.”
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Rep., Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Taipei, Taiwan


Acknowledgments (in Chinese).
Lin, C., Chang, D.-W., Shi, B.-C., and Lou, C.-R. (2005). “Studies on scour
This forensic investigation was supported by a grant from the Third protection of bridge piers, parts I–III.” Rep. to the Directorate General
District Maintenance Construction Office, the Directorate General of of Highways, Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Taipei,
Taiwan (in Chinese).
Highways of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications,
Lin, C., Shi, B.-C., Lou, C.-R., and Huang, C.-K. (2004). “Establishing the
in Taiwan. The authors greatly appreciate the financial support and close stage of river-crossing bridges.” Rep. to the Directorate General
assistance of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. of Highways, Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Taipei,
Taiwan (in Chinese).
National Science and Technology Center for Disaster Reduction (NCDR).
(2010). “Disaster survey and analysis of Morakot Typhoon.” Phase Rep.
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